Whistleblowing: A Restrictive

Definition and Interpretation Peter B. Jubb

ABSTRACT. Whistleblowing has been defined often alleged misdeeds are exposed. Its origins may go
and in differing ways in the literature. This paper has back 50 years or so and, though obscure, are
as its main purposes to clarify the meaning of whistle- often traced to the schoolyard or playing field
blowing and to speak for a narrow interpretation of where some authority figure, monitor or referee,
it. A restrictive, general purpose definition is provided acts to stop proceedings with a view to their
which contains six necessary elements: act of disclo-
orderly continuation. Though a relatively new
sure, actor, disclosure subject, target, disclosure recip-
ient, and outcome.
term, the practice of publicising wrongs that are
Whistleblowing is characterised as a dissenting act harmful to, and therefore matters of, public
of public accusation against an organisation which interest has a long history, including isolated
necessitates being disloyal to that organisation. The cases1 and the activities of pamphlet writers.2
definition differs from others in many ways but espe- There is a risk that whistleblowing will
cially by its emphasis on dissent, by being based on become interchangeable with, and not recognised
the ethical dilemma of conflicting loyalties, and by the as a special case of, informing. That broad asso-
strict way that dilemma is formulated in terms of con- ciation which juxtaposes the whistleblower with,
fidentiality and proprietary rights over information. say, the corrupt individual turned informer is
These features result in a definition in which motive quite undesirable, not because whistleblowing is
has no part, and which requires a free choice decision above reproach, but because it is severely tainted
to make disclosure to an external party.
already. Consistent case study evidence (Glazer
and Glazer, 1989; Jos et al., 1989; De Maria,
1994) indicates that whistleblowing, even when
Introduction acknowledged to be meritorious, typically results
in victimisation of whistleblowers who are pop-
The term ‘whistleblowing’ is becoming com- ularly associated with sneaks, spies, squealers and
monplace. It has a sensational quality favoured by other despised forms of informer. The more
journalists, is often prominent in headlines and whistleblowing is employed indiscriminately the
is used by them in a variety of contexts in which more such associations are likely to be made and
with increasing justification. Judicious usage
can help to isolate whistleblowers from other
Peter Jubb is senior lecturer, Department of Commerce, informers, and clarify that legitimate whistle-
Australian National University. He presently teaches blowing merits encouragement because of its
financial accounting and business ethics which he intro- social benefits.
duced to this university’s curriculum. He co-authored two
The proliferation referred to may be due in
books on financial accounting, has contributed chapters
to other books and published in academic and profes-
part to investigators from various disciplines
sional journals. Ethics related research interests are studying and defining the whistleblowing phe-
confidentiality and other aspects of professional ethics, nomenon in a manner that assists their scope of
public sector ethics in the context of restructuring, ethical enquiry and research methods (Miceli and Near,
characteristics of accounting students, and ethics in 1992, pp. 26–27). Another factor is that whistle-
business education. blowing is being recognised as a control instru-

Journal of Business Ethics 21: 77–94, 1999.

© 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
78 Peter B. Jubb

ment (Hooks et al., 1994; Ponemon, 1994; Whistleblowing is a deliberate non-obligatory act
Tucker, 1995) with administrative structures or of disclosure, which gets onto public record and is
legislation established to promote it by reward made by a person who has or had privileged access
or protection. In this process we may lose to data or information of an organisation, about
sight of the special attributes of whistleblowing non-trivial illegality or other wrongdoing whether
actual, suspected or anticipated which implicates
and identify it with more familiar control
and is under the control of that organisation, to
mechanisms. an external entity having potential to rectify the
Another explanation is the natural evolution wrongdoing.
of language and the cultural influences on it. It
may be that whistleblowing is becoming accepted Broadly speaking, whistleblowing is presented as
and that its increased use reflects that change in dissent, in response to an ethical dilemma, in the
attitude. The point gains credence from action form of a public accusation against an organisa-
groups and legislation supportive of whistle- tion. It contains six elements. These are: the act
blowers and from corporate structures and of disclosing damaging news; the whistleblower
policies that permit or encourage speaking up. agent; a disclosure subject – some (potential)
Moreover, some US studies, which are critical of wrongdoing; a target organisation held respon-
reliance on case study data and have employed sible; a disclosure recipient; and an outcome –
alternative methods, suggest a greater tolerance the disclosure enters the public domain.
of whistleblowing and a lesser degree of reprisal Following this introduction is a section that
than is apparent from the case studies. However, provides the overall framework of whistle-
those studies report conflicting results, have only blowing, placing it in the spheres of informing,
examined public sector subjects covered by accusation and dissent. Then, reasons for the
legislation or persons with reporting obligations, ethical focus of the proposed definition are given.
and they have tested attitudes or perceptions Two role related tensions are present in whistle-
which may not match behaviour when con- blowing. One is an ethical conflict between
fronted by actual whistleblowers (Miceli and personal and organisation values. A prospective
Near, 1992, pp. 39–41 and 200–211 who cite whistleblower, having first recognised the
numerous studies by themselves and others; conflict, must choose between these values, a risk
also Arnold and Ponemon, 1991). Even in laden decision to choose a courageous con-
North America corporate abuse of whistle- frontation or compliance that may make one
blowers remains frequent, the protective laws can complicit. The other, dominant, tension is the
lack bite or be subverted (Fong, 1991) and ethical dilemma of conflicting loyalties. The next
common law employment principles are not section contains the definition, explains its devel-
supportive.3 opment and argues its form. The argument is in
In Australia the same comments about legal two parts. One deals with some lesser matters
protection apply and as yet there is not the same and the second addresses three major points
degree of private sector corporate support.4 Also of dispute; whether moral motive is essential
the ‘mateship’ culture here remains firmly to whistleblowing; and whether authorised dis-
antagonistic towards whistleblowers (Schroder, closures and internal disclosures fall within the
1996). And in an environment of downsizing and domain of whistleblowing. The concluding
new industrial relations laws even public servants section summarises the main arguments and
having legal protection are warned to think more draws attention to limitations of this study.
than twice before walking the whistleblower road
(Connors, 1996).
This paper aims to clarify the meaning of Informing, accusation and dissent
whistleblowing and in doing so speak for a
narrow interpretation and application of the A whistleblower discloses information that others
term. The definition, which is developed and seek to keep private. Two points can be made
explained later is: about this. First, the release of information is
 Whistleblowing: A Restrictive Definition and Interpretation 79

done deliberately and with the aim of achieving seeking a transfer or by resignation. Voice, he
a disclosure. Midas’ barber was no whistleblower claimed, is the usual way to deal with dysfunc-
when he whispered the secret of the king’s tional social and political organisations. In both
ears to the bulrushes. Second, unconventional cases the means of expression are mechanisms to
methods are employed to make the disclosure relieve the individual’s discontent and to give
(Tucker, 1995, p. 475), indeed the whistleblower signals that will allow the organisation to heal
may feel compelled to act just because normal itself. Hirschman stated that in the economic
disclosure avenues such as audit or an organisa- domain “. . . exit drives out voice . . .” (1970,
tion’s formal communication channels have p. 120) yet his idea was that voice could play a
failed. useful healing function and he investigated ways
Whistleblowing is not merely informing. to stimulate voicing within economic enterprises.
There are many kinds of informer, from simple He argued that loyalty of customers (goodwill)
conveyors of messages to the dubious categories and employees could provide the catalyst for
already mentioned. Whistleblowing needs to be these actors to choose voicing rather than exit.
differentiated from informing in general if the Hirschman envisaged combinations of his
term is to have and convey particular significance. three options, indeed loyalty was in some sense
It is distinguishable from some types of informing not a separate option at all. Subsequently,
because the disclosure is an indictment. It iden- however, loyalty has been presented as a clearly
tifies perceived wrongdoing, typically a bad news distinct course of action which condenses into
message about misconduct, incompetence, fraud complete or partial compliance with question-
and the like alleged to have been ignored and/or able behaviour. This option is raised especially
covered up; or it might be about good news con- with regard to employees of organisations. Miceli
cealed for private advantage. Either way some and Near (1992, p. 33) capture the set of possi-
person or organisation is accused (Bok, 1980, bilities for employees in a table, reproduced here
p. 321) and challenged by the process. as Exhibit 1.
The presence of a challenge hints at another To give voice to concerns may not of itself be
typical feature which is that the disclosure throws a dissenting action but it surely becomes so if one
the gauntlet at someone in higher authority, persists in expressing disagreement since by then
thereby empowering lesser individuals with the concern is or has become a matter of com-
respect to their concerns. This feature shows plaint also. The voicing can be done with varying
that the referee analogy is actually misleading. degree of vigour and clarity, from negative body
Whistleblowers cannot stop what disturbs them, language through disruption to documented and
they do not have authority over those whom publicised statements. Whistleblowing is at the
they report; if they did they would have better extreme end of this spectrum and is a very direct,
remedies than whistleblowing at their disposal. unambiguous form of dissent.
The higher one’s position in the hierarchy the Miceli and Near (1992, pp. 35–39) also portray
less likely one will be a whistleblower;5 by the whistleblowing as prosocial organisational behav-
same token one is more likely to be an object of iour (citing Brief and Motowidlo, 1986), or as a
the accusation. political act to achieve a redistribution of power
Whistleblowing is also an act of dissent. In his or benefits within the organisation (citing Farrell
model of options when faced with degenerative and Petersen, 1982; and Cavanagh et al., 1981).
behaviour in organisations, Hirschman (1970) These depictions deal with stimuli for the act of
identified three major response categories which whistleblowing. It is sufficient at this point to say
he labelled exit, loyalty and voice. Exit is to only that whistleblowing is purposive dissent. It
distance oneself from a problem, voice is to may be driven, but perhaps not, by a moral oblig-
express one’s concern or disagreement. He pre- ation (De George, 1990, pp. 526–529) or a sense
sented exit as the standard response to dissatis- of one, and explicable by venal or high-minded
faction with economic entities, for instance by motives and emotions. What matters is that
withdrawing custom, or leaving one’s position by whistleblowing is a chosen action, not one done
80 Peter B. Jubb

EXHIBIT 1
Employee concerns and employee dissenta

Nature of the perceived activity triggering the concern

Illegal, immoral Not illegal immoral

or illegitimate or illegitimate

Expression of Exit dimension

the concern
(voice) Stay Go Stay Go

External External Exit with Secret Exit with

dissent to whistle- public sharing secret
someone who blowing protestb sharing
can take action
Internal Internal Protest Employee Explain
dissent to whistle- during exit participation, reason for
someone who blowing interviewb grievance resignation
can take action in exit
Dissent in Discussion, Exit with Sabotage, Sabotage,
some other confronta- notice to strikes strikes
form tion with wrongdoer with exit
wrongdoer
No expressed Inactive Inactive Silent dis- Silent
dissent observationc departure gruntlement departure
a
This is adapted, by permission of the author, from figure 1 in Blackburn (1988), which represents Graham’s
(1986) typology of responses to organizational decline.
b
This is also whistleblowing.
c
This has traditionally been viewed as ‘loyalty’ (Graham 1983) but Hirschman (1970) questions that view, as
does Farrell (1983) who labels it neglect.
Source: Miceli and Near, 1992, Table 1-2, p. 33.

under oath or under some kind of duress such Approach to the definition task
as threats. Disclosures made in such conditions
cannot be characterised as dissension. A definition serves to describe some thing or idea
Thus far whistleblowing has been presented but it may also serve some non-descriptive
as an action of dissent by making a disclosure purpose. This can be observed in whistleblowing
which accuses and challenges a higher authority. definitions displayed in Exhibit 3. The Miceli
These attributes serve to distinguish whistle- and Near definition has been influenced by
blowing from the general mass of acts of research considerations, “. . . certain operational
informing. The definition that follows will problems are solved by the use of a broader
allow greater discrimination of whistleblowing, definition . . .” (1992, p. 27). The Queensland
particularly from other forms of socially useful Whistleblower Study sought subjects through an
informing. It is preceded, however, by a presen- advertisement which includes the following
tation of the attitudes or assumptions that have expressions: “do you claim to be victimised
shaped it. because of your gender, sexual preferences,
colour, personal values?” and “. . . we want to
 Whistleblowing: A Restrictive Definition and Interpretation 81

know . . . what retribution has occurred” (De which leads, in addition to the belief about
Maria, 1994, p. 3). The requirement here that a wrongdoing, to one of two conclusions. One
whistleblower be a victim suggests, perhaps, a conclusion is that the wrongdoing contradicts
definition to fit an ideology or political purpose.6 and violates the organisation’s values. In this case
Again, definitions may reflect or be constructed one has a problem about what to do only if those
to suit a disciplinary focus, for instance, that of having authority within the organisation refuse
Chambers (1995). Lastly, whistleblowing legisla- to admit that there is a violation. If the ques-
tion will include definitions that reflect the policy tionable behaviour gets approved, the judgement
objectives of the laws. Typically, these are to process will include a weighing up of personal
promote public interest disclosures and/or to and organisational values and, if the individual
protect whistleblowers7 and the legal definitions remains convinced that wrongdoing is occurring,
may include some justificatory element, like the personal values will have prevailed. The
public-spirited behaviour by the actor. problem now becomes whether to challenge the
In this paper a definition for general use is organisation, to act out what one thinks is the
developed. The approach adopted is not con- morally correct option; or whether to conform
sciously purpose driven but it is deliberately to the organisation’s position. The second choice
founded on the belief that whistleblowing, can make the individual complicit in the per-
whatever else it may be, always presents ethical ceived wrongdoing. Thus, there is risk to the
dilemmas originating in role conflict and it is individual in both courses of action but the risks
these dilemmas that make whistleblowing such a of a challenge are more immediate and appear
fascinating phenomenon. The definition is, to be much higher.
therefore, constructed from an exclusively ethical Confrontation, particularly by whistleblowing,
perspective because that will give it the gener- of an organisation that is judged to be in the
ality appropriate for ordinary speech, and because wrong because it is off course or will not listen,
it allows further discrimination from other forms is dangerous conduct which requires firm con-
of dissent. viction, strength of purpose and considerable
The whistleblower’s dilemmas are twofold courage. One may be inclined to describe that
and interacting: a conflict between personal and conduct as foolhardy, stupid or non-rational
organisational values, and a conflict between given that case studies (for instance Jos et al.,
obligations owed to an organisation and to parties 1989; De Maria, 1994; Dempster, 1997) have
beyond it. The second of these dilemmas is that repeatedly documented bitter experiences of
of a divided loyalty, to the accused organisation past whistleblowers; but this is not to deny that
and to a wider constituency. It is the main topic the conduct is, or can be, also courageous.
developed in the body of this paper and is treated Anonymous whistleblowers may be practicing
as an ethical choice problem, a decision about caution and discretion but informants do not,
what ought to be done in the face of conflicting sometimes can not, always respect the anonymity
duties. The first dilemma is more in the realm of their sources. 8 Moreover the anonymous
of virtue ethics, being concerned, especially, approach must shut them off from whatever pro-
with the capacity to act, and with avoidance of tection and succour is offered by the law or by
complicity. support and investigative agencies. Even when
protection and remedies are available the risks are
still considerable since the mechanisms do not
The values dilemma always (some claim they seldom) work.
“Courage in general involves the capacity to
Someone convinced that an organisation with cope with difficulties and dangers, and not to
which she/he is connected is engaged in wrong- be ‘dis-couraged’ or unduly fearful of them”
doing, will have come to that conviction by (Mahoney, 1996, p. 3). Mahoney distinguishes
evaluating the questionable behaviour in an psychological courage, the ability to overcome
ethical judgement process (not explored here) fear of taking any risky action, like parachuting
82 Peter B. Jubb

or murder, and moral courage where the risky blowers’ complaints. This is not to say that
action “. . . is itself a moral action, such as telling whistleblowing is necessarily proper conduct
the truth . . . or resisting various pressures to do since the motives of the whistleblower and the
something one knows or believes to be uneth- circumstances of the action are crucial to its
ical” (1996, p. 3). These descriptions of courage justification. One motive may be to escape com-
and moral courage appear to fit well the kind of plicity so as to protect personal integrity and the
determination that is displayed by whistleblowers. ability to live with oneself.
Whether courage predisposes a person to dissent
this way or whether the virtue is developed by
the generally lengthy whistleblowing experience Central dilemma: Divided loyalties
is an open question.
Whistleblowing can be viewed as self-centred Persons contemplating whistleblowing face a
behaviour aimed at avoiding complicity and dilemma because their roles entail loyalties to the
maintaining personal integrity. Gillam (1996) targeted organisation that conflict, not just with
presents forward-looking complicity and back- integrity, that is loyalty to self, but also with
ward-looking complicity as two distinct types. perceived responsibilities to others, for instance
The former makes X morally responsible for a their professional associations or the general
wrong committed by Y if X’s own earlier action public. Bowie and Duska (1990, pp. 70–72)
contributes causally to Y’s wrongdoing; X and nominate obedience, confidentiality, and avoiding
Y thus share the moral responsibility for Y’s conflict of interests as three aspects of manage-
conduct. X can then be held morally at fault if rial loyalty to an organisation. The last, in which
Y’s wrongdoing is a foreseeable consequence of personal and organisational economic interests
his action. Any participant in the deliberations are opposed, has little bearing on whistleblowing
about or implementation of policies by which but the other two are very pertinent.
wrongdoing is perpetrated has the potential to be Obedience involves complying with reason-
a whistleblower. The decision not to do so is an able directives. Confidentiality is respect for the
act of omission which brings those persons private character of, and proprietary rights over,
within the ambit of forward-looking complicity. an organisation’s data. These loyalties apply
Backward-looking complicity arises when X widely. Both are embedded in employment con-
performs an action, after becoming aware of Y’s tracts while confidentiality extends to consultants
wrong, which gives comfort to the wrongdoing and others with authorised access to data. Trust
or disregards its victims. Here lack of causation by the organisation is what underpins confiden-
means that X can not be held morally respon- tiality and it applies because the person with
sible for Y’s wrong. However, X can be judged access privileges is an insider to the organisation’s
morally culpable for his own action on three operations, its data and its affairs. This situation
scores: negative consequences of that action; of trust depends, ultimately, on a morality which
want of respect for the victims; and condoning fills the gap in the absence of legal or role specific
of Y’s wrong. Here, too, a potential whistle- obligations but which also transcends all formal
blower could be accused of complicity by staying promises. Thus, prima facie, whistleblowing is
silent about discovered wrongdoing. to be condemned, and insiders should be loyal
Those who implement the wrongdoing under to their organisation simply because they are
instructions are equally caught up in complicity. allowed in.
They cannot rely on the defence of acting under A whistleblower who informs on perpetrators
orders, this being no justification for doing or takes an action that others refuse to do is
wrong (Hare, 1972). likely to be accused of disloyalty to peers. It is
In short, whistleblowing is a hazardous mode important to distinguish loyalty to the organisa-
of dissent involving high risk to the individual tion from loyalty to colleagues in an organisation.
and his/her dependents. It demands moral There is no obedience owed to peers and
courage, given the typical nature of whistle- superiors, nor any necessity for confidentiality
 Whistleblowing: A Restrictive Definition and Interpretation 83

inherent in the relationships between colleagues, that reviews, synthesises and critiques seven
other than that which stems directly from duties definitions which are presented in Exhibit 3.
owed to the organisation itself. Collegiate loyalty These were selected because they represent the
is real and may be keenly felt but its content range of views evident in the literature. Some
differs, being similar to the loyalty owed to have been honed over a number of years and the
family, friends and other social groups. two by Miceli and Near and by Johnson have
been widely quoted or relied on in subsequent
literature. The former relates to a major study
The proposed definition of whistleblower behaviour and the influences on
it; the Johnson9 definition is constructed around
This paper proposes and argues for the defini- a paradigm instance. Both have been influential
tion of whistleblowing previously presented in shaping The Definition. Exhibit 4 displays a
(referred to hereafter as The Definition) and dis- comparative analysis of these seven definitions
played in Exhibit 2, which also dissects the def- which helps to identify points of agreement and
inition to identify (a) six essential elements, (b) differences among them.
the primary descriptive components and (c) some There is some common ground, a consensus
refining descriptive matter. or substantial agreement that is expressed or can
It will be explained and justified by a process be implied. All concur that whistleblowing is an

EXHIBIT 2
A general definition of whistleblowing, and its dissection

The definition
Whistleblowing is a deliberate non-obligatory act of disclosure, which gets onto public record and is made by
a person who has or had privileged access to data or information of an organisation, about non-trivial illegality
or other wrongdoing whether actual, suspected or anticipated which implicates and is under the control of that
organisation, to an external entity having potential to rectify the wrongdoing.

The dissection

Element Descriptor Elaboration

Whistleblowing
1 ACTION Is a disclosure . . . deliberate
. . . non-obligatory
2 OUTCOME On public record
3 ACTOR By a person with privileged
access to an organisation’s
data or information . . . present or former
4 SUBJECT About illegality or . . . non-trivial
wrongdoing . . . actual, suspect, potential
. . . under organisation control
5 TARGET Which implicates the
organisation
6 RECIPIENT To an external entity . . . having potential to
. . . remedy the wrong
84 Peter B. Jubb

EXHIBIT 3
A representative selection of whistleblowing definitions

Whistleblowing is the act, by an employee or officer of any institution, profit or non-profit, private or public,
of informing the public about a belief that either (s)he has been ordered to perform, or (s)he has obtained knowl-
edge that the institution is engaged in, activities which (a) cause unnecessary harm to third parties, (b) are in
violation of human rights, or (c) run counter to the defined purpose of the institution (Adapted from the
Bowie and Duska definition of whistleblower (1990, p. 73)).
. . . whistleblowing by internal auditors is “The unauthorised disclosure in the public interest by internal auditors
of audit results, findings, opinions, or information acquired in the course of performing their duties and relating
to questionable practices” (Chambers, 1995, pp. 192-193).
Whistleblowing, defined as disclosing questionable practice involving the organization or its members, may be
either internal or external. Internal whistleblowing involves informing relevant organization members about
wrongdoing. External whistleblowing involves going outside the organization . . . to voice concerns over an
organizational wrongdoing (Chiasson et al., 1995, p. 24).
. . . whistle blowing . . . I define as the unauthorised and voluntary reporting of illegal or improper acts per-
petrated within an organisation to authorities outside the organisation or to the general public (Courtemanche,
1988, p. 36).
“The whistleblower is a concerned citizen, totally, or predominantly motivated by notions of public interest,
who initiates of her or his own free will, an open disclosure about significant wrongdoing directly perceived in
a particular occupational role, to a person or agency capable of investigating the complaint and facilitating the
correction of wrongdoing” (De Maria, 1994, p. 3).

Whistleblowing occurs “. . . when

1 an individual performs an action or series of actions intended to make information public;
2 the information is made a matter of public record;
3 the information is about possible or actual non-trivial wrongdoing in an organisation;
4 the individual[s] who performs the action is a member or former member of the organisation” (Johnson. In
Elliston et al., 1985, p. 15).

“. . . we defined whistle-blowing to mean ‘the disclosure by organisation members (former or current) of

illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons or organisations that
may be able to effect action’ ” (Miceli and Near, 1992, p. 15).

act of reporting; and all but one identify the others by being occupation specific. The most
matter to be reported in broad, comparable contentious aspects are whether to include
terms, namely questionable morality and/or motive; whether the disclosure must be to an
wrongdoing which includes but is not confined external informant or can be made within the
to illegality. Wrongdoing extends to acts and organisation; and whether the disclosure can be
omissions (Miceli and Near, 1992, p. 18). None permitted or must be unauthorised. These major
speak of an obligation to blow the whistle and issues are deferred.
this is to be expected in any general purpose
definition. Those like De George (1990) who do
argue for such a moral duty do so only in quite Peripheral issues in dispute
limited circumstances.
Disagreement is far more prevalent and First, somewhat simpler disputes regarding the
concerns actor and recipient attributes, the cir- disclosure parties and the circumstances of
cumstances of the disclosure and the issue of wrongdoing are examined. These are matters that
motive. Chambers’ definition differs from the are incorporated in The Definition and the order
 Whistleblowing: A Restrictive Definition and Interpretation 85

EXHIBIT 4
Dissection of definitions of whistleblowing

B&D Cham DeM Joh’n M&N Chia C’che

Action
Disclosing/reporting x x x x x x x
– intended x
– unauthorised x x
– voluntary x x

By
Employee/officer x
– internal auditor x
Organisation member x x x
– past or present x x

Motive
Appropriate moral motive x
In public interest x x

What
Illegality x x
Immoral acts* x x x x
Specific contraventions x
Wrongdoing x x x
Qualifiers
– occurs in organisation x x x
– non-trivial x
– in organisation control x
– involves org’n (member) x
– need only be suspected x x
– awareness through role x x

To
Internal authorities x
External authorities x x
General public x x x x
An entity able to effect
a remedy x x

* Acts and practices, and likewise, immoral, improper, illegitimate and questionable, are all taken to be
sufficiently synonymous for purposes of this discussion.

B&D = Bowie and Duska; Cham = Chambers; DeM = De Maria;

Joh’n = Johnson; M&N = Miceli and Near;
Chia = Chiasson et al.; C’che = Courtemanche.
86 Peter B. Jubb

in which they are discussed follows the Exhibit As whistleblowing is not conceivable unless
2 dissection. one holds sensitive data or information that can
be revealed, this paper relies on that fact and
describes the actor as a “person with privileged
Deliberate action access to an organisation’s data or information”.
This expression conveys the sense of a whistle-
Johnson’s definition is the only one that explic- blower’s insider status as effectively as does
itly makes whistleblowing a conscious, intended employee or member, and alludes to the partic-
act though that by De Maria certainly implies as ular trust placed in persons who are granted
much. Given the seriousness of the act and its access privileges. Consistent with the definitions
connotations of disloyalty, it would not be of De Maria and Chambers, it also implies that
tenable to include accidental or chance disclo- awareness of wrongdoing comes about through
sures as whistleblowing. one’s organisational role because the role explains
why access is permitted.

Actor is person with privileged access

Present or former
Bowie and Duska state that whistleblowers
come from the ranks of employees and officers; Those who had access privileges in the past
Chambers implies the same because of the occu- should be included, along with persons currently
pational roots of his definition; Miceli and Near in that position, as persons who could be whistle-
(1992, pp. 31–39) do likewise when elaborating blowers. Some persons may not feel sufficiently
on their definition. But categorising whistle- secure to make disclosures while remaining affil-
blowers as employees precludes those who give iated with the organisation. However, there is no
service under arrangements other than employ- clear basis for setting time limits to the past asso-
ment contracts. Volunteers, unpaid trainees, sub- ciation, or deciding if limits are necessary or
contractors and consultants may also qualify, as desirable.
might persons engaged by service contracts, those
holding executive positions and fee earning
directors. The organisation
“There is general agreement among theorists
that the whistle-blower must at some time have Whistleblowing requires a context, it cannot
been a member of the organization against which occur in a vacuum. The term ‘organisation’
the complaint is lodged” (Miceli and Near, 1992, provides the context, but it is, undesirably, an all
p. 16, citing Elliston, 1982). The term “member” encompassing term, capable of allowing any
is sufficiently general to capture employees plus disclosure to qualify as whistleblowing; for
the various other relationships just listed and, example, with society as the organisational
perhaps, potential whistleblowing candidates context, responding to police enquiries,
among suppliers, customers or clients. The reason reporting domestic violence, a call to a drug
for wanting to include them is that all are, like phone-in, and publishing a news story. However,
employees, persons whose relationships with the The Definition strictly limits the context in three
organisation allow them access to information ways; (a) the organisation must be owed loyalty
from which they may then learn about organi- by the whistleblower to whom it has given access
sation related wrongdoing. But ‘member’ is also to its data; (b) it is the setting for the subject of
a problematic term since it suggests a commu- the complaint, the locus or source of wrong-
nity of purpose between individual members and doing; and (c) it is the entity accused and targeted
between members and the organisation itself. by the disclosure. These conditions make a
That assumption of shared goals may not be definitional constraint that places substantial
warranted. limits to the scope of whistleblowing while
 Whistleblowing: A Restrictive Definition and Interpretation 87

incorporating familiar examples of it. The work- relevant evidence or are denied it once their
place organisation is the typical case and is the intentions become known or suspected. Miceli
context in which most whistleblowing occurs. and Near (1992, p. 18) also allow for acting on
However, as specified, other contexts are possible, beliefs by accepting that whistleblowers’ disclo-
for instance, the disclosure by a club or associa- sures can be incorrect. It is enough that they
tion member of its discriminatory admission rules have genuine and reasonable belief in their com-
and practices. plaints. Admitting suspect or potential wrong-
Dandekar (1990, p. 558) proposed that the doing also extends the scope of whistleblowing
target organisation must be reputable. This small to encompass organisation policies, practices
refinement recognises that whistleblowing loses and procedures that are frequently the source of
impact and purpose if it cannot damage the organisational wrongdoing.
target’s good name. Besides, a deeply corrupted
organisation does not deserve loyalty so that the
crucial whistleblower’s dilemma appears to be Wrongdoing under control of the organisation
missing. Reputation is not included in The
Definition mainly because it implies that, to This point is taken from the Miceli and Near
count as whistleblowing, the disclosure must definition. It recognises that not all matters of
actually impact on reputation. This goes beyond complaint are properly sheeted home to organi-
the outcome in The Definition (elaborated later, sations. Their responsibility for unauthorised acts
in the section on core disputes) of reaching the of their agents can be factually and legally
public domain. Moreover, while forfeited loyalty complex questions but, as a matter of principle,
may remove the ethical dilemma at an abstract to impose the adverse consequences of whistle-
level, it remains quite possible that a would-be blowing on an organisation which has no power
whistleblower feels a loyalty to the organisation, to control the wrongdoing is both unfair and
even though it is undeserved. Misplaced loyalty jeopardises the social value of the disclosure.
is just as capable of arousing in the actor the per-
ception of an ethical dilemma and all the asso-
Wrongdoing implicates the organisation
ciated conflicting emotions.
Whistleblowing that fails to implicate the accused
organisation has been misdirected. To be impli-
Non-trivial cated the organisation must not only be in
control and have power to effect a remedy, but
Johnson’s definition alone includes this obvious be accountable for and blameworthy for the
point. Whistleblowing should only relate to disclosed wrong. Avenues of implication are
serious wrongdoing, because one ought not diverse: encouragement, perpetration, abetting,
trivialise the act itself and because its conse- connivance; or failing to stop wrongdoing when
quences for the actor, the organisation and other such responsibility is accepted voluntarily or
organisation members can be catastrophic. lawfully imposed. Organisations that ignore
information, about misuse of their resources or
non-compliance with their obligations or stated
Actual, suspected or anticipated wrongdoing policies, are legitimate targets of subsequent
whistleblowing, despite being the intended
This condition is contained in the definitions of beneficiaries.
Johnson and Bowie and Duska. A definition
demanding actual wrongdoing would deny a
preventive function to whistleblowing. Also, it Having potential to rectify the wrongdoing
would impose a burden of proof on whistle-
blowers which few could hope to meet, indeed The case for communicating with an external
many whistleblowers lack authority to access party is made later. Note, now, that recipients
88 Peter B. Jubb

must have potential to bring about the desired good effects. Consequently, statements such as
change, a requirement specified in definitions Chambers’, that whistleblowing is unauthorised
by De Maria and Miceli and Near. Those who disclosure in the public interest, are quite unclear
disclose to the media hope that the pressure as to their meaning.
of publicity will persuade the organisation to In the sample, De Maria stands alone in stip-
take corrective action; those who disclose to ulating, unambiguously, a moral motive for
regulators may expect that the regulator whistleblowing, namely action to further the
will prohibit the offending actions or practices public interest. However, an ethical motive
or challenge them in court proceedings. requirement is attributed to De George (Elliston
Whistleblowing is about stopping, hindering et al., 1985, p. 17) and is evident in Bowie and
or preventing perceived wrongs. A disclosure Duska from the objectionable activities within
method that has negligible prospect of achieving their definition, and by their statement elsewhere
this result is self-destructive folly, not whistle- that “Whistle-blowing is done from appropriate
blowing. moral motive . . .” (1990, p. 74).
Johnson (Elliston et al., 1985, p. 7) takes a
contrary position. She takes pains to exclude
Core disputes motive from her definition because motives may
be mixed, ambiguous or undecipherable. In her
The last matters to be examined are the three scheme public interest, organisation welfare or
highly contentious issues of motive, per- petty reasons like spite are relevant to justifica-
mitted/unauthorised disclosure and internal/ tion but not germane to the nature of whistle-
external recipient. Not all of the sample defini- blowing.
tions address these matters. Neither Johnson nor Altruism is a special case said to reinforce the
Miceli and Near do so directly, however these argument for disregarding motive. Miceli and
authors hold strong views on all three issues Near (1992, pp. 27–30) deny that altruism – they
which are implicit in their definitions and call it ‘principled organizational dissent’ after
explained at length in their commentaries. Graham (1986) – characterises whistleblowing,
arguing that it is not a measurable attribute. Nor
is it separable from other motives because: (a)
Motive whistleblowers typically have mixed motives;
(b) preferring whistleblowing to some more
The question here is whether motive should be self-interested action, like suing, contains an
embedded in the definition such that an act element of altruism; and (c) any disclosure can
might be or fail to be whistleblowing because of produce unpredicted self-centred outcomes. Thus
the actor’s reasons. The onus of proof falls on whether an act can count as whistleblowing in
those who argue for the proposition, for while no way depends on the motive, altruistic or
some concepts, such as concern (in the sense of otherwise, for that action.
caring), deception or vengeance, necessarily Johnson (Elliston et al., 1985, pp. 15–17) uses
incorporate desire and motive, this is not usual a similar line of argument to deny a relevant dis-
and is not the case with whistleblowing. tinction between voluntary and coerced acts all
Action in the public interest is an expression of which she includes within the scope of
which describes actual or expected results, or whistleblowing. This contrasts with De Maria
refers to actor intent, or both. It may be driven and Courtemanche who both define whistle-
by motives that are virtuous or not; based on blowing as voluntary actions. Johnson depicts
legal, professional or self-imposed obligation; and voluntary and coerced as points on a continuum
focussed on self-interest or the good of others. and as matters that concern motive. To insist that
An action which results in public good can be whistleblowing be voluntary would add ambi-
done for shameful reasons; and moral or guity and detract from definitional precision. She
well-intentioned acts do not invariably produce also claims that ordinary usage applies whistle-
 Whistleblowing: A Restrictive Definition and Interpretation 89

blowing equally to coerced and voluntary dis- blowing needs separate examination. The
closures. Chambers and Courtemanche definitions state
Johnson’s inclusive position is objectionable on that whistleblowing must be unauthorised. While
four grounds. The ordinary usage argument is there is no doubt that unauthorised disclosures
inherently weak and undermined by her dismissal are within the domain of whistleblowing, the
of it elsewhere (when discussing the disclosure exclusion of authorised acts from that domain is
recipient issue). Second, the continuum would contestable. Authorised acts are those done at the
necessarily embrace authorised acts the inclusion behest of some law, code, superior or other
of which, besides taking the sting out of authority and they are either permitted or
coercion, opens wide the realm of whistle- required. The former are potential whistle-
blowing. Next, to include coerced acts has ques- blowing acts; as with voluntary action, a choice
tionable consequences. For instance, it (a) taints is made to disclose. Required acts present more
whistleblowing by association with plea bar- difficulty.
gaining and similar self-serving behaviour; (b) Miceli and Near embrace all acts in their
nets many classes of disclosure, dramatically so whistleblowing definition. Unauthorised acts
if coercion is to comprehend authorised acts; they include without debate, and most of their
and (c) regarding subpoenaed testimony, grants reasons (1992, pp. 21–25) for including role pre-
equal whistleblower status to spoilers who offer scribed acts stem from their inability to distin-
minimalist replies as to those providing compre- guish persons, roles or acts that clearly entail such
hensive evidence. The major objection, however, duties. Using the internal audit function as their
is that Johnson errs in linking the voluntary/ illustration, they say that job descriptions are
coercive dichotomy to motive. Motive implies seldom specific enough to establish an invariant
one has a choice, as with voluntary acts, whereas duty of disclosure; rather some small subset of
coercion negates freedom of action. job tasks may impose the duty in restricted cir-
One might argue that including motive in the cumstances. They mention other confounding
definition allows us to weed out the pretend problems such as holding contradictory multiple
whistleblower from the genuine article, but the roles; non-specific exhortations in the codes of
opportunity for disguise does not nullify, even professions and organisations to expose corrup-
alter, the validity of concepts. A patriot or a tion or wrongdoing; and that authority and duty
sheep, for example, remain what they are even to disclose can be confused by informal cultures
if a spy or a wolf can assume their mantle. Indeed or systems.
misrepresenting motive is the very thing that Underlying their argument appears to be a
makes the deception work. Therefore, the inclu- concern not to define whistleblowing in a way
sion of motive would make this problem greater that discourages it (by confining it to illicit acts),
not less. or places sole responsibility for whistleblowing
This paper supports omitting motive from the onto licensed persons. However, the points raised
whistleblowing definition. But it claims that acts by Miceli and Near have less impact if, contrary
performed under threat or duress are not those to their position, one restricts the ambit of
of free agents and therefore can not qualify as whistleblowing to external disclosures. Roles
whistleblowing which is perceived and presented that require public disclosure leave far less room
as a chosen act. Motive is not about the fact of for the ambiguities raised by these authors.
choice but it is pertinent to justification for Additionally, there is judicial precedent for
choices and explores reasons underlying them. excluding acts required by the advocate’s code
of ethics.10 But perhaps the strongest reason for
saying that required disclosures can never amount
Authorised acts to whistleblowing is that they lack the element
of dissent.
The previous section distinguished authorised Bowie and Duska’s criterion that whistle-
and coerced actions, so their status as whistle- blowing be an act with moral purpose suggests,
90 Peter B. Jubb

on the other hand, that the domain of whistle- known to the general public but it does mean
blowing is confined to those acts that merit that the whistleblower’s information is accessible
authorisation. Such a restriction presents huge without too many bureaucratic obstacles. It
operational difficulties and would raise diver- follows that an external informant will be, in
sionary debate about the nature and justification most cases, an agency or an entity with a role
of authority and obedience, including the for handling complaints, comprising official
motives of the authorising agent. bodies such as11 The Ombudsman, The Human
The position taken here is that whistleblowing Rights Commission, Merit Protection Review
extends neither to coerced acts nor to disclosures Board, Auditors-General, Independent Commis-
that are prescribed by the actor’s role in the sion Against Corruption, and the unofficial safety
organisation. It does encompass all unauthorised valve of the media.
acts and those where choice is unfettered or is Internal disclosures are made to persons within
permitted. In The Definition the term “non- the target organisation. The disclosure may be
obligatory” is coined to cover all these cases. made in accordance with routine procedures to
a designated superior; within prescribed arrange-
ments for non-routine situations, such as noti-
Disclosure recipients fying an ethics officer; or the disclosure may be
unauthorised and made to some powerful col-
Two issues arise concerning the informant to league, being someone outside the normal chain
whom the disclosure is made. First, whereas dis- of command, for instance an approach to a
closures made to external parties can qualify, director or to senior personnel in some other
indisputably, as whistleblowing, is this sufficient division or section. The issue is whether such
or is there some further requirement regarding unauthorised disclosure can count as whistle-
publicity? The second and most fundamental blowing.
question is whether internal disclosures also Chiasson et al. explicitly allow for whistle-
qualify. blowing through internal as well as external
All five sample definitions that refer to the channels. Miceli and Near do the same, though
informant allow for disclosure to external parties implicitly, and present three arguments (1992,
and/or to the public. Johnson, however, restricts pp. 25–27). One is that empirical evidence does
whistleblowing to external disclosure and, not support a conceptual distinction between
further, she imposes a “going public” require- internal and external disclosures. The studies
ment, a success criterion which says that the dis- indicate (a) that both channels are used in an
closure must reach the public arena. All methods incident and that internal disclosure commonly
of going public are allowed. The measure of precedes external whistleblowing; (b) that actor
success, an objective test requiring action by related variables like personality, attitudes and
recipients, is that they make the information experiences are similar for internal and external
public by placing it on official record. However, disclosers. A second argument raises research
the information need not be acted on to achieve concerns: that an artificial distinction creates
specific outcomes, like prevention or compensa- expectations of differentiating variables where
tion, which would be subjective goals of the none exist; or that, if recipients hold multiple
whistleblower. roles, disclosures can be concurrently internal and
Johnson’s going public condition is adopted external. Third, they say that any conceptual
in and forms the outcome element of The difference is minimal, in both cases dissent voiced
Definition. It reinforces the previously men- by an insider is aimed at terminating or pre-
tioned condition that the informant be someone venting occurrence of organisational wrong-
with potential to respond effectively to the dis- doing. Bok (1980, pp. 332–334) makes a similar
closure. Such persons are likely to be those in a point, identifying dissent, accusation and viola-
position to put the matter on public record. It is tion of loyalty as critical attributes shared by
not claimed that the disclosure must be made internal and external disclosing.
 Whistleblowing: A Restrictive Definition and Interpretation 91

Johnson and Courtemanche take a contrary disobedience, thereby adding weight to the
position. Johnson’s insistence on public record dilemma. Public disclosures do have these char-
removes all merely internal reporting from the acteristics and present serious moral conflict. But
whistleblowing domain. Her grounds are: that internal disclosure does not breach the organisa-
the dilemma and disclosure consequences for all tion’s confidences, nor violate its proprietary
concerned are so much more severe; and that to rights to the information released; and it is
do otherwise could make whistleblowing com- dubious whether the act is organisational dis-
monplace. Her image of whistleblowing as a obedience (De George, 1990, p. 515) though,
deserving act with dire effects encourages her clearly, it does disturb the hierarchy and
to present it as a rare, aggravated, response to command structure. Moreover, the disclosure
wrongdoing which needs solid ethical support. represents dissent from the peer group rather than
Dandekar (1990, p. 557) claims to follow Johnson dissent from organisational values which the
in principle but prefers to redefine external dis- whistleblower may be attempting to uphold.
closure so that it includes internal reporting Thus we seem to be dealing, once more, with
which by-passes formalised or conventional lines the different, maybe spurious, situation of dis-
of communication. loyalty to supervisors and colleagues.
Other arguments can be made to support the
case that internal disclosures are not whistle-
blowing. As to Bok, it is the case that accusa- Conclusion
tion and disloyalty are present whether a
disclosure is made to an internal or external This paper presented whistleblowing as a type
recipient however, and importantly, the targets of informing which entails disclosure, accusation
are different. External disclosure attacks and and dissent. A general purpose whistleblowing
accuses the organisation. Internal disclosure definition, consistent with these attributes, was
shields the organisation and accuses other organ- developed from a review, synthesis and detailed
isation members, those guilty of the alleged examination of a representative set of published
offence or those in authority who fail to deal definitions. Three core issues concerning the dis-
with it. Moreover, collegiate loyalty is a cultural closure, namely motive of the informer, authority
phenomenon whose foundations differ from the to disclose and recipient, and a number of lesser
trusted access to information on which organi- issues were identified and positions taken on each
sational loyalty is based. one.
Next, evidence that internal disclosure While The Definition owes much to the other
precedes public disclosure does not deny their definitions it differs in many important respects.
distinctiveness. Indeed it affirms that going public Inclusion of a target organisation as a definition
is not an extra step along a given path but charts element and the condition that the target be
a new course; it is action of a different kind, a implicated are unique features, as are the whistle-
last resort when other avenues are closed. The blower characteristics, and the total mix detailed
objection about disclosure to recipients with roles in the Exhibit 2 dissection. Also, The Definition
in and outside the target organisation is ill is founded on the ethical conflict of role-related
founded when we apply Johnson’s condition that loyalty to an organisation and loyalties owed to
public disclosure must enter the public record. wider constituencies and is differentiated by the
Disclosure to an employee/union official, say, is way the former is formulated. Organisation
public disclosure only if that person acts officially loyalty is equivalent to respecting confidentiality
to make it so. and the proprietary rights to data and informa-
The dominant case remains for dichotomising tion and is so represented because this alone is
disclosure and accepting only those that are relevant to a loyalty violation that stems from dis-
external as whistleblowing. Recall that whistle- closure.
blowing is an ethical dilemma because it neces- The form of the ethical dilemma has deter-
sitates a breach of trust. It may also involve mined the description of the whistleblower as a
92 Peter B. Jubb

person with privileged access to organisation Permissions

data. Also, it has allowed a clear line to be drawn
between loyalty to the organisation and loyalty Permission to reproduce the material in Exhibit
to one’s peers in the organisation which has been 1 has been granted by Dr Marilyn Blackburn and
something of a distraction in previous writings. the publisher, New Lexington Press.
The ethical dilemma foundation has the most
critical impacts. First, the act of disclosure must
represent a choice for there to be a real dilemma. Acknowledgements
Hence, disclosures made under duress or required
by duty are judged to be outside the domain of The paper has benefited from input and
whistleblowing. Second, there must be disclosure encouragement from participants at a seminar
to an external entity. All internal disclosures, even Department of Commerce, Australian National
those not authorised, fail to create the crucial University, the ISBEE 1st World Congress
dilemma. They may breach loyalty to colleagues of Business, Economics and Ethics; and the
but do not patently disobey the organisation Australian Association of Professional and
and do not harm its privacy and property Applied Ethics third national conference; and
rights. Internal disclosure is discreet, aiming not from comments of anonymous reviewers.
to broadcast but merely to gain attention of Especial thanks are due to professor Thomas
powerful insiders. If organisations encourage and Dunfee, Wharton School, for drawing my atten-
respond to internal disclosures they will be tion to the case of Balla v. Gambro Inc; and to
protected and the need for whistleblowing is professor John Kleinig, City University New
minimised thus ensuring it has that rare event York, for detailed comments on an early draft of
quality. If an organisation fails in this, the only the paper.
‘voicing’ option left is to go public through an
external agency. That irretrievable step is the true
essence of whistleblowing. Notes
Certain limitations should be noted. The
1
endeavour of defining complex phenomena is A celebrated one is that of Charles Trevelyan who
prone to undesirable influences of preconception in 1828, aware of corrupt practices by the Delhi
and ulterior goals. The Definition is explicitly Resident and thwarted in his attempts to have the
matter investigated, made it a public issue by bringing
based on the belief that loyalty conflict is the pre-
a private prosecution. Cited in Tucker (1995, p. 475).
dominating feature of whistleblowing, and it may 2
For instance Cathedral Trusts and Their Fulfillment
have been tempered by the desire for a defini- by Robert Whiston, published in 1849, which drew
tion which makes whistleblowing a rare, last- attention to resources of charitable foundations being
resort method of disclosure. Other undetected misapplied to the benefit of the clergy administering
biases may have played a part also. Finally, many them. This case is said to have been material for
important aspects of whistleblowing have not Anthony Trollope’s famous fictional story of Hiram’s
been examined in this paper. The most notable Hospital (Gilmour, 1986).
3
omissions are the legal framework for whistle- Consider Balla v. Gambro, Inc. (1991). In this case
blowing and the implications of legal definitions; an employee in-house counsel, dismissed because he
and the question of justification – how to isolate threatened to expose employer intentions to breach
and then foster meritorious, morally courageous regulations regarding public health and safety if they
were not abandoned, failed to obtain a remedy for
whistleblowing. In both those contexts motive
wrongful dismissal. His case, based on the tort of
will be a crucial factor. retaliatory dismissal, was denied because, as attorney,
he was bound by professional ethics, and these sufficed
to protect the public interest because they imposed
on him a duty to disclose matters threatening public
safety. Having this onus to disclose and, moreover, to
resign from further counselling of the ‘client’, the
 Whistleblowing: A Restrictive Definition and Interpretation 93

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