FY20 ARMY PROGRAMS

Counter-Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)

Systems

Executive Summary
• In July 2019, USD(A&S)
requested DOT&E’s support
in assessing the operational
performance of a select set of
counter-small unmanned aircraft
systems (C-sUAS) systems
as installed, integrated, and
employed in an operationally
representative environment.
• In collaboration with the
Combatant Commands, Service
representatives, and the Joint
Deployable Analysis Team
(JDAT) (part of Joint Chiefs of
Staff/J6), DOT&E developed
an assessment plan for 11
C-sUAS systems (Table 1) at 5
locations outside the continental
United States (OCONUS).
JDAT executed the OCONUS
assessment plan between November 2019 and March 2020
under DOT&E oversight. The two exceptions were the Land-Based Phalanx Weapon
• DOT&E also participated in test planning, observation, and System (LPWS) and Howler, which employ kinetic defeat
administration of two Service-led C-sUAS system tests within mechanisms.
the continental United States (CONUS) in February and • Fixed-site systems typically use multiple methods to detect,
March 2020. track, and identify sUAS, including radars, RF sensors to
• In April 2020, DOT&E delivered an independent analysis detect the wireless signals used to control sUAS or provide
of the OCONUS data to the newly formed, Army-led video feeds, and EO/IR or visual cameras to detect the sUAS’
Joint C-sUAS Office (JCO) in support of their C-sUAS visual or heat signature. These systems often combine these
down‑selection task. methods to provide a multi-layer capability, which requires an
• In May 2020, the SECDEF accepted the JCO effective human interface and command and control capability
recommendations to down-select from 28 fielded C-sUAS that integrates and networks the various sensors to provide
systems to 7. actionable information to the system operator.
• Mobile systems generally consist of fewer components and
System might use only one method to detect, track, and identify
• C-sUAS systems are designed to detect, track, identify, sUAS.
and defeat or disable small (Groups 1 and 2) unmanned
aircraft systems (sUAS). Common methods for detecting Mission
sUAS include radars, radio frequency (RF) scanners, and A unit equipped with a C-sUAS capability detects, tracks,
electro-optical (EO) or infrared (IR) cameras. Common defeat and identifies the presence of sUAS and provides kinetic
methods include jamming the sUAS RF control or video link, and non‑kinetic means to destroy or negate the ability of the
jamming sUAS Global Navigation Satellite System signals, adversary sUAS to complete its mission (either intelligence,
or destroying the sUAS using a kinetic mechanism, such as surveillance, and reconnaissance; or attack).
lasers, projectiles, or an intercepting sUAS. • Fixed-site systems provide broader defense of a base or
• Based on inputs from USD(A&S) and U.S. Central Command, installation and typically constitute a portion of the overall
DOT&E assessed a select set of widely employed C-sUAS layered defense strategy.
systems (listed in Table 1) against Group 1 sUAS. Most • Mobile systems are designed to be more agile, scalable, and
systems relied on RF jamming to defeat or disable sUAS. maneuverable. They can be moved within a forward operating

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base to protect high-value assets or installed on mobile must therefore be cued to the sUAS location or rely on visual
platforms to protect units on the move. detection by the operator.
• Handheld or soldier-worn systems are often employed as a
component of a fixed-site system to engage sUAS at short Major Contractors
range. Some handheld systems cannot detect sUAS and • Varies by C-sUAS system. See Table 1.

TABLE 1. C-SUAS SYSTEMS ASSESSED BY DOT&E

C-sUAS Detection Major Contractor /
System Name Defeat Methods Service
Category Methods Lead Integrator
Counter-Remote Control Model Aircraft
Integrated Air Defense Network (CORIAN) RF RF, GPS Army CACI
versions 1.5 and 1.8
Fixed Site-Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aerial
RF, radar, camera RF, GPS Army SRC, Inc.
Vehicle Integrated Defeat System (FS-LIDS)
Fixed or Semi-
Fixed Systems Medusa System of Systems RF, radar, EO/IR RF, GPS Air Force SAIC

Expeditionary-Marine Air Defense Integrated Naval Surface Warfare

RF, radar, camera RF, GPS Marine Corps
System (E-MADIS) Center, Crane Division
20-mm M940
Land-Based Phalanx Weapon System (LPWS) Radar, EO/IR Army Raytheon
ballistic round
Light-Marine Air Defense Integrated System Naval Surface Warfare
RF, radar, cameras RF, GPS Marine Corps
(L-MADIS) Center, Crane Division
Mounted or
Howler Radar, EO/IR Coyote UAS Army Raytheon
Mobile Systems
N/A – Israeli
EnforceAir RF RF D-Fend Solutions
System
Drone Restricted Access Using Known EW
RF RF Navy Northrop Grumman
(DRAKE) (backpack version)
Handheld or
Soldier-Worn Drone Defender RF, visual RF, GPS Army DeDrone
Systems
Dronebuster Visual RF, GPS Army Flex Force
EW – Electronic Warfare; EO – Electro-optical; IR – Infrared; RF – Radio Frequency; UAS – Unmanned Aerial System; C-sUAS – Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Activity
• From November 8, 2019, through March 13, 2020, • JDAT and the Services conducted the OCONUS and
JDAT executed OCONUS testing in accordance with the CONUS tests using adversarial Red Teams flying a range of
DOT&E‑approved test plan. The JDAT team executed 281 realistic fixed- and rotary-wing sUAS flight profiles. Testing
record test sorties using 11 C-sUAS systems (listed in Table 1) considered both single and multiple sUAS threats with a focus
across 5 U.S. Central Command locations. A DOT&E on commercial off-the-shelf Group 1 sUAS weighing less than
representative was part of the test team for three of the sites, 20 pounds.
and DOT&E representatives were part of the CONUS support • In April 2020, DOT&E completed and delivered an
team at JDAT. In coordination with JDAT, DOT&E approved independent analysis of OCONUS and CONUS test data to the
regular test modifications required by operational realities. JCO in time to support their C-sUAS down-select analyses and
• From February 28 through March 4, 2020, the Marine Corps comeback brief to the SECDEF.
executed the follow-on CONUS testing of the Light-Marine • In May 2020, the SECDEF accepted the JCO
Air Defense Integrated System (L-MADIS) C-sUAS system recommendations to down-select from 28 fielded C-sUAS
at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona. Testing consisted of 60 systems to 7. Services will sustain previously fielded systems
record test sorties. until replacement systems are available, but will not conduct
• From March 9 – 12, 2020, the Air Force executed follow-on additional research, development, test, and evaluation on the
CONUS testing of the Medusa C-sUAS system at Edwards non-selected systems.
AFB, California. Testing consisted of 61 record test sorties.
• DOT&E representatives assisted in planning and data Assessment
collection during CONUS tests. Tests were conducted in • OCONUS and CONUS testing were adequate to assess
accordance with DOT&E recommendations. C-sUAS system capability to detect, identify, track, and

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prevent an adversarial force from accomplishing sUAS prior to fielding. An operationally representative
reconnaissance or attack missions. assessment should include trained operators (including
• Group 2 UAS were not available in the time frame needed to military members when deployed with military operators),
support testing. Group 3 UAS were considered to be outside Red Teams trained to fly realistic and unpredictable threat
the scope of OCONUS and CONUS test efforts at the time of flight profiles, and a range of electromagnetic spectrum
testing. Additionally, swarm UAS threats were not utilized as environments (spanning rural to dense urban environments)
a potential threat. and environmental conditions (including coastal, urban,
• Software tools currently installed on threat sUAS systems for maritime, and forested).
security reasons introduced test limitations that might have 2. Develop a set of standardized measures of performance,
affected the observed C-sUAS performance. measures of effectiveness, operational assessment protocols,
• OCONUS testing occurred on systems as installed, integrated, ROEs, and TTPs for use in C-sUAS system operational
and operated at each location. The rules of engagement (ROE) assessments to enable meaningful performance comparisons
and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for employing across C-sUAS and to enable measures of progress in
C-sUAS systems varied by system and location. ROEs and C-sUAS performance over time.
TTPs at certain locations might have adversely affected 3. Include Group 2 and 3 UAS and swarm UAS threats in
C-sUAS system performance. For example, lengthy ROE future operational assessments. Future range upgrades
hinder timely engagements. should consider installing optical and RF tracking systems
• CONUS testing occurred at the test ranges using the advanced to execute simultaneous tracking of multiple targets and
versions of the Medusa and L-MADIS C-sUAS systems instrumentation. This is needed in order to quantify the
as compared to those assessed OCONUS. CONUS testing significance of the effect on individual elements, as well as
permitted a greater degree of control to assess the effect of potential interactions between elements within a swarm.
test conditions that could not be systematically varied during Test ranges will also need to maintain (and potentially
OCONUS testing and offered a less cluttered RF environment expand in the future) sufficient operational space to support
to the C-sUAS system operators. Approvals to use some the increasing performance and ranges of UAS, particularly
C-sUAS defeat capabilities within the United States can take for the larger Group 3 UAS.
up to 6 months to obtain so, in the interest of time, CONUS 4. Ensure that operators are sufficiently trained before
testing could not include the full spectrum of C-sUAS defeat conducting testing and deployment, and that their training
mechanisms. and Military Occupational Specialty (where applicable)
• C-sUAS detection capabilities were adequate for most properly represents operational users.
systems. Engagement (defeat) continues to be a challenge. 5. Explore options to reduce timelines for waivers and
A system-of-systems approach to C-sUAS yielded the highest authorization needed to employ a full spectrum of C-sUAS
performance. defeat mechanisms in operational assessments to maintain
• Reliability and maintainability shortfalls degraded the pace with the evolving sUAS threat.
capability of some C-sUAS systems. In addition, for several 6. Investigate alternative software tools for protecting sUAS
systems, operators indicated that they had limited training and information during testing that do not adversely affect the
experience on the system. ability to accurately evaluate C-sUAS performance.
• The details of the C-sUAS system performance across the kill
chain are classified and available on request.

Recommendations
The Army-led JCO should:
1. Monitor Services’ plans to execute operationally
representative assessments of C-sUAS system performance

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