G.R. No. 190809.  February 13, 2017.*

 
DE LA SALLE-ARANETA UNIVERSITY, petitioner, vs.
JUANITO C. BERNARDO, respondent.

Labor Law; Probationary Employees; Teachers; Jurisprudence

identified the requisites which should concur for a private school
teacher to acquire permanent status, viz.: (1) the teacher is a full-
time teacher; (2) the teacher must have rendered three (3)
consecutive years of service; and (3) such service must have been
satisfactory.—There is no dispute that Bernardo was a part-time
lecturer at DLS-AU, with a fixed-term employment. As a part-
time lecturer, Bernardo did not attain permanent status. Section
93 of the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools
provided: Sec. 93. Regular or Permanent Status.—Those who have
served the probationary period shall be made regular or
permanent. Full-time teachers who have satisfactorily completed
their probationary period shall be considered regular or
permanent. Per Section 92 of the same Regulations, probationary
period for academic personnel “shall not be more than three (3)
consecutive years of satisfactory service for those in the
elementary and secondary levels, six (6) consecutive regular
semesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level,
and nine (9) consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service for
those in the tertiary level where collegiate courses are offered on
the trimester basis.” Thus, jurisprudence identified the requisites
which should concur for a private school teacher to acquire
permanent status, viz.: (1) the teacher is a full-time teacher; (2)
the teacher must have rendered three consecutive years of
service; and (3) such service must have been satisfactory.
 Same; Same; Retirement Benefits; Republic Act (RA) No. 7641
is a curative social legislation. It precisely intends to give the
minimum retirement benefits to employees not entitled to the same
under collective bargaining and other agreements. It also applies
to establishments with existing collective bargaining or other
agreements or voluntary retirement plans whose benefits are less
than those prescribed in said law.—The Court declared in Aquino
v. National Labor Relations Commission, 206 SCRA 118 (1992),
that retirement

_______________

*  FIRST DIVISION.
  
 

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318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De La Salle-Araneta University vs. Bernardo

benefits are intended to help the employee enjoy the

remaining years of his life, lessening the burden of worrying for
his financial support, and are a form of reward for his loyalty and
service to the employer. Retirement benefits, where not mandated
by law, may be granted by agreement of the employees and their
employer or as a voluntary act on the part of the employer. In the
present case, DLS-AU, through Dr. Bautista, denied Bernardo’s
claim for retirement benefits because only full-time permanent
faculty of DLS-AU are entitled to said benefits pursuant to
university policy and the CBA. Since Bernardo has not been
granted retirement benefits under any agreement with or by
voluntary act of DLS-AU, the next question then is, can Bernardo
claim retirement benefits by mandate of any law? We answer in
the affirmative. Republic Act No. 7641 is a curative social
legislation. It precisely intends to give the minimum retirement
benefits to employees not entitled to the same under collective
bargaining and other agreements. It also applies to
establishments with existing collective bargaining or other
agreements or voluntary retirement plans whose benefits are less
than those prescribed in said law.
Same; Same; Same; The Implementing Rules provide that
Republic Act (RA) No. 7641 applies to “all employees in the private
sector, regardless of their position, designation or status and
irrespective of the method by which their wages are paid, except to
those specifically exempted x x x”; The only exemptions specifically
identified by RA No. 7641 and its Implementing Rules are: (1)
employees of the National Government and its political
subdivisions, including government-owned and/or -controlled
corporations, if they are covered by the Civil Service Law and its
regulations; and (2) employees of retail, service and agricultural
establishments or operations regularly employing not more than
ten (10) employees.—Republic Act No. 7641 states that “any
employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age x x x”;
and “[i]n case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to
receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned under
existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement and other
agreements.” The Implementing Rules provide that Republic Act
No. 7641 applies to “all employees in the private sector, regardless
of their position, designation or status and irrespective of the
method by which their wages are paid, except to those specifically
exempted x  x  x.” And Secretary Quisumbing’s Labor Advisory
further clarifies that the employees covered by Republic Act No.
7641

 
  

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De La Salle-Araneta University vs. Bernardo

shall “include part-time employees, employees of service and

other job contractors and domestic helpers or persons in the
personal service of another.” The only exemptions specifically
identified by Republic Act No. 7641 and its Implementing Rules
are: (1) employees of the National Government and its political
subdivisions, including government-owned and/or -controlled
corporations, if they are covered by the Civil Service Law and its
regulations; and (2) employees of retail, service and agricultural
establishments or operations regularly employing not more than
10 employees.
Same; Same; Same; Part-time Employees; The general
coverage of Republic Act (RA) No. 7641 is broad enough to
encompass all private sector employees, and part-time employees
are not among those specifically exempted from the law.—Based
on Republic Act No. 7641, its Implementing Rules, and Secretary
Quisumbing’s Labor Advisory, Bernardo, as a part-time employee
of DLS-AU, is entitled to retirement benefits. The general
coverage of Republic Act No. 7641 is broad enough to encompass
all private sector employees, and part-time employees are not
among those specifically exempted from the law. The provisions of
Republic Act No. 7641 and its Implementing Rules are plain,
direct, unambiguous, and need no further elucidation. Any doubt
is dispelled by the unequivocal statement in Secretary
Quisumbing’s Labor Advisory that Republic Act No. 7641 applies
to even part-time employees. Under the rule of statutory
construction of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Bernardo’s
claim for retirement benefits cannot be denied on the ground that
he was a part-time employee as part-time employees are not
among those specifically exempted under Republic Act No. 7641
or its Implementing Rules.
Implementing Rules; The Implementing Rules partake the
nature of a statute and are binding as if written in the law itself.
They have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality
in an appropriate case by a competent court.—In ruling that
Bernardo, as part-time employee, is entitled to retirement
benefits, we do no less and no more than apply Republic Act No.
7641 and its Implementing Rules issued by the DOLE under the
authority given to it by the Congress. Needless to stress, the
Implementing Rules partake the nature of a statute and are
binding as if written in the law itself. They have the force and
effect of law and enjoy the presumption of

 
 
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320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De La Salle-Araneta University vs. Bernardo

constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with

finality in an appropriate case by a competent court.
Advisory Opinions; In administrative law, contemporaneous
and practical interpretation of law by administrative officials
charged with its administration and enforcement carries great
weight and should be respected, unless contrary to law or
manifestly erroneous.—As a matter of contemporaneous
interpretation of law, Secretary Quisumbing’s Labor Advisory has
persuasive effect. It is undisputed that in administrative law,
contemporaneous and practical interpretation of law by
administrative officials charged with its administration and
enforcement carries great weight and should be respected, unless
contrary to law or manifestly erroneous.
Labor Law; Retirement Benefits; For the availment of the
retirement benefits under Article 302 [287] of the Labor Code, as
amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7641, the following requisites
must concur: (1) the employee has reached the age of sixty (60)
years for optional retirement or sixty-five (65) years for compulsory
retirement; (2) the employee has served at least five (5) years in the
establishment; and (3) there is no retirement plan or other
applicable agreement providing for retirement benefits of
employees in the establishment.—For the availment of the
retirement benefits under Article 302 [287] of the Labor Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7641, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the employee has reached the age of 60 years for
optional retirement or 65 years for compulsory retirement; (2) the
employee has served at least five years in the establishment; and
(3) there is no retirement plan or other applicable agreement
providing for retirement benefits of employees in the
establishment. Bernardo — being 75 years old at the time of his
retirement, having served DLS-AU for a total of 27 years, and not
being covered by the grant of retirement benefits in the CBA — is
unquestionably qualified to avail himself of retirement benefits
under said statutory provision, i.e., equivalent to one-half month
salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six months
being considered as one whole year.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Cause of Action; Retirement
Benefits; The cause of action for Bernardo’s retirement benefits
only accrued after the refusal of De La Salle-Araneta University
(DLS-AU) to pay him the same, clearly expressed in Dr. Bautista’s
letter dated

 
 
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De La Salle-Araneta University vs. Bernardo

February 12, 2004.—A cause of action has three elements, to

wit, (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the
part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant
violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff. Bernardo’s right to
retirement benefits and the obligation of DLS-AU to pay such
benefits are already established under Article 302 [287] of the
Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7641. However,
there was a violation of Bernardo’s right only after DLS-AU
informed him on November 8, 2003 that the university no longer
intended to offer him another contract of employment, and
already accepting his separation from service, Bernardo sought
his retirement benefits, but was denied by DLS-AU. Therefore,
the cause of action for Bernardo’s retirement benefits only
accrued after the refusal of DLS-AU to pay him the same, clearly
expressed in Dr. Bautista’s letter dated February 12, 2004. Hence,
Bernardo’s complaint, filed with the NLRC on February 26, 2004,
was filed within the three-year prescriptive period provided under
Article 291 of the Labor Code.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
   Pagunsan and Ty Law Offices for petitioner.
   Public Attorney’s Office for respondent.
   Estrada & Aquino for intervenor CEAP.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,  J.:

 
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by De La Salle-Araneta
University (DLS-AU) seeking the annulment and reversal
of the
 
 
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322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De La Salle-Araneta University vs. Bernardo

Decision1 dated June 29, 2009 and Resolution2 dated

January 4, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P.
No. 106399, which affirmed in toto the Decision3 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC-
NCR CA No. 043416-05. The NLRC reversed and set aside
the Labor Arbiter’s Decision4 dated December 13, 2004 in
NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-02-02729-04 and found that
respondent Juanito C. Bernardo (Bernardo) was entitled to
retirement benefits.
On February 26, 2004, Bernardo filed a complaint
against DLS-AU and its owner/manager, Dr. Oscar
Bautista (Dr. Bautista), for the payment of retirement
benefits. Bernardo alleged that he started working as a
part-time professional lecturer at DLS-AU (formerly known
as the Araneta University Foundation) on June 1, 1974 for
an hourly rate of P20.00. Bernardo taught for two
semesters and the summer for the school year 1974-1975.
Bernardo then took a leave of absence from June 1, 1975 to
October 31, 1977 when he was assigned by the Philippine
Government to work in Papua New Guinea. When
Bernardo came back in 1977, he resumed teaching at DLS-
AU until October 12, 2003, the end of the first semester for
school year 2003-2004. Bernardo’s teaching contract was
renewed at the start of every semester and summer.
However, on November 8, 2003, DLS-AU informed
Bernardo through a telephone call that he could not teach
at the school anymore as the school was implementing the
retirement age limit for its faculty members. As he was
already 75 years old, Bernardo had no choice but to retire.
At the time of his retirement, Bernardo was being paid
P246.50 per hour.5

_______________

1   Rollo, pp. 38-49; penned by Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario,

with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Vicente S. E. Veloso,
concurring.
2  Id., at pp. 51-52.
3  Id., at pp. 176-182.
4  Id., at pp. 147-156.
5  NLRC Rollo, pp. 22-23.

 
 
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De La Salle-Araneta University vs. Bernardo

Bernardo immediately sought advice from the

Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) regarding
his entitlement to retirement benefits after 27 years of
employment. In letters dated January 20, 20046 and
February 3, 2004,7 the DOLE, through its Public
Assistance Center and Legal Service Office, opined that
Bernardo was entitled to receive benefits under Republic
Act No. 7641, otherwise known as the “New Retirement
Law,” and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
 Yet, Dr. Bautista, in a letter8 dated February 12, 2004,
stated that Bernardo was not entitled to any kind of
separation pay or benefits. Dr. Bautista explained to
Bernardo that as mandated by the DLS-AU’s policy and
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), only full-time
permanent faculty of DLS-AU for at least five years
immediately preceeding the termination of their
employment could avail themselves of the post­-employment
benefits. As part-time faculty member, Bernardo did not
acquire permanent employment under the Manual of
Regulations for Private Schools, in relation to the Labor
Code, regardless of his length of service.
Aggrieved by the repeated denials of his claim for
retirement benefits, Bernardo filed before the NLRC,
National Capital Region, a complaint for nonpayment of
retirement benefits and damages against DLS-AU and Dr.
Bautista.
DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista averred that DLS-AU is a
nonstock, nonprofit educational institution duly organized
under Philippine laws, and Dr. Bautista was then its
Executive Vice President. DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista
countered that Bernardo was hired as a part-time lecturer
at the Graduate School of DLS-AU to teach Recent
Advances in Animal Nutrition for the first semester of
school year 2003-2004. As stated in the Contract for Part
Time Faculty Member Semestral, Bernardo bound himself
to teach “for the period of one semes-

_______________

6  Id., at p. 29.
7  Id., at p. 30.
8  Id., at p. 32.

 
 

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324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De La Salle-Araneta University vs. Bernardo

ter beginning June 9, 2003 to October 12, 2003.” The

contract also provided that “this Contract shall
automatically expire unless expressly renewed in writing.”9
Prior contracts entered into between Bernardo and DLS-
AU essentially contained the same provisions. On
November 8, 2003, DLS-AU informed Bernardo that his
contract would no longer be renewed. DLS-AU and Dr.
Bautista were surprised when they received a letter from
Bernardo on February 18, 2004 claiming retirement
benefits and Summons dated February 26, 2004 from the
NLRC in relation to Bernardo’s complaint.10
 DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista maintained that Bernardo, as
a part-time employee, was not entitled to retirement
benefits. The contract between DLS-AU and Bernardo was
for a fixed term, i.e., one semester. Contracts of
employment for a fixed term are not proscribed by law,
provided, that they had been entered into by the parties
without any force, duress, or improper pressure being
brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other
circumstance vitiating consent. That DLS-AU no longer
renewed Bernardo’s contract did not necessarily mean that
Bernardo should be deemed retired from service.
DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista also contended that Bernardo,
as a part-time employee, was not entitled to retirement
benefits pursuant to any retirement plan, CBA, or
employment contract. Neither was DLS-AU mandated by
law to pay Bernardo retirement benefits. The compulsory
retirement age under Article 302 [287] of the Labor Code,
as amended, is 65 years old. When the employee reaches
said age, his/her employment is deemed terminated. The
matter of extension of the employee’s service is addressed
to the sound discretion of the employer; it is a privilege
only the employer can grant. In this case, Bernardo was
effectively separated from the service upon reaching the
age of 65 years old. DLS-AU merely granted Bernardo the
privilege to teach by engaging his ser-

_______________

9   Id., at p. 20.
10  Id., at p. 11.

 
 
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De La Salle-Araneta University vs. Bernardo

vices for several more years after reaching the compulsory

retirement age. Assuming arguendo that Bernardo was
entitled to retirement benefits, he should have claimed the
same upon reaching the age of 65 years old. Under Article
291 of the Labor Code, as amended, all money claims
arising from employer-employee relations shall be filed
within three years from the time the cause of action
accrues.
Still according to DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista, Bernardo
had no cause of action against Dr. Bautista because the
latter was only acting on behalf of DLS-AU as its Executive
Vice President. It is a well-settled rule that a corporation is
a juridical entity with a legal personality separate and
distinct from the people comprising it and those acting for
and on its behalf. There was no showing that Dr. Bautista
acted deliberately or maliciously in refusing to pay
Bernardo his retirement benefits, so as to make Dr.
Bautista personally liable for any corporate obligations of
DLS-AU to Bernardo.
Finally, DLS-AU asserted that Bernardo failed to
establish the factual and legal bases for his claims for
actual, moral, and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
There was no proof of the alleged value of the profits or any
other loss suffered by Bernardo because of the nonpayment
of his retirement benefits. There was likewise no evidence
of bad faith or fraud on the part of DLS-AU in refusing to
grant Bernardo retirement benefits.
On December 13, 2004, the Labor Arbiter rendered its
Decision dismissing Bernardo’s complaint on the ground of
prescription, thus:

[T]he age of sixty-five (65) is declared as the compulsory

retirement age under Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended.
When the compulsory retirement age is reached by an employee
or official, he is thereby effectively separated from the service
(UST Faculty Union v. National Labor Relations Commission,
University of Santo Tomas, G.R. No. 89885, August 6, 1990). As
mentioned earlier, [Bernardo] is already seventy-five (75) years
old, and is

 
 
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326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De La Salle-Araneta University vs. Bernardo

way past the compulsory retirement age. If he were indeed

entitled to receive his retirement pay/benefits, he should have
claimed the same ten (10) years ago upon reaching the age of
sixty-five (65).
In this connection, it would be worthy to mention that the
Labor Code contains a specific provision that deals with money
claims arising out of employer-employee relationships. Article 291
of the Labor Code as amended clearly provides:
“ART.  291.  MONEY CLAIMS.—All money claims
arising from employer-employee relations accruing during
the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3)
years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise
they shall forever be barred.”
x x x x
The prescriptive period referred to in Article 291 of the Labor
Code, as amended applies to all kinds of money claims arising
from employer-employee relations including claims for retirement
benefits.
The ruling of the Supreme Court in De Guzman v. Court of
Appeals, (G.R. No. 132257, October 12, 1998), squarely applies to
the instant case:
 “The language of Article 291 of the Labor Code does not
limit its application only to “money claims specifically
recoverable under said Code,” but covers all money claims
arising from employer-employee relations. Since petitioners’
demand for unpaid retirement/ sepa­­ration benefits is a
money claim arising from their employment by private
respondent, Article 291 of the Labor Code is applicable.
Therefore, petitioners’ claim should be filed within three
years from the time their cause of action accrued, or forever
barred by prescription.”
It cannot be denied that the claim for retirement benefits/pay
arose out of employer-employee relations. In

 
 
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De La Salle-Araneta University vs. Bernardo

line with the decision of the Supreme Court in De Guzman, it

should be treated as a money claim that must be claimed within
three years from the time the cause of action accrued.
Thus, upon reaching the compulsory retirement age of sixty-
five (65), [Bernardo] was effectively separated from the service.
Clearly, such was the time when his cause of action accrued. He
should have sought the payment of such benefits/pay within three
(3) years from such time. It cannot be denied that [Bernardo]
belatedly sought the payment of his retirement benefits/pay
considering that he filed the instant Complaint only ten (10) years
after his cause of action accrued. For failure to claim the
retirement benefits/pay to which he claims to be entitled within
three (3) years from the time he reached the age of sixty-five (65),
his claim should be forever barred.11

 
The Labor Arbiter decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered DISMISSING the instant Complaint on the ground that
the claim for retirement benefits/pay is already barred by
prescription.12

 
Bernardo appealed the foregoing Labor Arbiter’s
Decision to the NLRC, arguing that since he continuously
worked for DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista until October 12,
2003, he was considered retired and the cause of action for
his retirement benefits accrued only on said date. There
was clearly an agreement between Bernardo and DLS-AU
that the former would continue teaching even after
reaching the compulsory retirement age of 65 years. In
addition, under Republic Act No. 7641, part-time workers
are entitled to retirement pay of one-half month salary for
every years of service, provided that the following
conditions are present: (a) there is no retirement

_______________

11  Rollo, pp. 153-156.

12  Id., at p. 156.

 
 
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328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De La Salle-Araneta University vs. Bernardo

plan between the employer and employees; (b) the

employee has reached the age of 60 years old for optional
retirement or 65 years old for compulsory retirement; and
(c) the employee should have rendered at least five years of
service with the employer. Bernardo avowed that all these
conditions were extant in his case.
The NLRC, in its Decision dated June 30, 2008, reversed
the Labor Arbiter’s ruling and found that Bernardo timely
filed his complaint for retirement benefits. The NLRC
pointed out that DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista, knowing fully
well that Bernardo already reached the compulsory age of
retirement of 65 years old, still extended Bernardo’s
employment. Thus, Bernardo’s cause of action for payment
of his retirement benefits accrued only on November 8,
2003, when he was informed by DLS-AU that his contract
would no longer be renewed and he was deemed separated
from employment. The principle of estoppel was also
applicable against DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista who could not
validly claim prescription when they were the ones who
permitted Bernardo to work beyond retirement age. As to
Bernardo’s entitlement to retirement benefits, the NLRC
held:

Equally untenable is the contention that [Bernardo], being a

part-time employee, is not entitled to retirement benefits under
Republic Act No. 7641. Indeed, a perusal of the retirement law
does not exclude a part time employee from enjoying retirement
benefits. On this score, Republic Act No. 7641 explicitly provides
as within its coverage “all employees in the private sector,
regardless of their position, designation, or status, and
irrespective of the method by which their wages are paid.”
(Section 1, Rules Implementing the New Retirement Law)
(Underlined for emphasis) The only exceptions are employees
covered by the Civil Service Law; domestic helpers and persons in
the personal service of another; and employees in retail, service
and agricultural establishments or operations regularly
employing not more than ten employees (ibid). Clearly,
[Bernardo] does not fall under any of the exceptions.

 
 
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De La Salle-Araneta University vs. Bernardo

Lastly, it is axiomatic that retirement law should be construed

liberally in favor of the employee, and all doubts as to the intent
of the laws should be resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve its
humanitarian purpose (Re: Gregorio G. Pineda, 187 SCRA 469,
1990). A contrary ruling would inevitably defy such settled rule.13

 
In the end, the NLRC adjudged:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and

SETTING ASIDE the appealed decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Accordingly, a new one is issued finding [Bernardo] entitled to
retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 7641 and ordering
[DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista] to pay [Bernardo] his retirement
benefits equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month of his latest
salary for every year of his service. Other claims are hereby
denied for lack of merit.14

 
In a Resolution dated September 15, 2008, the NLRC
denied the Motion for Reconsideration of DLS-AU and Dr.
Bautista for lack of merit.
DLS-AU filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition, imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC for (1) holding that
Bernardo was entitled to retirement benefits despite the
fact that he was a mere part-time employee; and (2) not
holding that Bernardo’s claim for retirement benefits was
barred by prescription.
The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision on June
29, 2009, affirming in toto the NLRC judgment. The Court
of Appeals ruled that the coverage of, as well as the
exclusion from, Republic Act No. 7641 are clearly
delineated under Sections 1 and 2 of the Implementing
Rules of Book VI, Rule II of the Labor Code, as well as the
Labor Advisory on Retirement Pay Law; and part-time
employees are not among

_______________

13  Id., at p. 181.
14  Id., at pp. 181-182.

 
  
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330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De La Salle-Araneta University vs. Bernardo

those excluded from enjoying retirement benefits. Labor

and social laws, being remedial in character, should be
liberally construed in order to further their purpose. The
appellate court also declared that the NLRC did not err in
relying on the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No.
7641 because administrative rules and regulations issued
by a competent authority remain valid unless shown to
contravene the Constitution or used to enlarge the power of
the administrative agency beyond the scope intended.
The Court of Appeals additionally determined that Ber-­­
nardo’s cause of action accrued only upon his separation
from employment and the subsequent denial of his demand
for retirement benefits. To the appellate court, the NLRC
was correct in applying the equitable doctrine of estoppel
since the continuous extension of Bernardo’s employment,
despite him being well over the statutory compulsory age of
retirement, prevented him from already claiming his
retirement benefits for he was under the impression that
he could avail himself of the same eventually upon the
termination of his employment.
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The assailed Decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission, dated 30 June 2008, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
[Bernardo’s] application for the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction is
accordingly DENIED.15

 
The Motion for Reconsideration of DLS-AU was denied
by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated January 4,
2010.
Hence, DLS-AU lodged the present petition before us,
raising the following issues:

_______________

15  Id., at p. 48.

 
 
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 De La Salle-Araneta University vs. Bernardo

I.
WHETHER OR NOT PART-TIME EMPLOYEES ARE
EXCLUDED FROM THE COVERAGE OF THOSE ENTITLED
TO RETIREMENT BENEFITS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO.
[7641].
 
II.
WHETHER OR NOT A CLAIM FOR RETIREMENT BENEFITS
FILED BEYOND THE PERIOD PROVIDED FOR UNDER ART.
291 OF THE LABOR CODE HAS PRESCRIBED.16

 
We find the instant petition bereft of merit.
 
Bernardo is not questioning
the termination of his employ­
-
ment, but only asserting his

right to retirement benefits.

 
There is no dispute that Bernardo was a part-time
lecturer at DLS-AU, with a fixed-term employment. As a
part-time lecturer, Bernardo did not attain permanent
status. Section 93 of the 1992 Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools provided:

Sec.  93.  Regular or Permanent Status.—Those who have

served the probationary period shall be made regular or
permanent. Full-time teachers who have satisfactorily completed
their probationary period shall be considered regular or
permanent.

 
Per Section 92 of the same Regulations, probationary
period for academic personnel “shall not be more than
three (3) consecutive years of satisfactory service for those
in the elementary and secondary levels, six (6) consecutive
regular

_______________

16  Id., at p. 17.

 
 
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332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De La Salle-Araneta University vs. Bernardo

semesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary

level, and nine (9) consecutive trimesters of satisfactory
service for those in the tertiary level where collegiate
courses are offered on the trimester basis.”
Thus, jurisprudence identified the requisites which
should concur for a private school teacher to acquire
permanent status, viz.: (1) the teacher is a full-time
teacher; (2) the teacher must have rendered three
consecutive years of service; and (3) such service must have
been satisfactory.17
Considering the foregoing requirements, a part-time
employee would not attain permanent status no matter
how long he had served the school.18 Bernardo did not
become a permanent employee of DLS-AU despite teaching
there as a part-time lecturer for a total of 27 years.
Our jurisprudence had likewise settled the legitimacy of
fixed-term employment. In the landmark case of Brent
School, Inc. v. Zamora,19 the Court pronounced:

From the premise — that the duties of an employee entail

“activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer” — the conclusion does not
necessarily follow that the employer and employee should be
forbidden to stipulate any period of time for the performance of
those activities. There is nothing essentially contradictory
between a definite period of an employment contract and the
nature of the employee’s duties set down in that contract as being
“usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of
the employer.” The concept of the employee’s duties as being
“usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of
the employer” is not synonymous with or identical to employment
with a fixed term. Logi-

_______________

17  Saint Mary’s University v. Court of Appeals, 493 Phil. 232, 237; 453
SCRA 61, 66 (2005).
18  Id., at p. 239; p. 68.
19  260 Phil. 747, 756-757, 763-764; 181 SCRA 702, 710-717 (1990).

 
 
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cally, the decisive determinant in the term employment should

not be the activities that the employee is called upon to perform,
but the day certain agreed upon by the parties for the
commencement and termination of their employment
relationship, a day certain being understood to be “that which
must necessarily come, although it may not be known when.”
Seasonal employment, and employment for a particular project
are merely instances of employment in which a period, where not
expressly set down, is necessarily implied.
x x x x
Accordingly, and since the entire purpose behind the
development of legislation culminating in the present Article 280
of the Labor Code clearly appears to have been, as already
observed, to prevent circumvention of the employee’s right to be
secure in his tenure, the clause in said article indiscriminately
and completely ruling out all written or oral agreements
conflicting with the concept of regular employment as defined
therein should be construed to refer to the substantive evil that
the Code itself has singled out: agreements entered into precisely
to circumvent security of tenure. It should have no application to
instances where a fixed period of employment was agreed upon
knowingly and voluntarily by the parties, without any force,
duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the
employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his
consent, or where it satisfactorily appears that the employer and
employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with
no moral dominance whatever being exercised by the former over
the latter. Unless thus limited in its purview, the law would be
made to apply to purposes other than those explicitly stated by its
framers; it thus becomes pointless and arbitrary, unjust in its
effects and apt to lead to absurd and unintended consequences.
Such interpretation puts the seal on [Bibiso v. Victorias Milling
Co., Inc.] upon the effect of the expiry of an agreed period of
employment as still good rule — a rule reaffirmed in the recent
case of Escudero v. Office of the President (G.R. No. 57822, April
26, 1989) where, in the

 
 
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334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De La Salle-Araneta University vs. Bernardo

fairly analogous case of a teacher being served by her school a

notice of termination following the expiration of the last of three
successive fixed term employment contracts, the Court held:
“Reyes’ (the teacher’s) argument is not persuasive. It
loses sight of the fact that her employment was
probationary, contractual in nature, and one with a
definitive period. At the expiration of the period stipulated
in the contract, her appointment was deemed terminated
and the letter informing her of the nonrenewal of her
contract is not a condition sine qua non before Reyes may be
deemed to have ceased in the employ of petitioner UST. The
notice is a mere reminder that Reyes’ contract of
employment was due to expire and that the contract would
no longer be renewed. It is not a letter of termination. The
 interpretation that the notice is only a reminder is
consistent with the court’s finding in Labajo, supra. x x x”

 
Bernardo’s employment with DLS-AU had always been
for a fixed term, i.e., for a semester or summer. Absent
allegation and proof to the contrary, Bernardo entered into
such contracts of employment with DLS-AU knowingly and
voluntarily. Hence, Bernardo’s contracts of employment
with DLS-AU for a fixed term were valid, legal, and
binding. Bernardo’s last contract of employment with DLS-
AU ended on October 12, 2003, upon the close of the first
semester for school year 2003-2004, without DLS-AU
offering him another contract for the succeeding semester.
Nonetheless, that Bernardo was a part-time employee
and his employment was for a fixed period are immaterial
in this case. Bernardo is not alleging illegal dismissal nor
claiming separation pay. Bernardo is asserting his right to
retirement benefits given the termination of his
employment with DLS-AU when he was already 75 years
old.
 
 

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De La Salle-Araneta University vs. Bernardo

As a part-time employee with

fixed­-term employment, Ber­-

nar­do is entitled to retire-

ment benefits.

 
The Court declared in Aquino v. National Labor
Relations Commission20 that retirement benefits are
intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of
his life, lessening the burden of worrying for his financial
support, and are a form of reward for his loyalty and
service to the employer. Retirement benefits, where not
mandated by law, may be granted by agreement of the
employees and their employer or as a voluntary act on the
part of the employer.
In the present case, DLS-AU, through Dr. Bautista,
denied Bernardo’s claim for retirement benefits because
only full-time permanent faculty of DLS-AU are entitled to
said benefits pursuant to university policy and the CBA.
Since Bernardo has not been granted retirement benefits
under any agreement with or by voluntary act of DLS-AU,
the next question then is, can Bernardo claim retirement
benefits by mandate of any law?
We answer in the affirmative.
 Republic Act No. 7641 is a curative social legislation. It
precisely intends to give the minimum retirement benefits
to employees not entitled to the same under collective
bargaining and other agreements. It also applies to
establishments with existing collective bargaining or other
agreements or voluntary retirement plans whose benefits
are less than those prescribed in said law.21
Article 302 [287] of the Labor Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7641, reads:

_______________

20  283 Phil. 1, 6; 206 SCRA 118, 121 (1992).

21   Manuel L. Quezon University v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 419 Phil. 776, 783; 367 SCRA 488, 494 (2001).

 
 
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336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De La Salle-Araneta University vs. Bernardo

Art.  302 [287].  Retirement.—Any employee may be

retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the
collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment
contract.
In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive
such retirement benefits as he may have earned under existing
laws and any collective bargaining agreement and other
agreements: Provided, however, That an employee’s retirement
benefits under any collective bargaining and other agreement
shall not be less than those provided herein.
In the absence of retirement plan or agreement providing for
retirement benefits of employees in the establishment, an
employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but
not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the
compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years
in said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to
retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary
for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being
considered as one whole year.
Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one-
half month salary shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one twelfth
(1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more
than five (5) days of service incentive leaves.
x x x x
Retail, service and agricultural establishments or
operations employing not more than ten (10) employees or
workers are exempted from the coverage of this provision.
Violation of this provision is hereby declared unlawful and
subject to the penal provisions provided under Article 288 of this
Code. (Emphases ours)
  
Book VI, Rule II of the Rules Implementing the Labor
Code clearly describes the coverage of Republic Act No.
7641 and specifically identifies the exemptions from the
same, to wit:
 
 

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De La Salle-Araneta University vs. Bernardo

Sec.  1.  General Statement on Coverage.—This Rule shall

apply to all employees in the private sector, regardless of
their position, designation or status and irrespective of the
method by which their wages are paid, except to those
specifically exempted under Section 2 hereof. As used
herein, the term “Act” shall refer to Republic Act No. 7641, which
took effect on January 7, 1993.
Section  2.  Exemptions.—This Rule shall not apply to the
following employees:
2.1  Employees of the National Government and its
political subdivisions, including Government-owned
and/or -controlled corporations, if they are covered by the
Civil Service Law and its regulations.
2.2  Domestic helpers and persons in the personal service of
another. (Deleted by Department Order No. 20 issued by
Secretary Ma. Nieves R. Confessor on May 31, 1994)
2.3.  Employees of retail, service and agricultural
establishments or operations regularly employing not
more than ten (10) employees. As used in this subsection:
(a)  “Retail establishment” is one principally engaged in
the sale of goods to end-users for personal or household use.
It shall lose its retail character qualified for exemption if it
is engaged in both retail and wholesale of goods.
(b)  “Service establishment” is one principally engaged in
the sale of service to individuals for their own or household
use and is generally recognized as such.
(c)  “Agricultural establishment/opera­tion” refers to an
employer which is engaged in agriculture. This term refers
to all farming activities in all its branches and includes,
among others, the cultivation and tillage of

 
 
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338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De La Salle-Araneta University vs. Bernardo
the soil, production, cultivation, growing and harvesting of any
agricultural or horticultural commodities, dairying, raising of
livestock or poultry, the culture of fish and other aquatic products
in farms or ponds, and any activities performed by a farmer or on
a farm as an incident to or in conjunctions with such farming
operations, but does not include the manufacture and/or
processing of sugar, coconut, abaca, tobacco, pineapple, aquatic or
other farm products. (Emphases ours)

 
Through a Labor Advisory dated October 24, 1996, then
Secretary of Labor, and later Supreme Court Justice,
Leonardo A. Quisumbing (Secretary Quisumbing), provided
Guidelines for the Effective Implementation of Republic
Act No. 7641, The Retirement Pay Law, addressed to all
employers in the private sector. Pertinent portions of said
Labor Advisory are reproduced below:

A.  COVERAGE
RA 7641 or the Retirement Pay Law shall apply to all
employees in the private sector, regardless of their position,
designation or status and irrespective of the method by which
their wages are paid. They shall include part-time
employees, employees of service and other job contractors
and domestic helpers or persons in the personal service of
another.
The law does not cover employees of retail, service and
agricultural establishments or operations employing not more
than [ten] (10) employees or workers and employees of the
National Government and its political subdivisions, including
Government-owned and/or -controlled corporations, if they are
covered by the Civil Service Law and its regulations.
x x x x

 
 
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De La Salle-Araneta University vs. Bernardo

C.  SUBSTITUTE RETIREMENT PLAN

Qualified workers shall be entitled to the retirement benefit
under RA 7641 in the absence of any individual or collective
agreement, company policy or practice. x x x (Emphasis ours)

 
Republic Act No. 7641 states that “any employee may be
retired upon reaching the retirement age x  x  x”; and “[i]n
case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive
such retirement benefits as he may have earned under
existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement and
other agreements.” The Implementing Rules provide that
Republic Act No. 7641 applies to “all employees in the
private sector, regardless of their position, designation or
status and irrespective of the method by which their wages
are paid, except to those specifically exempted x x x.” And
Secretary Quisumbing’s Labor Advisory further clarifies
that the employees covered by Republic Act No. 7641 shall
“include part-time employees, employees of service and
other job contractors and domestic helpers or persons in the
personal service of another.”
The only exemptions specifically identified by Republic
Act No. 7641 and its Implementing Rules are: (1)
employees of the National Government and its political
subdivisions, including government-owned and/or -
controlled corporations, if they are covered by the Civil
Service Law and its regulations; and (2) employees of
retail, service and agricultural establishments or
operations regularly employing not more than 10
employees.
Based on Republic Act No. 7641, its Implementing
Rules, and Secretary Quisumbing’s Labor Advisory,
Bernardo, as a part-time employee of DLS-AU, is entitled
to retirement benefits. The general coverage of Republic
Act No. 7641 is broad enough to encompass all private
sector employees, and part-time employees are not among
those specifically exempted from the law. The provisions of
Republic Act No. 7641 and its Implementing Rules are
plain, direct, unambiguous, and need
 
 
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340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De La Salle-Araneta University vs. Bernardo

no further elucidation. Any doubt is dispelled by the

unequivocal statement in Secretary Quisumbing’s Labor
Advisory that Republic Act No. 7641 applies to even part-
time employees.
Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio
unius est exclusio alterius, Bernardo’s claim for retirement
benefits cannot be denied on the ground that he was a part-
time employee as part-time employees are not among those
specifically exempted under Republic Act No. 7641 or its
Implementing Rules. Said rule of statutory construction is
explained thus:
 
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the
express mention of one person, thing, or consequence
implies the exclusion of all others. The rule is expressed in
the familiar maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is
formulated in a number of ways. One variation of the rule
is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that
which is implied. Expressum facit cessare tacitum. Thus,
where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain
matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to other matters.
x x x x
The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius and its
variations are canons of restrictive interpretation. They are
based on the rules of logic and the natural workings of the
human mind. They are predicated upon one’s own
voluntary act and not upon that of others. They proceed
from the premise that the legislature would not have made
specified enumeration in a statute had the intention been
not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned.22

_______________

22   Malinias v. Commission on Elections, 439 Phil. 319, 335-336; 390

SCRA 480, 491-492 (2002), citing Agpalo, Ruben E., Statutory
Construction, pp. 160-161 (1990), which, in turn, cited People v. Aquino, 83
Phil. 614 (1949); Lerum v. Cruz, 87 Phil. 652 (1950);

 
 
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The NLRC and the Court of Appeals did not err in

relying on the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No.
7641 in their respective judgments which favored
Bernardo.
Congress, through Article 5 of the Labor Code, delegated
to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and
other government agencies charged with the
administration and enforcement of said Code the power to
promulgate the necessary implementing rules and
regulations. It was pursuant to Article 5 of the Labor Code
that then Secretary of Labor Ma. Nieves R. Confesor issued
on January 7, 1993 the Rules Implementing the New
Retirement Law, which became Rule II of Book VI of the
Rules Implementing the Labor Code.
In ruling that Bernardo, as part-time employee, is
entitled to retirement benefits, we do no less and no more
than apply Republic Act No. 7641 and its Implementing
Rules issued by the DOLE under the authority given to it
by the Congress. Needless to stress, the Implementing
Rules partake the nature of a statute and are binding as if
written in the law itself. They have the force and effect of
law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and
legality until they are set aside with finality in an
appropriate case by a competent court.23
Moreover, as a matter of contemporaneous
interpretation of law, Secretary Quisumbing’s Labor
Advisory has persuasive effect. It is undisputed that in
administrative law, contemporaneous and practical
interpretation of law by administrative officials charged
with its administration and enforce-

_______________

Canlas and Manila Pencil Co. v. Republic, 103 Phil. 712 (1958); Oh Kim v.
Reyes, 103 Phil. 1139 (1958); Manila Lodge No. 761 v. Court of Appeals,
165 Phil. 161; 73 SCRA 162 (1976); Escribano v. Avila, 174 Phil. 490; 85
SCRA 245 (1978); Santos v. Court of Appeals, 185 Phil. 331; 96 SCRA 448
(1980); Velazco v. Blas, 201 Phil. 122; 115 SCRA 540 (1982).
23  Samson v. Restrivera, 662 Phil. 45, 60; 646 SCRA 481, 495 (2011).

 
 

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342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De La Salle-Araneta University vs. Bernardo

ment carries great weight and should be respected, unless

contrary to law or manifestly erroneous.24
We further find that the Implementing Rules and
Secretary Quisumbing’s Labor Advisory are consistent with
Article 4 of the Labor Code, which expressly mandates that
“all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the
provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules
and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.” There
being no compelling argument herein to convince us
otherwise, we uphold the legality and validity of the
Implementing Rules and Secretary Quisumbing’s Labor
Advisory, and likewise apply the same to Bernardo’s case.
For the availment of the retirement benefits under
Article 302 [287] of the Labor Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7641, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the employee has reached the age of 60 years for
optional retirement or 65 years for compulsory retirement;
(2) the employee has served at least five years in the
establishment; and (3) there is no retirement plan or other
applicable agreement providing for retirement benefits of
employees in the establishment. Bernardo — being 75
years old at the time of his retirement, having served DLS-
AU for a total of 27 years, and not being covered by the
grant of retirement benefits in the CBA — is
unquestionably qualified to avail himself of retirement
benefits under said statutory provision, i.e., equivalent to
one-half month salary for every year of service, a fraction of
at least six months being considered as one whole year.25

_______________

24  Amores v. Actg. Chairman, Commission on Audit, 291-A Phil. 445,

450; 218 SCRA 409, 413 (1993).
25  Under Book VI, Rule II, Section 5.2 of the Rules Implementing the
Labor Code, the “one-half month salary” shall include all of the following:
(a)  Fifteen (15) days salary of the employee based on his latest salary
rate. As used herein, the term “salary” includes all remunerations paid by
an employer to his employees for services rendered during normal
working days and hours, whether

 
 
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De La Salle-Araneta University vs. Bernardo

Bernardo’s employment was extended

beyond the compulsory retirement

age and the cause of action for his

retirement benefits accrued only

upon the termination of his extended

employment with DLS­-AU.

 
Article 306 [291] of the Labor Code mandates:

Art.  306 [291].  Money claims.—All money claims arising from

employer-employee relations accruing during the effectivity of
this Code shall be filed within three years from the time the cause
of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.

 
DLS-AU invokes UST Faculty Union v. National Labor
Relations Commission,26 wherein it was held that when an
employee or official has reached the compulsory retirement
age, he is thereby effectively separated from the service.
And so, DLS-AU maintains that Bernardo’s cause of action
for his retirement benefits, which is patently a money
claim, accrued when he reached the compulsory retirement
age of 65 years

_______________

such payments are fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece of

commission basis, or other method of calculating the same, and includes
the fair and reasonable value, as determined by the Secretary of Labor
and Employment, of food, lodging or other facilities customarily furnished
by the employer to his employees. The term does not include cost of living
allowances, profit-sharing payments and other monetary benefits which
are not considered as part of or integrated into the regular salary of the
employees.
(b)  The cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive
leave.
(c)  One-twelfth of the 13th month pay due the employee.
(d)  All other benefits that the employer and employee may agree upon
that should be included in the employee’s retirement pay.
26  266 Phil. 441, 448; 190 SCRA 758, 773 (1990).

 
 
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344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De La Salle-Araneta University vs. Bernardo

old, and had already prescribed when Bernardo filed his

complaint only 10 years later, when he was already 75
years old.
We are not persuaded.
The case of UST Faculty Union is not in point as the
issue involved therein was the right of a union to intervene
in the extension of the service of a retired employee.
Professor Tranquilina J. Marilio (Prof. Marilio) already
reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years old, but
was granted by the University of Sto. Tomas (UST) an
extension of two years tenure. We ruled in said case that
UST no longer needed to consult the union before refusing
to further extend Prof. Marilio’s tenure.
A cause of action has three elements, to wit, (1) a right
in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the
part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate
such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to
the plaintiff.27
Bernardo’s right to retirement benefits and the
obligation of DLS-AU to pay such benefits are already
established under Article 302 [287] of the Labor Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7641. However, there was a
violation of Bernardo’s right only after DLS-AU informed
him on November 8, 2003 that the university no longer
intended to offer him another contract of employment, and
already accepting his separation from service, Bernardo
sought his retirement benefits, but was denied by DLS-AU.
Therefore, the cause of action for Bernardo’s retirement
benefits only accrued after the refusal of DLS-AU to pay
him the same, clearly expressed in Dr. Bautista’s letter
dated February 12, 2004. Hence, Bernardo’s complaint,
filed with the NLRC on February 26, 2004, was
_______________

27   Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc. v. Bautista, 497 Phil. 863, 875;
458 SCRA 578, 590 (2005).

 
 
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De La Salle-Araneta University vs. Bernardo

filed within the three-year prescriptive period provided

under Article 291 of the Labor Code.
Even granting arguendo that Bernardo’s cause of action
already accrued when he reached 65 years old, we cannot
simply overlook the fact that DLS-AU had repeatedly
extended Bernardo’s employment even when he already
reached 65 years old. DLS-AU still knowingly offered
Bernardo, and Bernardo willingly accepted, contracts of
employment to teach for semesters and summers in the
succeeding 10 years. Since DLS-AU was still continuously
engaging his services even beyond his retirement age,
Bernardo deemed himself still employed and deferred his
claim for retirement benefits, under the impression that he
could avail himself of the same upon the actual termination
of his employment. The equitable doctrine of estoppel is
thus applicable against DLS-AU. In Planters Development
Bank v. Spouses Lopez,28 we expounded on the principle of
estoppels as follows:

Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that whenever

a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally
and deliberately led another to believe that a particular thing is
true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation
arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to
falsify it.
The concurrence of the following requisites is necessary for the
principle of equitable estoppel to apply: (a) conduct amounting to
false representation or concealment of material facts or at least
calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise
than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently
attempts to assert; (b) intent, or at least expectation that this
conduct shall be acted upon, or at least influenced by the other
party; and (c) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the actual
facts.
Inaction or silence may under some circumstances amount to a
misrepresentation, so as to raise an equitable

_______________

28  720 Phil. 426, 441-442; 708 SCRA 481, 495 (2013).

 
  
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346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

De La Salle-Araneta University vs. Bernardo

estoppel. When the silence is of such a character and under such

circumstances that it would become a fraud on the other party to
permit the party who has kept silent to deny what his silence has
induced the other to believe and act on, it will operate as an
estoppel. This doctrine rests on the principle that if one maintains
silence, when in conscience he ought to speak, equity will debar
him from speaking when in conscience he ought to remain silent.

 
DLS-AU, in this case, not only kept its silence that
Bernardo had already reached the compulsory retirement
age of 65 years old, but even continuously offered him
contracts of employment for the next 10 years. It should
not be allowed to escape its obligation to pay Bernardo’s
retirement benefits by putting entirely the blame for the
deferred claim on Ber­nar­do’s shoulders.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision
dated June 29, 2009 and Resolution dated January 4, 2010
of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 106399 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perlas-Bernabe

and Caguioa, JJ., concur.

Petition dismissed, judgment and resolution affirmed.

Notes.—The company standards should be made known

to the teachers on probationary status at the start of their
probationary period, or at the very least, at the start of the
semester or the trimester during which the probationary
standards are to be applied. (Mercado vs. AMA Computer
College-Parañaque City, Inc., 618 SCRA 218 [2010])
It is settled that even if probationary employees do not
enjoy permanent status, they are accorded the
constitutional protection of security of tenure. (Tamson’s
Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 660 SCRA 374
[2011])
 
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