PROTECTION FUNDAMENTALS AND FAULT

CALCULATIONS
Akhtar Kalam
Victoria University
Melbourne
Email: [email protected]

A. PROTECTION FUNDAMENTALS

INTRODUCTION TO PROTECTIVE RELAYING

Protective Relaying or Protection is the term that defines the branch of electric power engineering that is concerned with
the detection and disconnection of short circuits (faults) and other abnormal conditions on the power system.

There are three aspects of the design and operation of a power system that are important in considering the role of
protective relaying :

♦ Normal operation
♦ Prevention of electrical failure
♦ Mitigation of the effects of electrical failure.

The term "normal operation" assumes no failures of equipment, no mistakes of personnel, nor "acts of God". It involves
the minimum requirements for supplying the existing customer load and a certain amount of anticipated future load.
Design of the power system for normal operation involves major expense for equipment and includes consideration of:

• Choice between hydro, steam, or other sources of power

• Location of generating stations
• Transmission of power to the load
• Study of the load characteristics and planning for its future growth
• Metering
• Voltage and frequency regulation
• System operation
• Maintenance requirements
• The consequences of equipment or plant failure.

Protection systems must not interfere with or limit the normal operation of the system but must continually monitor the
system to detect electrical failure or abnormal electrical conditions.

Further important aspects in the design of the power system are:

⇒ incorporation of features aimed at preventing failures, and

⇒ provisions for mitigating the effects of failure when it occurs.

Modern power system design employs both recourse’s, as dictated by the economics of any particular situation.
Notable advances continue to be made toward greater reliability. But also, increasingly greater reliance is being placed
on electric power. Consequently, even though the probability of failure is decreased, the tolerance of the possible harm
to the service is also decreased.

The type of electrical failure that causes greatest concern is the short circuit, or "fault" as it is usually called, but there
are other abnormal operating conditions peculiar to certain elements of the system that also require attention. Some of
the features of design and operation aimed at preventing electrical failure are:

◊ Provision of adequate insulation

◊ Co-ordination of insulation strength with the capabilities of lightning arresters
◊ Use of overhead ground wires and low tower-footing resistance
◊ Design for mechanical strength to reduce exposure, and to minimise the likelihood of failure caused by animals,
birds, insects, dirt, sleet, etc.
◊ Proper operation and maintenance practice.

Some of the features of design and operation for mitigating the effects of failure are:

• Features that mitigate the immediate effects of an electrical failure

1 Design to limit the magnitude of short-circuit current
(a) By avoiding too large concentrations of generating capacity
(b) By using current-limiting impedance.
2 Design to withstand mechanical stresses and heating owing to short-circuit currents.
3 Time-delay undervoltage devices on circuit breakers to prevent dropping loads during momentary voltage dips.
4 Ground-fault neutralisers.

• Features for promptly disconnecting the faulty element

1 Protective relaying
2 Circuit breakers with sufficient interrupting capacity
3 Fuses.

• Features that mitigate the loss of the faulty element

1 Alternate circuits
2 Reserve generator and transformer capacity
3 Automatic reclosing.

• Features that operate throughout the period from the inception of the fault until after its removal, to maintain
voltage and stability
1 Automatic voltage regulation
2 Stability characteristics of generators.

• Means for observing the effectiveness of the foregoing features

1 Automatic oscillographs
2 Efficient human observation and record keeping.

• Frequent surveys as system changes or additions are made, to be sure that the foregoing features are still
adequate.

Thus, protective relaying is one of several features of system design concerned with minimising damage to equipment
and interruptions to service when electrical failures occur. WHEN WE SAY THAT RELAYS "PROTECT", WE
MEAN THAT, TOGETHER WITH OTHER EQUIPMENT, THE RELAYS HELP TO MINIMISE DAMAGE AND
IMPROVE SERVICE AT A MINIMUM COST. It will be evident that all the mitigation features are dependent on one
another for successfully minimising the effects of failure.

POWER SYSTEM PLANT AND LAYOUT

The following notes give an overview of plant and the electrical characteristic that are relevant to design of the
protection system. They also outline some of the various switching arrangements that are likely to be encountered on the
power system.

The aim is to identify, for the student, some of the underlying issues that need to be considered in the design of
protection.

Power System Plant

The system for generation, transmission and distribution of electricity is made up of generators, lines, transformers,
reactive plant (capacitors and static compensators) etc. connected in a network to provide reliable transport of electrical
energy from the generation source to the customer. The parameters of the plant (size and electrical specifications) and
its associated auxiliary equipment, together with the arrangement of the network, have a significant influence on the
design of the protection system.

Plant impedances and earthing arrangements will determine the magnitude and path of fault currents. Number and
location of current and voltage transformers will determine the arrangement of protection zones which, in turn effects
the reliability of the whole power system. Consequently, the protection engineer must have a sound knowledge of the
design of both the electrical plant and the power system in order to influence the design

The following paragraphs briefly outline some of the plant and system design considerations.

Generators
Generators appear in a number of sizes ranging from less than 1 MW (typically in a cogeneration plant) to 600 MW or
more in a large fossil fuelled station. Generated voltages are generally constrained in the range of 6.6kV to 33kV due to
design limitations in the generator insulation systems. This means that step-up transformers are generally needed to
connect the generator to the transmission system. Important parameters in the design of protection for the system and
the generator are the generator impedances.

A distinction is made for two conditions, namely the direct and quadrature axis which cover the positions when the axis
of the rotor poles are in phase with the machine poles, or 90 electrical degrees out of phase. Fault currents (resulting
from a short circuit on the power system) are mainly reactive and as they cause drops in the direct axis voltage, we use
the direct axis impedances for fault calculations.

The impedance of the generator varies with time following inception of a fault, due to the inductive nature of the
generator electrical circuit. The value depends on the time that has elapsed from the inception of a short circuit.
Impedances in three time zones are specified for calculation of currents and voltages:

• Subtransient impedance (Xd”) - determines the level for short circuit current during the first 1 to 3 cycles after short
circuit inception;

• Transient impedance (Xd’) - determines the level of current that a particular generator will contribute to a short
circuit during the transient period between 3 to 20 cycles

• Synchronous impedance (Xd) - determines the steady state value of short circuit current after the transient period.

The time constant that determines the duration of the subtransient and transient periods and related “offset” of the short
circuit current is determined by the inductance and resistance of the generator. It is often referred to as the X/R ratio of
the generator. In a multi generator system the X/R ratio is highest near the generation source and reduces as lines and
transformers are interposed between the generation and the load. The X/R ratio is important in the determination of
required current transformer performance, as you will see in Chapter 4.

For protection calculations, we assume that the nominal terminal voltage of all machines is acting behind the machine
impedance ie. all machines are unloaded, and their voltages are all in phase. Some organisations use the subtransient
impedance Xd” for fault calculations and apply a decrement to reduce current with time, depending on the measuring
and operating time of the protection relays. This can be appropriate if accurate high speed measurement is required,
however, the majority use the transient impedance Xd’ and assume that the current does not change during the
protection relay operating period. This is adequate for most applications and these course notes are based on the use of
the transient impedance Xd’

Also of importance in the design of the protection system is the method of earthing, which determines that paths for
earth fault currents in the system. Generator neutrals are generally earthed through a high impedance to limit the flow of
earth fault currents in the generator windings and eliminate the damage that this would cause. The path for earth fault
currents on the external power system is established through earthing of transformer neutral connections.

Transformers

Power transformers of various sizes are located throughout the power system. ‘step-up’ transformers convert the
generator voltage to levels suitable for the transmission system which transmits bulk power to the load centres.
Depending on the size of the system, transmission voltages will range from 132kV to 500kV. ‘Step-down’ transformers
reduce the voltages at the bulk load centres to typically 66kV or 33kV for distribution through a ‘subtransmission
network’ which supplies the high voltage distribution system. The distributions system is typically 33, 22 or 11kV and
supplies distribution substations that transform the voltage to the customer level.

Large transformers in the generating stations or transmission stations may be made up of three single phase units or a
single three phase unit. Physical size and transport limitations can frequently determine the choice that has to be made.
Single phase units, as well as taking up more space, have more complex connection arrangements, particularly with the
connection of the delta or tertiary winding. The external delta connections are more exposed to faults and failure can
result in high short circuit currents, which can be disastrous mechanically for the delta windings.

Inter-winding impedances, winding connections (ie. delta, star, interstar) and earthing arrangements are important for
the protection engineer. These factors determine the magnitude and path of fault currents and consequently the ability
for protection systems to selectively detect and clear faults from the system.

It is usually sufficient to use the inductive component of the transformer impedance in protection calculations and this
will usually be expressed as a percent or per unit at rating ie. percent impedance is the percentage voltage drop across
the transformer at rated voltage and current. With a short circuit on the terminals the current will be -

I Rated × 100
 %Z

Lines

Impedances, for calculation of fault currents, are the most important line parameter for protection purposes. These are
usually calculated in resistive and reactive ohms at system frequency and are expressed in the form R+jx or Zθ. The R
term is the resistance per phase and the jx term is obtained from the basic equation of the type

jx = k Log10 Separation of conductors

k1 (radius of conductor)

Factors that influence the impedance include the presence of overhead earth wire and mutual coupling with parallel
lines.

Switching Arrangements

Switching arrangements used in a particular power system or individual stations within the system are influenced by a
number of factors and there is no clear right or wrong arrangement. Factors that need to be considered are -

• Economic and business investment criteria,

• History of development of the individual power system ie. decisions made in the past can be uneconomic to
change because of wide spread changes that may be required,
• Ease and safety of operation and maintenance,
• Security, reliability and quality of supply to the customer,
• Flexibility for future development.

There are many switching arrangements used on the power system, all of which influence the design of the protection
system.

A major consideration for the Protection Engineer is the ability to establish appropriate protection zones that will
selectively isolate faulty items of plant. In this respect the number and location of current and voltage transformers is a
major consideration. The preference would be to locate current transformers on each side of the circuit breaker,
transformer of generator so that independent overlapping zones of protection can be established for each plant item.
This practice can result in significant costs, either in the cost of the plant item itself (eg. if the CT’s are mounted within
the CB structure) or in the cost of additional space and structures to mount free standing CT’s in the switchyard. A
frequent compromise is to provide CT’s on one side of the plant. With this arrangement it is possible to achieve
overlapping zones of protection but it can result in ‘blind spots’ or ‘dead zones’ which require special measures. For
example, with CT’s located on the line side of a circuit breaker, a fault between the CB and the CT post will be detected
by the busbar protection zone but is outside the line protection zone. The bus protection will operate to trip the local
circuit breakers but the protection at the other end of the line must detect and clear the fault from that end.

Single Switching

Each item of plant has it’s own CB. This arrangement -

• Is economic in terms of plant requirements,

• Is straight forward and safe to operate and maintain,
• Has few complications from a protection viewpoint, apart from selecting the location for CT’s and VT’s.

The major disadvantage is the inflexibility in programming maintenance. For example an outage of a CB will result in
the loss of the associated plant item to the system (possible a major generator or transformer).
 Single Switching

Double Switching

Each plant item has 2 circuit breakers to provide the ability to switch to either of two busbars.

This is a very flexible arrangement and has the major advantage that any item of plant can be transferred from bus to
bus without interrupting the circuit that it feeds. Again there are no particular design problems from a protection
viewpoint. It is relatively easy to establish selective zones for protection of each plant item, the busbars and the
incoming and outgoing circuits.

The major disadvantage is the high cost of providing circuit breaker and their associated auxiliary equipment and space
requirements. This additional expenditure has to be weighed against the gain in revenue or convenience of keeping
generation and other plant in service during outages of circuit breakers or busbars for maintenance or as a result of plant
failure.

Double Switching

Some savings can be achieved by using a combination of single and double switching. For example it can be argued that
the generator could be single switched and any maintenance requirements on the CB would be coordinate with
generator maintenance. In this case the generators shown in the double switched arrangement, two CB’s could be
eliminated by single switching the generators to alternate busbars.

Mesh Layout

This scheme has most of the advantages of a double bus layout, in that all plant can be kept in service for the outage of
any one CB. But, it requires only one CB for each item of plant in its simplest form compared with the 2 CB’s for each
item of plant in the double switched arrangement.
The limit on the number of items of plant in a mesh layout is usually around 6 in order not to prejudice the system in the
event of outages eg. if CB A is open for maintenance and a fault occurs on feeder 1, the system is left with generator 2
disconnected. The mesh layout is flexible and uses less CB’s that the double switched arrangement. There are no
particular design problems from a protection viewpoint. It is relatively easy to establish selective zones for protection of
each plant item and the incoming and outgoing circuits provided current transformers are provided with each circuit
breaker and plant item and, depending on the protection selected, voltage transformers are provided in the outgoing
lines.

G1

Feeder 1
A

G2

Six Circuit Breaker Mesh

1½ CB Switching

A more elaborate system than the mesh system is the 1½ CB arrangement.

1½ Circuit Breaker

This arrangement uses more CB’s than the mesh arrangement but gives better reliability for faults in the transmission
lines or generation plant. Again, provided current transformers and voltage transformers are carefully located the
protection arrangements a straight forward.

Transfer Bus Arrangement

This arrangement is applicable to stations where there are a large number of feeders. It permits more flexibility that the
single switched arrangement as any feeder may be kept in service while it’s CB is out of service, by using the transfer
bus and connecting the feeder either in parallel with another feeder or to a spare CB.
The system is more complex to operate and can require switching of current transformers and protection circuits
through auxiliary switches on the transfer isolators, to maintain adequate protection on the feeders.

Problems can also arise with the operation of earth fault protection when feeders are operated in parallel due to the
unbalance in load currents giving rise to artificial ‘earth fault current’ in the relay circuits. Special operating procedures
may be required to overcome this problem.

Transfer Bus

THE FUNCTION OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING

The function of protective relaying is to cause the prompt removal from service of any element of a power system when
it suffers a short circuit, or when it starts to operate in any abnormal manner that might cause damage or otherwise
interfere with the effective operation of the rest of the system. It achieves this through relays and protection schemes
that measure power system quantities, detect a fault or abnormal condition and open (trip) appropriate circuit breakers.

Circuit breakers are generally located so that each generator, transformer, bus, transmission line, etc., can be completely
disconnected from the rest of the system. These circuit breakers must have sufficient capacity so that they can carry
momentarily the maximum short circuit current that can flow through them, and then interrupt this current; they must
also withstand closing in on such a short circuit and then interrupting it according to certain prescribed standards.

Fusing is employed where protective relays and circuit breakers are not economically justifiable.

A secondary function of protective relaying is to provide indication of the location and type of failure. Such data not
only assists in expediting repair but also, by comparison with human observation and automatic oscillograph records,
they provide means for analysing the effectiveness of the fault-prevention and mitigation features including the
protective relaying itself.

PRINCIPLES OF PROTECTIVE RELAYING

The protection system can be divided into two main groups:-

• "primary" relaying
• "back-up" relaying.

Primary relaying is the first line of defence , whereas back-up relaying provides for failure of the primary protection to
clear the fault or abnormality, either through failure of protection equipment or primary plant.
Primary Relaying

Fig. 1 illustrates primary relaying.

Observation:

◊ Circuit breakers are located in close proximity to each power system element. This provision makes it possible
to disconnect only a faulty element. Occasionally, a breaker between two adjacent elements may be omitted, in
which event both elements must be disconnected for a failure in either one.

◊ A separate zone of protection is established around each system element. The significance of this is that any
failure occurring within a given zone will cause the "tripping" (ie. opening) of all circuit breakers within that
zone, and only those breakers.

It will become evident that, for failures within the region where two adjacent protective zones overlap, more
breakers will be tripped than the minimum necessary to disconnect the faulty element. But, if there were no
overlap, a failure in a region between zones would not lie in either zone, and therefore no breakers would be
tripped. The overlap is the lesser of the two evils. The extent of the overlap is relatively small, and the
probability of failure in this region is low; consequently, the tripping of too many breakers will be quite
infrequent.

◊ Adjacent protective zones of Fig. 1 overlap around a circuit breaker. This is the preferred practice because, for
failures anywhere except in the overlap region, the minimum numbers of circuit breakers need to be tripped.
When it becomes desirable for economic or space-saving reasons to overlap on one side of a breaker, as is
frequently true in metal-clad switchgear, the relaying equipment of the zone that overlaps the breaker must be
arranged to trip not only the breakers within its zone but also one or more breakers of the adjacent zone, in
order to completely disconnect certain faults.

Back-up Relaying

Back-up relaying is intended to operate when a system fault is not cleared in due time because of failure or inability of
the main protection or the associated protection to operate.

A clear understanding of the possible causes of primary-relaying failure is necessary for a better appreciation of the
practices involved in back-up relaying. When primary relaying fail several things may happen to prevent primary
relaying from causing the disconnection of a power system fault. Primary relaying may fail because of failure in any of
the following:

∗ Current or voltage supply to the relays

∗ DC tripping-voltage supply
∗ Protective relays
∗ Tripping circuit or breaker mechanism
∗ Circuit breaker.

It is highly desirable that back-up relaying be arranged so that anything that might cause primary relaying to fail will not
also cause failure of back-up relaying. Two principles are applied -

• Remote backup,
• Local backup.

With remote backup the back-up relays are located so that they do not employ or control anything in common with the
primary relays that are to be backed up. So far as possible, the practice is to locate the back-up relays at a different
station. Consider, for example, the back-up relaying for the transmission line section EF of Fig. 2. The back-up relays
for this line section is normally arranged to trip breakers A, B, I, and J. Should breaker E fail to trip for a fault on the
line section EF, breakers A and B are tripped; breakers A and B and their associated back-up relaying equipment, being
physically apart from the equipment that has failed, are not likely to be simultaneously affected as might be the case if
breakers C and D were chosen instead.

The back-up relays at locations A, B, and F provide back-up protection if bus faults occur at station K. Also, the back-
up relays at A and F provides back-up protection for faults in the line DB. In other words, the zone of protection of
back-up relaying extends in one direction from the location of any back-up relay and at least overlaps each adjacent
system element. Where adjacent line sections are of different length, the back-up relays must overreach some line
sections more than others in order to provide back-up protection for the longest line.

A given set of back-up relays will provide incidental back-up protection for faults in the circuit whose breaker the
back-up relays control. For example, the back-up relays that trip breaker A of Fig. 2 may also act as back-up for faults
in the line section AB. However, this duplication of protection is only an incidental benefit and is not to be relied on to
the exclusion of a conventional back-up arrangement when such arrangement is possible; to differentiate between the
two, this type might be called "duplicate primary relaying".
A second function of back-up relaying is often to provide primary protection when the primary-relaying equipment is
out of service for maintenance or repair.

It is perhaps evident that, when back-up relaying functions, a larger part of the system is disconnected than when
primary relaying operates correctly. This is inevitable if back-up relaying is to be made independent of those factors
that might cause primary relaying to fail. However, it emphasises the importance of the second requirement of back-up
relaying, that it must operate with sufficient time delay so that primary relaying will be given enough time to function if
it is able to. In other words, when a short circuit occurs, both primary relaying and back-up relaying will normally start
to operate, but primary relaying is expected to trip the necessary breakers to remove the short circuited element from the
system, and back-up relaying will then reset without having had time to complete its function. When a given set of
relays provides back-up protection for several adjacent system elements, the slowest primary relaying of any of those
adjacent elements will determine the necessary time delay of the given back-up relays.

Local Backup provides for the initiation of the required action at the same location as that at which the main protection
is situated. Local backup usually involves the provision of two completely independent (duplicate) protection systems
including relays, current transformers, circuit breaker trip coils etc.

For many applications, it is impossible to abide by the principle of complete segregation of the back-up relays. Then
one tries to supply the back-up relays from sources other than those that supply the primary relays of the system element
in question, and to trip other breakers. This can usually be accomplished; however, the same tripping battery may be
employed in common, to save money and because it is considered only a minor risk.

UNIT AND NON-UNIT SCHEMES

The purpose of an electrical power generation system is to distribute energy to a multiplicity of points for diverse
applications. The system should be designed and managed to deliver this energy to the utilisation points with both
reliability and economy. As there is a natural conflict between these two requirements, some compromise is necessary.
Reliability in system design is very important and although it is possible to achieve very high reliability, the economics
of doing so due to the excess plant required are prohibitive. Several ways of improving security of supply without
adding too much to the costs are by:-

♦ improving plant design

♦ increasing the spare capacity
♦ arranging alternative circuits to supply loads.
Also such division of the system into zones, each controlled by its own switchgear in association with protective gear,
provides flexibility during normal operation and ensures a minimum of dislocation following a breakdown.

In practical power systems any fault condition, especially a short circuit, is a potential threat to a secure supply as such a
condition can not only disrupt supply to consumers but also can cause irreparable damage to very expensive equipment.
The importance of removing such abnormal conditions as rapidly as possible is therefore quite obvious. This is where
the protective gear plays its part.

It is the function of protective gear to detect and initiate action to remove disturbances as soon as it is practicable.
Protection is therefore applied in overlapping zones to cover the system completely, leaving no part unprotected.
Another important requirement of the protective equipment is that only the faulted section should be disconnected and
protective devices must therefore be selective ie. when a fault occurs the protection is required to select and trip only the
nearest circuit breakers. This property of selective tripping is also called discrimination and is achieved by two general
methods.

(1) Non Unit Schemes:

These are invariably time-graded systems that utilise information (voltages and currents) derived from a particular point
on the system. Protection systems in successive zones as shown in Fig. 3 are arranged to operate in times that are
graded through the sequence of equipments to that upon occurrence of a fault, although a number of protective
equipments respond, only those relevant to the faulted zone complete the tripping function. The others make
incomplete operations and reset. Distance protection and time graded overcurrent devices are prime examples of non-
unit protection.

(2) Unit Protection:

These are schemes that respond to fault conditions lying within a clearly defined zone. They utilise information from
two or occasionally more points in a system. In most cases a unit protection system involves the measurement of
quantities at each end of the zone, and the transmission of information between the equipment at zone boundaries.
Examples of unit protection are differential current relays where the current entering a zone is compared with that which
leaves it. Also phase comparison carrier protection is another example.
ZONES OF PROTECTION

The protected zone is that part of a power system guarded by a certain protection and usually contains one or at the
most two elements of the power system. For a non-unit scheme, the zone lies between the current transformers and the
point or points on the protected circuit beyond which the system is unable to detect the presence of a fault (Fig. 4 & 5).
For a unit scheme, the zone lies between the two or several sets of current transformers and the point or points which
together with the relays constitute the protective system (Fig. 6).
COMMON TERMINOLOGIES

A list of Recommended Terminology is included at the front of the notes. Some of the terms that are impotent to
understanding the basic principles of the protection system are:

Stability This term refers to the ability of the system to remain inoperative to all load conditions and faults
external to the relevant zone. This quality is present in unit system, as they remain inoperative under
all conditions, with faults outside their own zone. However, non-unit systems can respond to faults
anywhere on the power system.

Selectivity Protection is arranged in zones so as to assure no part is left unprotected. When a fault occurs the
protection is required to select and trip the nearest circuit breakers only. Also known widely as
"Discrimination". In the non-unit systems the discrimination is not absolute, but it is dependant on
responses of a number of similar systems, all of which respond to a given abnormal condition.
However, for the unit systems, the discrimination is absolute and it is able to detect and respond to
abnormal condition occurring within the zone of protection.

Sensitivity This term is frequently used when referring to the minimum operating current of a complete protective
system. Hence protective system is sensitive, if the primary current is low. The requirements of all
relays should be quite sensitive for reliable operation. This term is usually expressed in amperes
referred to the primary circuit or as a percentage of the rated current of the current transformers.

Reliability Power system represents a large capital investment and in order to get maximum return it must be
loaded to its maximum. The purpose of power system is not only to supply energy but also to keep
the system in full operation, in order to give the best service to the consumers and earn revenue for the
supply authority. Failure is not confined to the protective gear but may also be due to the failure of
the circuit breaker. Hence every component involved in fault clearance can be regarded as a source of
failure.

Failures can be reduced by:

• reliable designs
• regular maintenance
• site testing.

Speed The objective of speed is to safeguard continuity of supply. Hence if fault can be isolated in the shortest
time, the greater the system can be loaded. Fig. 7 shows typical values of power that can be
transmitted as a function of fault clearing times for various types of faults. It can be seen that the fault
involving phases has marked effect on stability compared with the line-to-earth faults. The other
advantage of having fast clearance times is that unnecessary changes can occur in the system due to:

♦ high fault arc

♦ burn copper conductors
♦ machine or transformer lamination weld.

Fault currents can cause irreparable damage if allowed to continue for more than a few seconds. Hence fast fault
clearance is imperative.
B. FAULT CALCULATIONS

FAULTS ON POWER SYSTEM

A fault is the intentional or unintentional connecting together of two or more conductors that ordinarily operate with a
difference of potential between them. The connection between the conductors maybe by physical metallic contact or it
maybe through an arc. At the fault, the voltage between the two parts is reduced to zero in the case of metal-to-metal
contacts or to a very low value in case the connection is through an arc. Currents of abnormally high magnitude flow
through the network to the point of fault. These short circuit currents will usually be much greater than the designed
thermal ability of the conductors in the lines or machines feeding the fault. The resultant rise in temperature may cause
damage by the annealing of conductors and by the charring of insulation.
In a power system consisting of generators, circuit breakers, transformers, transmission and distribution circuits, it is
inevitable that sooner or later in such a large network some failure will occur somewhere in the system. The probability
of such failures is more on the power transmission lines, because of their greater length and bare exposure to
atmosphere.
A fault or short circuit may occur due to:
• deterioration of insulation
• damage due to unpredictable causes such as perching of birds, accidental short circuiting by snakes, tree
branches, bush fires etc.
• abnormal voltage viz. lightning or switching surges.
However, faults must not be confused with overcurrent. The latter implies that loads greater than the designed values
have been imposed on the system. Under such conditions voltage at the load point or in it vicinity may be low, but not
zero. The currents in the overloaded equipment are high and may exceed the thermal design limit. Nevertheless, such
currents are substantially lower than in the case of a fault. Service frequency may be maintained, but at below- standard
voltage.

FAULTS TYPE
Faults may be classified as permanent or transient. Permanent faults are those in which insulation failure or structure
failure produces damage that makes operations of the equipment impossible and requires repairs to be made. Transient
faults are momentarily faults that maybe removed by de-energising the equipment for a short period of time; short
circuits on overhead lines frequently are of this nature.
In general, faults on transmission systems maybe categorised under two headings: series and shunt type. Series faults
may involve single-pole switching and one or more conductor opening. These conductors maybe at one busbar or at
different busbars. They may occur either due to breaking of the conductors or through the action of the circuit breakers
and other devices that may not result in the opening of all the three phases simultaneously. Series faults form some sort
of unbalance in the system impedances and does not involve either the earth or any interconnection between phases.
Shunt faults such as single-phase-to-ground, two-phase-to-ground, phase-to-phase, three-phase faults with or without
ground and their combination, again form some sort of unbalance between phases or between phases and ground. These
faults may occur either through impedances or direct short circuits.
The most serious result of a major uncleared fault is fire that may not only destroy equipment but may spread into the
system and cause complete outage. Short circuit may have the following consequences:
∗ reduction of line voltage, which will lead to the breakdown of supply to the consumer
∗ damage may be caused to the elements of the system
∗ damage to other apparatus due to overheating and abnormal mechanical forces
∗ make the system unstable
∗ reduction in voltage, causing relays with pressure coil to maloperate
∗ reduction in voltage on healthy feeders connected to the system having fault, which may cause consumers
motor to draw excessively large currents.
In order to achieve designs that result in a reliable system it is of importance to have some idea of the frequency of the
incidence of faults on different equipment in a power system. A typical analysis of fault types is -
Overhead lines 50%
Cables 10%
Circuit Breakers 15%
Transformers 12%
Current and voltage transformers 2%
Control equipment 3%
Others 8%
It has already been mentioned that the two types of shunt and series faults may produce balanced or unbalanced currents
and hence they can be classified as balanced or unbalanced faults. However, in practice, majority of the faults that
occur on power transmission systems are unsymmetrical shunt faults. The frequency of occurrence of these faults is as
follows:
Single-line-to-ground 90%
Line-to-line 5%
Line-to-line-to-ground 3%
Line-to-line-to-line 2%

FAULT LEVEL CALCULATIONS

It is usual to express the short circuit capacity in kVA or MVA. The short circuit level is obtained from the product of
the greatest r.m.s. current that can be interrupted and the r.m.s. voltage across the contacts immediately after final arc
extinction.

Short circuit MVA = √3 x (nominal kV) x ISC x 10-3

The Thevenin’s equivalent circuit that represents the system is an emf equal to the nominal line voltage divided by √3 in
series with an inductive reactance of

(nominal kV/√3) x 1000

XTH = -------------------------- Ω
ISC

(nominal kV)2
= ------------------ Ω
short circuit MVA
For ease of calculation, it is usual to express all impedances on a common base. If base kilovolts is equal to nominal
kilovolts, then

base MVA
XTh = ------------------ per unit
short circuit MVA

Ibase
or = ----- per unit
ISC
The elements of a power system are specified as follows:
a. Generators and transformers are shown in percentage impedance on rating.
b. Feeders and interconnectors are based on actual impedance per phase.
c. Reactors are based on voltage drop at the rated current.
To convert these to p.u. values on a common base.
Z% MVA base
(i) Z p.u. = --- x -------------
100 MVA rating

MVA base
(ii) Z p.u. = ZΩ x -------------
kV2

VR MVA base
(iii) Z p.u. = ------ x -----------
IR kV2
Let us consider a typical impedance value of the components of a power system as indicated in Figure 1.
Using a 10 MVA base,
Generator: 25 MVA, 30%
30 10
XG = ---- x ---
100 25
= 0.12 p.u.
Interconnector: 0.04 Ω, 11kV
10
XI = --- x 0.04
112
= 0.0033p.u.
Transformer: 4 MVA, 7%
7 10
XT = ---- x ----
100 4
= 0.175 p.u.
Feeder: 0.009 Ω, 3.3kV

10
XF = ----- x 0.009
3.32
= 0.0083 p.u.
Reactor: 42.5V, 750A.
10 42.5
XR = ---- x -----
3.32 750
= 0.052 p.u.
10
Fault at A = -----
0.12
= 83.33 MVA
10
Fault at B = ---------------
0.12 + 0.0033
= 81.10 MVA
10
Fault at C = -------------------------
0.12 + 0.0033 + 0.175
= 33.52 MVA
10
Fault at D = ---------------------------------------
0.12 + 0.0033 + 0.175 + 0.0083
= 32.62 MVA
 10
Fault at E = ----------------------------------------------
0.12 +0.0033 +0.175 +0.0083 +0.052
= 27.89 MVA
For more complex networks with a larger number of components, the process of ‘network reduction’ to obtain the
Thevenin equivalent is the same as in the above examples and is just a matter of applying normal circuit analysis
theorems.

LIMITING SHORT CIRCUIT LEVELS

When a short circuit to earth or between phases occurs the current is limited by the system impedance (which is
fundamentally the impedance of the alternators, bus-bar interconnectors, transformers and feeders). The impedance of a
small system with limited generator capacity may be sufficient to limit the short circuit kVA at any point to a value that
the circuit breakers are capable of interrupting. In large systems, however, additional impedance may be required. This
is provided by reactors that limit the short circuit current to a value that can be interrupted by the breakers before
damage to plant occurs.
There are three possible locations for reactors:
(a) in series with the alternators
(b) in series with the feeders
(c) between the bus-bar sections
(a) This scheme is not commonly used as:
(i) modern power station alternators have sufficient leakage reactance to withstand short circuit
(ii) under normal healthy conditions large voltage drop and power loss in each reactor occurs due to load current
(iii) in case of short circuit on or near the bus-bar end of a feeder, large fault current causes large voltage drops in the
reactors which reduce the bus-bar voltage to such a low value that the alternators can fall out of synchronism.
(b) These are not commonly used for the following reasons:
(i) normally there are hundreds of feeder circuit breakers but only a few alternator circuit breakers. It is essential to
limit the short circuit which the feeder breakers will have to interrupt in order to reduce cost
(ii) in case of fault there is large voltage drop in its reactor with small reduction in bus-bar voltage and synchronism is
not lost
(iii) feeder reactor do not protect the alternators against bus-bar faults, however leakage reactance should afford enough
protection.
The disadvantages of using feeder reactors are:
(i) large voltage drop and power loss
(ii) in case of number of alternators, the value of reactance has to be increased to keep the short circuit levels within the
ratings.
(c) These are the most commonly used and gives all the advantages without the disadvantages of (b) above.

TRANSIENTS DURING A BALANCED FAULT

In order to consider the basic points a simple circuit model of an ac generator (or alternator) is shown in Figure 2. The
voltage e(t) is a fictitious generated voltage that is assumed to be dependent only on the speed of the machine and the
value of the field current. The resistance R is the ac resistance of the machine winding. The reactance X = jxL is also
fictitious, and its value is chosen to fit the problem, as follows:
Xd is synchronous reactance (steady state value)
Xd ' is transient reactance (3-10 cycles after sudden changes on the machine)
Xd " subtransient reactance (1-3 cycles immediately after sudden changes on the machine

The various values of X are represented in Table 1. This value depends upon whether condition of steady state or rapid
change is being considered.
Suppose a short circuit is suddenly applied at the terminals of an ac generator. The power frequency that flows in any
one of the windings will vary with time as shown in Figure 3. The current initially has a high magnitude, falls in value
rapidly in the first 5-15 cycles, and eventually comes to steady state.
 Table 1: Typical sequence reactance values for synchronous machines

The phenomena that occur with a synchronous machine that make necessary use of the three aforementioned values of
reactance involve transients in the field and in the rotor of the machine. An analysis of this behaviour is mathematically
considered as follows:
The voltage e(t) is assumed to be
e(t) = Emsin(ωt + α)
It can be seen that at time t = 0, a dc term exist whose initial magnitude may be equal to the magnitude of the steady
state current term.
The transient current i(t) is given by:

i(t) = (Em/Z)[sin(ωt + α - θ) - sin(α - θ)exp(-Rt/L)]

where Z = √(R2 + ω2L2)
and θ = tan-1(ωL/R)

The worst possible case occurs when θ - α = (i) 0° or = (ii) 90°.

(i) In this case the transient current is given by
i(t) = (Em/Z)sinωt
The waveform for this case is shown in Figure 4(i).
(ii) For this case, the current waveform approaches twice the steady state maximum value just after the initiation of
short circuit. The transient current is given by
i(t) = (Em/Z)(-cosωt + exp(-Rt/L)]
For small values of t, exp(-Rt/L) = 1
Thus, i(t) = (Em/Z)(1 - cos ωt)
∴ i(t) = 2Em/Z
Figure 4(ii) shows the waveform for such case.
Looking at the response of the Figures 3 to 4, we can note that the reactance of the machine appears to be time varying.
The symmetrical r.m.s. short circuit currents are usually desired. These are calculated using the synchronous, transient
and sub-transient reactance (Figure 5).
Steady state current = I = E/Xd = S/√2 = 1.414
Transient current = I' = E/Xd' = (S+T)/√2 = 2.83
Sub-transient current = I" = E/Xd" = (S+U)/√2 = 3.54
In fault calculations the initial symmetrical r.m.s. current, which is the sub-transient current is usually desired. On
occasion, the symmetrical r.m.s. current must be approximated at a time of (say) 5 cycles after fault occurs. Then the
transient current is used as approximation.
For calculations of fault current in a power system, each generator is represented as an emf E in series with an
approximated reactance (usually Xd"). The reactance of all transformers and lines are inserted into the single line
diagram and the short circuit calculation is performed using any valid circuit solution method.

SEQUENCE NETWORKS FOR CALCULATION OF UNBALANCED FAULTS

Up to date, our analysis of fault currents and voltages has been based on a three phase balanced short circuit and the
equivalent impedance network has represented the reactances of one phase. However, the majority of faults on the
power system involve one or two phases and earth. This means that the currents and voltages are no longer a balanced
three phase system. The maximum unbalance occurs at the fault point where one or more phases will have their voltage
reduced to near zero and fault current will flow.
A technique called ‘Symmetrical Components’ is used to represent the unbalanced three phase currents and voltages as
three symmetrical systems, each of which can be solved using three phase calculation techniques.
Symmetrical components were first proposed for the calculation of fault currents and voltages in 1918, in a paper to the
AIEE by C.L. Fortescue. They have been a major tool for the calculation of fault currents since that time.
The concepts of Symmetrical Components are relatively easy to understand but the application, in dealing with different
combinations of phases and earth for different fault conditions, can be complex and very time consuming.
As mentioned previously, there are many computer packages available today to perform fault calculations and most
protection practitioners would have limited need to perform complex manual calculations. Nevertheless, it is important
to understand the concepts and be able to employ the techniques to small systems.
An overview and some practice with the use of the techniques is given in the following paragraphs. If the reader wishes
to investigate the technique further there are a number of texts that give a comprehensive treatment, including the
Westinghouse, Electrical Transmission and Distribution Reference Book.
Symmetrical component analysis is based on the principle that three sets of balanced (symmetrical) vectors can be used
to represent an unbalanced three phase voltage or current. One set (a,b,c) using the impedances associated with the
normal operation of the power system, called the positive sequence impedances, a second set using impedances that
would be presented by the network to a set of vectors having a phase sequence of a, c, b, called the negative sequence
impedances and a third with three vectors of the same angle called the zero sequence impedances.
The sequence impedance of plant in a network can be imagined as the impedance derived from the equation of the
voltage drop resulting from the circulation of the sequence current through the network impedance ie the voltage could
actually be measured by measuring the voltage drop when the current of a particular sequence is circulated through the
network element.
The following tabulation demonstrates the concepts
a a a b c

c b b c

Positive Phase Sequence Negative Phase Sequence Zero Phase Sequence

(PPS) (NPS) (ZPS)

Denoted: Ea1 Eb1 Ec1 Denoted: Ea2 Ec2 Eb2 Denoted: Ea0 Eb0 Ec0
Ia1 Ib1 Ic1 Ia2 Ic2 Ib2 Ia0 Ib0 Ic0

For a phase to phase fault between phases b and c of a three phase. With the positive and negative sequence vectors
having the relationship shown it can be seen that adding the two sequence vectors gives the resultant fault currents in
phases b and c. There is no earth or neutral connection so the zero phase sequence vectors are zero.

a
b
c

a c b

Ic Ib

c b a

Consider an unloaded generator connected through a reactor as shown in Figure 6. The equations for the components
are as follows:
V1 = Ea - I1Z1
V2 = - I2Z2
 V0 = - I0Z0
where Ea is the positive sequence no-load voltage to neutral and Z0 is defined as
Z0 = 3Zn + Zg0
Zg0 is the sequence impedance per phase of the generator.

The sequence components of current are shown in Figure 7. The generated emf in the positive sequence network is the
no load terminal voltage to neutral, which is also equal to the transient and subtransient internal voltage since the
generator is not loaded.
The reference bus for the positive and negative sequence networks is the neutral of the generator. So far as the positive
and negative sequence components are concerned, the neutral of the generator is at ground potential if there is a
connection between neutral and ground having a finite or zero impedance since the connection will carry no positive
and negative sequence current. Remember the negative sequence paths are the same as those of positive sequence
currents. However, the impedance to the flow of negative sequence current in a rotating machine is not the same as that
of the positive sequence. This difference is not significant for most fault calculations, and is usually neglected.
Transformers and lines have equal positive and negative sequence impedances.

The zero sequence currents are a single phase set, and must flow up through the neutral from ground; consequently the
zero sequence network is different from the other two, both in the values of the impedances and the structure of the
network. In apparatus that has no neutral (ie is delta connected) or that has no connection between ground and neutral,
there is no path for the flow of zero sequence current. The zero sequence currents from each of the three phases of the
wye connected generator must flow through the neutral impedance Zn. The current flowing in the impedance Zn
between neutral and ground is 3I0 and the voltage drop across the neutral impedance is 3Zn I0. Since the current in the
zero sequence network is I0, the impedance must be 3Zn.
In case of an ungrounded wye connected load, the positive and negative sequence networks are identical, whereas the
zero sequence network is not connected from the neutral, since the wye is ungrounded.
If the wye is grounded, then there is a path for zero sequence currents to flow, and the neutral will be connected to the
reference bus.
The positive and negative sequence networks for a delta connected load have the same form as the wye connected load.
The zero sequence current is however, different. No zero sequence current paths exist for line currents, however zero
sequence currents may circulate around the delta. This circulating path is not normally energised, except in the case of
3rd harmonic exciting currents of transformer windings in a delta winding. Third and its odd multiple harmonics are
necessarily zero sequence components.

Transformer

The positive and negative sequence networks of transformers are identical to the per phase equivalent circuit used in
normal balanced analysis. The form of the zero sequence network is very much dependent on the actual connection of
the primary and secondary. Windings in delta connections prevent zero sequence line currents, but allow zero sequence
phase currents to circulate around the delta. Windings in ungrounded wye prevent all zero sequence current flow. In all
cases, current flow on one side of the transformer must produce a current flow on the other side (to balance the mmf's
produced by each winding). Magnetising paths are not included, since they are very high impedance paths. Table 2
gives zero sequence equivalent circuit for three phase transformers with different possible type of connections.
The phase shift introduced by delta-wye transformers has no effect on the magnitude of the fault currents at the point of
fault, but it should be taken into account in determining voltages on the far side of the transformer. Include the normal
30° phase shift for the required transformation.

Table 2: Zero sequence equivalent circuits of three phase transformer banks

Three winding transformers and auto-transformers pose interesting problems. On considering grounded wye-wye three
winding transformers with a delta tertiary, which has the same equivalent circuit as the grounded wye auto-transformer
with a delta tertiary. The tertiary is assumed to be brought out to terminals, although this is not always the case
(particularly in the case of auto-transformer). The positive and negative sequence are shown in Figure 8. The zero
sequence network must show that no zero sequence line currents can flow from the delta tertiary, but that the zero
sequence phase currents in the delta allow the bank to serve as a source of ground currents. Figure 9 shows the zero
sequence network for three transformer banks, together with diagrams of connections and the symbols for one line
diagram
On most fault calculations, the main interest in using this circuit is to calculate through faults involving ground. Thus
the tertiary connection is often not shown on the positive and negative sequence diagrams. The tertiary must be shown
connected to ground in the zero sequence diagram to correctly represent the fact that the bank can supply ground current
to the fault. If the delta tertiary were omitted from the bank, then the wye auto-transformer would have sequence
networks of the same form as those of a wye-wye two winding transformer, which can pass ground fault currents from
one side to the other, but cannot supply zero sequence current to a fault.
Synchronous Machines

In case of synchronous machines, the only source of voltage on the system is the positive sequence. Machines will
contribute to fault currents whether operating to produce voltage or operating as spinning reserve. The positive
sequence impedance Z1 is the normal transient/subtransient value. Negative sequence current set up a rotating magnetic
field in the opposite direction to that of positive sequence currents and which rotates around the rotor surface at twice
the synchronous speed; hence the effective impedance, being the negative sequence impedance Z2 is different from Z1.
In the absence of information Z2 is approximately 70% of Z1, as the system impedance will swamp the small difference
for system fault calculations.
The zero sequence impedance Z0 will depend on the nature of the connection between the star point of the windings and
earth and the single phase impedance of the stator windings in series. Because zero sequence currents are all in phase,
there will be considerable demagnetisation of the generator iron circuit which means that Z0 is very low, say half of Z1.
Resistors or reactors are frequently connected between the star point of the windings and earth for reasons associated
with protective gear and limitation of overvoltages and this completely swamps the machine impedance. Further as the
machines are usually connected to the system via delta-wye transformers, they cannot supply zero sequence currents to
system faults because they cannot flow outside the delta winding.

Induction Motors

Even though there is no external excitation, the flux present within an induction motor will contribute to the fault
current, but the contribution will decay to zero. For system fault studies, only the very large motors need be considered
and they may be lumped as an equivalent motor with power rating equal to the sum of the motors considered. Four
times full load current of this motor may be used to give a reasonable figure for the equivalent source impedance.

Lines and Cables

The positive and negative sequence impedances are the normal balanced values and are identical because the
impedances are independent of phase order for balanced applied voltages.
The zero sequence impedance depends on the nature of the return path through the earth if no fourth wire is provided. It
is also modified by the presence of earth wires on the towers.
The zero sequence mutual impedance between parallel circuits can be appreciable because they share an earth return
path, in addition to mutual coupling effects.
Table 3 summarises the expressions to be used to determine fault current and the forms of interconnection of the
sequence networks for various unsymmetrical fault conditions.
CALCULATION OF VOLTAGES IN THE NETWORK
While studying a power system, it is essential to know the short circuit currents and kVA the system carries under
various fault conditions and at different points in the system. Since the system remains balanced during symmetrical
(three phase) faults, analysis can proceed on a single-phase basis. The solution can be obtained directly by normal
method of reducing the network up to point of fault, expressing the system parts in terms of impedances in per unit
values, and then solving the related equations by network laws. The faults can also be represented by symmetrical
components and the solution obtained by method of symmetrical components. However, as earlier mentioned various
types of unsymmetrical faults (both shunt and series) do occur. These unbalanced type of faults can be solved by the use
of symmetrical component method.
The faults may occur at the terminals of an unloaded generator or at any point in the system under different operating
conditions; the fault may be complete dead short or it may be leakage through some impedance. In the latter case, the
fault impedance comes into the circuit at the proper place depending on the type of fault when solving symmetrical
component sequence networks. When considering the fault at any point in the system, the fault point should be located
in various sequence impedance networks and voltages and impedances up to the point of fault in each sequence network
should be considered for solution of fault current.

When the network currents have been determined, the sequence voltage at any point in the network can be found by
subtracting the impedance drops of that sequence from the generated voltage (if any), taking the neutral point of the
network as the point of zero voltage.
Table 3: Summary of fault current of sequence networks for various fault condition

a a
G b G b
c c

F1 F2 F0 F1 F2 F0
Z1 Z2 Z0 Z1 Z2 Z0

N1 N2 N0 N1 N2 N0
V V

Three Phase Fault, a-b-c One Phase to Ground Fault

a a
G b G b
c c

F1 F2 F0 F1 F2 F0
Z1 Z2 Z0 Z1 Z2 Z0
N1 N2 N0 N1 N2 N0
V

Double Phase Fault, b-c Double Phase to Earth Fault

The voltages at any point in the network (including the fault point) are given by:
V1 = Ea - I1Z1
V2 = - I2Z2
V0 = - I0Z0
The actual voltages on each phase can be calculated using the transformation as covered in standard Power System
textbooks.
[Vabc] = [A] [V012]
A similar procedure may be used to calculate the potential rise on neutral points, given that there is some impedance
between the neutral point and earth. Such an impedance appears only in the zero sequence network, and then as three
times the actual impedance, as described earlier.