CHAPTER-I

Elections of 1936-37 and Muslim League

 CHAPTER-I

ELECTIONS OF 1936-37 AND MUSLIM LEAGUE

The experience of contesting the elections of

1936-37 and forming ministries under conditions of

responsible government revealed the inner dynamics of

Indian politics. It brought to the surface both majority

and minority attitudes in a new and striking way. The

most significant of these was the Congress tendency

towards a one-party polity in India that assumed the

submersion of other Indian parties. Another was the

emergent unity of Muslim India. In the experiences of

those years Jinnah learnt lessons in practical politics

that a theoretical approach could never have taught him.

He and the Muslim League went into the elections as

idealists; they emerged from the aftermath as political

realists. The change could hardly have been more

significant for India and the shape of her independent

future.

Prior to the elections of 1937, Muslim politics

were chaotic, in a state of desperate disorganisation,

with interests in conflict in all levels, provincial,

local and personal. No Muslim organization appeared

capable of overcoming the differences that divided the

25
 26

Muslim body politic. Such oranizations as Jamiat-uWTl ema-

i-Hind, All India Muslim Conference and the All India

Muslim League had been deliberative bodies. The spheres

of activities, in the past, had been limited to annual

meetings and discussions. Since the non-cooperation days

the Jamiat had been in oblivion and was not sufficiently

organized. It continued to plough its lonely furrow until

the time when it unconditionally joined the Congress in

1937.1 The All-India Muslim Conference (originally the

All-Parties Muslim Conference organized under the

Chairmanship of Aga Khan in 1928), had been inactive. Its

executive board under the Chairmanship of Abdoola Haroon,

after holding a few meetings in the early months of 1936,

decided to withdraw from the election campaign. While

abstaining from specifically mentioning any particular

parties, the conference, winding up its offices, asked the

electors to support those candidates who stood by the

communal award and pledged themselves to safeguard the

religious and cultural rights of the Muslims and were

2
committed to the working of the provincial constitution.

Like other Muslim organizations, the Muslim League, during

the last few years had been in a moribund condition. The

League had been more or less defunct since 1920. In 1927,

its total membership was 1330. Between 1931 and 1933 its

1. Star of India, April 6, 1936.

2. Ibid., April 26, and September 29, 1936.

 27

annual expenditure did not exceed Rs.3,000. Decisions of

the council of the Muslim League were taken by a very

small minority, with only 10 out of its;310 members forming

a quorum. Since the central office of the League was

situated in Delhi, Leaguers from provinces far away from

3
Delhi hardly ever attended party meetings.

The League's popular appeal was negligible.

Part of the reason for this lay in the social conservatism

of its members. Wealth, social position and education

determined entry into the League. Between 1924 and 1926,

only 7 out of 144 resolutions passed had touched upon

social and economic problems. The last time these issues

had been debated was in 1928.^ The League had never

contested elections on all-India basis,^ and the extent of

support for it in the Muslim majority provinces was

doubtful. It could only provide a rallying point for

Muslims at the all-India level on questions such as

representation in the services and in legislatures; and

when these had been settled, as, for example, in the

Communal Award of 1932, the League appeared to have little

3. For this paragraph See. C. Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to

Pakistan, (Lahore 1961), pp.137-8, K.B. Sayeed,
Pakistan the Formative Phase, pp.176-7, and Z.H.Zaidi,
(ed) Introduction to M.A.Jinnah-Ispahani Correspon­
dence 1936-48 (Karachi, 1976), pp.10-14, arid Z.H.Zaidi
'Aspects of the Development of Muslim League Policy'
in C.H.Philips and M.D.Wainwright (eds.) The Partition
of India (London, 1970), p.246.
4. Zaidi,Introduction to Jinnah-Ispahani Correspondence,
pp. 13-14™
5. Zaidi, 'Aspects of Muslim League Policy', op.cit.,p.253.
 28

6
to offer Muslims in the provinces.

The Act of 1919 had introduced partial responsible

government in the provinces. This sets the scene for the

emergence of parties and politicians whose base and

horizons were essentially provincial, and whose political

alliances cut across communal divisons.^ They had,

therefore, little interest in Jinnah's all India Muslim

politics.

In the Punjab, for example, Fazl-e-Husain,

whose Unionist party had governed the province since 1920,

believed that Muslims, whose majority in the province was

only marginal, could not achieve anything without the

cooperation of the Hindu and Sikh minorities. The need

for Hindu and Sikh support partly determined the inter-

communal character of the Unionist party, which

8
represented agrarian interests in the Punjab.

Jinnah received, then, a crushing rebuff when

he asked Fazl-e-Husain to join the Muslim League

Parliamentary Board in 1936. Jinnah was told of 'the

advisability of keeping his finger out of the Punjab pie..

6. Zaidi, Introduction to Jinnah-Ispahani Correspondence,

pp.13-15.

7. On the effects of the Act of 1919 See D.Page, Prelude

to Partition: The Indian Muslims and the Imperial
System of Control 1920-32 (N.Delhi 1982).

8. Ibid. and Azim Husain, Fazl-e-Husain (Bombay 1946).

 29

We cannot possibly allow "provincial autonomy" to be

tampered with in any sphere, and by anybody, be he a

nominee of the powers who have given this autonomy or a

President of the Muslim League or any other association or

body.* ^

In Bengal, an opportunity for Muslim unity

arose when Hindus in Calcutta started an agitation against

the Communal Award in August 1936. The Award had given

Muslims 48.6 percent of the seats in the legislature, and

the British had envisaged that land-levels would support

them and raise their majority to 51.4 percent. Hindus

alleged that they had not been represented in proportion

to their population in the province, while Muslims had

been allowed weightage in all Muslim minority provinces.

But a cleavage soon arose between the parties which had

united against the Hindu. The United Muslim Party had

been started by the Nawab of Dacca to contest the

provincial elections and it represented big landlords,

lawyers and businessmen. It could not make common cause

with the Krishak Proja Party of Fuzlul Huq, which had been
10
founded as the Nikil Banga Proja Samity . in 1929, and

9. Sikander Hyat Khan to Fazl-i-Husain, 1 May 1936, Fazl-

i-Husain Papers, quoted in Zaidi, Introduction to
Jinnah-Ispahani Correspondence, p. 16.

10. Shila Sen, Muslim Politics in Bengal, 1937-1947 (N.

Delhi 1976), pp. 74-5.
 30

which espoused the interests of poor peasants and small

land-owners. As the majority of poor peasants in Bengal

were Muslims, Huq could claim that his party represented,

the Muslim majority of Bengal. But the inter-communal

character of his political alliance can be seen by his

maintenance of links with Hindus and Congress leaders even

while he was Vice-President of the Bengal Provincial

Muslim League.
11

Jinnah initially managed to bring together the

United Muslim Party and the Krishak Proja Party. But Huq

walked out of the agreement because Leaguers refused to

accept his demand that they also join the K.P.P. and

incorporate in the League's election manifesto a promise

to abolish the Permanent Settlement in Bengal. The big

Zamindars of Dacca's United Muslim Party would not agree

to this, so Jinnah brushed aside Huq's prosposals as not

being 'practical politics'. But the final break between

Huq and Jinnah seems to have been caused by Huq's

opposition to the nomination of 4 non-Bengali businessmen

12
to the Muslim League Parliamentary Board. .

In Bihar, the United Muslim and Ahrar Parties

could not sink personal differences and unite with the

11. Zaidi, Introduction to Jinnah-Ispahani Correspondence

pp. 8-9.

12. Ibid, p. 22 and Shila Sen, Muslim Politics, pp. 76-8.

 31

League. In the Central Provinces and Madras, disagreements

about the nomination of candidates proved the stumbling

block in the way of Muslim Unity. In Sind, leaders of the

Azad Muslim Party did not want their initiative in

provincial matters to be fettered by an all-India

Parliamentary Board. So, personal and provincial

rivalries prevented the formation of a single Muslim party

in most provinces.

It was in the United Provinces, with the Muslim

Unity Board, that Jinnah was able, eventually, to make ans

alliance. The Board had been formed at the time of the

Unity Conference of 1933, when representatives of two

leading Muslim organizations, the Muslim Conference and

the Nationalist Muslims, led by Khaliquzzaman, agreed to

form a joint front to promote the political interests of

13
Muslims. The Board seems to have had little sympathy

with the Muslim League, against whom some of its own

candidates successfully contested for Muslim seats in the

14
Central Legislatures in the elections of 1934.

13. For an account of the circumstances leading to the

formation of the Hnity Board. See Khaliquzzaman,
Pathway to Pakistan, (Lahore, 1961), pp.117-120.

14. Ibid., p.130.

 32

The success achieved by the Unity Board in the

elections---it won a third of the Muslim seats in the

15
legislature -probably explains Jinnah's eagerness to
reach a settlement with it. Why the Unity Board responded
so enthusiastically to Jinnah's call for Muslim unity is

not so easily discernible. Perhaps, as Sir Harry Haig,

the Governor, wrote, 'it was because the name of the

Muslim League carried considerable influence in the

1 fi
II.P.' Khaliquzzaman, who skillfully balanced himself

between three Parties, does not give a very satisfactory

account of the events which promoted him and other leaders

of the Unity Board to respond to Jinnah's appeal. He

simply says that the Board was at first willing to

consider a Congress request to put up Muslim candidates to

contest the Muslim League and the National Agriculturist

17
Party in the coming elections. Later, however, one of

the leaders of the Unity Board, Ahmad Said, seemed to be

in agreement with Jinnah on what is vaguely described as

'the future policy of Muslims,' and felt that Jinnah was

18
'prepared to go very far to satisfy the Board.

15. Ibid,, p.142.

16. Haig to Linlithgow 21 May 1936, Haig Collection Vol.5.

17. The formation of the N.A.P. was encouraged by Sir

Malcolm Hailey, Governor of the U.P. to counterpoise
the Congress. See P.D.Reeves, 'Landlords and Party
Politics in the United Provinces 1934-1937' in D.A.
Low (ed) Soundings in Modern South Asian History
(London, 1968), pp.261-82.
18. Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan, pp.140-41.
 33

Jinnah and the leaders of the Unity Board

appeared to agree that the Muslim League 'consisted mostly

of big landlords, title holders, and selfish people, who

looked to their class and personal interests more than to

communal and national interests and who had always been

ready to sacrifice them to suit British Policy. Jinnah

wished to purify and revive the League. In this

connection he intended to ask the League to give him a

mandate to form a parliamentary board for the purposes of

the forthcoming elections. He promised the nnity Board a

majority on the parliamentary board, and stressed the need

for a nnited Muslim Front. One difference remained

between the TTnity Board and the Muslim League. The Unity

Board was committed the goal of independence; the Muslim

League was not. Jinnah reassured the Unity Board. 'When

I give you a majority in the Parliamentary Board you can

'19
do everything.

As its 24th annual session held at Bombay in

April 1936, while condemning the federal scheme embodied

in the Government of India Act of 1935 as 'most

reactionary, retrograde, injurious and fatal' and 'totally

unacceptable', the League decided to utilize the

provincial part of the Act for 'what it was worth' and

authorized Jinnah to form a central parliamentary board.

The board was to consist of not less than thirty-five

19. Ibid, p. 141.

 34

members and was empowered to affiliate provincial boards

in the various provinces to contest the elections on the
20
ticket of the Muslim League.

Jinnah received certain assurances of help.

Malulana Ahmad Saeed, Secretary of the Jamiat-ul-niema-i-

Hind wrote: Unless you visit a good number of important

towns in different provinces, it is very difficult to form

representative local boards on proper lines... I would

request you with all the force at my command to start on a

tour and visit certain important centres of political

activity... We have not yet started work in earnest. The

continuous publicity of the aims and objects of the League

and its present policy is essential for educating the

public and the press alike. An Urdu Daily, at least a

Bi-weekly, wholly devoted to the cause of the League is

badly needed... I have already written to the members of

the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Hind to make effective speeches in

suport of the Muslim League in public meetings and appeal

to the Muslim voters to reserve their votes for the

candidates of the League only. Mazhar Ali Khan, general

secretary of Majlis-i-Ahrar-Isfam Hind, temporarily joined

hands with' the League.. Even secretary of the Unionist

party, Ahmad Yar Khan Daultana, who called himself one of

the 'ardent Jinhites' tried to bring about a settlement

and submitted to Jinnah a list of members to be elected

20. Star of India, April 13, 1936.

 35

on the League Council adding: "All these are your men

against the whole world." After the failure of the

League-Unionist negotiations, he once again approached

Jinnah: 'You have millions of admirers in this world but I

can assure you that few will come up to my standard of

devoted loyalty and profound admiration'.. He assured

t
Jinnah that like himself, Sikandar Hyat Khan was also a

great admirer of your leadership, statesmanship and your

other unique qualities. I feel it will be very

unfortunate if there is any hostility between two parties

in which you and Sir Mohammad Iqbal are on one side and

Sir Sikandar and myself on the other. I am writing to Sir

Sikandar to have a talk with you and to try to come to a

working settlement. Led us have minor difference of

opinion but it should be far from hostility or ill-will to

?1
each other.'

It was on May 21, 1936, that Jinnah announced the

personnel of the central parliamentary board consisting of

56 members^ (Bengal 8, Punjab 11, Sind 4, N.W.F.P.4,

Madras 4, United Provinces 9, Bihar 5, Central Provinces

2, Delhi 1, Assam 2, Bombay 6). Jinnah had encountered

difficulties in nominating the members of the board.

Provincial leaders representing different Muslim parties

had already formulated programmes and embarked upon their

election campaigns. Jinnah was late in the field and had,

perforce, to depend on those leaders who were still

21. Z.H.Zaidi, 'Aspects of Development of Muslim League

Policy,' op.cit., pp.246-47.
 36

unattached to any provincial parties or those whom he

could persuade to merge their organizations with the

23
Muslim League. It is difficult now to be sure whether

all the fifty six members nominated on the said board had

been previously consulted by Jinnah and had agreed to

serve on the board for there were many absentees from the

first meeting of the board held at Lahore on June 8,

n /

1936. Some of them, being the organizers and leaders of

provincial parties, were torn by their provincial

loyalties, their chances of domination in the provincial

politics and their reluctance to come under the

dictation of central board. Leaders like Fazlul Huq

(Krishak Proja Samity, Bengal), Syed Abdul Aziz (United

Party, Bihar), Sheikh Addul Majid Sindhi (Azad Party,

Sind), Syed Rauf Shah (Muslim Parliamentary Party C.P.).

Maul ana Zafar Ali Khan (Majlis-i-Ittehad-i-Millat, Panjab),

Nawab of Chhattari, Sir Muhammad Yusuf, Liaqat Ali Khan

(National Agriculturist Party, United Provinces), though

originally nominated on the board had organized their

respective parties to fight the elections under the

25
auspices of their own organizations.

23. Civil and Military Gazette, May 23, 1936.

24. Ibid, June.9, 1934, Also See Star of India, June 10,
1936.

25. Zaidi, 'Aspects of. Muslim League Policy,' op.cit. ,

p.247.
 37

Though some of these local Muslim parties did not

merge themselves with the Muslim League until after the

elections, in many respects their programmes and policies

4

were not at variance with those of the League. The

unwillingness of some of the leaders of provincial parties

to serve on the Muslim League parliamentary board was

therefore mainly due to their fear of the domination of

rival groups. Apparently these organizations would have

been prepared to join the League if they had been given a

freer hand in provincial politics. Till such freedom was

promised, personal, local and mainly vested interests kept

them away.

It was against this division in the Muslim ranks

that Jinnah raised his voice and tried to lift Muslim

politics from the provincial and local to an all-India

level. He believed that as long as the Muslims were

divided and disorganized, as long as they continued to

follow dispirate paths having provincial groups with no

wider unity and cohesion-- there could be no chance of a

settlement with the Congress. For these splinter

organizations had no public sanction behind them. Only a

United Muslim party would have the authority and sanction

to speak powerfully. If: 'the entire Muslims of India were

politically organized and if they remain united', said

Jinnah, 'then they will be forging sanctions behind them

in order to play their part in the decisions of all-India

 38

26
questions.'

In organizing, the Muslims under the banner of the

Muslim League, Jinnah did not believe that he was

diminishing the chances of Hindu-Muslim cooperation. He

had been a nationalist and had been called the 'ambassador

of Hindu-Muslim Unity'., and according to Nehru, had been

'largely reponsible in the past for bring the Muslim

27
League nearer to the Congress.' He still believed that

without Hindu-Muslim, unity, without united efforts on the

part of the two major communities, India's drive towards

freedom could not succeed. United action, a common

platform and mutual trust and confidence were needed to

solve the politcal tangle and bring India nearer to its

cherished goal of freedom. Referring to his part at the

Round Table Conference, he said in March 1936, 'I

displeased the Muslims, I displeased my Hindu friends

because of the 'famous' 14 points. I displeased the

Princes because I was deadly against their under-hand

activities and I displeased the British Parliament

because... I rebelled against it and said that it was all

a fraud... But whatever I have done, let me assure you

there has been no change in me, not the slightest, since
the day when I joined the Indian National Congress. It

might be I have been wrong on some occasions. But it has

26. Star of India, August 21, 1936.

27. Jawahar Lai Nehru, An Autobiography (1945 edition)

p. 67.
 39

never been done in a partisan spirit. My sole and only

object has been the welfare of ray country. ' Jinnah was

anxious for communal co-operation and understanding, 'I

will not and I cannot give it up. It may give me up, but
I will not.'28

In fact the League as early as January 1935 had

expressed its readiness 'to co-operate with any community

or party with a view to secure such future constitution

for India as would satisfy the people!\ Jinnah continue

his efforts to bring unity and solidarity among the

Muslims. But this was never without advocating

co-operation with their sister communities. In fact he

gave out that the Muslim League would be prepared to

co-operate with all progressive parties in the country

especially the Congress. About two weeks after the Muslim

League Session held at Bombay, Jinnah in a statement on

April 27, 1936 made this clear, 'Hindus cannot take

Muslims seriously and that the Congress does not take us

seriously because so far we Muslims have not proved

ourselves worthy of alliance and that until we are ready

to take a proper place in the national life of the

country, there can not be a whole-hearted and real

settlement.' His advice to Muslims was that 'they should

first organize themselves and deserve before they

desired.' For he believed that 'if Muslims would speak

with one voice, a settlement between Hindus and Muslims

28. Civil and Military Gazette, March 3, 1936.

 40

would come quicker.' Justifying the move of organizing

the Muslims and putting their affairs in order, he

explained that it did not mean that the Muslims 'should

not stand as firmly by national interest. In fact, they

should prove that their patriotism is unsullied and that

their love of India and her progress is no less than

29
that of any other community in the country.'

Jinnah did not, at this stage, regard the

separate electorates or the communal award as an ideal

arrangement. They were a temporary measure, and could

be replaced by something better. But until such an

arrangement could be made, they must remain. 'So long

as the separate electorates existed,' he said on July

24, 1936, 'the separate organization of Mussalmans was

an inevitable corollary. But that did not mean that

such a position was an ideal one or that he was

satisfied with it.' u

Throughout 1936 and the beginning of 1937

Jinnah continued to speak for Hindu-Muslim co-operation.

He realized that there had been difference in the past

but he believed that those differences were not

incapable of solution for he was still looking at the

29. Ibid. April 28, 1936.

30. Star of India, July 29, 1936.

 41

Indian political scene as an idealist. 'If out of 80

million Indian Muslims,' declared Jinnah on October 20,

1936, 'I can produce a patriotic and liberal-minded

nationalist block, who will be able to march hand in

hand with the progressive elements in other communities,

31
I will have rendered great service to my community.'

Berhaps because of his earnest desire for

co-operation with the Congress, Jinnah had got Wazir

Hasan, a liberal known for his nationalist views elected

as President of Bombay session of the League. This was

explained to Wazir Hasan in a letter written to him just

after his election: 'Raja Saheb of Salimpur was very

anxious for his election as President of the Annual

Session of the League and came to Delhi twice during the

last two weeks. Mr. Shaukat Ali, in his usual way, has

been canvassing for him. But Mr. Jinnah with great tact

managed the whole thing in a marvellous way and you were

elected without having recourse to voting. Mr. Jinnah

came from Lahore only for this meeting yesterday in the

32
morning and returned to Lahore last night.'

When Jinnah embarked on rallying the Muslims on

the League platform and asked them to stand by its

31. Civil and Military Gazette, October 20, 1936.

32. Zaidi, 'Aspects of Muslim League 1937-47', in

op.cit. pp.250-251.
 42

policy, he was far from running the Muslim League as a

counter to the Congress. For him the memories of the

Lucknow pact were still fresh. He regarded it as a

'landmark in the political history of India.' There

were differences between the Muslims and Hindus but if

the two communities had been able to compose their

differences once, there was no need for despair. It was

for this reason that the League was endeavouring by

systematic organization to produce the best material

among the Muslims. At a public meeting on January 7,

1937, Jinnah was still prepared to say, 'Hindus and

Muslims could join hands to. form one party' provided they

could evolve a common programme of work both inside ajrkh

33
outside the legislatures.'

Jinnah wanted to make the Muslim League a

popular organization built not on the support of a few

at the top but one which had a wider appeal for the

masses. He was conscious of the charges often levelled

against the League that it had been a party of

'toadies' and rich landlords. Fie was aware that the

organization though open to all, had been able to

attract only a majority of the Muslim community. He

knew that so far it had failed to evoke any general

enthusiasm from the Muslim intelligentsia, and that it

33. Star of India, January 9, 1937.

 43

lacked mass contact. It could not, be held, effectively

and authoritatively speak for the Muslims of India until

it had wider basis of support. This, he believed., was

essential in order to lay the real foundation of Hindu-

Muslim unity. 'The masses should be persuaded and

educated in that direction so that lasting unity could

be attained.

In April 1936 Lord Linlithgow replaced Lord

Willingdon as Viceroy, coming out to-.inaugurate the

Constitution he had been most instrumental in helping to

complete as chairman of the joint parliamentary

committee. In his first broadcast to India, Linlithgow

tried to assure his pluralistic audience of his personal

impartiality, stating: "God has indeed been good to me

for he has given me five children... I love them all

most dearly. But among my children I have no

35
favourite." The viceroy's son, who reported that

speech, also wrote of Jinnah's "reaction" to it as

"ominous", adding in what must have been Linlithgow's

perception of the League leader's policy, that he

"told his followers that the new Viceroy's pledge of

impartiality was a poor reward for Muslim loyalty to

34. Ibid. July 29, 1936.

35. John Glendevon, The Viceroy at Bay: Lord Linlithgow
in India 1936-194TT (London: Collins 15>71), p.237
 44

O f.
to the Government,"

Lord Linlithgow had arrived in India with a firm

determination to implement the new constitution. But he

was also anxious, so far as possible, to make the scheme

acceptable to all parties. He urged the Indians to

'give these Reforms a fair and reasonable trial... and

work the constitution in a spirit of tolerance and

cooperation, for the honour and good of their

37
motherland.'

After years of investigation and deliberation; the

British Government had prepared a constitution which the

main political parties had either rejected or acquiesced

it only reluctantly. Some parties had hoped to destroy

the new constitution and replaced it with a new

instrument framed by a properly elected constituent

assembly; and others, at best, were willing to work the

scheme 'for what it is worth.' It was to Linlithgow's

credit that he was able not only to persuade the various

political parties to participate in the government, but

also to demonstrate that the constitution, despite some

drawbacks, was capable of being worked.

36. Ibid, p.25:

37. The Viceroy's address to the Indian Legislature, 21

September, 1936, See also V.B. Kulkarni, India and
Pakistan, (Bombay, 1973) pp.311-12.
 45

The British Government announced that the

Government of India Act of 1935 would came into force on

1 April, 1937. The federal part of the scheme was kept

in abeyance as it depended on the fulfilment of the

precondition that a sufficient number of Indian States

should accede to the proposed federation. Nevertheless

it was decided that the implementation of the provincial

part of the constitution should go ahead.

The Government of India Act extend electorate to

some 36 million, as compared to an electorate of 7

million in 1920, and representing 30 percent of the

adult population,
would elect 1585 representatives to
38
the provincial legislatures. The Act of 1935 was the

first constitutional measure introduced by the British

in India which envisaged that the parties winning a

majority of seats in the legislatures would form

ministries which would function on the basis of joint

39
and collective responsibility.

Provincial autonomy could not, however, begin to

function until a general election to fill the seats in

the provincial legislatures had been held. Indian

politics were in some confusion. Paradoxically most of

the important parties had expressed dissatisfaction with

38. Indian Franchise Committee Report, (Bombay, 1973)

pp.311-12.
39 • Government of India Act (New Delhi, 1936).
 46

the new constitution, and yet all of them eventually

resolved to work it at least to the extent of participat­

ing in the elections.

The new constitution had not given the 'complete

independence' demanded by the Congress. It was not

immediately known whether the Congress would reject the

constitution completely and revert to non-cooperation, or

whether it would participate in the coming elections and

use the new constitution as a means to gain its overall

aim : the achievement of a Purna Swaraj or complete

independence. The initial impulse was to have nothing to

do with it, but on this question the Congress was by no

means united among itself. Officially, it had. opposed the

new constitution from its inception in 1933-34. The

British Government's White Paper of 1934 outlining the

essentials of the proposed constitution was condemned by

the Congress Working Committee (C.W.C.), which declared

that the 'only satisfactory alternative £0 the White Paper

is a constitution drawn by a constituent Assembly elected

40
on the basis of an adult franchise.'

Once the Act had been given the royal assent,

however, there was little that the Congress could do to

40. The Indian National Congress, Resolutions 1934-36

(AICC Allahabad), pp.19-20.
 47

alter its format. The Lucknow session of the Congress

held in April 1936 approved the decision to contest the

elections, but this did not mean that the Congress had

agreed to work the constitution. In an obvious reference

to the Viceroy's appeal for co-operation, Jawaharlal Nehru

retorted: we go to the legislatures not to co-operate with

the apparatus of British imperialism, but to combat the

41
Act and to seek to end it.

The attitude of the Congress towards the

constitution was one of militant hostility, and it was in

this mood that its members entered upon the election

campaign. In April 1936, the Congress Working Committee

appointed a parliamentary sub-committee, with Sardar

VallabhbhaiPatel as president, to organise the election

campaign. But the unity of the party was threatened by

internal conflict. There were sharp differences between

the socialistic programmes of Nehru and those of the more

conservative leaders such as Patel and Rajender Prasad.

Gandhi was afraid that Nehru's radical political and

42
social philosophy, unfolded . at this juncture, might

precipitate a premature cleavage in the nationalistic

ranks and thereby jeopardize the Congress's prospects in

/ Q
the forthcoming elections. At the same time Gandhi

41. Sir Maurice Gwyer and A.Appadorai (eds) Speeches and

Documents on the Indian Constitution 1921-47 (London
1957), p.3#6; See also J. Nehru, India and the World
(London, 1936), pp.91-92.
42. J.Nehru,Eighteen Months in India (Allahabad,1938),
pp.28-40.
43. A.Singh, 'Is Gandhi's Life Work Ruined' Asia (Oct.1936),
‘ p.ll. ----
 48

realized that Nehru was the only leader who could bridge
the growing gap between 'Socialism' and 'Gandhism'. As
the accepted leader of the Congress 'left wing'^. Nehru

enjoyed the confidence of the radicals; and as Gandhi's

favourite he was also acceptable to the 'moderates' in the

Congress. He was thus ideally fitted to the task of

reconciling the two groups. But more than anything else

Gandhi was aware that, apart from himself, Nehru was the

only other leader who had a mass appeal and could gather

votes. Thus in an astute move Gandhi secured Nehru's re-

election to the Congress Presidency

As the date of the. election drew nearer, the

Congress leaders worked in unity. In August 1936 the All-

India Congress Committee (AICC) adopted an election

manifesto which repeated that the purpose of sending

Congressmen to the legislatures would be, as Nehru had

said earlier, 'not to cooperate in any way with the Act,

but to combat.it and seek an end of it.' The decision

with regard to accepting office was postponed, but the

manifesto went on to state that, whatever the decision

might be on this question, the object in view remained the

same-getting the Act repealed.

45. S.Gopal, Jawahar Lai Nehru: A Biography (London,

1975), p.200; See also H.Mukerjee, The Gentle
Colossus-A Study of Jawaharlal Nehru (Calcutta,
1964), pp.74-75.
 49

The Congress had a considerable advantage over

its opponents. It was the only organised all-India

political party, and its parliamentary wing, the Swaraj

party, was experiencd in electioneering and had built up

elaborate electoral machinery throughout the country. The

Congress had an army of electioneering agents in the towns

and villages. Subhash Chandra bose has described how the

party workers in 1920 were organized:

'Students responded to the appeal in large

numbers... It was these student-workers who carried the

message of Congress to all the corners of the country, who

collected funds, enlisted members, held meetings and

demonstrations, preached temperance, established

arbitration boards, taught spinning and weaving and

encouraged the revival of home industries. Without them

all the influence of Mahatma Gandhi would not have carried

very rfar.'»46

Most of these student-workers were still

available seventeen years later, and their numbers had

been augmented to many thousands by the recruitment of

enthusiastic young people who welcomed the prominence that

politics gave them. They cost very little, having few

needs and asking for no more than bare subsistence; and

46. S.C.Bose, The Indian Struggle (London, Reprint, 1964)

p.32. r \

155*sl
 50

they were new organized and trained by the master hand of

Gandhi. It required herculean efforts to organize

campaigns, to explain to the newly enfranchised masses,

mostly illiterate, the meaning of the ballot boxes, and to

select prospective candidates for the Congress election

tickets. As proof of their claim to represent a

particular constituency, hopeful candidates would refer to

their long services in the party as organizers or

financiers, but above all to their jail records. To

choose one person from several applicants was not as easy

task. Luckily for the Congress, Patel as the Chief

Organizer achieved the seemingly impossible with amazing

ease. 47

The Congress placed primary importance on

winning the election. The Congress parliamentary board

glossed over any ideological controversies and laid down

only three conditions to guide the selection of

candidates; that they should have signed the Congress

pledge, that they could finance their campaign, and that

48
they had a good chance of winning. In giving party

nominations there was no insistence on habitual wearing of

Khaddar, hither to an essential Gandhian pre-requisite.

47. D.V.Tahmankar, Sardar Patel, (London, 1970),

pp.143-4.
48. Rajendra Prasad, Autobiography(Bombay, 1957), p.427.
 51

Nor was the nomination limited to those who had been

members of the Congress for a prescribed period indeed

many of the Congress nominees had joined the Congress

merely in order to get a Congres ticket. In Madras, for

example, the Justice Party had suffered from the natural

reaction against its long period of the office and also

from a lack of able leadership. There is little doubt

that a number of political aspirants, realizing the

weakness of other parties, had jumped on to the Congress

49
bandwagon in order to get an easy run in the election.

As we have already discussed the only Muslim

party with some claims to an all-India organization was

the All-India Muslim League. The League, however, could

be described as an all-India body only by courtesy: prior

to the 1936-37 elections it was in a dormant condition

hence no comparison of highly organised and cadre based

Congress Party. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, its permanent

president, had stayed on in Britain after the second round

table conference, and during his absence abroad the party

had existed on paper only.^ During the 1930s the League

was neither so communal nor so militant as it was to be in

49. Dr.C.J.Baker gives an interesting account of sudden

'Conversions' throughout 1936. The Politics of South
India 1920-37 (Cambridge, 1976), pp.247-79.

50. K.B.Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase (London,

New Edition, 1968), p.81.
 52

later days: it was an organization of Muslims to protect

what were considered to be their special interests, and

was not yet committed to the partition of the country on a

communal basis. Economically it had little to offer in

the way of constructive ideas and had done little for the

improvement of the standards of workers and peasants. It

was essentially an upper and middle-class organization,

wanting an all-India leadership. Its lack of success in

becoming a dynamic organization was largely due to the

fact that its leadership had been dominated by

'careerists'-- professional politicians who felt no

particular dedication to their cause. Convenience, rather

51
than conviction, governed their politics.

Jinnah, as we have already stated, returning to

India from self-imposed exile in Britain in 1935, had

immediately set about trying to revitalize the League. At

its annual session of April 1936, the Muslim League

condemned the federal scheme of the 1935 Act as 'most

reactionary, retrograde, injurious and fatal' and totally

unacceptable,' but nevertheless decided to utilize the

52
provincial part of the Act 'for what it is worth.'

Jinnah was authorised, like the Congress, to form a

central election board for organizing the League's

53
election campaign. With few provincial and district

branches, and limited financial and publicity

51. Choudhry, Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan (Lahore,

1961), pp.137-9.
52. Resolution of the AIML, 11-12 April 1936. Gwyer and
Appadorai, Speeches and Documents, pp.384-85.
53. R. Coupland, Indian Politics, 1936-42, p.13.
 53
54
resources, the League gathered itself to go into the

elections for the first time on an all-India basis.

The Muslim League election board published an

election manifesto which declared that the League stood

for 'full responsible government for India'. The main

feature of the Muslim League programme was to maintain the

solidarity of the Muslims as an all-India community and to

save them from breaking up into provincial parties and

groups. The election was to be fought and this is an

important point not essentially between the Congress and

the Muslim League (as some of the member of the Muslim

League continued to be the members of the Congress) but

between the Muslim League and the local Muslim parties.

The issue was whether local interests should be

subordinated to the all-India interests of the community

55
or vice-versa

The manifesto which was adopted on June 9,

1936, while maintaining that the position of Muslims

should be protected and safeguarded in any future

political constitutional structure, argued that such a

demand did not 'Savour of Communal ism'. For it was not

only 'natural, but essential for securing a stable

54. Star of India (Calcutta) was the solitary English

dailyofthe Muslim League.
55. Civil and Military Gazette, June 11, 1936.
 54

national government by ensuring whole-hearted and willing

co-operation of the minorities who must be made to feel

that they can rely upon the majority with a complete sense

of confidence and security.' The manifesto asked for the

replacement of the present provincial constitution and

the proposed central constitution by 'democratic full

self-government'. In the meantime the representatives of

the Muslim League were to 'utilize the legislatures in

order to extract maximum benefits out of the constitution

for the uplift of the people in various spheres of

national life'. The need for the new social order with a

view to ameliorating the condition of the poor and

backward Muslims was also stressed.

56
The League adopted the following programme:

1. To protect the religious rights of the

Musalmans. In all matters of purely religious

character, due weight shall be given to the

<“>

opinions of Jamiat-ul-nle,ma-i-Hind and the

Mujtahids.

2. To make every effort to secure the repeal of

all repressive laws.

3. To resist all measures which are detrimental

to the interests of India, which encroach upon

the fundamental liberties of the people and

lead to economic exploitation of the country.

56. Ibid. June 12, 1936, Also see Star of India* June 12, 1936.,
Text of the Manifesto in Indian Annual Register, 1936, ii,
299-301, and Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan, p. 417.
 55

4. To reduce heavy cost of administrative machinery,

central and provincial, and allocate substantial

funds for nation-building departments.

5. To nationalize the Indian army and reduce the

military expenditure.

6. To encourage development of industries, including

cottage industries.

7. To regulate currency, exchange and prices in the

interest of economic development of the country.

8. To stand for the social, educational and economic

uplift of the rural population.

9. To sponosor measures for the relief of agricultural

indebtedness.
10. To make elementary education free and compulsory.

11. To protect and promote Urdu language and script.

12. To devise measures for the amelioration of the

general conditions of Muslims.

13. To take steps to reduce the heavy burden of

taxation.

14. To create a healthy public opinion and general

political consciousness throughout the country.

When we compare the manifesto of Muslim League

with that of Congress we notice so many similarities with

sharp differences. The social and political objectives

 56

outlined in the manifesto were very similar to those of

the Congress. Most historians, however in trying to point

out the similarities in these manifestoes,"^ have failed

to notice the marked conflict between them. In general,

the election manifestoes of most parties bore a striking

resemblance to that of the Congress, but in detail the

Congress manifesto with its socialistic bias stood apart

from the rest, the most elementary difference being the

League's opposition to any attempt to expropriate private

property: it would not interfere with the landed

interests, while the Congress was committed to sweeping

land reforms. It is essential to bear this in mind,

because it was largely because of this difference of

approach between the Congress and the League that the rift

between the two parties widemed.. Another striking

difference was the League's pledge to 'protect and

promote the Urdu language and script', the insinuation

being that the Congress was trying to make Hindi, the

national language of India. The merits of the arguments

will be examined later on; here we need only note that

the Hindi-iJrdu controversy was one of the main factors

contributing to bad feelings between the two parties.

Similarly the Lucknow pact of 1916 was hailed as 'one of

57. Tara Chand, History of the Fredom Movement in India, (Delhi

1972)IV,pp 224-JJ Cnaudhry Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of
Pakistan (New York, 1967)p.27, Coupland, Indian Politics,1936-
42, pp.160-1; Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan, pp. 156-7^
 57

the greatest beacon lights in the constitutional history

of India' and a 'signal proof of the identity of purpose,

eagerness and cooperation between the two sections of the

58
people of India.' Again this could be interpreted as

meaning that the League solemnly stood by separate

electorates, which was one of the central pillars on which

the Lucknow Pact was based.

Further, the manifesto of the League was vaguely

worded, and was characterised by an absence of committment
59
on any issue. The Congress manifesto, drafted by Nehru,

rejected the new constitution 'in its entirely', while the

Muslim League manifesto made no mention of it. The

manifesto of the League also made no reference to the

future political development of India. Independence was

not demanded, and, it was clear that the Muslim League did

not desire the severence of the British connection. It

is, in fact, significant that one of the reasons for the

failure of negotiations between Jinnah and the Ahrars,

who had a radical social programme, was Jinnah's refusal

to promise them that demand for independence would be

58. Indian Annual Register, p. 291

59. The Congress Election Manifesto, 22 August, 1936,
S. Gopal (Ed.), Selection Works of Jawaharlal Nehru
(New Delhi, 1975), Vol. 7, pp. 459-64.
 58

made in the election manifesto of the Muslim League.^®

The Congress manifesto reflected the growing mass

support for the organization, and stressed the crucial

role to be played by the masses in the struggle for

fi 1
freedom. The Muslim League manifesto merely asked for

the creation of 'a healthy public opinion and general

political consciousness throughout the country.

Nevertheless the Muslim League did not openly

oppose the Congress. Indeed some of the members of the

League continued to be members of the Congress, and

Jinnah's election speeches stressed compromise and mutual

fi9

accommodation between the two parties.

As the provincial elections approached, Nehru

reiterated in his presidential address to the Faizpur

Congress in December 1936 the struggle against

imperialism, the issues of social and economic, freedom,

the demand for a constituent Assembly, his hostility to

the Indian States system, and the need for greater mass
63
participation in the Congress. The address emphasised

60. M.Noman, Muslim India: The Rise and Growth of the

All-India Muslim League (Allahabad, 1942) p.329. On
the Ahrars, See Also F. Hardy, The Muslim’s British
India (Cambridge, 1972), p.216
61. S. Gopal (ed) Selected Works, Vol.7, p. 460.
62. Star of India, 29. July and 24 August, 1936.
63. Presidential address to the Faizpur Congress, 27
December 1936, S.Gopal(ed) Selected Works Vol.7,
pp. 598-614.
 59

his beief that the contest in India was 'between two

forces the Congress as representing the will to freedom of

the nation, and the British Government in India and its

supporters who oppose this urge and try to suppress it'.^

Jinnah did not agree to this. There was a"third

party"in India, he sharply informed Nehru, and that was
65
the Muslim's Party; revealing a vital difference in his

attitude to political questions from Nehru's. For Nehru,

the issue was that of independence. 'He who is for it

must be with the Congress and if he talks in terms of

fi A
communalism he is not keen on independence'. Jinnah's

sole aim was to establish the Muslim League as the only

representative of Muslim affairs and to maintain it as

such in the forefront of Indian politics.

Nehru's reply to Jinnah revealed his disdain for

the political and long-term role a communal organization

such as the League could play on the Indian political

scene. He expressed unhappiness over Jinnah's reference

to a 'third party', for, as he was it, between British

Imperialism and Indian nationalism Jinnah would have

64. 'Line up with the Congress', 18 September 1936, Ibid,

p. 468
65. Bombay Chronicle, 4 January, 1937.
66. 'Line up with the Congress' S. Gopal (ed) Selected
Works, Vol.7, pp. 468-9.
 60

Muslims remain as a political group apart, apparently

playing off one against the other, and seeking communal
c 7
advantage even at the cost of the larger public good.
th
This was 'communalism raised to the h power.’ Nehru,

explained, with a patient sarcasm, the unacceptability of

the 'Logical conclusion' of Jinnah's statement — 'that

in no department of public activity must non-Muslims have

£0
anything to do with Muslim affairs'. He ridiculed
the 'new test of orthodoxy' being enunciated by Jinnah -

that Muslims were 'only those who follow Mr. Jinnah and
the League.' 69

Nehru decried the communal philosophy of the

League, as he pointed out thatfcreal issue', pertaining to

economic and political problems, could not be considered

communally.^® He attached no significance to 'third

parties', 'middle and undecided groups', for, in the long

run, they had no role to play. The Congress represented

Indian nationalism 'and is thus charged with a historic

, _ ,71
destiny'.

Nehru was contemptuous of the indifference of the

League to the question of independence, and of its

67. The Congress and Muslims', 10 Jan.,1937, J. Nehru,

Eighteen Months in India (Allahabad,1938),p.152
68. Ibid,pp.150-1.
69. Ibid, p. 151.
7°. Ibid p. 158.
71. Ibid, p. 153
 61

distance from the masses. It represents a group of Muslims,

no doubt, highly esteemablec persons but functioning in the

higher regions of the upper middle classes and having no

contacts with the Muslim-masses and few even with the

72
lower middle class.' He welcomed cooperation with the

League, but only on the basis of anti-imperialism and the

good of the masses. He ruled out pacts between handfuls

of upper class people which ignored the interests of the

73
masses.

Jinnah chafed under Nehru's derisive view of the

Muslim League even as he attached what he regarded as

Nehru's claim to be the 'sole custodian of the masses'.

With a sarcasm that matched that of Nehru, he challenged

the Congress claim that it was a national organization and

defended the communal character of the League. 'The League

does not believe in assuming a non-communal label with a

few adventurers or credulous persons belonging to other

communities thrown in and who have no backing of their

people, and thus pass off as the only party entitled to

74
speak and act on behalf of the whole of India.'

Jinnah's stand on political and economic question

was also revealed. He asserted that the Muslim League

72. Ibid ., p. 154

73. Ibid., pp. 155-6.
74. Leader, 23 January, 1937.
 62

would maintain a separate identity; and he made a show of

the League's importance, gratuitously laying down the

terms under which the League would cooperate with any

party in struggle for freedom. The Muslm League 'is

prepared to join hands with any progressive party in the

fight for the country's freedom, but to achieve this the

question of minorities must be settled satisfactorily'.

Jinnah expressed his disagreement with 'certain methods

and means to which the Congress stands pledged'. He

informed Nehru that ’Even a large bulk of patriotic and

nationalistic Hindus are not members of the Congress.

Because they do not believe in the Congress methods'

This war of election compaign ended with the

elections. The elections to the provincial legislatures

under the new constitution were held throughout British

India in the winter of 1936-37. The electorate had been

greatly enlarged to thirty million men and women. Some

15.5 million or over fifty-four percent of the voters went

to the polls.^ Voting was assisted by the use of symbols,

and in some places with coloured voting boxes, a system

which gave advantage to organized parties as against

independent and small groups.

75. Ibid., 23 Jan. 1937.

76. Balashevik and Dyekov, Contemporary History of India,
p. 314.
 63

The British had great interest in the electoral

fortunes of the Congress, which they regarded as a test of

its strength against them. Even as they predicted a

77
Congress victory in most provinces, British officials

discussed the possibility of an opposition to it,

especially in view of the emphasis on independence and

economic reform in its election manifesto. In the h.P,,

the British were supporting the Natonal Agriculturist

Party against the Congress; Linlithgow hoped that Nehru's

expounding of his radical economic theories would

consolidate the Right throughout India for the purpose of

78
the elections. Tt is interesting, in view of the fact

that both the Congress and the British sought the hand of

the Muslim League only three years later, that there are

only the most cursory references - or none at all - to the

election campaign of the League in official reports, and,

at this time, the British do not seem have envisaged its

emergence as an opposition of any significance. Perhaps

it was because the League was considered similar to the

Congress in its socialistic tendencies - and Jinnah the

77. See, for example, Brabourne to Linlithgow, 13 November

1936; Keane to Linlithgow, 28 October 1936; Sifton to
Linlithgow, 3 November 1936; Hyde Gowan to
Linlithgow, 10 November 1936; Linlithgow Collection,
Vol.112.
78 Linlithgow to Zetland, 27 August 1936, Ibid, Vol.3.
 64

79
arch enemy of the Raj1, - and, of course, the League had

not been able to consolidate its position, as the leading

Muslim organization, especially in the Muslim-majority

provinces.

Contrary to the expectations of many, when the

results were announced the Congress emerged as the

majority party in five provinces out of eleven provinces

and near majority in Bombay (86 out of 175) and was the

largest single party in two others. It had won 711 out of

1585 provincial assembly seats. Of the 38 seats reserved

for 'Labour', the Congress won 18; of the 37 allotted to

land owners and 56 to 'commerce', the Congress obtained

80
four and three respectively.

Political and Economic information department

of the All India Congress Committee (AICC) also issued an

81
analysis of election results of 1937 elections.

According to this analysis the Congress had been able to

secure an absolute majority in the legislative Assemblies

of 5 provinces, namely Madras, the United Provinces, the

Central Provinces and Berar, Bihar, Orissa. The Congress

was the biggest single party in 4 provinces namely Bombay,

79. Raja of Mahmudabad, ’Some Memories', in Philips and

Wain-wright (eds) Partition of India, p.384.

80. For these figures see Returns Showing the Results of

Elections in India, 1937, Command Paper No.5589, Also
Indian Annual Register 1937 Vol.I (Calcutta) pp.168
(a) to 168(p).
81. Indian Annual Register, 1937, Vol. 1 (Calcutta)
pp. 168 (a).
 65

Bengal, Assam, North West Frontier Province. In the

assemblies of Sind and Punjab the. Congress was in a

82
comparatively smaller minority. The following table

shows the number of seats won by the Congress in different

Provincial Assemblies and the percentage of votes secured

by the Congress.

Province Total Won by % of total Approximate

seats Congr­ seats won % of total
ess by Congress votes

Madras 215 159 74 65

Bihar 152 98 65 75
Bengal 250 54 22 25
The C.P.& Berar 112 70 62.5 61
Bombay 175 86 49 56
The U.P. 228 134 59 65
Punjab 175 18 10.5 13
N.W.F.P. 50 19 38 -

Sind 60 7 11.5 12
Assam 108 133 31 -

Orissa 60 36 60 —

Analysis says that the total number of

Muslim seats in the legislative assemblies of the 11

provinces was 482. Out of this number Congress contested

only 58 and won 26, that is 4570 of the seats contested.

Out of 38 labour seats Congress contested 20 and won 18

that is 90 percent of total seats contested. Congress

contested 8 landholders seatsout of total of 37 and won 4

that is 50 percent of seat contested. Congress contested

 66

8 out of 56 seats reserved for commerce and Industry and

won 3 that is 40 percent of total seats contested.

Political and Economic department of AICC also

issued data for legislative councils of six provinces.

The following table shows the position of the Congress

83
Party in the Legislative Councils.

Province Total No.of Contested by Won by

seats in Congress Congress
L.C's.

Madras 46 33 26

Bihar 26 12 8

Bombay 26 15 13

The TT.P. 52 19 8

Bengal 57 12 9

Assam 23 1

Total 230 92 64

As shown above, of a total 230 seats in the

Legislative Councils of 6 Provinces, 92 were contested by

the Congress and 64 were won, that is, the Congress

secured 28 percent of the total seats and 60 percent of

the seats contested by it.

83. Ibid. , p.168(f).

 67

If we further analyse the results of elections

to the provincial legislative assemblies we find some

striking information. In Madras, the Congress contested

114 General (Rural & Urban) seats out of 116 and won 111

seats. It contested 26 seats out of 30 Scheduled Caste

seats and won 26 that is cent percent of seats contested.

Out of 28 Mohammadans (Rural & Urban) seats Congress

contested 9 and won only 4 which was a poor achievement.

Out of 8 Women's Constituencies Congress contested 7 seats

and won all the seats contested. The Congress won only 3

out of 8 Indian Christian seats. Congress did not contest

any Anglo-Indian and European seats. Congress secured

none of 6 commerce and industry seats and again nil out of

6 landholders seats but congress won all the 6 labour

seats and also won both seats reserved for Backward tribe

and University seats. This analysis shows that the

Congress party was very much popular among all the leading

sections of Indian electorates in the Madras Province. •

Further the Congress secured approximately 65 percent of

the total votes castes and 74 percent of the total seats

84
in the Madras Assembly.

84. Ibid., p.168(f).

 68

The following table shows Party wise position

85
in the Madras Legislative Assembly.

Party Seats

Congress 159

Justice Party 17

Independents 15

People's Party 1

Muslim League 11

Muslim Progressive Party 1

European Commerce 3

European General 3

Madras Planters 1

Nattu Kottai Nagarathera Association 1

Anglo-Indian 2

South Indian Chambers of Commerce 1

Total 215

In Bihar the Congress secured 75 percent of the

total votes casts and 65 percent of the total seats in

Bihar Legislative Assembly. Again the Congress was very

much popular among General (rural & urban) constituencies

of the total of 78 General Seats it secured 73 seats. It

also shown its popularity among Schedule castes, labour,

85. Ibid.
 69

university, women constituencies.

If we see the Party wise position in Bihar

Legislative Assembly the Congress -won gg 0ut of 152 seats

while Muslim League secured nil. Partywise position in

the Bihar Legislative Assembly was as follows: Congress

98, Muslim Independents 15, Muslim United 6, European 2,

constitutionals 2, Anglo-Indian
Indian 1, Christian 1,
87
Loyalists 1, Ahrars 3, and No Party 24.

In Bombay Legislative Assembly the Congress

contested 84 out of 92 General (Urban & Rural) seats and

69 seats. The Congress also won 4 out of 7 Maratha seats,

4 out of 15 Schedule Caste seats, 1 out of 7 commerce and

Industry seats, 2 out of 7labour seats, 5 out of 5 women

general seats and 1 university seat reserved for

university. But the Congress failed to secure none among

Mohammadan, Backward Tribe, Indian Christian, Anglo-

Indian, European, Land holders and Women Mohammadan. Over

all the Congress secured about 56 percent of the total

votes castes, and won 49 percent of the total seats in

the Assembly.

The position of the Parties in Bombay

legislative Assembly was as follows: Congress 86, Muslim

League-20, Independent Muslims-10, Democratic Swaraj

Party-5, European, Anglo Indian, Indian Christian 7,

86. Ibid., p.168(h)

87. Ibid.
 70

Independents (including Ambedkar's Party and non-

QO
Brahmins) 41, Labour-5, and Nationalist-1.

89
In the United Provinces Legislative Assembly
the Congress secured approximately 65% of the total number

of votes casts and won 59 percent of the total seats in

the Assembly. Constituency-wise the Congress was popular

among General, Schedule Castes and labour. Out of 124

General (Rural & Urban Women Included) seats it contested

123 seats and won 114. Out of 20 Schedule Caste seats it

secured 16 and it won all the 3 seats reserved for labour.

It also won I University seats. But Congress failed to

secure none in Muslim, Landholders, Indian Christian,

Anglo-Indians, Europeans, European Commerce, Indian

Commerce constituencies.

The position of the various parties in the IT.P.

Legislative Assembly was as follows.: the Congress-134,

Muslim League-27, Nationalist Agriculturist Party-16,

Independent Muslims-30, Independent Hindus-10, Others-11.

The Congress secured in Bengal legislative

Assembly roughly 25 percent of the total votes casts and

22 percent of the total seats. But in general

constituencies it maintained its hold. Out of 48 general

88. For Bombay Legislative Assembly results see Ibid,

p. 168(i), 168(j).

89. For United Provinces Assembly results see Ibid.

p.l68(k).
 71

seats it won 43. It also won 5 out of 8 Labour seats 6

out of 30 Scheduled Castes seats-*- theIn the rest of

90
constituencies the performance of the Congress was nil.

The Congress secured approximately 61 percent of

the total votes cast and 62.5 percent of the total seats
91
in the Central Provinces Legislative Assembly. It won

58 out of 65 General seats,.5 out of 19 Scheduled Castes

seats, 2 out of 3 landholders seats, 1 out of 2 Labour

seats, 1 out of 2 Commerce seats, all the 3 Women seats.

It secured nil in Muslim, Backward Tribe, European, Anglo-

Indian and University Constituencies.

If we see partywise the Congress secured 70,

Mohammadan 14, non-Brahmin 3, Ambedkarites 4, Nationalists

2 and others 19 in the Central Provinces Legislative

Assembly.

92
The results of Punjab Legislative Assembly

elections revealed that the Congress was in a worst

condition in the Punjab. Here the Congress secured only

10 out of 42 General seats, 4 out of 31 Sikh seats, 2 out

of 84 Muslim seats and 2 out of 4 Women seats. Overall

congress secured only 13 percent of total votes cast and

10.5 percent of the total seats.

90. For Bengal Assembly results Ibid. 168(1).

91. For Central Provinces Assembly Results Ibid.p.l68(m).
92. For Punjab Legislative Assembly Results Jbid.p.168(m)
 72

In the North West Frontier province (NWFP)^ the

Congress contested 29 out of 36 Muslim seats and secured

15 seats. The Congress also won 4 out of 9 general seats.

The Congress secured 38 percent of total seats in the

N.W.F.P. Legislative Assembly.

The position of the various parties in the

N.W.F.P. legislative Assembly was as follows: Congress-19,

Hindu Sikh Nationalist 7, Muslim Independent Party 2,

Independent Muslims 21, and Independent Hindus-1. It is

interesting that Muslim League secured none in the

Assembly despite of it was a Muslim majority province.

The Congress secured 60 percent of the total

94
seats in the Orissa Legislative Assembly. It contested

43 out of 60 seats and won 36 seats. In the Assembly the

Congress-secured 36, nnited-Party-5, National Party-4,

Independents-11, and Nominated-4.

95
For the Assam Legislative Assembly the Congress

contested only 41 seats out of 108 and secured 33 seats.

The position of the other parties was as follows.

93. Results of N.W.F.P. Assembly see Ibid. 168(o).

94. For Results of Orrisa Legislative Assembly see Ibid.

168(o).

95. For Results of Assam Legislative Assembly Election

See Ibid., p.l68(p).
 73

Independent Hindus-10, Muslim Proja Party-1, ”nited

People's Party-3, Assam Valley Muslim-5, Surma Valley

Muslim-5, European-9, Backward Tribes-4, Labour-4,

Independent Muslims-14 0thers-20.

96
In the Sind Legislative Assembly the position of

various parties was as follows: the Congress-7, TTnited

Party-23, Azad Party-3, Muslim Party-3* Hindu Sabha-4,

Independents-17, Europeans-3. Here again Muslim League

secured none despite of Muslim majority province.

The extent of the success of the Congress

97
confounded most political pundits , and one British

official could only remark, somewhat grudgingly, that it

remained to be seen whether the Congress would actually

98
fulfil its promises. Officials unanimously attributed

the victory of the Congress to the absence of any

99
organized opposition against it, the attraction of the

96. For Sind see ibid. p. 168(p).

97. See, for example, Fortnightly Report (FR). for Assam

For first half of January, 1937j F.R. Orissa for
second half of Januay, 1937); Home Political (Inter­
nal) Department (HP) File No. 18/2/36; and FR for tt.p.
for First half of Feb., 1937, H.P.File No.18/2/37;
Anderson to Linlithgow, 8 February 1937, Linlithgow
Collection, Vol.112.

98. Haig to Linlithgow,13 Feb. 1937, Linlithgow Collection

Vol.112.

99. F.R. for Bihar for first half of Feb.1937, H.P.File No.18/2/37
Keane to Linlithgow, 15 December 193-6; Anderson to Linlithgow,
3 December 1936; Hyde Gowan to Linlithgow, 10 November 1936,
Sifton to Linlithgow, 9 Feb.,1937, L.C. Vol.112.
 74

names of Gandhi and Nehru, ^ and "wild promises" of the

reduction of rent.*^ The enormous extent of the new

franchise was regarded as a great advantage to the

Congress, especially in Bihar and in the O.P.,where

congress election propaganda had been directed more

102
against landlords than against the British. Here the

Congress defeated, often in straight fights, big landlords

who were thought to have exercised exceptionally great

103
influence over their tenants, and whom the British had

hoped would be able to check any rising tide of Congress

fortunes. In the N.W.F.P. also, the congress defeated the

Khans the great feudal ' [landowners'-usually by very big

104
margins.

But these factors alone do not explain the numerous

Congress victories. The party's general programme was

more positive and constructive than those of its

opponents. In agricultural constituencies, where it has

100. See, for example, FR for U.P. for first half of

February, 1937; FR for Bihar for second half of
February 1937; H.P.file No.18/2/37.

101. Haig to Linlithgow, 9 Feb. 1937, L.C. Vol.112*, F.R.

for Assam for second half of Jan. 1937", H.P. File No.
18/1/37; and FR for Bihar for first half of Feb.
1937, H.P.File No.18/2/37.

102. Griffith to Linlithgow, 9 November 1936; Haig to

Linlithgow, 26 Jan. and 4 Feb. 1937; L.C.Vol.112;
F.R. for Assam for first half of January 1937, H.P.
File No.18/1/37; F.R. for Bihar for first half of
Feb. 1937; H.P. File No.18/2/37.

103. Haig to Linlithgow, 13 February 1937; L.C. Vol.112,

F.R.H.P.File No.18/2/37 for Bihar for the first half of Feb.,
1937.
104. Griffith to Linlithgow, 22 Feb. 1937, L.C. 102.*.
 75

had been specially successful, it had put forward an

extensive programme of rural reforms. The Congress had

won its victories on issues which appealed to millions of

voters and to many more who had no votes. On the other

hand, its opponents were divided and failed to put up a

united front. The landed proprietors had not yet learnt

that they would have to rely for political organization

upon their own efforts and not upon official machinery.

Another factor of no less importance in accounting

for the Congress success was Nehru's ability to carry the

Congress message to the masses. Professor Brecher sums up

Nehru's contribution thus: "Like an arrow he shot through

the country, carrying the Congress message to remote

hamlets in the hills and on the plains. He covered some

50,000 miles, using every conceivable means of transport.

All told, about 100,000 persons attended his meetings and

millions more lined the route to catch a glimpse of the

Congress crown prince.

Nehru's approach to the electors was ideological

in the main, with very few references to individual

candidates. The Congress election manifesto was explained

in simple terms, and a few core themes were stated ad inf ini ti

'Fight for India's freedom; built the Congress into a

105. M.Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography (London,

,1959), pp.227-8.
 76

mighty army of the Indian people; organize to remove

poverty, unemployment and social and cultural

degradation.' 'Let every voter, man or woman, do his or

her duty to the country and vote for the Congress,' was his

constant theme. 'Thus we shall write in millions of hands

1 06
our flaming resolve to be free.' The technique of

hammering on a few key objectives was successful in

carrying the message effectively to the Indian

countryside.

Sir Harry Haig has suggested another explanation

for the Congress victory: the sense of change awakened in

the villages. The government, which had in the past

agitation opposed the Congress with the weight of its

authority, now stood inactive. It was too much to expect

that the villager would understand the constitutional

necessity for this attitude. 'He felt that the British

Raj was weakening, that the Congress was coming, and, as

so often happens, threw himself definitely on what seemed

107
to be the winning side.'

Handicapped during its election campaign by a

108
shortage of Muslim workers, the Congress achievement

106. D.G.Tendulkar, Mahatma:Life of Mohandas Karamchand

Gandhi (Bombay 1951-4), IV; p.' 165.

107. Harry Haig, 'The United Provinces and the New

Constitution, The Asiatic Review (1940), XXXVI, 425.

108. G.B.Pant to Rajender Prasad, 21 January 1937,

Rajender Prasad Correspondence File 11/37, Collection
1. Reel.5.
 77

with Muslim seats was some what less remarkable. It

contested 56 out of 482 muslim seats in British India, and

was 26. It. did not secure a single Muslim seat in Bombay,

the Hnited Provinces, Bengal and Central Provinces. Its

greatest successes with Muslim seats were achieved in

Madras, Bihar and N.W.F.P. where it obtained 4,5 and 15

seats respectively. The success of the Congress in the

N.W.F.P. was only one indication that its overall failure

in Muslim constituencies did not necessarily reflect

communal trends.

Yet, if the Congress polled poorly in Muslim

constituencies, the Muslim League did not fare nearly as

well in those constituencies as it had hoped. Out of 482

Muslim seats, the League captured only 105. Only 4.8

percent of the Muslimswho went to the polls voted for it.

It won a substantial number of seats in the Hindu majority

provinces the United Provinces and Bombay, but in the

Muslim majority provinces it did not create much of an

impression. It failed to secure a single seat in Bihar,

Orissa and the N.W.F.P. the latter a predominantly Muslim

provinces. Its performances in the Punjab and Sind, both

Muslim majority provinces, were equally dismal, its gain

being a single seat in the former and none in the latter.

In Bengal the League won only 37 out of 119 Muslim seats.

Its performance in Bombay and U.P. where it won 20 out of

39 and 27 out of 64 Muslim seats respectively were

 78

impressive. In the province of Madras, out of 28 Muslim

seats, the League secured 11. These are significant

figures which show that in 1937 the League was not a vital

force in Indian politics. Comparatively speaking, the

League won a substantial number of seats in the Hindu

majority provinces, but in the Muslim majority provinces

it did not create any impression.

1 nQ
The following table shows the position of the

Muslim League in the provincial assemblies.

Province Total Muslim Seats won Percentage of

seats by Leage Muslim seats

Madras 28 11 39

Bombay 39 20 51

Bengal 119 37 31

IT.P. 64 27 42

Punjab 86 1 1.1

Assam 34 9 26.4

NWFP 36 - -

Orissa 4 - -

Sind 36 _ -

Bihar 39 _ -

C.P. 14 —■

109. For these figures see Returns Showing the Results

Elections in India, 1937, Command paper,1^0.5589.
 79

The poor showing by the Muslim League was

neither surprising nor unexpected. The League was

essentially an urban-based political party and had little

or no contact with the masses in 1937. It has been

pointed out by Khaliquzzaman that from its birth in 1906.,

the League’s activities were ’always’ confined to indoor

political show.' He further writes: 'Even its annual

sessions were held either in well decorated pandals

(stages) or in big halls where a few honourable invitees

were allowed by special cards. Mass public meetings were

110
unknown.’ In 1937, the year which marked the begining

of the ’parting of ways’ between the Congress and the

League, it was claimed by some Congressmen that the

Congress had more Muslim members on its rolls than its

Muslim rival. It is also perhaps true that Gandhi and

Nehru were better known to the Muslim masses than was

111
Jinnah.

The fact that an inter-communal party

based on the agrarian interests of all communities won a

majority in the Punjab showed that communal questions did

not play a decisive part in the elections. The same could

be said of Bengal, where the success of the Congress and

110. Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan, p.137.

111. The Pioneer (Lucknow), 26 September, 1937.
 80

the K.P.P. pointed to the popularity of radical economic

programmes.
112 Taking into account the rout of the Hindu

Mahasabha in the general consntituencies at the hands of

the Congress, and the lack of success of the League in the

Muslim majority provinces, it can be concluded, then, that

communal questions did not play a major role in the

elections of 1937.

The election results proved that neither

the Congress nor the Muslim League could claim to

represent Muslims. But the success of the Congress in the

general constituencies showed its popularity on the all

India level; for the Muslim League, the future did not

appear very promising as it had failed to capture a

majority of the Muslim votes; and more significantly, it

was not in a position to form a government on its own in

any province. This realization lay behinds the almsot

conciliatory posture taken up by Jinnah after the

elections. He therefore, expressed the League’s

willingness to cooperate 'with any group or party if the

113
basic principles are determined by common consent.' In

the Presidential address of the AIML (25th session,

Lucknow) Jinnah warned and gave a call, 'The paper

declarations, slogans and shibboleths are not going to

112. Fortnightly report for Bengal for first half of

February 1937, H.P.File No. 18/1/37.

113. Leader, 1 March 1937.

 81

carry us anywhere. What India requires is a completely

united front and honesty of purpose, and then by whatever

name you may call your government is a matter, of no

consequence so long as it is a government of the people,

11/
by the people, for the people.'

Nehruwas not inclined to respond

sympathetically to Jinnah's call, and his terms, for

cooperation, especially at a time when felt confident that

the Congress itself could win over the Muslim masses on

the basis of economic issues. Nor was he dismayed that

the Congress had won only a fraction of the Muslim seats

in the elections. During the election campaign the

Congress had found awilling response from the Muslim

masses 'and a desire to line up with our freedom

movement.' Until now the Congress had not made much

effort to work among the Muslim masses, and Jinnh also

complained of it in Presidential address of Muslim League

session, 'The present leadership of the Congress,

especially during the last 10 years, has been responsible

for alienating the Musalmans of India, more and more..,

they have by their words, deeds and programmes shown, more

and more, that the Musalmans cannot expect any justice or

fair play at their hands. Wherever they were in a

majority and wherever it suited them, they refused to

114. Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, (ed) Foundations of

Pakistan: All India Muslim League Documents Vdl.ll
( 1924-17)’,”"(Karachi W0)7 pT26f:----------
 82

cooperate with the Muslim League parties and demanded

unconditional surrender and the signing of their

115
pledges.' But now it was essential that the Congress

take 'full advantage of this new interest and awakening,'

and make 'a special effort' to enrol more Muslim members,

'so that our struggle for freedom may become even more

broadbased than it is, and the Muslim masses should take

the prominent part in it which is their due.'11*’ The

Congress was not interested in pacts with a few persons

representing communal organizations, 'with no common

political background, meeting together and discussing and

117
quarelling.' Clearly, Nehru, whether or not he say the

motives behind Jinnah's cautious overtures to the

Congress, turned them down without realizing the far-

reaching consequences of it.

The inception of the Congress Muslim mass

contact programme, and Nehru's declaration that the

Congress hoped to rouse the Muslim masses in its favour

could hardly have been welcomed by the League. Whatever

118
Nehru may have said to the contrary, this could only

mean that the success of the programme would lead to the

rout of the Muslim League as a political organization. To

115. Ibid., p.267.

116. Leader, 3 April, 1937.

117. 'The Congress and Muslims,' 4 April 1937, J.L.Nehru,

Eighteen Months in India, p.161.

118. Nehru to Ismail Khan, 5 Feb.1938, Nehru Correspond­

ence , Vol.39.
 83

Jinnah, it must have seemed as insult, added to the

injury, that not only was the Congress indifferent to the

idea of co-operating with the Muslim League, but also that

it was inaugurating a campaign, the very success of which

would spell the political extinction of the Muslim League.

The very reasons which made Nehru confident of its success

roused Jinnah's fears. The implications of the Congress

Muslim Mass Contact Programme being quite clear, Jinnah's

sharp reaction to its inauguration was not surprising. He

regretted that Nehru should have found a solution which

would produce more bitterness and

frustrate the object
119
that every nationalist had at heart. To Jinnah, the

Congress attempt 'under the guise of establishing mass

contact with the Mussalmans, is calculated to divide and
weaken and break the Mussalmans, and is an effort to
120
detach them from their accredited leaders."

It would not be the last of Nehru's political

errors of judgement in his dealings with Jinnah, but it

was one of the most fatal mistakes he ever made in a

moment of hubris. More than Iqbal, it was Nehru who

charted a new mass strategy for the League, prodding and

challenging Jinnah to leave the drawing rooms of politics

to reach down to the hundred million Muslims who spent

119. Leader, 22 April, 1937.

120. Pirzada, Documents, p.270.

 84

most of each day labouring in rural fields. There was, of

course, only one possible way for the League to stir that

mass, to awaken it, and to lure it to march behind Muslim

leadership. The cry of Islam in danger of din (religion)

alone could emerge as the unique stand of the Muslim

Leage. "No common principle or policy binds them,*' Nehru

had taunted, referring to Jinnah's independent "party" in

the assembly. And for Jinnah this was a as significant a

turning point, traumatically triggered by public

humilitation, as the Congress non-cooperation resolution

rebuke he had sustained at Nagpur in 1920'. Only, then his

was the secular rational leadership, seeking in vain to

reduce a 'Mahatma' to mere 'Mr'. Now Nehru had used "Mr."

before Jinnah's name as a sarcastic form of rebuke, for

that title was the badge of British identity Jinnah

appeared to epitomize, despite his claims to Muslim

121
leadership.

Jinnah, however, never lost his temper except

for calculated political advantage. He used anger as a

barrister or as actor would, to sway his jury audience,

never from an uncontrollable flaring of passion. The

hatred he felt toward Nehru was cold, born of contempt

rather than rage. "What can I say to the busibody

President of the Congress?" Jinnah remarked of Nehru in

121. Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan (Oxford Press,

New Delhi 1987) p.l4FT
 85

an interview several months later. "He sees to carry the

responsibility of the whole world on his shoulders and

must poke his nose into everything except minding his own
122
business."

On the basis of the analysis of Elections of

1936-37 to the provincial legislative Assemblies we can

conclude that the Muslim League's claim of being the

sole-representative of Muslims of India fall flat on the

ground. It is interesting that Muslim League was routed

in elections in the Muslim majority provinces. On the

contrary it achieved some success in Muslim minority

provinces like Bombay and U.P. Results of the 1936-37

elections revealed that Muslim League in 1936-37 was

all-India Muslim party only in name and almost without

any organization like that of its rival Congress. It

stands no where in the world of Indian politics. Jinnah,

under his "pendulum strategy" of swinging the ballast of

Muslin support from Congress to the British and then back

again, which thus won the greatest concession for muslims

at every stage of the long, tough struggle toward a

negotiated transfer of power, turned towards Congress but

got rebuke at every stage. In the experiences of those

years Jinnah learned lessons in practical politics that

122. Quoted in ibid, p.143.

 86

a theoretical approach never could have taught him. He

and the Muslim League went into the elections as

idealists; they emerged from the aftermath as political

realistis. The change could hardly have been more

significant for India and the shape of her independent

future. This inextricably woven the "side issue" of 1936

with the main issue in 1947.

mm