FM 5-71-2 Appendix A Engineer Estimate
FM 5-71-2 Appendix A Engineer Estimate
FM 5-71-2 Appendix A Engineer Estimate
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APPENDIX A
ENGINEER ESTIMATE
The engineer estimate is an extension of the military decision-making process (see FMs 5-100, 5-71-3, 71-2, and 90-
7). It is a logical thought process conducted by the engineer concurrently with the supported maneuver force's
tactical planning process. The engineer-estimate process generates early integration of the engineer plan into the
combined-arms planning process. It drives the coordination between the engineer, the supported commander, and
other staff officers and the development of detailed engineer plans, orders, and annexes.
Each step of the engineer-estimate process corresponds to a step of the decision-making process. Like the decision-
making process, the engineer estimate is continuously refined. Table A-1 shows the relationship between these two
processes. A more detailed discussion of each step of the engineer-estimate process is found below.
Terrain analysis Analyze the terrain's impact on the battle using the OCOKA framework:
Enemy mission and M/S Anticipate enemy engineer operations and their impact on the battle.
capabilities
Consider the enemy's mission and doctrinal employment of engineers in
battle.
Friendly mission and M/S Evaluate the friendly engineer capability and its impact on accomplishing the
capabilities mission.
Maneuver forces.
Engineer forces.
Higher engineer HQ.
Adjacent engineer units.
Consider the availability of critical resources.
To analyze the terrain and the enemy, the engineer commander uses the IPB and the EBA. The engineer XO uses
the same process to assist in developing the TF's SITEMP and the engineer estimate. The IPB is a tool used to see
the terrain and the enemy. The first two steps of the EBA do the same, but with an engineer focus. For example, the
EBA will detail how the enemy engineers will modify terrain and develop EAs. This is critical information needed to
complete the TF's SITEMP. However, the IPB process is used by the engineer to develop his "engineer-specific" IPB.
The IPB is only two-thirds of the EBA process. The friendly engineer capability must be analyzed to complete the
EBA. The TF engineer must use all assets and resources available-the TF S2, the brigade engineer, and the
engineer battalion staff-during the IPB/EBA process.
The EBA is a continuous process that is continually refined as the situation becomes clearer. Each time new
information is collected or the conditions change, the engineer must evaluate its impact on the mission and refine the
facts and assumptions as necessary.
To do a proper EBA, the engineer company planner must understand the IPB process. The following paragraphs
detail the IPB process and the engineer contribution to the completed product. For more information on the IPB, see
FM 34-130.
Specifically, weather analysis determines the effect of the weather on the mission. Weather affects terrain,
equipment, visibility, and soldiers. Snow, dust, humidity, and temperature extremes all have an impact on soldier
efficiency and limit the potential of weapons and equipment. Poor visibility affects obstacle placement. Normally,
inclement weather will favor an attacker but will degrade his mobility and C2. Defenders are less likely to be alert and
weapons less effective. The attacker can close with the defender with greater ease in limited visibility conditions.
Table A-3 summarizes the effects of weather.
Terrain analysis is a major component of the IPB. The objective of the terrain analysis is to determine the impact that
the terrain (including weather) will have on mission accomplishment. The engineer supports the intelligence officer in
this process. Using the OCOKA framework (see Table A-4), the engineer determines what advantages or
disadvantages the terrain and anticipated weather offer to both enemy and friendly forces. This process has a direct
impact on planning engineer operations. Table A-4 shows examples of how the components of OCOKA may impact
engineer support.
Observation Offense Planning the obscuration/location of the support force for breaching operations.
and fields of
fire Defense Obstacle distance from direct-fire systems (might also affect obstacle composition with
reduced standoff). Limited fields of fire might limit certain obstacle effects (for example, fix
and block).
Cover and Offense Planning obscuration/assault positions for breaching operations. Impacts feasibility of
concealment conducting a covert breach.
Obstacles Offense Task-organizing special engineer mobility assets (such as AVLBs and ACEs). Plotting enemy
countermobility effort, tying into existing obstacles.
Key terrain Offense Targeting indirect-fire suppression and obscuration for breaching operations.
Defense Obstacle intents tied to how valuable the key terrain is for retention.
Avenues of Offense Capability to conduct in-stride, deliberate, and covert breaching operations. Focusing
approach countermobility effort in a transition to a hasty defense. The need for flank protection.
Defense Focusing specific obstacle effects in a specific location in an AA. Size of AA impacts on
required countermobility effort.
Observation and Fields of Fire. Terrain and vegetation affect the friendly and enemy forces' capabilities to observe
one another and engage each other with direct-fire weapons. Dead space is normally covered by indirect fire or
sensors. Observation and fields of fire are used to identify potential EAs, defensible terrain, and specific system
positions and to identify where maneuvering forces are most vulnerable to observation and fires.
In the defense, a potential mission for the engineer company is to improve fields of fire by cutting down trees, power
lines, and vegetation. Intervisibility and unobstructed view from one point to another are other factors of observation
and fields of fire. The analysis of both are critical to obstacle siting.
Cover and Concealment. Cover is protection from enemy fire. Concealment is protection from enemy observation.
Both describe the viability of key terrain and the AA. Advances in technology, such as thermal sights, have affected
the availability of concealment. The evaluation of concealment and cover aids in identifying defensible terrain,
possible approach routes for breaching, assembly areas, and deployment and dispersal areas.
Obstacles. Obstacles are classified as both existing and reinforcing. Existing obstacles are further broken down into
natural and cultural classes. Reinforcing obstacles include tactical and protective obstacles emplaced by soldiers to
multiply combat power through terrain reinforcement.
The obstacles analyzed during the IPB/EBA process include both existing and reinforcing, but focus on existing
obstacles. However, any reinforcing obstacles in the battlefield environment are included in the analysis. Obstacles
define the AAs. They create cross compartments in the AA and can turn, fix, block, or disrupt maneuver. The
following are examples of natural obstacles:
Swamps.
Dense forests.
Deep, steep-sloped ravines.
Rivers and streams.
Hills or mountains with excessive slopes.
The following are examples of cultural obstacles:
Urban areas.
Quarries.
Railroad beds.
Built-up or elevated roads.
Reinforcing obstacles are those constructed, emplaced, or detonated to enhance existing obstacles or the terrain.
Some examples of reinforcing obstacles are-
Minefields.
Tank ditches.
Abatis.
Tank walls.
Road craters.
Wire entanglements.
Built-up areas, rivers, steep elevation, and old friendly or enemy obstacle systems are normally analyzed for their effect
on the AAs. A technique used to display the cumulative effects of obstacles is a graphical product that depicts areas of
terrain as unrestricted, restricted, and severely restricted in terms of their effects on mobility.
Unrestricted terrain is fairly open and presents no hinderance to ground movement. Nothing needs to be done to
enhance the force's mobility. Unrestricted terrain is a function of the type of unit moving on the terrain. Table A-5
depicts the terrain that is considered to be unrestricted (favorable).
Vegetation Trees less than 2" thick with 20 ft or more between them
Obstacles None
* Slope has priority over roads. Roads negate vegetation unless obstacles are used.
Restricted terrain hinders ground movement. Little effort is needed to enhance mobility. Restricted terrain is also a
function of the type of unit traversing the terrain. Table A-6, depicts terrain that is considered to be restricted and
Table A-7 depicts terrain that is considered to be severely restricted (unfavorable).
Hydrology Rivers, streams, lakes, and flooded areas that can be forded at several places
Vegetation Trees 2" thick with less than 20-ft intervals (mounted forces only)
Obstacles None
* Except in open areas. Mounted forces only. Roads negate vegetation unless obstacles are used.
Built-up Wider than 500 meters or cannot be easily bypassed by mounted forces
areas
Hydrology Rivers, streams, lakes, swamps, and bogs that cannot be forded or spanned by an AVLB and that are not
frozen. Hard, vertical banks higher than 4 feet will stop tanks as will streams more that 4 feet deep.
Elevation Terrain with elevation variation of 200 to 400 meters per kilometer.
Obstacles Minefields, tank ditches, tree blow down, and barriers (may be directional).
Roads One trail per kilometer and no hard-surfaced roads except in open area (mechanized or armored forces
and trails only).
Key Terrain. Key terrain is any locality or area that affords a marked advantage to whichever combatant seizes,
retains, or controls it. It is not necessarily the highest hill in the area. It could be a piece of high ground where a force
can overlook low ground, a major road junction, or even a river or stream crossing site. Key terrain can be controlled
by fire, obstacles, or the relative positioning of friendly forces. It is often selected for battle positions or objectives.
Some examples of key terrain are-
Mobility corridors are areas within AAs that permit movement and maneuver. These are mostly open areas with good
routes for rapid movement and mutual support. When existing or tactical obstacles cross an AA, they form lines of
resistance called cross compartments. Table A-8 depicts the frontages that determine the size of the unit that can
deploy along each mobility corridor.
Engineer threat evaluation should provide the TF S2 with the number of obstacles that the enemy can build (by type),
the amount of fortification he is capable of, and how many breaches the enemy can complete given his equipment
and doctrine. The engineer must ensure that these analyses are incorporated into the TF's SITEMP.
Threat analysis and integration are also major components of the IPB. Enemy mission and engineer capability are
subcomponents of the threat-analysis and -integration process. The engineer supports the intelligence officer during
the threat evaluation by focusing on the enemy's mission as it relates to enemy engineer capability. When executing
this component of the EBA, the engineer must first understand the enemy's anticipated mission (attack or defend)
and consider how enemy engineers will be doctrinally employed. He then develops an estimate of the enemy
engineer capabilities. To do this, he uses the S2's order of battle and knowledge of enemy engineer organizations
and other assets (such as combat vehicle self-entrenching capabilities) that may impact engineer operations. The
engineer must also consider confirmed intelligence pertaining to recent enemy engineer activities.
The engineer then uses the S2's SITEMP and the enemy-capability estimate to plot the enemy's engineer effort and
its location. Coordinating with the S2, the engineer recommends PIR and the engineer force necessary to augment
the reconnaissance effort. Enemy engineer activities must be organic to the total combined-arms R&S plan. Table A-
2 contains a quick summary on enemy mission and engineer-capability analysis.
The third component of the EBA estimates the friendly engineer capability and its impact on mission
accomplishment. To perform this function, the engineer uses the information he developed in the first step of the
engineer estimate (receive the mission).
Knowing the type of operation, the engineer quickly prioritizes the development of capability estimates. He considers
engineer forces task-organized to his supported unit as well as the assets that other members of the combined-arms
team have (such as mine plows) to determine the assets that are available. Assets under the control of the higher
engineer headquarters and adjacent engineer units should be noted for future reference in the event a lack of assets
is identified during SOEO development.
Having determined the assets available and having already estimated and refined the time available with the S3, the
engineer uses standard planning factors or known unit work rates to determine the total engineer capability. For
example, in the offense, the engineer would focus first on the amount of breaching equipment (AVLBs, MICLICs,
ACEs, engineer platoons, and CEVs) available and translate that into breaching lanes. In the defense, the engineer
would determine the number of minefields, hull- or turret- defilade positions, and tank ditches that he could construct
with available resources. He uses the results of his capability estimates during the SOEO development. Table A-2
contains an outline of this analysis.
The engineer combines his analyses of the terrain, enemy capability, and friendly capability to form facts and
assumptions about the following:
Likely enemy engineer effort and the most probable enemy COA.
Potential enemy vulnerabilities.
Critical friendly requirements.
The impact of the above factors on the mission.
The engineers determine their capability to support the TF. The TF engineer and XO analyze the engineer company's
capability to emplace obstacles, prepare vehicle fighting positions, breach obstacles, and recommend where the terrain
best supports the above.
The availability of key breaching equipment such as the ACE, the CEV, the AVLB, and the M1A1 plows and rollers,
are tracked to keep the TF commander apprised of the breaching capability available. During the war-gaming phase
of the tactical decision-making process, the engineer normally recommends the placement of TF breaching assets as
well as the breaching technique based on the terrain and enemy obstacle threat. He also determines the number of
lanes the TF potentially can make. Table A-9 shows the TF's breaching capability.
17-meter gaps 4
NOTE: The number of tank plows is determined by the number of tank companies per TF.
Likewise, the engineers provide the TF commander with details of the friendly capability to build fortifications and
obstacles. Generally, this is done by meters of minefield or the number of obstacles and the number of fighting
positions potentially available. These estimates are functions of time, equipment, troops, soil conditions, the unit
training level and materials available. Table A-10 shows the engineer company's capabilities to create obstacles as
well as planning factors for obstacle construction. Table A-11 shows the planning factors for fortification (for
comparison, all equipment is available). This table uses the following planning factors:
15 hours per day available to actually dig (remaining hours used for movement, maintenance, resupply,
reconnaissance, position siting, and coordination).
ACEs work in teams using 3.5 hours per two-tier vehicle fighting position.
Dozers work in teams using 2.5 hours per two-tier vehicle fighting position.
SEEs working individually using 1 hour per crew-served weapons position.
All crews are assumed to be trained.
FASCAM (artillery-
delivered) 1 or 2 to plan
NOTE: Hand-emplaced rate is 100 meters per hour per platoon. AT ditch rate with two ACEs, Volcano, and GEMSS
is for one load, blocking obstacles.
Dozer (X2) 12 18 24 32
ACE (X7) 12 19 25 32
SEE (X2) 20 40 60 60
Specified tasks.
Implied tasks.
Assets available.
Limitations (constraints and restrictions).
Risk.
Time analysis.
Essential tasks.
Restated mission.
SPECIFIED TASKS
Specified tasks are those derived directly from the WO, OPORD, or commander's intent. Examples include obstacle
zones, obstacle belts with intents, the required number of breaching lanes, and the type of breach designated by the
higher commander.
IMPLIED TASKS
Implied tasks are developed by analyzing the mission in conjunction with the facts and assumptions developed earlier.
For example, obstacle-handover coordination during a relief-in-place mission, if not specified, is an implied task. A
classic example of an implied task is identifying and planning a river-crossing operation to support an attack to seize an
objective if a river crossing is necessary to accomplish the mission but is not specified in the higher OPORD.
ASSETS AVAILABLE
The engineer should have already identified the available engineer assets in the EBA. He should also examine the total
force structure of the combined-arms team. This will help him as he develops the SOEO. For instance, the amount of
firepower available may help to determine whether the force should conduct an in-stride versus a deliberate breach.
LIMITATIONS
Constraints are those specified tasks that limit freedom of action. Designated reserve targets, obstacle belts (with
intents), and breach-lane requirements are examples of constraints the engineer must consider in his mission analysis.
Restrictions are limitations placed on the commander that prohibit the command from doing something. Therefore, they
impact greatly on the COA development. Obstacle zones and belts are excellent examples of restrictions because they
limit the area in which tactical obstacles can be placed.
RISK
A commander might specify a risk he is willing to accept to accomplish the mission. For instance, the priority obstacle
effort in a defense may be employed on the most likely enemy AA while situational obstacles are to be planned on the
most dangerous AA as an economy-of-force measure. The engineer must understand how a risk involving an engineer
capability will specifically impact on combined-arms operations and advise the commander accordingly.
TIME ANALYSIS
The engineer must ensure that engineer operations are included in the combined arms time analysis. First, he
determines the actual total time available. While preparing the friendly capabilities portion of the EBA, he established a
fact or assumption of the time available. He now refines this time analysis. A good tool to use in this process is a basic
time-line sketch that includes such items as the-
ESSENTIAL TASKS
Specified and implied tasks that are critical to mission success are identified as essential tasks. The engineer focuses
the development of his plans, staff coordination, and resource allocation on the essential tasks. The engineer does not
ignore the other specified and implied tasks, but his planning centers on the essential tasks.
RESTATED MISSION
The restated mission follows the same format as any mission statement. The who, what, where, and why are based on
the mission analysis. The restated mission must clearly articulate the engineer's task and purpose during the operation.
Develop an SOEO.
Belt The belt technique divides the battlefield into areas that run the width of the sector, war-
gaming across the
front and multiple avenues at once. This is the preferred technique. It allows the engineer to war-game the
mutual support between obstacle belts and groups. It is the best method for analyzing mutual support and
adjacent engineer support.
Box This technique focuses solely on critical enemy or friendly events in a designated area (box). The advantage
of this method is that it is not time-consuming. It allows the engineer to focus on a particular breaching site
or EA.
After each COA is independently war-gamed, the results are compared. The goal of comparing COAs is to analyze
the advantages and disadvantages of a COA relative to the other plans. Each COA is compared to the others using
specific evaluation criteria. These evaluation criteria may be developed by the staff or may be directed to the staff by
the commander during his planning guidance.
The engineer compares COAs in terms of which SOEO best supports mission accomplishment. His comparison is
only part of the total comparison by the staff.
RECOMMEND A COURSE OF ACTION
The objective of the comparison is to make a unified recommendation to the commander on which COA is best. The
engineer may have to give greater consideration to a COA that he can least support if it looks like it is the best selection
from the other staff perspectives. He must be prepared to inform the maneuver commander where risk must be
accepted or what additional assets he will need to avoid that risk. The engineer must also be prepared to inform the
maneuver commander where those assets may be obtained and what influence the commander may have to exert to
get them. This is where knowledge of the higher and adjacent unit's engineer assets becomes important.
Based on the staff's recommendations, the commander makes a decision on which COA to adopt for final planning.
He may select a specific COA, modify a COA, or combine parts of several COAs. In any event, the commander
decides and issues to the staff additional guidance for developing the plan. This guidance concentrates on
synchronizing the fight, focusing on integrating the TF combat support into the plan.
The engineer conveys his written plan through his input in the basic OPORD (SOEO, subunit instructions, and
coordinating instructions paragraphs) and the engineer annex (see Appendix B). As part of the combined-arms staff,
the engineer also participates in the OPORD brief to the assembled command group. As with the other primary staff
officers, the engineer gets only one chance to brief the command group on the SOEO. This is the first step in a
properly executed and well-coordinated engineer plan.
The engineer's focus is to brief the subordinate commanders; the maneuver commander and staff should already
know the plan. Time is always critical; repeating information covered by other staff members should be avoided, and
only critical items should be covered (including SOP items). Above all, the engineer should be thoroughly familiar
with the total plan so that he is comfortable fielding questions.
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