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Arbitration:
The Implications of an Increase in Third-
Party Participation
By
Eugenia Levine*
INTRODUCTION
. Eugenia Levine is an Associate in international arbitration and litigation at White & Case LLP. The
views expressed in this article are the author's own and are not reflective of the views of
the author's affiliated institutions.
1. Kenneth Kinyua, Assessing the Benefits of Accepting Amicus Curiae Briefs in Investor-
State Arbitrations: A Developing Country's Perspective (Stellenbosch Univ. Faculty of Law,
Working Paper Series No. 4, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract
id=1310753.
2. Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration'sEngagement of
the Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 775
(2008); see also Andrew Newcombe and Axelle Lemaire, Should Amici Curiae Participate in
Investment Treaty Arbitrations?,5 VINDOBONA J. INT'L L. & ARB. 22 (2001).
200
2011] AMICUS CURIAE IN INT'L INVESTMENTARBITRATION 201
on the implications of the rise in amicus participation and considers the need to
develop more specific criteria to determine whether amicus curiae participation
should be permitted in particular circumstances, and the form and extent of such
involvement in particular contexts.
I.
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION-AN OVERVIEW
13. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec.17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
[hereinafter NAFTA].
14. Energy Charter Treaty art. 26, Dec. 17, 1994, 2080 U.N.T.S. 102 [hereinafter ECT].
15. See, e.g., International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Arbitration, available at
http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/rules.asp; London Court of International Arbitration
Rules of Arbitration, available at www.lcia.org/ARBfolder/ARB DOWNLOADS/ENGLISH/
rules.pdf; Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, available at
www.sccinstitute.com/_upload/shared-files/regler/ webA4_vanliga 2004_eng.pdf.
16. ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/comarb/icsidlicsid2a.asp [hereinafter ICSID Rules].
17. ICSID Rules Governing the Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceedings by
the Secretariat of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/comarb/icsid/icsid3.asp [hereinafter ICSID Rules].
18. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/
uncitral texts/arbitration/1976Arbitrationrules.html.
19. See North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 13, ch. 11, art. 1120 (stipulating
that a disputing investor may submit a claim against a host State to arbitration under either the Rules
of the ICSID Convention, if both the host State and the home State of the claimant are parties to the
Convention, or the Additional Facility Rules of ICSID, if either the host State or the investor's home
State is a party to the ICSID Convention, but not both, or the UNCITRAL Rules).
20. William D. Rogers, Senior Partner, Arnold & Porter, Remarks at Inter-American
Development Bank Conference on Commercial Alternative Dispute Resolution in the XXI Century:
The Road Ahead for Latin America and the Caribbean (Oct. 26, 2000) (notes on file with author).
21. See, e.g., Agreement Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and the Government
of the Republic of Bolivia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments art. 9, May 24, 1988, Gr.
Brit.-Bol., GR. BRrr. T.S. No. 34 (1990) (Cm. 1071).
22. ECT, supra note 14, art 26.
204 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 29:1
parties with a more efficient and, in the investor-State context, perhaps more
impartial outcomes, by proceeding outside national judicial systems. 23 Because
arbitral awards are normally not subject to any appeal except for those provided
in the arbitration rules, the determination of these awards largely bypasses the
judicial process. 24 The other key attraction is "[t]he implication . .. that what
proceeds in the arbitration will not only be kept private between the parties but
will remain absolutely confidential." 25 This concept of privacy and
confidentiality originates primarily from the foundational underpinnings of
international commercial arbitration, but it has also to a considerable extent been
translated into the investment context. 26
Investment arbitral proceedings frequently rely on the same procedural
rules that govern commercial arbitration, and contain certain privacy and
confidentiality rights. 27 For instance, the UNCITRAL Rules, which are
frequently used in investment arbitration disputes, ensure the parties' rights to
privacy by guaranteeing in-camera proceedings without access by third parties
unless the disputing parties consent otherwise. 2 8 The rules also restrict the
publication of any awards without the parties' consent. 29 Although the existence
of a general duty of confidentiality that would prohibit access to documents
remains an unsettled question, arbitral panels proceeding under the UNCITRAL
rules tend to accept parties' rights to prohibit third-party access to relevant
documents by express agreement. 30 There are also similar privacy and
confidentiality rights in the investment-specific ICSID regime. For instance, the
ICSID Convention disallows publication of the award without the consent of the
parties 3' and the ICSID Rules prohibit attendance of third parties at arbitral
hearings without the parties' consent. 32 As such, the institutional rules and the
consent-based nature of arbitration have traditionally provided disputing parties
with the advantage of fashioning the investment arbitration proceedings to
preserve privacy and confidentiality.
II.
THE RATIONALE FOR THIRD-PARTY PARTICIPATION IN INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION
population "render several issues of public nature and thus public interest." 38 A
further consideration in investment arbitration proceedings is that "adverse
decisions leading to monetary awards will likely be paid by out of the public's
tax revenues." 39 In light of these factors, commentators have argued that dispute
settlement procedures in investment arbitrations lack public openness and
scrutiny, and delegitimize outcomes arrived at in secrecy by private decision-
makers.40 Beyond ensuring legitimacy through transparency, some authors have
also highlighted that the public nature of these arbitrations may create a situation
where third parties have substantial legal interests in the dispute and should be
granted broader rights of participation. 4 1
In the seminal NAFTA case of Methanex Corporationv. United States of
America, the U.S. government acknowledged that investment disputes are "to be
distinguished from a typical commercial arbitration on the basis that a State [is]
the Respondent, the issues [have] to be decided in accordance with a treaty and
the principles of public international law and a decision on the dispute could
have a significant effect extending beyond the two Disputing Parties." 42 At the
same time, however, no one can ignore that arbitration is inherently based on a
certain degree of party autonomy and privacy, and arbitration cannot be invested
with all the features of a court process without reducing its attractiveness to
investors and its key role in promoting the foreign investment regime. 4 3 As
such, it is necessary to appropriately balance the attractive features of
investment arbitration, such as privacy and efficiency, with acknowledgment of
and accommodation for the impact of investor-State arbitration on broader
public policy and third-party interests. Nevertheless, on the whole there appears
to be a more compelling case for introducing a degree of third-party
participation into investor-State arbitration proceedings than into international
commercial arbitration.
III.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THIRD-PARTY PARTICIPATION IN INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION-THE RISE OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
44. Lance Bartholomeusz, The Amicus Curiae Before InternationalCourts and Tribunals, 5
NON-STATE ACTORS & INT'L L. 209,211 (2005).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See European Convention on Human Rights art. 36(2), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222,
stating: "The President of the Court may, in the interest of the proper administration ofjustice, invite
any High Contracting Party which is not a party to the proceedings or any person concerned who is
not the applicant to submit written comments or take part in hearings."
51. See, e.g., WTO, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, art.17(9), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu e/dsu-e.htm; see also
Petros C. Mavroidis, Amicus CuriaeBriefs Before the WTO: Much Ado About Nothing, Jean Monnet
Working Paper 2/01, availableat www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/mavroidisamicus.pdf.
52. Bartholomeusz, supra note 44.
53. Id.
54. See, Timothy R. West and Matthew M.C. Roberts, Amicus Curiae Participationin U.S.
Supreme Court Oral Arguments, ALL ACADEMIC RESEARCH (2003), available at
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa research-citation/0/8/3/4/1/pages834 1/p8341 1-
208 BERKELEY JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 29:1
intervention on the basis that it highlighted "the general importance of the issue
in the territories of all Contracting Parties." 5 5 U.S. courts have also on occasion
extended amicus rights to participation in the oral part of the proceedings. 5 6 As
such, the concept of amicus curiae is not inherently restricted to any one form of
participation and could, in appropriate cases, include attendance and
participation at oral hearings, access to the disputing parties' documents and
even cross-examination of witnesses. 5
1.php.
55. Id.
56. See, Timothy R. West and Matthew M.C. Roberts, supra note 54.
57. Choudhury, supra note 2; Vifluales, supranote 43.
58. See, e.g., Secretive World Bank TribunalBans Public and Media Participationin Bechtel
Lawsuit over Access to Water, CIEL.ORG, http://www.ciel.org/IfiLBechtelLawsuit_12Feb03.html
(last visited Oct. 8, 2010).
59. Aguas dal Tunari SA v. The Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/02 (Oct. 21,
2005).
60. Choudhury, supranote 2, at 814.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Mistelis, supra note 25, at 185.
63. VanDuzer, supranote 7, at 681.
2011] AMCUS CURIAE IN INT'L INVESTMENTARBITRATION 209
64. NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-
DisputingParty Participation,Oct. 7, 2003, 16 W.T.A.M. 167 (2004) [hereinafter FTC Statement].
65. See Canada Model Foreign Investment Protection Agreement, art. 39 [hereinafter
Canadian Model BIT], available at http://ita.law.uvic.caldocuments/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-
en.pdf; United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 28(3) [hereinafter US Model BIT],
availableat http://www.ustr.gov/Trade Sectors/Investment/ModelBIT/SectionIndex.html.
66. Choudhury, supra note 2; see also Methanex Amicus Curiae Decision, supra note 30.
67. Methanex Amicus Curiae Decision, supranote 30.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
210 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 29:1
82. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A., and Vivendi UniversalS.A. v. The
Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and
Participation as Amicus Curiae in Suez (July 30, 2010) [hereinafter Suez].
83. Biwater Amicus Curiae Decision, supra note 81; Andrew de Lotbiniere McDougall and
Ank Santens, ICSID TribunalsApply New Rules on Amicus Curiae,22 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP.
69(2007).
84. Biwater Amicus Curiae Decision, supra note 81, at 7.
85. Id. at 2.
86. Note that the first two criteria in Rule 37(2) of the ICSID Rules of Arbitration are
somewhat similar to the considerations discussed by the Methanex and UPS tribunals in determining
whether to grant amicus participation under the UNCITRAL Rules. Notably, under the ICSID Rules,
amicus curiae are not limited to participating solely in disputes concerning a question of "public
interest." In contrast, tribunals adjudicating under the UNCITRAL Rules emphasize this criterion in
deciding whether to allow amicus participation.
87. Biwater Amicus Curiae Decision, supranote 81, at 14-15.
88. Id. 62-68.
212 BERKELEY JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 29:1
not entitled to any kind of substantive rights. 89 Notably, the tribunal stated that
"allowing for the making of such submission by these entities in these
proceedings is an important element in the overall discharge of the Arbitral
Tribunal's mandate, and in securing wider confidence in the arbitral process
itself." 90 In its order, the tribunal highlighted the presence of public interest in
the arbitration. 91
Finally, the ICSID tribunal in the Suez case also made reference to the new
procedural standards on amicus participation, even though the proceedings were
not officially governed by these standards, as they were initiated prior to the
amendments. 92 The proceeding, which concerned a dispute regarding water
privatization and water supply services in Argentina, considered a petition for
amicus curiae participation by five NGOs, representing issues of human rights
and public services access. 93 As in the cases already discussed, the third parties
sought access to documents and hearings as well as the right to submit legal
briefs. The tribunal, perhaps not surprisingly, did not extend participation rights
beyond submission of briefs. 94 Although the decision-makers in this case
emphasized that the amicus curiae could bring new perspectives to the
proceeding, they also highlighted the importance of not unduly burdening the
disputing parties with broad third-party intervention. 95
A review of the manner in which tribunals have allowed NGOs to
participate in investment arbitrations to date reveals that the rationale driving
their intervention has been more procedural than substantive. Given the public
interest in the proceedings, the need to promote a level of public involvement
and transparency appears to have influenced arbitral tribunals. At the same time,
the arbitral tribunals, perhaps because they perceived that these third parties
were not able to materially impact the merits of the disputes, granted them very
limited rights.
IV.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT TRENDS INAMiCUS CURIAE PARTICIPATION
103. AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erdmi Kft. v. Republic of Hungary,
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Procedural Details, available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&reqFrom=ListCases&caseld=C1 14&actionVal=viewCase (last
viewed Nov. 2, 2010).
104. Id.
105. Triantafilou, supranote 6.
2011] AMICUS CURIAE IN INT'L INVESTMENTARBITRATION 215
the Commission raises a crucial issue regarding the need for investment
tribunals to recognize that certain third parties may have more significant legal
interests in the outcome of the dispute, and as such, may merit broader
participation rights.
In this regard it is significant that the NGO amicus curiae participants
discussed earlier did not have direct legal interests in the outcomes of the
dispute. Rather, they represented broad concerns with key thematic issues. For
instance, a review of the amicus submissions in the Methanex case indicates that
the NGOs focused primarily on human rights, such as the right to potable water
and general health concerns. 106 The briefs submitted by these NGOs were
somewhat "opinion-driven" in nature, and not directly connected with the
primary and substantive legal issues implicated in the proceedings. 10 7
On the other hand, the Commission appears to have "a significant, direct,
and legally protectable interest" in the outcome of disputes involving EU
law. 108 Within the EC system and throughout EU territory, the Commission has
the specific mandate of a "public prosecutor," particularly in competition law
matters. 109 Moreover, the Commission has frequently intervened as amicus
curiae in a range of proceedings: it routinely participates as a third party in
arbitral EC competition law proceedings, " 0 and has previously appeared before
U.S. courts in matters that had implications for the Commission's enforcement
of European competition law and policy.' Commentators have highlighted
that there is a strong Community interest in the correct and uniform application
of Community law. 1 12
Thus, there is an argument that the Community has a particular mandate to
ensure that Community law is interpreted consistently in all forums, which
justifies giving greater weight to its submissions in the AES proceedings than
those of NGO third parties in previous investment arbitrations. One scholar
argues that the nature of the EC's interest in this case was more significant than
informing the tribunal of narrow environmental or cultural implications of a
106. See Methanex, Submission of Non-Disputing Parties Bluewater Network, Communities for
A Better Environment and Centre for International Environmental Law (Mar. 9, 2004), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c5818.htm.
107. For a discussion of the "opinion-driven" nature of many amicus curiae submissions, see
Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Participationof Amicus Curiae in NAFTA ChapterEleven Cases, Essay
Papers on Investment Protection (2002), available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/disp-diff/participate.aspx?lang-en.
108. Triantafilou, supra note 6.
109. Gordon Blanke, The Role of the European Commission as Amicus Curiae in EC Merger-
Remedy-Related Arbitrations, in THE USE & UTILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION in EC
COMMISSION MERGER REMEDIES: A NOVEL SUPRANATIONAL PARADIGM IN THE MAKING? 155
(Gordon Blanke ed., 2006).
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Calvin S. Goldman et al., International Antitrust: Developments After Empagran
and Intel - Comity Considerations, Am. Bar Ass'n Antitrust Mtg. (Mar. 31, 2005).
112. Blanke, supranote 109, at 161.
216 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 29:1
Republic of Kenya. 127 In that case, the State and the claimant both
acknowledged the claimant's payment of a cash bribe to the previous
government. 128 However, there are likely to be circumstances where neither
party would consider it advantageous to disclose that their agreement was
founded on official State corruption. 12 9 In this situation, informed amicus curiae
can play an important role in bringing relevant allegations of corruption to the
arbitral tribunal. 130 Notably, the issue of agreements based on an illegality is
significant since "[t]here is a strongly held view within the arbitration
community that an arbitral tribunal has the power and jurisdiction to consider
issues of illegality and can do so of its own motion, if the issue has not been put
before it by the parties." 1 31
Further, participation by representatives of supranational regimes, such as
the Commission, could specifically assist in preventing the "fragmentation" of
international law, whereby conduct that is illegal under one international regime
is nevertheless sanctioned under another international law regime. 132 Several
commentators have expressed the concern that "investment law must evolve and
be interpreted consistently with international law, including human rights law,
multilateral environmental treaties and WTO law." 133 It is notable that the
Professor Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann specifically identified "fragmentation and
conflicts between different special international treaty regimes." 134 A lack of
coordination at the international level may lead to national authorities
increasingly becoming subject to conflicting commands from different
supranational systems. As already suggested in the discussion of the AES case,
the Commission's interest, and potentially its capacity, to prevent fragmentation
of Community law and enforcement on EU territory of awards contrary to EC
public policy is a case on point. As a mechanism to minimize fragmentation of
international law, it may be necessary as a matter of best practice to allow
representatives of interested supranational regimes to participate in arbitral
proceedings in order to inform the tribunal of the extent to which the laws of a
127. World Duty Free Company Ltd. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7 (Oct. 4,
2006) (award not publicly available).
128. Kinyua, supranote 1.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. For a general discussion of the concept of "fragmentation" in international law, see Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann, Justice as Conflict Resolution: Proliferation, Fragmentation, and
Decentralization of Dispute Settlement in International Trade, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 273
(2006).
133. See, e.g., Anna van Aaken, Fragmentationof InternationalLaw: The Case ofInternational
Investment Protection 1 (University of St. Gallen Law School, Law and Economics Research Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 2008-1, 2008).
134. Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, Justice as Conflict Resolution: Proliferation, Fragmentation,
and DecentralizationofDispute Settlement in InternationalTrade, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 273,
280 (2006).
2011] AMCUS CURIAE IN INT'L INVESTMENTARBITRATION 219
In considering the role that amicus curiae can play in investment arbitration
proceedings, and in contemplating whether broader intervention rights may be
warranted in certain circumstances, it is of course necessary to also reflect on the
potential negative consequences of third-party involvement in State-investor
arbitral proceedings. There are in fact a number of possible, and somewhat
compelling, arguments against a sweeping or radical expansion of the State-
investor arbitration mechanism to encompass broader third-party participation.
First, third-party intervention can increase the practical burdens on the
disputing parties. In fact, the Methanex tribunal emphasized the need to ensure
that third-party participation does not impose any additional burdens on the
parties or the arbitral process more generally. 136 Several commentators have in
fact highlighted that allowing greater third-party intervention in State-investor
disputes could potentially lead to rising costs and delays. 137 Arbitration
specialist Noah Rubins suggests, for example, that there are even considerable
"costs and time involved in the parties' review and [potential] response to
nonparty submissions."l 38 This consideration is central given that "[investor-
State disputes already run, on average, several years and entail large costs for
both claimants and respondent States." 1 39 Obviously, if the level of third-party
participation moves beyond submission of written briefs, and third parties seek
Given the range of different arbitral rules and investment regimes currently
in place, it will undoubtedly be difficult to create a harmonized approach to
third-party participation. However, certain steps can be taken to increase
consistency. First, a set of clear guidelines should be included in the major
regimes and rules that are utilized in investment arbitration: the NAFTA, the
ICSID Convention and/or arbitration rules, the UNCITRAL Rules and the key
model BITs. Notably, in order to distinguish between the rights of amicus curiae
in commercial and in investment arbitration, arbitration rules which are
applicable to both kinds of process, such as the UNCITRAL Rules, should
stipulate that any new provisions on third-party participation apply only where a
State is a party to the arbitration. 15 3 While the processes of amendment for
different instruments involved in the investment arbitration regime are
independent, they tend to be influenced by one another. For instance, the FTC
Statement appears to have had an impact on the amendments to the amicus
provisions in the ICSID Rules. 154 Thus, once some of the central regimes begin
adopting more comprehensive guidelines on amicus participation, there is a
strong chance that a degree of "cross-fertilization" and harmonization will
follow.
In terms of the criteria that should be adopted for third-party intervention, it
is first of all necessary to develop standards that will allow for guaranteed or
mandatory, rather than purely discretionary, right of participation as amicus
curiae. These applicants must be able to satisfy criteria similar to those already
addressed in the ICSID Rules, such as the presence of a significant interest in
the merits of the dispute. Such an approach would certainly require significant
revision to the provisions of many prominent rules, such as the ICSID Rules. At
the same time, it will genuinely address the fact that in circumstances where a
third party has a sufficient interest in the proceedings, it may be necessary from
the perspective of legitimacy to formalize their status rather than leaving the
possibility of participation subject to an ad hoc process.
The tribunal should also be empowered with a structured discretion to
allow for different forms of amicus participation: (a) submission of written
briefs; (b) attendance at hearings, and potentially the making of oral arguments;
and (c) access to some or all of the documents on the record. In determining
whether or not to exercise the discretion to extend participation rights beyond
submission of written briefs, the tribunal should be directed to assess whether an
amicus curiae applicant can demonstrate a direct legal interest in the dispute.
153. See Fiona Marshall & Howard Mann, Revision of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules:
Good Governance and the Rule of Law: Express Rules for Investor-State Arbitrations Required,
INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. INT'L (2006), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdfl2006/
investment uncitral_rulesrrevision.pdf.
154. Choudhury, supra note 2.
2011] AMCUS CURIAE IN INT'L INVESTMENTARBITRATION 223
Other relevant considerations would include the extent to which a third party can
contribute substantively to the quality of a final award and the extent to which
such contribution is dependent on more extensive intervener rights. Finally, the
criteria should stipulate that the interests and benefits of amicus participation
should not outweigh factors such as unjustifiable burdens of cost and delay.1 55
Any amendments to the rules should also specifically empower the tribunal to
redact inherently confidential materials, such as trade secrets, as well as to limit
the length of written submissions and access to the record, the time allowed for
any oral arguments or for cross-examination of witnesses. Ultimately, beyond
guaranteeing a minimal level of participation where an amicus curiae can satisfy
the tribunal that they have a particular interest, even if only a broad public
interest, in the dispute, arbitrators should be considered competent to weigh up
competing considerations and to determine in particular cases whether "the
added burdens of (broader] amicus involvement are justified." 5 6
Although this approach of expanding third-party participation rights should
be adopted with caution, it appears to represent an appropriate balance between
preserving the traditional features of arbitration and enhancing the systemic
legitimacy of State-investor dispute resolution.
V.
CONCLUSION