Who Owns The Sahara?: Annette Lohmann

Morocco
Algeria
Libya
Mauritania
Mali Niger
Annette Lohmann
Who Owns the Sahara?

Old Conflicts, New Menaces: Mali and the Central Sahara
between the Tuareg, Al Qaida and Organized Crime
Annette Lohmann
Who Owns the Sahara?

Old Conflicts, New Menaces:
Mali and the Central Sahara
between the Tuareg, Al Qaida
and Organized Crime
About the author Imprint
Annette Lohmann directs the office of the Friedrich-Ebert- Published by:

Stiftung in Bamako, Mali. Previously, she has worked for the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Regional Office Abuja,
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Bonn and Berlin, at first as 12 Marrakesh Street, Wuse II, Abuja, Nigeria
representative of the FES in the Working Group on
Development and Peace (FriEnt) in the Federal Ministry for Tel +234 (0)9-4137977
Economic Cooperation and Development, then in the [email protected]
Middle East and North Africa Department with a focus on www.fes-westafrica.org/abuja
the Israeli - Palestinian conflict. She holds a M.A. from Freie
Universität Berlin. Coordinator:
Sebastian Sperling
First impression in June 2011
Layout by Samson Nnah, [email protected]

Printed in Abuja
Printed by Single Vision Limited, Abuja, Nigeria

07032105185, 08050371359
© Copyright with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
ISBN 978-978-915-488-3
ANNETTE LOHMANN | WHO OWNS THE SAHARA? OLD CONFLICTS, NEW MENACES: MALI AND THE CENTRAL SAHARA
Table of Contents
List of Acronyms.....................................................................................................................................4
Executive Summary ...............................................................................................................................5
Introduction............................................................................................................................................6
I. Current problems and their historic roots.....................................................................................6

An old conflict with new impact: The unresolved question of the Western Sahara.....................................6
An even older conflict with continuous impact: The Tuareg and the peace agreement ..............................6
The fight for dominance between Algeria and Libya .................................................................................7
From fundamentalist Islamic movements in Algeria to AQMI ....................................................................7
II. A new dimension – Al Qaida International comes into the picture ..............................................9
AQMI's spread throughout the region.....................................................................................................10
Mali pays the price for the unresolved question of AQMI ........................................................................11
So far no support for AQMI in Mali .........................................................................................................11
III. Growing engagement of international actors: The quest for natural resources?....................12
IV. New approaches by the Malian government..............................................................................12

Unexpected support: Tuareg vs. AQMI?...................................................................................................13
Needed: Political and economic development..........................................................................................13
V. Regional cooperation: A shared intention?.................................................................................15
VI. A problem with a bigger scope: Approaches by multilateral actors .........................................16

The approach of ECOWAS ......................................................................................................................16
The approach of the African Union .........................................................................................................17
The approach of the European Union .....................................................................................................18
The approach of the United Nations .......................................................................................................19
VII. Recommendations ................................................................................................................................20

Literature ................................................................................................................................................24
3
List of Acronyms
ACSRT - African Center for Studies and Research on GSPC - Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le
Terrorism Combat
AFRICOM - United States Africa Command INCB - International Narcotics Control Board
APSA - African Peace and Security Architecture OAU - Organization of the African Unity
AQMI - Al Qaida au Maghreb Islamique OMC - Observation and Monitoring Centre
ATT - Amadou Toumani Touré PSI - Pan-Sahel Initiative
AU - African Union PSPSDN - Programme spécial pour la paix, la sécurité

et le développement dans le nord du Mali
CTC - Counter-Terrorism Committee
R2P - Responsibility to Protect
CTED - Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate
TSCTP - Trans-Sahara-Counter-Terrorism Program
ECOWARN - ECOWAS Early Warning and Response
Network UMA - Union au Maghreb Arabe
ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African UN - United Nations

States
UNODC - United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
ECPF - ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework
UNOWA - United Nations Office for West Africa
EDF - European Developmental Fund
UPM - Union pour la Méditerranée
ENP - European Neighbourhood Policy
USAID - United States Agency for International
EU - European Union Development
FIS - Front Islamique du Salut Islamic WANSED - West African Network for Security and
Democratic Governance
GIA - Groupe Islamique Armé
4
Executive Summary
complex conflict situation in northern Mali and the region
of the central Sahara, and to formulate appropriate
The conflicts in northern Mali and the region of the responses, all the different conflict lines, actors and issues
central Sahara are increasingly complex. The region has have to be taken into account because they are
traditionally been a pathway for many illegal commercial interlinked. The conflict is not simply the consequence of a
activities such as drug, arms or human trafficking from security situation that is deteriorating because of AQMI.
West and North Africa to Europe. Due to the vast area The support of western nations has so far focused rather
and its inhospitality, none of the neighbouring states of on strengthening the security forces' capacities of the
the central Sahara is able to control its entire territory. This countries of the central Sahara. This, however, falls short
development has created an area without effective of solving the complex conflict situation. Only an inclusive
regulation and policing and has thus made the central approach which takes the complex nature of the conflict
Sahara attractive for terrorists. Al Qaida au Maghreb system into account, and which is supported by regional
Islamique (AQMI) has gained a foothold not only in North and international mechanisms, will lead to a truly peaceful
Africa but also in West Africa over the past years. A situation in northern Mali and the central Sahara.
formerly Algerian problem has become the problem of an
entire region. AQMI destabilizes the region, from a
security point of view as well as from a political one.
These developments hit Mali the hardest because of its
particular weaknesses.
For example, Mali is still in the process of resolving the old
Tuareg conflict. The installation of special Tuareg units
within the Malian army is a positive sign that the 2006
peace agreement is being implemented.
Moreover, the Malian state has yet another front to
tackle: Its destabilization due to corruption and
organized crime on many levels of its state and security
apparatuses, both often directly linked to the trafficking
of drugs and small arms in the region. In fact, the
boundaries between organized crime and terrorism
become increasingly blurred and threaten the stability of
the Malian state.
While some experts assume that the Malian government
lacks the true political will to take action and thus
continues with its unofficial policy of staying still, there
have been signs of a possible policy shift due to mounting
pressure by the US and France. At the same time, the new
strategy of fostering political and economic development
of the northern regions is a positive step as AQMI cannot
be solely fought militarily. This government program also
supports putting the peace agreement into practice.
The emergence of AQMI has diverted international
attention: The focus is now almost exclusively on the
terrorist movement. However, in order to understand the
5
Introduction and the smaller eastern and southern part controlled by

the Polisario. The rebels demand independence while
The Sahara encompasses more than nine million square Morocco claims the Western Sahara as part of its national
kilometres and is the world's largest hot desert. It covers territory. Clashes between the Moroccan army and the
large parts of Algeria, Chad, Egypt, Libya, Mali, Polisario demonstrate the ongoing violent nature of this
Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Sudan and Tunisia. In this conflict, which started in the mid-seventies. As Morocco
paper, the focus is put on the area of the central Sahara considers Algeria part of the problem, it often refuses to
and the states most involved and concerned with the participate in high-ranking regional meetings if Algeria is
conflicts. These are Mali, Algeria, Libya, Mauretania, present (and vice versa). This undermines the much
Niger and to a lesser extent also Morocco. Ever since the needed regional cooperation in the fight against today's
independence of its adjacent states, the region of the menaces.
central Sahara has witnessed turmoil and often times
violent conflicts. While in the debate the conflict is often The even older conflict with
referred to as “Sahel conflict”, this paper deliberately continuous impact: The Tuareg and
uses the term “central Sahara” because it is the more the peace agreement
precise geographic and political description as the band
The historic Tuareg conflict has not yet been completely
of the Sahel does not include the Maghreb. For an
settled and thus plays into today's complex conflicts in
encompassing analysis, the countries of the Maghreb
northern Mali and the region of the central Sahara.
have to be taken in account. Furthermore, it is important
After Malian independence in 1960, the state had little
to analyze the situation not solely as one conflict but to
presence in the North and did not develop the region. This
understand it is a complex picture of overlapping and self-
lack of attention contributed to a feeling of neglect by the
aggravating conflicts. These conflicts are not new but are
northern population including the Tuareg. Furthermore,
deeply rooted in older conflicts. Therefore, the histories of
the non-acceptance of the nomadic way of life by the
these conflicts have to be included into the analysis.
newly created socialist state, which caused the loss of
This paper draws upon an extensive review of primary and
power of traditional leaders, fuelled the conflict. The first
secondary material as well as on conversations with
rebellion in 1962 ended with a violent defeat of the
experts. Due to the sensitivity of the issue, not all of the
Tuareg. Afterwards, a military administration was created.
sources can be specified. I owe a special debt of gratitude
The Malian state was only represented in the north by
to my colleagues at FES for their critical feedback. Most
military personnel with clear orders to prevent any
importantly, I would like to thank my colleagues at FES
outbreak of violence.
Mali for countless fruitful discussions.
In the early 1990s, the pressure on the dictatorial Malian
regime mounted and gave way to a democratization
I. Current problems and their process in 1991. In this context Mali witnessed the
historic roots outbreak of the second Tuareg rebellion. The government
An old conflict with new impact: was accused of having done too little for the northern
The unresolved question of the regions. After negotiations mediated by Algeria, the first
Western Sahara peace agreement - Accord de Tamanrasset - was signed in
The conflict over the Western Sahara between Morocco, 1991. The agreement called for an immediate cease-fire,
which annexed the territory, and Algeria, which supports the abolishment of certain military posts as well as the
the Polisario rebel group, a military and political creation of a commission to end the hostilities. The state
organization, has been a severe problem for regional committed itself to decentralization and to the
cooperation. The territory of the Western Sahara is development of the north. The transitory government
divided in a larger part in the west controlled by Morocco which followed the dictatorial regime in 1991 continued
6
the negotiations which led to the Pact National in 1992, simply be a tactical manoeuvre to gain more recognition.
the second peace agreement. This agreement officially There has also been progress with regard to economic
ended the rebellion. It included the integration of Tuareg development – especially regarding the support of the
rebels into the Malian army and public service as well as youth in the north. However, many things still remain to be
projects for those who did not wish to join the army. done. Most importantly, the questions of transitional
Despite this agreement, hostilities between government justice and a reconciliation process have not yet been
forces and some rebel groups continued. Only in 1996, addressed adequately.
after negotiations led to the third peace agreement,
Flamme de la paix, the rebellion was fully ended. The arms The fight for dominance between
of the rebels were destroyed in the “flames of peace” Algeria and Libya
during an official ceremony.
Both Algeria and Libya did not want the Tuareg conflict to
However, in 2006 the conflict flared up again. It began spread to their own Tuareg populations which are much
with the desertions of many former Tuareg leaders from better integrated as it is the case in Mali and Niger.
the Malian army as well as the occupation of military Therefore, Algeria and Libya have both acted as mediators
posts. Again, with help from Algeria, a peace agreement - in the Tuareg conflict, using this role also to underline their
the Accord d'Algers - was reached soon after. However, ambitions as regional powers and thus competing against
this agreement was highly contested by some who each other for influence in the region.
claimed it was only a remake of the Pact National in 1992 Libya has been involved in Malian politics for a long time.
which had not fulfilled expectations and did not last. The Gaddafi has in the past called for a Tuareg state which he
Accord d'Algers call for an economic, social and cultural envisaged to stretch from Mauretania to Iraq thus trying to
development of the northern region of Kidal as well as for exercise control over the region. Libya remains very
the integration of the Tuareg rebels into the Malian army, engaged in today's Malian politics, economy and religious
just as the Pact National had called for. Furthermore, the life and is an important partner in the areas of technical
Pact National as well as the Accord d'Algers included the and financial cooperation. In order to promote its military
withdrawal of Malian military from the north. cooperation Libya has opened a special office for this in
Today, the Accord d'Algers are being put into practice the Malian capital of Bamako in early 2011. After the
although the process has been time consuming. The issue military intervention in Libya, many Malians – ordinary
of integrating former rebels into the army is still of high citizens as well as political and cultural leaders – have
importance. At the end of December 2010, almost the openly expressed their support for Gaddafi. The Malian
entire command structure of the Malian army in the north government remains silent on this issue yet has officially
was replaced in order to expand and to strengthen the denied any involvement in the recruitment of mercenaries
capacities of the army. A high-ranking army officer and to fight in Libya. As there are strong indications that AQMI
former Tuareg leader during the rebellion was named was able to gain access to weapon arsenals in Libya in late
head of the special Tuareg units. This marks an important March, Algeria has put its troops at the Algerian-Libyan
step in putting the peace agreement into practice. Also, border on alert.
the return of the well-known former Tuareg leader
Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, who had spent the previous two From fundamentalist Islamic
years in exile in Libya, could be a positive signal in this movements in Algeria to AQMI
regard. One has to see, however, whether he will change
In Algeria, the Front Islamique du Salut Islamic (FIS) was
his negative position towards the peace process. Tensions
banned in 1992 after the first round of legislative elections
are rising due to verbal threats by some Tuareg factions of
because it posed a threat to the ruling regime. The ban
a new rebellion. However, as there will be presidential as
marked the beginning of the Algerian civil war. FIS formed
well as parliamentary elections in Mali in 2012 this might
7
itself into several armed groups, principally the Groupe

Islamique Armé (GIA). This group became one of the
various fundamentalist Islamic movements committed to
the pursuit and restoration of their version of Islam in
North Africa. Its objective was to overthrow the secular
national government and establish an Islamic state. A
splinter group of the GIA, the Groupe Salafiste pour la
Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), emerged in the late
1990s. In early 2007, the group became today's AQMI.
With its drugs and arm trafficking as well as its hostage
enterprise, AQMI has contributed to the
internationalization of the conflict. Thus, international
attention has almost exclusively focused on the terrorist
movement.
8
II. A new dimension – Al Qaida Belmokhtar controls an estimated 150 to 200 fighters. A
International comes into the fight over the control of the resources deriving from the
picture illegal trafficking of goods as well as the hostage business
The media has often been using the labels “Salafists” has become an issue of conflict between Droudkel and his
(originating from the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication unit leaders who are competing for power and prestige.
et le Combat - GSPC) and “AQMI” as synonyms, thereby For a long time it was not clear whether and how strongly
suggesting that AQMI is principally an Algerian problem. AQMI is connected to the mother network Al Qaida. Many
While it is historically true that AQMI’s predecessors have observers have pointed out that AQMI is primarily a
their roots in Algeria, AQMI itself does not have an criminal organization using the label Al Qaida for their
agenda which is primarily or exclusively concerned with operations which guarantees (international) attention.
Algeria: It has expanded into the vast area of the central However, a video message from Osama Bin Laden
Sahara. endorsing the kidnapping of five French, one Togolese and
AQMI had been considered rather weak and isolated, but one Malagasy in Niger in the fall of 2010, as well as
it has successfully integrated into local communities and AQMI's demand that France would have to negotiate
established cooperation with government and security directly with Bin Laden, show that the organization is
officials as well as with regional drug traffickers and other trying to demonstrate a unified appearance (Farrall 2011:
criminal organizations (Goïta: 2). Thus, it is aiming for the 135) and that there are in fact ties to the international
destabilization of the entire region in order to foster its operations of Al Qaida. The repeated demand of AQMI as
economic and political interests by “producing” well as of Bin Laden in several video messages for a
insecurity. withdrawal of the French troops in Afghanistan creates a
There are several known leaders who seem to be heading new linkage with the international Al Qaida network and
different wings struggling for dominance. It is thus their political demands and adds a new, very dangerous
unclear whether AQMI actions and messages are always dimension. The death of Bin Laden will, however, not end
endorsed by all members as it is not a homogenous AQMI's operations as the group is operating
group. One has to take into account that AQMI is not a independently. It might even contribute to a radicalization
hierarchically organized terrorist organization in the and recruitment of new members.
traditional sense. Its branches are not completely As France officially refuses to pay ransom and cannot give
controlled by headquarters and the command structure is in to these political demands, it has turned to trying to free
not always clear (Farrall 2011: 133). French hostages by military force. So far, this has always
For the past years, the leader of AQMI has been Amir resulted in the death of the hostages, and it will most likely
Abdelmalek Droudkel (also known as Abou Moussab also contribute to a further escalation of the conflict as it
Abdel Wadoud). He is originally from southern Algeria could strengthen the radical elements of AQMI and boost
and is responsible for the emergence of AQMI in early further recruitment.
1
2007 (Tawil 2010: 14) . Droudkel appoints leaders for In late February 2011, three of the hostages taken in Niger
different regional units. The leader of the unit for the west in the fall 2010, were released most likely due to the
is Amir Moktar Belmokhtar, also from southern Algeria payment of ransom by their employer, the French
and known as “Mister Malboro” due to his role in the company Areva. The freed hostages included the Togolese
illegal trafficking of cigarettes. He was associated with the and the Malagasy as well as the only woman in the group
abduction and killing of two Frenchmen in Niger. He was who suffers from a serious illness. The four other French
a member of the GIA as well as of the GSPC in Algeria. hostages remain in captivity. Apparently, AQMI is
demanding 90 million Euro ransom as well as the
1. Until 2005, according to a report by the International Crisis
Group, the Sahel was “not a hotbed of terrorist activity.” Only withdrawal of the French troops of Afghanistan. Thus,
after 2005 one can describe the events such as hostage taking AQMI is using an attack against western interests for
as directly related to AQMI.
9
political reasons as well as to pursue a local agenda by has not been involved in the conflict with AQMI but might
demanding ransom to finance their operations. This is, in the future provide a space for retreat.
however, not to be mistaken as a sign that AQMI is The situation in Libya is rather unique after the beginning
abandoning the global agenda in favour of local goals of the fighting and the military intervention to enforce a
(Farrall 2011: 135). The kidnapping of an Italian tourist in no-fly-zone. As early as February 2011, AQMI expressed
southern Algeria in early February which is linked to AQMI its support for the rebels and their “legitimate demands.”
underlines that the industry of kidnappings continues to Shortly afterwards, Al Qaida called for the support of the
flourish in the region. rebellion in Libya. This comes as no surprise as Al Qaida is
on bad terms with Gaddafi because he had ordered an
AQMI's spread throughout the assassination attempt of Bin Laden. Gaddafi’s claim that
region the rebels were fighting for Al Qaida thus do not have to
AQMI is not only spreading from its country of origin, be necessarily propaganda but can be seen as a legitimate
Algeria, to the central Sahara and most notably to Mali concern. However, the rebels have clearly distanced
and Niger – but also gaining a stronghold in other themselves from Al Qaida.
countries of the Maghreb. It has been estimated that AQMI has financial resources of
In early January 2011, 27 terrorists were arrested by about 100 Mio. US Dollars based on its proceeds from
Moroccan authorities including a Moroccan member of drug trafficking, the kidnapping business and other
AQMI. While Moroccan police had previously arrested operations. Observers point out that while AQMI is still in
radical Islamist militants planning terrorist attacks, this the “money collecting phase”, it could soon begin using
was the first time the Moroccan authorities found an these revenues for other terrorist attacks. Furthermore,
arsenal of weapons on their territory. It has been assumed there are strong indications that AQMI has gained access
that the terrorists were preparing attacks against the to weapon arsenals in Libya2. These weapons are assumed
security forces of Morocco as well as targeting foreigners to have been transported into the region of the central
in Morocco. Interestingly, the weapons were found very Sahara – including Mali. Both the continued flow of
close to the defence wall separating Morocco from the income and the access to new weapons are likely to lead
Polisario rebels. Earlier, there had already been reports of to a strengthening of AQMI and a major shift of the
collaborations between the Polisario and AQMI with security situation in the central Sahara. A first indicator is
regards to the trafficking of goods and the taking of the updated French travel advice in April 2011, which does
hostages. not any longer restrict its warning to certain parts of Mali
Mauretania has also had its share of AQMI terrorists who but expands it to the entire Malian territory.3
assaulted and kidnapped western foreigners as well as AQMI's exclamation of support for the recent uprisings in
attacked the military. Mauretania has become very North Africa and the Middle East is not to be mistaken as
engaged in the fight against AQMI. For instance, it has evidence that AQMI is an “Algerian” or “North African”
refused negotiations with kidnappers and does not phenomenon but rather as an attempt to establish its
release any captured terrorist for possible exchanges. It stronghold in the entire region of North and West Africa
has entered into an agreement with Mali about joint by searching popular support in political vacuums. So far
counter-terrorist patrols. It is most likely due to this tough
stand on terrorism that AQMI tried to assassinate the 2. It is unlikely that the rebels have handed out the weapons to
Mauritanian president Ould Abdelaziz in early February in AQMI. Most likely, due to the chaotic situation, many different
people and groups have gained access, including those not
the capital Nouakchott accusing him of his close relations close to the rebels.
with France. The attempt failed, yet it shows how tensions 3. The travel advise also includes Niger without exceptions.
are rising and the situation is beginning to escalate. Other foreign nations, such as Germany, have expanded their
warning to other parts of Mali, yet have not included the entire
Notably, two of the suspects fled to Senegal which so far Malian territory.
10
the events have, however, not at all promoted Al Qaida's was seen in 2009 when the family law Code de la famille
standing in the region, although AQMI is trying to jump was to be reformed in order to give more rights to women.
on the bandwagon, exclaiming its support for the Within a very short time, religious leaders organized mass
protesters. Currently, Al Qaida politically irrelevant. If, protests, some of them violent. Many of the
however, the soon-to be-democracies in North Africa and demonstrators were not even aware of the details of the
the Middle East will not deliver –– especially with regard reform but perceived it as western intervention against
to economic demands and expectations –– and thus not Muslim tradition and were willing to protest against that.
fulfil the high expectations, Al Qaida could be considered This shows that if AQMI succeeds in positioning itself as
a political alternative in the future by significant parts of representing traditional Islam under attack by western
the populations. powers, the attitude against AQMI might change. The
presence of western forces could trigger this perception.
Mali pays the price for the Together with high rates of unemployment among the
unresolved question of AQMI youth and a lack of an economic perspective, this could
Mali is one of the poorest countries in the world which has become a serious political problem for Mali.
always been militarily weak and which has been in the
past politically weakened by the aforementioned
rebellions. Thus, AQMI has very strategically chosen
northern Mali as a safe haven as opposed to Algeria or
Mauretania. AQMI is deliberately taking advantage of
Mali's fragile infrastructure. The attempt to develop the
tourism industry in the Sahara has come to an abrupt halt
with the appearance of AQMI. The presence and activities
of AQMI thus ended one of the very few possibilities for
economic development in the underdeveloped and
neglected northern regions of Mali. This is now
substituted by providing logistical support to AQMI.
Furthermore, any (economic) development is undermined
by AQMI’s presence because it hinders international
cooperation. This development is, however, much
needed to end the logistical support for AQMI by the local
population who lack alternative sources of income.
So far no support for AQMI in

Mali
Although there is some logistical support for AQMI by
local communities, the Malian population shows little
signs of sympathy or ideological support for AQMI. Until
now, the Malian society can be characterized as a multi-
ethnic as well as multi-religious society which has
managed to avoid conflicts of this nature in contrast to
many other countries. Though Islam in Mali is very
tolerant, there is the possibility to mobilize the masses, as
11
III. Growing engagement of intervene militarily in the north. Both the US and France
international actors: are training Malian combat units and are thereby
The quest for natural resources? preparing for a military encounter.
This state of affairs begs the questions why international
The central Sahara is witnessing a growing international
actors take such a high interest in the security situation of
presence. France has stationed special forces in Mopti,
the region. Of course, with the worldwide linkage of
Mali, as well as in Niger and Burkina Faso, after the
drugs, arms and human trafficking, the events in the
kidnapping in northern Niger in September 2010. It has
central Sahara are affecting Europe and the US. However,
collaborated with the Mauritanian army, e.g. in the case
there is another possible reason for the engagement: The
of the failed attempt to free a French hostage in July
2010. After this failure, France declared “war” on AQMI search for natural resources such as gas, oil, uranium etc4.
and announced it would intensify military support for the The US, France, China and other Asian countries, as well
governments in the region. as Algeria, are now trying to gain control over the natural
resources in the region without making much noise about
In 2007, AFRICOM (United States Africa Command), the
it. Africa is becoming an important source of oil and
first US combat command dedicated solely to Africa was
natural gas for Europe, which has become concerned
established with the aim of promoting US national
about its over dependence on Russia, as well as for the US,
security objectives in the region. It remains subject to
which is increasingly relying on oil imports from Africa
controversy as some observers have criticized it as a
(Goldwyn, David L. 2009: 67). Sub-Saharan African oil
possible sign for a militarization of US policy in Africa
production now accounts for about one fifth of US oil
(Bellamy, William Mark 2009: 24). So far, no African
imports (Van de Walle 2009: 8). Experts are estimating
country is willing to host AFRICOM which for now
that Africa will become the second important supplier
remains in Stuttgart, Germany.
region after the Middle East for oil and gas. With the
AFRICOM has been closely observing the events in the
ongoing events in the Middle East, the oil supply via the
central Sahara with a particular focus on AQMI. Under
Suez Canal could be threatened.
the Operation Enduring Freedom Trans Sahara, which
A Trans-Sahara-Pipeline is currently economically
AFRICOM took responsibility for in 2008, US forces
infeasible but this might be reconsidered in the future. This
cooperated with their counterparts from Algeria, Burkina
project, however, could only be accomplished if a
Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria,
minimum of security for the personnel as well as for the
Senegal, and Tunisia to improve intelligence, command
hardware and especially the transport can be guaranteed.
and control, logistics and border control, and to carry out
Organized crime and terrorism pose a clear threat to this.
joint operations against terrorist groups. US and West
African forces have jointly conducted exercises such as
IV. New approaches by the Malian
Exercise Flintlock in spring 2010 to improve the security Government
partnerships initiated under the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI)
in 2002 and the Trans-Sahara-Counter-Terrorism For a long time the Malian government has faced open
Program (TSCTP) in 2005. These military efforts are accusations by regional as well as international actors that
designed to support complementary development it is not determined enough in its fight against AQMI. This
activities led by the US State Department and USAID was no coincidence, as the Malian president Amadou
(United States Agency for International Development) Toumani Touré (called ATT) was reluctant to act because of
(Ploch 2010: 24).
4. The official search for oil in Mali began as early as 1963 and
The US has been present in Mali since 2001, with a remains ongoing until today. Currently, two-thirds of an area
which represents 65% of the Malian territory is still available
training centre for the Malian army in the northern region for exploitation mostly in the region of Timbuktu. First
of Gao. The Malian army receives equipment by the US contracts exist and call for the beginning of exploitation in
2011. It remains unclear if and when this endeavor will be put
and France. Lately, the US has also put pressure on Mali to into practice.
12
limited resources5 and, more importantly, because of the Allegedly, AQMI has “sleepers” in Bamako. While an
fear of a further destabilization of the country if military attack in early January 2011 on the French embassy in
actions of western nations were allowed, or more so if he Bamako turned out to be the deed of an amateur not
began a Malian military offensive against AQMI with commissioned by AQMI, it did receive much attention as it
foreign support. In early 2010, he even allowed, for the was the first of its kind in the so far rather peaceful Malian
release of four militants from a Malian jail in order to free a capital.
French hostage. This sparked outrage in Algeria and
Mauretania and led to a temporary recall of the Unexpected Support: Tuareg vs.
ambassadors of these countries. Yet at the same time, AQMI?
Mali is indeed hit very hard economically by a sharp In 2010, high-ranking former Tuareg rebel leaders
decline of tourism revenues6, and suffers from organized indicated their willingness to the Malian government to
crime and corruption linked to AQMI and its illegal fight against AQMI and to kick the terrorists out of “their
trafficking. desert” [sic!]7. The offer, however, has not been taken up
While some experts assume that the Malian government by the Malian government. The underlying problem here
lacks the true political will to take action and thus is the lack of trust between the government and the
continues with its unofficial policy of staying still, there Tuareg, as the government would have to provide the
have been signs of a possible policy shift due to the Tuareg with arms. Interestingly, the Tuareg have
mounting pressure by the US and France. There are demanded a “green light” by the government before any
indications that the Malian army is beginning to position intervention although they must have been aware that it
itself against AQMI. Details are not known and there is no was rather unlikely to be given. The fact that the Tuareg
official confirmation. But just the mere fact that ATT gave have demanded governmental approval can be
a green light to the French in early January 2011 to pursue interpreted as a signal to the government, as well as the
the kidnappers of two young Frenchmen from Niger into Malian society, that the Tuareg want to integrate and not
Malian territory is a clear and official sign of a act on their own, so that they are no longer considered
repositioning of the Malian government. Furthermore, criminals as they have been during and after the
the updated French travel advice puts more pressure on rebellions. Of course, it could also be a sign that they are
the Malian government to take action. First steps have preparing to claim ownership of the oil in the desert. With
been taken by intensifying the regional cooperation. the return of former Tuareg rebel leader Ag Bahanga to
Algeria has pledged 10 Million US Dollars to the Malian Mali speculation is rising whether he is going to play a
government to develop its northern regions. By doing so, significant role in the fight against AQMI.
the proliferation of arms as well as the infiltration of AQMI
in the region is to be stopped. Needed: Political and Economic
Observers point out that a massive military engagement Development
would lead to a deterioration of the security situation and
The question of peace in the north is not solely a question
could be followed by terrorist attacks in Bamako.
of security and of defeating or at least containing AQMI
but also of greater political importance with regards to
5. The Malian army consists of 8,000 soldiers and lacks resources putting the peace agreement into practice and to finally
and equipment. end the Tuareg conflict. Therefore, the Malian president
6. In 2009, the number of European tourists to Timbuktu
estimated at about 10,000 annually was halved due to the has launched a new program to foster the political and
threats by AQMI. As the travel warnings by foreign
governments are increasingly becoming more urgent, the
number of tourists continues to decrease. However, some 7. The peace process calls for the integration of former Tuareg
observers are voicing doubts about the travel warnings and rebels into the Malian army. However, not all former fighters
point out that western governments are using these to can - or want to be – integrated into the special units formed
exercise pressure upon the Malian government to act. for this purpose.
13
distribution of funds among the different Tuareg groups in

economic process in northern Mali. The Programme
the north. The Tuareg society is a class-based society and
spécial pour la paix, la sécurité et le développement dans le
the highest class is being accused by the other classes of
nord du Mali (PSPSDN) consists of five components:
being favoured by the Malian government. Thus, what is
Security, Governance, Development, Communication
also needed is the intent among the different social classes
and Management. ATT has pledged 32 billion FCFA
to cooperate with each other. The danger lies in the
(about five million Euros) for his remaining presidency, i.e.
possibility of legitimizing and strengthening traditional
until mid-2012. The program is supported by the
mechanisms of exclusion.
European Union's stability instrument as well as
Moreover, the Malian state has yet another front to tackle:
bilaterally by EU member countries.
Its destabilization due to organized crime and corruption
Poverty, unemployment especially among the young in
on many levels of the Malian state and security apparatus,
the north, economic underdevelopment and the feeling
often directly linked to the trafficking of drugs and small
of exclusion from decision-making provide a hotbed for
arms in the central Sahara (Lacher 2011: 2). Mali has
fundamentalist ideas.
ratified the 2009 ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and
The development program is much needed as the lack of
Light Weapons and installed a national commission to
presence of the state in the northern regions has created
fight against the proliferation of small arms. However, the
an environment of criminality and a culture of impunity
commission lacks funding and Mali still has to harmonize
(not necessarily to be confused with AQMI activities
national law with the convention (Sperling 2010:8).
although there might be some overlap between
Furthermore, Mali has created a new office to fight against
“regular” criminality and activities associated with
drug trafficking.
AQMI). The intentions of two peace agreements with the
Tuareg, the Pact National and the Accord d'Algers (which
included the withdrawal of the Malian army) have turned
into the opposite: Instead of improving the security
situation for the residents of the northern regions, the
absence of the Malian army has now led to a very
insecure environment. Residents have been increasingly
complaining and protesting about assaults and the lack
of security. The Malian government therefore must
strengthen its visible and effective presence in the north
and fight against lawlessness.8 Furthermore, the Accord
d'Algers call for economic development – something the
new program is intended to do. Finally, by creating a
political and economic perspective in the north, the
government hopes to reduce the logistical support for
AQMI by offering alternatives and to help prevent the
creation of a hotbed for future terrorists.
ATT has recognized the importance to integrate the
different Tuareg factions into the program in order to
gain their support for the implementation. One challenge
to the initiative, however, is the question of equal
8. Outside the larger cities there are no police forces, no courts

and no prisons.
14
V. Regional cooperation: and might support it in order to keep the region

A shared intention? destabilized. A region destabilized by terrorism puts
Algeria in the comfortable position to receive US support
Certainly, Mali has to do its part but a regional challenge
for the fight against terror. In January 2011, US president
does require regional and international cooperation. First
Obama renewed the partnership with Algeria by sending
steps have been taken by the stakeholders: In April 2010,
the Algerian president Bouteflika a letter stating his
Algeria, Mali, Mauretania and Niger agreed to cooperate
support for the Algerian fight against terror in the Sahara
to fight terrorism and in September 2010 created a
and calling for intensifying the bilateral cooperation. At
shared anti-terror command in Tamanrasset in the south
this time, the revolution in Tunisia was already under way.
of Algeria for its coordination. In May 2011, the four
An instable region and the threat of international
states decided to create a common intervention force in
terrorism spreading in North and West Africa give Algeria
the next year and a half comprising of at least 25.000
the opportunity to remain an alley of the US. This creates
soldiers. Morocco and Libya, however, are not part of this
the paradox situation in which Algeria on the one hand is
cooperation which certainly is an obstacle to regional
required to be tough on terrorism to convince the US of its
cooperation against terrorism9 .
willingness and capability and on the other hand needs
Furthermore, in September 2010, Mali and Niger agreed
the instability in order to remain relevant to the US and
on a military cooperation to reinforce the collaboration of
thereby receiving political and military support required for
their armies and to secure their shared border. In May
the regime to stay in power. Though it needs the American
2011, the four States decided to create a joint
support, Algeria has made it clear that it does not wish for
intervention force during the next year and a half. After
any western presence in the region. Furthermore, Algeria
the kidnapping and killing of two French citizens in
is aiming to become a regional hegemon by exercising
January 2011, Niger is trying to limit the damages
control over the exploitation of oil for instance in northern
especially regarding its relations with France which has
Mali10. The exploitation of the oil reserves in northern Mali
been accusing Niger of being involved with AQMI.
is, however, highly dependent on a secure environment.
However, as Niger is a structurally weak and poor country
Also, a volatile situation in southern Algeria allows for a
lacking so far a strategy on security and terrorism, these
strengthening of the military forces in that region. This is
security threats present a big challenge for the newly
necessary to consolidate the security system and is even
elected President Issoufou. He has, however, announced
more necessary during the times of popular uprisings
to use military means solution as well as economic
throughout the region. In sum, Algeria's role is far from
development to counter terrorism in his country.
clear and it appears that it plays a double game. As Algeria
Despite this attempt to reinforce regional cooperation it
is widely considered to be a key actor this is a severe
remains unclear whether all concerned states share the
obstacle to peace and security in the region.
same intentions.
The role of Libya is equally unclear as it is also aiming for
Algeria for instance, criticizes the Malian response to
influence in the region. Libya has acted as mediator in the
AQMI as too lax and indecisive and tries to establish itself
Tuareg conflict but also hosted the most important Tuareg
as a regional power by refusing any international
rebel leader, Ag Bahanga, who returned to Mali in early
interference. At the same time, however, Algeria has
2011. With the crisis in Libya and the military intervention,
declined to take part in regional meetings on the issue
there is a regional cooperation of a different kind
due to the Moroccan presence. Rumour has it that the
happening: While Malian and African refugees from Libya
Algerian intelligence service has connections to AQMI
are arriving in Mali, at the same time, a new form of
9. Libya at first agreed to take part and later withdrew for 10. As the oil fields of southern Algeria and northern Mali might
unknown reasons. Morocco, the long-term rival of Algeria, was be connected underground, Algeria fears that the
apparently left out deliberately. exploitation in Mali could threaten its own reserves.
15
mercenaries is emerging: Young Tuareg, from Mali and as an external, multilateral actor which is running
Niger are following the call of Gaddafi to defend him. The programs on ground which via the representation of the
most important reasons for the men to join the Libyan commission as well as the United Nations (UN) will be
army – with an average age of 18 – are unemployment, analyzed.
misery, political frustration and the feeling of owing
something to Gaddafi. An agreement dating back to The approach of ECOWAS
1980 obligates Gaddafi to protect the Tuareg refugees Beyond the engagement of the directly concerned states,
from Niger and Mali in Libya while in return the Tuareg are observers have asked why the Economic Community of
to guarantee the security in southern Libya. Gaddafi is West African States (ECOWAS), which has developed
now using this obligation to defend his regime. In doing elaborate mechanisms and instruments to prevent violent
so, he can not only count on the new arrivals of fighters conflicts, to address security threats, and to maintain
but also on those who have stayed in Libya in the 1970s peace in the sub-region, has not yet stepped up. Article
and 80s after they fled due to droughts, famine and the 3(d) of the 1999 ECOWAS protocol for Conflict
lack of support of their governments. Many were Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and
integrated into the Libyan army and are now fighting on Security expressly proclaimed the organization's
Gaddafi's side. Their number is estimated in the tens of commitment to “strengthen cooperation in the areas of
thousands. However, there are no reliable figures of how conflict prevention, early-warning, peace-keeping
many of the former Tuareg rebels remain loyal to Gaddafi operations, the control of cross-border crime,
and how many have joined the rebels or deserted. If these international terrorism and proliferation of small arms and
men were to return to Mali and Niger – for instance after anti-personnel mines.” The Mechanism for Conflict
an overthrow of Gaddafi – this could quickly lead to a Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping
threat to national security if their integration failed. and Security enables ECOWAS to intervene in conflicts in
Apparently, the first Tuareg fighters are already returning its member countries. An Early Warning mechanism
to Mali. It is, however, difficult to predict whether this (ECOWARN) was created which comprises an observation
would lead to a new Tuareg rebellion or rather to a rise of and monitoring centre (OMC) where data based on early
petty crime due to the lack of economic alternatives. At warning indicators are collected. The Mediation and
the same time, however, there is not at all a united Tuareg Security Council as a key decision-making organ, regular
front regarding the question of supporting Gaddafi. Their meetings of Chief of Defence Staffs, the ECOWAS
reactions are manifold. Interestingly, the positions voiced Standby Force and the Council of the Wise have been
via Internet against the regime of Gaddafi are prevailing. established and constitute important elements of the
All in all, this creates a rather paradox situation of regional regional security architecture.
entanglements. In its 2008 Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF),
ECOWAS furthermore developed the basis for a
VI. A problem with a bigger scope:
comprehensive action plan in the field of peace and
Approaches by multilateral actors
security. The overall aim of the ECPF is to strengthen the
In the following, different regional and multilateral human security architecture in West Africa. For instance,
organizations which are, or could be, playing a role in this cross-border initiatives are envisioned in order to reduce
conflict will be examined. First, ECOWAS as the regional cross-border crime. Moreover, the ECPF implicitly refers to
organization which also has experience in the area of
11
conflict resolution will be analyzed . As ECOWAS is,
however, reluctant to take concrete action, the question
of the role of the African Union (AU) will be addressed. 11. As the Union au Maghreb Arabe (UMA), which was founded in
1989, is still in the making and does not have any security or
Furthermore, the approaches of the European Union (EU) peace related instruments, its role will not be further discussed.
16
12
the principle of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) by question of national sovereignty, certain conditions have
addressing the necessity for: to be met. ECOWAS could intervene militarily in the case
Ÿ The Responsibility to prevent – actions taken of a conflict between its member states, in the case of an
to address the direct and root causes of intra and internal conflict which could lead to a humanitarian
inter-state conflicts that put populations at risk. disaster or constitutes a serious threat to peace and
Ÿ The Responsibility to react – actions taken in security in the region and in the case of mass violence and
response to grave and compelling humanitarian mass human rights violations, among others (Konadje no
disasters. date: 12). In the case of the conflict in the central Sahara
Ÿ The Responsibility to rebuild – actions taken to these criteria are clearly not met. Also, ECOWAS could
ensure recovery, reconstruction, rehabilitation and only intervene militarily if the concerned states agree. At
reconciliation in the aftermath of violent conflicts, this point it seems rather unlikely that Mali and Niger
humanitarian or natural disasters. would agree because this would equal an official
surrender of their policies.
The fact that the ECPF does not explicitly refer to the R2P
principle indicates an intentional openness to apply the One would furthermore have to factor in the reaction of
ideas behind the principle in a broader context. As the Algeria or Libya to a military intervention in a conflict they
four categories of mass crimes R2P refers to are of high are involved in by an organization they are not part of on
importance with regard to the “Responsibility to react” grounds that they would most likely refuse. As Algeria
which contains the option of a military intervention, an seems to be playing a double game it seems highly unlikely
often highly contested approach, a broader approach for that it would agree to a military intervention. The role of
the two other categories is to be appreciated. Especially Libya is now fully unpredictable due to the uprising and
the “Responsibility to prevent” which contains military intervention.
approaches and mechanisms such as Preventive ECOWAS is, however, closely monitoring the conflict. At a
Diplomacy and Early Warning – Early Action must not be meeting of the Chiefs of the Defence Staff of ECOWAS in
restricted to grave human rights crimes only. However, Bamako in early 2011, the question of AQMI was
there remains a gap between the written intent of the discussed. It was decided to develop an action plan in
ECPF and ECOWAS policy on the ground. order to strengthen border control and the sharing of
Several aspects hinder the engagement of ECOWAS in information by the intelligence services of the respective
the conflicts in the central Sahara. First of all, not all countries. This development is, however, overshadowed
concerned states - especially the important actors Algeria by the crisis in Ivory Coast which is receiving more
and Libya - are members of ECOWAS. Any kind of attention. Furthermore, the West African Network for
engagement is thus more difficult. Also, ECOWAS has Security and Democratic Governance (WANSED), a
limited resources and capacities, and other conflicts and regional network bringing together institutions and
crises have demanded its attention in the past (e. g. Sierra experts working on security policy and advising the
Leone, Liberia) and present (Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, ECOWAS commission, has decided to put the question of
Niger, Ivory Coast). the conflict on its agenda as a priority in order to enhance
the dialogue among the actors working on the conflict.
It is also very unlikely that ECOWAS would consider a
military intervention. As this concerns the highly sensitive
The approach of the African Union
When a regional organization does not become active in a
12. The principle of the “Responsibility to Protect“ redefines the
concept of sovereignty: If a state is not willing or capable to conflict, the next higher institution – in this case the
protect its citizens in the case of genocide, war crimes, ethnic
African Union (AU) – is considered to be responsible.
cleansing or crimes against humanity, the international
community becomes responsible. In the case of the conflicts in However, again not all of the concerned states are
the central Sahara the categories defined by the
“Responsibility to Protect” doctrine are not met.
17
members13. Due to disputes over the Western Sahara with contributions to the AU and invests into many projects in
other AU members, Morocco has not joined. AU member states – is critically discussed as the African
Union does not seem to be able to use its influence to
The Peace and Security Council of the African Union,
mediate the conflict. It remains unclear if and how Gaddafi
which has been set up for the prevention, management
might have used his dominant role in the past to exercise
and resolution of conflict, oversees peace support
influence upon the AU's policy on the central Sahara.
operations and can institute sanctions as well as facilitate
humanitarian action. Even more, the African Union has a
The approach of the European Union
standby brigade available. The commitment of African
countries to counter-terrorism resulted in the adoption of The European Union is capable of a comprehensive
the Convention on the Prevention and Combatting of approach for crisis prevention, conflict management und
Terrorism at the Summit of the OAU (Organization of the peace building. It is financially well prepared and has also
African Unity), the predecessor of the AU, in 1999. This developed the necessary instruments. Based on the
commitment was further reiterated in the Dakar Cotonou Agreement, the EU is using an array of
Declaration against terrorism in 2001. African leaders instruments supporting the African Peace and Security
identified terrorism as an impediment to peace and Architecture (APSA) on its various levels. Specifically, the
development of the continent and consequently resolved instrument of the African Peace Facility aims to strengthen
to collaborate effectively to combat the phenomenon. African capacities for crisis prevention, conflict
The African Union also has created an Early Warning transformation and the consolidation of peace. In 2010,
System for the observation and monitoring of conflicts. new security threats such as organized crime, piracy and
In 2004, the African Center for Studies and Research on the trafficking of drugs, humans and weapons were
Terrorism (ACSRT) was established in accordance with the added to the agreement. As agreed upon in the Cotonou
provisions contained in the AU action plan for the Agreement, the EU and its African partners are aiming for
prevention and fight against terrorism in Algeria. It aims at an active, comprehensive and integrated policy regarding
complementing international efforts by strengthening peace consolidation and crisis prevention. To ensure both
cooperation between African countries to prevent and sides developed the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, a wider
combat terrorism, assisting in the full implementation of political framework for cooperation and consultation. It
international conventions relating to terrorism and aims at coordinating the various policies and instruments,
playing the role of a monitoring and alerting tool by on the regional as well as on the national level. In the
incorporating in its approach the concept of preventive partnership on Peace and Security, Africa and the EU
management of conflict situations (African Journal for the discuss and define specific measures to jointly address
Prevention and Combating of Terrorism 2010). problems in this field.
In December 2010, the African Union announced the However, in the case of the conflicts in the central Sahara,
adoption of a law condemning terrorism and prohibiting the EU has been searching for an adequate response to the
the payment of ransom to terrorist groups. This new law mounting threats and is only slowly formulating a
allows for the persecution and extradition of terrorists development and security policy approach (Renard 2010:
between the member states of the African Union. One 5). This is in part due to the lack of political consensus
has to see how this law will be implemented and whether among its member states.
the African Union might consider taking further steps. In October 2010, the EU announced that it would draw up
With the crisis in Libya, the role of Gaddafi as main a strategy for the Sahel by 2011. The EU intends “to make
contributor to the African Union – Libya pays 15% of the use of various instruments at its disposal in a coherent way
to foster security, stability, development and good
13. In 2010, the AU as well as ECOWAS suspended Niger due to governance in the Sahel-Saharan strip.” In March 2011,
the coup d'état. In March 2011, both organizations readmitted
Niger after the successful presidential elections.
the High Representative presented a draft of the European
18
Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel. It allows for an important role in any conflict setting. The UN
states that its purpose is “… a framework for the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy provides a framework
coordination of the EU's current and future engagement for combating terrorism. Its pillars include measures to
in the region with the common objective of reinforcing address conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism;
security and development….” (European Strategy for measures to prevent and combat terrorism; capacity
Security and Development in the Sahel: 3). Thus, the EU building; and measures to ensure a human rights and rule
wants to build on and support existing political and of law based approach to countering the threat. Thus, the
operational initiatives for security and development in the UN strategy is encompassing rather than exclusively
Sahel (ibid: 5). focusing on security approaches (Renard 2010: 4).
Linking security and development is the overarching The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
subject of the strategy. It defines four key themes: plays an important role in dealing with counterterrorism.
1. “(…) security and development in the Sahel cannot be In December 2010, together with partner organizations, it
separated, and that helping these countries achieve launched a comprehensive program to combat drug
14
security is integral to enabling their economies to grow trafficking and organized crime in West Africa . This
and poverty to be reduced. program focuses on peace building, security sector
2. (…) achieving security and development in the Sahel is reform, and national and regional institution and capacity
only possible through closer regional cooperation. (…) building; as well as on strengthening action in the areas of
3. (…) all the states of the region will benefit from organized crime, trafficking and terrorism, justice and
considerable capacity-building, both in areas of core integrity, drug prevention and health, and awareness
government activity, including the provision of raising and research. The UN Security Council's Counter-
security and development cooperation. Terrorism Committee (CTC) also has been active through
4. (…) the EU therefore has an important role to play the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED). The
both in encouraging economic development for the focus is on the ratification of international conventions
people of the Sahel and helping them achieve a more and protocols on the prevention and suppression of
secure environment in which it can take place, and in terrorism, financial law practice, law enforcement and
which the interests of EU citizens are also protected.” border control. CTED has also involved Mali, Mauretania
(ibid.: 1) and Niger in its efforts to bring West African states
The strategy is an integrated approach containing all the together to address the lack of resources for counter-
important challenges and issues as well as responses. As it terrorist measures (ibid.: 3). Furthermore, UNOWA (United
is very comprehensive and tries not to leave out any Nations Office for West Africa) is also concerned with drug
possibly relevant issue, the interrelations between security trafficking and organized crime.
and development approaches are not always clear and

well developed. The strategy reads at times rather like an
accumulation of problems and approaches. As the
strategy rightly puts security and development in its
centre, the question of how exactly its claim of a coherent
approach encompassing both aspects and initiatives
remains unanswered.
The approach of the United Nations

Without exception, all the concerned states of the conflict
in the central Sahara are members of the United Nations.
14. UN Office on Drugs and Crime Regional Program for West
The UN has legitimacy and a convening power which Africa 2010 – 2014.
19
VII. Recommendations
Ÿ Support the socio-economic development of
northern Mali: Poverty, unemployment especially

The support of western nations has so far focussed on among the young in the north, economic
strengthening the security forces' capacities of the underdevelopment and the feeling of exclusion from
countries of the central Sahara. This, however, falls short decision-making provide a hotbed for fundamentalist
of solving the complex conflict situation which consists ideas. The key challenge for stabilizing northern Mali
not only of the terrorist threat posed by AQMI but also of are public investments and to provide for alternative
organized crime, the Tuareg conflict and questions of sources of income and thereby creating economic,
socio-economic and political development. Therefore, social as well as political perspectives. This will also
the focus has to be on creating coherent and overarching serve the implementation of the peace agreement
approaches which deescalate the conflict and establish a with the Tuareg.
peaceful and prosperous environment. The use of military Ÿ Support the strengthening of the Rule of Law in
force, especially by western nations, has to be extremely northern Mali: The Malian state needs to be further
carefully considered. Western nations – most notably supported in its political approach to the conflict.
France and the US – are regarded with suspicion due to Especially the strengthening of the state presence with
their history in the region and suspected hidden agendas. a functioning judicial system and rule of law is
Also, any military intervention causing civilian causalities imperative.
would immediately spark a strong public response. Only Ÿ Strengthen the democratic institutions in Mali
an inclusive approach which takes the complex nature of and Niger: Malian democracy has yet to be
the conflict system into account, and which is supported consolidated, thus international actors active in the
by regional and international mechanisms, will lead to a country need to continue the strengthening of
truly peaceful situation in northern Mali and the central democratic institutions, and to support the
Sahara. mechanisms for the rule of law. As Niger is facing a
fresh democratic start, its democratic institutions also
At the international, multilateral and
regional level need to be strengthened.
The following recommendations are addressing the Ÿ Revive the Union pour la Mediterranee: Currently,
United Nations, the European Union as well as its the UPM is politically dead due to the unresolved
members and finally ECOWAS on the regional level. Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Also, the conflict between
Ÿ· Intensify the fight against drugs: UNDOC has Algeria and Morocco over the Western Sahara
implemented various initiatives in 2009 and 2010 to hinders an effective cooperation. However, with the
provide technical assistance to West Africa in the areas recent developments in North Africa, the European
of drug control and the fight against organized crime, Union could try to revive the union for dialogue
most notably the development of the UNODC among its members on political reforms.
Regional Programme for West Africa for the period Ÿ Make use of the European Neighbourhood
2010-2014. The report of the International Narcotics Policy: Another potentially promising approach,
Control Board (INCB) which is monitoring the is the use of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
implementation of the United Nations drug control through which the EU offers “privileged
conventions from March 2011 draws attention to the relationships” and which contains bilateral action
increase in cocaine trafficking through Africa to plans of the EU with selected countries
Europe illustrated by large-scale seizures in West such as Morocco. Recently, the European Union has
Africa. Thus, the fight against drugs needs not only to decded to link the ENP more closely to visible reforms.
be continued but to be intensified. As the Moroccan king Mohammed VI has announced
political reforms including strengthening the role of
20
parliament and of political parties, this is an have to “deliver” not only politically but also
opportunity to engage Morocco in a regional economically. If economic and social progress does
dialogue. Furthermore, the Association Agreement not keep pace with political progress, Al Qaida and
(AA) from 1996 with Morocco can be an important other extremist groups could profit in the future from
tool in this regard. these disappointments and be considered political
Ÿ Engage Algeria in a dialogue via the Road alternatives.
Map: The current popular uprisings and democratic Ÿ Make use of the Africa-EU Partnership: Use this
revolutions in Northern Africa and the Middle East existing partnership to foster dialogue on the conflicts
should be used as an opportunity to convince the in the central Sahara by bringing together all the
Algerian regime to slowly open up. By ending the relevant actors. Common grounds and understanding
state of emergency and announcing reforms, the of the conflict situation among the concerned actors
Algerian president has signalled his willingness are the prerequisite for coherent approaches. To be
concede some of his powers. This should be successful, the EU and its African partners need to find
encouraged. It remains, however, uncertain, how political consensus on how to deal with the conflicts
far the regime is willing to go. The Association in the central Sahara.
Agreement with Algeria from 2002 lays down the Ÿ Enhance regional dialogue and cooperation in
contractual relations. The Road Map agreed with West Africa: As discussed, the complex conflict
Algeria in 2008 sets objectives in sectors of mutual system requires regional dialogue and cooperation. As
interest such as the fight against terrorism. The not of all of the concerned states are members in the
dialogue with Algeria needs to be continued and different regional organizations, it is of high
reinforced. importance to not limit the dialogue to the
Ÿ Promote a coherent European approach on membership. Dialogue and cooperation should
security and development: Ensure that the serve the aim of harmonizing national policies with
different strategies (including European Strategy for regard to counter terrorism approaches.
Security and Development in the Sahel, European Ÿ Strengthen diplomatic and civil approaches: The
Security Strategy, EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy), the existing regional security architecture should be
national cooperation strategies as well as the existing supported by strengthening diplomatic and civil
mechanisms and instruments (especially the approaches for conflict prevention. Most specifically:
European Developmental Fund, the Instrument Ÿ Operationalize the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention
for Stability, the ENP, the African Peace Facility), are Framework (ECPF): The ECOWAS standard needs to
used in a coherent approach. This is especially be put into practice. As ECOWAS embraces the
important with regards to defining the relationship principle of the “Responsibility to Protect”, it has to
between security and development approaches. The prepare answers to put this into practice. This
institutions within the Joint Africa-EU Strategy need refers especially to the “Responsibility to prevent”.
to be used for such an integrated approach. Necessary instruments for its implementation do
Ÿ Support the soon-to-be-democracies in North exist, however, they are either rarely applied or have
Africa / the Middle East: The uprisings in Tunisia, not functioned properly. A more coherent approach is
Egypt and other countries of the region have sent necessary for its operationalization.
clear demands for political participation as well as
economic and social progress. Especially the lack of
perspectives of many young people has been an
important catalyst.
For the new democracies to be successful, they will
21
At the national level social and economic policy. The governmental
Besides the needed international and regional approach focuses solely on how to achieve growth.
engagement, Mali will have to do its part. The following While it is true that growth is the necessary prerequisite
recommendations are thus addressing Malian to fight poverty, it also has to be taken into account that
governmental as well as non-governmental actors. growth and social justice are closely interlinked.
Ÿ Continue the socio-economic development of Ÿ Continue the strengthening of the Rule of Law in
northern Mali: Poverty, unemployment especially northern Mali: The Malian state needs to continue its
among the young in the north, economic political approach to the conflict. The strengthening of
underdevelopment and the feeling of exclusion from the state’s presence with a functioning judicial system
decision-making provide a hotbed for fundamentalist and rule of law is imperative.
ideas. The key challenge for stabilizing northern Mali Ÿ Strengthen the democratic institutions in Mali:
are public investments and to provide for alternative Malian democracy has yet to be consolidated, thus
sources of income and thereby creating economic, Malian actors need to continue the strengthening of
social as well as political perspectives. This will also democratic institutions, and to support the mechanisms
serve the implementation of the peace agreement for the rule of law.
with the Tuareg. Ÿ Promote the democratic governance of the
Ÿ Continue the implementation of the peace security sector: Security policy in Mali is almost
agreement: While socio-economic development is exclusively dominated by the president. While his
an important part of the peace agreement, there is engagement is to be welcomed, for a democratic
also a greater socio-historical gap to close: The governance of the security sector other relevant actors
cleavage between the north and the south. This need to be included. Therefore, strengthening the
includes a national dialogue and the building of trust capacity and the role of the Assemblée Nationale (and
as many problems from the past rebellions have not especially the Commission on Security and Defence)
been properly discussed in public debates. This is also and thus of parliamentary oversight is imperative.
to serve the continued building of the nation. Ÿ Continue the legal fight against small arms by
Ÿ Sensitize the local leaders and communities in supporting the Assemblée Nationale to
northern Mali: The local as well as the religious and harmonize national law with the convention: Mali
the traditional leaders have to be included in the has ratified the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms
programs of the Malian government and be sensitized and Light Weapons but has yet to translate it into
about their important role in the conflict setting. If national law. Supporting the Assemblée Nationale in
they engage in oder to create a more prosperous, harmonizing national law with the convention will
stable region together with the Malian state and create a more profound legal basis in the fight against
international actors, AQMI will lose its needed small arms.
logistic support. Also, these leaders can exercise Ÿ Foster debates about the complex nature of the
influence upon the youth and educate them about the conflict: As there is a lack of public debate as well as of
consequences of the insecure situation on their debate among the political elites, the issue needs to
everyday life. be put on the agenda to create more awareness of the
Ÿ Include the trade unions in the process: To achieve complex nature of the conflict. This requires analyses
social stability in northern Mali as a prerequisite for an taking all actors and lines of conflict into consideration.
overall stabilization, a socially just socio-economic Ÿ Foster regional dialogue and cooperation: The
development is needed. This cannot be achieved regional security architecture and regional dialogue
without the trade unions. Poverty reduction and and cooperation are of high importance, as the conflict
employment policy are the corner stones of Malian
22
and security situation has only recently become a

Malian problem. While regional dialogue and
cooperation have to take place on many levels, the
Malian president has planned for a conference of
Heads of State on the conflict since 2007. This initiative
needs to be taken up.
Ÿ Sensitize the media: Balanced and impartial media
coverage is necessary in order to foster a public debate.
However, the Malian media sector lacks many
essentials such as training for journalists and
appropriate compensation as often journalists are not
properly paid by their employers. This hinders generally
more qualified media coverage. In a conflict situation
this might trigger an escalation by, for instance, the
spreading of rumours or partial coverage.
Ÿ Fight against corruption and organized crime: in
order to prevent a further destabilization of the
country, corruption and organized crime need to be
fought as these are obstacles in the fight against
AQMI. International donors should put this topic
higher up on the agenda.
Ÿ Start an open debate on the future exploitation
of oil in Mali: As the question of oil is most likely to

become of high importance in the future, an early and
open dialogue about this highly sensitive question is
needed. This includes the question of the distribution
of revenues as well as the oil's relevance to the conflict
situation. Experiences from other countries should be
included to avoid the “resource curse.”
23
Literature
Te r r o r i s m u s i m S a h e l . U r s a c h e n , A k t e u r e ,
African Journal for the Prevention and Combating of Handlungsmöglichkeiten, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft
Terrorism, June 2010. und Politik, Januar 2011.
Bellamy, William Mark, Making better sense of the U.S. Ploch, Lauren, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests
security engagement in Africa, in: Cooke, Jennifer G., and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, Washington,
Morrison, J. Stephen (Ed.), U.S. Africa Policy beyond the D.C: Congressional research Service, November 2010.
Bush Years. Critical Challenges for the Obama

Administration, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & Renard, Thomas, Terrorism and Other Transnational
International Studies, 2009, 9-33. Threats in the Sahel: What Role for the EU? Brussels:
Center on Global Terrorism Cooperation, September
Goldwyn, David L., Pursuing U.S. energy security interest 2010.
in Africa, in: Cooke, Jennifer G., Morrison, J. Stephen

(Ed.), U.S. Africa Policy beyond the Bush Years. Critical Sperling, Sebastian, Staatsfeinde Nummer Eins?
Challenges for the Obama Administration, Washington, Organisierte Kriminalität gewinnt Einfluss in Westafrika,
D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2009, Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2010.
62-90.
Tawil, Camille, The Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic
Ploch, Lauren, Africa Command: U.S. Strategic Interests Maghreb: Expansion in the Sahel and Challenges from
and the Role of the U.S. Military in Africa, Washington, Within Jihadist Circles, Washington, D.C.: The Jamestown
D.C.: Congressional research Service, November 2010. Foundation, April 2010.
European Strategy for Security and Development in the Van de Walle, Nicolas, US Policy Towards Africa: The Bush
Sahel,draft,http://www.euo.dk/upload/application/pdf/f1 Legacy and the Obama Administration, African Affairs,
80e1ed/SEC%282011%29331.pdf, 8.3.2011. Vol. 109/No. 434, 1-21, 2009.
Farrall, Leah, How al Qaeda works, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol.

90, No. 2, 2011, 128-138.
Goïta, Modibo: West Africa’s Growing Terrorist Threat:

Confronting AQIM’s Sahelian Strategy, Africa Security
Briefing, No. 11, February 2011.
International Crisis Group, Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel :

Fact or Fiction ?, Africa Report N. 92, 31.3.2005.
Konadje, Jean-Jaques, Les Initiatives de la CEDEAO en

Matiere de Securite, de Prevention des Conflits et de
Maintien de la Paix dans la Zone Sahelienne Ouest-
Africaine, l’Ecole Militaire de Paris, no date.
Lacher, Wolfram, Organisierte Kriminalität und
24
FES Peace and Security Series No. 5
About the FES Africa Peace and Security Series

The lack of security is one of the key impediments to and their national, regional and continental responses. The
development and democracy in Africa. The existence of FES Africa Peace and Security Series aims to contribute
protracted violent conflicts as well as a lack of account- to this dialogue by making relevant analysis widely
ability of the security sector in many countries are chal- accessible.
lenging cooperation in the field of security policy. The The series is being published by the FES Africa Security
emerging African Peace and Security Architecture pro- Policy Network, namely:
vides the institutional framework to promote peace and
• FES Addis Ababa (FES Regional Security Policy Project
security. Eastern Africa, African Union Cooperation)
As a political foundation committed to the values of social
democracy, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) aims at strength- • FES Maputo (FES Regional Security Policy Project Southern
Africa) ,
ening the interface between democracy and security policy.
FES therefore facilitates political dialogue on security threats • FES Abuja (FES Regional Security Policy Project West
Africa)
About this study

Al Qaida au Maghreb Islamique (AQMI) has gained a contribute to an environment of insecurity. Only an
foothold in West Africa and destabilizes the region. This inclusive approach which takes the complex nature of the
development hit Mali the hardest because of its conflict system into account, and which is supported by
weaknesses as it is still in the process of resolving the regional and international mechanisms, will lead to a
Tuareg conflict by putting the peace agreement into peaceful situation in northern Mali and the central Sahara.
practice. Furthermore, corruption and organized crime
ISBN 978-978-915-488-3

Who Owns The Sahara?: Annette Lohmann

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Who Owns the Sahara?

Who Owns the Sahara?

Annette Lohmann directs the office of the Friedrich-Ebert- Published by:

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I. Current problems and their historic roots.....................................................................................6

IV. New approaches by the Malian government..............................................................................12

V. Regional cooperation: A shared intention?.................................................................................15

VI. A problem with a bigger scope: Approaches by multilateral actors .........................................16

VII. Recommendations ................................................................................................................................20

AQMI - Al Qaida au Maghreb Islamique OMC - Observation and Monitoring Centre

ATT - Amadou Toumani Touré PSI - Pan-Sahel Initiative

AU - African Union PSPSDN - Programme spécial pour la paix, la sécurité

ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African UN - United Nations

Introduction and the smaller eastern and southern part controlled by

itself into several armed groups, principally the Groupe

So far no support for AQMI in

distribution of funds among the different Tuareg groups in

8. Outside the larger cities there are no police forces, no courts

V. Regional cooperation: and might support it in order to keep the region

the “Responsibility to prevent” which contains military intervention.

Prevention and Combating of Terrorism 2010). problems in this field.

and development approaches are not always clear and

The approach of the United Nations

northern Mali: Poverty, unemployment especially

At the national level social and economic policy. The governmental

and security situation has only recently become a

of oil in Mali: As the question of oil is most likely to

Terrorism, June 2010. und Politik, Januar 2011.

Bush Years. Critical Challenges for the Obama

Goldwyn, David L., Pursuing U.S. energy security interest 2010.

in Africa, in: Cooke, Jennifer G., Morrison, J. Stephen

Farrall, Leah, How al Qaeda works, in: Foreign Affairs, Vol.

Goïta, Modibo: West Africa’s Growing Terrorist Threat:

International Crisis Group, Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel :

Konadje, Jean-Jaques, Les Initiatives de la CEDEAO en

Lacher, Wolfram, Organisierte Kriminalität und

About the FES Africa Peace and Security Series

About this study

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