NWC 4111G

COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

(CES)
NWC 4111G

(Instructional Workbook for In-Class Work/Wargaming)

JMO Department, Naval War College

30 September 2004
 NWC 4111G

Intentionally Blank
 NWC 4111G

PREFACE

This document provides a framework to conduct a Commander's Estimate of the Situation

(CES) for military problems requiring the employment of combat forces. It is based on the Navy's
NWP 5-01 (Rev. A) Naval Operational Planning, CJCSM 3500.5A, Joint Task Force HQ Master
Training Guide, U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College Warfighting Book, MCDP-6
Command and Control, MCWP 5-1 Marine Corps Planning Process, the series of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College publications ST 100-9 The Tactical Decision Making
Process and ST 101-5 Command and Staff Decision Processes, Battle Command: Leadership and
Decision Making for War and Operations Other Than War (Draft 2.1), U.S. Army FM 101-5
Staff Organization and Operations, JP 3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations, JP 5-0 Doctrine for
Planning Joint Operations, JP 5-00.2 Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures and JP
2-01.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlespace, and a variety of products from the U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting
Center. The format is designed to accommodate the estimate requirements regardless of the size
of the forces involved and the environment and the scale of the objectives to be accomplished.
The format of the estimate is also intended to be applied across the full range of military
operations, from Stability and Support Operations (SASO) to war.

Electronic copies of this workbook are available through the Naval War College, Joint
Military Operations Department website, http://www.nwc.navy.mil/jmo/

i
 NWC 4111G

Intentionally Blank

ii
 NWC 4111G

Table of Contents Page

Preface.............................................................................................................................................. i
The Commander’s Estimate of the Situation ..................................................................................1
Step 1: Part 1. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace ................................................. 1-1
Part 2. Mission Analysis ................................................................................................ 1-25
* Mission Analysis Brief ........................................................................... 1-36
* Commander's Guidance .......................................................................... 1-38
* Warning Order ....................................................................................... 1-42
Step 2: Development of Friendly Courses of Action .................................................................. 2-1
Step 3: Analysis of Friendly Courses of Action (War Game) ..................................................... 3-1
Step 4: Comparison of Friendly Courses of Action and the Decision......................................... 4-1
Step 5: Development of Plans and Orders ................................................................................... 5-1
Step 6: Transition......................................................................................................................... 6-1
Appendix A: JIPB Products……………………………………………………………………. A-1
Appendix B: Force Ratio / Force Multiplier Data………………………………………………B-1
Appendix C: Center of Gravity Determination............................................................................C-1
Appendix D: Sample Planning Assumptions ……………………………………………... D-1
Appendix E: Risk Assessment………………………………………………………………..... E-1
Appendix F: Examples of Governing Factors…………………………………………………. F-1
Appendix G: Sample Decision Matrix........................................................................................ G-1
Appendix H: Joint Synchronization Matrix................................................................................ H-1
Appendix I: Plan Rehearsal …………………………………………………………………......I-1
Appendix J: Operational Time Definitions……………………………………………….…….J-1
Appendix K: Abbreviations and Acronyms.………………………………………….……..….K-1

iii
 NWC 4111G

THE COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION (CES)

Military commanders are required to make decisions constantly. Every day, they and their
staffs resolve simple, routine and/or complex problems. To help them think through their options
when faced with a force employment decision, while applying their knowledge, experience and
judgment, military commanders use a decision-making tool called the Commander’s Estimate of
the Situation.

Purpose: Joint Pub 5-0 defines the CES as “a logical process of reasoning by which a
commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a
decision as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission.”

Developing estimates is a continuing function of all commanders and staff officers. In

reality, all officers involved in military operations are continually revising their original
estimates in the light of current developments. The estimate of the situation is an ongoing
process, which begins at the inception of the planning phase and ends at the conclusion of
operations. An entirely new estimate normally is not prepared except when a new operation is
undertaken or when a drastic change in the situation renders such action necessary.

In the estimate, the commander evaluates all the elements that affect the employment of
forces and assets. The Course of Action (COA) selected is the basis for the development of plans
and the issuing of combat orders. The commander’s estimate is also a means to transmit the
decision to the next higher command echelon for approval. It is not a document to convince the
reader of the wisdom of the selected COA. Rather, it is a summary that clearly communicates
valuable guidance from the commander and is used as a valuable tool by the staff and
subordinate commanders.

The commander’s estimate is the first and most critical phase in the military planning
process. It is conducted at all command echelons: tactical, operational, and theater-strategic.
Normally a geographic combatant commander will also prepare a strategic estimate during
peacetime as an integral part of the deliberate planning process (DPP).1

Scope: The commander’s estimate of the situation encompasses a commander's assigned

area of operations, his area of interest, and should be as comprehensive as time constraints
permit. It may vary from a short, almost instantaneous mental estimate to a carefully written
document that requires days of preparation and the collaboration of many staff officers. Time
available to complete the estimate is an important factor in the CES process.

Format: The steps in the commander’s estimate can be expanded or condensed according to
the nature of a problem. However, to maintain the logical sequence of reasoning and to ensure
consideration of pertinent factors, all the steps of the estimate should be generally followed
whenever possible. The format of the estimate process should not prevent a commander from
selecting the best method of arriving at a sound solution to a military problem.
___________________
1
A Strategic Estimate provides a guide for developing assessments of national strategic issues. The format is somewhat different
from the Commander’s Estimate of the Situation (JP 1).

1
 NWC 4111G

The process is supported by staff section specific estimates. Most of the staff divisions (e.g.,
J-1, J-2, J-3, etc., or Service counterparts) prepare their own estimates of the situation. Pertinent
parts of these staff estimates are then inserted, verbatim or in modified form, into the
commander’s estimate of the situation. See CJCSM 3500.5A, Joint Task Force HQ Master
Training Guide for a good review of each of the staff estimates.

Generic Commander’s Estimate of the Situation

The Commander’s Estimate of the Situation is directly linked with the Joint Operation
Planning and Execution System (JOPES), Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures) during
Crisis Action Planning. After Step II, Crisis Assessment, the Warning Order is published which
formally directs course of action development and starts the planning process of the
Commander’s Estimate of the Situation. Yet, even though JOPES discusses the requirement for
submission of a CES, it does not provide guidance for the preparation of one. There is an
excellent review of an operational-level CES contained in CJCSM 3500.5A, Joint Task Force
HQ Master Training Guide. This workbook provides a discussion of how to conduct an estimate
of the situation regardless of the scope of military action to be taken. It includes the elements
used in the commander’s estimate at most command echelons. Where appropriate, references to
formats or guidance contained in joint doctrine publications, or recommended formats, are
provided. A CES conducted by another Service may differ in format and detail, but will address
similar issues.

The generic commander's estimate consists of six principal steps:

Step 1: Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace and Mission Analysis

Step 2: Development of Friendly Courses of Action.
Step 3: Analysis of Friendly Courses of Action.
Step 4: Comparison of Friendly Courses of Action and the Decision.
Step 5: Development of Plans/Orders.
Step 6: Transition.

Note that in practice these steps take place sequentially, but may be compressed depending
on available planning time, staff experience/capabilities, and the commander's involvement in
the process. Additionally, subordinate—or even superior commanders—will be conducting their
own parallel CES that require inputs from your command’s CES process. In other words, no
CES is done in isolation. These steps are described and analyzed here sequentially for
instructional purposes only.

2
 NWC 4111G

COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

Joint
Intelligence MISSION
STEP 1 Preparation of ANALYSIS
the Battlespace
PRODUCTS

• Battlespace Effects
• Enemy Critical Factors • Mission Analysis Brief
• ECOAs o Proposed Mission
• Commander's
• Initial Collection Requirements o Planning Guidance
o Intent
• Warning Order

DEVELOPMENT
of FRIENDLY
STEP 2 • COA Brief
COAs

• War Game
STEP 3 ANALYSIS OF COAs • Refined Collection
Plan

STEP 4
• Adv/Disadv each COA
COMPARISON OF
• Approved COA
COAs
• 2d Warning Order

STEP 5
• Plan/Order
ORDER Development
DEVELOPMENT • Joint Synch
Matrix

TRANSITION
STEP 6 • Handover of
Plan/Order
• Rehearsals
3
 NWC 4111G

STEP 1: JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE (JIPB)

AND MISSION ANALYSIS (MA)

PART 1: JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION

OF THE BATTLESPACE

THE PURPOSE OF THE JIPB PORTION OF THIS CES WORKBOOK IS NOT TO MAKE
THE USER A JIPB EXPERT. THE INTENT IS TO EXPOSE THE NON-INTELLIGENCE
STAFF OFFICER/PLANNER TO A CRITICAL ASPECT OF THE PLANNING PROCESS
WHICH IS ON-GOING THROUGHOUT THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF AN
OPERATION. ALL PLANNERS NEED A BASIC FAMILIARITY OF THE JIPB PROCESS
IN ORDER TO BECOME CRITICAL CONSUMERS OF THE PRODUCTS PRODUCED BY
THE J2/G2/N2/A2. THE JIPB SERVES AN INTEGRAL SUPPORTING ROLE TO THE
OVERALL CES PROCESS. SOME OF THE STEPS IN THE JIPB ARE CONDUCTED IN
PARALLEL WITH THE MISSION ANALYSIS AND WILL REQUIRE INPUT FROM
OTHER MEMBERS OF THE JOINT PLANNING TEAM. SEE APPENDIX A FOR
GREATER JIPB DETAILS AND JOINT PRODUCT EXAMPLES.

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace is the analytical process used by joint
intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence
products in support of the joint force commander's decision-making process. (JP 2-01.3) The
primary purpose of JIPB is to support the commander's decision making and planning for a
major operation or campaign by identifying, assessing, and estimating the enemy's center(s) of
gravity,2 critical vulnerabilities, capabilities, limitations, intentions, and COAs that are most
likely to be encountered based on the situation. JIPB products help to provide a clear
understanding of the strategic landscape and battlespace (operational environment) that is used
by the joint force staff to develop friendly COAs and provide a foundation for the commander's
decision regarding which friendly COA to adopt. Although JIPB support to decision making is
both dynamic and continuous, it must also be "front loaded" in the sense that the majority of
analysis must be completed early enough to be factored into the commander's decision making
effort.

In order for the joint force staff to identify potential COAs, the Joint Force Commander
(JFC) must formulate planning guidance based on an analysis of the friendly mission. This
analysis helps to identify specified, implied, and essential tasks; possible branches and sequels;
and any limitations on the application of military force. JIPB supports Mission Analysis by
enabling the commander and staff to visualize the full extent of the battlespace, to distinguish the
known from the unknown, and to establish working assumptions regarding how adversary and
friendly forces will interact within the limitations of the battlespace environment. JIPB also
assists commanders in formulating their planning guidance by identifying significant adversary
capabilities and by pointing out critical battlespace factors, such as the locations of key
geography, attitudes of indigenous populations, and potential land, air, and sea avenues of
approach. MA and the commander's planning guidance form the basis for the subsequent
development of friendly COAs by the staff.
____________________
2
Depending on the level of operation, the JIPB should identify enemy Centers of Gravity at the strategic, operational, and tactical
level, as appropriate.

1-1
 NWC 4111G

JIPB is a continuous process, which enables JFCs and their staffs to visualize the full
spectrum of adversary capabilities and limitations as well as potential Enemy Courses of Action
(ECOAs) across all dimensions of the battlespace. While JIPB is most often seen as part of the
military planning process, it is actually conducted both prior to and during operations. Just as the
commander must continually make decisions about the course of a campaign or operation, the
intelligence staff must constantly work to seek out, analyze, and disseminate new information to
support those decisions. Although the specifics of the process vary depending on the situation
and force involved, there is general agreement on the four major steps of JIPB.

I. DEFINE THE BATTLESPACE ENVIRONMENT. This first step is an initial survey of the
geographic and non-geographic dimensions of the battlespace. It is used to bound the problem
and to identify areas for further analysis. There are generally three tasks that must be
accomplished.

1. Identify the Area of Operations and the Area of Interest. Much of the information
may be provided in the superior's order or OPLAN, but usually this step requires coordination
with the J-5, J-3, or other elements of the staff. If a Joint Operations Area (JOA) or other
operational areas have been identified, they will help guide the intelligence requirements and
collection plan. The operations area, or Area of Operations (AO), is generally the area of direct
concern to the commander and intelligence will be focused on this area. The Area of Interest
(AI) is usually a larger area, including areas that may influence the operation, but might not be
under direct operational control of the commander. Intelligence activities will also be focused on
this area, but not necessarily to the same degree as on the AO. The AO and AI may differ for
each dimension of warfare – land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace – and may need to be
adjusted later in the planning process, e.g., if additional threats are identified outside the defined
areas which may impact upon the commander's AO.

(Joint) Area of Operations:

(Recommend this be displayed on a map/chart for clarity and reference)

1-2
 NWC 4111G

Area of Interest:

2. Determine the Significant Characteristics of the Battlespace Environment. This sub-

step is an initial review of the factors of space, time, and forces and their interaction with one
another. Examining these factors in general terms early in the process will help initiate
intelligence collection and other activities that will support the later steps of the CES. This
review will require information on friendly forces and how the factors of space and time affect
them. For this reason, the J2 staff must work closely with the J5, J3, and other staff members
throughout the process.

3. Evaluate Existing Data Bases and Identify Intelligence Gaps and Priorities. In this
sub-step, intelligence personnel review the information found in various automated databases,
Intelink sites (the classified version of the internet), and other intelligence sources, both
classified and unclassified. The staff begins to coordinate with local, theater, and national
intelligence organizations that may provide support to the operation, and initiates new
intelligence collection and production requests as necessary. Intelligence requests and
requirements may take the form of:

• Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs). These are the commander's intelligence

priorities for the operation that will drive all intelligence activities used in support of
Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) to be discussed later. The J2
staff will normally develop and propose PIRs for the commander's approval.

• Requests for Information (RFIs). This is a general term that may be used by operations
or other personnel who need timely information from the intelligence staff or an
intelligence organization concerning an aspect of the operation. If the information is
readily available, such as through the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC), the RFI will be
answered directly. If the answer will require additional analytical work, a production
request may be necessary.

• Production Requests (PRs). These are used to request the development of new studies,
reports, and other intelligence products. For example, if the initial review of available
intelligence revealed that little information existed on the enemy's information operations
capability, a PR might be sent by the J2 staff to the theater JIC, requesting that this
information be provided by a certain date. If the information to answer such a request
does not currently exist in the intelligence community, a collection requirement may be
placed.

• Collection Requirements (CRs). These may take many forms, depending on the
information needed and the collection assets available to get it. For example, some
1-3
 NWC 4111G

information may be available through the tasking of a theater intelligence collector such
as U-2 aircraft. The J2 staff collection managers process these requirements and it is their
job to determine where and how to best get the necessary intelligence.

This step is only a preliminary review of the intelligence available; the J2 staff will continue
to levy intelligence requirements throughout the JIPB process and, in fact, throughout the entire
course of the operation.

II. DESCRIBE BATTLESPACE EFFECTS. The purpose of this step is to determine how the
battlespace affects both friendly and enemy operations. It begins with an identification and
analysis of all militarily significant environmental characteristics of each battlespace dimension.
These factors are then analyzed to determine their effects on the capabilities and broad COAs of
both enemy and friendly forces. Not all parts of this step may be a J2 responsibility. For
example, in some commands weather and topography may not be specifically J2 functions. The
J2 staff will, however, take the lead in coordinating these efforts.

1. Analyze the Factor of Space of the Battlespace Environment. This step involves an in-
depth analysis of the factor space. Generally, only those characteristics of the AO should be
considered which affect the preparation, planning, and employment of the enemy or friendly
forces and assets. The scope and extent of this analysis at each level of war differs considerably.
For example, the tactical commander is rarely concerned with the economic, political, and
technological aspects of the situation, whereas the theater of operations and theater of war
combatant commanders are concerned with these aspects. Moreover, weather is normally of
greater concern for the tactical commander, while the climate receives greater attention at the
operational and theater-strategic level. This does not mean, however, that the weather is not
taken into account in determining the time and place of attack by the operational commanders,
especially in planning and executing an amphibious landing. The focus in this step is to briefly
describe the most important features of the situation and their effect on enemy capabilities and in
the development of friendly COAs for all of the battlespace dimensions (land, maritime, air,
space, electromagnetic, and cyberspace). While all of the aspects of a given element are fully
considered, only those aspects that have an impact on the tactical, operational, or strategic
mission are highlighted.

The land dimension is determined through terrain analysis. Terrain analysis consists of an
evaluation of the military aspects of the battlefield's terrain to determine its effects on military
operations, both friendly and enemy. The most important military aspects of terrain are:
Observation and fields of fire; Cover and concealment; Obstacles; Key terrain; and Avenues of
approach (OCOKA).

The maritime dimension pertains to key military aspects of the maritime environment. These
include maneuver space and chokepoints; harbors and anchorages; ports, airfields, and naval
bases; shipping routes; and the hydrographic and topographic characteristics of the ocean floor
and the littoral land mass.

The air dimension involves an analysis of all factors of the battlespace that may affect
friendly and enemy air operations. Enemy infrastructure that supports either offensive air

1-4
 NWC 4111G

operations or defense against air attacks should be analyzed. This step will require analysts to
consider not only terrain and weather, but aspects such as airspace issues as well.

The space, electromagnetic, and cyberspace dimensions analysis will vary greatly
depending on the nature of the threat, the level of command involved, and the time available for
planning. Specialized support may be required, such as from elements from the US Space
Command or the electronic warfare and information operations communities. The J2 staff will
need to coordinate with other staff elements that are involved with these areas.

The items listed below are applicable to the entire range of military operations, from SASO
to war. Therefore, describe and analyze only those aspects of the factors of space, time, and
forces that are applicable to the mission of the friendly forces.

a. Military geography: The physical environment includes many parameters that affect the
combat capabilities and execution of actions of friendly forces and assets (see Figure 1-1). In
describing these features the commander and staff should be aware that there are generally
accepted descriptions of related conditions as defined by the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL).

Land
Terrain Slope
Steep (>10%); Moderate (3 to 10%); Little (<3%)
Vegetation
Jungle (rain forest, canopied); Dense (forested); Light (meadow, plain); Sparse (alpine,
semi-desert); Negligible (arctic, desert)

Sea
Ocean Depth
Shallow (<100 fathoms); Limited (100 to 500 fathoms); Deep (500 to 2500 fathoms);
Very Deep (>2500 fathoms)
Harbor Depth
Deep (>60 ft); Moderate (30 to 60 ft); Shallow (<30 ft)

Air
Air Temp
Hot (>85oF); Temperate (40o to 85oF); Cold (10o to 39oF); Very Cold (<10oF)
Visibility
WOXOF (<1/4 NM); Low (1/4 to 1 NM); Moderate (1 to 3 NM); Good (3 to 10 NM);
High (10 to 20 NM); Unlimited (>20 NM)

Figure 1-1. Examples of Conditions of the Physical Environment

1-5
 NWC 4111G

(1) Area: total area (in sq miles/kilometers) in which the planned combat action is to take
place; length and width of the area (in miles/kilometers); geographical boundaries (land, maritime,
river, lakes).

(2) Position: Land or maritime position; insular, peninsular position; exterior or central
position, etc.

(3) Distances: Distances from home bases to the area of combat employment; distances
between base of operations to the concentration or assembly area; distances between various
physical objectives, etc.

(4) Land Use: The main characteristics of the land use (arable land; permanent crops, irrigated
land, etc.).

(5) Environment: Provide an overview of the environmental issues that potentially can affect
the employment of military forces on both sides (pollution—air, water, land; natural hazards;
destructive earthquakes, volcanoes, etc.).

(6) Topography: Provide the main features of relief (flat, mountainous, swampy, desert, etc.)
and the affect the topography has on the movement and employment of military forces on both
sides.

(7) Vegetation: The main characteristics of vegetation in the area (barren, woodland, meadows
and pastures, hedgerow, rice paddies, etc.) and its affect on the movement and employment of
military forces on both sides.

(8) Hydrography/Oceanography: Characteristics of sea/ocean areas (size of the area; coastal

indentation, coasts and offshore islands/islets; archipelagoes, deltas, straits, narrows, bottom's
topography; water depths, salinity, bioluminescence, currents, tides, etc.), and rivers/estuaries,
streams, lakes, and artificial inland waterways (canals, lakes, etc.).

(9) Climate/Weather: The main features of the climate (temperate, cold, arctic, tropic,
subtropics); change of seasons; thaw; duration of the day (sunrise, sunset, twilight, etc. and their
general affects on the preparation execution of the forthcoming military action); cloud cover, low
ceiling/visibility, fog, precipitation (rainfall, snow, etc.); winds, waves (high seas—sea state 5 and
higher), surf height; temperatures (sea, air, mean and extreme temperatures, etc.), humidity and its
affect on the use of weapons/equipment and fatigue of personnel; thermal crossover and
transmissivity; precipitation (rainfall, snow, etc.) and its affect on off-road trafficability; sea ice,
icebergs, currents, tides, etc.
b. Demography: Provide the analysis of the main aspects of the demographic situation; total
population; age structure; racial composition; regional distribution; urban vs. rural population;
average density (per sq mile/km); net migration rate; growth rate; life expectancy at birth; total
fertility rate; degree of urbanization; birth rate; mortality rate; infant mortality rate; health and
medical, etc.

(1) Ethnicity: Ethnic composition; national groups and national minorities; ethnic problems or
conflicts, etc.
1-6
 NWC 4111G

(2) Religion: Main religions; relations with the state; religious holidays; religious differences
or problems; etc.

(3) Languages: Dominant languages; dialects; languages of the ethnic minorities; alphabet
used, etc.

(4) Literacy: Provide general overview; illiteracy of adults; illiteracy among urban and rural
population, etc.

c. Politics: The main characteristics of the political system (system of government; executive,
judiciary, legislature, etc.); form of government; administrative divisions; legal system;
constitutional system and constitutional issues; ruling regime; political parties and leaders; other
political or pressure groups; trade unions; human rights; political stability; internal threats (political
extremism, terrorism, insurgency, serious crime/drugs, etc.) external threats (border disputes,
resource disputes, etc.).

d. Diplomacy: The main characteristics of the country's diplomatic position; relations with
foreign countries; alliances/coalitions; bilateral agreements; diplomatic representation;
international law issues/problems (maritime claims, neutrality declarations, etc.).

e. Natural Resources: Minerals (iron, zinc, lead, copper, silver, graphite, uranium, etc.);
energy resources (thermal—coal, lignite, oil, natural gas, hydroelectric, wind, etc.); water supply,
food supply, etc.

f. Economy: Key characteristics of economic system; economic policy; economic

performance; national product (GNP); real growth of GDP; total budget; budget deficit; inflation
rate; currency; debts (external, internal, etc.); external debt servicing payments; foreign investment;
foreign aid; aid donors; finance (banking, insurance, etc.); domestic trade; land and maritime trade
(coastal, regional, ocean-going, etc.); foreign trade; trade deficit; trading partners; heavy industry
(mining, metallurgy, machine building, etc.); defense industry; military R&D; covert programs;
production of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, chemical); aerospace industries;
shipbuilding; ship repair facilities; light industry (consumer goods; chemicals and related products;
pharmaceutical industry; food, beverages, tobacco; textile and clothing; wood and paper products;
apparel, leather, footwear; etc.) petroleum products; electronics; electricity (by source-thermal,
hydroelectric, nuclear, wind, solar; capacity, production, consumption); fisheries; tourism
(domestic, foreign, etc.); work force by sectors (agriculture, industry, forestry, banking, education,
culture, administration and justice; welfare and education, etc.); migrant workers; unemployment;
income per capita; living standards; nutrition level, etc.

g. Agriculture: The main characteristics of agricultural production; cereal production; fodder

crops; beef and dairy production; livestock production (sheep, cattle, etc.); produce; fruits, etc.

1-7
 NWC 4111G

h. Transportation: General characteristics of the transportation system (domestic, links with

other countries in the region or out of the area); land transportation—roads (paved, unpaved—
gravel, earth, etc.); railroads (standard gauge, narrow gauge; electrified; industrial, etc.), inland
waterways (rivers, lakes, canals, etc.); maritime transport—merchant marine (merchant vessels by
type—passenger ships, ferries; crude oil tankers, liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers; container
ships freighter; bulk-carriers; size, age, speed, etc.); shipping companies; ports; port terminals—oil,
container, freight, etc., air transport—civil aviation; air carriers—domestic and international
service; business aviation; agricultural aviation; airports (paved or unpaved runways; runway
weight bearing capacity; maximum on ground (MOG) capacity; runways by length—>3,600 m
2,400-3,659 m; 1,220-2,439 m; <1,220 m), etc.

i. Telecommunications: Wire services, commercial satellite, radio (FM/AM, short-wave),

cable, land line, fiber optical lines and other communications facilities in the area of operations that
might enhance Command and Control (C2) of military forces.

j. Culture: Describe and analyze the main cultural traits; cultural biases and prejudices;
sensitivities; prevalent view of other national groups, races, or nations; cultural differences among
various ethnic groups, etc.

k. Ideology: Describe and analyze the key characteristics of the political ideology; strengths
and weaknesses; vulnerabilities; etc.

l. Nationalism: Describe briefly and analyze the key aspects of the nationalism (country or
political parties/groups, etc.); nationalistic feelings; strengths and weaknesses/vulnerabilities; etc.

m. Sociology: Social conditions run a wide range from the psychological ability of a
population to withstand the rigors of war, to the health and sanitation conditions in the area of
operations. Language, social institutions and attitudes, and similar factors that may affect selection
of a course of action should be considered.

n. Science and Technology: Although little immediate military impact may result from the
state of science and technology in a target area, the long-range effects of such factors as the
technical skill level of the population and scientific and technical resources in manpower and
facilities should be considered in cases where they may affect the choice of a COA.

Summarize the Key Elements of the Factor of Space:

1-8
 NWC 4111G

2. Analyze the Factor of Time of the Battlespace Environment. This part of the analysis
should analyze the factor of time in generic terms and how it affects the mission accomplishment
on both sides.

a. Preparation Time: Estimate the time required to prepare for war or for the
forthcoming military action based on the doctrinal tenets or empirical data.

b. Duration of the Enemy Action: Estimate the time of the expected or pending enemy
tactical action, major operation, or campaign.

c. Warning Time: Estimate the warning time for the forthcoming military action for both
friendly and enemy forces (based on the existing reconnaissance, intelligence and early warning
capabilities).

d. Decision Cycle: Estimate the time required for both sides to make a decision - the time
from receipt of the mission to the selection of the optimal COA.

e. Planning Time: Estimate the time required for both sides to issue a directive - the time
from the selection of a COA to the issuance of a directive.

f. Time for Mobilization: Estimate the time required for both sides to mobilize ready
reserves or complete partial or total mobilization.

g. Reaction Time: Estimate the time for both sides (based on doctrinal tenets or
empirical data) to effectively react to the enemy's move or action.

h. Time Required for Deployment: Estimate the time both sides require to prepare and
move forces from their home stations to the ports or airfields of embarkation.

i. Deployment Transit Time: Estimate the time required to move forces by land, sea,
and air from major base or staging/deployment areas into the theater or area of operations;
compute distances and transit times for each friendly unit/force, and enemy unit/force.

j. Time for Concentration: Estimate the time both sides require to move and concentrate
forces within the battlespace.

k. Time to Prepare and Complete Maneuver: Estimate the time necessary for both
sides to prepare, execute, and complete their maneuvering (tactical or operational).

l. Time to Accomplish the Mission: Estimate the time both sides require to accomplish
the entire combat mission.

m. Rate of Advance (or Delay): Estimate potential rates of advance (in an offensive) or
rate of delaying action (in a defensive) for both sides (applicable only in land warfare).

1-9
 NWC 4111G

n. Time for Bringing up Reinforcements: Estimate the time required by both sides to
move and effectively employ reinforcements.

o. Time to Commit Reserves: Estimate the time required by both sides to effectively
commit tactical or operational reserves.

p. Time to Regenerate Combat Power: Estimate the time both sides need to regenerate
combat power (R&R for manpower; replenishment of POL, AMMO, food, water, etc.)

q. Time for Redeployment: Estimate the time both sides require to prepare and
complete redeployment of forces to a new area/mission.

r. Time to Reconstitute Forces: Estimate the time required by both sides to reconstitute
forces after the end of the hostilities, it encompasses regeneration of combat power and
reorganization.

Summarize the Key Elements of the Factor of Time:

3. Assess Time - Space Relationship. Any key time-space relationships should be

identified and assessed with respect to their affect on both enemy and friendly COAs.

4. Determine the Battlespace Effects on Enemy and Friendly Capabilities and Broad
Courses of Action. The analysis that has been conducted in STEP 1 is combined into a single
integrated product that focuses on the total environment's effects on all COAs available to both
friendly and enemy forces. The product may take the form of a briefing, set of overlays,
intelligence estimate, or any other format the commander deems appropriate. Regardless of the
format, this product is designed to support the development and evaluation of friendly
COAs by providing the J5/J3 and commander with an evaluation and an analysis of the periods
of optimal conditions for specific types of military operations.

1-10
 NWC 4111G

Example of Battlespace Effects on Enemy and Friendly COAs

Item: REDLAND is bounded Effect on ECOAs Enemy can Effect on friendly COAs
on three sides by neutral minimize Force deployments Friendly Lines of Operation
nations, and water on the on those neutral borders. will be predictable.
fourth side.

Summarize Key Influences of Time/Space on ECOAs and Potential Friendly COAs:

SITUATION EFFECT ON ENEMY COAs EFFECT ON FRIENDLY COAs

Item:

Item:

Item:

Item:

Table 1-1. Influences of Time and Space on ECOAs and Potential Friendly COAs

Charts or overlays that show the important aspects of terrain for all significant dimensions of
military operations are the primary products that are developed during this sub-step. The most
important graphic is a Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO) that depicts critical
information such as restricted areas, avenues of approach, likely engagement areas, and key
terrain. Examples of a Land MCOO, Maritime MCOO, and Air MCOO are provided in
Appendix A (source Joint Pub 2-01.3, JTTP for Joint IPB).

III. EVALUATE THE ENEMY (the Factor of Force). The third step in the JIPB process is to
identify and evaluate the enemy's forces and its capabilities, limitations, doctrine, and tactics,
techniques and procedures (TTP) likely to be employed. In this step, analysts develop models to
portray how the enemy normally operates and identifies capabilities in terms of broad ECOAs
the enemy might take. Analysts must take care not to evaluate enemy doctrine and concepts by
"mirror imaging" US doctrine.

1. Identify Enemy Force Capabilities. At this point the intelligence staff will normally
utilize basic intelligence data that has been produced by theater joint intelligence centers and
other analytical organizations to analyze the enemy factor of force. The broader term "means"
can be used when not only military forces, but also other sources of power (political, economic,
etc.) of a nation or a group of states are brought to bear. This part of the estimate may provide a
detailed analysis of the armed forces as a whole or individual services or focus on the combat

1-11
 NWC 4111G

forces and combat support forces on both sides depending on the scale of the forthcoming
military action and the command echelon.

a. Defense System: Provide an overview and analysis of the defense system; components
of defense system (armed forces, police, para-military forces/groups; civil defense, etc.); national
military organization; civilian control; civil-military relations; defense expenditures; security
assistance; arms transfers; arms imports; foreign military aid; military relations with foreign
countries; foreign military advisors; etc.

b. Armed Forces: Total strength; trained reserve; mobilized manpower; officer corps,
NCOs, soldiers/seamen; Services (Army, Navy, Air Force and/or Air Defense, Marine Corps or
Naval Infantry, Coast Guard); etc. The following elements should be analyzed: overall numerical
strength of forces on both sides; active forces vs. reserves; combat vs. noncombat forces; forces in
combat vs. forces assigned for protection of the rear areas; types of forces and force mix; mobility
(tactical or strategic); task organization; reconstitution ability; logistic support and supportability;
combat readiness; transportation assets, etc.

c. Relative Combat Power of Opposing Forces: The relative combat power is derived by
evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of friendly and enemy forces, their location and
disposition, logistics, time and space factors, and combat efficiency (see Appendix B). Normally,
the staff will identify relevant factors, tabulate the facts, and then draw conclusions. Comparisons
are meaningful only if they reflect the forces that will directly oppose each other. Any strength or
weakness factor must reflect directly or indirectly the ability or inability of a force to achieve its
assigned objective.

(1) Composition of Forces: This includes Order Of Battle (OOB) of major enemy forces or
formations; type and forces’ mix; major weapons systems and equipment and their
operational characteristics.

(2) Reserves: Describe and analyze reserves (tactical, operational, or strategic) for the
forthcoming action on both sides.

(3) Reinforcements: Estimate friendly and enemy reinforcement capabilities that can affect
the forthcoming action in the area under consideration. This study should include
ground, naval, air, and space elements; Weapons Of Mass Destruction (WMD); and an
estimate of the relative capacity to move these forces into the area of operations or
theater of operations.

(4) Location and Disposition: This includes geographic location of enemy units; fire
support elements; C2 facilities; air, naval, and missile forces; and other elements of
combat power in, or deployable, to the area of operations or the given theater of
operations.

(5) Relative Strengths: List the number and size of enemy units committed and those
available for reinforcement in the area. This should not be just a tabulation of numbers
of aircraft, ships, missiles, or other weapons, but rather an analysis of what strength the

1-12
 NWC 4111G

enemy commander can bring to bear in the area in terms of ground (air, naval) units
committed and reinforcing, aircraft sortie rates, missile delivery rates, unconventional,
psychological, and other strengths the commander thinks may affect the ratio of forces
in the employment area.

d. Logistics: Summarize such considerations as transportation, supply, maintenance,

hospitalization and evacuation, labor, construction, type of lines of communications (LOCs), to
include land, air, sea; and their position (exterior or interior); protection and degree of vulnerability
to diverse types of threat, and other elements of logistical support and sustainment.

e. Combat Efficiency: Estimate friendly and enemy state of training, readiness, battle
experience, physical condition, morale, leadership, motivation, doctrine, discipline, and whatever
significant strengths or weaknesses may appear from the preceding paragraphs.

Summarize the Key Elements of the Factor of Forces (Enemy):

2. DRAW-D. At this point, the analyst begins to consider general enemy COAs and how
the enemy might be expected to act under each of these general COAs. General COAs can be
described using the acronym “DRAW-D,” which stands for Defend, Reinforce, Attack,
Withdraw, or Delay.

1-13
 NWC 4111G

a. Doctrinal templates. Individual service templates are usually constructed that portray
each of the enemy's service or functional area employment patterns. For example, in addition to a
ground template that illustrates the enemy's typical land force organization for an offensive,
separate templates are constructed for naval, air, space, and cyberspace assets, as appropriate.
These templates may be combined into joint doctrinal templates for each of the broad COAs
(DRAW-D) the enemy may employ. These templates (see Figure 1-2) are constructed by
analyzing all available intelligence on the enemy's doctrine and through an examination of the
enemy's past operations and exercises.

Figure 1-2. Examples of Doctrinal Templates (JP 2-01.3)

b. Description of enemy tactics. In addition to a graphic depiction shown in the template,

an enemy model should at a minimum include a written description of an enemy's preferred
tactics. These descriptions should answer questions such as: does the enemy typically initiate
offensive operations at night; how does the enemy utilize reserve forces; and how does weather

1-14
 NWC 4111G

affect the enemy's operations? Time event matrices may be used to show how the enemy might
be expected to sequence and synchronize an operation over time.

c. Identification of High Value Targets (HVTs). The enemy model should include a list
of HVTs – those assets the enemy commander requires for the successful completion of the
missions that are depicted on the doctrinal templates. For example, an enemy ground force may
be vulnerable to amphibious flanking attacks. In such a situation, the enemy's coastal defense
assets, such as artillery and anti-ship cruise missiles, may be HVTs. This list of HVTs is
developed in collaboration with the Joint Target Coordination Board (JTCB) and may be used
later in the planning process to develop specific target sets.

3. Determine the current enemy situation (Situation Template). The intelligence staff
uses all available sources, methods, and data bases to determine the enemy's current situation.
This includes all significant elements of space, time, and forces addressed in previous steps.
Enemy orders of battle, current force status and composition, and other factors are considered in
maintaining a current situation plot, which is continuously updated throughout the planning
process and the execution of the operation. See Appendix A for an example of a Situation
Template.

4. Identify enemy capabilities. The intelligence staff is ready to determine what broad
COAs the enemy is capable of taking that would allow him to achieve his objectives. Although
the full analysis of the enemy's potential COAs will be done in the next JIPB step, here the
analysts may begin to refine the DRAW-D general COAs. For example, what kind of attack
might the enemy conduct – an envelopment, penetration, or another kind? Are there
nonconventional capabilities the enemy might use, such as WMD or information operations?
One tool is to compare the current enemy situation with each of the enemy doctrinal templates
already constructed. Based on this situation, what does the enemy doctrine suggest it may do? As
an example, this analysis might lead to a capability statement such as the following: “The enemy
has the capability to interdict friendly SLOCs at chokepoints GREY and BLUE after
repositioning units of the southern fleet. Current naval deployments preclude an attack before 4
August.” The J-2 disseminates this evaluation of enemy capabilities to the other staff sections as
soon as possible, typically as a written intelligence estimate that can support a wide range of
further planning efforts. Depending on time available and the requirements of the JFC, however,
the evaluation may be disseminated in a briefing or in other forms as desired.

IV. DETERMINE ENEMY COAs (ECOAs). Accurate identification of ECOAs requires the
commander and his staff to think "as the enemy thinks." From that perspective, it is necessary
first to postulate possible enemy objectives and then visualize specific actions within the
capabilities of enemy forces that can be directed at these objectives and their impact upon
potential friendly operations. This visualization should consider enemy actions two levels down.
From the enemy's perspective, appropriate physical objectives might include their own forces or
their elements, forces being supported or protected, facilities or LOCs, and geographic areas or
positions of tactical, operational or strategic importance.

1-15
 NWC 4111G

The commander should not consider ECOAs based solely on factual or supposed knowledge
of the enemy intentions. The real COA by the enemy commander cannot be known with any
confidence without knowing the enemy's mission and objective – and that information is rarely
known. Even if such information were available, the enemy could change or feign his ECOA.
Therefore, considering all the options the enemy could physically carry out is more prudent. No
ECOA should be dismissed or overlooked because it is considered as unlikely or uncommon,
only if impossible.

Potential enemy actions relating to specific physical objectives normally need to be

combined to form statements of ECOAs. These statements should be broad enough so that the
fundamental choices available to the enemy commander are made clear. Once all ECOAs have
been identified, the commander should eliminate any duplication and combine them when
appropriate.

To develop an ECOA, one should ask the following three questions:

• Can the enemy do it?

• Will the enemy accomplish his objective?
• Would it materially affect the accomplishment of my mission?

The final step in the JIPB process is designed to produce, at a minimum, two ECOAs: the
enemy's most likely COA and the most dangerous COA. This gives the commander a "best
estimate" and "worst case" scenario for planning. However, if time allows, other ECOAs are
also developed. Each ECOA usually includes a description of expected enemy activities, the
associated time and phase lines expected in executing the COA, expected force dispositions,
associated Centers of Gravity, a list of assumptions made about the enemy when projecting the
COA, a list of refined HVTs, and a list of Named Areas of Interest (NAIs),3 which are
geographical areas where intelligence collection will be focused. There are six sub-steps
involved in determining the ECOAs.

1. Identify the enemy's likely objectives and desired end state. The analyst should begin
by identifying the enemy's overall desired end state and strategic objective(s)4 which will form
the basis for identifying subordinate objectives—which may be both tangible and intangible.5
Because hard intelligence may not be available to answer these questions, assumptions will
likely have to be made. These assumptions should be coordinated with the Joint Force
Commander, J-3, J-5, and other staff planning sections as necessary.

____________________
3
Named Area of Interest—The geographical area where information that will satisfy a specific information requirement can be
collected. NAIs are usually selected to capture indications of adversary courses of action, but also may be related to conditions
of the battlespace. (JP 2-01.3)
4
The enemy’s Desired End State and Strategic Objective(s) are products of national-strategic analysis and should be provided
from those sources.
5
An example of a tangible objective is “the destruction of the enemy fleet.” An intangible objective might be to “split the enemy
coalition.”

1-16
 NWC 4111G

2. Identify enemy Critical Factors6 / Centers of Gravity (COGs)7 / Critical Capabilities

(CCs) / Critical Requirements (CRs) / Critical Vulnerabilities (CVs)8 / Decisive Points
(DPs).9 Once the enemy's objectives have been deduced, the staff continues its COG
determination by identifying and analyzing the enemy's critical factors to determine his critical
strengths and critical weaknesses. These critical factors can be both tangible and intangible and
may come from a variety of sources: leadership, fielded forces, resources, infrastructure,
population, transportation systems, and internal and external relationships of the enemy, etc. To
find critical strengths, the analyst searches for those key aspects that determine from which
elements the enemy derives freedom of action, physical strength, or the will to fight. From these
strengths, the analyst should recognize the enemy's COG.

Analysis of COGs (at each level of war as appropriate) is conducted only after gaining an
understanding of the broad operational environment (paragraphs I, II, and III of the JIPB above),
but before a detailed study is made of the enemy's potential COAs. Analysts must determine
whether or not potential COG(s) are truly critical to the enemy's strategy and must thoroughly
examine the means by which COG(s) influence and affect enemy strategy and potential COAs.
The determination of the enemy's COG(s) is one of the most critical parts of the JIPB
process because their proper identification can help the JFC better anticipate enemy COAs and
will help shape friendly strategy and plans. The next step for the staff once the COGs are
determined is to assess the critical capabilities, which are the crucial enablers for the COG to
function. Logically following this step is the need to identify the critical requirements, which
are the essential conditions, resources, and means for a critical capability to be operational. At
this point, a vulnerability assessment will help identify the critical vulnerabilities, which may
be exploited to gain access to the COG. During this step, it is important to note that the CVs can
be found within critical strengths, capabilities, requirements, or weaknesses. By identifying the
CVs, the commander can focus efforts on those critical vulnerabilities that will achieve decisive
or significant results and lead to the enemy’s COG. Planners must remain alert for the
tendency to focus on weaknesses that bear no relationship to the COG. These are not
critical vulnerabilities and simply serve as a means of wasting friendly forces’ resources.
Following this, the staff must then categorize the decisive points, whose control of offers an
advantage to both forces. However, throughout this process, the planner must realize that
sometimes a situation may arise in which there are no perceived enemy vulnerabilities and, based
on risk assessment, the friendly force must directly focus efforts on the enemy COG. See
Appendix C for a more in-depth discussion of COG determination.

____________________
6
Critical Factors---cumulative term for critical strengths and critical weaknesses of a military or nonmilitary source of power;
they can be quantifiable (tangible) or unquantifiable (intangible); critical factors are present at each level of war; they require
constant attention because they are relative and subject to changes resulting from actions of one’s own forces or of the enemy’s
action. (Vego, Milan Operational Warfare, Naval War College, 2000).
7
If the unit conducting the CES is a tactical headquarters, you may wish to identify a tactical COG.
8
Critical Vulnerabilities--weaknesses (and sometimes strengths) in relationship to the COG, that are open to attack or can be
exploited by the opposing force. (Vego, Milan Operational Warfare, Naval War College, 2000)
9
Decisive Point--a geographic location or source of military or nonmilitary power whose destruction or capture, control or
defense, or continuous surveillance and monitoring would give immediate and marked advantage over the opponent in
accomplishing one’s military objective. (Vego, Mila Operational Warfare, Naval War College, 2000)

1-17
 NWC 4111G

Enemy Center of Gravity Determination

Identify

1a. Strategic Objective(s)

1b. Operational Objective(s)

2a. Critical Strengths 2b. Critical Weaknesses

3a. Strategic COG

3b. Operational COG

1-18
 NWC 4111G

4. Critical Capabilities

6. Check
CVs
5. Critical Requirements

7. Decisive Points

1-19
 NWC 4111G

3. Identify friendly objectives and critical factors. Though not a product of the JIPB
process, in order for the J2 to properly assess the enemy's potential ECOAs, which should focus
on defeating the friendly COGs, he needs to have a full appreciation of the friendly objectives,
critical factors, COGs, critical vulnerabilities, and decisive points.

zATTENTION: This sub-step requires the intelligence analysts to coordinate with

Joint Planning Group and others to determine friendly critical factors such as strengths,
weaknesses, and COG(s). We will revisit this information again during Mission Analysis.

Friendly Center of Gravity Determination

Identify

1a. Strategic Objectives

1b. Operational Objectives

2a. Critical Strengths 2b. Critical Weaknesses

3a. Strategic COG

1-20
 NWC 4111G

3b. Operational COG

4. Critical Capabilities

6. Check CVs

5. Critical Requirements

7. Decisive Points

1-21
 NWC 4111G

4. Identify the full set of ECOAs available to the enemy. In this sub-step, the preliminary
list of ECOAs (developed from DRAW-D) is reviewed and analyzed against the lists that have
been made of enemy objectives and the friendly critical factors as seen by the enemy. Additional
ECOAs are developed and a consolidated list of all potential ECOAs is constructed. Each
identified ECOA is examined to determine whether it meets the following tests:

• Suitability: does the ECOA have the potential to accomplish the enemy's objective?
• Feasibility: does the enemy have sufficient space, time, and forces to execute the
ECOA?
• Acceptability: is the amount of risk associated with the ECOA likely to exceed the level
of risk the enemy will accept?
• Uniqueness: each ECOA must be significantly different from the others, or else it should
be considered a variation, branch or part of another ECOA.
• Consistency with doctrine: does this ECOA appear to be consistent with the enemy's
doctrine, TTP, and observed patterns of operations?
(Joint Pub 2-01.3)

In applying these tests the analyst must always be careful not to discard an ECOA just
because it appears unacceptable, inconsistent with past practices, etc., from our own perspective.
These tests are useful tools in determining which ECOAs the enemy might be likely to follow,
but because our understanding of the enemy's thinking will never be perfect, we must be cautious
not to apply these tests too stringently. An attempt should be made to anticipate possible
"wildcard" COAs the enemy might use. Such asymmetric or unexpected ECOAs could be the
result of either a careful, deliberate strategy, or of a miscalculation on the part of the enemy—but
they can be extremely dangerous in either case. Planners should also be careful not to "mirror
image"—assuming the enemy would react as we would.

ECOA #1 REDLAND initially conducts joint operations to disrupt JTF Blue Sword forced
entry operations, and upon establishment of the JTF Blue Sword in REDLAND, the REDLAND
armed forces disperse into small-unit formations in the mountains and cities and initiate
insurgency operations to defeat the JTF ground forces.

Example ECOA

1-22
 NWC 4111G

ECOAs
ECOA #1

ECOA #2

ECOA #3

ECOA #4

5. Evaluate and prioritize each ECOA. All of the identified ECOAs are evaluated and
ranked according to their probability of adoption.10 This prioritized list is intended to provide
commanders and staffs with a starting point for the development of an OPLAN that takes into
consideration the most likely, as well as the most dangerous, ECOAs. Developing this list
requires an analysis of the situation from the enemy's perspective, using what may be known
about the enemy's intentions. This knowledge will never be complete and much of this step is
based on assumptions rather than facts.

Not all potential ECOAs need be retained in this step. Those that would not affect the
friendly mission and those that are clearly unfeasible are discarded at this point. Potential
ECOAs should not be discarded merely because they are considered unlikely; retain it if an
ECOA would affect the mission, but list it low in probability as appropriate. Analysts must also
be on guard against enemy deception efforts. The enemy may deliberately adopt a less than
optimal ECOA in order to maximize surprise or may gradually increase preparations for a
specific ECOA over a lengthy period of time, thereby psychologically conditioning the JIPB
analyst to accept that level of activity as normal and not threatening. If an ECOA is discarded,
to avoid confusion, it is strongly recommended that you do not renumber the ECOAs.

After listing the ECOAs in the relative probability of adoption, a list of enemy
vulnerabilities should be compiled. These are vulnerabilities that could be exploited by friendly
forces and it could be a general list or tied to specific ECOAs. This list will aid in later steps of
the planning process when friendly COAs are compared against ECOAs and the advantages and
disadvantages of each are evaluated.

____________________
10
Ranking is recommended by the J2 and approved by the commander.

1-23
 NWC 4111G

Retained ECOAs (Prioritized) Vulnerability(s)

ECOA #

ECOA #

ECOA #

ECOA #

Example Prioritization of Retained ECOAs

Retained ECOAs (Prioritized) Vulnerability(s)

ECOA # 3 REDLAND conducts a two pronged • No operational Reserves remaining
ground attack against the APOD with • Extended LOCs
the 3rd RGB from the North and the • Complex C3, little experience
1st RGB from the South, with
supporting air operations.
(Most Likely)
ECOA # 4 REDLAND conducts a delay and • Weak maritime interdiction
interdicts friendly APODs / SPODs capability
• Limited Battlespace for delay
ECOA # 1 REDLAND initially conducts joint • Limited popular support
operations to disrupt JTF Blue Sword • Limited sustainment capability
forced entry operations, and upon • Centralized C3 required, minimal
establishment of the JTF Blue Sword capability
in REDLAND, the REDLAND armed
forces disperse into small-unit
formations in the mountains and cities
and initiate insurgency operations to
defeat the JTF ground forces.
(Most Dangerous)

1-24
 NWC 4111G

6. Develop each ECOA in the amount of detail time allows. Depending on the amount of
time available for analysis and planning, each ECOA is developed in sufficient detail to describe:
the type of military operation involved; the earliest time military action could commence; the
location of the sectors, zones of attack, avenues of approach, and objectives that make up the
COA; and the expected scheme of maneuver and desired end state. ECOAs will usually be
developed in the order of their probability of adoption and should consist of a situation
sketch/template, a narrative description, and a listing of HVTs.

The situation template (see Appendix A) for each ECOA will normally consist of a
Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay, which depicts the battlespace, together with a doctrinal
template or model that shows how the enemy would be expected to act in that environment.
Whenever possible, Time Phase Lines (TPLs) should be placed on the situation template to
depict the expected progress of enemy force movements (such as D+1, D+2, etc.). A situation
matrix (see Appendix A) that depicts the expected progress of enemy activity across time in a
spreadsheet format may also be used. This technique is most often seen in land-centric
operations.

The ECOA narrative description accompanies the situation template and usually addresses
the earliest time the ECOA could be executed, location of the main effort, supporting operations,
time and phase lines. In addition, critical decisions that the enemy commander must make during
implementation of the ECOA are described in terms of their location and space as decision
points.

HVTs have been initially identified in earlier JIPB steps. They should be refined and
reevaluated at this point, identified on the templates, and coordinated with the staff targeting
elements for possible targeting during combat.

7. Identify initial collection requirements. Once the likely ECOAs are determined, the
challenge becomes determining which one the enemy will actually adopt. In this sub-step, the
analyst attempts to identify specific areas and activities which, when observed, will reveal which
COA the enemy has chosen. The geographic areas where you expect key events to occur are
called Named Areas of Interest and the activities themselves are called indicators. Using a
situation matrix, an event template graphic (see Appendix A), or other tool, the intelligence staff
begins to task the appropriate collection systems and analytical assets to watch for indicators in
given NAIs.

1-25
 NWC 4111G

PART 2: MISSION ANALYSIS

I. The commander is responsible for analyzing the mission and restating the mission for
subordinate commanders to begin their own estimate and planning efforts. Mission analysis is
used to study the assigned mission and to identify all tasks necessary to accomplish it. Mission
analysis is critical because it provides direction to the commander and the staff, enabling them to
focus effectively on the problem at hand.

During the mission analysis process, it is essential that the tasks (specified and implied) and
their purposes are clearly stated to ensure planning encompasses all requirements; limitations
(restraints – can't do, or constraints – must do) on actions that the commander or subordinate
forces may take are understood; and the correlation between the commander’s mission and intent
and those of higher and other commanders is understood.

When the commander receives a mission tasking—normally through a WARNING ORDER

(WO) during Crisis Action Planning (CAP) or PLANNING GUIDANCE during Deliberate
Planning Process—analysis begins with the following questions:

• What tasks must my command do for the mission to be accomplished?

• What is the purpose of the mission received?
• What limitations have been placed on my own forces' actions?
• What forces/assets are available to support my operation?

Once these questions have been answered, the commander should understand the mission.
The commander should become familiar with the area and the situation before initiating analysis
and issuing planning guidance, particularly if this is a mission not anticipated by the command.
Pertinent and significant facts are identified, and the initial assumptions to be used in the
estimate process are assessed to decide their current validity.

II. Mission analysis normally contains the following steps:

• Determine planning facts

• Determine the source(s) of the mission.
• Determine who are the "supporting" and "supported" commanders.
• State Higher Commander's mission.
• State Higher Commander's intent.
• Identify specified, derive implied, and determine essential tasks.
• Identify externally imposed limitations affecting the mission.
• Identify available forces and assets and noted shortfalls.
• Identify (planning) assumptions.
• Conduct initial risk assessment.
• Develop the proposed mission statement.
• Provide a Mission Analysis Brief
• Receive the Commander's Planning Guidance
• Receive the Commander's Intent.
1-27
 NWC 4111G

• Issue Commander's Planning Guidance

• Issue WARNING ORDER to subordinate commands.

1. Determine Planning Facts: The essence of the Mission Analysis step is to ascertain
"What does the organization know about the current situation and status?" The following
paragraphs should lead the staff through the discovery of those facts.

2. The Source(s) of the Mission: Normally found in a Higher HQ OPORD/OPLAN,

planning directive, or WARNING ORDER. Depending on the scope of the operation, consider
also reviewing applicable UNSCRs, alliance directives, National Security Presidential Decision
Directives, and other authoritative sources for additional information.

3. Identify the “Supported” and “Supporting Commanders" and Agencies: The staff
should be clear in their understanding of support relationships. This information will also be
normally found in the Source of Mission document (s).

4. Analyze the Higher Commander's Mission: The higher commander's mission

statement—normally contained in Higher Commander's directive—and the capabilities and
limitations of friendly forces must be studied. The commander must draw broad conclusions as
to the character of the forthcoming military action. However, the commander should not make
assumptions about issues not addressed by the higher commander and if the higher
headquarters' directive is unclear, ambiguous, or confusing, the commander should seek
clarification.

Higher Commander's Mission:

5. State the Higher Commander's Intent: A main concern for a commander during
mission analysis is to study not only the mission, but also the intent of the higher commander.
Within the breadth and depth of today’s battlespace, effective decentralized control cannot occur
without a shared vision. Without a commander’s intent that expresses that common vision, unity
of effort is difficult to achieve. In order to turn information into decisions and decisions into
actions that are “about right," commanders must understand the higher Commander’s Intent.

1-28
 NWC 4111G

While the Commander’s Intent had previously been considered to be inherent in the mission and
concept of operations, most often you will see it explicitly detailed in the plan/order.
Successfully communicating the more enduring intent allows the force to continue the mission
even though circumstances have changed and the previously developed plan/concept of
operations is no longer valid.

The higher Commander’s Intent is normally found in paragraph 3, Execution of the higher
commander’s directive, although its location in the text may vary. Sometimes the higher
Commander's Intent may not be transmitted at all. When this occurs, the subordinate commander
and staff should derive an intent statement and confirm it with the higher headquarters. The
intent statement of the higher echelon commander should then be repeated in paragraph 1,
Situation, of your own Operations Plan (OPLAN) or Operations Order (OPORD) to ensure that
the staff and supporting commanders understand it. Each subordinate Commander’s Intent must
be framed and embedded within the context of the higher Commander’s Intent, and they must be
“nested” both vertically and horizontally to achieve a common military end state throughout the
command.11 The intent statement must be within the framework of the next higher commander.

A Commander’s Intent is broader than the mission statement and it is a concise, free form
expression of the purpose of the force’s activities, the desired results, and how actions will
progress toward that end. It is a clear and succinct vision, of how to conduct the action. In short,
it links the mission and the concept of operations. The intent expresses the broader purpose of
the action that looks beyond the "why" of the immediate operation to the broader context of that
mission and may include "how" the posture of the force at the end state of the action will
transition to or facilitate further operations (sequels).

A Commander’s Intent is not a summary of the concept of operations. It does not tell
specifically “how” the operation is being conducted. It must be crafted to allow subordinate
commanders sufficient flexibility and freedom to act in accomplishing their assigned mission(s)
even in the “fog of war.” The intent consists of three components:12
Purpose: the reason for the military action with respect to the mission of the next higher
echelon. The purpose explains why the military action is being conducted. This helps the force
pursue the mission without further orders, even when actions do not unfold as planned. Thus, if
an unanticipated situation arises, participating commanders will understand the purpose of the
forthcoming action well enough to act decisively, and within the bounds of the higher
commander’s intent.
Method: the “how,” in doctrinally concise terminology, explains the offensive form of
maneuver, the alternative defense, or other action to be used by the force as a whole. Details as
to specific subordinate missions are not discussed.
End State:13 describes what the commander wants to see in military terms (“military
landscape”) after the completion of the mission by his own and friendly forces.

____________________
11
Nested refers to the concept of complementary intents among the joint force commands to ensure all are similarly focused.
12
There is no specified joint format for Commander’s Intent, though the offered construct is generally accepted.
13
this should not be confused with the concept of “Desired End State,” which reflects a broader view of all elements of power
and the conditions that the highest political leadership of national or alliance/coalition forces wants in a given theater after the
end of hostilities. (Vego, Milan Operational Warfare, Naval War College, 2000)

1-29
 NWC 4111G

The commander is responsible for formulating the single unifying concept for a mission.
Having developed that concept, the commander then prepares his intent statement from the
mission analysis, the intent of his higher commander, and his own vision to ensure his
subordinate commanders are focused on a common goal. The task here is to clearly articulate the
intent so it is understandable two echelons below. When possible, the commander delivers it,
along with the order (or plan), personally (and/or via VTC). Face-to-face delivery ensures mutual
understanding of what the issuing commander wants by allowing immediate clarification of
specific points. While intent is more enduring than the concept of operations, the commander
can, and should, revise his intent when circumstances dictate.

Higher Commander's Intent:

6. Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks: Any mission consists of two
elements: the task(s) to be accomplished by one’s forces and their purpose. If a mission has
multiple tasks, then the priority of each task should be clearly expressed. Usually this is done by
the sequence in which the tasks are presented. There might be a situation in which a commander
has been given such broad guidance that all or part of the mission would need to be deduced.
Deduction should be based on an appreciation of the general situation and an understanding of
the superior's objective. Consequently, deduced tasks must have a reasonable chance of
accomplishment and should secure results that support the superior commander’s objective.

a. State the task(s): The task is the job or function assigned to a subordinate unit or
command by higher authority. A mission can contain a single task, but it often contains two or
more tasks. If there are multiple tasks, they normally will all be related to a single purpose.

Depending on the objective to be accomplished, tactical, operational, and strategic tasks are
differentiated. Examples of tactical tasks are: destroy enemy convoy TANGO; seize enemy
naval base (airfield) ZULU; destroy enemy submarines in combat zone ROMEO; seize hill
BRAVO, etc. Examples of operational tasks are: obtain and maintain sea control in maritime
operations area ECHO; obtain air superiority in air area of operations HOTEL; conduct
amphibious landing operation in BRAVO amphibious objective area (AOA); conduct a blockade
of the CHARLIE Strait; conduct amphibious defense in the ALFA area of the coast, etc.
Examples of strategic tasks are: destroy Purple armed forces in the Theater of Operations; seize
control of country RED; destroy RED sea-based nuclear deterrent forces, etc.

1-30
 NWC 4111G

(1) Specified Task(s): Tasks listed in the mission received from higher commander's
headquarters are specified or stated (assigned) tasks. They are what the higher commander wants
accomplished. The commander’s specified tasks are normally found in paragraph 3b (Execution
- Tasks) section of the order, but could also be contained elsewhere—for example in
coordinating instructions or in annexes (though this should be avoided if possible).

Specified Task(s):

(2) Implied Task(s): After identifying the specified tasks, the commander identifies
additional major tasks necessary to accomplish the assigned mission. Though not facts, these
additional major tasks are implied tasks, which are sometimes deduced from detailed analysis of
the order of the higher commander, known enemy situation, and the commander’s knowledge of
the physical environment. Therefore, the implied tasks subsequently included in the
commander’s proposed mission should be limited to those considered critical to the
accomplishment of the assigned mission. Implied tasks do not include routine or standing
operating procedures (SOPs) that are performed to accomplish any type of mission by friendly
forces. Hence, tasks that are inherent responsibilities of the commander (providing protection of
the flank of his own unit, reconnaissance, deception, etc.) are not considered implied tasks. The
exceptions are only those routine tasks that cannot successfully be carried out without support or
coordination of other friendly commanders. An example of an implied task is if your command
was given a specified task to seize a seaport facility, the implied task might be the requirement to
establish sea control within the area of operations before the assault.

Implied Task(s):

(3) Essential Task(s): Essential tasks are determined from the list of both specified and
implied tasks. They are those tasks that must be executed to achieve the conditions that define
mission success. Depending on the scope of the mission's purpose, some of the specified and
implied tasks might need to be synthesized and re-written as an essential task. Only essential
tasks should be included in the mission statement.

1-31
 NWC 4111G

Essential Task(s):

b. State the Purpose: The purpose follows the statement of task(s). To clearly delineate the
two, the statement “in order to” should be inserted between the task(s) and purpose. Purpose is
normally found at the beginning of the “Execution” section of the superior’s directive. If the
superior’s directive also contains an intent statement, that should also be reviewed to help
analyze the “purpose” of the operation. The purpose always dominates the tasks. A task or
tasks can be accomplished or changed due to unforeseen circumstances, but the purpose remains
essentially the same if the original mission remains unchanged.14 Purpose should answer the
“why” question.

Example; “JTF Blue Sword will seize seaport Y (task) in order to sever Country Z's Lines
of Communication (purpose).”15

Purpose:

7. Identify Externally Imposed Limitations:

a. Restraints (Can't Do): Restraints or restrictions are things the higher commander
prohibits subordinate commander(s) from doing (for example, not conducting reconnaissance
flights beyond Latitude 52°, not to approach the enemy coast closer than 30 nautical miles,
specific Rules of Engagement (ROE) guidance, etc.).

The commander and staff should consider the impact of the stated ROE on their ability
to accomplish the mission (for example, access to or through sovereign land, sea, or airspace as a
legal/political consideration). Any requirement to change the ROE, either relaxation or more
restrictive, must be considered and addressed when developing the COAs.

___________________
14
Be alert for “Mission Creep.” As the operation proceeds and tasks with no linkage to the purpose are added, the force is likely
experiencing Mission Creep. The commander should initiate a new CES at this point to ensure the reliability of the operation.
15
If the mission statement supports a complex, multi-phased operation or campaign, it may require separate purpose and
supporting tasks for each major phase.

1-32
 NWC 4111G

Restraints (Can't Do):

b. Identify Externally Imposed Constraints (Must Do): The superior's directive normally
indicates circumstances and limitations under which one’s own forces will initiate and/or
continue their actions. Therefore, the higher commander may impose some constraints on the
commander’s freedom of action with respect to the actions to be conducted. These constraints
will affect the selection of COAs and the planning process. Examples include tasks by the higher
command that specify: “Be prepared to . . . ”; “Not earlier than . . . ”; “Not later than . . . .”; “Use
coalition forces…” Time is often a constraint, because it affects the time available for planning
or execution of certain tasks.

Constraints (Must Do):

Constraints and restraints collectively comprise “limitations” on the commander's

freedom of action. Remember restraints and constraints do not include doctrinal
considerations. Do not include self-imposed limitations during this portion of the CES.

8. Analysis of Available Forces and Assets:

a. Review forces that have been provided for planning and their locations (if known).
Determine the status of reserve forces and the time they will be available.

b. Referring back to paragraph 6 in which you identified your specified and implied tasks,
now determine what broad force structure and capabilities are necessary to accomplish these
tasks (e.g., Is a Carrier Battle Group or forcible entry capabilities required?). Note: The service
component Liaison Officers (LNOs) and planners are critical players in this step.

1-33
 NWC 4111G

c. Identify shortfalls between the two.

CAUTION: This is just an initial JTF force structure analysis. More specific requirements will
be determined after the Courses of Action have been developed and analyzed!

Forces Available and Noted Shortfalls by Task or Function

Example: Task: Seize APOD. Observation: No forced entry capability (MEU, Airborne)

z REMINDER During the JIPB portion of this Step, the J2 was provided
the Friendly Objectives, Critical Factors, Center(s) of Gravity, Critical
Vulnerabilities, and Decisive Points. These are Joint Planning Group (JPG)
products from the Mission Analysis. If not already accomplished, this friendly
information should now be identified. See pages 1-19 thru 1-21.z

9. Identify Higher Command's Assumptions and Create Your Own Assumptions: An

assumption is used in the absence of facts that the commander needs to continue planning. An
assumption is a supposition on the current situation (or a supposition on the future course of
events), which is (1) assumed to be true without positive proof, and (2) necessary to enable the
commander, during planning, to complete an estimate of the situation and decide the course of
action (Joint Pub 1-02). An assumption encompasses the issues over which a commander
normally does not have control. If you make an assumption, you must direct resources towards
turning that assumption into a fact (i.e., directing intelligence collection, RFIs, etc) and/or
developing a branch plan.

Assumptions are made for both friendly operations and the enemy. The commander can
assume the success of friendly supporting actions that are essential for success, but cannot
assume success for the actions of his own forces—no matter which COA he chooses. Planners
should normally assume the worst-case scenario.16 In other words, they must assume that the
opponent will use every capability at his disposal and will operate in the most efficient manner
possible. To dismiss enemy options as unlikely could dangerously limit the depth and validity of
planning. Planners should not assume away an enemy capability. They cannot assume a
condition simply because of a lack of accurate knowledge of friendly forces or a lack of
intelligence about the enemy.
___________________
16 Exception is when your command possesses accurate and reliable intelligence to the contrary.

1-34
 NWC 4111G

Key characteristics of assumptions are that they are reasonable suppositions— logical and
realistic; and they must be essential for planning to continue. Existing capabilities should not be
treated as assumptions. Examples of inappropriate assumptions include: “Our forces will flow
into theater without delay”; “necessary logistics resources, including support to available
operational forces . . . will be provided from CONUS as required”; “communications will be
provided as required”; etc. An appropriate assumption might be, “Country Orange will remain
neutral during the operation.”

Subordinate commanders must treat assumptions given by the higher headquarters as facts.
If the commander or staff does not concur with the higher commander's planning assumptions,
they should be challenged before continuing with the planning process. All assumptions should
be continually reviewed.

Assumptions are used in the commander’s estimate at each command echelon. Usually,
commanders and their staffs should make assumptions that fall within the scope of their
battlespace. We often see that the higher the command echelon, the more assumptions that will
be made. Assumptions enable the commander and the staff to continue planning despite a lack of
concrete information. They are artificial devices to fill gaps in actual knowledge, but they play a
crucial role in planning. A poor assumption may partially or completely invalidate the entire
plan—to account for a possible wrong assumption, planners should consider developing
branches to the basic plan. Assumptions should be kept at a minimum. For examples of planning
assumptions see Appendix D to this workbook.

Assumptions are not rigid. Their validation will influence intelligence collection. They
must be continuously checked, revalidated, and adjusted until they are proven as facts or
are overcome by events.

Higher Command's Assumptions:

Own Assumptions:

Tests for an Assumption:

Is it logical?
Is it realistic?
Is it essential for planning?

1-35
 NWC 4111G

10. Conduct an Initial Risk Assessment: In order to advise the Commander of initial
apparent risks, the staff should conduct an initial risk assessment. Risks, and their mitigation, are
addressed again in STEP 2 Developing COAs. See Appendix E Risk Assessment for more
information.

a. There may be risks associated with:

(1) Mission (risks the Commander is willing to take for mission accomplishment, e.g.,
forward presence vs. risk of provocation).
(2) Force protection issues (e.g., a high risk of significant casualties, medium risk of
fratricide, low risk of terrorist activities in the JOA).
(3) Time available as provided by Higher HQ-imposed limitations.

b. Higher HQ might state or imply acceptable risk (e.g., could be addressed in the Higher
Commander’s intent, concept of operations, additional guidance).

c. Individual staff sections determine risks from their own situational analysis and provide
them to the Joint Planning Group / Operational Planning Group (JPG/OPG)17 through their
representatives.

d. The JPG/OPG determine the overall risks and consider potential methods for risk
mitigation.

Initial Risk Assessment:

11. Develop Proposed Mission Statement: The product of the mission analysis is the
proposed mission. It must be a clear, concise statement of the essential (specified and implied)
tasks to be accomplished by the command and the purpose(s) of those tasks. Multiple tasks are
normally listed in the sequence to be accomplished. Although several tasks may have been
identified during the mission analysis, the proposed mission includes only those that are essential
to the overall success of the mission. The tasks that are routine or inherent responsibilities of a
commander are not included in the proposed mission. The external limitations, assumptions and
facts identified in STEP 1 are used later during the formulation of COAs. The proposed mission
becomes the focus of the commander’s and staff's estimates. It should be reviewed at each
step of the CES process to ensure planning is not straying from this critical focus (or that the
mission requires adjustment). It is contained in paragraph 1 of the commander’s estimate and
paragraph 2 of the basic OPLAN or OPORD.
____________________
17 OPG--Operational Planning Group. JPG--Joint Operational Planning Group. Those members of the service components or
joint staff engaged in the planning process.

1-36
 NWC 4111G

All efforts by the commander and the staff should be mission-oriented. Losing sight of the
assigned mission will result in a confused analysis, which may ultimately lead to failure. The
mission statement must contain all of the following elements:

• Who (organization, group of forces) will execute the action?

• What type of action (for example, deterrence, defeat, evacuation, etc.) is contemplated?
• When will the action begin?
• Where will the action occur (area of operations and objectives)?
• Why (the purpose of the operation)?

The element of "what" states the mission essential tasks. The unit mission statement will
include on-order missions; be-prepared missions will be in the concept of operations.18
Sample Proposed Mission Statement

On order, JTF Blue Sword conducts operations to seize lodgments in REDLAND and
defeat the REDLAND armed forces in order to eliminate terrorist safe havens in the
region.

Proposed Mission Statement:

____________________
18
An on-order task is a task that will be executed; only the timing of the execution is unknown. A be-prepared task is a task that
might be executed, and as a contingency, the tasked unit will be prepared to execute the task if so directed. Since a be-prepared
task is by definition a contingency, it cannot be considered an essential task and as such, should not appear in the mission
statement.

1-37
 NWC 4111G

MISSION ANALYSIS BRIEF

Upon conclusion of the Mission Analysis and JIPB, the staff will present a Mission Analysis
Brief to the commander. The purpose of the Mission Analysis Brief is to provide the
commander with the results of the staff's analysis, offer a forum to surface issues that have been
identified, and an opportunity for the commander to refine his guidance to the staff and to
approve or disapprove the staff's analysis. Though unit Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
may dictate the specific format for a Mission Analysis Brief, the following example format (see
Figure 1-3) is provided:

MISSION ANALYSIS BRIEFING

BRIEFER SUBJECT
Chief of Staff or J5/J3 - Purpose and agenda
- Area of Operations (Joint Operations Area)

J2 - Initial intelligence situation brief (could also include

elements of the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace)

J5/J3 - Commander’s mission, intent and concept of operations

- Forces currently available (US and multinational)
- Assumptions
- Limitations — Must do and cannot do
- Centers of gravity/decisive points — Enemy and friendly
- Tasks to be performed
— Specified
— Implied
— Essential
- Initial JTF force structure analysis
- Risk assessment
- End state
- Proposed mission statement
- Proposed Initial CCIR*
- Time analysis—Including projected planning milestones

J1** - Facts, assumptions, conclusions

— Personnel actions
— Personnel services
— Other personnel related support

1-38
 NWC 4111G

J4** — Facts, assumptions, conclusions

— Supply
— Services
— Health services
— Transportation
— Others

J6** - Facts, assumptions, conclusions

Others** - Others as appropriate to the mission

* Optional—depends on SOP.
** Should only be amplifications that each of these staff sections believe necessary for the
commander to hear.

Figure 1-4. Example Mission Analysis Briefing Format

1-39
 NWC 4111G

COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE

1. Commander's Intent: The commander will normally issue an initial intent (see
discussion in Part 2, paragraph 5, pp. 1-26 through 1-27) with the planning guidance and in the
WARNING ORDER. The commander’s intent should focus on the purpose of the forthcoming
action for subordinate units two levels down. The intent statement in an OPORD or OPLAN is
placed in paragraph 3, Execution.

Remember, the Commander’s Intent must be crafted to allow subordinate commanders

sufficient flexibility in accomplishing their assigned mission(s). It must provide a “vision” of
those conditions that the commander wants to see after the military action is accomplished. The
commander must define how the “vision” will generally be accomplished by forces and assets
available, and the conditions/status of friendly and enemy forces with respect to the battlespace
as the end state. The commander, and not his staff, writes the best Commander’s Intent. There
are a variety of techniques, which may be used in crafting an intent, one is offered below.

Method
Purpose

COMMANDER’S INTENT

The purpose of this operation is to eliminate REDLAND's support to

international terrorism.
JTF Blue Sword will conduct rapid and decisive military operations to quickly
overwhelm REDLAND's armed forces, and thoroughly dismantle their
terrorist support structure. Surprise and speed of operations will be keys to
our success. The flow of JTF forces into REDLAND must occur seamlessly
upon seizure of requisite APODS/SPODS; we cannot lose the initiative at this
critical stage. All operations must minimize collateral damage or the
environment may become more conducive to a population more receptive to
REDLAND guerilla operations.
At the conclusion of operations, the REDLAND armed forces are defeated and
the terrorist C2 and camp infrastructure in REDLAND is destroyed and our
forces are postured to hand-over the JOA to an International Peacekeeping
force.

End State

Sample Commander's Intent Statement for a JTF Commander

1-40
 NWC 4111G

Commander’s Initial Intent:

2. Commander's Critical Information Requirement: An element of information

personally required and approved by the commander that directly affects his decision-making.
CCIRs result from the analysis of Information Requirements (IR) against the mission and
Commander's Intent and are normally limited in number (often 5 or fewer items) to enhance
comprehension. They help the commander filter information available to him by defining what is
important to mission accomplishment. They also help focus the efforts of his subordinates and
staff in allocating resources and to assist staff officers in making recommendations. The CCIRs
directly affect the success or failure of the mission and they are time-sensitive in that they drive
commanders' decisions at decision points. The CCIRs contain two key subcomponents of
information requirements:

• Priority Information Requirements—What do I need to know about the enemy (as

discussed in the JIPB section of this workbook)?
• Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR)—What do I need to know about the
capabilities of our own and adjacent friendly forces (what information must we track on
our own forces)?

The key question is, "What does the commander need to know in a specific situation to
make a particular decision in a timely manner?" The commander decides what information is
critical, based on his experience, the mission, the higher Commander's Intent, and input from the
staff. CCIRs are situation-dependent and specified by the commander for each operation. He
must continuously review the CCIRs during the planning process and adjust them as situations
change. During the CES, initial CCIRs are identified in Step 1, Part 1, “JIPB.” The staff often
nominates proposed initial CCIRs for the Commander's approval during the Mission Analysis
briefing. The CCRIs will be revised and updated in Step 3, “Analyze Friendly COAs.”

1-41
 NWC 4111G

Initial CCIR:

3. Commander's Planning Guidance: The commander approves or modifies the proposed

mission and provides his staff and the subordinate commanders and their staffs initial planning
guidance. The purpose of the Commander's Guidance is to focus staff effort in a meaningful
direction to develop courses of action that reflect the commander's style and expectations. The
content of planning guidance varies from commander to commander and is dependent on the
situation and time available. This guidance is essential for timely and effective COA
development and analysis. The guidance should precede the staff’s preparation for conducting
their respective staff estimates. The commander’s responsibility is to implant a desired vision of
the forthcoming combat action into the minds of the staff. Enough guidance (preliminary
decisions) must be provided to allow the subordinates to plan the action necessary to accomplish
the mission consistent with the intent of the commander two echelons above. The Commander’s
Guidance must focus on the essential military tasks and associated objectives that support the
accomplishment of the assigned mission.

The commander may provide the planning guidance to the entire staff and/or subordinate
commanders or meet with each staff officer or subordinate unit commander individually as the
situation and information dictates. The guidance should be published in written form. No format
for the planning guidance is prescribed; however, the guidance should be sufficiently detailed to
provide a clear direction and to avoid unnecessary effort by the staff or subordinate commanders.
The more detailed the guidance is, the more specific staff activities will be. And, the more
specific the activities, the more quickly the staff can complete them. Yet, the more specific the
activities, the greater is the risk of overlooking or inadequately examining other details that may
affect mission execution.

Commander's Planning Guidance should consider addressing:

• Specific course(s) of action to consider or not to consider, both friendly and enemy,
governing factors to use for COA assessment, and the priority for addressing them.
• Initial CCIR.
• Initial intent.
• Initial risk assessment.
• Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) priorities.
• Military deception guidance (this guidance may be limited in dissemination for OPSEC
purposes).
• Fires (lethal and non-lethal) direction.

1-42
 NWC 4111G

• Effects (lethal and non-lethal) direction.

• Targeting direction.
• Security measures to be implemented.
• The time plan (back briefs, rehearsals, movement, etc.).
• The type of order to be issued.
• Collaborative planning sessions to be conducted.
• Deployment priorities.
• The type of rehearsal to conduct.
• Additional specific priorities for sustainment.
• Any other information the commander wants the staff and/or components to consider.

Commander’s Planning Guidance can be very explicit and detailed, or it can be very broad,
allowing the staff and/or subordinate commanders wide latitude in developing subsequent COAs.
However, regardless of its scope, the content of planning guidance must be arranged in a logical
sequence to reduce the chances of misunderstanding and to enhance clarity. Moreover, it must be
recognized that all the elements of planning guidance are only tentative.

The commander may issue additional planning guidance during the decision making
process. The focus should remain upon the framework provided in the initial planning guidance.
There is no limitation as to the number of times the commander may issue his planning guidance.
However, when guidance radically changes prior communications, the commander should clarify
why the guidance has changed since some other aspect of the planning process may also be
compromised.

Commander’s Planning Guidance:

1-43
 NWC 4111G

WARNING ORDER

Once the commander approves the mission following the Mission Analysis briefing and
evaluates the factors affecting mission accomplishment, a WO will normally be issued to
subordinate commanders using the five-paragraph format (SMEAC).

1. Situation (S)
2. Mission (M)
3. Execution (E)
4. Admin and Logistics (A)
5. Command and Control (C)

It serves as a preliminary notice of a forthcoming military action with an understanding that

more information will follow after the COA is selected. It is normally issued as a brief written
message that lists the available information and required instructions.

The commander and his staff also refine their initial planning timeline for the use of
available time. They compare the time needed to accomplish essential tasks to the higher
headquarters’ time line to ensure mission accomplishment is possible in the allotted time.

The commander and staff specify when and where they will conduct the various
briefings that are the result of the planning process, if they will conduct collaborative
planning sessions and, if so, when and by what means, and when, where, and in what form
they will conduct rehearsals. The commander can maximize available planning time for his
own and subordinate units by sending additional WOs as detailed planning develops. This
allows parallel planning by subordinate units. The commander also frequently uses LNOs
to stay abreast of planning at higher headquarters.

1-44
 NWC 4111G

STEP 2: DEVELOPMENT OF FRIENDLY COURSES OF ACTION

A COA is any concept of operation open to a commander that, if adopted, would result in
the accomplishment of the mission. For each COA, the commander must envisage the
employment of his forces and assets as a whole—normally two levels down—taking into account
externally imposed limitations, the factual situation in the area of operations, and the conclusions
previously drawn up during STEP 1 (JIPB and Mission Analysis).

This step should begin with a review of some key Step 1 information:

• Mission
• Commander's Intent
• Assumptions
• Objectives (enemy & friendly)
• Centers of Gravity (enemy & friendly)
• Decisive Points (enemy & friendly)

After receiving guidance, the staff develops COAs for analysis and comparison. The
commander must involve the entire staff in their development. Commander's Planning Guidance
and Commander’s Intent focus the staff to produce a comprehensive, flexible plan within the
time constraints. Direct commander participation helps the staff get quick, accurate answers to
questions that occur during the process. COA development is a deliberate attempt to design
unpredictable COAs (difficult for the enemy to deduce). A good COA will position the force for
future operations and provide flexibility to meet unforeseen events during execution. It also
provides the maximum latitude for initiative by subordinates.

The order from higher headquarters normally provides the what, when, and why for the
force as a whole. The "who" in the COA does not specify the designation of units; it arrays assets
by component (for example, naval, ground, air, space) and by function (intelligence, maneuver,
fires, logistics, command and control, protection).

There are normally four steps in COA development:

• Generate options.
• Test for validity.
• Recommend command relationships.
• Prepare COA statements and sketches.

1. Generate Options: A good COA should be capable of defeating all retained enemy
COAs. In a totally unconstrained environment, the goal is to develop several such COAs. Since
there is rarely enough time to do this, the commander often limits the options with his
commander's guidance. The options should focus on enemy COAs arranged in order of probable
adoption.

Brainstorming is the preferred technique for generating options. It requires time,

imagination, and creativity, but it produces the widest range of options. The staff must be

2-1
 NWC 4111G

unbiased and open-minded in evaluating proposed options. Staff members can quickly identify
COAs not obviously feasible in their particular areas of expertise. They can also quickly decide
if they can modify a COA to accomplish the requirement or eliminate it immediately. If one staff
member identifies information that might affect another's analysis, he shares it immediately. This
eliminates wasted time and effort. As discussed in STEP 1 when developing possible ECOAs,
the staff may wish to use the DRAW-D19 concept to consider general friendly COAs.

Planners should consider military deception operations for their potential influence on COAs
since aspects of the deception operation may influence unit positioning.

Planners next make the initial array of friendly forces. Planners normally array forces two
levels down.20 The initial array of forces focuses on generic units without regard to specific units
or task organization, and then considers all force multipliers, i.e., airpower, IO, etc., they must
allocate to accomplish the mission.

The initial array identifies the total number of units or assets needed, develops a base of
knowledge to make decisions, and identifies possible methods of dealing with the enemy during
scheme-of-maneuver development. If the number arrayed is greater than the number available,
the shortfall becomes a possible requirement for additional resources or a place to possibly
accept risk. See Appendix E for a discussion on risk assessment.

Planners should compare friendly forces against enemy forces to see if there are sufficient
forces to accomplish the tasks. Planners should not develop and recommend COAs based solely
on mathematical analyses of relative combat power and force ratios. Although some numerical
relationships are used in this process, the estimate is largely subjective. It requires assessing both
tangible and intangible factors, such as friction or enemy will and intentions. Numerical force
ratios do not include the human factors of warfare that, many times, are more important than the
number of tanks, ships, or airplanes. The staff must carefully consider and integrate the
intangible factors into their comparisons. See Appendix B for a discussion on force ratios and
relative combat power.

COA development planning should consider all joint force capabilities and focus on
contributing to the defeat / neutralization of the enemy's Center of Gravity and the protection of
the friendly COG. As identified in STEP 1, Part 1, “JIPB,” access to both of these COGs is
found through the control/neutralization /defeat of identified critical vulnerabilities and decisive
points. The COA should mass the effects of overwhelming combat power at these points to
achieve a result with respect to the enemy's COG.

____________________
19
DRAW-D may be a less useful technique during the planning for Stability and Support Operations (SASO), since the planning
may focus on actions other than those implied by DRAW-D.
20
The intent of arraying forces two levels down is to assess force requirements and not to micromanage subordinates.

2-2
 NWC 4111G

The massing of effects on the COG is considered the decisive operation. Next, the staff
determines the shaping operations—those operations that set conditions for the decisive
operation to succeed. The decisive operations’ purpose directly relates to the mission of the
unit; the shaping operation's purpose relates directly to the decisive operation. The staff then
determines the essential tasks for the decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations--those
operations that enable shaping and decisive operations through logistics/supporting activities and
battlespace management--to achieve these purposes.

Once staff members have explored each COA's possibilities, they can examine each (by
changing, adding, or eliminating COAs as appropriate) to determine if it satisfies the COA-
selection criteria. The staff must avoid the common pitfall of presenting one good COA among
several “throwaway” COAs. Often the commander will combine COAs or move desirable
elements from one to another.

COA#1: JTF Blue Sword conducts airborne and amphibious forced entry operations to seize
REDLAND airbase and projects ground forces into REDLAND to defeat the 23rd Red Guard
Division and destroy terrorist sites. Air and maritime forces conduct supporting operations and
neutralize REDLAND air and naval capabilities.

Sample Tentative COA Statement

List Tentative Courses of Action:

COA #1:

COA #2:

COA #3:

COA #4:

2-3
 NWC 4111G

2. Test for validity. Before going any further in COA development, the staff should review
the tentative COAs for their validity. Test for validity address: suitability, feasibility,
acceptability, distinguishability, and completeness.

• Suitable. It must accomplish the mission and comply with higher command guidance.
However, the commander may modify his guidance at any time. When the guidance
changes, the staff records and coordinates the new guidance and reevaluates each COA to
ensure it complies with the change.

• Feasible. The unit must have the capability and resources to accomplish the mission in
terms of available time, space, and resources, within constraints of the physical
environment, logistics and sustainability, and in the face of extreme enemy opposition.
This requires a visualization of the COA against each ECOA. Innovative COAs take full
advantage of the situation and all available forces and assets. Any assessment of the
feasibility at this point in the estimate is only tentative. The intent here is to discard
COAs that are clearly not feasible because available forces and assets are inadequate.

• Acceptable. The advantage gained by executing the COA must justify the cost in
resources, especially casualties. A COA is considered acceptable if the estimated results
are worth the estimated costs—losses of friendly forces versus the mission's purpose—
and it complies with higher commander's guidance. Moreover, losses in regard to time,
position, or opportunity must be estimated as well. Whether a COA is acceptable it must
be considered from both the commander's view and the view of the commander's
superior. Must the COA be reconciled with external constraints, particularly ROE? A
COA that does not meet this test must be modified to make it acceptable or discarded at
this point in the estimate. This assessment is largely subjective. Like the feasibility test,
the acceptability of a specific COA can only be tentative at this stage. The prospect of
risk needs to be taken into account, and may have to be accepted.

• Distinguishable. Each COA must differ significantly from the other COAs. The
significant differences of each COA is ensured by emphasizing distinctions in regard to:
direction/type of the main effort; direction/type of supporting effort; scheme of maneuver
(air, land, sea); task organization; phasing/sequencing; anticipated use of reserves; timing
(simultaneous or sequential); principal method of combat employment or method21of
mission accomplishment; and logistics considerations.

• Complete. A COA is complete if it includes the following: WHO? (which component

commander(s) is/are to conduct combat action(s); WHAT? (the type of combat action:
DRAW-D); WHEN? (the time the action will begin); WHERE? (the location of action);
HOW? (the method or scheme of employment of forces and assets); and WHY? (the
purpose of combat action).
(Joint Pub 5-00.2)
_____________________
21
Method differs from scheme of maneuver in that method reflects a markedly different way to accomplish a mission, e.g.,
blockade versus forced entry.

2-4
 NWC 4111G

3. Recommend Command and Control Arrangements: Planners next establish preliminary

command and control arrangements to groupings of forces for each COA. This structure should
consider the types of units to be assigned to a headquarters or component and its span of control.
If planners need additional headquarters, they note the shortage and resolve it later. C2
arrangements take into account the entire battlespace organization. It also accounts for the
special C2 requirements of operations that have unique requirements, such as amphibious
landings or special operations.

4. Develop the Course of Action statement and sketch for each COA.

a. The course of action statement describes how the forces will accomplish the commander's
Intent. It concisely expresses the commander's concept for operations and governs the design of
supporting plans or annexes. Planners develop a concept by refining the initial array of forces
and using graphic control measures to coordinate the operation and to show the relationship of
friendly forces to one another, the enemy, and the battlespace. During this step, units are
converted from generic to specific types of units, such as armored or mechanized divisions. The
purpose of this step is to clarify the commander's initial intent about the deployment,
employment, and support of friendly forces and assets and to identify major objectives and target
dates for their attainment. In drafting the tentative concept of operations for each COA should
state, in broad but clear terms, what is to be done, the size of the forces deemed necessary, and
time in which force needs to be brought to bear.

A course of action statement should be simple, clear, and complete. It should address all the
elements of organizing the battlespace. Depending on the time available and the complexity of
the operations, the statement may include some of the following:

• The purpose of the combat action.

• When forces will be deployed.
• A statement of where the commander will accept operational (and/or tactical) risk.
• Identification of critical friendly events22 and phases of the operation (if phased).
• How and where joint forces will be employed.
• Designation of the decisive operation, along with its task and purpose.
• Designation of shaping operations, linked to how they support the decisive operation.
• Designation of reserve, to include location, composition, task, and purpose.
• ISR and protection operations.
• Identification of options that may develop during an operation.
• Assignment of subordinate areas of operations.
• Concept of operational fires.23
• Determined IO concept of support and objectives.
• Prescribed formations or dispositions when necessary.
• Priorities for each operational function in support of the operation.
• Considerations of the effects of enemy WMD on the force (as applicable).
____________________
22
These critical events will be used later in Step 3, “Analyze Friendly COAs (War Game).”
23
Operational Fires--fires applied to achieve a decisive impact on the outcome of a campaign or major operation. They can be
lethal or nonlethal. (Vego, Milan Operational Warfare, 2000)

2-5
 NWC 4111G

Planners select control measures24 to control subordinate units during the operation.
Planners base control measures on the array of forces and the scheme of maneuver to defeat
probable enemy courses of action. Control measures clarify responsibilities and synchronize
combat power at decisive points while lessening the risk of fratricide. All control measures
impose some constraints on subordinate commanders. Control measures used should be the
minimum required to exercise necessary control over the operation while allowing as much
freedom of action as possible to subordinates. Planners should also develop phase lines to
implement expected branches and sequels.

b. The COA sketch provides a picture of the joint force employment concept of the COA.
Together, the statement and sketch cover the “who” (generic task organization), “what” (tasks),
“when,” “where,” “how,” and “why” (purpose of the operation) for each subordinate
unit/component command; and any significant risks for the force as a whole.

The sketch could include the array of generic forces and control measures, such as:

• Component command boundaries that establish the JOA/AO.

• Unit deployment/employment.
• Control graphics.
• Lines of Operations.
• Intermediate Staging Bases (ISBs), i.e., Bases of Operation (BOOs); LOCs; and
Objectives (OBJs).
• Sequencing of events.
• Designation of the decisive (i.e., main effort), and shaping (i.e., supporting effort)
operations.
• Enemy known or templated locations.

Planners can enhance the sketch with identifying features such as cities, rivers, and roads to
help orient the commander and staff. The sketch may be on any media; what it portrays is more
important than its form (see figure 2-1).

At this stage of the process, the staff might propose, or the commander might require, a
briefing on the COAs developed and retained. The purpose of this briefing is to gain the
commander’s approval of the COAs to be further analyzed; to receive guidance on how COAs
are to be compared and evaluated; or to receive guidance for revision of briefed COAs or the
development of additional COAs. This is another place where a collaborative session may
facilitate subordinate planning.

____________________
24
Some examples are identifying Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA), Amphibious Objective Areas, specific Areas of
Operations for ground and/or maritime components, Joint Rear Areas, specific fire control measures, etc.

2-6
 NWC 4111G

The COA briefing includes:

• Updated JIPB.
• Possible ECOAs.
• The unit mission statement.
• The Commander's Intent and the higher Commander's Intent.
• The COA statements and sketches.
The rationale for each includes: considerations that might affect ECOAs; deductions
resulting from a relative combat power analysis; the reason units are arrayed as shown on
the sketch; the reason the staff used the selected control measures; assumed risk; and
updated facts and assumptions.

After a decision is made concerning which COAs are to be further analyzed, the commander
should provide additional planning guidance to subordinate commands and also request their
analysis of the COAs. During Crisis Action Planning, this process may be verbal, via a change to
the original WARNING ORDER and/or through the release of a COMMANDER
EVALUATION REQUEST message. If he rejects all COAs, the staff begins again. If he accepts
one or more of the COAs, staff members begin the wargaming process.

Figure 2-1 is an example of a COA. In this case the detailed shaping operations in the early
phases are what would differentiate this COA from other proposed COAs.

2-7
 NWC 4111G

Proposed Course of Action __1

__1___:
___: (Airborne Forced Entry)

COA STATEMENT: The Airborne Forced Entry COA is an aggressive offensive operation aimed at
destroying the RGB and associated terrorist infrastructure. This COA is conducted in 5 Phases.
Phase 1: The first phase's focus is to shape the conditions for the subsequent decisive operations.
During Phase 1, the JFACC will conduct operations to: ensure air superiority in the objective areas,
destroy REDLAND Military and Terrorist C2 nodes, neutralize enemy forces in the vicinity of RED
CITY AIRFIELD, and OBJ DOG, and delay enemy movement towards the AIRFIELD, in priority, of
2d, 3d, and 1st RED GUARD Bdes (RGB). JSOCC will support with surveillance and targeting upon
the 3 RGB. JFMCC will destroy REDLAND maritime capability and support deception operations,
which will portray an amphibious assault in the vicinity of RED PORT. Information Operations will
support the deception and shape the REDLAND public response to the operation. Phase 1 will end
when the JFACC has gained air superiority over the objective areas and the enemy threat at the
AIRFIELD and DOG are neutralized. Phase 2 begins with the main effort, a Brigade-size airborne
assault to seize the RED CITY AIRFIELD and establish a blocking position at OBJ DOG. JFACC
continues to support objectives of Phase 1, and expands air superiority throughout REDLAND. JSOCC
continues to support 3 RGB operations and expands surveillance to suspected terrorist training camps.
JFMCC continues to support Phase 1 objectives and positions to support JTF operations if the MEU is
committed. IO operations remain unchanged. The MEU is the JTF reserve with priority of employment
first to OBJ RAT (blocking position if 3 RGB deploys) and then CAT (if 2 RGB deploys). Phase 2 ends
with the AIRFIELD secured. Phase 3 begins with the deployment of follow-on, air-landed forces, and
ends when the second Brigade-size force is in the JOA. Phase 4 becomes the decisive operation, when
the JFLCC, main effort, accepts the MEU, and completes the destruction of the RGBs and remaining
terrorists. Phase 5 is hand-over and redeployment.

Figure 2-1. Example COA Sketch and Statement

2-8
 NWC 4111G

Proposed Course of Action _____: ( )

SKETCH:

COA STATEMENT:

Table 2-1. Course of Action Sketch and Statement

2-9
 NWC 4111G

STEP 3: ANALYSIS OF FRIENDLY COURSES OF ACTION (WAR GAME)

The heart of the commander’s estimate process is the analysis of opposing courses of action.
Analysis is nothing more than wargaming--either manual or computer assisted. In the previous
steps of the estimate, ECOAs and COAs were examined relative to their basic concepts--ECOAs
were developed based on enemy capabilities, objectives, and our estimate of the enemy's intent
and COAs developed based on friendly mission and capabilities. In this step we conduct an
analysis of the probable effect each ECOA has on the chances of success of each COA. The
aim is to develop a sound basis for determining the feasibility and acceptability of the COAs.
Analysis also provides the planning staff with a greatly improved understanding of their COAs
and the relationship between them.

The COA analysis identifies which COA best accomplishes the mission while best
positioning the force for future operations. It helps the commander and staff to:

• Determine how to maximize combat power against the enemy while protecting the
friendly forces and minimizing collateral damage.
• Have as near an identical visualization of the combat action as possible.
• Anticipate battlespace events and potential reaction options.
• Determine conditions and resources required for success.
• Determine when and where to apply the force's capabilities.
• Focus intelligence collection requirements.
• Determine the most flexible COA.

COA analysis is conducted using wargaming. The war game is a disciplined process, with
rules and steps that attempts to visualize the flow of the operation. The process considers friendly
dispositions, strengths, and weaknesses; enemy assets and probable COAs; and characteristics of
the physical environment. It relies heavily on joint doctrinal foundation, tactical judgment, and
operational experience. It focuses the staff's attention on each phase of the operation in a logical
sequence. It is an iterative process of action, reaction, and counteraction. Wargaming stimulates
ideas and provides insights that might not otherwise be discovered. It highlights critical tasks and
provides familiarity with operational possibilities otherwise difficult to achieve. Wargaming is a
critical portion of the CES and should be allocated more time than any other step. Each retained
COA should, at a minimum, be war gamed against both the most likely and most
dangerous ECOAs.

During the war game, the staff takes a COA statement and begins to add more detail to the
concept, while determining the strengths or weaknesses of each COA. Wargaming tests a COA
or improves upon a developed COA. The commander and his staff (and subordinate commanders
and staffs if the war game is conducted collaboratively) may change an existing COA or develop
a new COA after identifying unforeseen critical events, tasks, requirements, or problems.
Planners need to follow these general rules during the conduct of the war game:
• Remain objective, not allowing personality or their sensing of "what the commander
wants" to influence them. They must avoid defending a COA just because they
personally developed it.
• Accurately record advantages and disadvantages of each COA as they become evident.

3-1
 NWC 4111G

• Continually assess suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of the COA. If a COA fails
any of these tests during the war game, they must reject it.
• Avoid drawing premature conclusions and gathering facts to support such conclusions.
• Avoid comparing one COA with another during the war game. This must wait until STEP
4 (Comparison of Friendly COAs).

The OPG/JPG chief, is normally responsible for coordinating actions of the staff during the
war game.25 The OPG/JPG chief is the unbiased controller of the process, ensuring the staff stays
on a timeline and accomplishes the goals of the wargaming session. In a time-constrained
environment, the OPG/JPG chief ensures that, at a minimum, the decisive action is war gamed.

The J3 (for short-term planning) or J5 (for long-term planning) normally selects the
techniques and methods that the staff will use for wargaming. The J3 role-plays the friendly
commander during the war game. The J3 staff must ensure that the war game of the COA covers
every operational aspect of the mission, records each event's strengths and weaknesses, and
annotates the rationale. When staff members are available, the J3 should assign different
responsibilities within the J3 section for wargaming. The rationale for actions during the war
game are annotated and used later to compare COAs in addition to the Commander's Guidance.

The J1 analyzes COAs to project potential personnel battle losses and determine how
Combat Service Support (CSS) provides personnel support during operations.

The J2 role-plays the enemy commander (unless a Red Cell is used for that role). He
develops critical enemy decision points in relation to the friendly COA, projects enemy reactions
to friendly actions, and projects enemy losses. When staff members are available, the J2 should
assign different responsibilities to individual staff members within the section for wargaming—
such as enemy commander, friendly J2, and enemy recorder. The J2 must capture the results of
each enemy action and counteraction and the corresponding friendly enemy strengths and
vulnerabilities. By trying to win the war game for the enemy, he ensures that the staff fully
addresses friendly responses for each enemy COA. For the friendly force, he identifies
information requirements and refines the event template to include Named Areas of Interest
(NAIs) that support decision points and refines the event matrix with corresponding decision
points, Target Areas of Interest (TAIs), and high-value targets; refines situation templates; and
participates in the targeting meetings and determines High-Payoff Targets (HPTs)26 based on
JIPB.

The J4 analyzes each COA to assess its transportation and sustainment feasibility. He
estimates how long it will take for assets to arrive in theater and he determines critical
requirements for each sustainment function by analyzing each COA to identify potential
problems and deficiencies. He assesses the status of all sustainment functions required to support
the COA and compares this to available assets.
____________________
25
This role is sometimes filled by the J5, J3, or Chief of Staff depending on a variety of factors--not the least of which is time
available. Whoever fills this role should have a clear understanding of the Commander’s Intent.
26
High Payoff Targets are those targets whose loss to the enemy will significantly contribute to the success of the friendly course
of action. HPTs are those high value targets (Step 1 JIPB) identified through wargaming that must be acquired and successfully
attacked for the success of the friendly commander’s mission. (JP 2-01.3)

3-2
 NWC 4111G

He identifies potential shortfalls and recommends actions to eliminate or reduce their effect for
that COA. While improvising can contribute to responsiveness, only accurate prediction or
requirements for each sustainment function can ensure the continuous sustainment of the force.
In addition, the J4 ensures that available movement times and assets will support the COA.

The Civil-Military Operations (CMO) staff analyzes each COA for effectively integrating
civil considerations into the operation. The CMO staff focuses on the operational areas, but like
the J1 and J4, they must also focus on the combat support and combat service support issues,
particularly those regarding foreign nation support and the care of displaced civilians. The staff's
analysis of each COA considers the impact of operations on public order and safety, potential for
disaster relief requirements, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), emergency services,
and protection of culturally significant sites. If the unit does not have an assigned CMO staff,
these responsibilities should be assigned to another staff section.

Special staff officers help the coordinating staff by analyzing the COAs in their own areas of
expertise (legal, public affairs, etc.), indicating how they could best support the mission. Every
staff member must determine the force requirements for external support, the risks, and each
COA's strengths and weaknesses. This can be greatly facilitated and refined when wargaming is
done collaboratively. In addition, when conducted collaboratively, wargaming allows
subordinate units to immediately see refinements to the concept of the operation that emerge
with the war game process; thus the units tailor their own concepts accordingly and speed up the
process.

The staff follows eight steps during the wargaming process:

• Gather the tools.

• List all friendly forces.
• List assumptions.
• List known critical events.
• Determine Governing Factors.
• Select the war game method.
• Record and display results.
• War game the operation and assess the results.

1. Organize for the War game: Gather the necessary tools, materials, and data for the war
game. Units need to war game on maps, sand tables, computer simulations and other tools that
accurately reflect the nature of the terrain. The staff then posts the COA on a map displaying the
JOA/AO and other significant control measures. Tools required include, but are not limited to:

• Display Critical Mission Analysis Information: Higher and own—Mission, Commander's

Intent, Assumptions and CCIRs.
• Event template.
• Recording method.
• Completed COAs, to include maneuver and ISR.
• Means to post enemy and friendly unit symbols.

3-3
 NWC 4111G

• Chart or Map of AO/JOA (either paper or digital).

• Updated estimates and Common Operating Picture.

2. List all Friendly Forces: The commander and staff consider all units that can be
committed to the operation, paying special attention to support relationships and limitations. The
friendly force list remains constant for all COAs that the staff analyzes.

NOTE: Friendly Force information should have been recorded during STEP 1—Mission Analysis.

Friendly Forces
Ground Maritime Air SOF

3. Review Assumptions. The commander and staff review assumptions (as developed in
STEP 1) for continued validity and necessity.

4. List Known Critical Events: These are essential tasks, or a series of critical tasks,
conducted over a period of time that require detailed analysis (e.g., the series of component tasks
to be performed on D-Day). This may be expanded to review component tasks over a phase(s)
of an operation (e.g., lodgment phase) or over a period of time (C-Day through D-Day). The
planning staff may wish at this point to also identify Decision Points (those decisions in time and
space that the commander must make to ensure timely execution and synchronization of
resources). These decision points are most likely linked to a critical event (e.g., commitment of
the JTF Reserve force).

Critical Events: Critical Events:

• Forced entry ops, seizure of

Red Airbase
• JTF deception operation
• Achievement of air
superiority
• Achievement of maritime
superiority

Example List of Critical Events

3-4
 NWC 4111G

5. Determine the Governing Factors:27 Governing Factors are those criteria the staff uses
to measure the effectiveness and efficiency of one COA relative to other COAs following the
war game. They are those aspects of the situation (or externally imposed factors) that the
commander deems critical to the accomplishment of his mission. Potential influencing factors
include elements of the Commander's Guidance and/or Commander’s Intent, selected principles
of war, external constraints, and even anticipated future operations for involved forces or against
the same objective. Governing Factors change from mission to mission. Though these factors
will be applied in the next step when the COAs are compared, it will be helpful during this
wargaming step for all participants to be familiar with the factors so that any insights into a given
COA which influence a factor are recorded for later comparison. The criteria may include
anything the commander desires. If not received directly from the commander, they are often
derived from his intent statement. See Appendix F for a list of possible Governing Factors.
Examples include:

• The Commander's Guidance and Commander’s Intent.

• Mission accomplishment at an acceptable cost.
• The principles of war/MOOTW (MOOSEMUSS/SLURPO).
• Doctrinal fundamentals for the type of operation(s) being conducting.
• The level of residual risk in the COA.

The factors should look at both what will create success and what will cause failure. They
may be used to determine the criteria of success for comparing the COAs in STEP 4.

6. Select the Wargaming Method: There are a variety of wargaming methods that can be
used, with the most sophisticated being computer-aided modeling. Time and resources available
to support the wargaming will undoubtedly influence the method selected. However, wargaming
can be as simple as using a detailed narrative in conjunction with a map or situation sketch. Each
critical event within a proposed COA should be war gamed based upon time available using the
action, reaction, counteraction method of friendly and/enemy interaction.

7. Record and Display Results: Recording the war game's results gives the staff a record
from which to build task organizations, synchronize activity, develop decision support templates,
confirm and refine event templates, prepare plans or orders, and analyze COAs based on
identified strengths and weaknesses. The War game Worksheet (Table 3-1) can be used by staff
members to record any remarks regarding the strengths and weaknesses they discover (see
Figure 3-1 as an example). The amount of detail depends on the time available. Details and
methods of recording and displaying war game results are best addressed in unit Standard
Operating Procedures.

The War game Worksheet allows the staff to synchronize the COA across time and space in
relation to the enemy COA. The War game Worksheet uses a simple format that allows the staff
to game each critical event using an action/reaction/counter-action method, with an ability to
record the timing of the event, force/assets requirements and remarks/observations.
___________________
27
The JPG/OPG may include the suggested Governing Factors in their Mission Analysis brief at the end of Step 1 in order to
receive the Commander’s Guidance/modification.

3-5
 NWC 4111G

8. War game the Combat Action and Assess the Results: During the war game, the
commander and staff try to foresee the dynamics of an operation's action, reaction, and
counteraction. The staff normally analyzes each selected event by identifying the tasks the force
must accomplish two echelons below. Identifying the COAs' strengths and weaknesses allows
the staff to make adjustments as necessary.

Each game turn usually consists of three moves— two by the friendly force, one by the enemy
force. The friendly force has two moves because the activity is intended to validate and refine the
friendly force’s COA, not the enemy’s. If necessary, additional moves may be required to
achieve desired effects.

• Friendly Actions. The war game begins with the first friendly action. The war game then
proceeds as each warfighting function representative gives the details of the friendly
COA. Representatives explain how they would predict, preclude, and counter the
enemy’s action.

• Enemy Reactions.28 Normally the J2 (or a selected RED Cell) will speak for the enemy
and respond to friendly actions. He will use an enemy synchronization matrix and event
template to describe the enemy’s activities. The event template will be updated as new
intelligence is received and as a result of the war game. These products will depict the
locations of NAIs and when to collect information that will confirm or deny the adoption
of a particular COA by the enemy and will serve as a guide for collection planning. The
J2 will describe enemy actions by warfighting function. He should present the enemy’s
concept of operations, and concept of reconnaissance and surveillance. What intelligence
collection assets do the enemy have? How and when will he employ them? Also, the J2
should describe how the enemy would organize its battlespace. He should identify the
location, composition, and expected strength of the enemy reserve, as well as the
anticipated decision point and criteria that the enemy commander might use in
committing his reserve. Other enemy decision points that he might identify include likely
times, conditions, and areas for the enemy use of weapons of mass destruction and
friendly NBC defense requirements, when the enemy could begin a withdrawal, where
and when the enemy will use unconventional forces, etc. Based on the experience level of
the J2, he might also offer insight on the likely effectiveness of friendly actions. The
friendly commander will want to know what decisions the enemy commander will have
to make and when those decisions will be made--“Are they event driven?” When a
deception plan is being war gamed, the J2 should outline target biases and
predispositions, how and when the enemy would receive the desired misleading
indicators and enemy actions that will indicate the deception has been successful.

• Counteractions. After the enemy reaction is executed, friendly forces will provide a
counteraction and the various warfighting functions’ activities will be discussed and
recorded before advancing to the next series of events. If necessary, the war game
facilitator authorizes more “moves” by both sides in order to achieve the desired fidelity.
____________________
28
At a minimum, the staff should war game all friendly COAs against both the enemy’s most likely and most dangerous ECOAs.
If time permits, all ECOAs should be war gamed against all friendly COAs.

3-6
 NWC 4111G

The staff considers all possible forces including templated enemy forces outside the
AO/JOA/AOR that could react to influence the operation. The staff evaluates each friendly move
to determine the assets and actions required to defeat the enemy at each turn. The staff should
continually evaluate the need for branches to the plan that promote success against likely enemy
moves in response to the friendly COA. The staff lists assets used in the appropriate columns of
the worksheet and lists the totals in the assets column (not considering any assets lower than two
command levels down).

The commander and staff look at many areas in detail during the war game, including all
enemy capabilities, deployment considerations and timelines, ranges and capabilities of weapon
systems, and desired effects of fires. They look at setting the conditions for success, protecting
the force, and shaping the battlespace. Experience, historical data, SOPs, and doctrinal literature
provide much of the necessary information. During the war game, staff officers conduct a risk
assessment in their area of expertise and responsibility for each COA.

The staff continually assesses the risk to friendly forces from catastrophic threats, seeking a
balance between mass and dispersion. When assessing WMD risk to friendly forces, the planners
view the target that the force presents through the eyes of an enemy target analyst. They must
consider ways to reduce vulnerability and determine the mission-oriented protective posture
(MOPP) level needed for protection consistent with mission accomplishment. They must also
consider deployment of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) decontamination assets.

The staff identifies the operational functions required to support the scheme of maneuver
and the synchronization of the sustaining operation. If requirements exceed available assets, the
staff recommends the priority for use to the commander based on his guidance and intent, and on
the situation. To maintain flexibility, the commander may decide to withhold some assets for
unforeseen tasks or opportunities. He uses this analysis to determine his priorities of support.

During the war game, the commander can modify the COA based on how the operation
develops. When modifying the COA, the commander should validate the composition and
location of decisive and shaping operations and reserve forces, based on the Mission, Enemy,
Terrain (Battlespace) effects, Troops and Equipment Available, Time available, and Civil
Considerations (METT-TC) factors, and adjust control measures as necessary. The commander
may also identify combat situations or opportunities or additional critical events that require
more analysis. This should be conducted expeditiously and incorporated into the final results of
the war game.

3-7
 NWC 4111G

SKETCH

Friendly Enemy Friendly

COA ECOA Response

COA# 1 Critical Event: Seize Red Airbase

Sequence Action Reaction Counter Time Forces/ Remarks
Number Action Assets
Abn Bde Garrison from MEU H+1 -Abn Bde Requires early
1 conducts
forced
Red City
launches
establishes
Blocking Psn
-MEU
AI
commitment of
afloat reserve
entry onto counter attack on Main Road; (MEU);
airfield against Abn Air Interdicts PSYOP Focus
force at the Red force
Airfield

Figure 3-1. Example War Game Worksheet

3-8
 NWC 4111G

Sketch:

COA # Critical Event:

Sequence Action Reaction Counter Time Forces/ Remarks
Number Action Assets
1

Table 3-1. Sample War Game Worksheet

If more time is available, the staff should use the more detailed War Game
Synchronization Matrix (Table 3-2). This recording tool allows the staff to better focus the
analysis within specific components and operational functions, as well as other planning
considerations (see Figure 3-2 as an example). Though its takes longer to complete, this tool will
prove more helpful when the staff begins developing the detailed concept of operations upon the
completion of the CES process (see JP 5-00.2).

3-9
 NWC 4111G

COMPONENTS/
ACTION REACTION COUNTERACTION
FUNCTIONS
JFLCC Abn Bde conducts airborne Garrison from Red City Completes Airfield seizure;
forced entry on Red launches Counter-attack establishes hasty defense
Airfield against Abn force at afld
MARFOR MEU positioned afloat — MEU establishes blocking
COMPONENTS

JTF Reserve psn on Red City MSR

JFMCC CVGB provides air cap AI focus on delay of Red
over objective area Garrison Force
JFACC Coord forced entry air ops Coord CAS and AI ops
and CAS
JSOCC SR forces in psn at airfield Report status of Garrison
and Red MSR NLT H-4 Force counter attack
JPOTF PSYOP Theme per PSYOP teams with MEU,
OPORD- spt forced entry focus on Garrison force
INTELLIGENCE NAIs 1 &2 Status of Garrison Force
OPERATIONAL
FUNCTIONS

FIRES CVGB provides air support CAS / AI support continues

LOGISTICS Abn Force has 3 DOS MEU has 15 DOS
COMMAND & JTF HQ afloat O/O MEU is passed
CONTROL TACON to the Abn force.
PROTECTION Deception theme: no
impending U.S. ops
DECISION Commitment of MEU (JTF
POINTS Reserve)
CCIR Enemy Disposition at the Movement of the Garrison
airfield Force
OTHERS

BRANCHES Early Commitment of

MEU; Joint Force Coord
Required
REMARKS Add additional PSYOPS
Tm to MEU. Change to
CCIR
AI against Garrison Force

Figure 3-2. Example War Game Synchronization Matrix

3-10
Friendly COA # ________ Short Name: __________ NWC 4111G
Enemy COA- (Most Likely / Most Dangerous)
Time / Phase / Critical Event: ______________

COMPONENTS/ ACTION REACTION COUNTERACTION

FUNCTIONS
ARFOR/JFLCC
COMPONENTS

MARFOR
NAVFOR/JFMCC
AFFOR/JFACC
JSOCC
JPOTF

INTELLIGENCE
OPERATIONAL
FUNCTIONS

FIRES
LOGISTICS
COMMAND & CONTROL
PROTECTION
MOVEMENT & MANEUVER

DECISION POINTS
OTHERS

CCIR
BRANCHES
REMARKS

Table 3-2. Sample War Game Synchronization Matrix

3-11
 NWC 4111G

Figure 3-3. Wargaming Summary

Commander’s Guidance Friendly COAs Enemy COAs

Most Likely
Counter
Actions Most Dangerous
-actions

Reactions
WAR Results of Wargaming
- Results of wargaming will
GAMING
affect the six joint functional
areas of:
War Game Results
-- Movement& maneuver
Command & Control -- Intelligence
Support - Refinement of component tasks -- Firepower
- Support requirements - Task organization
- Spt for non-DOD agencies
Movement & Maneuver
- Command relationships -- Support
- Logistics synchronization - Synchronization matrix
requirements. - Movement requirements - CJTF decision points -- Command and control
- Concepts of maneuver - Recommended CCIRs
- Mobility & countermobility - Requirements for branches & sequels
-- Protection
Intel/Surveillance/Recon - Significant areas to control - IO/IW requirements - Synch matrices and
- PIR (EEI) - M&M synchronization - ROE modification requirements
- Collection plan requirements requirements - Multinational operations requirements decision support matrices
- Public affairs requirements
- Decision Spt tools (e.g., DSM/DSTs) are means to record these
Protection - Refinement to battlespace architecture
- Air/Missile Defense requirements
results.
- NBC protection requirements
- NEO requirements Firepower
- Joint search & rescue requirements - High Value/Payoff Targets
- Combat identification requirements - Degree of defeat required
- Risk assessment - Combat assessment requirements
- Prorection synchronization requirements - Firepower synchronization requirements

An effective war game may also produce some of the following results:29
• Refining or modifying the COA, to include identifying branches and sequels that become
on-order or be-prepared missions.
• Insights into the COAs that will support the next CES step, which will be to compare the
COAs.
• Identifying key or decisive terrain and determining how to use it.
• Refining the enemy event template and matrix.
• Refining task organization, to include forces retained in general support of the command.
• Identifying tasks the unit must retain and tasks to be assigned to component commands.
• Allocating operational function assets to component commands to accomplish their
missions.
• Developing, identifying or confirming the locations of decision points as well as the
NAIs, TAIs, and IR needed to support the decision points.

____________________
29
As mentioned at the beginning of this step, the purpose of the war game is to provide insights into each COA in order to
support the eventual commander’s COA decision. Though this appears to be a lengthy list, if the war game is properly resourced
with both knowledgeable participants and adequate time, the war game will also provide the commander and the staff with
substantial preliminary information that will be required for the later CONOPS development.

3-12
 NWC 4111G

• Developing a synchronization matrix;

• Developing a decision support template.
• Developing IO objectives and tasks.
• Estimating the duration of each critical event as well as of the entire operation.
• Projecting the percentage of total enemy forces defeated in each critical event as well as
overall.
• Identifying likely times and areas for enemy use of WMD and friendly NBC defense
requirements.
• Identifying the location and commitment of the reserve.
• Identifying / Confirming the most dangerous enemy COA.
• Identifying the location of the commander, unit command posts, and IO nodes.
• Identifying additional critical events.
• Identifying additional requirements for operational function support with supporting
plans and graphics.
• Determining requirements for deception and surprise.
• Refining C2 requirements, to include control measures and updated operational graphics.
• Refining CCIR and IR, to include the last time information is of value, and incorporating
them into the ISR plan.
• Developing the intelligence collection and dissemination plan and the resulting ISR plan
and graphics.
• Determining the timing of force concentration and initiation of the attack or
counterattack.
• Determining deployment times for critical assets.
• Identifying, analyzing, and evaluating strengths and weaknesses of the COA.
• Integrating the targeting process, to include identifying or confirming HPTs and
determining attack guidance.
• Identifying additional hazards, assessing their risk, developing control measures to reduce
risk from all identified hazards, and determining residual risk.

3-13
 NWC 4111G

STEP 4: COMPARISON OF FRIENDLY COURSES OF ACTION

AND THE DECISION

The fourth step in the CES is a comparison of the remaining COAs. The commander and
staff develop and evaluate a list of important governing factors, consider each COA’s advantages
and disadvantages, identify actions to overcome disadvantages, make final tests for feasibility
and acceptability and weigh the relative merits of each. This step ends with the commander
selecting a specific COA for further CONOPS development.

The COA comparison starts with each staff officer analyzing and evaluating the advantages
and disadvantages of each COA from his perspective. Each staff member presents his findings
for the others' consideration. Using the governing factors developed as evaluation criteria earlier,
the staff then outlines each COA, highlighting its advantages and disadvantages. Comparing the
strengths and weaknesses of the COAs identifies their advantages and disadvantages with respect
to each other.

The actual comparison of COAs is critical. The staff may use any technique that facilitates
the staff reaching the best recommendation and the commander making the best decision. The
most common technique is the decision matrix, which uses evaluation criteria (governing
factors) to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of each COA (see Table 4-1). Each staff officer
may use his own matrix, using the same evaluative criteria, for comparison in his own field of
interest. Decision matrices alone cannot provide decision solutions. Their greatest value is to
provide analysts a criteria to compare several competing COAs against criteria, which, when
met, will produce success. The matrix should use the evaluation criteria developed earlier.

1. Governing Factors.

The comparison of COAs begins with governing factors—these factors were selected during
STEP 3. For selected examples of governing factors see Appendix F.

The techniques for conducting the comparison vary, but all of them must assist the
commander in reaching a sound decision. Normally, a “decision matrix” (Table 4-1) is used to
facilitate this process. This matrix numerically portrays subjectively chosen and subjectively
weighted governing factors. Each staff member may use his own matrix or recommend his own
choice of governing factors based on his respective functional area.

The commander reviews this list and deletes or adds to it as he sees fit. The list need not be a
lengthy one—there should be few factors, though enough to differentiate COAs.

Some general comments for creating the decision matrix:

• Having determined the governing factors, ensure each is defined so its meaning is
understood by all. (For example, if MASS is selected as a factor, is MASS good—as in
massing effects, or is it bad, as in complicating operational protection.)
• Determine how you will measure the advantages or disadvantages of a governing factor.
(For example, again using achievement of MASS—as in massing effects as a governing
factor, then what do you assess as a strength? Does the ability to achieve greater than a

4-1
 NWC 4111G

6:1 ratio of ground forces at the point of decision, coupled with local air superiority
define strength, while anything less is weakness?)
• Prioritize the governing factors by overall importance. (This assists in determining if
weights should be assigned.)
• Determine the range of values, which may be assigned. The higher number in the range
indicates the better value. Keep the numbers manageable in order to be meaningful.

As demonstrated in the completed decision matrix of Appendix G, the governing factors

may be evaluated on their individual merits (all weights equal) or each factor may be weighted
for importance.

• When assigning weights, you should ask the question "is this factor really two (or three)
times more important than that factor?"
• The weights are multiplied by the initially assigned score in each column; the results are
then totaled.

The Chief of the OPG/JPG, sometimes the Chief of Staff (COS) normally determines the
weight of each criterion based on its relative importance. The commander may also designate
importance of some criteria that result in weighting those criteria. The staff officer responsible
for a functional area scores each COA using those criteria. Multiplying the score by the weight
yields the criterion's value. The staff officer then totals all values. However, he must be cautious
in portraying subjective conclusions as being the objective results of quantifiable analysis.
Comparing COAs by category is more accurate than attempting to aggregate a total score for
each COA.

The result obtained is not meant to be absolute or objective in nature. However, if the same
criteria are ruthlessly applied to all COAs, the relative ranking and the merits (or faults) of each
should be readily apparent. Each situation is different and requires a different set and number of
governing factors to be established. See Appendix G for an example of a completed matrix.

2. List Advantages and Disadvantages of Each COA.

This is perhaps the most valuable part of the comparison as it is here that the tradeoffs
between the COAs should be most apparent. The advantages and disadvantages of any particular
COA could be quite lengthy and detailed. Many advantages and disadvantages should be carried
forward from the conception and analysis steps. Table 4-2 provides a format.

The staff compares feasible COAs to identify the one that has the highest probability of
success against the most likely enemy COA and the most dangerous enemy COA. The selected
COA should also:

• Offer the greatest opportunity for mission accomplishment.

• Best position the force for future operations.
• Provide the best flexibility to meet unexpected threats and opportunities.
• Provide maximum latitude for the initiative by subordinates.
• Address the associated risk.

4-2
 NWC 4111G

GOVERNING FACTORS WT COA COA COA COA

#1 #2 #3 #4

TOTAL
WEIGHTED TOTAL

Table 4-1. Sample Decision Matrix

(See Appendix G for a Sample Completed Matrix)

4-3
 NWC 4111G

COA ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES MODIFICATIONS

Table 4-2. Comparison of Advantages / Disadvantages with Modifications

3. Compare the Merits of COAs.

The staff compares the various remaining COAs in order to determine which one best
satisfies the requirements of the mission. The staff should seek to answer the question, “Is this
the utmost we can do to carry out the mission?” This question requires a resounding “yes!” The
remaining COAs should not be discarded — they may be retained as possible branches, alternate
plans or deception plans.

However, during the final decision, the commander may find none of the COAs analyzed to
be valid. Consequently, new COAs would need to be developed. They must also be tested for
suitability and then analyzed against each ECOA in order to predict the outcomes of the new
COAs against each ECOA. If, after all analysis and comparison, no COAs are found suitable,
feasible, and acceptable, the commander should present the examined options along with
supporting facts to his higher commander. The commander should point out what could be
accomplished under the circumstances and estimate what additional forces would be required to
accomplish the original mission. It is then the responsibility of the superior commander to either
order that a selected COA be carried out despite the consequences or change the original mission
statement.

4-4
 NWC 4111G

4. COA Decision.

After completing its analysis and comparison, the staff identifies its preferred COA and
makes a recommendation. The staff then briefs the commander. The Chief of the OPG/JPG
highlights any changes to the COAs as a result of the wargaming process. Component
commanders may be present, but are not required, for the decision brief; their participation,
either in person or via VTC, enhances the planning process. The decision-briefing format
includes:

• The intent of the higher headquarters (two levels up).

• The mission.
• The status of friendly forces.
• An updated JIPB.
• COAs, including the assumptions used in planning, results of staff estimates, and
advantages and disadvantages (including risk) of each COA (with decision matrix or
table showing COA comparison).

After the decision briefing, the commander selects the COA, which most effectively
accomplishes the mission. The commander will rely heavily on the staff for their professional
judgment and experience; however, it is ultimately the commander’s decision to make. Once the
commander has selected a COA, written his intent statement, and identified his CCIRs, the
selected COA may need refinement. It is this COA that the staff will continue to refine, analyze
and synchronize to produce the concept of operations. The commander then issues any additional
guidance on priorities for operational functions (particularly for resources he needs to preserve
his freedom of action and to ensure continuous service support), orders preparation, rehearsal,
and preparation for mission execution.

Having already identified the risks associated with the selected COA, the commander decides
what level of residual risk he will accept to accomplish the mission and approves control
measures that will reduce the risks. If there is time, he discusses the acceptable risks with
adjacent, subordinate, and senior commanders. However, the higher commander's approval to
accept any risk that might imperil the higher commander's intent must be obtained. Based on the
commander's decision, the staff immediately issues a Warning Order with essential information
so subordinate commands can refine their plans. This Warning Order confirms guidance issued
by the commander and expands on details not covered by the commander personally.

5. Joint Synchronization Matrix.

Based on the commander's decision and final guidance, the CES process is completed,
and the staff now refines the COA and completes the plan and prepares to issue the order. The
staff prepares the order or plan to implement the selected COA by turning it into a clear, concise
concept of operations. The staff development of the order/plan is often aided by completing a
joint synchronization matrix. This internal staff planning tool is used in much the same manner
as the wargaming synchronization matrix (see Appendix H for more information and a
recommended format). The commander can use the COA statement as his concept of operations

4-5
 NWC 4111G

statement. The COA sketch can become the basis for the operation overlay. The staff assists
subordinate staffs with their planning and coordination as needed.

6. Concept of Operations.

Using the joint synchronization matrix, the staff builds the concept of operations. This is the
commander's clear, concise statement of where, when, and how he intends to concentrate combat
power to accomplish the mission according to his higher Commander's Intent. It broadly outlines
considerations necessary for developing a scheme of maneuver. It includes designation of the
decisive operation and key shaping operations, the commander's plan to defeat the enemy, and
specific command and support relationships. These relationships are then included in the task
organization and organization for combat in plans and orders. It can also include:

• Physical Objective(s)
• Commander’s Intent
• Scheme of Maneuver
• Sector of Main Effort
• Sector of Supporting Effort
• Phasing
• Deception
• Employment of force elements (ground, naval, air, special forces, space, etc.)
• Fires (type, purpose, priorities)
• Allocation of sustainment assets
• NBC (offensive and/or defensive)
• Reserves (designation, purpose, location, and anticipated employment)

From this expanded concept of operations, the staff is ready to move to the next step,
Development of Plans/Orders.

4-6
 NWC 4111G

STEP 5: DEVELOPMENT OF PLANS/ORDERS

In this step, the staff will use the Commander’s Guidance, Commander’s Intent, and
CONOPS to develop the required plan or order. A plan is prepared in anticipation of operations
and it normally serves as the basis of a future order. An order is a written or oral communication
that directs actions and focuses a subordinate’s tasks and activities towards accomplishing the
mission. While various portions of the plan or order have been developed during the planning
process, this is the step to put them into the approved military format. Since a plan or an order
will normally contain only critical or new information, not routine matters found in SOPs, a well
written plan or order should be clear, as concise as possible, and focused on the mission. When
developed, the military directive (as it is also known) should be synchronized, understood, and in
total support of the higher commander’s intent. It should also contain the following
characteristics:

1. Characteristics.

• Clarity. Each executing commander should be able to understand the directive

thoroughly. Wording should be simple, straightforward, using proper military (doctrinal)
terminology.
• Brevity. The directive should be concise, avoiding extra words and unnecessary details;
however, this should not be at the expense of completeness.
• Authoritativeness. Write the directive in the active voice and authoritative form of
expression whenever possible.
• Simplicity. All elements should be as simple as possible in order to reduce
misunderstandings.
• Flexibility. A good directive allows for adjustments that arise do to unexpected
operating conditions.
• Timeliness. It is critical to disseminate the directive to allow adequate planning and
preparation by subordinate commands. Through the use of Warning Orders as discussed
in earlier steps, subordinate units can begin planning prior to receipt of the final order or
plan.
• Completeness. It must contain all necessary information to coordinate and execute the
mission, and it must provide control measures that allow for and maximize the
subordinate commander’s initiative.
• Command Organization. It must establish a clear command structure with clearly
delineated responsibilities.

2. Format of Military Plans and Orders.

Plans and orders can come in many varieties from the very detailed Campaign Plans and
Operations Plans to simple verbal orders. They also include Functional Plans, Operation Orders,
Warning Orders, Planning Orders, Alert Orders, Execute Orders, and Fragmentary Orders. The
more complex directives will contain much of the amplifying information in appropriate annexes
and appendices. However, the directive should always contain the essential information in the
main body. The form may depend on the time available, the complexity of the operation, and the
levels of command involved. However, in most cases, the directive will be standardized in the

5-1
 NWC 4111G

five-paragraph format that was introduced back in step one. Following is a brief description of
each of these paragraphs.

• Paragraph 1 – Situation. The commander’s summary of the general situation that

ensures subordinates understand the background of the planned operations. Paragraph 1
will often contain sub paragraphs describing the higher Commander’s Intent, friendly
forces, and enemy forces.
• Paragraph 2 – Mission. The commander inserts his restated mission (containing
essential tasks) developed during the mission analysis.
• Paragraph 3 – Execution. This paragraph contains Commander’s Intent, which will
enable commanders two levels down to exercise initiative while keeping their actions
aligned with the overall purpose of the mission. It also specifies objectives, tasks, and
assignments for subordinates.
• Paragraph 4 – Administration and Logistics. This paragraph describes the concept of
support, logistics, personnel, public affairs, civil affairs, and medical services.
• Paragraph 5 – Command and Control. This paragraph specifies the command
relationships, succession of command, and overall plan for communications.

3. Commander Approval of the Plan/Order.

The commander reviews and approves orders before the staff reproduces and briefs them
unless he has delegated that authority to his COS or J3/5. Once the plan or order is released, the
command must ensure the plan or order is clearly understood by both the staff elements and
subordinate commands that will be responsible for its execution. The measures taken to assure
this clear understanding of the plan or order are contained in the final step, Transition.

See the following publications for assistance with specific formats:

NWP 5-01, Naval Operational Planning.

MCWP 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process.
JOPES Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures.
JOPES Volume II, Planning Formats and Guidance.

5-2
 NWC 4111G

STEP 6: TRANSITION30

Transition is critical to the overall planning process. It is an on-going, concurrent process

that is especially important at the operational level where typically there are separate staff
sections responsible for planning and execution.
Transition is an orderly turnover of a plan or order as it is passed to those tasked with the
execution of the operation. It provides information, direction and guidance relative to the plan or
order that will help to facilitate situational awareness. Additionally, it provides an understanding
of the rationale for key decisions necessary to ensure there is a coherent shift from planning to
execution. These factors coupled together are intended to maintain the intent of the concept of
operations, promote unity of effort, and generate tempo.
Successful transition ensures that those charged with executing the order have a full
understanding of the plan. Regardless of the level of command, such a transition ensures that
those who execute the order understand the commander’s intent and the concept of operations.
Transition may be internal or external in the form of briefs or drills. Internally, transition occurs
between future plans or future and current operations. Externally, transition occurs between the
commander and his subordinate commands.

1. Transition Brief

At the higher levels of command, transition may include a formal transition brief to
subordinate or adjacent commanders and to the staff supervising execution of the order. At lower
levels, it might be less formal. The transition brief provides an overview of the mission,
Commander’s Intent, task organization, and enemy and friendly situation. It is given to ensure
that all actions necessary to implement the order are known and understood by those executing
the order. The commander, deputy commander, chief of staff, or organizational SOP provides
transition brief guidance, which may prescribe who will give the brief, the briefing content, the
briefing sequence, and who is required to attend. Time available dictates the level of detail
possible in the transition brief. Orders and supporting materials should be transmitted as early as
possible before the transition brief. The brief may include items from the order or plan such as:

• Higher headquarters mission (tasks and intent).

• Mission.
• Commander’s Intent.
• CCIRs.
• Task organization.
• Situation (friendly and enemy).
• Concept of operations.
• Execution (including branches and potential sequels).
• Planning support tools (such as synchronization matrix, JIPB products, etc.).

____________________
30
This chapter draws heavily from MCWP 5-1.

6-1
 NWC 4111G

2. Confirmation Brief

A confirmation brief is given by a subordinate commander after he receives his order or

plan. Subordinate commanders brief the higher commander on their understanding of
commander’s intent, their specific task and purpose, and the relationship between their unit’s
missions and the other units in the operation. The confirmation brief allows the higher
commander to identify gaps in his plan, identify discrepancies between his and subordinate
commander’s plans, and learn how subordinate commanders intend to accomplish their mission.

3. Transition Drills.

Transition drills increase the situational awareness of the subordinate commanders and
the staff and instill confidence and familiarity with the plan. Sand tables, map exercises, and
rehearsals are examples of transition drills. A common term used to describe transition drills is a
“rock drill.” See Appendix I for a detailed discussion on rehearsals.

6-2
 NWC 4111G

APPENDIX A: JIPB Products

Figure A-1. Example of a Land MCOO (JP 2-01.3)

A-1
 NWC 4111G

Figure A-2. Example of a Maritime MCOO (JP 2-01.3)

A-2
 NWC 4111G

Figure A-3. Example of an Air MCOO (JP 2-01.3)

A-3
 NWC 4111G

Figure A-4. Situation Template Construction and Example (JP 2-01.3)

A-4
 NWC 4111G

Figure A-5. Example Event Template Showing NAIs (JP 2-01.3)

A-5
 NWC 4111G

Figure A-6. Example of a Situation Matrix (JP 2-01-3)

Many different formats and methods may be used. An example of one type of collection
matrix is provided below.

Est
NAI Indicators ECOA1 Indicators ECOA2 Indicators ECOA3
Time
1 D-3 Surface combatants Forward movement of
missing from port corps size force
2 D-2 Forward deployment of Laying of minefields
combat aircraft
3 D-1 Increased reconnaissance Increased IADS readiness
along coastal areas and activity
4 H-12 Naval SOF activity Artillery assault

A-6
 NWC 4111G

APPENDIX B: Force Ratio / Force Multiplier Data

Summary:
This appendix lays out two methods of computing force ratios. Both methods are rough
analysis techniques, which give planners a starting point for considering force requirements for a
given operation. The first technique is a simple comparison of like type forces with little further
refinement. The second, technique adjusts like type force comparison based upon differing force
structures. Each technique requires increasingly more time to construct the supporting data.
However, no matter which technique is used, the planners must also consider the impact of other
tangible and intangible factors as well as the influence of other joint forces on the force ratios.

I. ANALYZING RELATIVE COMBAT POWER31

Combat power is the effect created by combining maneuver, firepower, protection, and
leadership, the dynamics of combat power, in combat against the enemy. By integrating and
applying the effects of these elements with any other potential force multipliers (logistics,
morale, experience, doctrine, etc.) as well as other joint forces available against the enemy, the
commander can generate overwhelming combat power to achieve victory at minimal cost. This
task is difficult, at best. It requires an assessment of both tangible and intangible factors as well
as consideration of an inordinate number of those factors either directly or indirectly affecting
the potential outcome of the battle.

However, by analyzing relative-force ratios and determining and comparing each force’s
most significant strengths and weaknesses as a function of combat power, planners can gain
some insight into:

• Friendly capabilities pertaining to the operation.

• What type operations may be possible from both friendly and enemy perspectives?
• How and where the enemy may be vulnerable?

Although some numeric relationships are used in this process, it is not like the former-Soviet
mathematically substantiated computation for the correlation of forces. Rather, it is only a
largely subjective estimate. The COAs must not be based strictly on mathematical analyses.
Pure, logical approaches are often predictable, sacrificing the surprise that bold, audacious action
can achieve.

1. Equal Value Force Ratios.

Planners can initially make a rough estimate of relative-force ratios. Figure B-1 shows an
analysis in which planners are counting land-centric forces as roughly equal to enemy
equivalents.

____________________
31
This appendix draws heavily from the Army CGSC ST 100-3 Battle Book and FM 34-3 Intelligence Preparation of the
Battlefield, Appendix F.

B-1
 NWC 4111G

Friendly Force Unit # Enemy Force Unit #

Armored Division 3 Armored Division 4
Airborne Brigade (1 ea) (1/3 of a Div) Airborne Regt. (1ea) (1/3 of a Div)
TOTAL
Ratio = 3.33 : 4.33 or 3.33 TOTAL 4.33
1.0 : 1.3

Figure B-1. Example of Equal Value Force Ratios (Equal Values)

2. Equivalent Relative Force Ratios.

Seldom will the U.S. face a force that has equal force values as we see in Figure B-1. In order
for the planners to adapt this rough planning tool they must have a means to adjust enemy force
values to an equivalency to U.S. forces. The intelligence staff is responsible for producing these
enemy equivalency values. For example, though REDLAND may have fielded Armored Divisions,
their Divisions may be smaller, with fewer tanks of lesser capability than the U.S. Armored
Division. As such, the intelligence staff may assess the REDLAND Division at a lesser value than
the U.S. Armored Division, possibly a .55 value. The same analysis would follow for each
REDLAND combat capability. A further refinement of this process would be using a single base
combat element (in this case an Armored Division) and providing an equivalent relative value to
each force element (both enemy and friendly). For example, a U.S. Airborne Brigade's relative
strength to a U.S. Armored Division is .30 and a REDLAND Airborne Regiment might have an
assessed value of .25. See Figure B-2 for an example of relative combat power computations.

Friendly Force Unit # Enemy Force Unit #

Armored Division (3) 3 Armored Division (4) 1.20
Airborne Brigade (1) .30 Airborne Regiment (1) .25
Attack Avn Brigade (1) .50 Aviation Regiment (1) .30
Field Arty Brigades (4) 1.20 Field Arty Regiments (3) .90
Anti-Tank Regiment (1) .20
TOTAL
Ratio = 5 : 2.85 or
1.0 : .6
5 TOTAL 2.85
NOTE: Using Armored
Division Equivalents

Figure B-2. Example of Equivalent Relative Force Ratios (Relative Values)

B-2
 NWC 4111G

This form of calculation is normally only applied between like services, since assessing an
Armored Division Equivalent (or other single service combat force) value to a Carrier Battle
Group or Air Superiority Squadron becomes complex and diminishes the value of this rough
analytic tool. Techniques that integrate other joint force assets are addressed later in this
appendix.

3. Other Force Ratio Considerations.

When the staff finishes its computations, it draws conclusions about friendly and enemy
relative capabilities and limitations as they pertain to the operational situation. These
computations give the staff a feel for relative strengths and weaknesses, but not absolute
mathematical answers as to what friendly or enemy forces will do. Numerical relative-force
ratios do not include the human factors of warfare. Many times human factors may be more
important than the number of tanks or tubes of artillery. Therefore, the staff must carefully
consider and integrate them into their comparisons. By using historical minimum-planning ratios
for various combat missions and carefully considering terrain and enemy templating
assumptions, planners can generally conclude what type of operations they can conduct (Figure
B-3).

Friendly Mission Friendly: Enemy Position

Delay 1:6 N/A
Defend 1:3 Prepared or fortified
Defend 1 : 2.5 Hasty
Attack 3:1 Prepared or fortified
Attack 2.5 : 1 Hasty
Counterattack 1:1 Flank

Figure B-3. Example of Historical Minimum Planning Ratios

A planner first compares the relative force ratios with the ratios in column 2 of Figure B-3.
He can then determine if his unit has the odds that would give him the flexibility to conduct any
type of operation he desires. The J2/G2/N2 will also assess if the enemy has that capability. In a
defensive situation, the planner would know the enemy must conduct a penetration. In an
offensive situation, he would know he could not conduct offensive operations without massing
his forces and accepting risk in some area. He would be able to use this information when he
begins developing a scheme of maneuver. If he identifies a ratio closer to one of the other
planning ratios, he could draw other conclusions indicating another type of possible operation.
This step provides the planner with a notion of "what to"; not "how to." There is no direct
relationship between force ratios and attrition or advance rates. Relative-force ratios do not
necessarily indicate the chance for success.

B-3
 NWC 4111G

II. REFINE ANALYSIS AND DETERMINE RELATIVE COMBAT POWER

The values calculated earlier are empirical values based solely on relative technological
levels, equipment capabilities, and manning levels of the affected units. Other factors such as
weather, morale, leadership, training, terrain, cultural and societal limitations, relative
technological levels between the forces, and surprise can greatly influence the relative combat
power of units.

“A unit can achieve effects beyond its absolute combat power by maximizing relative
combat power potential. Through the application of strengths against weaknesses and the
minimization of weaknesses against enemy strengths, the maneuver-oriented unit can attain a
relative combat power advantage against a numerically superior force.”32

The J2/G2/N2 must incorporate subjective factors into the analysis to more precisely
determine the relative combat power between friendly and threat forces. When realistically
conducted, the wargaming phase of the CES is particularly useful in determining some of the
additional factors that will influence the combat power of a unit. Some factors that may affect
relative combat power potential:

1. Force Capabilities.

Air, Naval, and Space Superiority: Air, naval, and space superiority generally allow the
dominant power to more effectively deliver munitions against land threat forces, and conduct
more efficient resupply operations. Bad weather, favorable terrain for the threat forces, lack of
suitable port facilities or airfields, or an effective concealment and deception plan can mitigate
these advantages.

Information Operations (IO): Information operations include military deception, counter-

deception, OPSEC, electronic warfare capabilities, information assurance, psychological
operations, counterintelligence, and counterpropaganda operations. The threats ability to conduct
or counter friendly efforts in the IO spectrum can decisively influence the relative combat
potential of a threat force.

Information Superiority: Relative advantages in intelligence and command and control can
decisively influence the outcome of combat and substantially increase the lethality of friendly
forces. Initiative in the areas of digitalization, automation, and intelligence provide a significant
advantage to U.S. forces due to significant advantages in situational awareness. The availability
of other assets such as JSTARS and tactical UAV can drastically improve targeting. On the other
hand, loss of these systems or an effective threat deception plan can neutralize the advantages of
these assets.

NBC Capabilities: The presence of NBC munitions, delivery systems, their use or indications of
imminent use may significantly affect the relative combat power potential. Also considered
under this category is whether the threat force possesses the national will to use NBC weapons.
____________________
32
Army CGSC ST 100-3, pp. 15-17.

B-4
 NWC 4111G

Special Operations Forces (SOF): Both threat and friendly special operations forces are a force
multiplier, the effects of whose actions cannot be quantified through the calculation of a Relative
Combat Power Value. For example, the presence of a small threat SOF unit in the friendly
force’s rear area, although relatively ineffective in terms of combat power, may divert significant
forces for rear area security. Several threat countries maintain a robust SOF capability, which
through sabotage and other operations may profoundly affect friendly force combat and resupply
operations.

Threat Leadership and C2: Command and control may also influence threat capabilities,
especially if threat leadership has either positively or negatively influenced morale. Charismatic
leadership may greatly improve threat unit capabilities, whereas either poor leadership or
successful efforts by friendly forces to undermine threat command-and-control may diminish the
relative capabilities of threat units.

2. Environmental Effects.

Terrain: Terrain affords each force certain mobility or positional advantages and disadvantages.
The relative advantages and disadvantages will further define how effectively each unit is able to
bring its combat power to bear. Each unit’s knowledge of the area of operation can also influence
the relative combat power of each. In most instances, the force most familiar with the terrain will
be able to use its existing combat power most effectively.

Weather: Weather conditions may provide an advantage to either friendly or threat forces that
could improve or diminish their relative combat power. For example, under certain
environmental conditions such as heavy fog or smoke obscuration, the US force may have a
relatively greater capability to detect threat movement at longer ranges due to a technological
advantage in thermal sight capability or ground-surveillance radar. Under those specific
conditions, forces may have a greater force value than originally assigned. The intelligence
officer for the US force under these weather conditions may choose to subjectively downgrade
the values for the opposing units to reflect these conditions.

3. Combat Effects.

Experience: Relative levels of combat experience of the threat commander will influence the
combat effectiveness of the units and therefore the relative force ratios.

NBC Posture: Operations in an NBC environment or by personnel in NBC defensive gear may
significantly degrade due to the physical and psychological limitations of operating in an NBC
environment.

Reconstitution: The ability of a force to reconstitute itself during a campaign will significantly
affect the combat strength of the unit. Additionally, a reconstituted force will possess somewhat
less combat power than the original force due to the effects of integrating new personnel, losses
in leadership and experience, combat damage to equipment, etc.

B-5
 NWC 4111G

Tactical Surprise: Surprise may significantly influence the relative combat power resulting in a
significantly higher value for the surprising force. The intelligence analyst must subjectively
determine how drastically the element of surprise will affect the force ratio.

Threat Morale: Morale is an intangible that may greatly affect the combat power of a unit. An
assessment of the threat forces’ morale may be based on human intelligence (HUMINT) or
communications intelligence (COMINT) reporting, observed threat behavior, or other forms of
reporting and can be difficult to discern reliably except under extreme circumstances. For
example, threat forces defending their homeland, although under demoralizing conditions, may
be highly motivated and be capable of defending at a higher level than represented in the
assigned force values. Conversely, friendly psychological or combat operations may
substantially degrade the morale of a threat force.

4. Other Factors.

Other factors such as training, cultural, societal, or seasonal limitations may further affect
threat and friendly unit relative capabilities.

The scope of the calculations for absolute force ratios and relative combat force potential is
limited only by time and analytical resources. Deliberate planning may allow for a more
thorough calculation of force ratios, while the analyst in a high OPTEMPO environment may be
able to complete only a rudimentary calculation during the CES.

At the end of this analysis, the intelligence analyst should be able to succinctly state the
relative combat potential for the threat force. For example, “although the absolute force ratio
between the U.S. force and the 23rd Guards Division is 1.96: 1.00, REDLAND, has superior
knowledge of the terrain and has occupied heavily fortified defensive positions along the high
ground in vicinity of the capital city. According to HUMINT reporting, the morale of 23rd
Guard’s units is mostly high. Their leadership has participated in four other battles against U.S.
forces, and has likely learned from those experiences.

B-6
 NWC 4111G

Appendix C: Center of Gravity Determination

Identification of both the enemy and friendly centers of gravity is an essential element of
any plan. If the staff gets this part wrong the operation will, at best, be inefficient, and at worst,
end in failure. The purpose of this appendix is to provide the planner with a brief review of the
requirements for each of the information requirements displayed in the center of gravity (COG)
worksheet found in STEP 1, Part 1 of this workbook. This appendix is not intended to replace the
extensive study of the nuances of COG analysis which all planners should strive to master;
rather, it is intended to identify information requirements and to offer some considerations in the
application of the collected data. Many will observe that this workbook offers a blend of two
complementary theoretical constructs, those of Dr. Milan Vego and the perspective of Joint
Doctrine (which partially reflects many of the thoughts of Dr. Joe Strange). One should find that
Dr. Vego’s explanation offers the planner a useful technique for identifying the COG and
potential considerations for its defeat, while Dr. Strange’s concept provides a methodology for a
systematic approach for the employment of effects upon the COG. Used in concert, the two
theories provide the staff officer with a suite of COG planning considerations.

The reader will note that this workbook has the staff collecting information for both the
enemy and friendly COGs. Neither can be identified nor considered in a vacuum—a common
staff planning mistake. The struggle between opposing forces employing their unique means and
ways to achieve their respective ends (objectives) is a dynamic that can only be appreciated if
they are viewed collectively. While the explanations and examples provided below will be for
enemy COG analysis, the process is the same for determining and analyzing friendly COGs. The
only differences are in the planning actions taken once the analysis is completed. Planners will
develop courses of action that focus on defeating the enemy’s COG while at the same time
mitigating risks to their own COG.

OBJECTIVE Figure C-1. COG Flow Chart

Strategic
1
Operational

Critical Factors
Critical Strengths Critical
2 Weaknesses CC
CC
CC
COG
CC
CR
CC
CC CR
COG CR
3 Strategic CC Critical 4
and Capability CV CV
Operational 6
CV
5
CR CR CR
CR-Critical Requirement
CV-Critical Vulnerability CV CV 6 CV CV
CC-Critical Capability

C-1
 NWC 4111G

Figure C-1, COG Flow Chart, identifies the flow that is used in this workbook to identify
a COG and to determine the ways in which it can be attacked. Each step of the process, as they
correspond to the numbers in figure C-1, is described below and an example, using an Enemy
COG analysis of Desert Storm, is provided in Table C-1.

1. IDENTIFY THE OBJECTIVE(S). This is a critical first step. Before one can determine a
COG, the objective(s) must be identified. If this portion of the analysis is flawed, then the error
will infect the remainder of the process. The planner should first determine the ultimate (strategic
or operational objectives) and then the intermediate (operational or major tactical objectives).
The operational objectives should show a direct relationship to the strategic objectives. If this
linkage between strategic and operational objectives cannot be established, the objectives are
suspect. Remember, objectives, and particularly strategic objectives, usually have requirements /
tasks that fall primarily into the responsibility of instruments of power other than the military.
These are still important to identify since the military may have a supporting role in their
accomplishment.

2. IDENTIFY CRITICAL FACTORS. Critical factors are those attributes considered crucial
for the accomplishment of the objective. These factors that in effect “describe” the environment
(in relationship to the objective) must be identified and classified as either sufficient (critical
strength) or insufficient (critical weakness). Vego defines critical factors as “a cumulative term
for critical strengths and critical weaknesses of a military or nonmilitary source of power; they
can be quantifiable (tangible) or unquantifiable (intangible); critical factors are present at each
level of war; they require constant attention because they are relative and subject to changes
resulting from the actions of one’s forces or of the enemy’s actions”(Operational Warfare, 635).
It is important while conducting the analysis for this step that planners maintain a sharp eye on
the objectives identified in the first step—each level of war will have critical factors that are
unique to that level. The questions which should be asked when determining critical factors for
the enemy are: “What are the attributes, both tangible and intangible, that the enemy has and
must use in order to attain his strategic (operational) objective?” These are critical strengths. The
second question is, “What are the attributes, both tangible and intangible, that the enemy has and
must use in order to achieve his strategic (operational) objective, but which are weak and may
impede the enemy while attempting to attain his objective?” These are critical weaknesses. The
answers to these two questions will produce a range of critical strengths and critical weaknesses
associated with specific levels of war. One should note, that like the close relationship expected
to be found between strategic and operational objectives, there will undoubtedly be some critical
strengths and critical weaknesses that have a similar close relationship between the
corresponding critical factors (for example: a strategic critical weakness, such as a strategic
leader having a tenuous communications link to his fielded forces may also create an operational
critical weakness for fielded forces unable to reliably communicate with their higher command).

3. IDENTIFY THE CENTER OF GRAVITY. Joint doctrine identifies the COG as “those
characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom
of action, physical strength, or will to fight” (JP 5-00.1, II-6). While agreeing with the joint
definition, Vego offers the planner another way to view this all important concept. He states that
a COG is “that source of massed strength—physical or moral, or a source of leverage—whose
serious degradation, dislocation, neutralization, or destruction would have the most decisive

C-2
 NWC 4111G

impact on the enemy’s or one’s own ability to accomplish a given military objective”
(Operational Warfare, 634).
While both definitions are helpful for assisting in the identification of the operational COG,
when considering the strategic COG, a planner should be alert for the fact that both definitions
appear focused upon only the military aspects of the analysis. In view of the discussion in the
first step, when strategic objectives are being identified, remembering that the role of instruments
of power other than the military may prevail, planners should consider a broader application of
the two definitions.
The COG (s) at each level of war should be found among the listed critical strengths identified
within the critical factors of step two. While all of the identified strengths are critical, the planner
must deduce which among those capabilities identified rise(s) above all others in importance in
accomplishing the objective (that is, those tangible and intangible elements of combat power that
would accomplish the assigned objectives) —this critical strength is the COG. This does not
diminish the importance of the other critical strengths; however, it forces the planner to examine
closely the relationships of the various critical strengths to one another and the objective. This
analysis of these relationships will prove important in the next step.

4. IDENTIFY CRITICAL CAPABILITIES. Joint doctrine identifies critical capabilities as

“those adversary capabilities that are considered crucial enablers for the adversary’s COG to
function as such, and are essential to the accomplishment of the adversary’s assumed
objective(s)” (JP 5-00.1, II-7). If the COG is a physical force (often the case at the operational
level), the staff may wish to begin their examination of critical capabilities by reviewing the
integration, support, and protection elements of one’s own or enemy combat power as they apply
to the COG. Many of these elements are often found in the Operational Functions as described
in the UJTL. Moreover, these capabilities will often be found within the critical strengths and
weaknesses identified in step two. The planner should be alert for two major considerations.
First, although a capability is a critical strength, if it bears no relationship to the identified COG
it cannot be considered a critical capability. The second consideration is that although we
perceive some capability as a critical weakness, if it is an essential enabler for the enemy COG
then it is a critical capability, albeit weak in nature. An example of this phenomenon could be the
same communications circumstance offered earlier in step two. A critical capability for an
operational center of gravity to accomplish its mission might be its ability to exert command and
control (C2)—its ability to receive direction as well as communicate directives to subordinates.
The fact that we have deduced this to be a weakness does not diminish its importance to the
COG for accomplishment of its assigned mission. This insight of a capability’s weakness will be
applied at a later step.

5. IDENTIFY CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS. Once a COG’s critical capabilities are

identified, the next step is for the staff to identify “those essential conditions, resources, and
means for a critical capability to be fully operational” (JP 5-00.1, II-7). These are the critical
requirements that support each of the critical capabilities. This is essentially a detailed view of
what comprises a critical capability. Using the C2 example as a critical capability, the critical
requirements might include tangible requirements such as: communication nodes, antennas,
frequency bands, individual command posts, spare parts, band width, specific satellites, etc. It
may also include intangibles such as commander’s perceptions and morale.

C-3
 NWC 4111G

Planners should be cautious at this point. One will be presented with a wealth of potential targets
or tasks as each critical capability is peeled back and the numerous supporting critical
requirements are identified. There is often a temptation to stop at this point of the analysis and
begin constructing target lists. Such an action could result in a waste of resources and may not be
sufficient to achieve the desired effects. The planner should find the sixth step as a more
effective way to achieve the defeat of a COG.

6. IDENTIFY CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES. Joint doctrine defines critical vulnerabilities

as “those aspects or components of the adversary’s critical capabilities (or components thereof),
which are deficient, or vulnerable to neutralization, interdiction, or attack in a manner achieving
decisive or significant results, disproportionate to the military resources applied” (JP 5-00.1, II-
7). The planner should contemplate those critical capabilities and their supporting critical
requirements in this regard, keeping in mind that these weaknesses must bear a direct
relationship to a COG and its supporting critical capabilities for it to be assessed as a critical
vulnerability. Striking a weakness that bears no such relationship is simply a measure taken to
harvest “low hanging fruit,” which offers no decisive benefit.
The planner should also take this opportunity to consider the previously assembled lists of
critical strengths and critical weaknesses from step two to determine if there are any critical
factors with a close relationship to the COG that were not captured in the previous critical
capability / critical requirement steps (steps four and five).
While the planner will first seek critical weaknesses within the critical capabilities and
supporting critical requirements, as implied by joint doctrine, Vego cautions that there might be
opportunities found in critical strengths that provide decisive or significant results
disproportionate to the military resources applied. An example might be the Integrated Air
Defense (IAD) that is protecting an operational COG. While this critical capability might be
assessed as a strength, its neutralization and the subsequent opening of the COG to direct attack
may be assessed by the commander as more favorable in regard to the amount of resources and
time expended to achieve the desired effects.

7. IDENTIFY DECISIVE POINTS. Though not reflected in Figure C-1, identification of

decisive points remains an important feature of the COG analysis and its subsequent defeat or
neutralization. Joint doctrine identifies decisive points as “a geographic place, specific key event,
critical system, or function that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an
adversary and greatly influence the outcome of an attack” (JP 5-00.1, II-14). As with all previous
steps, the value of a decisive point is directly related to its relationship to a COG and its
objective. If there is no relationship, it is not a decisive point. A decisive point is neutral in
nature; that is, it is by definition important to both the enemy and friendly commanders. If, for
example, an APOD/SPOD complex is a decisive point for a friendly commander enabling him to
project his COG through it on the way to the objective, the enemy commander will also assess
the complex as a threat to his COG and should attempt to deny the friendly force commander
control of the decisive point. In both cases, this decisive point, if within the capability of the
force, will undoubtedly become an objective or task assigned to both enemy and friendly
subordinate commands. Failure to do so becomes an identified risk to one’s COG.

The planner must remember that this is a dynamic process. Any changes in the information
considered in the first two steps of this process require the staff to revalidate its conclusions and

C-4
 NWC 4111G

subsequent supporting operations. As objectives change, the sources of power required to

achieve the desired end might also chage. As new sources of strength appear in the battlespace,
how do they interact?

Table C-1, Desert Storm Enemy COG Analysis, provides an example COG analysis using the
worksheet provided in this workbook. This example is not intended to be exhaustive and serves
only as an illustrative example, exploring only a single critical capability and its associated
critical requirements, and offering simply a selection of decisive points.

Table C-1. Desert Storm Enemy COG Analysis

Enemy Center of Gravity Determination

Identify

1a. Strategic Objective(s)

o Retain Kuwait as 19th Province
o Enhance Saddam Hussein’s hold on power
o Increase Iraq’s political and military influence in the
Arab world.
o Increase Iraq’s power and influence within OPEC

1b. Operational Objective(s)

o Defeat or neutralize a coalition attack to liberate Kuwait
o Prevent coalition forces from obtaining air superiority
o Prevent coalition forces from obtaining sea control in the
northern part of the Persian Gulf

C-5
 NWC 4111G

2a. Critical Strengths 2b. Critical Weaknesses

o Integrated Air Defense (IAD) o World Opinion; Arab world
o WMD outrage
o Land-based ballistic missiles o Long and exposed Land
(Scuds ) LOCs from IRAQ to KTO.
o Republican Guards in the o Combat skills and readiness
Kuwait Theater of Operations of the Air Force
(KTO) o Numerical and qualitative
o Forces are in defensive inferiority of naval forces
positions o Low morale and poor
o Saddam and his strategic C2 discipline of regular forces
o Combat experienced units and o Class IX for weapon systems
commanders o Inadequate forces to protect
o Missile-armed surface the Iraq-Iranian border
combatants
o Sea Mine inventories and
delivery platforms

3a. Strategic COG

Saddam and his inner circle security apparatus

3b. Operational COG

Republican Guards in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO)

Note: for the sake of brevity, this example will

only examine the Operational COG

C-6
 NWC 4111G

4. Critical Capabilities
o Sustain Rep Guard forces in KTO (Log)
o Receive strategic direction and provide directives
to subordinate units (C3)
• Protect forces from coalition airpower
(Integrated Air Defense--IAD)
o Employ conventional defensive forces as a
screening force
o Maintain organizational morale

Note: for the sake of brevity, this example will

only examine the single critical capability of IAD
6. Check CVs
5. Critical Requirements (per the example IAD) 9 Radars
o Radar Sites vulnerable to
o Communication nodes jamming
o Iraqi Air Force 9 Air Force
o Class IX for IAD systems 9 LOCs &
o Resupply of Class V Class IX
o Morale of fixed site crews

Enemy Decisive Points

(NOTE—SELECTED EXAMPLES, NOT AN EXHAUSTIVE LISTING)

o APODS & SPODS in Saudi Arabia

o Strait of Hormuz
Figure C-1 . Center of Gravity Determination
o APODS in Turkey
o C3I nodes

C-7
 NWC 4111G

APPENDIX D: Sample Planning Assumptions

• Shipping and air augmentation assets will be available when the country YELLOW
becomes involved in the hostilities.

• Country YELLOW will remain neutral, but will deploy the major part of its forces along
the border of country BRAVO.

• Country GREEN will (not) allow use of its ports and air heads for transit of BLUE
forces.

• Canal ZULU will remain open during hostilities for all U.S. shipping.

• Country PURPLE and YELLOW will (not) remain neutral.

• Country GREEN will (not) allow over flight rights to U.S. aircraft.

• Country ORANGE will (not) provide basing rights for U.S. ships carrying nuclear
weapons.

• Country CRIMSON will (not) allow basing of U.S. ships and aircraft if they do (not)
conduct combat missions against country RED.

• Country BROWN will not grant basing rights to the enemy forces.

• RED will (not) use weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

• No RED reinforcements are expected in the Bravo area.

• RED Force ALFA will (not) use air surveillance/targeting aircraft.

• Ratios of forces will (not) remain unchanged for the next 48 hours.

• Reserves will be fully mobilized NLT _________.

• Forces will deploy with _____ Days of Supply.

D-1
 NWC 4111G

APPENDIX E: Risk Assessment

Risk is inherent in any use of military force or routine military activity. Earlier, in STEP 1,
the commander conducted his initial risk assessment. In STEP 2 the staff will develop a more
focused view of the operational risks and offer means to mitigate them. There are several types
of risk. However, the risk discussed in relation to the CES is associated with the dangers, which
exist due to the presence of the enemy, the uncertainty of the enemy intentions, and the potential
rewards, or dangers of friendly force action in relation to mission accomplishment.

Where resources are scarce, the commander may accept risk by applying the principle of
economy of force in one area (supporting effort) in order to generate “massed effects” of combat
power elsewhere (main effort). In an effort to affect surprise or maintain tempo he may begin
action prior to the closure of all units or sustainment. To maneuver or move the force for further
actions he may sacrifice somewhat on force protection by transiting a part of the force through a
contested area. It is the rare situation where forces are so mismatched that the commander is not
concerned with risk to the mission, and even in these situations he will still desire to minimize
the individual risk to his forces. All these are examples of risk - risk a commander alone
determines how and where he is willing to accept.

While risk cannot be totally eliminated, it can be “managed” by a systematic approach that
weighs the costs - time, personnel, resources - against the benefits of mission accomplishment.
Commanders have always risk-managed their actions: intuitively, by their past experiences, or
otherwise. Risk management won’t prevent losses but, properly applied, it will allow the
commander to take necessary and prudent risks without arbitrary restrictions, and while
maximizing combat capabilities.

Accepting risk is a function of both risk assessment and risk management. This entails:

• Identification of threats. Identify threats to the force. Consider all aspects of Mission,
Enemy, Terrain, Time, Troops, and Civil Considerations (METT-TC) for current and
future situations. Sources of information about threats include reconnaissance, intelligence,
experience/expertise of the commander and staff, etc.

• Assessment of threats. Assess each threat to determine the risk of potential loss based on
probability (frequent–occurs often, continuously experienced; likely–occurs several
times; occasional–occurs sporadically; seldom–unlikely, but could occur at some time;
unlikely–can assume it will not occur) and severity (catastrophic–mission is made
impossible; critical–severe mission impact; marginal–mission possible using alternate
options; negligible–minor disruptions to mission) of the threat. Determining the risk is
more an art than a science. Use historical data, intuitive analysis, and judgment to
estimate the risk of each threat. Probability and severity levels are estimated based on the
user’s knowledge of probability of occurrence and the severity of consequences once the
occurrence happens. The level of risk is assessed by a combination of the threat, its
probability of occurring, and degree of severity. The levels of risk are extremely high–
loss of ability to accomplish mission; high–significantly degrades mission capabilities in

E-1
 NWC 4111G

terms of required mission standard; moderate–degrades mission capabilities in terms of

required mission standards; and low–little or no impact on accomplishment of the
mission.

• Address risk, determine residual risk, and make risk decision. For each threat, develop
one or more options that will eliminate or reduce the risk of the threat. Specify who,
what, where, when, and how. Determine any residual risk and revise the evaluation of the
level of risk remaining. The commander alone then decides whether or not to accept the
level of residual risk. If the commander determines the risk is too great to continue the
mission or a COA, he directs the development of additional measures to account for the
risk or he modifies (or rejects) the COA.

• Define indicators. Think through the threat—what information will provide indication
that the risk is no longer acceptable? Ensure subordinates and staff are informed of the
importance of communicating the status of those indicators.

• Observe and evaluate. In execution, monitor the status of the indicators and enact further
options as warranted. After the operation, evaluate the effectiveness of each option in
reducing or eliminating risk. For options that were not effective, determine why and what
to do the next time the threat is identified.

Applying risk management requires a clear understanding of what constitutes “unnecessary

risk,” when the benefits actually do outweigh costs, and guidance as to the command level to
make those decisions. When a commander decides to accept risk, the decision must be
coordinated with the affected units—where and how the commander is willing to accept risk is
detailed in each COA.

Bottom Line: Planners must identify risks inherent to the operation and offer specific
measures in their COAs/CONOPS to mitigate the risks. The commander must be aware of
the residual risk after mitigating measures have been applied.

E-2
 NWC 4111G

APPENDIX F: Examples of Governing Factors

• Which is most decisive?

• Which requires the least time?
• Which is least complicated by Rules of Engagement?
• Which allows the greatest flexibility in selecting the time and place of the action?
• Which offers the greatest flexibility?
• Which offers the least operational risk?
• Which is easiest to support from the perspective of command, control, and
communications?
• Which offers best logistics/sustainability?
• Which makes the enemy’s logistic support most difficult?
• Which is most dependent on weather? on terrain?
• Which offers best use of our transportation links?
• Which has the most adverse affect on the enemy’s center of gravity?
• Which allows the accomplishment of the assigned objective in the shortest time?
• Which will best facilitate the attainment of the next objective?
• Which best capitalizes on the Principles of War (MOOSEMUSS) or Principles of
MOOTW (SLURPO)? (List each or selected ones as directed.)
• Which offers the least losses?
• Which inflicts the largest losses on the enemy?
• Which offers the greatest hope of splitting the enemy's coalition?
• Which will most strengthen the cohesion of our coalition?
• Which will reduce the enemy morale the most?
• Which offers the most favorable ratio of relative combat power?
• Which will best facilitate future operations?

NOTE: No matter which Governing Factors are chosen, it is important that every member of the
joint planning group have the same understanding of what the factor means. For example, simply
stating "Risk" as a governing factor with no further explanation could lead to multiple
interpretations: Risk to forces? Risk to aircraft / ships / coalition? Risk of mission failure? etc.

F-1
 NWC 4111G

APPENDIX G: Sample Decision Matrix

GOVERNING WT COA #1 COA #2 COA #3 COA #4

FACTORS
SIMPLICITY 3 2 6 1 3 4 12 3 9

SURPRISE 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4

SPEED 2 1 2 2 4 3 6 4 8

MASS 4 3 12 1 4 2 8 4 16

RISK 2 4 8 3 6 4 8 4 8

FLEXIBILITY 4 3 12 3 12 4 16 3 12

SUSTAINABILITY 3 3 9 3 9 2 6 3 9

C2 3 3 9 2 6 1 3 3 9

TOTAL 21 18 23 28

WEIGHTED TOTAL 60 47 62 75
NOTE: This is simply a staff planning decision aid, and should be viewed as such. Selection of a
numerically superior COA may not be the best recommendation. The strength of this aid is that it
allows the commander and staff to systematically review specific important strengths and
weaknesses of each COA.

1. Numerical values for each governing factor are assigned after the COA is war-gamed. These
values reflect the relative advantages or disadvantages of each governing factor for each COA.

2. These numbers provide a subjective evaluation of the best COA without weighting one
governing factor over another.

3. The weights are multiplied by the initially assigned score in each column.

4. Scores are totaled to provide a “best” COA based on weights assigned by the commander.

5. There is no requirement to rank each COA governing factor (i.e., all three COAs can
receive the same assessment score for a particular governing factor).

6. There are other recording techniques that can be used by the JPG/OPG. The staff can
assign + (for strengths), - (for weaknesses), and 0 (for neither a strength or weakness) and then
add up the results. The COA with the largest number of +s is assessed as "best."

G-1
 APPENDIX H: Joint Synchronization Matrix

The Joint Synchronization Matrix is a staff decision and planning aid that graphically
reflects the joint33 execution of an operation over a specific time period. Once completed, the
matrix will provide the staff:

• A graphic portrayal of the synchronization of subordinate tasks during the operation and
a means to refine the synchronization of events / actions that did not receive detailed
attention during the earlier CES steps.
• A graphic portrayal of the key decision points for the operation.
• A clear focus for supporting activities (logistics, IO, Intelligence collection, etc.).
• A means to identify and prioritize branch planning requirements.
• A graphic portrayal of the plan / order—with a completed matrix in hand, a single
planner can now quickly develop the base plan /order.

The construction of the matrix should begin during the wargame (see STEP 3 of the CES on
page 3-1) in the form of a wargaming worksheet, however, the full value of the matrix is most
often realized after the commander has approved a course of action (COA) and the operational
sequencing of the operation has been established.

Upon receipt of the commander's decision (STEP 5 of the CES), the planning staff should
assemble and complete the matrix. The organizational mechanics of the how the staff completes
the matrix are the same as used during the wargame as described in STEP 3 of this workbook.

The first two decisions that must be made are: 1. Will the matrix synchronize by event or
time period (or a combination thereof)? 2. What forces / functions and activities will the matrix
synchronize? There are no hard and fast answers to these questions, and they are most often
tailored to the given situation. Consider the following for each of these decisions:

• Forces / Activities. Along the left column of the matrix, the staff will list the forces,
activities, and decisions to be synchronized. The minimum requirement for listing is for
all the commands that will be tasked in the order. Most staffs also find useful to list any
activities that will be in support of the operation (such as logistics, IO, Intelligence) as
well as organizations / forces not under your control but important to your operations
(NGOs, UN, Host nation, allied force, etc). See the example matrix; figure H-1, on page
H-3.

____________________
33
Though this matrix is being used for joint synchronization, component-level commanders also use this tool for synchronization
of their subordinate elements with the joint force operation.

H-1
 • Time34 or Event. The top line of the matrix is for the time period or events to be
synchronized. As a rule of thumb, there is a proportional reduction in the granularity of
synchronization as the time period broadens. So, for example, if the staff chooses to
simply synchronize by operational phase, it will likely fail to expose all synchronization
requirements if there are multiple critical events executed during each phase of the
operation. On the other hand, a detailed day by day synchronization matrix could create
an ungainly tool. With these considerations in mind, staffs often find most useful to use a
combination of the two. For the early phases, smaller time periods or multiple events are
listed, while the latter phases are not broken down further. This technique allows for
detailed synchronization of the events that are near term (and the ones we know most
about) and less detail for those phases that are further down the road and will most likely
be less precise in our detailed understanding. The detailed examination of the earlier
phase(s) also allows for a sharper focus upon force closures—especially important if
critical capabilities are not in place in the AO/JOA and their arrival supports a specific
event. See the example matrix; figure H-1, on page H-3.

____________________
34
See Appendix J for a summary of operational time definitions.

H-2
H-3
 PRE-PHASE I PHASE I PHASE II PHASE III PHASE IV PHASE V
OPERATIONS ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________ ___________
TIME
C DAY/D DAY

Figure H-2. Sample Joint Synchronization Matrix

H-4
DECISION
POINT
 APPENDIX I: Plan Rehearsals

(Extracted from the Joint Warfighting Center JTF Rehearsal Handbook)

In the complex world of Joint Operations, rehearsals are vital to the successful execution of
an Operation Order (OPORD). Joint operations rehearsals allow the joint force staff to practice
the OPORD before its actual execution. Through Joint operations rehearsals, the Joint Force
Commander (JFC) and staff gain an understanding of the concept of operations in its entirety.
These rehearsals afford a comprehensive view of the operation, orient the individual joint force
components to one another, and more importantly, give each component a thorough
understanding of the JFC’s intent, priorities, and guidance.

Joint operations rehearsals are conducted at the operational level of war. This yields a much
broader perspective than the tactical level. The operational level of war focuses on the
deployment and employment of joint force major component forces, commitment and
withdrawal from battle, and the arrangement of battles and major operations in the Joint
Operations Area (JOA).

Service Types Techniques

Army • Confirmation Brief • Full Dress Rehearsal
• Backbrief • Reduced Force Rehearsal
• (Field Manual (FM) • Combined Arms • Area (Terrain) Model
101-5 and Rehearsal Rehearsal
• Center for Army • Support Rehearsal • Sketch Map Rehearsal
Lessons Learned (Fires, logistical • Map Rehearsal
(CALL) support, etc.) • Radio Rehearsal
Newsletter 98-5 • Battle Drill or
Standing Operating
Procedures (SOP)
Rehearsal
Marine Corps • Staff Rehearsal • None identified
• Integrated Rehearsal
(Marine Corps Warfare • Modified, Integrated
Publication (MCWP)5- Rehearsal
1)
Air Force • Full Dress Rehearsal • None identified
(Air Force Doctrine • Partial Force
Document (AFDD) 2-7) Rehearsal
Navy • Amphibious Rehearsal • Complete Rehearsal
(Naval Warfare • Assault Rehearsal • Limited Rehearsal
Publication (NWP) • Sweep Rehearsal
Series) • Unit Rehearsal (e.g.,
SEALs)
Table I-1. Service Types and Techniques of Rehearsals

I-1
 Before a Joint Operations Rehearsal can be conducted the joint force’s and the component’s
OPORDs must be synchronized as part of the planning process. Synchronization allows the joint
force staff and components to identify and correct major interoperability problems in the concept
of operations.

There is limited information concerning Joint operations rehearsals in Joint publications,

and the normal alternative of reverting to Service publications for guidance can cause
considerable confusion. Service definitions for “types” and “techniques” of rehearsals, in Table
I-1, reveal differing perspectives on this critical aspect of planning and executing operations.

1. General.

Rehearsing is the process of practicing a plan in the time available before actual execution.
Rehearsing key combat and logistic actions allows participants to become familiar with the
operation and to visualize the plan. This process assists them in orienting themselves to their
surroundings and to other units during execution. Rehearsals also provide a forum for
subordinate leaders to analyze the plan. However, caution must be exercised in adjusting the plan
in order to prevent errors in synchronization. While the joint force may not be able to rehearse
an entire operation, the JFC should identify key elements for rehearsal. Rehearsals should always
be performed before the execution of an operation. The JFC should not equivocate on rehearsals
as they allow the participants to gain a better understanding of his intentions and vision for the
operation. The JFC should attend subordinate rehearsals so that he understands components’
plans and to ensure his intent is understood.

The operational level rehearsal helps the Commander weave the series of component tactical
actions over days and weeks into a campaign or set of major operations that ultimately address
the Combatant Commander’s requirements for an end state. The operational-level planning
horizon has expanded and consequently the vision of the future is more important. At the
operational level, the questions that involve future vision are:

• What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the Joint
Operations Area (JOA) to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends)
• What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (Ways)
• How should the resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of
actions? (Means)
• What is the likely cost or risk to the JTF in performing that sequence of actions?
• Do I have the right forces in the right place at the right time?
• Where am I in light of my operational end state?
• What should I be doing now to influence events three to five days from now?

2. Types and Techniques of Joint Operations Rehearsals.

a. Types.

• Staff Only Rehearsals. This type of rehearsal is internal to the participating JTF or
component headquarters staffs or conducted between the JTF and component staffs.

I-2
• Commanders and Staff Rehearsals. This type of rehearsal is for the JFC, component
commanders, and their staffs. The actual participants may vary from only commanders
and key staff personnel to full joint force and components’ headquarters participation.

• Partial Force Rehearsals. This type of rehearsal is a compromise between a Staff Only
Rehearsal, a Commanders and Staff Rehearsal, and the resource-intensive Full Force
Rehearsal. The ultimate desire is to have representation from as many joint force
components as possible.

• Full Force Rehearsals. These are the most effective, but also the most resource-intensive
types of rehearsals. This technique may involve all participants (Commanders, staffs and
units) rehearsing parts or all of the operation.

b. Techniques.

Note: Whenever possible, all joint operations rehearsal techniques should include the
exercising of communications personnel, facilities, and circuits that will be used during the
actual operation.

• Map/Chart Technique. By assembling commanders and a minimum of staff personnel

around some type of tactical display (e.g., map, nautical charts, aerial imagery), the
rehearsal director leads participants through the operation. Participants are responsible for
moving/explaining their actions and counteractions to the enemy’s (or others ,e.g., third
country’s) reactions.

• Area (Terrain) Board Technique. Same as the previous technique except that some
form of area model is used in place of a map/chart.

• Simulation Supported Technique. When properly used, simulation provides an

opportunity to increase the fidelity of any rehearsal process. Simulations such as the Joint
Theater Level Simulation (JTLS) or the Joint Training Confederation (JTC) may be used
to actually portray the "execution" of a plan. However, the databases required for this
technique have limitations and require time to develop. Therefore, decisions to use them
when rehearsing a time-sensitive operation resulting from crisis action planning should
be carefully considered.

• Similar Area Technique. The Commanders and Staff, Partial Force, and Full Force
rehearsal types may use areas (land areas/sea and littoral areas/buildings and structures)
that are similar to the actual Joint Operations Area (JOA).

• Actual Area Technique. In certain types of operations (such as retrogrades), the JTF
may be able to use the actual area in which the operation will take place.

I-3
 The commander may also direct that numerous, multi-echelon rehearsals be conducted. The
factors the commander should consider in making a decision on the numbers, types, and
techniques of rehearsals are:

• Available time
• Who will participate
• Operations security considerations
• Area/space availability
• Objectives of the rehearsal

Combining the types and techniques of rehearsals produces the combination of possibilities
reflected in Table I-2.

Note: It is feasible for the joint force to use various technologies (e.g., video teleconferencing
(VTC) and available collaborative systems) to conduct the Map/Chart, Area (Terrain) Board, and
Simulation Supported techniques of rehearsals.

Types Techniques
• Map/Chart Technique
• Area (Terrain) Board Technique
• Simulation Supported Technique
Staff Only
• Map/Chart Technique
• Area (Terrain) Board Technique
• Simulation Supported Technique
• Similar Area Technique
Commanders and Staff • Actual Area Technique
• Map/Chart Technique
• Area (Terrain) Board Technique
• Simulation Supported Technique
• Similar Area Technique
Partial Force • Actual Area Technique
• Map/Chart Technique
• Area (Terrain) Board Technique
• Simulation Supported Technique
• Similar Area Technique
Full Force • Actual Area Technique

Table I-2. Rehearsal Types and Techniques Combinations

I-4
3. Preparing for Joint Operations Rehearsals.

General. Rehearsals at all levels of command are key to ensuring an understanding of the
concept of operations, specific responsibilities, timing of actions, and backup procedures to
coordinate joint force operations. Rehearsing the entire operation is desirable. However, in time-
constrained situations, rehearsals may be abbreviated to focus on the most critical portions of the
operation.

Select Type. The Commander should specify the type of rehearsal to be conducted in his
“commander’s guidance.” This allows the staff to begin planning for rehearsals, which may be a
considerable effort in itself, especially if a Full Force rehearsal is desired. Figure I-1 portrays
how the four types of rehearsals vary according to amount of time/resources required and the
amount of understanding desired concerning the operation.

Figure I-1. Selecting Type of Rehearsal

Specify basic rehearsal requirements. The Commander (or designated representative, e.g.,
J3, J5) should:

• Identify and prioritize the events to be rehearsed (e.g., D-Day actions).

• Allocate time for the events being rehearsed.
• Designate attendees.

Determine roles/responsibilities of participants. Examples are:

• Facilitator. This is a key billet and one that is fundamental to the success of the
rehearsal. The individual assigned as the facilitator should be intimately familiar with the
Operations Order (OPORD). Typically this individual has participated in the joint force
plan development process as well as the crosswalk between the component and joint
force OPORDs. The facilitator should also have a solid understanding of the JFC’s
intent. The facilitator keeps the rehearsal on track by adhering to the agenda and
ensuring the discussion remains focused on the subject at hand.

• Red Cell. The Red Cell portrays a credible threat against which the joint force can
rehearse. The credible threat can range from a known enemy force, belligerent factions

I-5
 in military operations other than war, or other contingency circumstances such as the
weather (rain/snow), natural disasters (hurricanes/earthquakes) and other distracters that
could impede mission success. It is important that the Red Cell use individuals with the
requisite expertise in the threat they are representing to challenge the JTF actions in a
realistic manner. The Red Cell should be an independent group of participants and not
“dual hated” to represent both friendly and “enemy” forces and capabilities.

• Briefers/Role Players. Role players need to be identified to represent and brief the
actions and counteractions of the joint force HQ, Service and/or functional components,
and supporting commands and agencies. The role players must understand the details of
their respective commanders’ concepts of operation and intents on accomplishing their
assigned missions, as well as the capabilities and limitations their respective
organizations can bring to bear to support the JFC.

• Recorder. A recorder must be identified to capture those items that require further
action or coordination. By freeing the training audience of note taking tasks, recorders
allow participants to focus their attention on the rehearsal. Effective techniques for the
recorder include posting large butcher block paper on the wall of the rehearsal area to
capture action items or keeping an overhead projection slide up on a screen. Either of
these two techniques allows the rehearsal participants to see what is recorded and helps
ensure all required actions are identified.

• Prepare script. A script is prepared and used as a tool to control the rehearsal,
regardless of the type of rehearsal selected. The script is used to keep the rehearsal on
track and as a method for ensuring that key personnel are not overlooked while
conducting a rehearsal. A script should consist of the following:

• Agenda. The overall plan for conducting of the rehearsal.

• Review of the type and technique to be used

• Ground rules
• Administrative issues
• Training objectives and standards to be used
• Timeline
• Other issues - Commander’s discretion

• Sequence of events. Exactly what will be rehearsed and in what order.

• Sequence of responses.. Role players should respond in some type of logical order or the
rehearsal can become disorganized and confusing. A commonly used method to alleviate
confusion is the action-reaction-counteraction sequence with role players responding to
one another using some prearranged order (e.g., Air Force (AFFOR), Army Forces
(ARFOR), Marine Corps Forces (MARFOR), Navy Forces (NAVFOR), Joint Force Air
Component Commander (JFACC), Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF)).

I-6
 • Issue rehearsal instructions. Some type of order or letter of instruction (LOI) should be
developed by the staff to provide specifics concerning the above topics.

• Assemble resources and support personnel. Most rehearsals require various types of
training aids, sites, security precautions, construction, etc., to be coordinated and
assembled. In addition, support personnel will be necessary, and their roles and
responsibilities must be determined and explained.

• Prepare site. Regardless of the type and technique of rehearsal, some type of site
preparation is required. Some items to verify are:

• Site facilities (parking, latrines/heads, buildings, seating, etc.)

• Site security (operations security and local physical security)
• Appropriate training aids (maps, area (terrain) boards, audio-visual devices, etc.)
• Feeding plans/facilities

4. Conducting Joint Operations Rehearsals.

a. Staff Only Rehearsals.

Staff only rehearsals are designed to familiarize the joint force and/or component staffs with
the plan or order (e.g., transitioning the plan from one staff section to another) or to practice
internal headquarters’ procedures before the operation’s execution. Explanations of these two
variations are provided below.

• Transitioning the plan. The value of a plan lies in its ability to be translated into an
easily understood and executed order. This transition from plan to order can create
difficulties within a joint force or component staff if the staff fails to reach an agreed
upon procedure in advance. This procedure should cover which section is responsible for
which type of plan and order and, most importantly, how the plan or order moves from
one set of planners to others. When transitioning plans or orders from one section to
another, all must understand the method of transmission and the form the plan or order
will take. One approach is to have a designated planner with a particular operation that
moves with the plan from J5 (Future Plans) to J35 (Future Operations) and then into the
J3 (Current Ops) for execution. The plan gains fidelity as it progresses. This provides the
guaranteed presence of a “subject matter expert” if questions arise during plan refinement
or execution. Another technique is to provide a formal plan brief conducted by the losing
planners (J5 Future Plans) to the receiving planners/operators (J3 Current Ops). This
provides for a clear transition and ensures unclear concepts or concerns are reviewed.
Table I-3 provides a sample sequence of events to accomplish this variation.

I-7
 • Joint Planning Group (JPG) conducts plans hand-off brief to J3 Joint
Operations Center (JOC) personnel.

• JPG provides to J3 JOC personnel:

• Coordinated draft Fragmentary Order (FRAGO)

• Course of Action (COA) sketch of applicable branches/sequels
• Draft execution/synchronization checklist/matrix

• JPG provides clarification as required.

• J3 JOC accepts planning products for modification and issuance as an order.

Table I-3. Sample "Transitioning the Plan" Sequence of Events

• Practicing internal procedures. This form of Staff Only rehearsal practices the internal
processes and procedures that a staff is expected to perform during an actual operation.
For example, the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) should rehearse its agenda
and briefing sequence. Using this procedure, the Joint Operations Center (JOC) should
rehearse its shift changeover process, or the Rules of Engagement (ROE) Cell should
rehearse its meeting process.

Staff Only rehearsals can be conducted by using any of the following techniques:

• Map/Chart Technique
• Area (Terrain) Board Technique
• Simulations Supported Technique

JTF Lessons Learned

• The Chief of Staff should be proactive in ensuring these rehearsals are conducted and
adequately attended by the various staff representatives and all Liaison Officers.
• Staff Only rehearsals provide the additional benefit of bringing cohesiveness to a newly
formed JTF Headquarters or component staff.

b. Commanders and Staff Rehearsals.

Commanders and Staff rehearsals provide a means for the principal leaders to 1) understand
the intent of a JFC with a minimum of disruption to tactical level units and 2) familiarize
themselves with the operation before the conduct of either partial force or full force rehearsals.
Commanders and Staff rehearsals can be conducted by using any of the following techniques:

I-8
• Map/Chart Technique
• Area (Terrain) Board Technique
• Simulations Supported Technique
• Similar Area Technique
• Actual Area Technique

The steps in conducting this type of rehearsal include:

• Conduct introduction.

Welcome and introduce the participants.

Explain purpose, overall process (technique), and expected results of the rehearsal.
Review in detail the overall schedule of events.
Explain the “standards” expected to be met throughout this process.
Orientation on all tools (maps, terrain models, synchronization matrices, handouts, etc.).

• Review the friendly, enemy, and third party situations.

Review Combatant Commander’s/own mission, intent and concept of operations.

Review overall (not specific) enemy situation.

• Portray action-reaction-counteraction events. Starting with the phase, critical event,

or timeline the JFC has designated, discuss the components’ actions. Then the “Red
Cell” presents the anticipated reactions. If the plan is well developed, the joint
force/components’ counteraction should then be presented. When it becomes obvious
that changes need to be made to the original plan, record these for Conducting Joint
operations rehearsals development of either changes to the plan or fragmentary orders
(FRAGOs). Significant changes can take the form of branch plans.

• Conduct After-Action Review (AAR). The commander may wish to conduct an AAR
to review lessons learned for future inclusion into the command’s decision-making
process. Additionally, the commander may take the opportunity to reiterate
Commander’s Intent and make sure changes to the plan or order are understood.

I-9
 Commander and Staff Rehearsal
Sample Agenda

• Facilitator/staff brief:

Current friendly situation

Enemy situation and Courses of Action (COAs)
Combatant Commander’s mission and intent
Command’s mission and Commander’s intent
Command’s Task Organization
Overall Command’s Concept of Operations
Key tasks (e.g., critical tasks)
Initial command relationships

• Facilitator sets the phase, action, or critical event that is to be rehearsed (e.g.,
deployment, D-Day events, non-combatant operations).

• Components discuss their actions.

• J2 (or “Red Cell”) portrays the expected enemy reactions (most likely enemy
COA).

• Components in turn discuss their counteractions to the enemy’s reactions.

Note: If the counteraction is a branch or sequel plan, the facilitator must determine if time is
available to discuss it or if it should be deferred to a later date. In many cases, the counteraction
will only be a “concept” for a branch plan that will be developed and rehearsed later.

• Facilitator reviews decisions and necessary follow-on actions (including any

changes to the plan or order that are necessitated by the rehearsal).

• Commanders provide summary remarks.

Table I-4. Commander and Staff Rehearsal Sample Agenda

JTF Lessons Learned

• Rehearsals where components merely brief their concept of operations from

beginning to end are ineffective since little interaction occurs between components.
• Major changes WILL cause the desynchronization of plans -- the exact opposite of
the rehearsal’s intent. Keep the changes to an absolute minimum (refinements to the
plan).
• The commander should focus on the “seams” of interaction among JTF
components. Asking questions about inter-component coordination and cooperation
will reveal potential weaknesses.

I-10
 c. Partial Force Rehearsals.

Partial Force (sometimes called “reduced force”) rehearsals normally require less resources
(e.g., time, personnel, materiel) than the Full Force rehearsal but more than the Commanders and
Staff rehearsal. Like the Full Force rehearsal, this type is best conducted under the same
conditions, weather, time of day and terrain, as the force will encounter during the actual
operation. Battle space requirements are the same as the Full Force rehearsal, only the number of
participants change. A form of Partial Force rehearsal is commonly called a Training Exercise
without Troops (TEWT).

In Partial Force rehearsals, the Commander must first decide the level of leader involvement
in the rehearsal. The selected leaders then rehearse the plan while traversing the actual or like
terrain. This type is an efficient means of rehearsing particular phases in the operation before a
Full Force rehearsal or, if as a substitute for a Full Force rehearsal due to severe time constraints.
This rehearsal type is also an excellent way for component commanders to rehearse and
understand portions of their individual plans before participating in a Full Force rehearsal. As in
the Full Force rehearsal, careful consideration must be given to the component commanders and
the tactical units' timetables before scheduling.

Finding a suitable operating area for a Partial Force rehearsal can be just as difficult as
finding an operating area for a Full Force rehearsal. As with the Full Force rehearsal, the time
intensive task of developing and issuing a separate operations directive, which mirrors the actual
plan, to include operational graphics, is normally accomplished.

d. Full Force Rehearsals

The Full Force rehearsal produces the most detailed understanding of both the mission and
the Commander’s Intent. It is also the most difficult type to perform because it notionally
involves every individual and system participating in the operation.

Full Force rehearsals are normally the most time consuming of all the rehearsal types. It is
particularly important to be sensitive to encroaching on the Functional or Service component’s
preparation timelines by scheduling a Full Force rehearsal in a very compressed planning and
execution window. Time permitting, Functional and Service components might consider
conducting a Partial Force rehearsal before the Full Force rehearsal. While this requires even
more time, it is considered time well spent in ensuring the Full Force rehearsal is conducted
efficiently. If time cannot be found to conduct a separate component rehearsal, a component
might consider conducting a Full Force rehearsal as part of the JTF’s Partial Force rehearsal.

Operations Security (OPSEC) is always a consideration in conducting Full Force rehearsals.

The movement of a large body of the JTF and components will certainly attract attention from
the enemy. The JTF must develop plans to ensure the Full Force rehearsal is protected from the
eyes of the enemy.

Finding a suitable operating area for a Full Force rehearsal can be difficult. If possible, the
JTF should conduct this rehearsal under the same conditions, weather, time of day, terrain, etc.,

I-11
as the force will encounter during the actual operation. This may include the use of live
ammunition. The rehearsal area must be identified, secured, cleared and maintained throughout
the rehearsal process. Additionally, the time intensive task of developing a separate operations
directive, which mirrors the actual plan, to include operational graphics, is normally
accomplished for this type of rehearsal.

5. Choosing the Correct Type or Technique.

There are no “right answers” for the type and technique of rehearsals to conduct. The
Commander must consider several factors before making a choice. These include:

• Available time. Time is the essential resource and must be carefully considered when
determining rehearsal types, techniques and schedules. The time required for a rehearsal
varies with the complexity of the tasks to be rehearsed, the type, and technique of
rehearsal used. . It is usually advantageous to give the priority of rehearsal time to the
lowest level units. Focusing on the critical events of the operation can also save time.

• Participation. The Commander must provide guidance concerning who should be

involved in the rehearsal. If the Commander wishes that all joint force members
participate in the rehearsal, then more time and other resources will be expended.

• Operations security (OPSEC) considerations. The main question the Commander must
consider is “How easily can the enemy gather intelligence from the rehearsal?” The more
participants, the more of an OPSEC risk the rehearsal becomes.

• Area/space availability. In some cases, especially for Full Force rehearsals, obtaining the
area/terrain that is similar to the objective area may be difficult.

• Objectives of the rehearsal. What is to be accomplished? The Commander must determine

the extent of the objectives (or tasks) to be accomplished in the rehearsal. Some tasks
require that a specific type or technique be employed to accomplish certain tasks.

I-12
 NWC 4111G

APPENDIX J: Operational Time Definitions

Times. (DOD) (C, D, and M-days end at 2400 hours Universal Time (zulu time) and are
assumed to be 24 hours long for planning.) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
normally coordinates the proposed date with the commanders of the appropriate unified and
specified commands, as well as any recommended changes to C-day. L-hour will be
established per plan, crisis, or theater of operations and will apply to both air and surface
movements. Normally, L-hour will be established to allow C-day to be a 24-hour day.

a. C-day. The unnamed day on which a deployment operation commences or is to

commence. The deployment may be movement of troops, cargo, weapon systems, or a
combination of these elements using any or all types of transport. The letter "C" will be the
only one used to denote the above. The highest command or headquarters responsible for
coordinating the planning will specify the exact meaning of C-day within the aforementioned
definition. The command or headquarters directly responsible for the execution of the
operation, if other than the one coordinating the planning, will do so in light of the meaning
specified by the highest command or headquarters coordinating the planning.

b. D-day. The unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is to commence.

c. F-day. For deliberate planning, day on which FDO force deployment begins.

d. F-hour. The effective time of announcement by the Secretary of Defense to the Military
Departments of a decision to mobilize Reserve units.

e. H-hour. The specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation commences.

f. I-day. The day on which the Intelligence Community determines that within a potential
crisis situation, a development occurs that may signal a heightened threat to U.S. interests.
Although the scope and direction of the threat is ambiguous, the Intelligence Community
responds by focusing collection and other resources to monitor and report on the situation as
it evolves.

g. L-hour. The specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to

commence.

h. M-day. The term used to designate the unnamed day on which full mobilization
commences or is due to commence.

i. N-day. The unnamed day an active duty unit is notified for deployment or redeployment.

j. R-day. Redeployment day. The day on which redeployment of major combat, combat
support, and combat service support forces begins in an operation.

k. S-day. The day the President authorizes Selective Reserve callup (not more than 200,000).

J-1
 NWC 4111G

l. T-day. The effective day coincident with Presidential declaration of National Emergency
and authorization of partial mobilization (not more than 1,000,000 personnel exclusive of the
200,000 callup).

m. W-day. Declared by the National Command Authorities, W-day is associated with an

adversary decision to prepare for war (unambiguous strategic warning).

J-2
 NWC 4111G

APPENDIX K: Abbreviations and Acronyms

ABCCC Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center

ABN Airborne
AFFOR Air Force Forces
AI Area of Interest; Air Interdiction
ALOC Air Lines of Communication
AO Area of Operations
AOA Amphibious Objective Area
AOC Air Operations Center
APOD Aerial Port of Debarkation
APOE Aerial Port of Embarkation
ARFOR Army Forces
ATO Air Tasking Order
BN Battalion
BDE Brigade
C2 Command and Control
C2W Command and Control Warfare
C3IC Coalition Coordination, Communications, & Integration Center
C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers & Intelligence
Command, Control, Communications, Computers & Intelligence,
C4ISR
Surveillance and Reconnaissance
CA Civil Affairs
CAP Crisis Action Planning
CCIR Commander's Critical Information Requirements
CENTAF US Air Force component, US Central Command
CES Commander's Estimate of the Situation
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual
CJTF Commander, Joint Task Force ; Combined Joint Task Force (NATO)
Civil-Military Operations Center; Cheyenne Mountain Operations
CMOC
Center
COA Course of Action
COG Center of Gravity
COMSEC Communications Security
CONPLAN Concept Plan
COS Chief of Staff
CR Collection Requirement
CRAF Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CRD CINC's Required Date
CS Combat Support
CSAR Combat Search and Rescue
CSS Combat Service Support

K-1
 NWC 4111G

CV Critical Vulnerability; Aircraft Carrier

CVBG Aircraft Carrier Battle Group
CVN Aircraft Carrier, Nuclear
DAL Defended Assets List
DES Desired End State
DCJTF Deputy Commander, Joint Task Force
DIRLAUTH Direct Liaison Authorized
DISA Defense Intelligence Systems Agency
DIV Division
DJTFAC Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell
DoD Department of Defense
DP Decision Point
DRAW-D Defend, Reinforce, Attack, Withdraw, Delay
EAD Earliest Arrival Date
ECOA Enemy Course of Action
FDO Flexible Deterrent Option
FID Foreign Internal Defense
FSCL Fire Support Coordination Line
FFIR Friendly Force Information Requirements
FRAGO Fragmentary Order
HQ Headquarters
HQ COMDT Headquarters Commandant
GCCS Global Command and Control System
HN Host Nation
HNS Host Nation Support
HPT High Payoff Target
HQ Headquarters
HVT High Value Target
IAW In Accordance With
IM Information Management
IMO Information Management Officer
IMP Information Management Plan
IO Information Operations
ISB Intermediate Staging Base
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
JCLL Joint Center for Lessons Learned
JCMA Joint Communications Security Monitoring Activity
JCSE Joint Communications Support Element
JFE Joint Fires Element
JIB Joint Information Bureau
JDLC Joint Distributed Learning Center
JFACC Joint Force Air Component Commander
JFC Joint Force Commander
JFLCC Joint Force Land Component Commander

K-2
 NWC 4111G

JFMCC Joint Force Maritime Component Commander

JFSOCC Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander
JPOTF Joint Psychological Operations Task Force
JIC Joint Intelligence Center
JICO Joint Interface Control Officer
JIOC Joint Information Operations Center
JIPB Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
JIPTL Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List
JMC Joint Movement Center
JOA Joint Operations Area
JOPES Joint Operational Planning and Execution System
JOC Joint Operations Center
JP Joint Publication
JPG Joint Planning Group
JPO-STC Joint Program Office for Special Technology Countermeasures
JPRC Joint Personnel Reception Center
JRSOI Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration
JSC Joint Spectrum Center
JSOTF Joint Special Operations Task Force
JTCB Joint Targeting Coordination Board
JTF Joint Task Force
JTF HQ Joint Task Force Headquarters
JULLS Joint Universal Lessons Learned System
JTTP Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
JVB Joint Visitors Bureau
JWAC Joint Weapons Analysis Center
LAD Latest Arrival Date
LASH Lighter Aboard Ships
LKA Amphibious cargo ship
LOC Line of Communications
LNO Liaison Officer
LPD Amphibious transport dock ship
LPH Amphibious assault helicopter ship
LSD Dock landing ship
LST Tank landing ship
MARCENT Marine Forces Central Command
MARFOR Marine Forces
MCM Mine Countermeasures
MCOO Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay
MEF Marine Expeditionary Force
Mission, Enemy, Terrain (Battlespace), Troops available, Time
METT-TC
available, and Civil Considerations
MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit
MEH Materials Handling Equipment

K-3
 NWC 4111G

MHC Minehunter, Coastal

MIO Maritime Interception Operations
MOG Maximum on Ground
MOPP Mission-Oriented Protective Posture
Mass, Objective, Offensive, Surprise, Economy of Force, Maneuver,
MOOSEMUSS
Unity of Command, Security, Simplicity.
MOOTW Military Operations Other Than War
MOUT Military Operations in Urban Terrain
MTW Major Theater War
NAI Named Area of Interest
NAVFOR Navy Forces
NBC Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
NCA National Command Authorities
NEO Noncombatant Evacuation Operation
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NIPRNET Unclassified but Sensitive Internet Protocol Router Network
NIST National Intelligence Support Team
NSA National Security Agency
NSW Naval Special Warfare
OBJ Objective
OPCON Operational Control
OPG Operational Planning Group
OPLAN Operation Plan
OPORD Operation Order
PA Public Affairs
PAO Public Affairs Officer
PAX Personnel
PIR Priority Intelligence Requirement
POD Port of Debarkation
POE Port of Embarkation
POLAD Political Advisor
PR Production Request
PREPO Pre-Positioned force, equipment, or supplies
Prime BEEF Prime Base Engineer Emergency Forces
PSYOP Psychological Operations
PVO Private Voluntary Organization
Rapid Engineers Deployable Heavy Operations Repair Squadron,
RED HORSE
Engineers
RFI Request for Information
ROE Rules Of Engagement
RSOI Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration
SASO Stability and Support Operations
SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
SLOC Sea Line of Communications

K-4
 NWC 4111G

Security, Legitimacy, Unity of Effort, Restraint, Perseverance,

SLURPO
Objective
Situation, Mission, Execution, Admin and Logistics, Command and
SMEAC
Control
SOCCE Special Operations Command and Control Element
SOF Special Operations Forces
SOP Standing (or standard) Operating Procedures
SPOD Sea Port of Debarkation
SPOE Sea Port of Embarkation
SJA Staff Judge Advocate
SJFHQ Standing Joint Force Headquarters
TACON Tactical Control
TADIL Tactical Digital Information Link
TAI Target Areas of Interest
TF Task Force
TPFDD Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data
UJTL Universal Joint Task List
USA United States Army
USAF United States Air Force
USN United States Navy
USMC United States Marine Corps
USCG United States Coast Guard
USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command
VISA Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement
VTC Video Teleconferencing
WO Warning Order
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

K-5