This judgement ranked 1 in the hitlist.

Brij Lal v. State of Punjab, (P&H) (DB) : Law Finder Doc Id # 59364

1975(2) ILR (Punjab) 310 : 1973 PLJ 462 : 1973 RLR 456

PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT

(DB)

Before :- Prem Chand Pandit and Bhopinder Singh Dhillon, JJ.

Civil Writ No. 379 of 1973. D/d. 9.5.1973

Brij Lal - Petitioner

Versus
The State of Punjab, etc. - Respondents

For the Petitioner :- R.L. Sharma, Advocate.

For the State :- J.S. Wasu, Advocate-General, Punjab with S.K. Syal, Advocate.

For the Respondent Nos. 3 to 6 :- J.M. Sethi, Advocate.

Punjab Co-operative Societies Act, 1961, Sections 68(1) and 2(e) and 69 - Revision
of orders passed in appeals - Revisional power lies with the State Govt. - Held, power
specifically given to Registrar but exercised through his delegate is revisionable by
State Govt. only - Revisional powers with Registrar when orders passed by authority
subordinate to Registrar.

[Para 13]

Cases referred :-

1. Nachhittar Singh v. The State of Punjab and others, 1973 P.L.J. 199.

2. The Halwara Co-operative Agricultural Service Society Ltd., Halwara v. The State of Punjab
and others, 1972 P.L.J. 461,

3. Roop Chand v. The State of Punjab and another, 1963 P.L.R. 577.

4. The Ferozeshah Co-operative Agricultural Service Society Ltd. v. The Secretary to

Government, Punjab and others, C.R. No. 927 of 1969, decided on 6th November, 1969.

5. The Bhadra Ryots Co-operative Society Ltd. v. The State of My sore and another, 1971 Co-
operative Law Journal, 87.

JUDGMENT

Dhillon, J. - This judgment will dispose of Civil Writ petition Nos. 379, 431, 489, 797 and 957
of 1973. The petitioners in all these writ petitions approached the State Government in
revisional jurisdiction under the provisions of Section 69 of the Punjab Co-operative Societies
Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). It may be pointed out that the powers of the
State Government under Section 69 of the Act are not exercised by the Minister of the Co-
operative Department but the same are being exercised by a delegatee either the Under-
Secretary or the Deputy Secretary to Government, as the case may be. It is the admitted case
of the parties that in none of these cases, appeal against the award of the Arbitrator lay to the
State Government, Punjab, under Section 68 of the Act, but in fact the appeals lay to the
Registrar under Section 68(2)(c) of the Act, who has further delegated its powers to his
subordinate officers. The delegatee of the State Government dismissed the revision petitions
following the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court reported in Nachhittar Singh
v. The State of Punjab and others, 1973 P.L.J. 199, wherein the learned Single Judge of
this Court held that where an appeal lies either to the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, or to
the State Government under Section 68 of the Act, no revisional jurisdiction can be exercised
under the provisions of Section 69 of the Act.

2. Therefore, the only question which has to be considered in these cases is as to what is the
correct interpretation of Section 69 of the Act. It may be pointed out that Chapter XI of the Act
deals with appeals and revisions and consists of only three Section Nos. 68, 69 and 70. Section
68, Sub-section (1) provides that an appeal shall lie under this section against various orders
mentioned therein passed under the Act and the appealable orders are specifically mentioned
in clauses (a) to (k) of this Sub-section. Sub-section 2 of this section provides as to before
which authority the appeal against the orders made appealable under Sub-section (1) of this
section, shall lie. Sub-Section (3) of this section specifically provides that no appeal shall lie
under this section from any decision or order made by any authority in appeal or in other
words Sub-section (3) bars a second appeal from the orders made appealable under Sub-
section (1) of this section. Then comes Section 69 which deals with the revisional powers,
which is in the following terms :-

"69 Revision.
The State Government and the Registrar may, suo moto or on the application of
a party to a reference, call for and examine the record of any proceedings in
which no appeal under Section 68 lies to the Government or the Registrar, as
the case may be, for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the legality
or propriety of any decision or order passed and if in any case it shall appear to
the Government or the Registrar that any such decision or order should be
modified, annulled or revised, the Government or the Registrar, as the case may
be, may, after giving persons affected thereby an opportunity of being heard
pass such order thereon as it or he may deem fit."

3. Section 70 of the Act deals with the powers of the Appellate or Revisional Authority for
passing interlocutory orders during the pendency of the appeal or revision, as the case may
be. In the present cases, we are only concerned with the interpretation of Section 69 of the
Act. As I have already pointed out, in Nachhittar Singh's case (supra), a learned Single Judge
of this Court interpreted Section 69 of the Act so as to mean that if an appeal against an order
lies under Section 68 of the Act, either to the Registrar or to the State Government, in that
case, there is no power of revision either with the State Government or with the Registrar. The
net result of this interpretation is that in all cases in which appeals are provided under Sub-
section (1) of Section 68 of the Act, no revision petition lies and the order made in the first
appeal becomes final. In my opinion, from the plain language of the provisions of Section 69 of
the Act, this interpretation is not possible. Section 69 clearly vests the revisional power in the
State Government where the order sought to be revised passed under appeal has not been
passed by the State Government or in other words, where the order sought to be revised
passed in appeal has been passed by the Registrar or his delegatee, and the power of revision
in cases where the appellate order is not passed by the Registrar, but by an authority
subordinate to him, not in the capacity of the delegatee mentioned in Sub-section (2) of
Section 68 of the Act, would lie in the Registrar. I am inclined to interpret Section 69 of the Act
in this matter because if the intention of the legislature in enacting Section 69 of the Act was
to exclude the revisional jurisdiction in all the cases where the appeal lies either to the
Registrar or to the State Government, it was quite sufficient that a mention would have been
made in Section 69 of the Act that if an appeal lies under Section 68 of the Act, no revision
would lie. There was no necessity for the Legislature to have enacted the words "any
proceedings in which no appeal under Section 68 lies to the Government or the Registrar, as
the case may be" in Section 69 of the Act. Further more, the words "as the case may be
"inserted after the words" "in which no appeal under Section 68 lies to the State Government
or the Registrar" and before the words "for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself", make it
clear that the State Government in exercising the revisional powers cannot revise the appellate
order as the same has been passed by the State Government in exercising the revisional
powers cannot revise the appellate order as the same has been passed by the State
Government under Section 68 of the Act and in case where the appellate order sought to be
revised has been passed by an authority order sought to be revised has been passed by an
authority subordinate to the Registrar (not in the capacity of a delegatee of the Registrar) in
that case the power of revision will lie to the Registrar. The words "as the case may be" are
sufficiently indicative of the intention of the Legislature that the appellate authority will not
exercise the revisional power against its own orders passed in appeal, but an authority higher
than the appellate Authority is competent to exercise that revisional powers even in the case
where the first appeal has been provided under Sub-section (1) of Section 68 of that Act. To
interpret this Section otherwise, would mean ousting of the jurisdiction of the State
Government or the Registrar from entertaining the revision petition against all orders which
are appealable under Sub-section (1) of the Section 68 of the Act. This cannot be the intention
of the Legislature as I find that all important and material orders passed under the Act are
made appealable under Sub-section (1) of Section 68 of the Act, and if the section is
interpreted in the manner as interpreted in Nachhattar Singh's case (supra) in that case the
revisional jurisdiction will be completely ousted qua the orders passed in appeal under Section
68 of the Act and orders passed in first appeal in all important matters will become final. For
instance, under clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 68 of the Act, an order of the Registrar
made under Sub-section (2) of Section 8 of the Act refusing to register a Society, has been
made appealable. Similarly, under clause (b), an order of the Registrar made under Sub-
section (4) of Section 10 refusing to register an amendment of the bye-laws of a co-operative
society; under clause (bb) an order of the Registrar made under Section 10-A directing
amendment of bye-laws of a co-operative society; under clause (c) a decision of a co-operative
society, other than a producers' society, refusing to admit any person as a member of the
society who is otherwise duly qualified for membership under the bye-laws of the society;
under clause (d) a decision of a co-operative society expelling any of its members; under
clause (e) an order made by the Registrar removing or suspending a committee member
thereof under Section 27; under clause (f) an order made by the Registrar under Section 57
apportioning the costs of an inquiry held under Section 50 or an inspection made under
Section 51; under clause (g) any order of surcharge under Section 54; under clause (h) any
decision or award made under Section 56; under clause (i) an order made by the Registrar
under Section 57 directing the winding up of a co-operative society; under clause (j) any order
made by the Liquidator of a co-operative society in exercise of the powers conferred on him by
Section 59; and under clause (k) any order made under Section 65 of the Act, are made
appealable. If an interpretation is given that in all these matters no revision petition would lie
and the legislature only intended to provide only one appeal against these orders and the
orders passed in appeal will become final, that, in my opinion, in addition to causing great
hardship to the aggrieved persons, will be against the very language of the provisions of
Section 69 of the Act itself.

4. No doubt, if the interpretation as given in Nachhattar Singh's case (supra), is adopted,

Section 69 of the Act will not become wholly redundant as there are some other provisions in
the Act under which the orders, if passed, are not made appealable under Section 68 of the Act
and in these cases the revisional jurisdiction can be exercised but the fact remains that all
such provisions under which orders passed have not been made appealable, are not so
important and material in the working of the Act. The said provisions are Sections 13, 14, 21,
22, 45, 46 and 47 of the Act. Section 13 deals with the amalgamation, transfer of assets and
liabilities and division of co-operative societies. Section 14 deals with the cancellation of
registration certificates of co-operative societies in certain cases. Section 21 deals with the
transfer of interest on death of members; whereas Section 22 deals with the liability of past
member and estate of deceased member. Section 45 deals with the restrictions on loans.
Section 46 deals with the restrictions on borrowings and Section 47 deals with the restrictions
on other transactions with non-members of the Society. It would thus be seen that all these
sections, orders passed under which have not been made appealable, are not so important as
the provisions mentioned in clauses (a) to (k) of Sub-section (1) of Section 68 of the Act which
have been made appealable. But if the interpretation to Section 69 of the Act is given as I am
inclined to interpret, it will give wider meaning to Section 69 of the Act and not restricted
meaning as given in Nachhattar Singh's case (supra) because in that case revision petition will
be competent against all orders passed under the Act, whether the order sought to be revised
is the appellate order or otherwise.

5. Mention may also be made to a decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in The
Halwara Co-operative Agricultural Service Society Ltd. Halwara v. The State of
Punjab and others, 1972 P.L.J. 461, wherein the learned Single Judge of this Court took
the view that the remedy under Section 69 of the Punjab Co-operative Societies Act for
revision does not exist in case where the appeal lay to the Government or the Registrar. In
that case it was held by the learned Single Judge that since the appeal in that particular case
lay to the Deputy Registrar, therefore, the remedy of revision was open. That is the case
decided on its own facts and if that decision be taken to mean that in case an appeal lies either
to the Registrar or to the State Government, no revision petition lies, it may be taken that I
am taking a different view in the interpretation of Section 69 of the Act, which view I have
already expressed. The learned Advocate-General also supported the counsel for the
petitioners regarding the interpretation of Section 69 of the Act and contended that Nachhattar
Singh's case (supra) has been wrongly decided.

6. Having interpreted Section 69 of the Act so as to mean that if an appeal against an order is
preferred under Section 68 of the Act to the State Government, the State Government will
have no revisional power under Section 69 of the Act against the order passed in appeal, and
in case an order in appeal under Section 68 of the Act has been passed by the Registrar, the
Registrar has no power of revision against the order passed in appeal, the only question which
now falls for determination is whether regarding the orders impugned in the present petitions,
the revisional power would vest in the State Government or the Registrar under the provisions
of Section 69 of the Act. The awards in all the five writ petitions have been passed by the
Arbitrator admittedly under the provisions of Section 56(1)(c) of the Act. It is, therefore, the
admitted case between the parties that the appeals against these awards were filed under
clause (e) of Sub-section (2) of Section 68 of the Act and the same were disposed of by the
person authorised by the Registrar in that behalf. It may be pointed out that the provisions of
Section 3 of the Act, which are in the following terms, authorised the State Government by
general or special order to confer on any person appointed under Sub-section (2) all or any of
the powers of the Registrar under this Act.

"3. Registration of Co-operative Societies.

1. The Government may appoint a person to be the Registrar of Co-operative
Societies for the State.
2. To assist the Registrar in his functions under this Act, the Government may
appoint such number of Additional Registrars, Joint Registrars, Deputy
Registrars, Assistant Registrars, and other persons with such designations as it
may think fit.
3. The Government may, be general or special order, confer on any person
appointed under Sub-section (2) all or any of the powers of the Registrar under
this Act.
4. Every person appointed under Sub-section (2) shall exercise his powers
subject to the general superintendence and control of the Registrar".

7. Before coming into force the Punjab Co-operative Societies Amendment ordinance, 1969,
which ultimately was converted into Punjab Act No. 26 of 1969, amending the provisions of
Sections 68 and 69 of the Act, the State Government issued a notification dated 14th August,
1969 published in the Punjab Government Gazette dated 22nd August, 1969, conferring the
powers of the Registrar, Co-operative Societies upon the officers mentioned therein, which is in
the following terms :-

"All Joint Registrars Co-

All the powers of Registrar exercisable under
operative Societies, Punjab and
the aforesaid Act and Rules framed
Deputy Registrars, Co-
thereunder from time to time.
operative Societies, Punjab.
 The powers of Registrar exercisable under
All Assistant Registrars Co- Sections 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 25, 28(1)(b), 42, 48,
operative Societies, Punjab. 50, 51, 52, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 63(a), 65,
66, 67, 68, 82(2), 83 of the aforesaid Act."

8. After the coming into force of the Punjab Co-operative Societies Amendment Ordinance,
1969 and the Amendment Act No. 26 of 1969, the State Government issued a notification
dated 19th November, 1969, which is now in force. The said notification superseded the
notification dated 14th August, 1969 and under Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Act, the
State Government conferred upon the following officers of the Co-operative Department such
powers of the Registrar, as indicated against each :-

"1. All Joint Registrars, All powers of the Registrar exercisable under the
Co-operative aforesaid Act and
Societies, Punjab.
2. All Deputy Registrars, All powers of the Registrar exercisable under the
Co-operative aforesaid Act and the Rules framed thereunder from time
Societies, Punjab. to time except powers under Section 26(ID) and Sub-
sections (1), (2), (3), (4), (6) and (7) of Section 27 in
respect of Co-operative Sugar Mills, Co-operative
Consumers Stores, and Central Co-operative Banks."
"3. All Assistant Powers of the Registrar exercisable under Sections 8, 9,
Registrars, Co- 10, 11, 13, 25, 26(IA), 28, 42, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 55, 56;
operative Societies 57, 58, 59, 61, clause (a) of and the proviso to Sections
Punjab. 63, 65, 66, 67, 73, 82 (2) and 83 of the aforesaid Act and
also powers of the Registrar under Section 26(ID) and
Sub-sections (1), (2), (3), (4), (6) and (7) of Section 27
so far as they relate to Primary Societies as defined in
Section 15-A of the aforesaid Act and rules 8, 10, 12, 15,
27, 38, 39, 43(1), 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51; 52, 53, 54, 55,
56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 67, 68, 69 and 70 and
rules 1(b), 1(d), 4 and 10 of Part I of Appendix 'C' of
Punjab Co-operative Societies Rules, 1963."

9. It would be clear from this notification, which is now in force, that the powers of the
Registrar to be exercised under clause (e) of Sub-section (2) of Section 68 of the Act having
not been delegated by the State Government under Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Act to
any officer under him, it has been left to the discretion of the Registrar either to decide the
appeals himself or to authorise any officer mentioned in sub-clause (e) of Sub-section (2) of
Section 68 of the Act, for deciding the appeals. In pursuance of this powers under clause (e),
the Registrar, - vide circular letter no. 29587-616, dated 9th June, 1971, which is in the
following terms, delegated its powers to the officer, who has appointed the person concerned
to adjudicate a particular dispute under Section 56(1)(c) of the Act.

"Please refer to provisions contained in Section 68 of the Punjab Co-operative

Societies Act, 1961. Clause (e) of Sub-section (2) of this Section at present at
present provides that when a decision or order was made by any person (other
than Assistant Registrars/Deputy Registrars/ Joint Registrars etc.) the appeal
against that decision or order shall lie to the Registrar who may authorise any
Assistant Registrar, Deputy Registrar, Joint Registrar or Additional Registrar,
Deputy Registrar, Joint Registrar or Additional Registrar to hear that appeal. At
the moment all such appeals are filed before the Registrar who has to authorise
any Assistant Registrar/Deputy Registrar or Joint Registrar etc. to hear the
appeal by special orders so as to avoid delay in disposal thereof. This increases
work at Head Office level and also causes inconvenience to the appellants who
have to file each and every such appeal before the Registrar in the first instance.
In order to remove this hardship it has been decided to issue general
authorisation for hearing appeals under clause (e) of Sub-section (2) of Section
 68 of the Act. In future the appeals in these cases shall lie to the Officer who has
appointed the person concerned to adjudicate a particular matter. For instance,
if an Arbitrator has been appointed by an Assistant Registrar, the appeal against
his Award shall lie to that Assistant Registrar and in case he has been appointed
by a Deputy Registrar, then the appeal shall lie to the Deputy Registrar, so on
and so forth. Appeals filed under clauses (c) and (d) of Sub-section (1) of
Section 68 shall be heard by the Assistant Registrar of the circle to which such
cases relate."

10. It is the admitted case of both the parties that the powers of appeal exercised in all the
five writ petitions, which are being disposed of by us, were exercised by the delegates of the
Registrar in view of the circular letter No. 29587-616, dated 9th June, 1971. It is, therefore,
apparent that the appellate orders had been passed by the authorities as delegates of the
Registrar under clause (e) of Sub-section (2) of Section 68 of the Act. In this view of the
matter, in my opinion, the revision petitions would lie not to the Registrar but to the State
Government because under clause (e) of Sub-section (2) of Section 68 of the Act, the power to
dispose of the appeals, in the cases mentioned therein, can only be exercised by the Registrar
and the delegatee exercising the powers of the Registrar, will be deemed to be acting as the
Registrar as the powers under this clause can be exercised only by the Registrar and if a
particular decision is made by a delegatee exercising the powers which are specifically
provided under the Act to be exercised by the Registrar, the order of the delegatee, in law, will
be considered to be the order of the Registrar and the revision petition in that case will lie to
the State Government. I am fortified in this regard by an authority of the Supreme Court in
Roop Chand v. The State of Punjab and another, 1963 P.L.R. 577(576), wherein it was
held that an order passed by the delegatee of the State Government under the provisions of
Sub-section (4) of Section 21 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of
Fragmentation) Act, 1948, will be deemed to be an order of the State Government and in
those cases no revision under Section 42 of the said Act would lie to the State Government
which authority had already exercised the appellate powers though through a delegatee. It
was held by their Lordships that it is the statute which creates that power. The power can,
therefore, be exercised in terms of the statue and not otherwise. It was further held that it
would, therefore, follow that an order made in exercise of that power will be the order of the
authority to which, that power was given and no one else had the right to exercise that power.
It was also held that no doubt that power to delegate is given by the statute but the power
given to the authority cannot create an independent power in the officer. The same principle
would apply to the present case, and therefore, in my opinion, when a power, which has been
specifically entrusted to the Registrar under the provisions of clause (e), Sub-section (2) of
Section 68 of the Act, is exercised by a delegatee the said order of the delegatee, will be
deemed to be the order of the Registrar in the eyes of law and in those cases the revision
would lie to the State Government. Similar view was taken by a learned Single Judge of this
Court in The Ferozeshah Co-operative Agricultural Service Society Ltd. v. The
Secretary to Government, Punjab and others, C.R. No. 927 of 1969, decided on 6th
November, 1969, by Gurdev Singh, J., (as he then was). In that case an order was passed
by a delegatee exercising the powers of the Registrar for winding up of a Co-operative Society.
It was held that an order passed by the delegatee in exercise of the powers conferred on the
Registrar, was deemed to be an order of the Registrar and appeal in those cases shall lie to the
State Government.

11. At this place a reference to a Division Bench decision on the Mysore High Court in The
Bhadra Ryots Co-operative Society Ltd. v. The State of My sore and another, 1971
Co-operative Law Journal, 87, may be made, on which reliance is being placed by the
learned Advocate-General for the State of Punjab, who propounds the view that an order
passed by the Assistant Registrar will be appealable to the Registrar even though the Assistant
Registrar exercised the powers of the Registrar under the substantive provisions of the Act. In
the present case, we are not concerned with the interpretation of the provisions of clauses (a),
(b), (c) and (d) of Sub-section (2) of Section 68 of the Act, rather we are only concerned with
the interpretation of clause (e) of Sub-section (2) of Section 68 of the Act, in which the power
of deciding an appeal, if the decision or order was made by any other person than the
Registrar, is given to the Registrar or its delegatee. Therefore, it may not be appropriate to
consider the general question regarding the interpretation of clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of
Sub-section (2) of Section 68 of the Act, which will be appropriately done in a proper case. As
regards the interpretation of clause (e) of this section, I have no doubt in my mind that an
order passed by any person as a delegatee of the Registrar, is not revisable by the Registrar
himself, but it can only be revised by the State Government. The authority reported in Bhadra
Ryots Co-operative Society's Case (supra) is clearly distinguishable as under the provisions of
Section 106(2) of the Mysore Co-operative Societies Act, 1959, which were being interpreted
by the learned Judges of the Mysore High Court, and which are in the following terms, the
powers of hearing appeals by the Registrar and his subordinates are couched in different
language :-

"106(2). An appeal against any act, decision or order under Sub-section (1) shall
be made within sixty days from the date of the act, decision or order, -
(a) if the act, decision or order was made by the Registrar, to the State
Government;
(b) if the act, decision or order was made by any other officer, to that officer's
immediate superior officer."

12. It would be clear that there is no provision in that Act, which fell for interpretation,
analogous to clause (e) of Sub-section (2) of Section 68 of the Act. The clauses (a) and (b) of
Sub-section (2) of Section 106 of the Mysore Co-operative Societies Act are analogous to
clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Sub-section (2) of Section 68 of the Act. There is no clause
which is analogous to clause (e) of Sub-Section (2) of Section 68 of the Act, wherein
specifically the Registrar or his delegatee, has been given power to hear appeals against the
decisions or orders made by other persons. Moreover, with great respect to the learned Judges
of the Mysore High Court, I am not prepared to subscribe to this view for the simple reason
that this decision has not taken notice of the principles laid down by their Lordships of the
Supreme Court in Roop Chand's case (supra). The principle that where a power under the
statute has been given to a particular authority and though a power has also been given to
delegate the said power to any other person, the delegatee derives the power from the
statutory person, who alone can exercise the said power under the statute, was not taken into
consideration by the learned Judges of the Mysore High Court deciding that case. Therefore,
my conclusion is that where a power under the statute has been specifically given to the
Registrar alone and the same is exercised by a delegatee, the said order will be revisable by
the State Government and not by the Registrar even though the delegatee, who exercised the
power, was the Assistant Registrar or the Deputy Registrar or the Joint Registrar or the
Additional Registrar.

13. In all these cases the State Government, who has the jurisdiction to entertain the revision
petitions against the orders passed in appeal by a delegatee of the Registrar under clause (e)
of Sub-section (2) of Section 68 of the Act, has refused to exercise jurisdiction, therefore, the
orders of the State Government passed in revision petitions, dismissing the same holding that
it has got no jurisdiction to hear the revision petitions, are hereby quashed. The cases are sent
back to the State Government with the directions that the State Government may dispose of
the revision petitions on merits. However, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the
cases, there will be no order as to costs.

Pandit, J. - Section 68(1) gives the various orders against which an appeal is competent. Sub-
section (2) of this section mentions the authorities before whom the appeal will lie. Sub-
section (3) lays down that there will be no second appeal from any decision taken or order
made on appeal by the authorities referred to in Sub-section (2). Section 69 deals with the
revisional powers of the State Government and the Registrar. They can be exercised by both
these authorities either suo motu or on the application of a party to a reference. According to
this section, before the revisional powers are made use of, either by the State Government or
the Registrar, the first question that will be determined will be if an appeal lies under Section
68 against that particular decision or order. If the reply be in the affirmative, then the person,
who is desirous of invoking the revision powers, will be directed to go and file an appeal
against that decision or order to the authorities specified in Section 68(2) of the Act. If no such
appeal is competent, then the Registrar or the State Government will exercise their revisional
powers. If on appeal the decision has been taken or the order has been passed by the
Registrar or his delegate, then the revisional will lie to the State Government. If, on the other
hand, the order has been made by any of the authorities subordinate to the Registrar, then in
that case the Registrar will have the revisional powers. This is the plain meaning of Section 69
of the Act.

With these observations, I agree with the order proposed by my learned brother.

This judgement ranked 1 in the hitlist.

Punjab State Federation of Consumers' Co-op v. Commissioner, (P&H) : Law Finder Doc Id #
28070

1991(3) S.C.T. 66 : 1991(2) SimLJ 991 : 1991(2) LJR 282

PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT

Before :- J.L. Gupta, J.

Civil Writ Petition No. 10772 of 1990. D/d. 12.4.1991.

Punjab State Federation of Consumers' Co-op Wholesale Stores Ltd. - Petitioner

Versus

Commissioner (Appeals), Jalandhar Division - Respondent

For the Petitioner :- Mr. M.S. Kang, Advocate.

For the Respondent No. 4 :- M.K. Tewari, In person.

For the Respondent :- Mr. Randhir Singh, AAG. Pb.

A. Punjab Cooperative Societies Act, 1961, Sections 55 and 56 -

Reference/Jurisdiction - Additional Registrars of Cooperative Societies have been
conferred with all the powers of Registrar - Additional Registrar Competent to decide
the reference made to the Registrar under Section 55 and 56

[Para 3]

B. Punjab Cooperative Societies Act, 1961, Sections 55 and 56 - Maintainability of

proceedings - The question of maintainability decided as a preliminary objection not
challenged - Proceedings allowed to continue till finally decided - Cannot be allowed
to challenge the final order on the ground on maintainability - A party disputing the
maintainability of proceedings cannot be allowed to sit on fence and wait for final
order till then the remedies may become time barred. Principal of estoppel applied.

[Para 5]

C. Punjab Cooperative Societies Act, 1961, Sections 68 and 69 - Delay in filing

Revision and Appeal - Appeal as well as revision filed after a long unexplained delay -
No sufficient cause proved for the delay - There is no impropriety in rejecting the
appeal/revision on the ground of limitation.
[Para 7]

D. Punjab Cooperative Societies Act, 1961, Sections 55 and 56 - Amendment of

claim/Estoppel - Amendment and additions of claim allowed vide a separate order
which was not opposed nor challenged - Final order cannot be challenged on the
ground that amendment and addition of claim could have not been allowed.

[Para 6]

JUDGMENT

J.L. Gupta, J. - The Punjab State Federation of Consumers' Cooperative Wholesale Stores Ltd.
(hereinafter referred to as 'Constofed') is a Cooperative Society registered under the Punjab
Cooperative Societies Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). Aggrieved by the award
at Annexure P-3 and the others passed in appeal and revision (Annexure P-5 and P-6) it has
approached this Court through the present writ petition. By the award, respondent No. 4 who
was employed as a Business Manager with the petitioner, has been held entitled to an amount
of Rs. 69,432.66 towards the arrears of salary etc. The facts and circumstances relevant for
the decision of the case may be noticed.

2. Respondent No. 4 was employed as Business Manager with the petitioner when he was
placed under suspension vide order dated 15.6.1976. He was served with a charge-sheet and
ultimately vide order dated 20.11.1981 his four increments were ordered to be stopped with
cumulative effect. He was also censured and it was ordered that he will not be entitled to any
allowance for the period of suspension other than what had already been paid to him. On
12.7.1982, the post of Business Manager held by respondent No. 4 was abolished as a
measure of economy and consequently his services were terminated. It is further averred in
the petition that for the acts of omission and commission committed by respondent No. 4 a
criminal case was registered against him under Sections 471 and 120B of the Indian Penal
Code at Police Station Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi. The case is stated to be still pending. After the
termination of his services and dismissal of his appeal against the order of termination
respondent No. 4 is alleged to have approached the Registrar of Cooperative Societies
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Registrar') for a reference of his dispute regarding the recovery
of arrears of pay etc. for the period of suspension under section 55(1)(b) of the Act. This claim
was made vide Annexure P.1. The petitioner resisted the claim and filed a detailed written
statement vide Annexure P-2. In this written statement an objection with regard to the
maintainability of the arbitration proceedings is also alleged to have been raised. After hearing
the parties the arbitrator awarded to respondent No. 4 an amount of Rs. 69,432.66 which was
to be paid in four equal instalments. The award was given on 6.10.1986. The petitioner claims
to have applied for a copy on 30.10.1986 which is alleged to be ready on 10.2.1987. A
photocopy of the award is alleged to have been received by the petitioner from respondent No.
4 on 20.4.1987. The appeal was filed through his counsel by the petitioner on 15.7.1987. This
appeal was dismissed by the Registrar on account of unexplained delay vide his orders dated
2.3.1988. The revision petition was also dismissed as no explanation had been given for filing
the revision after an inordinately long delay. The orders passed on appeal and revision petition
are at Annexures P-5 and P-6. Aggrieved by the award, as also the orders passed in appeal
and revision, the Constofed has approached this Court through the present petition.

3. In reply, two written statements have been filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and
respondent No. 4 respectively. On behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to 3, it has been maintained
that the Registrar was competent to entrust the case to Additional Registrar for giving an
award as arbitrator and that the reference was legally maintainable. It has been further
averred that the claim had been legally amended during the course of the proceedings.
Respondent No. 4 in his separate written statement has pleaded that vide notification dated
21.3.1978 the Government had passed an order delegating the powers of the Registrar to the
Additional Registrar.

The order at Annexure P-3, it is stated by respondent No. 4, is not an award by any arbitrator
but an order passed by an officer exercising the powers of Registrar. It is further maintained
that the Registrar had not appointed any arbitrator but the order at Annexure P-3 was an order
by an authority to whom the powers of the Registrar had been delegated. It has been further
pointed out that on 8.7.1986 the objection of the petitioner regarding maintainability of the
claim of respondent No. 4 had been rejected. No objection against that order was ever taken.
Thereafter, the petitioner participated in the proceedings and when the final order was passed
on 30.10.1986 against the petitioner, they were not entitled to challenge that order on the
ground that the same was beyond the jurisdiction of the Additional Registrar. Various other
averments made in the petition have also been controverted in the written statement filed on
behalf of respondent No. 4.

4. Mr. Kang appearing on behalf of the petitioner has contended that the arbitration
proceedings were totally without jurisdiction and beyond the provisions of sections 55 and 56
of the Act. He has further contended that the Registrar alone was competent to decide whether
the dispute in the present case was one touching the constitution of the management or the
business of the society. It has also been contended that the arbitrator could not permit the
petitioner to enhance his claim and to raise it from an amount of Rs. 23,275... to Rs.
69,432.66. He has also commented upon the conduct of the Additional Registrar in opining
that the revision petition should not be filed. These contentions have been firmly controverted
by Sarvshri H.S. Riar and N.K. Tiwari appearing on behalf of the respondents.

5. A fact which deserves notice at the outset is that vide his order dated 8.7.1986, the
Additional Registrar had clearly held that the petition filed by respondent No. 4 was
maintainable. Even though a copy of this order has not been produced on the record of this
case, the fact has been mentioned in the order at Annexure P-3. Respondent No. 4 has also
made a categorical averment in this behalf in his written statement. This averment has not
been controverted by the petitioner by filing any rejoinder. Consequently, I take it that vide
order dated 8.7.1986 the Additional Registrar had clearly held the application filed by
respondent No. 4 to be maintainable. The petitioner did not challenge this order before any
forum. If the petitioner was aggrieved by this order, he could have proceeded to challenge it
either by way of an appeal or revision under the Act or in proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution. This was not done. On the contrary, the proceedings before the Additional
Registrar were allowed to continue. These culminated in the final order passed almost three
months later, on 6.10.1986. In such a situation, I am led to believe that the petitioner took a
chance. He decided to sit on the fence. Now, since the final order has gone against the
petitioner, a challenge has been made regarding the maintainability of the proceedings before
the Additional Registrar. In the circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that a party to a
dispute who challenges the maintainability of the proceedings cannot be allowed to sit on the
fence and wait for years for the final decision in the dispute. In the meantime, other remedies
which may be open to a party may become either time-barred or get unduly delayed. The
conduct of the petitioners leads me to hold that it is now estopped from challenging the
maintainability of the proceedings before the Additional Registrar. While considering this
matter, I cannot ignore the fact that more than four years have elapsed since the Additional
Registrar had upheld the maintainability of the petition filed by respondent No. 4. If I were to
uphold the claim today as made out by the petitioner, the respondent may be totally without
any remedy under the law. If this view of the matter, I reject the contention raised on behalf
of the petitioner that the proceedings were wholly incompetent. The ancillary contention that
the Registrar alone should have decided the matter also cannot be sustained in view of the fact
that vide notification at Annexure P-1 passed on 21.3.1978 all the powers of the Registrar had
been delegated to the Additional Registrar.

6. As for the next submission regarding the competence of the Additional Registrar to permit
respondent No. 4 to file the revised claim, a perusal of the order (Annexure P-3) shows that by
an application, the respondent had made a request for amending the original claim. He had
filed an application revising his claim from Rs. 23,275.00 to Rs. 43,411.96. He had also raised
a claim for Rs. 39,031.06 by was of interest. A copy of the revised claim was supplied to the
petitioner-Federation. No objection whatsoever is stated to have been raised to the revision of
the claim. This fact finds mention in the order dated 6.10.1986. Since the petitioner did not
object to either the revision of the claim itself or to enhanced amount claimed by respondent
No. 4, I do not think it would be fair for the petitioner to raise this objection in the writ petition
for the first time. The writ Court would normally be reluctant to allow a party to raise an
objection when it has not been raised before the authority or Tribunal against whose order the
petition has been filed.

7. The petitioner appears to have pursued the last remedy of appeal and revision in a very
leisurely manner. The appeal against the order dated 6.10.1986 appears to have been filed
only in July, 1987. There was a delay of 235 days as found by the Registrar. The authority
after perusal of the evidence has found that there was no evidence to prove that there was
sufficient cause for condonation of delay. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. Thereafter,
the revision petition was filed against the order of 2.3.1988 on 7.3.1990. The Commissioner,
Appeals appears to have dismissed the revision in limine. It was found that no reasons have
been given for explaining the delay. If the Additional Registrar who had dealt with the matter
and passed the order Annexure P-3 earlier had at a subsequent stage, opined that there was
no point in wasting funds. I find no impropriety, whatsoever, in his observations. He did
exactly what would have appealed to any reasonable person. The criticism made by the
counsel for the petitioner and the contention raised in paragraph 14 of the petition is, I think
wholly unwarranted.

8. I, therefore, dismiss this petition with costs. This costs shall be payable equally to
respondent No. 1 to 3 and respondent No. 4. The costs are assessed at Rs. 2000/-.

Petition dismissed.

Product S.No.723072561
This judgement ranked 1 in the hitlist.

Darshan Singh v. Rajesh Pal Singh, (P&H) : Law Finder Doc Id # 15542

1998(2) R.C.R.(Rent) 172 : 1998(3) R.C.R.(Civil) 678 : 1998(2) PLR 800 : 1998(2)
CurLJ (CCR) 282 : 1998(3) CivCC 382 : 1998(2) RLR 140

PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT

Before :- R.S. Mongia, J.

Civil Revision No. 2364 of 1995. D/d. 26.5.1998.

Darshan Singh - Petitioner

Versus

Rajesh Pal Singh - Respondent

For the Petitioner :- Mr. Jatin Salwan, Advocate.

For the Respondent :- Mr. Yog Raj Vij and Mr. K.S. Dadwal, Advocates.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908, Order 8, Rule 1 - East Punjab Urban Rent, Restriction
Act, 1949 - Ejectment - Non-payment of Rent - Written statement - Written
statement not signed by the tenant - It is not even verified - The provisions of Civil
Procedure Code apply to the proceedings under the Act - Written statement without
signature and verification cannot be looked into - Ejectment well based.

[Para 8]

JUDGMENT

R.S. Mongia, J. - Respondent Rajesh Pal Singh had filed a petition under Section 13 of the
East Punjab Urban Rest Restriction Act (as applicable to U.T. Chandigarh) (hereinafter called
the 'Act') for ejectment of the present petitioner-tenant from house No. 3009/1, Sector 45-D,
Chandigarh. The ground for ejectment was non-payment of rent since November 1, 1989. It
was alleged in the petition that the house in question was let out to the tenant at the monthly
rent of Rs. 550/- besides water and electricity charges. The tenancy was oral and the tenant
was in arrears of rent since November 1, 1989, which he had neither paid nor tendered.

2. The tenant (petitioner in the present case) admitted the relationship of landlord and tenant
between the parties. However, it was alleged that in fact the rent was Rs. 250/- per mensem
and not Rs. 550/- per mensem as claimed by the landlord. It was further alleged that the
tenant had been paying the rent regularly but the landlord had refused to issue the receipts.
As per the tenant, he had paid the rent upto December, 1991, and the landlord had refused to
receive the rent w.e.f. January 1992. Rent for the months of January and February, 1992, at
the rate of Rs. 250/- per mensem was tendered along with interest and cost in the Court.

3. The landlord produced AW1 Vijay Kumar, who deposed that in his presence, the tenant had
paid a sum of Rs. 550/- as rent to the landlord. Similarly AW2 Partap Singh also stated that he
was once present when the tenant had paid rent to the landlord at the rate of Rs. 550/-.
Rajesh Pal, landlord, also himself appeared as his own witness to prove that in fact rent was
Rs. 550/- per mensem excluding water and electricity charges. On the other hand, tenant
himself appeared as RW1 and deposed that he took the premises on rent at the monthly rent
of Rs. 250/- excluding water and electricity charges. He also produced two witnesses - Sher
Singh and Jarnail Singh - who deposed that Darshan Singh, tenant, had paid in their presence
Rs. 250/- as rent to the landlord. The learned Rent Controller observed that the landlord who
was to prove that the rent was Rs. 550/- produced oral evidence. It was further observed by
the learned Rent Controller that this evidence cannot be looked into as the statements of both
the witnesses are beyond pleadings as it was nowhere mentioned that such and such persons
were present when rent was paid by the respondent to him and, therefore, these statements
were ignored.

4. I am of the view that the statements of these two witnesses could not be ignored on the
ground that their names did not find mentioned in the pleadings. The pleadings were complete
when it was alleged that the rate of rent was Rs. 550/- per mensem. It is only when a tenant
denies such a plea that the question of proof would come. In the replication it could be said
that the rent was settled in the presence of such and such person or rent for a particular
month was paid in the presence of a particular person. It will be then seen as to whether the
statement of such a witness inspires confidence and is to be believed or not. The ground for
throwing out the evidence of the witnesses of the landlord, according to me, is not well based.
Naturally, when the tenancy is oral, it can only be proved by oral evidence and the details of
evidence are not to be pleaded in the ejectment petition.

5. The learned Rent Controller did not believe the evidence of the respondent-tenant that the
rent even at the rate of Rs. 250/- had been paid by the tenant to the landlord since November,
1991. According to the Rent Controller, the tenant had failed to prove by any sufficient
evidence the mode of payment of rent from November 1, 1989 to December 1991. No rent
receipt or any other document had been placed on record by the tenant to show the payment
of rent by him. The Rent Controller held that the tenant was in arrears of rent and liable to be
ejected.

6. The Appellate Authority on appeal filed by the tenant upheld the findings of the learned Rent
Controller and the order of ejectment of the tenant.

7. Learned Counsel for the petitions argued that once the landlord was disbelieved regarding
the rate of rent, he should not be believed at all that no payment of rent had been made to
him. In these circumstances, the tenant's statement that he had made the payment to the
landlord @ Rs. 250/- per mensem should be believed ipso facto.

8. After hearing learned Counsel for the parties, I am of the view that there is no merit in this
revision petition. Apart from the fact that it is a pure finding of fact by two Courts that the
petitioner-tenant is in arrears of rent, I am of the view that in the present case, whatever had
been pleaded by the petitioner-landlord should have been ipso facto taken to be a gospel truth
inasmuch the written statement allegedly filed by the tenant could not be looked into at all.
The written-statement has not been signed by the tenant. It is not even verified. The
provisions of the Civil Procedure Code apply to the proceedings under the Act and the written
statement without the signatures of the tenant and verification could not be looked into. In
other words, the rate of rent and the ground of non-payment of rent on the basis of the
pleadings by the landlord and his evidence should have been ipso facto believed. Be that as it
may, both the Courts have found on appreciation of evidence that the tenant had failed to
prove the payment of rent and having found that he was in arrears of rent, the ejectment is
well based. It may be observed here that even if a landlord fails to prove the rate of rent, it is
not a question of disbelieving him. The Court may come to the conclusion that there is no
sufficient evidence to came to a particular conclusion and on that ground it may hold that the
rate of rent is not the one as suggested by the landlord. In such a case, it may be a case of
lack of evidence to prove a particular point and not a question of disbelief.

9. For the foregoing reasons, I find no merit in this revision petition, which is hereby
dismissed. However, the tenant is given one month's time to vacate the premises.

Petition dismissed.