BEATRIZ L. GONZALES v.

CFI OF MANILA
G.R. No. L-34395, May 19,1981
Alexand Rhea M. Villahermosa

FACTS:

Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died and was survived by his
widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: 3 sons and four daughters including
petitioner. The real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal
portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y
De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.

FilomenaLegarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress
was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. De Legarda. Mrs.Legarda executedan affidavit adjudicating
extrajudicially to herself the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter,
FilomenaLegarda.As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena Races succeeded her
deceased daughter FilomenaLegarda as co-owner of the properties held proindiviso by her
other six children. Later, Mrs Legardaexecuted two handwritten Identical documents wherein
she disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of
her sons and partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito
Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda
y De la Paz.

Mrs.Legarda died and her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will. In the testate
proceeding, Beatriz Legarda, a daughter of the testatrix filed a motion to exclude from the
inventory of her mother’s estate the properties, which she inherited from her deceased
daughter on the ground that said properties are reservable properties, which should be
inherited by FilomenaLegarda. Without awaiting the resolution on the motion, Beatriz filed an
ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother’s estate
for the purpose of serving a declaration that said properties are reservable properties which
Mrs.Legarda could not bequeath in her will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her sons and
daughters.
ISSUE: Are the properties in question be subjected to reserva troncal?
RULING:
Yes, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of
Mrs.Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the
time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of the
prepositusFilomenaLegarda were living or they survived Mrs.Legarda. So, the ultimate issue in
this case is whether Mrs.Legarda, as reservor, could convey the reservable properties by will or
mortis causa to the reservees within the third degree (her sixteen grandchildren) to the
exclusion of the reservees in the second degree, her three daughters and three sons. As
indicated at the outset, that issue is already res judicata or cosajuzgada.

We hold that Mrs.Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren
the reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the
reservable properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191).
The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the
reservees survived the reservor. Thereservees inherit the reservable properties from the
prepositus, not from the reservor.

Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest
relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of
Mrs.Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be
given and deprive the other reservees of their share therein. To allow the reservor in this case
to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in favor of the reservees in the
third degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second degree would be a glaring
violation of article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed. Applying that doctrine
to this case, it results that Mrs.Legarda could not dispose of in her will the properties in question
even if the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third degree from FilomenaLegarda.
The said properties, by operation of Article 891, should go to Mrs.Legarda's six children as
reservees within the second degree from Filomena Legarda.
 DE PAPA ET. AL v. CAMACHO ET. AL
G.R. NO. L-28032, September 24, 1986
Alexand Rhea M. Villahermosa

FACTS:
Romana donated four parcels of land to Toribia. When Toribia died in 1915, she left the said
property to Faustino and Trinidad, her children. When Balbino died in 1928, three parcels of
land were adjudicated to Toribia and since she predeceased her father, the same was given to
her children Faustino and Trinidad. Faustino died in 1937 and left his ½ pro-indiviso share in
the seven lands to his father Eustacio Dizon, subject to reserve troncal. When Trinidad died in
1939, all her ½ pro-indiviso share were inherited by Dalisay, subject to usufruct of Primo
Tongko. Eustacio died in 1965, survived by his only granddaughter Dalisay. Dalisay claims the ½
by virtue of the reserva troncal implied by law upon the death of Faustino. Plaintiffs, as uncles
and aunts, also claim ¾ of the ½ pro-indiviso share, being a third relative of Faustino.
The lower court ruled that both plaintiffs and defendants are all entitled as reservatarios.
ISSUE:
Are all relatives of the prepositus within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed
without distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista?
RULING:
No. Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives of
the descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over
the property which the reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to
him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when
the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the
right granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the
exclusive benefit of designated persons who are within the third degree of the person from
whom the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding
degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as
such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one alleging
his rights as reservatario who is not within the third degree of relationship, nevertheless there
is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third degree
mentioned by law, as in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable
property came. x x x

Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate
succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double
that of brothers and nephews of half blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter
se, proximity of degree and the right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of
double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should likewise be operative.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of relatives (reservatarios) to
whom the property should be returned; but within that group, the individual right to the
property should be decided by the applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art.
891 does not specify otherwise. x x x Reversion of the reservable property being governed by
the rules on intestate succession, the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto
because, as aunts and uncles, respectively, of Faustino Dizon (the prepositus), they are excluded
from the succession by his niece, the defendant-appellant, although they are related to him
within the same degree as the latter. x x x Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings
already cited, the defendant-appellant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the
reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.
 SIENES, ET AL. v. ESPARCIA, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-12957, March 24, 1961
Alexand Rhea M. Villahermosa

FACTS:
Saturnino Yaeso originally owes Lot 3368. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he had four
children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea
Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco. Lot 3368 was issued in the name of Francisco.
When Francisco died, without any descendant, his mother, as his sole heir, executed the public
instrument entitled extra-judicial settlement and sale whereby, among other things, for and in
consideration of the sum of P800.00, she sold the property in question to Sienes. Thereafter,
Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving half-sisters of Francisco, and who as such had
declared the property in their name executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Esparcia.
Andrea Gutang died later with Cipriana Yaeso (child from the first wife) surviving her.
Sienes then filed an action asking for the nullification of the sale executed by Paulina and
Cipriana, the reconveyance of the lot and damages and cost of suit.Fidel Esparcia countered that
they did not know any information regarding the sale by Andrea Gutang in favor of the Sps.
Sienes, and that if such sale was made, the same was void since Andrea had no right to dispose
of the property.
The lower court declared that both the sale made by Andrea Gutang to Sps. Sienes was and that
of Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso to the Sps. Esparcia were void. The land in question was
reservable property and therefore, the reservista Andrea Gutang, was under obligation to
reserve it for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which
said property came, if any, survived her. Record shows that lone reserve surviving was Cipriana
Yaeso.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reservoir or the reserve alienate the subject lot
RULING:
Yes. The lot is a reservable property, and the reservoir may alienate the property subject to a
resolutory condition. In reserva troncal the reservor has the legal title and dominion over the
reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition. He may alienate the same but subject
to the reservation, i.e., the rights acquired by the transferee are revoked upon the survival of
reservees at the time of death of the reservor. The reserva instituted by law in favor of the heirs
within the third degree belonging to the line from which the reservable property came
constitutes a real right which the reservee may alienate and dispose of, although conditionally,
the condition being that the alienation would transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when
the reservee survives the reservor.

Upon the death of the reservor, there being a surviving reservee, the reservable property passes
in exclusive ownership to the latter. In the present case, inasmuch as when the reservista,
Andrea Gutang died, CiprianaYaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the
previous sale made by the former in favor of appellants became of no legal effect and the
reservable property passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.

On the other hand, the sale executed by the sisters, Paulina and CiprianaYaeso, in favor of the
Sps. Esparcia was subject to a similar resolutory condition. While it may be true that the sale
was made by Cipriana and her sister prior to the death of Andrea, it became effective because of
the occurrence of the resolutory condition.
 MARIA MENDOZA et.al. v. JULIA POLlCARPIO DELOS SANTOS
G.R. No. 176422, March 20, 2013
Alexand Rhea M. Villahermosa

FACTS:
The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land.Two of the said lots are in the
name of respondent Julia Delos Santos. The other lot is also in the name of Julia but co-owned by
Victoria Pantaleon, who bought 1/2 of the property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and her
siblings. Petitioners alleged that the properties were part of their grandparent’s properties that
were subject of an oral partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel, one of the
children.After Exequiel’s death, it passed on to his spouse Leonor and daughter, Gregoria.
Gregoria later died intestate and without issue. After Gregoria’s death, respondent, who is
Leonor’s sister,adjudicated unto herself all these properties as the sole surviving heir of Leonor
and Gregoria.

Petitioners claim that the properties should have been reserved by respondent in their behalf
and must now revert back to them, applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on reservatroncal.
Respondent, however, denies any obligation to reserve the properties as these did not originate
from petitioners’ familial line and were not originally owned by Placido and Dominga. According
to respondent, the properties were bought by Exequiel and Antonio from a certain Alfonso
Ramos in 1931. It appears, however, that it was only Exequiel who was in possession of the
properties. RTC granted theaction for Recovery of Possession by ReservaTroncal of petitioners.
CA reversed and set aside the decision stating that petitioners failed to establish that Placido
and Dominga owned the properties in dispute.10 The CA also ruled that even assuming that
Placido and Dominga previously owned the properties, it still cannot be subject to
reservatroncal as neither Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga nor did Gregoria
predecease Exequiel.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioners have the right to the properties by virtue of the law on
reserva truncal

RULING:
NO, Article 891 on reserve troncal is not applicable. Petitioners cannot be considered
reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives within the 3rd degree of Gregoria from whom
the properties came. The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the
descendant/prepositus―the one at the end of the line from which the property came and upon
whom the property last revolved by descent. It is Gregoria in this case.
Petitioners are Gregoria’s fourth degree relatives, being her first cousins. First cousins of the
prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios.While it may
appear that the properties are reservable in character, petitioners cannot benefit from
reservatroncal. First, because Julia, who now holds the properties in dispute, is not the other
ascendant within the purview of Article 891 of the Civil Code and second, because petitioners
are not Gregoria’s relatives within the third degree.
 DEL ROSARIO v. CONANAN
G.R. No. L-37903, March 30, 1977
Alexand Rhea M. Villahermosa

FACTS:
On November 13, 1972, petitioner, legitimate mother of the deceased, filed for the settlement
and partition of her late son Felix del Rosario who died on a plane crash. While oppositor
Dorotea del Rosario is the legitimate surviving wife of Felix. Dorotea and Felix had a legally
adopted child named Marilou del Rosario. The court dismissed the petitioner’s petition based on
the law on intestate succession that an adopted child concurring with the surviving spouse of
the adopter excludes the legitimate ascendants from succession, ...therefore, the petitioner not
being included as intestate heir of the deceased cannot be considered as a co-owner of or have
any right over the properties sought to be partitioned.
ISSUE: Is petitioner, as the legitimate mother of the deceased, entitled to an inheritance?
RULING:
YES. The court opined that the governing provision is article 343 of the New Civil Code. Under
Article 343, an adopted child surviving with legitimate parents of the deceased adopter, has the
same successional rights as an acknowledged natural child, which is comprehended in the term
"illegitimate children". Consequently, the respective shares of the surviving spouse, ascendant
and adopted child should be determined by Article 1000 of the New Civil Code. It is most unfair
to accord more successional rights to the adopted, who is only related artificially by fiction of
law to the deceased, than those who are naturally related to him by blood in the direct
ascending line. The applicability of Article 343 does not exclude the surviving parent of the
deceased adopter, not only because a contrary view would defeat the intent of the framers of the
law, but also because in intestate succession, where legitimate parents or ascendants concur
with the surviving spouse of the deceased, the latter does not necessarily exclude the former
from the inheritance.