Maxims of Interpretation
Maxims of Interpretation
MAXIMS OF INTERPRETATION
In the field of interpretation of statutes many maxims have been used from
time to timo by the Courts. Many of the general principles of interpretation
harebeen expressed in the form of maxims, like ex visSceribus actus (the statute
should be read as a whole), ut res magis valeat quam pereat (it may rather
become operative than null), noscit1ur a sociis (know from the association).
ejusdem generis (of the saine kind), expressio unius est exclusio alterius
(express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another) and
contemporanea expositio est fortissima in lege (contemporaneous exposition is
the best and strongest in the law). Detailed discussion on each of these have
already been done in Chapter 3. In addition to these, Chapter 7 has been
devoted to a detailed discussion on statutes in pari materia (in an analogous
cause, case or position). Besides these, there are certain other maxims which
are needed to be discussed in very brief. They are as follows:
1. a verbis legis non est recendendum
This means from the words of the law that there is not any departure.
When the law says that something is to be done, it has to be done and a
departure from the same is not permissible. Words of a statute cannot be varied.
The legislature expresses its intention through the language it uses and it is not
permissible to depart from the same. Disregarding the express words of a
statute is not permitted.
In Babaji Kondaji Garad v. Nasik Merchants Co-operative Bank Limited,
Nasik, reservation of seats for members of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled
Tribe was provided under Section 73-B of the Maharashtra Co-operative
Societies Act, 1960. The Supreme Court held that this is valid and mandatory.
The Court observed that those seats must be filled by election method in
preference to other methods like appointment and co-option provided under
Section 73-B which may be resorted to when election was not possible. Failure
to hold election in terms of
Section 75-B would render the entire electio
invalid. In case of conflict between a'legislative enactment and a subordinate
legislation the former will prevail over the latter. The effect of this lea tne
Court to hold the subordinate legislation ultra vires the main legislatv
enactment.
2. absolute sententia expositore non indiget
This means plain language does not need an interpreter. When the
legislature enacts an Act, the intention of the legislature is reflected in, ne
effect
language it has been used. If the language is plain, clear and unambiguous
ge
8iven to it by the Court and, therefore, it is said that plain lang
does not need an
interpreter.
1. (1984) 2 SCC 50.
(302)
MAXIMS
OF
INTERPRETATION
INTERPR
303
Singhji v. State of Rajasthan, the Supreme Court held that
In Amar
In here, the language is clear and the
meaning plain, effect must be
the
it Customs Act, 1938, Section 64 and Appendix E refer to the
siten to
ven to
Bhomicharas as as lagirdars. In Marwar Tenancy Act (No. 39 of 1949), Section 3
landlord as including a "Bhomichara Jagirdar, and in view of the
9) detines la,
at both this Act and Act No. 40 of 1949 vere part of a comprehensive
fact legislation, that both of them came into force on 6.4.1949 and that
chene of
4(11)of Act No. 40 of 1949 enacts that the words and expressio1s used
to have
theren.are to have the same meaning as in Act No. 39 of 1949, it would be safe
sme that the word jagir' was used in Section 169 of the Rajasthan Land
to assu
Act, 1952 as including Bhomichara Tenures.
eforms and Resumption of Jagirs and, therefore,
The word 'deemed imports
that in fact there was no grant,
were held otherwise than under a grant were obviously
aterests which
intended to be included. Therefore, if Bhomichara is a proprietary interest,
it
because its origin was not in grant. In the
cannot be taken out of the section
Section 169 and, therefore, within the
fesult, it must be held to fall within
clear and the meaning plain,
operation of Article 31-A. Where the language is
effect must be given to it. Therefore, Bhomichara tenure is comprehended
within the term jagir in Section 169.
3. abundans cautela non nocet
This means great caution does no harm. Therefore, whenever great caution
is required in something, this requirement must be fulfilled because great
caution does not cause any damage to anyone's interest.
. accessorium non ducit, sed sequitur sSuum principale
This means the accessory right does not lead, but follows its principal.
and there is right, the
Whenever there is a principal right an accessory
has to follow. It
principal right will always lead the accessory right which
Cannot be otherwise because an accessory right cannot lead the principal right;
has to be subservient to the main.
.accessorius sequitur naturam sui principalis
follows the nature of its principal. This is a
This means an accessory
does not lead but follows its
orollary to the principle that accesSorya right
an
principal. An accessory right cannot nave aitterent nature than its principal
ght. The nature cf the right determines the nature of the accessorv
principal
ight
non est audiendus, nisi se bene de
.acCusator post rationabile tempusS
O1issione excusa verit a time unless he
not to be neard arrer reasonable
This means an accuser is 1nis Dasic
principle that someone
for the delay. isa to law cannot be
dn account satisfactorily g Contrary
who accuses another for havingu n n e c e sso
done
sarily
easonable time, and if at all
unreasonaB
for an ion for the delay. In the
allowed
e d to
remain silent
up a
explanatior
satisfactory
d of false accusations and
then he has to put
he does so flood
Oes so would be a
there
absence off this principle
2. AIR 1955 SC 504.
304
THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
reputation of the person being accused would be at stake. Therefar.
reasonably quick hearing of the accuser is a basic requirement. erefore, a
7. actio non datur non damnificato
This means an action is not given to him who is not injured. An injured alone
has the right to initiate an action. If he chooses not to do so then that is the end
of it. A person whóhas not been wronged has no right to start legal proceedings
Locwe Starndi of the initiator has to prove to combat frivolous litigation.
8. actio personalis moritur cum persona
This means a personal right of action dies with the person. Where the
defendant by his wrongful act causes damage to the plaintiff and the plaintiff
brings a personal action against him which is his right and if during the
pendency of the case the plaintiff dies, then the personal right of action of the
plaintiff also comes to an end.
In M. Veerappa v. Evelyn Sequeera,3 the Supreme Court held that this
principle is applicable not only to those cases where after getting damages for
personal injuries the plaintiff dies during pendency of the case but also in such
cases where the lower Court has dismissed a case but the plaintiff dies during
pendency of the case in the appellate Court. The suit abates in tort but not in
contract.
In Pedasubhayya v. Akkamma,4 the Supreme Court held that a suit for
partition brought on behalf of a minor coparcener in a joint Mitakshara family
does not abate on death of the minor but can be continued
by his legal
representative. The maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona has
application only when the action is one for damages for a personal wrong, and
as a suit for partition is a suit for property, the rule in question has no
application.
In B.
Gajapathi Rao State Pradesh,5
v.
of Andhra the appellant preferred
an appeal by special leave against a sentence of imprisonment. During the
pendency of the case the appellant passed away. The Supreme Court held that
with his death the appeal abates. Where the sentence is not one of fine but or
imprisonment, which on the death of the accused becomes infructuous, the
sentence does not affect the property of the deceased accused in the hands of his
legal representatives, and, therefore, the appeal in such a case would abate
upon the death of the accused.
9. actori incumbit onus probandi
This means the burden of
is in civil matter the
proof lies on the plaintiff or the prosecution. If 1
burden of proof lies on the plaintitf and if it is a crimina
case then the burden of
proof lies on the prosecution to prove the charge
the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. One who alleges has to satisfy theagainst Court
that the allegation is true.
3. AIR 1988 SC 506.
4. AIR 1958 SC 1043,
5. AIR 1964 SC 1645.
305
OF INTERPRETATION
MAXIMS
Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat,6 the Supreme
1In DDayabhai
ayabhai
there is no conflict between
the general burden which is
t observed that n e v e r shifts, and the special burden that
Cour
on
alwavs o n prosecution and which
the
his defence of insanity.
make out
rests on
sts
the accused to
on th
curiae neminem gravabit
10. actus one. A Court does justice to
act of the Court shall prejudice no
This means an
Court of Justice, and since justice is
the parties
and that is why it is known as a
it is called a Court of Law. It is,
why
ane by application of law that is to any one.
that an act of the Court shall not be prejudicial
therefore, expected
Gujarat v. Jagan Bhai,' there was a pre-emption decree directing
In State of certain date. The deposit was made
the decree holder
to make' a deposit by a
was later on discovered that
the deposit was
within the stipulated time. It officers of
due to an error on the part of the
iess byrupee. This mistake was
one
Court held that the mistake
the Court in filling the challan. The Supreme
should be rectified by the Court and the parties relegated
to the position on the
date of deposit.
11. actus nemini est damnosus
legis
one. Therefore, any act done
in
This m e a n s an act in law shall prejudice no
accordance with law shall not be prejudicial
to any one. Law does not cause
law does not cause prejudice to any
one.
injustice to anyone and thus an act in
an act of the Court
dealt with above that
This principle is similar to the one
shall prejudice no one.
12. actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea
This means an act itself does not constitute guilt unless done with a guilty
guilty mind constitute a
mind. A result prohibited by law together with a
crime8
Court ruled
In State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George,° the Supreme
that mens rea is not an essential ingredient of an offence under Section 23 (1A)
1947. Mere
read with Section 8 (1) of the Forejgn Exchange Regulation Act,
without the permission of the Reserve
voluntary act of bringing gold into India
Bank of India constitutes an offence.jlhere is a presumption that mens rea is an
essential ingredient of a statutory offence; but this may be rebutted by the
express words of a statute creating
the offence or
by necessary implication.
13. ad ea quae frequentius accidunt jura adaptantur
This means the laws are adopted to those cases which more frequently
occur. The purpose of law is to set tne soclety in order. Therefore, the law must
be strong enough to deal with situations which occur in society. This is all the
more important when certain kindsior incident are taking place m o r e
frequently. Thus, laws are adoptea se
to cases which occur quite often in
society.
6. AlR 1964 SC 1563.
7. AIR 1966 SC 1631.
Bhattacnaryya, lne lndian Penal Code, 2010 pp. liv-lvii.
see Prof. T.
8 For a detailed discussion,
9. AIR 1965 SC 722.
14. adversus extraneous vitiosa THE
This means an
imperfect possessio INTERPRETATION OF
prodessi STATUTES
STATUTRS
outsiders
claiming.adversely.possession
In
is
accustomedsolet
ossession and adverse claim of cases of a clash to prevail *
Over the latter. outsiders, the former bet prevail a
As
adverse claim ofImperfect possession stands on a
Ween an ag
i4nt
outsiders. better ccustomed toto prepretect
footinemed
footing in
va
15. aedificare in tuo com evail
This means it is not
proprio sole non licet quod alteriri nou neceat
proper
injurious to another. This ensures to build
upon one's own
care has to be taken
a certain orderliness land what
land as may be
to see that one is not
ess in the society may
The society.
in matter of damaging
the interest of any
another. This maxim suchconstructing
Therefo
building
building laws. onhis
k isisv
very
16.
aequitasest
important
correctio legis
This means
equity is a correction of the
lae, generalitere
qua parte deficit
defective. The general law may be general law in the
corrects these defects defective in some
part where it is
such situations. and thereby ensures better
respects sometimes. Equity
administration of justice in
17.
aequitas est quasi equalitas
his
means
Iherefore, equityequity
is as if it were
always ensures
equality. The basis of equity is equality.
equality. One look that matters are decided in
at the various accordance
they are
sound
principles of equality. principles of equity gives an impressi0n witn uat
18.
aequitas factum quod habet
nis means fieri oportuit
Equity treats
equity regards as done that which
a
contract to do ought to have been
aohich
tne parties intended a thing as
producing
the state of
Eerore, whatever should exist when the contract had been artals
needed to have duly per ormed.
19. been done is treated as done by
aequitas nunquam equi
This means contravenit leges
the law. equity never
is not to counteracts the laws.
brings nction
in the
element of do something
ws. Equity does not go against
not
which is against the law. simply
20. equality. it nply
aequitas sequitur
law his means
equity
legem
follows the law.
furtherquity generally
rule, remedy operates by Equity does not
the
quity or
recognising
other clain
zal rule
the legal and adding som
trust forrecognises the machinery of
the legal title of ery of its*ow
itsown. Thus, in the case ot a trus
law. beneficiary. The purpose the trustee
of
but ompels
con him to hold it on
21.
aequum equi ot act avention of the
in
et
This neans bonum est lex
believes
all that law that which 1sis legum
laws is that has to equal and
law must be
cqual and good good is the law of
laws ity
ensurere to all. Therefore,
equality and
goodness.
the basic ia"
MAXIMS OF INTERPRETATION
307
a7. affirmanti non neganti incumbit probatio
This
means the burden of proof lies
upon him who affirms, not
adenies. This is a fundamental principle him
the person who affirms something has toin connection with burdenupon of proof
prove it, the person
same has no role tO play.
Inis is denying the
For instance, in the tort of equally applicable to both civil and
criminal
on Dart of the negligence the
plaintiff has
defendant, else he will lose the case.
or
to prove
minal
negligence
rasecution has to prove the criminal charges Similarly, the
against
3sonable doubt and it it fails to do the same then the the accused beyond
acquittal. accused is entitled to
23. allegans contravia non est audiendus
This means he who alleges
contradictory
cannot be permitted to blow hot and cold withthings
is not to be heard. A
person
o7 insist, at different
reference to the same transaction
times, on the truth of each of the two
ailegations, suit his private interests. Whenever
to conflicting
are made by someone the Court contradictory statements
may not attach importance to any of these.
In Nagubai Ammal v. B.
Sharma Rao,l0 the Supreme Court ruled that
maxim that a cannot
the
person 'approbate and reprobate' is
of the doctrine of
election, and its operation must be confinedonly one
application
to reliefs claimed
respect of the same property though the
nconsistent.
grounds of relief are different and
24.
allegatio contra factum non est admittenda
This means an allegation
contrary to a deed is not admissible. Whatever
has been stated in a deed cannot be
contradicted and, therefore, such a
statement cannot be admitted. A deed is a fact ánd
anyone alleging against this
fact will fail attempt.
in his
25. ambigua responsio contya proferentem est accipienda
This means an ambiguous answer is to be taken
against him who offers it. In
law questions are to be ansWered explicitly. Therefore, law does not give any
credence to ambiguous answers ana they/will be
interpreted against the person
who offers the same.
26. ambiguitas verborum latens veryicatione suppletur, nam quod ex
facto oritur ambiguum verificatione facti tollitur
This means latent
for an ambiguity
ambiguity o woras
arising upon proor may be removed
o extraneous by parole
fact tha may evidence,
be removed
evidence
in
be removed in
Act, manner.
like 1872 which example of this maxim is Section 96
An says "when the lacts aare such that the language
ndian
used
Evidence
might
This means an
argument from a like case is good in law. The binding effect
of a decision does not
considered therein or not,
depend upon whether a particular argument was
provided that the
argument was subsequently advanced was point decided.
with reference to which an
actually
In Somawanti v. State of
difference between the effectPunjab,11
the Supreme Court ruled that there is no
of the
of 'conclusive
proof, the aim
expression, 'conclusive evidence' from that
of both being to
give
from the proof of another. finality
of the existence of a fact to the establishment
31.
argumentum ab inconvenienti plurimum valet
This means an
argument from
gives importance to an argument frominconvenience avails much in law. The law
inconvenience.
32. audi alteram
partem
This
means hear the
other side. Both sides should be
decision is arrived at. This heard before
is also a fundamental
that Court must hear both the parties before principle natural justice
of
tollowing this principle may result into pronouncing a
judgment. NO
miscarriage justice.
of
33. autre
fois
acquit
This means
formerly
offence pleads that he had acquitted. By this plea, a
person charged with an
been tried before and acquited of the same offence
by a competent Court.
convict
autre fo1s
4. this plea, a person charged with an
This means formerly convicted. By same offence
nleads
ottence p l e a a that he had been tried before and convicted of the
Court.
competent
a
hy
propter
sunt faciendae interpretationes cartarum,
he nignae et verba
laicorum, ut res magis valeat quam pereat;
5
simplicitat laio
ilicitatem
non e contra,
debent inservire
intentioni,
written documents are to be made,
means liberal constructions of
This
of the laity, and uphold the document; and words
hecause of
the simplicity intention. Documents are
made subservient, not contrary, to the
ought to be ordinarily ordinary people have no
to be
construed liberally because than null, as
and also that it may rather become operative
pecial knowledge, the intention not in
contradiction
purchased for the benefit of the property. A trustee ought not to be permitted to
make a profit out of the trust.
46. communis error facit jus
This means common or universal error makes law. Law is made by error
committed again and again.
47. conditio praecedens adimpleri debet priusquam sequatur effectus
This means a condition precedent must be fulfilled before the effect car
follow. Condition precedent has great importance in law and, therefore, it has
got to be fulfilled. Without doing that no effect can follow.
MAAIMSODA
311
c t u a l l y
uently,
a r e subject to same punishment. participation, and
49. constit
titutiones tempore posteriores potiores sunt his quae ipsas
recesserUnt
This means later laws prevail over those which preceded them. Since
the latter will of the legislature, it prevails over the earlier one.
is the
iaw'
atter
The slature has a right to change its earlier opinion and, therefore, this
principle.
so slight that
no person of ordinary
a
USE, any harm, if that harnm is
harm."
Eper would complain of such
petitio nec tolli
nec minuipotest
creditorum
e b i t o r u m pactionibus taken away n o r
neither be
creditors can been
Th the rights of creditors have
S means The rights of
the debtors. such agreements as
agreements among enter into
Dreded by debtors cannot
this principle. The creditors.
wOLLdDy
o r diminish
the rights of
vay
54. This isa
delegatus non potest delegare cannot be further delegated.
authority
delegating
This mearns a delegated
power
legislation.
If a
no power
to
funda principle of
delegated
that other
authority
has
elegateea authority,
to a n o t h e r
POwer agricultural
elegate
legate the same again. and
Fisheries,s
anRegulation 62
Agriculture
cultivation given
by
In.
lingham 7 V.
Minister of as to been delegated
under
d o l i i n c a p e r
has
of malice. In India, this conclusive presumption
incapable
ns
means incapable
Indian Penal
under seven years of age in Section 82,
1his p t e d for
a d on
7This children
offence which is done by a child
section "Nothing is an
this
a ording to and a girl for
There is no difference between a boy
nie. Accordi
and thus
thu
and
TE'a
S
lex
aiura
ler sed
hard but it is the law. Even if a statutory provision
50. the law is Court to amend the
law. A
This means
it is not for the
to some people, that is the
hardship and literal sense, as
sas
must be interpreted
in its plain
enactment
xdl
principle of interpretation.
actio fraud
59 ex dolo malo non oritur arises out of a fraud. One
who commits
law It is the
means no right of action stand on law.
nus of that does not interfered with.
right of action
out
cannot be
e n claims a and this principle
Which grants right of action
contractus arises
oritur A contract
ct canmne
act cannot give rise to a contract.
One of
61.ex-nudo acto on oritur actio c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
without
absence of
In the
contract
valid
contract is
consideration.
action can
arise from
it.
essential element of a
therefore,
no
consideration no contra is
Rsideratiements
This is the
end and
execution is
immensely
xecution cannot be
execution
Therefore,
ruit.
314 THE INTERPRETATION OF M
STATUTES
63. executio juris non habet injuriam
This means the execution of the process of law does no th
execution of the process of law is necessary, as without it law
injury. Since
has to be done. Therefore, this does not cause any injury to
has no meaning, it
anyone.
64. fiat justitia, ruat caelum
This means let justice be done, though heavens fall. Law administers
and thus
justice
justice has to be done whatever the consequences.
65. generalia specialibus non derogant
This means general things do not derogate from special things. It is binding
to apply a rule of construction which has been propounded again and again and
which is well settled. In former statutes wherever Parliament has
unambiguously made some provision on a particular subject, a presumption
arises that if afterwards the legislature lays down a general principle in the
latter statute, then this principle will not override the earlier provision till
the same has been specifically provided. Where general words have been used
in a latter statute which apply also on an earlier legislation without doing
violence to the language therein then the earlier legislation cannot be held to
be impliedly repealed or changed till there is a clear intention to that effect.
When the legislature in its wisdom has made a law on a specific subject then
the intention of a latter general statute is not to interfere with it till the same
has been so indicated. In the event of a clash between a general Act on a
particular subject and special Act on that subject, the special Act will prevail
over the general Act. No latter general Act can prevail over an earlier special
Act.
In Bishop of Gloucester v. Cunnington,8 the Court of Appeal held that
parsonage houses are placed by the legislatureina category by themselves.
Save where a licence is obtained, residence by the incumbent in a parsonage
home is compulsory. An incumbent who fails to reside in the house can be
ordered to do so. It is impossible to suppose that the legislature intended that
ot
a parsonage house has been let the tenant should have the protection
Where
the Rent Restrictions Acts. Confirmation to this view is found in Section 5%,
1838 under which lease of a house can be
Pluraties Act,the tenant evicted whenever
avoided and
every parsonage
the bishop orders the incumbent to
reside in the house. If the Rent Restrictions Acts apply to such a house tney
must impliedly have repealed that section under which possession can be
Rao v. Government
Venkateswara Samithis and Zila
In Andhra Pradesh Panchayat
72 of the its terms, if
ihat
Section on the government on
that
1959 conters a general
power Samithi. But
Parishads Act, cancel a resolution
of a Panchayat
section, it can cancel a
here is
no other
power on
the government to
of the Act
confers a special mentioned
Section 62
circumstances
Samithi in the
a Panchayat non
resolution passed by Court ruled that the principle
'generalia specialibus
of Section 72 the
case
therein. The Supreme the operation
to exclude from order
compels one it follows that if the
derogant' Section 62. If so
construed, Section
for under reviewed under
provided Section 62, it cannot be
reviewed falls
under the scope of order made under
only to review an
enables the government
72 for Section 72 (3)
Section 72 (1).
Shahzada Nand
& Sons,22 the
Patiala v.
Commissioner, generalia
In Income Tax wherein the principle
Craies3
has referred
to whenever
Supreme Court thus: "The rule is, that
has been explained the s a m e statute,
e n a c t m e n t in
specialibus non derogant general
and a the
enactment would overrule
there is a particular comprehensive sense,
enactment
in its most and the general
and the latter, taken be operative,
enactment must which it may
tormer, the particular of the statute to
other parts
affect only the
must be taken to
from the point of view of legal practitioners but from that of the employer and
workmen who are the principal contestants in an industrial dispute. It is onlv
when a party engages a legal practitioner as such that the latter is enabled to
enter appearance before Courts or tribunals. Here, under the Act, the restriction
is upon a party as such and the occasion to consider the right of the legal
practitioner may not arise.
In State of Gujarat v. Patel Ramjibhai25 the Supreme Court held that
Section 33 (6), Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 is aspecial provision confined to a
particular class of tax evaders, namely, unregistered dealers, while Section 35
of this Act is a general provision to deal with cases of escaped assessment or
under assessment. Construed in accordance with the maxim generalia
specialibus non derogant' the Special Class of unregistered dealers covered by
Section 33 (6) must be taken to have been excluded from the purview of the
general provision in Section 35. Thus, in the case of an unregistered dealer who
evades tax by committing the double default specified in Section 33 (6), action
can be taken only under that section and not under Section 35 and there is no
In State
of Bihar v. Yogendra Singh,28 the age of superannuation of staffo
college was reduced by the government after taking over by the government
under the Bihar Private Medical Colleges (Taking Over) Act, 1978. The
Supreme Court held the reduction valid. Section 6 dealt specifically with the
Subject of determination of terms of the teaching staff and other employees of
the Magadh Medical College, taken over by the government, and it tnls
25. AIR 1979 SC 1098.
26. AIR 1979 SC 1203.
27. AIR 1993 SC 1222.
28. AIR 1982 SC 882.
Ol INTEK, N
NMAXIAISO
This
d 79 excuses;
ctions 7 6 a n d of the Indian Penal Code ignorance of law does
not excuse.
have
s0$sibilium nulla obligatio est incorporated these principles.
there is no
obligation
means
This to
do impossible things. do impossible
Therefore, if things. Law does not
n y o n e to
oblige
inosssible thing, law will take no action against him. someone does not do an
This means words are prima facie to be taken in their lawful and
rightful
sense. Thus, if some Act says that some act is to be done, then this means that
the act is to be done lawfully. For instance, if there is a law to impose tax on
Someone, then it would mean that the tax is to be imposed lawfully.
Maxwell36 has quoted a famous case R. v. Hulme.7 As per a statute where
any witness 'shall answer every question' relating to the matters aforesaid he
tisin theinterest
nterest of
o the State or public
properly.
Poperly
end of
interest reipublicae ut sitfinis litiuum State that
there
should be an
time and
of
of the
This means I t is in the
interest
for n o one.
It is a
waste
money,
.
ssary
it affects health and peace
too.
dare
74. jus dicere et non jus Law making is the
This means to declare the law, not to make it.
is to declare the
of the legislature. The jurisdiction of the Court
jurisdiction activism, Court sometimes
law. While construing, specially by judicial
an impression of law making.
declares the law in such a m a n n e r that it creates
declares the law while law making
is the domain of
But the truth is that Court
legislature.
75. lex non cogit ad impassibillia
is
the impossible. Since impossible
This m e a n s the law does not compel
futile to compel the
which cannot be done, the law knows it will be
that
impossible and, therefore, this principle.
This means
conveniens est bicitum
anyone in nothing which is
not lawful.
an
inconvenient situation.inconvenient is lawful. Law
Therefore, anything that is does not
put
not
$3. non
obstante clause convenient
This means
notwithstandingnotwithstanding clause. Sometimes
happen" This is anything contained in section section in a
the
Constitution known as non
obstanate clause. and so, this
Act says
so an
of
atthe
shall be
nulity.
322
THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
(3) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be construed as
which is null and void or which ie
sonferring upon any child of a marriage
annulled by a decree of nullity under Section 12, any rights in or to the property
of any person, other than the parents, in any case where, but for the passing of
this Act, such child would have been incapable of possessing or acquiring any
Such rights by reason of his not being the legitimate child of his parents"
Section 11 says "Any marriage solemnized after the commencement of this Act
shall be null and void and may, on a petition presented by either party thereto
a decree of nullity if it contravenes
against the other be so declared
party, by
any of the conditions specified in Clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of Section 5." The
one
children born of void
Supreme Court held that section 16 which legitimises
Section 11" bui
marriages opens with a non obstante clause "notwithstanding..
of the enacting clause it
having regard to the language and beneficient purpose
can not be restricted to that are void under Section 11 and children
marriages
born of all void marriages are legitimised.
Limited and others v. K.
Nagpur Electric Light and Power Company
In
Industrial Disputes Act,
Shreepathirao,40 a question under the C.P. and Berar
1947 involved. Section 30 of the Act imposes a statutory obligation on the
was
of all his employees and a breach
employer to make Standing Orders in respect
That being so the
of the statutory obligation involves a criminal liability.
court would be justified, if it can reasonably do so, to construe the Standing
Orders so as to make them consistent with the compliance of the said statutory
The Standing Orders of an electric power company in Order 2 stated
obligation.
office of main department or
"(a) employees means all persons employed in the
whose name and
stores or
power house or receiving station of the company..
workman' means
ticket number are included in the departmental musters, (5)
may from time to time
be declared to be
such categories of employees as
workman' by the company. Order 16 dealt with termination of employment.
rder 18 provided certain safeguards in case penalty for misconduct was
workman was not allotted a ticket and
imposed. An employee, who being not a
ticket number and therefore whose name alone was on the muster was suspendea
Two days later another order
after certain charges were framed against him. The employee urgea
terminating his services under order 16 was served on him.
that his discharge was invalid because (a) he was not an employee within tne
not
of the definition in the Orders and, therefore, he could
Standing
meaning under Order 16; (b) there were no Standing Orders governing
e
discharged
case of employees like him and that the company had committed a breach
the provisions of the section by not framing such Standing Orders; and
of Order 18. 1ne
suspending him the company did not observe the provisions The
Supreme Court held that he had been validly discharged by the company
d
proper way to construe the definition of 'employees' in the order was
ets
the definition as not intended to exclude employees who did not possesstu
40. AIR 1958 SC 658
rATION
INTERIP'RETA
O
M A .
325
eTI1Ssble to hola hald that it excludes the
whole Act and stands ali
alone by
ilsell.
Slate afMaharashtra
of Ma and another v. Indian
Hotel and
In
others with Sta
d
r i a t i o n and of Maharashtra Restaurants
and other etc. etc.
v.
Namatlh 'ishnu
Vis Waringe etc. etc.with Ghar Hakka
Jagruti Charitable Trust
fMaharashtra and others,0
constitutionality of
31A and Sections
the Bombay
Police ACt, 1951 was in
question along with discussion on
33-A and 33-B, the Supreme Court observed that Section 33-A
abits hoiding of a pertormance of dance, of any kind or type, in any eating
1ermit room or beer-bar having facilities below the rank of 3 star. This
aDlete embargo on
performance of dances in the establishment covered
det Section 33A(1). Section 33-A contains a non obstante clause which makes
hsction stand alone and absolutely independent of the Act and the Rules.
n 33-A (ii) makes it a criminal offence to hold a dance performance in
ttavention of sub-section (1). Section 33-A is therefore a harsh provision. On
ne oiher hand, the establishments inter alia 3 starred and other hotels
cred under Section 33-B enjoy complete exemption from any such restriction.
his classification of
establishment below 3 star and above is based on classes
ot cstablishment or classes of persons who frequent such establishments is
onstitutional as violative of Articie 14 of the Constitution. Classification
nto prohibited and exempted establishments on the basis of facilities it
PON Ides and on the basis of harm it causes to atmosphere is not justified in the
ahence of empirical data showing that dancing in prohibited establishment
Tecessarily leads to depravity and corruption of public morals. Presumption is
the
degree of sexual arousal, character of behaviour dance generates
epends on social strata of audience is without any basis, and classification
a de on the basis of such invidious presumption is liable to be struck down.
tohibition on dancing in bar placed by Section 31-A violates Article 19(1) (z)
heConstitution. Total prohibition placed on eating houses, permit rooms,
rCe bar below the rank of 3 starred hotel by Section 33-A is unjustified when
ereare sufficient legislations, rules and regulations to regulate prohibited
bishments. Moreso Section 33-A has proved to be counter productive
usands of women workers have lost jobs. Expressing "any kind or type" in
as
bono publico
91. pro
in the
means for the This expression has beern used
public good.
This
case/ under the mischief rule of interpretation.
It is frequently used
Hevdon's
at other
important places also in law.
rejected,
to be
and the method of proving
has got this maxim.
consequence
is expressed through
has been
decided by a
administer justice.
remedium
ibi breach of
96. ubi jus there is a remedy. In case of a
there is a right
w h e r e there
where futile. Thus,
then existence of the right will be
This means
This meanlegal legal remedy reme
right
right
been
t h a
said
it has dormientibus,
dormientibus,
iure.
jura sub veniunt
ris, ett non
e non
v i g i l a n t i b u s ,
Onehas to be vigilant
of his rights, then only he can seek help
go
to
s le
ep .
of their breach. The
ses of
Limitation Act, 1963 is a good example
cases within the limitation
who
the expiry
. A f t e r the
this of period right will cease
of After
6ER 637.