Pipeline Security Guidelines

March 2018 (with Change 1 (April 2021))

 Table of Contents

1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Background and Purpose ............................................................................................... 1
1.2 Scope .............................................................................................................................. 1

2 Corporate Security Program .................................................................................................... 2

3 Corporate Security Plan ........................................................................................................... 4

3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 4
3.2 Security Plan Elements .................................................................................................. 4

4 Risk Analysis .............................................................................................................................. 6

4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 6
4.2 Criticality Assessment.................................................................................................... 6
4.3 Security Vulnerability Assessment ................................................................................ 7

5 Criticality ................................................................................................................................... 8
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 8
5.2 Facility Criticality .......................................................................................................... 8

6 Facility Security Measures...................................................................................................... 16

6.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 16
6.2 Baseline and Enhanced Security Measures .................................................................. 16
6.3 Site-Specific Security Measures .................................................................................. 16

7 Pipeline Cyber Asset Security Measures ............................................................................... 22

7.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 22
7.2 Pipeline Cyber Assets Identification ............................................................................ 22
7.3 Security Measures for Pipeline Cyber Assets .............................................................. 22
7.4 Cyber Security Planning and Implementation Guidance ............................................. 27

8 Protective Measures for National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) Alerts ................ 28

Appendix A – Recurring Actions ............................................................................................... 29

Appendix B – TSA Notification Criteria ................................................................................... 31
Appendix C – Acronyms ............................................................................................................. 32
Appendix D – Reference Documents ......................................................................................... 33
 Record of Changes

Change Number Date Comment

1 April 2021 Replaced Section 5 (Criticality)
TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines
Introduction

1 INTRODUCTION
Under the provisions of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (Public Law 107-71), the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was established on November 19, 2001 with
responsibility for civil aviation security and “security responsibilities over other modes of
transportation that are exercised by the Department of Transportation.” On September 8, 2002,
TSA initiated its pipeline security efforts. Those responsibilities now reside within the Office of
Security Policy and Industry Engagement’s Surface Division.

1.1 Background and Purpose

In executing its responsibility for national pipeline security, TSA originally utilized the Pipeline
Security Information Circular, issued on September 5, 2002, by the Department of
Transportation’s (DOT) Office of Pipeline Safety as the primary Federal guideline for industry
security. Complementing this document, and also adopted by TSA, was the DOT-issued Pipeline
Security Contingency Planning Guidance of June 2002.

Recognizing that the Security Circular required updating, TSA initiated a process to amend the
Federal security guidance. The 2010 Pipeline Security Guidelines were developed with the
assistance of industry and government members of the Pipeline Sector and Government
Coordinating Councils, industry association representatives, and other interested parties. This
document was soon revised resulting in the 2011 Pipeline Security Guidelines.

The advancement of security practices to meet the ever changing threat environment in both the
physical and cyber security realms required that the guidelines be updated again. Utilizing a similar
industry and government collaborative approach, TSA developed this document, which supersedes
the 2011 version of the Pipeline Security Guidelines.

The security measures in this guidance provide the basis for TSA’s Pipeline Security Program
Corporate Security Reviews and Critical Facility Security Reviews. This document is guidance
and does not impose requirements on any person or company. The term “should” means that TSA
recommends the actions described. Nothing in this document shall supersede Federal statutory or
regulatory requirements.

1.2 Scope
These guidelines are applicable to operational natural gas and hazardous liquid transmission
pipeline systems, natural gas distribution pipeline systems, and liquefied natural gas facility
operators. Additionally, they apply to operational pipeline systems that transport materials
categorized as toxic inhalation hazards (TIH). TIH materials are gases or liquids that are known or
presumed on the basis of tests to be so toxic to humans as to pose a health hazard in the event of a
release during transportation. (See the Hazardous Materials Regulations: 49 CFR parts 171-180.)

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TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines
Corporate Security Program

Operators of pipeline systems not included in the descriptions above are encouraged to implement
the security measures contained herein to the extent appropriate to their particular system.

2 CORPORATE SECURITY PROGRAM

A risk-based corporate security program should be established and implemented by each pipeline
operator to address and document the organization’s policies and procedures for managing security
related threats, incidents, and responses. In addition, each operator should:

• Develop a corporate security plan as described in Section 3;

• Ensure sufficient resources, to include trained staff and equipment, are provided to
effectively execute the corporate security program;
• Ensure identified security deficiencies have appropriate financial resources allocated in the
corporate budgeting and purchasing processes;
• Assign a qualified primary and alternate staff member to manage the corporate security
program;
• Develop and maintain a cyber/Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
security plan, or incorporate cyber/SCADA security measures in the corporate security
plan;
• Develop and maintain security elements within the corporate incident response and
recovery plan;
• Implement appropriate threat level protective measures upon receipt of a pertinent National
Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) Bulletin or Alert; and
• Notify TSA of security incidents meeting the criteria provided in Appendix B by phone or
email as soon as possible.

Figure 1 identifies the major steps that each pipeline operator should take in creating and
implementing a corporate security program and the relevant sections in the guidelines where
specific details are provided.

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TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines
Corporate Security Program

Figure 1: Corporate Security Program Overview

Corporate Security Program Overview

Critical Facility?

Pipeline operators should conduct a

SVA for each critical facility.
(Section 4.3)
Pipeline operators should adopt
baseline security measures at all
facilities.
(Sections 6 and 7) Pipeline operators should adopt
baseline and enhanced security
measures at each critical facility.
(Sections 6 and 7)

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TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines
Corporate Security Plan

3 CORPORATE SECURITY PLAN

3.1 Introduction
Operators should develop and implement a security plan customized to the needs of the company.
The corporate security plan should be comprehensive in scope, systematic in its development, and
risk-based reflecting the security environment. At a minimum, the plan should:

• Identify the primary and alternate security manager or officer responsible for executing and
maintaining the plan;
• Document the company’s security-related policies and procedures, to include, but not
limited to, methodologies used and timelines established for conducting criticality
assessments, risk assessments, and security vulnerability assessments (SVAs), if
applicable;
• Reference other company plans, policies and procedures such as insider threat, business
continuity, incident response and recovery plans;
• Be reviewed on an annual basis, and updated as required based on findings from
assessments, major modifications to the system or any of its facilities, substantial changes
to the environment in which it operates, or other significant changes;
• Be protected from unauthorized access based on company policy; and,
• Be provided to TSA for review upon request.

3.2 Security Plan Elements

This section identifies and provides a brief description of the recommended elements of a corporate
security plan. In developing their plan, operators should incorporate these elements in a format
that is most suitable to their organization.

• System(s) Description - Identify the pipeline system(s) to which the plan applies.
• Security Administration and Management Structure - Identify the person(s) primarily
responsible for the corporate security program, and describe the responsibilities and duties
of personnel assigned to security functions.
• Risk Analysis and Assessments - Describe the methodology used to conduct security
risk analysis to include criticality assessments and SVAs.
• Physical Security and Access Control Measures - Describe the corporate policies and
procedures employed to reduce security risks throughout the company.
• Equipment Maintenance and Testing - Discuss policies and procedures for ensuring
security systems and equipment are maintained and function properly.

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TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines
Corporate Security Plan

• Personnel Screening - Describe policies and procedures for conducting employee

background checks, including criteria for disqualification and process for appeal, in
compliance with Federal and state laws. Describe company policies for contractor
personnel background checks.
• Communications - Describe the policies and procedures employed to ensure effective
communication is maintained on both a routine and emergency basis. The description
should include, but not be limited to, types of equipment used, communication methods
between personnel, facilities, off-site responders, and procedures for notification of
government and law enforcement agencies.
• Personnel Training - Describe security training requirements, to include training in
security equipment operation, security awareness, and security incident recognition and
reporting procedures for company personnel and contractors.
• Drills and Exercises - Describe company policies and procedures for conducting security
drills and exercises. Establish requirements for after-action reports, communication of
lessons learned, and implementation of security improvement efforts based on exercise
results.
• Security Incident Procedures - Describe procedures for responding to security incidents
and emergencies. Define the types of events that constitute a breach of security, describe
the procedures for investigating security incidents, and who should be notified. In addition,
the emergency response plan may be referenced in this section.
• NTAS Response Procedures - Describe the operator’s additional protective measures for
periods of heightened threat corresponding to the duration of Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) NTAS Bulletins or Alerts.
• Plan Reviews - Describe policies and procedures for the review, validation, and updating
of the corporate security plan.
• Recordkeeping - Describe security-related recordkeeping requirements, such as for
criticality assessments, SVAs, and other company sensitive security information, as well
as measures to prevent unauthorized disclosure.
• Cyber/SCADA System Security Measures - Describe the corporate policies and
procedures employed to reduce security risks to cyber/SCADA systems and assets
throughout the company. If a separate cyber/SCADA security plan is maintained, it should
be incorporated by reference.
• Essential Security Contact Listings - List internal and external emergency contact
information for reporting and responding to a security incident or suspicious activity.
• Security Testing and Audits - Describe policies and procedures for auditing and testing
of the effectiveness of the company's security plan and procedures, to include
documentation of results.
• Outreach - Describe policies and procedures for company security awareness outreach
efforts to neighbors, law enforcement, media, and the public.

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TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines
Risk Analysis

4 RISK ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction
The intent of these guidelines is to bring a risk-based approach to the application of the security
measures throughout the pipeline industry. As stated in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan,
DHS assesses risk as a function of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences. With this in mind,
the most effective security programs employ a risk management process that facilitates planning
and decision making to mitigate risks for pipeline assets. General elements include:

• Assessments used to determine facility criticality;

• Threat assessments identifying known or potential adversaries;
• Vulnerability assessments identifying security weaknesses;
• Risk assessments (based on threat, vulnerability, and consequence, considering facility
criticality assessment findings);
• Risk mitigation to determine and implement appropriate risk reduction countermeasures;
and
• Ongoing risk management to monitor, reassess, and modify the program.

Recognizing that there are multiple risk assessment methodologies, each operator should
determine the process and methodology most appropriate for implementation of the corporate
security plan at the facilities comprising their pipeline system. TSA may ask to review the
operator’s risk assessment methodology.

4.2 Criticality Assessment

Determining facility criticality is an essential first step in the security risk management process.
Information and findings gathered in the criticality assessment assist operators with prioritizing
assets and implementing risk reduction countermeasures. Operators should evaluate each operating
facility within their system using the criteria outlined in Section 5.2 to determine or validate
criticality. Operators should:

• Conduct facility criticality assessments on a periodic basis, not to exceed 18 months, for
all facilities;
• Document the methodology used, and retain the criticality assessment until no longer
valid;
• Conduct an SVA or the equivalent as outlined in Section 4.3 of this document for
facilities determined to be critical; and
• Maintain and secure the company’s list of critical facilities.

The operator’s list of critical facilities is subject to review and evaluation by TSA. Operators and
TSA will work together towards concurrence on the facilities listed.

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TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines
Risk Analysis

4.3 Security Vulnerability Assessment

A security vulnerability assessment (SVA) is one of the risk assessment methodologies pipeline
operators may choose. The SVA serves as a planning and decision support tool to assist security
managers with identifying, evaluating, and prioritizing risks and determining effective security
measures to mitigate threats and vulnerabilities to their critical facilities. Common steps performed
while conducting an SVA include:

• Asset Characterization - identification of hazards and consequences of concern for the

facility, its surroundings, and its supporting infrastructure; and identification of existing
layers of protection;
• Threats Assessment - description of possible internal and external threats;
• Security Vulnerability Analysis - identification of potential security vulnerabilities and
existing countermeasures and their level of effectiveness in reducing identified
vulnerabilities;
• Risk Assessment - determination of the relative degree of risk to the facility in terms of the
expected effect on each asset and the likelihood of success of an attack; and
• Countermeasures Analysis – comparison of strategies that reduce the probability of a
successful attack or reduce the possible degree of success, strategies that enhance the
degree of risk reduction, the capabilities and effectiveness of mitigation options, and the
feasibility of the options.

Operators of critical pipeline facilities should:

• Conduct an SVA or the equivalent on a periodic basis, not to exceed 36 months, and within
12 months after completion of a significant enhancement or modification to the facility;
• Conduct an SVA or the equivalent for newly identified or constructed critical facilities
within 12 months of designation or after achieving operational status.
• Document findings from each assessment and retain them until no longer valid;
• Implement appropriate findings from the SVA in a timely fashion but no later than 24
months after SVA completion; and
• Document the assessment methodology used and make the documentation available for
TSA review upon request.

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TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines
Criticality Change 1 (April 2021)

5 CRITICALITY

5.1 Introduction
The objective in determining which pipeline facilities are critical is to ensure that reasonable
appropriate security risk reduction measures are implemented thereby reducing the impact of
service disruptions to critical infrastructure and the public.

5.2 Facility Criticality

The designation of critical pipeline facilities is a challenging task considering the diverse
operational and market environments spanning the pipeline industry. Pipeline operators are
uniquely positioned to understand the criticality of their operations and the infrastructure necessary
to serve those functions. Pipeline companies should develop a written policy and procedure to
identify critical facilities in accordance with their enterprise risk management process and the TSA
guidance below.

To aid operators in applying the guidance, the criteria are differentiated for each of the three
major pipeline subsectors:
• natural gas distribution
• natural gas transmission (to include LNG peak shaving and satellite plants)
• hazardous liquid transmission

Determination of pipeline critical facilities:

• TSA is responsible for notifying pipeline operators of TSA-designated critical pipeline

systems. Operators should pay particular attention to identifying critical facilities on these
systems.
• A pipeline facility is considered critical if it provides primary service to designated critical
infrastructure and is determined by the operator to be a “single point of failure” (i.e.,
does not have redundancy or systematic backup). TSA defines a single point of
failure as a facility that if rendered inoperable would degrade service to critical
infrastructure to the point that the infrastructure would not be able to satisfactorily
perform its critical mission.
• Operators are responsible for conducting an operational assessment and identifying
specific pipeline facilities that are necessary for critical pipeline systems (as designated by
TSA) to function.
• System redundancies, contingency plans and available mitigations may be considered
when evaluating the criticality of a facility. If requested, operators should provide TSA
documentation including how identified redundancies are evaluated. This documentation
is protected from unauthorized disclosure as sensitive security information. As
external mutual aid is not under the control of the operator, it should not be considered as
a contingency or mitigation factor when identifying critical facilities.
• Operators should coordinate with the appropriate internal company business functions,
(e.g., sales, marketing, and rates (tariffs)) to identify pipeline feeds to potentially critical

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 TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines
Criticality Change 1 (April 2021)

infrastructure, including large volume customers such as natural gas-fired power

generation plants, military bases and defense industrial base manufacturers.
• Operators may take into consideration whether firm or interruptible contracts are in
place. In general, contracts for interruptible service may indicate the dependency on a fuel
source is not vital to that critical infrastructure; however, this assumption should be
validated with owners of said critical infrastructure.
• Operators may consider adjustments based on the severity of consequences as a result
of the loss of a facility or disruption in service (e.g., climate conditions, restart capability
and life-safety).
• Operators may consider their ability to continue operations (e.g., product free flow
or alternate or redundant prime-mover capacity) as an adequate facility backup as long as
they demonstrate no impact to deliverability.
• TSA, in consultation with pipeline operators, may designate specific pipeline facilities
as critical in accordance with this guidance.
• Operators may set more stringent criteria and designate facilities as critical in addition
to those meeting the guidance below.

A pipeline facility is defined as new and existing pipelines, rights of way, and any equipment,
facility, or building used in the transportation of gas or hazardous liquids or in the treatment of gas
or hazardous liquids during the course of transportation. 1 Critical facilities may include, but are
not limited to:
• pipeline interconnections
• metering and/or regulating stations
• pump stations
• compressor stations
• operational control facilities
• main line valves
• tank farms, terminals

If damage or destruction of a facility has the potential to meet at least one of the following
criteria, the facility or facilities should be designated as critical.

1
Consistent with definitions in 49 CFR § 192.3, 193.2007 and 195.2.
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TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines
Criticality Change 1 (April 2021)

Table 1: Critical Facility Criteria

Criteria Subsector Guidance

1. Disrupt or TSA will notify pipeline operators who directly
significantly reduce serve installations or defense industrial base
required service or (DIB) manufacturers deemed critical to national
deliverability to defense and who rely on the pipeline commodity
installations to perform a critical mission at that location.
identified as critical
to national defense. Natural Gas Distribution Natural gas distribution operators should
designate as critical those facilities that must
function to provide service to critical defense
installations or DIB manufacturers with a firm
contract.

Natural Gas Transmission Natural gas transmission operators should

designate as critical those facilities that must
function to provide service to critical defense
installations or DIB manufacturers with a firm
contract.

Hazardous Liquid Hazardous liquid transmission operators should

Transmission designate as critical those facilities that must
function to provide service to critical defense
installations or DIB manufacturers.

2. Disrupt or TSA will notify pipeline operators of key

significantly reduce infrastructure they serve (e.g., “black start”
required service or electric power generation plants, Category X
deliverability to key airports and service to the Strategic Petroleum
infrastructure (such Reserve).
as power plants or Natural Gas Distribution Service to Natural Gas-Fired Power Generation
major airports) Plants
resulting in major Natural gas distribution operators should
operational designate as critical those facilities that must
disruption. function to provide service to power generation
facilities that:
• Directly serve as Defense Critical Electric
Infrastructure as identified by Department of
Energy (DOE) and with firm contract
• Receive natural gas in excess of 30,000 MMcf
annually per a firm contract as listed on
Energy Information Administration (EIA) Form
923 (Power Plant Operations Report (Annual))
• Serve as a “black start” electric generation
plant with firm contract
Natural Gas Transmission Service to Natural Gas-Fired Power Generation
Plants
Natural gas transmission operators should
designate as critical those facilities that must
function to provide service to power generation
facilities that:
• Directly serve as Defense Critical Electric
Infrastructure as identified by DOE and with
firm contract
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 TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines
Criticality Change 1 (April 2021)
Criteria Subsector Guidance
2. Disrupt or Natural Gas Transmission • Receive natural gas in excess of 30,000 MMcf
significantly reduce (Cont.) annually per a firm contract as listed on EIA
required service or Form 923 (Power Plant Operations Report
deliverability to key (Annual))
infrastructure (such • Serve as a “black start” electric generation
as power plants or plant with firm contract
major airports)
resulting in major Hazardous Liquid Service to Category X Airports
operational Transmission Hazardous liquid transmission operators should
disruption. (Cont.) designate as critical those facilities that must
function to provide service to TSA designated
Category X airports.

Service to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve

(SPR)
Hazardous liquid transmission operators should
designate as critical those facilities that must
function to provide service to or within the SPR
sites.

3. Cause mass Natural Gas Distribution Operator-Generated Methodology

injuries, casualties In addition to guidance below, natural gas
or significant health distribution operators should use their own
or environmental methodology to designate additional critical
effects.2 facilities which may cause mass casualty or
significant health effects. Operators should
consider variation in service territory and facility
siting, differences in regional weather extremes
and distinctions among risk profiles.

Facilities Operating Near Occupied Buildings or

Areas
Natural gas operators should evaluate their
facilities through their Distribution Integrity
Management Program (DIMP)3 or comparable
risk methodology and designate as critical those
facilities that:
• Operate at pressures above 125 PSIG
• Operate in a Class 4 location
(regardless of operating pressure) as
defined in the Dept. of Transportation
(DOT) 49 Code of Federal Regulations 4
• Operate in a Class 3 location
(regardless of operating pressure) and
do not have service regulators installed
or redundant overpressure protection
systems

2
For these guidelines, a mass casualty incident is defined as an event that overwhelms the local healthcare system, where the
number of casualties vastly exceeds the local resources and capabilities in a short period of time.
3
49 CFR, Part 192 Subpart P, Gas Distribution Pipeline Integrity Management (IM).
4
49 CFR § 192.5.
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 TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines
Criticality Change 1 (April 2021)
Criteria Subsector Guidance
3. Cause mass Natural Gas Distribution High Risk (Tiered) Facilities under DHS CFATS
injuries, casualties (Cont.) Natural gas distribution operators should review
or significant health and consider as critical all facilities designated
or environmental as high risk under the DHS Chemical Facility
effects. (Cont.) Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) program.

Natural Gas Transmission Facilities Operating in HCAs

Natural gas transmission operators should
designate as critical all facilities operating in
High Consequence Areas (HCAs) as defined in
Dept. of Transportation (DOT) 49 Code of
Federal Regulations.5 HCAs could include
designated human health-safety, structure or
human occupancy impact zones from a release
of natural gas.

High Risk (Tiered) Facilities under DHS CFATS

Natural gas transmission operators should
review and consider as critical all facilities
designated as high risk under the DHS Chemical
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS)
program.

Hazardous Liquid Facilities Operating in HCAs

Transmission Hazardous liquid transmission operators should
designate as critical all facilities operating in
High Consequence Areas (HCAs) as defined in
Dept. of Transportation (DOT) 49 Code of
Federal Regulations.6 HCAs can include
commercially navigable waterways, high
population areas, other populated areas, or
unusually sensitive areas.

High Risk (Tiered) Facilities under DHS CFATS

Hazardous liquid transmission operators should
review and consider as critical all facilities
designated as high risk under the DHS Chemical
Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS)
program.

4. Disrupt or Natural Gas Distribution Natural gas distribution operators should

significantly reduce designate as critical those facilities that directly
required service or support essential public services and emergency
deliverability response and which rely on natural gas to
resulting in a state perform their critical mission.
or local
government's Consideration should be given to:
inability to provide • government complexes or hubs that
essential public function as a state’s primary government
services and facility, including executive, legislative and
emergency judicial complexes
response for an • state emergency response headquarters

5
49 CFR § 192.903 and Appendix E to Part 192: Guidance on Determining High Consequence Areas and on Carrying Out
Requirements in the Integrity Management Rule.
6
49 CFR § 195.450, 195.452 and Appendix C to Part 195: Guidance for Implementation of an Integrity Management Plan.
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Criticality Change 1 (April 2021)
Criteria Subsector Guidance
extended period of Natural Gas Distribution • complexes that provide essential public
time. (Cont.) service or emergency response capability7

Operators should coordinate with the

appropriate state office (e.g., State Office of
Emergency Management) to identify essential
public service and emergency response
facilities. In the case that state offices are
nonresponsive to operator requests, TSA will
work with DHS to facilitate this coordination.

For this criterion, an extended period of time is

defined as the inability to provide essential
public services and emergency response for
seven or more consecutive days due to a
disruption of natural gas distribution service.

Natural Gas Transmission Not applicable

Hazardous Liquid Hazardous liquid transmission operators should

Transmission designate as critical those facilities that directly
support essential public services and emergency
response and which rely on hazardous liquids to
perform their critical mission.

Consideration should be given to:

• government complexes or hubs that
function as a state’s primary government
facility, including executive, legislative and
judicial complexes
• state emergency response headquarters
• complexes that provide essential public
service or emergency response capability8

Operators should coordinate with the

appropriate state office (e.g., State Office of
Emergency Management) to identify essential
public service and emergency response
facilities. In the case that state offices are
nonresponsive to operator requests, TSA will
work with DHS to facilitate this coordination.
For this criterion, an extended period of time is
defined as the inability to provide essential
public services and emergency response for
seven or more consecutive days due to a
disruption of hazardous liquid transmission
service.

7
See FEMA Continuity Guidance Circular (February 2018) and particularly National Essential Functions 6 – Provide Emergency
Services, 7 – Maintain Economic Stability, and 8 – Provide Basic Essential Services.
8
See FEMA Continuity Guidance Circular (February 2018) and particularly National Essential Functions 6 – Provide Emergency
Services, 7 – Maintain Economic Stability, and 8 – Provide Basic Essential Services.
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Criticality Change 1 (April 2021)
Criteria Subsector Guidance
5. Disrupt or Natural Gas Distribution Not applicable
significantly reduce
the intended usage Natural Gas Transmission Not applicable
of major rivers,
lakes, or waterways Hazardous Liquid Hazardous liquid transmission operators should
(for example, public Transmission designate as critical all pipeline facilities that
drinking water for could significantly impact public drinking water
large populations or sources if state or local advisories are issued.
disruption of major
Hazardous liquid transmission operators should
commerce or public
designate as critical all pipeline facilities subject
transportation
to Oil Pipeline Response Plans9 impacting a
routes).
PHMSA-defined Major River-High Volume Area
or Other Navigable Waters. 10

Hazardous liquid transmission operators are

encouraged to consult with environmental/risk
specialists with expertise in this area.

6. Disrupt or Natural Gas Distribution Natural gas distribution operators should

significantly reduce designate as critical all facilities that if
required service or disrupted for more than seven consecutive
deliverability to a days would experience reduced service or
significant number deliverability to 100,000 or more meters.
of customers or
individuals for an Natural Gas Transmission Not applicable
extended period of
time. Hazardous Liquid Not applicable
Transmission

7. Significantly Natural Gas Distribution Natural gas distribution operators should

disrupt pipeline designate as critical all pipeline facilities where
system operations the loss or disruption of facility operations
for an extended lasting more than seven days would significantly
period of time. impact overall deliverability and system safety.

Factors to consider in determining criticality of a

facility include:
• whether a facility contains components
not readily available to the operator due
to long lead times or limited geographic
sourcing
• if a facility contains critical pipeline
cyber assets11
Natural gas distribution operators should identify
as critical operational control rooms without a
hot site backup (i.e., a backup control room that
is continuously running and where all hardware
and software are run concurrently with the
primary site).

9
49 CFR, Part 194 – Response Plans for Onshore Oil Pipelines.
10
49 CFR, Part 194 – Response Plans for Onshore Oil Pipelines, Appendix B.
11
Section 7.2, TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines (March 2018).
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 TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines
Criticality Change 1 (April 2021)
Criteria Subsector Guidance
7. Significantly Natural Gas Transmission Natural gas transmission operators should
disrupt pipeline designate as critical all pipeline facilities where
system operations the loss or disruption of facility operations lasting
for an extended more than 14 days would significantly impact
period of time. overall deliverability and system safety.
(Cont.)
Factors to consider in determining criticality of a
facility include:
• whether a facility contains components
not readily available to the operator due
to long lead times or limited geographic
sourcing
• if a facility contains critical pipeline
cyber assets12
Natural gas transmission operators should
identify as critical operational control rooms
without a hot site backup (i.e., a backup control
room that is continuously running and where all
hardware and software are run concurrently with
the primary site).
Hazardous Liquid Hazardous liquid transmission operators should
Transmission designate as critical all pipeline facilities where
the loss or disruption of facility operations
lasting more than seven days would significantly
impact overall deliverability and system safety.

Factors to consider in determining criticality of a

facility include:
• whether a facility contains components
not readily available to the operator due
to long lead times or limited geographic
sourcing
• if a facility contains critical pipeline
cyber assets13
Hazardous liquid transmission operators should
identify as critical operational control rooms
without a hot site backup (i.e., a backup control
room that continuously running and where all
hardware and software are run concurrently with
the primary site).

12
Section 7.2, TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines (March 2018).
13
Section 7.2, TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines (March 2018).
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Facility Security Measures

6 FACILITY SECURITY MEASURES

6.1 Introduction
Upon completion of the risk analysis process, operators should determine the appropriate
mitigation measures for both critical and non-critical facilities.

6.2 Baseline and Enhanced Security Measures

Pipeline operators should develop and implement baseline security measures at all of their
facilities.

Operators should develop and implement both baseline and enhanced security measures at each
of their critical facilities.

Table 2 identifies the baseline and enhanced security measures for operators to implement at
appropriate pipeline facilities. Recurring actions are summarized in Appendix A.

6.3 Site-Specific Security Measures

Operators should develop, document, and implement site-specific security measures for each of
their critical facilities. These measures should be tailored explicitly for each facility and address
specific actions to be taken in response to pertinent NTAS Bulletins or Alerts. On a periodic basis,
not to exceed 18 months, these site-specific security measures should be reviewed and updated as
necessary.

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TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines
Facility Security Measures

Table 2: Baseline and Enhanced Security Measures

BASELINE SECURITY ENHANCED SECURITY MEASURES

MEASURES
Fencing / Barriers
Employ measures to impede unauthorized Create a security perimeter that impedes
access to facilities. unauthorized vehicles from entering the facility
perimeter or critical areas by installing and
maintaining barriers (e.g., fences, bollards, jersey
barriers, or equivalent.)

Maintain fences, if used, without gaps

around gates or underneath the fence
line.
Ensure that there is a clear zone for several
feet on either side of the fence, free of
Physical Security and Access Control

obstructions, vegetation, or objects that

could be used for concealment or to scale
the fence.
Access Controls
Employ measures to impede unauthorized Implement procedures (such as manual or
persons from gaining access to a facility electronic sign in/out) for controlling access to
and restricted areas within a facility. the facility and restricted buildings or areas
within the facility.

Close and secure perimeter gates or Monitor and escort visitors at critical facilities.
entrances when not in use.

Post “No Trespassing” or “Authorized

Personnel Only” signs at intervals that are
visible from any point of potential entry.
Gates
Install and maintain gates of an equivalent
quality to the barrier to which they are
attached.
Locks and Key Control
Establish and document key control
procedures for key issuance, tracking,
collection, loss, and unauthorized duplication.

Use patent keys to prevent unauthorized

duplication.

Conduct key inventories every 24 months.

17
TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines
Facility Security Measures

Table 2: Baseline and Enhanced Security Measures

BASELINE SECURITY ENHANCED SECURITY MEASURES

MEASURES
Facility Lighting
and Access Control
Physical Security

Provide sufficient illumination for human or

technological recognition of intrusion into the
facility perimeter or critical areas.
Intrusion Detection & Monitoring
Provide critical facilities or critical areas within a
facility with security measures to monitor, detect,
and assess unauthorized access 24 hours a day,
7 days a week.

Personnel Identification and Badging

Develop identification and badging Ensure that company or vendor identification is
policies and procedures for personnel available for examination by being visibly
who have access to secure areas or displayed or carried by personnel while on-site.
sensitive information. These policies
should address:
• Lost or stolen identification cards or
badges;
• Temporary badges; and
• Personnel termination.
Personnel Security

Ensure personnel identification cards or badges

are secure from tampering and contain the
individual’s photograph and name.
Background Investigation
Establish policies and procedures for Conduct pre-employment background
applicant pre-employment screening and investigations of applicants for positions that are:
behavioral criteria for disqualification of • Authorized regular unescorted access to
applicants and employees. control systems or sensitive areas;
• Authorized access to sensitive information;
• Assigned security roles;
• Assigned to work at or granted access rights
to critical facilities.

At a minimum, investigations should:

• Verify and validate identity;
• Check criminal history*; and
• Verify and validate legal authorization to
work.
* NOTE: Operators should consider using the
Federally-established list of disqualifying
crimes (see 49 CFR 1572.103) to assess the
suitability of their personnel for these positions.

18
TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines
Facility Security Measures

Table 2: Baseline and Enhanced Security Measures

BASELINE SECURITY ENHANCED SECURITY MEASURES

MEASURES
Verify that contractors have background
investigation policies and procedures at least as
Personnel

rigorous as the pipeline operator’s.

Security

Conduct recurring background investigations on

a regular basis (as labor laws or bargaining unit
contracts allow), not to exceed 10 years, for
employees occupying security positions or who
have access to sensitive information or areas.
Equipment Maintenance and Testing
Equipment Maintenance

Develop and implement a maintenance Through routine use or quarterly examination,

program to ensure security systems are in verify the proper operation and/or condition of all
good working order. security equipment.
and Testing

Identify and respond to security equipment

malfunctions or failures in a timely
manner.

Provide an equivalent level of protective security

measures to mitigate risk during power outages,
security equipment failure, or extended repair of
security systems.

Design and Construction

Construction

Conduct an SVA for newly identified or

Design &

Integrate security risk mitigation measures

constructed critical facilities within 12 months of
during the design, construction, or
designation or after achieving operational status.
renovation of a facility.

Update the facility SVA within 12 months following

significant modifications.

Communication
Communication

Develop internal and external notification Ensure primary and alternate communication
requirements and procedures for security capabilities exist for internal and external reporting
events. of appropriate security events and information.

Document and periodically update contact Establish a defined process for receiving,
(who) and communication (how) handling, disseminating, and storing security and
information for Federal, state, and local threat information.
homeland security/law enforcement
agencies. (See Appendix B for TSA contact
information.)

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TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines
Facility Security Measures

Table 2: Baseline and Enhanced Security Measures

BASELINE SECURITY MEASURES ENHANCED SECURITY

MEASURES
Personnel Training
Personnel Training

Provide security awareness briefings, to Provide security training, to include incident

include security incident recognition and response training, to personnel assigned
reporting procedures, for personnel with security duties upon hiring and annually
unescorted access upon hiring and every 3 thereafter.
years thereafter.

Document security training and maintain

records in accordance with company record
retention policy.
Drills and Exercises
Drills and Exercises

Conduct periodic security drills or exercises, Conduct or participate in an annual security

to include announced or unannounced tests drill or exercise. Multiple facilities may
of security and incident plans. These can be participate in a common drill or exercise.
conducted in conjunction with other required
drills or exercises.
* NOTE: Response to an actual security
incident can satisfy this measure.

Develop and implement a written post-event

report assessing security drills or exercises
and documenting corrective actions.
Security Incident Procedures

Security Incident Procedures

Implement procedures for responding to
security incidents or emergencies and to
pertinent National Terrorism Advisory
System (NTAS) Bulletins or Alerts. These
procedures should include the appropriate
reporting requirements.

Post bomb threat checklists by telephones at

staffed facilities.

20
TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines
Facility Security Measures

Table 2: Baseline and Enhanced Security Measures

BASELINE SECURITY MEASURES ENHANCED SECURITY

MEASURES
Recordkeeping
Develop and document recordkeeping policies
and procedures for security information.
Protection of SSI in accordance with the
provisions of 49 CFR Parts 15 and 1520 should
be specifically addressed.
Recordkeeping

The following documents, as appropriate, In addition to the documents specified for

should be retained until superseded or non-critical facilities, the following
replaced: documents, applicable to critical facilities,
• Corporate Security Plan; should be retained until superseded or
• Criticality assessment(s); replaced:
• Training records; • SVA(s);
• Security drill or exercise reports; • Site-specific measures.
• Incident response plan(s);
• Security testing and audits. Make security information records available
to TSA upon request.
Make security information records available to
TSA upon request.

Outreach
Conduct outreach to nearby law
enforcement agencies to ensure
Outreach

awareness of the facility’s functions and

significance.
Conduct outreach to neighboring
businesses to coordinate security efforts.
Also conduct outreach to neighboring
residences to provide facility security
awareness.

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TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines
Pipeline Cyber Asset Security Measures

7 PIPELINE CYBER ASSET SECURITY MEASURES

7.1 Introduction
The operational technology used by the operators to manage their infrastructure and products are
vital to the pipeline system's safe and efficient operation. “Operational technologies” (OT) are the
systems that detect or cause a change through the direct monitoring and/or control of physical
devices, processes and events in the pipelines. OT systems include control systems (SCADA,
process control systems (PCS), distributed control systems (DCS)), measurement systems and
telemetry systems, which are collectively referred to as “pipeline cyber assets.”

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has developed the Framework for
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, a set of standards and best practices to assist
organizations in managing cybersecurity risks and to promote the protection of critical
infrastructure. To implement an effective cybersecurity strategy, pipeline operators should
consider the approach outlined in the NIST Framework and the guidance issued by DHS and the
Department of Energy along with industry-specific or other established methodologies, standards,
and best practices (see Section 7.4).

7.2 Pipeline Cyber Assets Classification

Operators should evaluate pipeline cyber assets and classify them using the following criteria:

• Critical pipeline cyber assets are OT systems that can control operations on the pipeline.
Baseline and enhanced security measures should be applied to these assets.
• Non-critical pipeline cyber assets are OT systems that monitor operations on the pipeline.
Baseline security measures should be applied to these assets.

7.3 Security Measures for Pipeline Cyber Assets

Table 3 shows the baseline and enhanced cybersecurity measures that pipeline operators should
apply to pipeline cyber assets based on their criticality designation. These measures incorporate
updates to the previous TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines as well as recommendations and
practices from the government and industry documents listed in Section 7.4. The cybersecurity
guidelines that follow are organized according to the relevant functions and categories presented
in the NIST Framework.

22
TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines
Pipeline Cyber Asset Security Measures

Table 3: Baseline and Enhanced Cyber Security Measures

Baseline Security Enhanced Security

Measures Measures
Asset Management
Establish and document policies and procedures Employ mechanisms to maintain
for assessing and maintaining configuration accurate inventory and to detect
information, for tracking changes made to the unauthorized components.
pipeline cyber assets, and for
patching/upgrading operating systems and
applications. Ensure that the changes do not
adversely impact existing cybersecurity controls.
Develop and maintain a comprehensive set of Review network connections periodically,
network/system architecture diagrams or other including remote and third party connections.
documentation, including nodes, interfaces,
remote and third party connections, and Develop a detailed inventory for every
information flows. endpoint.
Review and assess pipeline cyber asset
classification as critical or non-critical at
least every 12 months.

Business Environment
Identify

Ensure that any change that adds control

operations to a non-critical pipeline cyber asset
results in the system being recognized as a
critical pipeline cyber asset and enhanced
security measures being applied.
Governance
Establish and distribute cybersecurity policies,
plans, processes and supporting procedures
commensurate with the current regulatory, risk,
legal and operational environment.
Review and assess all cybersecurity policies, Review and assess all cybersecurity policies,
plans, processes, and supporting procedures plans, processes, and supporting procedures
regularly, not to exceed 36 months, or when regularly, not to exceed 12 months, or when
there is a significant organizational or there is a significant organizational change.
technological change. Update as necessary. Update as necessary.

Risk Management Strategy

Develop an operational framework to ensure
coordination, communication and accountability
for information security on and between the
control systems and enterprise networks.

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TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines
Pipeline Cyber Asset Security Measures

Table 3: Baseline and Enhanced Cyber Security Measures

Baseline Security Enhanced Security

Measures Measures
Risk Assessment
Identify

Establish a process to identify and evaluate Ensure threat and vulnerability information
vulnerabilities and compensating security received from information sharing forums and
controls. sources are made available to those
responsible for assessing and determining
the appropriate course of action.

Access Control
Establish and enforce unique accounts for each Restrict user physical access to control
individual user and administrator, establish systems and control networks through the
security requirements for certain types of use of appropriate controls. Employ more
privileged accounts, and prohibit the sharing of stringent identity and access management
these accounts. practices (e.g., authenticators, password-
construct, access control).
In instances where systems do not support
unique user accounts, then implement
appropriate compensating security controls
(e.g., physical controls).

Ensure that user accounts are modified, deleted,

or de-activated expeditiously for personnel who
no longer require access or are no longer
employed by the company.
Establish and enforce access control policies for Monitor physical and remote user access to
local and remote users. Procedures and controls critical pipeline cyber assets.
should be in place for approving and enforcing
policy for remote and third-party connections.
Protect

Ensure appropriate segregation of duties is in

place. In instances where this is not feasible,
apply appropriate compensating security
controls.
Change all default passwords for new software, Employ mechanisms to support the
hardware, etc., upon installation. In instances management of accounts.
where changing default passwords is not
technically feasible (e.g., a control system with a
hard-coded password), implement appropriate
compensating security controls (e.g.,
administrative controls).

24
TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines
Pipeline Cyber Asset Security Measures

Table 3: Baseline and Enhanced Cyber Security Measures

Baseline Security Enhanced Security

Measures Measures
Awareness and Training
Ensure that all persons requiring access to the Provide role-based security training on
organization’s pipeline cyber assets receive recognizing and reporting potential indicators
cybersecurity awareness training. of system compromise prior to obtaining
access to the critical pipeline cyber assets.

Establish and execute a cyber-threat awareness

program for employees. This program should
include practical exercises/testing.

Data Security & Information Protection

Establish and implement policies and procedures
to ensure data protection measures are in place,
including identifying critical data and establishing
Protect

classification of different types of data,

establishing specific handling procedures, and
protections and disposal.

Protective Technology
Segregate and protect the pipeline cyber assets
from enterprise networks and the internet using
physical separation, firewalls and other
protections.
Regularly validate that technical controls comply
with the organization’s cybersecurity policies,
plans and procedures, and report results to
senior management.
Implement technical or procedural controls
to restrict the use of pipeline cyber assets
for only approved activities.
Anomalies and Events
Implement processes to generate alerts and log
cybersecurity events in response to anomalous
activity. Review the logs and respond to alerts
in a timely manner.
Detect

Security Continuous Monitoring

Monitor for unauthorized access or the
introduction of malicious code or
communications.
Conduct cyber vulnerability assessments as Utilize independent assessors to conduct
described in your risk assessment process pipeline cyber security assessments.

25
TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines
Pipeline Cyber Asset Security Measures

Table 3: Baseline and Enhanced Cyber Security Measures

Baseline Security Enhanced Security

Measures Measures
Detection Processes
Detect

Establish technical or procedural controls for

cyber intrusion monitoring and detection.

Perform regular testing of intrusion and malware

detection processes and procedures.
Response Planning
Establish policies and procedures for Conduct cybersecurity incident response
cybersecurity incident handling, analysis and exercises periodically.
reporting, including assignment of the specific
roles/tasks to individuals and teams.

Establish and maintain a cyber-incident Establish and maintain a process that

Respond

response capability. supports 24 hours a day cyber incident

response.
Communications
Report significant cyber incidents to senior Pipeline operators should follow the
management; appropriate federal, state, notification criteria in Appendix B
local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) entities;
and applicable ISAC(s).
Mitigation
Ensure the organization’s response plans and
procedures include mitigation measures to help
prevent further impacts.
Recovery Planning
Establish a plan for the recovery and
reconstitution of pipeline cyber assets within a
Recover

timeframe to align with the organization’s safety

and business continuity objectives.

Improvements
Review the organization's cyber recovery plan
annually. Update as necessary.

26
TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines
Pipeline Cyber Asset Security Measures

7.4 Cyber Security Planning and Implementation Guidance

The following is a list of planning and implementation guidance developed by industry or
Federal government entities. Operators should consult the current edition of these and other
cyber security references on a frequent basis in developing and reviewing their company’s
cyber security program.

• American Chemistry Council, Guidance for Addressing Cyber Security in the Chemical
Industry
• American Gas Association (AGA) Report Number 12, Cryptographic Protection of
SCADA Communications, Part 1: Background, Policies and Test Plan
• American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/International Society of Automation (ISA)
– 99.00.01 – 2007, Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems:
Terminology, Concepts, and Models

• ANSI/ISA – 99.02.01 – 2009, Security for Industrial Automation and Control Systems:
Establishing an Industrial Automation and Control System Security Program
• American Petroleum Institute (API) Standard 1164 Pipeline SCADA Security
• ANSI/API Standard 780, Security Risk Assessment Methodology for the Petroleum and
Petrochemical Industries
• U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity
• U.S. Department of Commerce, NIST, Special Publication 800-82, Guide to Industrial
Control Systems (ICS) Security

• U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Infrastructure Protection, Risk-Based

Performance Standards Guidance: Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, May
2009
• U.S Department of Energy, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability,
Energy Sector Cybersecurity Framework Implementation Guidance, January 2015
• U.S Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Systems Sector Cybersecurity
Framework Implementation Guidance, June 2015

27
TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines
Protective Measures for National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) Alerts

8 PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR NATIONAL TERRORISM

ADVISORY SYSTEM (NTAS) ALERTS
The Department of Homeland Security’s NTAS provides a framework to disseminate information
via Bulletins or Alerts regarding the threat of terrorist acts to the nation.

TSA has developed a supplement to this document containing recommended security measures to
reduce vulnerabilities to pipeline systems and facilities during periods of heightened threat and to
establish a consistent security posture within the pipeline industry. This supplement is unclassified
but sensitive and is marked as Sensitive Security Information (SSI). The password- protected
document may be obtained by email request to [email protected].

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 TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines
Appendix A – Recurring Actions

APPENDIX A – RECURRING ACTIONS

RECURRING ACTIONS
12 Months 18 Months 24 Months 36 Months Other
Perform an annual Conduct facility Periodically update
review of the criticality contact and
corporate security assessments on a communications
plan and update as periodic basis, not to information for
required. (Section 3.1) exceed 18 months. government agencies.
(Section 4.2) (Table 2
Communication)
Conduct security drills
or exercises on a
periodic basis. (Table
2 Drills and Exercises)

Review and assess Review and assess Perform regular testing

pipeline cyber asset all cybersecurity of intrusion and
Baseline

classification as critical policies, plans, malware detection

or non-critical at least processes, and processes and
every 12 months. supporting procedures. (Table 3
(Table 3 Cyber Asset procedures Cyber Detection
Management) regularly, not to Processes)
exceed 36 months.
(Table 3 Cyber
Governance)
Review the Conduct cybersecurity
organization's cyber incident response
recovery plan exercises periodically.
annually. (Table 3 (Table 3 Cyber
Cyber Improvements) Response Planning)

Periodically review
facility staffing
requirements for
implementing
additional security
measures. (NTAS
Supplement, p.1)
Provide notification of
a pipeline incident in
accordance with
Appendix B.

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 TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines
Appendix A – Recurring Actions

RECURRING ACTIONS
12 Months 18 Months 24 Months 36 Months Other
Conduct a SVA within Implement Conduct periodic
12 months of appropriate findings SVAs, not to exceed
significant NLT 24 months 36 months. (Section
modification to a after SVA 4.3)
critical facility, a newly completion.
identified critical (Section 4.3)
facility or a newly
constructed facility
identified as critical.
(Section 4.3)
Review site- Conduct key Verify the proper
specific security inventories every 24 operation and/or
measures months. (Table 2 condition of all security
Enhanced

periodically, not to Locks and Key equipment through

exceed 18 Control) routine use or
months. (Section quarterly examination.
6.3) (Table 2 Equipment
Maintenance and
Testing)
Conduct or participate Conduct recurring
in an annual security background
drill or exercise. investigations, not to
(Table 2 Exercises exceed 10 years, for
and Drills) employees occupying
security positions or in
sensitive positions.
(Table 2 Background
Investigation)
Provide security Provide security
training to personnel awareness briefings
assigned security for personnel with
duties upon hiring and unescorted access
annually thereafter. upon hiring and
(Table 2 Personnel every 3 years
Training) thereafter. (Table 2
Personnel Training)
Review and assess all
cybersecurity policies,
plans, processes, and
supporting procedures
regularly, not to
exceed 12 months.
(Table 3 Cyber
Governance)
Note: 1. Baseline measures apply to all pipeline operators. Enhanced measures apply to operators’ critical facilities.
2. All baseline and enhanced security measures are detailed in Section 6 of this document.

30
TSA Pipeline Security Guidelines
Appendix B - TSA Notification Criteria

APPENDIX B - TSA NOTIFICATION CRITERIA

As the lead Federal agency for pipeline security, TSA requests to be notified of security incidents
that are indicative of a deliberate attempt to disrupt pipeline operations or activities that could be
considered precursors to such an attempt. Pipeline operators should notify the Transportation
Security Operations Center (TSOC) via phone at 866-615-5150 or email at [email protected] as
soon as possible if any of the following incidents occurs or if there is other reason to believe that
a terrorist incident may be planned or may have occurred:

• Explosions or fires of a suspicious nature affecting pipeline systems, facilities, or assets;

• Actual or suspected attacks on pipeline systems, facilities, or assets;
• Bomb threats or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats to pipeline systems,
facilities, or assets;
• Theft of pipeline company vehicles, uniforms, or employee credentials;
• Suspicious persons or vehicles around pipeline systems, facilities, assets, or right-of-way;
• Suspicious photography or possible surveillance of pipeline systems, facilities, or assets;
• Suspicious inquiries from people asking about pipeline system, facility, or asset
operations, vulnerabilities, or security practices;
• Suspicious individuals applying for security-sensitive positions in the pipeline company;
• Theft or loss of sensitive security information (detailed pipeline maps, security plans,
etc.).

When contacting the TSOC, provide as much of the following information as possible:

• Name and contact information;

• The time and location of the incident, as specifically as possible;
• A description of the incident or activity involved;
• Which entities have been notified and what actions have been taken;
• The names and/or descriptions of persons involved or suspicious parties and license
plates as appropriate.

Actual or suspected cyber-attacks that could impact pipeline industrial control systems (SCADA,
PCS, DCS), measurement systems and telemetry systems or enterprise associated IT systems
should be reported to the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center
(NCCIC) at 888-282-0870.

For questions or concerns, email the TSA Pipeline Security staff at [email protected]

31
 APPENDIX C – LIST OF ACRONYMS
AGA American Gas Association
ANSI American National Standards Institute
APGA American Public Gas Association
API American Petroleum Institute
CFR Code of Federal Regulations
DCS Distributed Control System
DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DOT U.S. Department of Transportation
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
HSEEP Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program
HSIN Homeland Security Information Network
ICS Industrial Control System
INGAA Interstate Natural Gas Association of America
ISA International Society of Automation
IT Information Technology
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NTAS National Terrorism Advisory System
PCS Process Control System
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SSI Sensitive Security Information
SVA Security Vulnerability Assessment
TIH Toxic Inhalation Hazard
TSA Transportation Security Administration
TSOC Transportation Security Operations Center
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

32
 APPENDIX D – REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
Operators should consult the current edition of these and other security references on a frequent basis
in developing and reviewing their company’s security program. Cyber planning and implementation
guidance appears in Section 7.4.

American Gas Association (AGA), Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA) &
American Public Gas Association (APGA), Security Guidelines: Natural Gas Industry, Transmission
and Distribution

American Petroleum Institute (API) & National Petrochemical & Refiners Association (NPRA),
Security Vulnerability Assessment Methodology for the Petroleum and Petrochemical Industries

API, Security Guidelines for the Petroleum Industry

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization,

and Protection.

Presidential Policy Directive 7: National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS)

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),

Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) Vols. 1 - 4

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Cyber Security Division, Catalog of Control
Systems Security: Recommendations for Standards Developers

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Pipeline

Security Smart Practices

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, TSA, Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan:

Pipeline Modal Annex

33