G.R. No.

193707 December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to reverse and set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal
case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal
Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.

The following facts are culled from the records:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son
named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen
(16) years of age.3

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued
by the appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months
old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines. 6

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the
amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or
less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never
gave support to the son, Roderigo. 8

Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu,
and since then, have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established a business
known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu
City.10 To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City. 11

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from
respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter. 12

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No.
9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. 13 Respondent
submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her reply-
affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending
the filing of an information for the crime charged against herein respondent.

The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:

That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of
Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and
still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor,
of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim. CONTRARY TO
LAW.15

Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.16 Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail. 17 Petitioner
also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his
Opposition.18 Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was arraigned. 19 Subsequently, without
the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion
to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) prescription
of the crime charged.20

On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order, 21 dismissing the instant
criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien, the dispositive part of which
states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense
with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.

The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty is
hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s
obligation to support their child under Article 195 23 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes
him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are
obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s nationality." 24

On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:

x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the
memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused
is a foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s
duty and obligation to givesupport to his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating
R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is conclusively established that R.A.
9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding that he is not
bound by our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the considered
opinion of the court that no prima faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence, the case
should be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
 1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law; and

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for
his unjustified failure to support his minor child. 27

At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite
the fact that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in
Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation, 28 which lays down the instances when a
ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:

x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with
this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that
petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law.
In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC,
to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was
rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a
petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court
under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of
fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appealis elevated to the
Supreme Court only on questions of law." (Emphasis supplied)

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. 29

Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the response thereto
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or
not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and
whether or not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to
do so.

It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law
concerning the liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable
under special criminal laws, specifically in relation to family rights and duties. The inimitability of
the factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by this Court, which
will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition
and remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time, effort and resources of the courts.
Thus, in the present case, considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of justice
should prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.

Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we
do not fully agree with petitioner’s contentions.

To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that
the legal obligation to support exists.

Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to
support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued
in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying with his
obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.

On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by
petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support. 32 Respondent also
added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any financial
support.33

On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 34 of the New
Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 35 of
the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws
are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to
Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed
by their national law with respect to family rights and duties. 36

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since
the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is
subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support
to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. 37

In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –

Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed
by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even when staying in a
foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15). 39

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son
under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland.
This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has
the burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that
being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and
capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his
position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does
not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after
the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 42 has already enunciated
that:

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized
to takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 43

In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is
not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our
local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation
to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the
same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and
penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign
land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality
principle on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does
not completely show that he is notliable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was
issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid
covenant, respondent’s obligation to support his child is specifically stated, 46 which was not
disputed by respondent.

We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states
that parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable
by law, said law would still not find applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and
SA v. American Realty Corporation,47 to wit:

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded
and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence
laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public
policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our
jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice
to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law;
hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles
of Conflict of Laws.48

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation
to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly
enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of
financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his
former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis, 49 to wit:

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe
considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq.
of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added) 50

Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section
5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioner’s son, to
wit:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's
freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include,
butnot limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

xxxx

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due
her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x
xx

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support
or custody of minor childrenof access to the woman's child/children. 51

Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is
considered anact of violence against women and children.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in
petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New
Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public
security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject
to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is
indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with
petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the
Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged
against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired
upon his arrest.

Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting, that there
is a legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has
been extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime 52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262,
which provides that:

SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty
(20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing
offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in
the instant case has clearly not prescribed.

Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s child
calls for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and
falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-
Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September 1,
2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on the
merits of the case.

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of
the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\

In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside
the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by
respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for
Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.

The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that,
after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children
born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in
Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila,
(the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be
ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with
right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada
Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property"
as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the
ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no
bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to
appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an
interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently
committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court
in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error committed
which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would
be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed
in this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property
in the Philippines.

Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property
because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that
they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal
funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.

For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail
over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and
declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest
Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations
between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative
community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal
fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner
who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction
over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California,
authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the
ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property nor
community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the
law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce
proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear
on my behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further
contesting, subject to the following:

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.

3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.

xxx xxx xxx 4

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is
contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same
being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court
of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus
severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a
penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other,
is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq.
of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the
Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,

vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of
Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:

An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only
to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the
opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved
jurisdictional question.

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births,
Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started
auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their
only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a
separation de facto between them.

After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private
respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg
Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they
had been living apart since April, 1982. 2

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of
property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the
same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody
of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was
locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said
marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private
respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while
still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as
1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A.
de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal
approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery
against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two
branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch
XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda
Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge
Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7

On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaid
resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similar
petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary
of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed the
respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have already been
arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire
records of both cases to his office for review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend
further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of the
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date,
petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in
said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending
before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated
September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that
is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused
to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct
contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted
herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14

On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court
denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is without
jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be
prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an
offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing
the criminal complaint." 15

On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents
from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A.
Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations,
issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints
against the petitioner. 16

We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes
against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended
spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with
this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the
jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for
a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts
the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try
the case.

Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person
who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the
prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian
of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first
four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that
while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents,
grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and
concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to
initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do
so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions;
in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined
as of the filing of the complaint or petition.

The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that
the same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been found
necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State,
through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness
therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio,
and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more
predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter
exclusively within his power and option.

This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer
the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence, as cogently
argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This
is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the
supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the
filing of the criminal case. 21

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to
commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or
capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his
capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the
commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was
acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would
thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without
the legal capacity to do so.

To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue
as to when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminal
prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of such
status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it
is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between
the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the
action by the former against the latter.

American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari
materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no
longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that
the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where,
however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have
no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —

'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the
husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when
the offense is said to have been committed, he had ceased to be such when the
prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such as to entitle
 him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is against the
unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for this provision
in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be such
when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)

We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction,
considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of
such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the
time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended
spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing
of the complaint.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in
our civil law on the matter of status of persons.

Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a
United States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed
a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and
praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to
manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error
of such stance, thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States
of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American
citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in
any State of the Union. ...

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces
the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. ...

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was
the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree
of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this
case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would
no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed.
Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be
one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would
thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the
effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not
affect or cast obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private
respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of
the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declared
void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of
a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled
to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal
judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the
complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the
marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage
from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer
have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of
the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed before the
termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and
requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was effected, as in this
case, by a valid foreign divorce.

Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must
suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended
spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was
raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not
involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy
herein.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another
one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The
temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.

G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner,

vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree
is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts
do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law
on evidence.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the January
7, 1999 Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City,
Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
 "WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A.
Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties
can now remarry under existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties." 3

The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.

The Facts

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal, on March 1, 1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18,
1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family
court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of

Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government. 6 Petitioner – a Filipina – and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan
City.7 In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as "single" and
"Filipino."8

Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. 9

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage 10 in the court a
quo, on the ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time
he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of respondent's marriage to
Editha Samson only in November, 1997.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his
prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to an
Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian in
1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.1âwphi1.nêt

On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending – respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family
court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken down." 13

Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it stated
no cause of action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with respondent. 15 The court
marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both parties. 16 After they submitted their
respective memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution. 17

Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia
was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis
of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, respondent's alleged lack of legal
capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by respondent.
The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify
or annual.
Hence, this Petition.18

Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

"I

The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the
respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby capacitating
him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner.

"2

The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a certificate
of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite voiding the
petitioner' marriage to the respondent.

"3

The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in this case.

"4

The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52
and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.

"5

The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in pronouncing
that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated the
parties to remarry, without first securing a recognition of the judgment granting the divorce
decree before our courts."19

The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on two
pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and
(2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Because of our
ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the rest.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is partly meritorious.

First Issue:

Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson

Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and Editha
Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce decree, like any
other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the
existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself.
She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages
solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci
celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the
conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage
was performed.

At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our discussion.
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. 21 A
marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because
of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner,
Article 2625 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." 26 A
divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. 27

A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be
made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law." 28 Therefore,
before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove
the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 29 Presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient.

Divorce as a Question of Fact

Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first comply
with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code. These articles
read as follows:

"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file
separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which
shall specify the following:

xxx xxx xxx

"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or
annulled;

xxx xxx xxx

"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant
shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal certificate required in the last
preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of
annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous marriage. x x x.

"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the children's
presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of
property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their persons."

Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public document –
a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no further proof of its
authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. 30 A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is
the judgment itself.31 The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially
body or tribunal of a foreign country. 32

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven
as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested33 by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 34

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued
by an Australian family court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had
not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. 36 The trial court ruled that it
was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. 37 Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce
decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia. 38

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the
political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. 40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective
cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian,
respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to
Philippine personal laws.

Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because
she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was
satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia,
because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian
divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign
laws in the exercise of sound discretion.

We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence of a fact
or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." 41 In civil cases, plaintiffs have the
burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer;
and defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they
introduce new matters.42 Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of
proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. 43 Like
any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. 44 The power of
judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should
be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue:

Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry

Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was legally
incapacitated to marry her in 1994.

Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.

Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in evidence,
adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.

Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution
of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two
basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et
thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond
in full force.45 There is no showing in the case at bar which type of divorce was procured by
respondent.

Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or provisional

judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an
absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation
is effected.46

Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices,
still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute;
thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited
from remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior. 47

On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless
the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy." 48

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national
law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of
evidence on this matter.

We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable presumption or
presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule 39 49 of the Rules of Court,
for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the legal effects of the divorce decree
obtained under Australian laws.

Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity

Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family Code
was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to her, its
absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.

We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of
the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been
sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly
authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the
part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. 50

As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity to marry
petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following exhibits were
presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" – Complaint; 51 (b) Exhibit "B"
– Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-Australian) and Grace J. Garcia
(Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija; 52 (c) Exhibit "C" – Certificate of
Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987
in Malabon, Metro Manila;53 (d) Exhibit "D" – Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City
Certification that no information of annulment between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D. Samson
was in its records;54 and (e) Exhibit "E" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A.
Recto;55 (2) for respondent: (Exhibit "1" – Amended Answer; 56 (b) Exhibit "S" – Family Law Act
1975 Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia; 57 (c) Exhibit "3" –
Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto; 58 (d) Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi of
Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate; 59 and Exhibit "5" – Statutory
Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J. Garcia Recio since
October 22, 1995.60

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We agree with
petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto
clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to adduce sufficient
evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove
his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.

Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on
the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated
to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the most
judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any, which show
petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a
nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence two
existing marriage certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro
Manila dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case
to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent's
legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on
the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.

G.R. No. 124862. December 22, 1998

FE D. QUITA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN,* Respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941.
They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured.
Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the
divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live
separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she
obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz
in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married
for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.

On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning
the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also
referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro,
Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as
surviving children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead
of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors
themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors
(Blandina and the Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private
writing and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan,
claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.

On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and
the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent as
well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the same
day, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within
ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on the
declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed
without the required documents being submitted.

The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao1 which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino
citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not
entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction,"2 disregarded the divorce between petitioner
and Arturo. Consequently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of
Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties
due to lack of judicial approval.3 On the other hand, it opined that there was no showing that
marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged
Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her. As regards
Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987 4 only petitioner and
Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net
hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs. 5cräläwvirtualibräry

On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs
that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who
was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus
on 15 February 19886 partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the
exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and
petitioner to the other half.7 Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated
in the aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their
marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to
petitioner.

In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors
allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a
hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a
controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11
September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988
order of the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.8 On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration. 9cräläwvirtualibräry

Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that
there is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the
heirship of the Padlan children or as to their respective shares in the intestate estate of the
decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private respondent is the
proper heir of the decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present petition based on
established facts and admissions of the parties.

We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there is
a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary cases.

We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children
to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by
him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; 10 nor as to their
respective hereditary shares. But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse
of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the
scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and
distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth of
the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the
documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.

We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others, the
issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she
had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above
quoted procedural rule.11 To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained
legally married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained. 12 Reading between the lines, the
implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo.
This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The
purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary
and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing
the evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely
applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao.

Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she
stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v.
Romillo Jr.13 that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set
for hearing.14 Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the issue on her
citizenship.15 The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded
to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and
were married in the Philippines."16 It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on
their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied
with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted
as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must
have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino
citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very
well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.

Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; 17 it did not merit
enlightenment however from petitioner. 18 In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is
brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript
of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original
of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof
before another trial court. When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered
that she was since 1954.19 Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was
obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase
the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings
to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering
the case returned to the trial court for further proceedings.

We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited
only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's
claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April
1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a
bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code.
Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes
a legitimate relationship.20cräläwvirtualibräry

As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and her counsel to be declared in
contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping, 21 the same lacks
merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve the same transactions and same
essential facts and circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action, subject matter
and issue.22 The present petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions
filed before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles
of certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare
the existence of forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the
remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its
decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The
order of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net
hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda,
with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, is
likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial
court should be limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo
Padlan.

The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present
petition for forum shopping is DENIED.
[G.R. NO. 162580 - January 27, 2006]

ELMAR O. PEREZ, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, Fifth Division, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG

and LILY GOMEZ-CATINDIG, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the July 25,
2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74456 which set aside and declared as
null and void the September 30, 2002 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
84, granting petitioner's motion for leave to file intervention and admitting the Complaint-in-
Intervention3 in Civil Case No. Q-01-44847; and its January 23, 2004 Resolution 4 denying the
motion for reconsideration.

Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig5 twice on May 16, 1968. The
first marriage ceremony was celebrated at the Central Methodist Church at T.M. Kalaw Street,
Ermita, Manila while the second took place at the Lourdes Catholic Church in La Loma, Quezon
City. The marriage produced four children.

Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems that they decided to separate from
each other. Upon advice of a mutual friend, they decided to obtain a divorce from the Dominican
Republic. Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed
to the Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-
in-fact to institute a divorce action under its laws. 6

Thereafter, on April 30, 1984, the private respondents filed a joint petition for dissolution of
conjugal partnership with the Regional Trial Court of Makati. On June 12, 1984, the civil court in
the Dominican Republic ratified the divorce by mutual consent of Tristan and Lily. Subsequently,
on June 23, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, ordered the complete
separation of properties between Tristan and Lily.

On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United
States7 and both lived as husband and wife until October 2001. Their union produced one
offspring.8

During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in the
Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not recognized
in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed void under Philippine law. When
she confronted Tristan about this, the latter assured her that he would legalize their union after
he obtains an annulment of his marriage with Lily. Tristan further promised the petitioner that he
would adopt their son so that he would be entitled to an equal share in his estate as that of each
of his children with Lily.9

On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as Case No. Q-01-44847.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention 10 claiming that she has a
legal interest in the matter in litigation because she knows certain information which might aid the
trial court at a truthful, fair and just adjudication of the annulment case, which the trial court
granted on September 30, 2002. Petitioner's complaint-in-intervention was also ordered admitted.

Tristan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the
order dated September 30, 2002 of the trial court. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and
declared as null and void the September 30, 2002 Order of the trial court granting the motion for
leave to file intervention and admitting the complaint-in-intervention.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition
filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals gravely
abused its discretion in disregarding her legal interest in the annulment case between Tristan and
Lily.

The petition lacks merit.

Ordinarily, the proper recourse of an aggrieved party from a decision of the Court of Appeals is a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, if the error subject
of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was granted by a court with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as alleged in this case, the proper
remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules.11 This is based on the premise
that in issuing the assailed decision and resolution, the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse
of discretion, amounting to excess of lack of jurisdiction and there is no plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. A remedy is considered plain, speedy, and adequate if it will
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effect of the judgment and the acts of the lower
court.12

It is therefore incumbent upon the petitioner to establish that the Court of Appeals acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated the
assailed decision and resolution.

We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal
violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. By grave abuse of
discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or
to act at all in contemplation of law. 13 The word "capricious," usually used in tandem with the term
"arbitrary," conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective
hand of certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is
imperative.14
The Rules of Court laid down the parameters before a person, not a party to a case can intervene,
thus:

Who may intervene. - A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success
of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof
may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether
or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate
proceeding.15

The requirements for intervention are: [a] legal interest in the matter in litigation; and [b]
consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of the original parties may be delayed
or prejudiced, or whether the intervenor's rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or
not.16

Legal interest, which entitles a person to intervene, must be in the matter in litigation and of such
direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal operation
and effect of the judgment.17 Such interest must be actual, direct and material, and not simply
contingent and expectant. 18

Petitioner claims that her status as the wife and companion of Tristan for 17 years vests her with
the requisite legal interest required of a would-be intervenor under the Rules of Court.

Petitioner's claim lacks merit. Under the law, petitioner was never the legal wife of Tristan, hence
her claim of legal interest has no basis.

When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily.
The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the
marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.19 Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will be
governed by Philippine laws with respect to his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her
status, condition and legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she was
married here or abroad, initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and
eventually becomes successful in getting an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not
recognize such absolute divorce. 20

When Tristan and Lily married on May 18, 1968, their marriage was governed by the provisions
of the Civil Code21 which took effect on August 30, 1950. In the case of Tenchavez v. Escano22 we
held:

(1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the
present Civil Code (Rep. Act No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction;
and neither is the marriage contracted with another party by the divorced consort, subsequently
to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to validity in the country. (Emphasis added)

Thus, petitioner's claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their marriage was celebrated abroad
lacks merit. Thus, petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which her motion for
intervention is based.

Since petitioner's motion for leave to file intervention was bereft of the indispensable requirement
of legal interest, the issuance by the trial court of the order granting the same and admitting the
complaint-in-intervention was attended with grave abuse of discretion. Consequently, the Court
of Appeals correctly set aside and declared as null and void the said order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated July 25, 2003 and Resolution
dated January 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74456 are AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007

EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

x ---------------------------------------------------- x

G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,

vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the September 12,
1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3 Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134
in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who
was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six
children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America
(U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on
December 14, 1973. 6

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos,
before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los
Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years
from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.

Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708
which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent
was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the
decedent’s surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage,
and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and
exclusive, valued at ₱30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid
debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of
administration be issued to her.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first
marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause
of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in
the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He
further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only
a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry
Lee.

On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking
the dismissal 10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying
the two motions to dismiss.

Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while Felicisimo
exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New
Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she
presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus,
she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article
26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14

Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed motions for
reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph
2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondent’s
bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article
256 16 of the Family Code.

On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a motion to
disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.

On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration.
It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition
and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed moot
and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador
S. Tensuan pending the resolution of said motion.

Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On even date,
Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it was based.

On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The
case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.

On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective position papers
on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995,
Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous
motion for reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers
on June 14, 24 and June 20, 25 1995, respectively.

On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held
that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the
Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in
Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters
of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found
that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in
the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph
2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair the vested
rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.

Respondent moved for reconsideration 26

and for the disqualification 27
of Judge Arcangel but said
motions were denied. 28

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders of the trial
court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the
records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. 29

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term "place of
residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers
to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person as
distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his
functions as governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for
letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.

The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent by virtue of
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil
v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly
dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit,
State of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract
a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –

With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment
of E.O. No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view — sweeping
statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the
basic policy of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what
the law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of
the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, 32 the
Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this reason, the
marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous
marriage.

Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute
the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33

Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34

which were denied by the
Court of Appeals.

On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for review on
certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which was
granted. 36

In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the subject petition
for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was
a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that
a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his
domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because
it was performed during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that
paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and
ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife
of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.

The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether respondent has
legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.

The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides
at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the
doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as contradistinguished from domicile – of the
decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:

[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules
of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where
the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in
the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile"
but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same
meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its
popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence
or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular
sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No
particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more
than temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and
Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to
say, there is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for
purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated
as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place
of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein
with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in
one place and domicile in another.

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982
up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale 44 dated
January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented
billing statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period
August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala
Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to
1990 sent by the deceased’s children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling
cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village,
Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of
administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over
Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time,
Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati
City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the petition for letters of
administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien
spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s marriage to
Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3,
1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code,
particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to
rule in the affirmative.

The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino
wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter.
Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his
interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however,
recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the
properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:

In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind
either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the
law provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as
well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be
considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should
not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court recognized the
validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is not a
proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the severance
of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the
actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22,
1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still
in effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the
Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between
parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary
consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his
treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign
divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v.
Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical background and legislative intent
behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof
states:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227
was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second
paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

x x x x
Legislative Intent

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph
2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision
Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated
to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis added)

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2,
Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial
precedent.1awphi1.net

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one
of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot
possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital
bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse
obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.

Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under
Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the
cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country
if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court
stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by
its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the
judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law
should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative
intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the
legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and
justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar
circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions,
to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a
balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is
worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence.
"Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice
Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them."

xxxx

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to
render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts
and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its
decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice,
presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice. 69

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry
Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show
that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as
well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v.
Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and
divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that
proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody
of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of
his office. 71

With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act
of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law.
As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must
be alleged and proved. 73

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the
divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we
find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration,
as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired
through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.

Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to
the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.

An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material
and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in
the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by
petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails
to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she
may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the
property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired
through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging
to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the
applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article
144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as
husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that
even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect,
Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the property regime under this provision as follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies
to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-
ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.

xxxx

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-
ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property is essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by
competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and
not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x 81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-
owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming
the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss
and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for reconsideration is
AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014

SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA
ZABALLERO-LUNA, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine
law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos
submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial
approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent
marriage.

The Case

The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the adverse decision
promulgated on November 11, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with
modification the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
138, in Makati City.2 The CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the
husband in a condominium unit, and in the law books of the husband acquired during the second
marriage.

Antecedents

The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:

ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip,
Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with his
first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially
married ina civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Parañaque, Rizal on September
10, 1947 and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan
on September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNA’s marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7) children,
namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda,
Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost two (2)
decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from each other
in February 1966 and agreed to separation of property, to which end, they entered into a written
agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated
November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and liquidate their
conjugal partnership of property.

On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with EUGENIA from
the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of
Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same date,
ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and
SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.

Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and
Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.

On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora
Development Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium
unit) at Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square meters, for ₱1,449,056.00, to be
paid on installment basis for 36months starting on April 15, 1978. Said condominium unit was to
be usedas law office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the
condominium unit was executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10,
1983, which was registered bearing the following names:

"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia
P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and
TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x" Subsequently, 8/100 share
of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the condominium unit was sold
to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the
following names:

"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia
P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"

Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the
partners but the same was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated
that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA
thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a
portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted until the death of
ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.

After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks, office
furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of
the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit
belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm named
Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.

The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law books,
office furniture and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the
heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, on September 10, 1999, docketed
as Civil Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired during
the existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that
since they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner of the said properties upon the death of
ATTY. LUNA to the extent of ¾ pro-indiviso share consisting of her ½ share in the said properties
plus her ½ share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to her in the latter’s last
will and testament; and thatthe heirs of ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD
from her share in the subject properties. The complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the
owner of the ¾ portion of the subject properties;that the same be partitioned; that an accounting
of the rentals on the condominium unit pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD be conducted; that a
receiver be appointed to preserve ad administer the subject properties;and that the heirs of ATTY.
LUNA be ordered to pay attorney’s feesand costs of the suit to SOLEDAD. 3

Ruling of the RTC

On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the aforementioned
facts,4 disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit located at the SIXTH FLOOR of
the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title
No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE METERS is
adjudged to have been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry;

(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the condominium unit,
hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds of
Makati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN
LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia
Zaballero Luna";

(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation,
American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit
and defendants are ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as appropriate
arrangements have been madefor transport and storage.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.5

Decision of the CA

Both parties appealed to the CA.6

On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the RTC, namely:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS ACQUIRED
THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT
CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE TESTIMONY
OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACQUISITION OF THE
 UNIT, BUT IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT;

IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANT WAS ALREADY
DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND LUNA;

V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ABSENCE OF THE
DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT;

VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACTTHAT THE
NAME OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE
EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE CONDOMINIUM
UNIT;

VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF THE
FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE APPLICABLE;

VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED BY PESCRIPTION AND LACHES; and

IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE INTERVENTION FOR
FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY FILING FEE. 7

In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the trial court, to wit:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN THE
LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT WITH THE USE OF PLAINTIFF’S MONEY;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY PREPONDERANCE
OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY.
LUNA’S LAW OFFICE; and

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID FOR
THE SAID FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD PRESCRIBED AND
BARRED BY LACHES AND ESTOPPEL.8

On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision, 9 holding and ruling:

EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter’s death on July 12,
1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican Republic did not
terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not
recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x10

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001 Decision of the RTC of
MakatiCity, Branch 138, is hereby MODIFIEDas follows:

(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the SIXTH FLOOR of the
KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No.
21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic) SQUARE METERS is hereby
 adjudged to defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-
Luna (first marriage), having been acquired from the sole funds and sole industry of Juan
Luces Luna while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage)
was still subsisting and valid;

(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or under any other concept
over the condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761
of the Registry of Deeds ofMakati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should
be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA
married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";

(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna(first
marriage) are hereby declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the
condominium unit.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.11

On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. 13

Issues

In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on certiorarithat:

A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Agreement for Separation and
Property Settlement executed by Luna and Respondent Eugenia was unenforceable; hence,
their conjugal partnership was not dissolved and liquidated;

B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the Dominican Republic court’s
approval of the Agreement;

C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner failed to adduce sufficient
proof of actual contribution to the acquisition of purchase of the subjectcondominium unit;
and

D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was not entitled to the
subject law books.14

The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be entitled to
the 25/100 pro indivisoshare in the condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris,
Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports).

The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain the law that should
determine, firstly, whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia)
had validly dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly, whether the second marriage entered into
by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in property. Ruling of the
Court

We affirm the modified decision of the CA.

1. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia
subsisted up to the time of his death

The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the
Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the
Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Codecontinued to follow the
nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
although living abroad.15 Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed thiscase by
virtue of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on
July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.

From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present,
absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-
recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, 16 even
if either or both of the spouses are residing abroad. 17 Indeed, the only two types of defective
marital unions under our laws have beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As such, the
remedies against such defective marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity ofthe
marriage and the annulment of the marriage.

It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained
abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the
time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes
marriage as an inviolable social institution,19 and regards it as a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family life. 20 The non-
recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity
of the marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid
marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly
provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce
decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and
enforcement in this jurisdiction.

2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement

was void for lack of court approval

The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement (Agreement)
that the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had entered into and executed in connection with the divorce
proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic to dissolve and liquidate
their conjugal partnership was enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible
error in decreeing otherwise.

The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.

Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to
their marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership
of gains governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in
force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the event
that they had not entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage.
Article 119 of the Civil Codeclearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative
community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In
the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative community
or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property relations
between husband and wife.

Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership of gains thusly:

Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a common
fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry, and divide
equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits
obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.

The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various causes of termination
enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz:

Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

(3) When the marriage is annulled;

(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.

The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per sedissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent court
was still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:

Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation
of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial
order. (1432a)

Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall be decreed
when the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil
interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.

xxxx

The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as
of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for judicialapproval or the voluntary
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear atthe hearing to
safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership,
the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons.

After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall apply.
The provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be
applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic
sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the late Atty.
Luna and Eugenia?

The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval took place only as
an incident ofthe action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the
justifications for their execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds raised in the action
for divorce.21 With the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law for being
contrary to Philippine public policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement was not also
legally valid and enforceable under Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains
of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.

3. Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,

was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership

What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad?

The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976
was void for being bigamous, 22 on the ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia
had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.

The Court concurs with the CA.

In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of
the Civil Codeclearly states:

Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.

Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before

the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. 23 A bigamous
marriage is considered void ab initio.24

Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initioby virtue of
its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the
rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:

Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married,
ortheir marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by eitheror both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership.(n)

In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such
fact.1âwphi1 To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer
proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-
ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As the
Court explained in Saguid v. Court of Appeals:25
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-
ownership ofproperties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous
relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the
bigamous and adulterousunion is without basis because they failed to substantiate their allegation
that they contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court
of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the controverted property was titled in the name of the
parties to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership absent evidence of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by
competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and
not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. This applies with more vigor where, as in the
instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex parte.1âwphi1 The plaintiff is not
automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendantsome measure of
protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be
granted only after the court isconvinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief.
Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mereallegation is not
evidence.26

The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual contributions in the purchase
of the condominium unit in the aggregate amount of at least ₱306,572.00, consisting in direct
contributions of ₱159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had obtained from Premex
Financing and Banco Filipino totaling ₱146,825.30; 27 and that such aggregate contributions of
₱306,572.00 corresponded to almost the entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the
condominium unit amounting to ₱362,264.00 of the unit’s purchase price of ₱1,449,056.00. 28 The
petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were paid for solely out of her personal funds, proof
of which Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank you" note; 29 that she had the financial capacity to
make the contributions and purchases; and that Atty. Luna could not acquire the properties on his
own due to the meagerness of the income derived from his law practice.

Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?

In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioner’s assertions on her actual
contributions through the following findings and conclusions, namely:

SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent funds
were used to buy the law office condominium and the law books subject matter in contentionin
this case – proof that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article 148 of the
Family Code to apply – as to cases where properties were acquired by a man and a woman living
together as husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which was void ab initio. Under
Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on co-ownership would govern. But this was not readily
applicable to many situations and thus it created a void at first because it applied only if the parties
were not in any way incapacitated or were without impediment to marry each other (for it would
be absurd to create a co-ownership where there still exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute
community between the man and his lawful wife). This void was filled upon adoption of the Family
Code. Article 148 provided that: only the property acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in
proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares were
prima faciepresumed to be equal. However, for this presumption to arise, proof of actual
contribution was required. The same rule and presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money
and evidence of credit. If one of the parties was validly married to another, his or her share in the
co-ownership accrued to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith was not validly married to another, his or her share
shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on
forfeiture applied even if both parties were in bad faith. Co-ownership was the exception while
conjugal partnership of gains was the strict rule whereby marriage was an inviolable social
institution and divorce decrees are not recognized in the Philippines, as was held by the Supreme
Court in the case of Tenchavez vs. Escaño, G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 355,
thus:

xxxx

As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit, SOLEDAD failed to

prove that she made an actual contribution to purchase the said property. She failed to establish
that the four (4) checks that she presented were indeed used for the acquisition of the share of
ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the Decision of the trial court,
viz.:

"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for ₱55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was issued
on January 27, 1977, which was thirteen (13) months before the Memorandum of Agreement,
Exhibit "7" was signed. Another check issued on April 29, 1978 in the amount of ₱97,588.89,
Exhibit "P" was payable to Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff, thiswas in payment of the loan
of Atty. Luna. The third check which was for ₱49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was dated May 19,
1979, also for payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The fourth check, Exhibit "M", for ₱4,072.00 was
dated December 17, 1980. None of the foregoing prove that the amounts delivered by plaintiff to
the payees were for the acquisition of the subject condominium unit. The connection was simply
not established. x x x"

SOLEDAD’s claim that she made a cash contribution of ₱100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. Clearly,
there is no basis for SOLEDAD’s claim of co-ownership over the 25/100 portion of the condominium
unit and the trial court correctly found that the same was acquired through the sole industry of
ATTY. LUNA, thus:

"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the condominium unit was in the name of Atty.
Luna, together with his partners in the law firm. The name of the plaintiff does not appear as
vendee or as the spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired for the use of the Law firm of Atty.
Luna. The loans from Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust Company were loans
of Atty. Luna and his partners and plaintiff does not have evidence to show that she paid for them
fully or partially. x x x"

The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the name of "JUAN LUCES
LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna" was no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the
condominium unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well
settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The phrase
"married to" preceding "Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil status of ATTY. LUNA.

SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical that SOLEDAD had no
participation in the law firm or in the purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove
that she had anything to contribute and that she actually purchased or paid for the law office
amortization and for the law books. It is more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who
bought the law office space and the law books from his earnings from his practice of law rather
than embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of the law firm that he headed. 30
The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA both because they were
substantiated by the records and because we have not been shown any reason to revisit and undo
them. Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did not discharge her burden
of proof. Her mere allegations on her contributions, not being evidence, 31 did not serve the
purpose. In contrast, given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia,
the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds and effort
remained. It should then be justly concluded that the properties in litislegally pertained to their
conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole ownership of the
25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to
the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 11, 2005; and ORDERS
the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

G.R. No. 188289 August 20, 2014

DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner,

vs.
LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 9 May 2008 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R .. CV No. 88686, which affirmed in part the 8 December 2006 Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96.

The factual antecedents are as follow:

David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3 December 1988 in
Quezon City, Philippines. They resided in California, United States of America (USA) where they
eventually acquired American citizenship. They then begot two children, namely: Jerome T.

Noveras, who was born on 4 November 1990 and JenaT. Noveras, born on 2 May 1993. David was
engaged in courier service business while Leticia worked as a nurse in San Francisco, California.

During the marriage, they acquired the following properties in the Philippines and in the USA:

The Sampaloc property used to beowned by David’s parents. The parties herein secured a loan
from a bank and mortgaged the property. When said property was about to be foreclosed, the
couple paid a total of ₱1.5 Million for the redemption of the same.

Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines in 2001. In December
2002,Leticia executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc
property for ₱2.2 Million. According to Leticia, sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his
family and lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province. Leticia claimed that David agreed toand
executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia in the presence of David’s father, Atty. Isaias Noveras, on 3
December 2003 stating that: 1) the ₱1.1Million proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property
shall be paid to and collected by Leticia; 2) that David shall return and pay to Leticia ₱750,000.00,
which is equivalent to half of the amount of the redemption price of the Sampaloc property; and
3) that David shall renounce and forfeit all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties
situated in the Philippines.5 David was able to collect ₱1,790,000.00 from the sale of the Sampaloc
property, leaving an unpaid balance of ₱410,000.00.

Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the
Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce
on 24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29 June 2005. 6 The California court granted
to Leticia the custody of her two children, as well as all the couple’s properties in the USA. 7

On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the
RTC of Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David’s failure to
comply with his obligation under the same. She prayed for: 1) the power to administer all conjugal
properties in the Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease and desist from selling the subject
conjugal properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal properties be forfeited in favor of her
children; 4) David to remit half of the purchase price as share of Leticia from the sale of the
Sampaloc property; and 5) the payment of₱50,000.00 and ₱100,000.00 litigation expenses. 8

In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was entered on
29 June 2005 by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that the
conjugal partnership properties, which also include the USA properties, be liquidated and that all
expenses of liquidation, including attorney’s fees of both parties be charged against the conjugal
partnership.9

The RTC of Baler, Aurora simplified the issues as follow:

1. Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts of abandonment and marital
infidelity which can result intothe forfeiture of the parties’ properties in favor of the
petitioner and their two (2) children.

2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in California, U.S.A. and the
same can be included in the judicial separation prayed for.

3. Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by petitioner Leticia T. Noveras and
respondent David A. Noveras will amount to a waiver or forfeiture of the latter’s property
rights over their conjugal properties.

4. Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras isentitled to reimbursement of onehalf of the ₱2.2

[M]illion sales proceeds of their property in Sampaloc, Manila and one-half of the ₱1.5
[M]illion used to redeem the property of Atty. Isaias Noveras, including interests and
charges.

5. How the absolute community properties should be distributed.

6. Whether or not the attorney’s feesand litigation expenses of the parties were chargeable
against their conjugal properties.

Corollary to the aboveis the issue of:

Whether or not the two common children of the parties are entitled to support and presumptive
legitimes.10

On 8 December 2006, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:

1. The absolute community of property of the parties is hereby declared DISSOLVED;

 2. The net assets of the absolute community of property ofthe parties in the Philippines are
hereby ordered to be awarded to respondent David A. Noveras only, with the properties in
the United States of America remaining in the sole ownership of petitioner Leticia Noveras
a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana pursuant to the divorce decree issuedby the Superior Court of
California, County of San Mateo, United States of America, dissolving the marriage of the
parties as of June 24, 2005. The titles presently covering said properties shall be cancelled
and new titles be issued in the name of the party to whom said properties are awarded;

3. One-half of the properties awarded to respondent David A. Noveras in the preceding

paragraph are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, his two minor children with petitioner
LeticiaNoveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana as their presumptive legitimes and said legitimes
must be annotated on the titles covering the said properties.Their share in the income from
these properties shall be remitted to them annually by the respondent within the first half
of January of each year, starting January 2008;

4. One-half of the properties in the United States of America awarded to petitioner Leticia
Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana in paragraph 2 are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, her
two minor children with respondent David A. Noveras as their presumptive legitimes and
said legitimes must be annotated on the titles/documents covering the said properties. Their
share in the income from these properties, if any, shall be remitted to them annually by the
petitioner within the first half of January of each year, starting January 2008;

5. For the support of their two (2) minor children, Jerome and Jena, respondent David A.
Noveras shall give them US$100.00 as monthly allowance in addition to their income from
their presumptive legitimes, while petitioner Leticia Tacbiana shall take care of their food,
clothing, education and other needs while they are in her custody in the USA. The monthly
allowance due from the respondent shall be increased in the future as the needs of the
children require and his financial capacity can afford;

6. Of the unpaid amount of ₱410,000.00 on the purchase price of the Sampaloc property,
the Paringit Spouses are hereby ordered to pay ₱5,000.00 to respondent David A. Noveras
and ₱405,000.00 to the two children. The share of the respondent may be paid to him
directly but the share of the two children shall be deposited with a local bank in Baler,
Aurora, in a joint account tobe taken out in their names, withdrawal from which shall only
be made by them or by their representative duly authorized with a Special Power of
Attorney. Such payment/deposit shall be made withinthe period of thirty (30) days after
receipt of a copy of this Decision, with the passbook of the joint account to be submitted to
the custody of the Clerk of Court of this Court within the same period. Said passbook can
be withdrawn from the Clerk of Court only by the children or their attorney-in-fact; and

7. The litigation expenses and attorney’s fees incurred by the parties shall be shouldered
by them individually.11

The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that cover their legal and
personalstatus are those of the USA. With respect to their marriage, the parties are divorced by
virtue of the decree of dissolution of their marriage issued by the Superior Court of California,
County of San Mateo on 24June 2005. Under their law, the parties’ marriage had already been
dissolved. Thus, the trial court considered the petition filed by Leticia as one for liquidation of the
absolute community of property regime with the determination of the legitimes, support and
custody of the children, instead of an action for judicial separation of conjugal property.

With respect to their property relations, the trial court first classified their property regime as
absolute community of property because they did not execute any marriage settlement before the
solemnization of their marriage pursuant to Article 75 of the Family Code. Then, the trial court
ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law should apply
because the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any
proof of their national law. The trial court held that as the instant petition does not fall under the
provisions of the law for the grant of judicial separation of properties, the absolute community
properties cannot beforfeited in favor of Leticia and her children. Moreover, the trial court observed
that Leticia failed to prove abandonment and infidelity with preponderant evidence.

The trial court however ruled that Leticia is not entitled to the reimbursements she is praying for
considering that she already acquired all of the properties in the USA. Relying still on the principle
of equity, the Court also adjudicated the Philippine properties to David, subject to the payment of
the children’s presumptive legitimes. The trial court held that under Article 89 of the Family Code,
the waiver or renunciation made by David of his property rights in the Joint Affidavit is void.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s Decision by directing the equal division
of the Philippine properties between the spouses. Moreover with respect to the common children’s
presumptive legitime, the appellate court ordered both spouses to each pay their children the
amount of ₱520,000.00, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Numbers 2, 4 and 6 of the assailedDecision
dated December 8, 2006 of Branch 96, RTC of Baler, Aurora Province, in Civil Case No. 828 are
hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:

2. The net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in the Philippines are
hereby divided equally between petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana (sic) and
respondent David A. Noveras;

xxx

4. One-half of the properties awarded to petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) in paragraph 2

shall pertain to her minor children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes which
shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the said properties. Their share in the
income therefrom, if any, shall be remitted to them by petitioner annually within the first
half of January, starting 2008;

xxx

6. Respondent David A. Noveras and petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) are each ordered to
pay the amount of₱520,000.00 to their two children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive
legitimes from the sale of the Sampaloc property inclusive of the receivables therefrom,
which shall be deposited to a local bank of Baler, Aurora, under a joint account in the latter’s
names. The payment/deposit shall be made within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt
ofa copy of this Decision and the corresponding passbook entrusted to the custody ofthe
Clerk of Court a quowithin the same period, withdrawable only by the children or their
attorney-in-fact.

A number 8 is hereby added, which shall read as follows:

8. Respondent David A. Noveras is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic)
the amount of ₱1,040,000.00 representing her share in the proceeds from the sale of the
Sampaloc property.

The last paragraph shall read as follows:

Send a copy of this Decision to the local civil registry of Baler, Aurora; the local civil registry of
Quezon City; the Civil RegistrarGeneral, National Statistics Office, Vibal Building, Times Street
corner EDSA, Quezon City; the Office of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Aurora; and to
the children, Jerome Noveras and Jena Noveras.

The rest of the Decision is AFFIRMED.12

In the present petition, David insists that the Court of Appeals should have recognized the
California Judgment which awarded the Philippine properties to him because said judgment was
part of the pleading presented and offered in evidence before the trial court. David argues that
allowing Leticia to share in the Philippine properties is tantamount to unjust enrichment in favor
of Leticia considering that the latter was already granted all US properties by the California court.

In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties
in the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of
California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With
respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticiafiled a petition for judicial separation ofconjugal
properties.

At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond of
marriage between the parties. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, 13 we stated that:

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained
that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered
by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must
beproven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to
show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in
an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the
foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense. 14

The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the foreigner
must comply with our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in
evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.15

Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal
may be proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must beaccompanied, if the record is
not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof.
The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or
a specific part thereof, asthe case may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer.

Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for
the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy
of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the
official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if hebe the clerk of a court having a seal,
under the seal of such court.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates
to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.

It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals,16 we relaxed the requirement on certification
where we held that "[petitioner therein] was clearly an American citizenwhen she secured the
divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the
presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticatedby the foreign court issuing
said decree is, as here, sufficient." In this case however, it appears that there is no seal from the
office where the divorce decree was obtained.

Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption 17 as the lower courts did with respect to
the property regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because,
to begin with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid
recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the
Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.

As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made before the
celebration of marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed provided that the modification
isjudicially approved and refers only to the instances provided in Articles 66,67, 128, 135 and 136
of the Family Code.18

Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of property on paragraphs
4 and 6 of Article 135 of the Family Code, to wit:

Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of
property:

(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it
civil interdiction;

(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;

(3) That loss of parental authority ofthe spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court;

(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his
or her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101;

(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has
abused that power; and

(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least
one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.

In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the presentation of the final judgment
against the guiltyor absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree ofjudicial
separation of property. (Emphasis supplied).

The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this case to necessitate
judicial separation of properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family Code. The trial
court ratiocinated:

Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code quoted above, must be for a valid
cause and the spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he/she has left the conjugal
dwelling without intention of returning. The intention of not returning is prima facie presumed if
the allegedly [sic] abandoning spouse failed to give any information as to his or her whereabouts
within the period of three months from such abandonment.

In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has returned to and stayed at his
hometown in Maria Aurora, Philippines, as she even went several times to visit him there after the
alleged abandonment. Also, the respondent has been going back to the USA to visit her and their
children until the relations between them worsened. The last visit of said respondent was in
October 2004 when he and the petitioner discussed the filing by the latter of a petition for
dissolution of marriage with the California court. Such turn for the worse of their relationship and
the filing of the saidpetition can also be considered as valid causes for the respondent to stay in
the Philippines.19

Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was not
tackled in the trial court’s decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as
liquidation of the absolute community of properties.

The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed separated for
more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment
had not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when
David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from
her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as
Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once confined,
testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation
form.20 Third and more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California
court in June 2005.

Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition
for judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.

The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property automatically dissolves
the absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 ofthe Family Code,
thus:

Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or

(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138.
(Emphasis supplied).

Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the absolute community
regime and the following procedure should apply:

Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:

(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute
community and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
 (2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In
case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid
balance with their separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second
paragraph of Article 94.

(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be
delivered to each of them.

(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net
assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different
proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has
been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purposes of computing the
net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),the
said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of
its dissolution.

(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in
accordance with Article 51.

(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the
conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated tothe spouse with
whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of
seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise.
In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best
interests of said children. At the risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the case to
the trial court. Instead, we shall adopt the modifications made by the Court of Appeals on
the trial court’s Decision with respect to liquidation.

We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the
California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that
real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.

We affirm the modification madeby the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses
in the absolutecommunity properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their children’s
presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court explained in this wise:

Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc
property.1âwphi1 While both claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras
property, absent a clear showing where their contributions came from, the same is presumed to
have come from the community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of
the redemption money.

David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property for
the benefit of the absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of
₱120,000.00 incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses
in the amount of ₱300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be allowed in the absence
of receipts or at least the Statement of Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14
of Republic Act No. 7166 duly received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise, expenses
incurred to settle the criminal case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had not
benefited the family. In sum, Leticia and David shall share equally in the proceeds of the sale net
of the amount of ₱120,000.00 or in the respective amounts of ₱1,040,000.00.
xxxx

Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate children and
descendants consists of one-half or the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The
children arc therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the absolute
community, which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well as to
their respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property including the
receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of ₱410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia
should each pay them the amount of ₱520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom. 21

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV
No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 205487 November 12, 2014

ORION SAVINGS BANK, Petitioner,

vs.
SHIGEKANE SUZUKI, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 filed by petitioner Orion Savings Bank (Orion)
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the decision2 dated August 23, 2012 and the
resolution3 dated January 25, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 94104.

The Factual Antecedents

In the first week of August 2003, respondent Shigekane Suzuki (Suzuki), a Japanese national,
met with Ms. Helen Soneja (Soneja) to inquire about a condominium unit and a parking slot at
Cityland Pioneer, Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang (Kang), a Korean national
and a Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV) holder.

At the meeting, Soneja informed Suzuki that Unit No. 536 [covered by Condominium Certificate
of Title (CCT) No. 18186]4 and Parking Slot No. 42 [covered by CCT No. 9118] 5 were for sale for
₱3,000,000.00. Soneja likewise assured Suzuki that the titles to the unit and the parking slot were
clean. After a brief negotiation, the parties agreed to reduce the price to ₱2,800,000.00. On August
5, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang a Bank of the Philippine Island (BPI) Check No. 83349 6 for One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00) as reservation fee. 7 On August 21, 2003, Suzuki issued
Kang another check, BPI Check No. 83350,8 this time for ₱2,700,000.00 representing the
remaining balance of the purchase price. Suzuki and Kang then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated August 26, 20039 covering Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42. Soon after, Suzuki took
possession of the condominium unit and parking lot, and commenced the renovation of the interior
of the condominium unit.

Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver the titles to the properties,
which were then allegedly in possession of Alexander Perez (Perez, Orion’s Loans Officer) for
safekeeping. Despite several verbal demands, Kang failed to deliver the documents. Suzuki later
on learned that Kang had left the country, prompting Suzuki to verify the status of the properties
with the Mandaluyong City Registry of Deeds.

Before long, Suzuki learned that CCT No. 9118 representing the title to the Parking Slot No. 42
contained no annotations although it remained under the name of Cityland Pioneer. This
notwithstanding, Cityland Pioneer, through Assistant Vice President Rosario D. Perez, certified that
Kang had fully paid the purchase price of Unit. No. 536 10 and Parking Slot No. 42.11 CCT No. 18186
representing the title to the condominium unit had no existing encumbrance, except for
anannotation under Entry No. 73321/C-10186 which provided that any conveyance or
encumbrance of CCT No. 18186 shall be subject to approval by the Philippine Retirement Authority
(PRA). Although CCT No. 18186 contained Entry No. 66432/C-10186 dated February 2, 1999
representing a mortgage in favor of Orion for a ₱1,000,000.00 loan, that annotation was
subsequently cancelled on June 16, 2000 by Entry No. 73232/T. No. 10186. Despite the
cancellation of the mortgage to Orion, the titles to the properties remained in possession of Perez.

To protect his interests, Suzuki thenexecuted an Affidavit of Adverse Claim 12 dated September 8,
2003, withthe Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City, annotated as Entry No. 3292/C-No. 18186
in CCT No. 18186. Suzuki then demanded the delivery of the titles. 13 Orion, (through Perez),
however, refused to surrender the titles, and cited the need to consult Orion’s legal counsel as its
reason.

On October 14, 2003, Suzuki received a letter from Orion’s counsel dated October 9, 2003, stating
that Kang obtained another loan in the amount of ₱1,800,000.00. When Kang failed to pay, he
executed a Dacion en Pagodated February 2, 2003, in favorof Orion covering Unit No. 536. Orion,
however, did not register the Dacion en Pago, until October 15, 2003.

On October 28, 2003, Suzuki executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over Parking Slot No. 42
(covered by CCT No. 9118) and this was annotated as Entry No. 4712/C-No. 9118 in the parking
lot’s title.

On January 27, 2004, Suzuki filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against Kang
and Orion. At the pre-trial, the parties made the following admissions and stipulations:
 1. That as of August 26, 2003, Kang was the registered owner of Unit No. 536 and Parking
Slot No. 42;

2. That the mortgage in favor ofOrion supposedly executed by Kang, with Entry No.
66432/C-10186 dated February 2, 1999, was subsequently cancelled by Entry No. 73232/T
No. 10186 dated June 16, 2000;

3. That the alleged Dacion en Pagowas never annotated in CCT Nos. 18186 and 9118;

4. That Orion only paid the appropriate capital gains tax and the documentary stamp tax
for the alleged Dacion en Pago on October 15, 2003;

5. That Parking Slot No. 42, covered by CCT No. 9118, was never mortgaged to Orion; and

6. That when Suzuki bought the properties, he went to Orion to obtain possession of the
titles.

The RTC Ruling

In its decision14 dated June 29, 2009, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 213, Mandaluyong
City ruled infavor of Suzuki and ordered Orion to deliver the CCT Nos. 18186 and 9118 to Suzuki.

The court found that Suzuki was an innocent purchaser for value whose rights over the properties
prevailed over Orion’s. The RTC further noted that Suzuki exerted efforts to verify the status of
the properties but he did not find any existing encumbrance inthe titles. Although Orion claims to
have purchased the property by way of a Dacion en Pago, Suzuki only learned about it two (2)
months after he bought the properties because Orion never bothered to register or annotate the
Dacion en Pagoin CCT Nos. 18186 and 9116.

The RTC further ordered Orion and Kang to jointly and severally pay Suzuki moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, appearance fees, expenses for litigation and cost ofsuit.
Orion timely appealed the RTC decision with the CA.

The CA Ruling

On August 23, 2012, the CA partially granted Orion’s appeal and sustained the RTC insofar as it
upheld Suzuki’s right over the properties. The CA further noted that Entry No. 73321/C-10186
pertaining to the withdrawal of investment of an SRRV only serves as a warning to an SRRV holder
about the implications of a conveyance of a property investment. It deviated from the RTC ruling,
however, by deleting the award for moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees,
expenses for litigation and cost of suit.

Orion sought a reconsideration of the CA decision but the CA denied the motion in its January 25,
2013 resolution. Orion then filed a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45 with this Court.

The Petition and Comment

Orion’s petition is based on the following grounds/arguments: 15

1. The Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki is null and void. Under Korean law,
any conveyance of a conjugal property should be made with the consent of both spouses;
 2. Suzuki is not a buyer in good faith for he failed to check the owner’s duplicate copies of
the CCTs;

3. Knowledge of the PRA restriction under Entry No. 73321/C-10186, which prohibits any
conveyance or encumbrance of the property investment, defeats the alleged claim of good
faith by Suzuki; and

4. Orion should not be faulted for exercising due diligence.

In his Comment,16 Suzuki asserts that the issue on spousal consent was belatedly raised on appeal.
Moreover, proof of acquisition during the marital coverture is a condition sine qua nonfor the
operation of the presumption of conjugal ownership. 17 Suzuki additionally maintains that he is a
purchaser in good faith, and is thus entitled to the protection of the law.

The Court’s Ruling

We deny the petition for lack of merit.

The Court may inquire into conclusions of fact when the inference made is manifestly mistaken

In a Rule 45 petition, the latitude of judicial review generally excludes a factual and evidentiary
re-evaluation, and the Court ordinarily abides by the uniform factual conclusions of the trial court
and the appellate court.18 In the present case, while the courts below both arrived at the same
conclusion, there appears tobe an incongruence in their factual findings and the legal principle
they applied to the attendant factual circumstances. Thus, we are compelled to examine certain
factual issues in the exercise of our sound discretion to correct any mistaken inference that may
have been made.19

Philippine Law governs the transfer of real property

Orion believes that the CA erred in not ruling on the issue of spousal consent. We cannot uphold
this position, however, because the issue of spousal consent was only raised on appeal to the CA.
It is a well-settled principle that points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the
attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal and considered by a
reviewing court.20 To consider these belated arguments would violate basic principles of fairplay,
justice, and due process.

Having said these, we shall nonetheless discuss the issues Orion belatedly raised, if only to put an
end to lingering doubts on the correctness of the denial of the present petition.

It is a universal principle thatreal or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the
country or state where it is located. 21 The reason is found in the very nature of immovable property
— its immobility. Immovables are part of the country and so closely connected to it that all rights
over them have their natural center of gravity there. 22

Thus, all matters concerning the titleand disposition ofreal property are determined by what is
known as the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title canpass from
one person to another, or by which an interest therein can be gained or lost. 23 This general
principle includes all rules governing the descent, alienation and transfer of immovable property
and the validity, effect and construction of wills and other conveyances. 24

This principle even governs the capacity of the person making a deed relating to immovable
property, no matter what its nature may be. Thus, an instrument will be ineffective to transfer
title to land if the person making it is incapacitated by the lex loci rei sitae, even though under the
law of his domicile and by the law of the place where the instrument is actually made, his capacity
is undoubted.25

On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally by the national
law of the spouses.26 However, the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden
of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved
as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. 27 He is presumed to know only domestic
or the law of the forum.28

To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections
24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:

SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof
or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be
made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country
inwhich the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (Emphasis supplied)

SEC. 25. What attestation ofcopy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy
is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation
must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a
court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be governed by
Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal natureof the property shall be governed by
South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.

In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on the conjugal
ownership ofproperty. It merely attached a "Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of
Korea"29 to prove the existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not qualify as sufficient
proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing that it was properly
authenticated bythe seal of his office, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132. 30

Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approachor processual

presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded or, evenif pleaded, is not
proven, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law. 31

Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is merely
descriptive of the civil status of Kang. 32 In other words, the import from the certificates of title is
that Kang is the owner of the properties as they are registered in his name alone, and that he is
married to Hyun Sook Jung.

We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have held that registration of the property in the
name of only one spouse does not negate the possibility of it being conjugal or community
property.33 In those cases, however, there was proof that the properties, though registered in the
name of only one spouse, were indeed either conjugal or community properties. 34 Accordingly, we
see no reason to declare as invalid Kang’s conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of
spousal consent.
The petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the due execution of the Dacion en
Pago

Article 1544 of the New Civil Codeof the Philippines provides that:

ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should
be movable property.

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in
good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was
first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title,
provided there is good faith.

The application of Article 1544 of the New Civil Code presupposes the existence of two or more
duly executed contracts of sale. In the present case, the Deed of Sale dated August 26,
200335 between Suzuki and Kang was admitted by Orion36 and was properly identified by Suzuki’s
witness Ms. Mary Jane Samin (Samin).37

It is not disputed, too, that the Deed of Sale dated August 26, 2003 was consummated. In a
contract of sale, the seller obligates himself to transfer the ownership of the determinate thing
sold, and to deliver the same to the buyer, who obligates himself to pay a price certain to the
seller.38 The execution of the notarized deed of saleand the actual transfer of possession amounted
to delivery that produced the legal effect of transferring ownership to Suzuki. 39

On the other hand, although Orion claims priority in right under the principle of prius tempore,
potior jure (i.e.,first in time, stronger in right), it failedto prove the existence and due execution
of the Dacion en Pagoin its favor.

At the outset, Orion offered the Dacion en Pagoas Exhibit "5"with submarkings "5-a" to "5-c" to
prove the existence of the February 6, 2003 transaction in its Formal Offer dated July 20, 2008.
Orion likewise offered in evidence the supposed promissory note dated September 4, 2002 as
Exhibit "12"to prove the existence of the additional ₱800,000.00 loan. The RTC, however, denied
the admission of Exhibits "5" and "12,"among others, in its order dated August 19, 2008 "since
the same [were] not identified in court by any witness."40

Despite the exclusion of its most critical documentary evidence, Orion failed to make a tender
ofexcluded evidence, as provided under Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. For this reason
alone, we are prevented from seriously considering Exhibit "5" and its submarkings and Exhibit
"12" in the present petition.

Moreover, even if we consider Exhibit "5" and its submarkings and Exhibit "12" in the present
petition, the copious inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonial and documentary
evidence of Orion, militate against the conclusion that the Dacion en Pagowas duly executed. First,
there appears to be no due and demandable obligation when the Dacion en Pago was executed,
contrary to the allegations of Orion. Orion’s witness Perez tried to impress upon the RTC that Kang
was in default in his ₱1,800,000.00 loan. During his direct examination, he stated:

ATTY. CRUZAT:

Q: Okay, so this loan of ₱1.8 million, what happened to this loan, Mr. Witness?
 A: Well it became past due, there has been delayed interest payment by Mr. Kangand...

Q: So what did you do after there were defaults[?]

A: We have to secure the money or the investment of the bank through loans and we have
executed a dacion en pagobecause Mr. Kang said he has no money. So we just execute[d]
the dacion en pago rather than going through the Foreclosure proceedings.

xxxx

Q: Can you tell the court when was this executed?

A: February 6, 2003, your Honor.41

A reading of the supposed promissory note, however, shows that there was nodefault to speak of
when the supposed Dacion en Pagowas executed.

Based on the promissory note, Kang’s loan obligation wouldmature only on August 27, 2003.
Neither can Orion claim that Kang had been in default in his installment payments because the
wordings of the promissory note provide that "[t]he principal of this loanand its interest and other
charges shall be paid by me/us in accordance hereunder: SINGLE PAYMENT LOANS. 42 "There was
thus no due and demandable loan obligation when the alleged Dacion en Pago was executed.

Second, Perez, the supposed person who prepared the Dacion en Pago,appears to only have a
vague idea of the transaction he supposedly prepared. During his cross-examination, he testified:

ATTY. DE CASTRO:

Q: And were you the one who prepared this [dacion en pago] Mr. witness?

A: Yes, sir. I personally prepared this.

xxxx

Q: So this 1.8 million pesos is already inclusive of all the penalties, interest and surcharge
due from Mr. Yung Sam Kang?

A: It’s just the principal, sir.

Q: So you did not state the interest [and] penalties?

A: In the [dacion en pago], we do not include interest, sir. We may actually includethat
but....

Q: Can you read the Second Whereas Clause, Mr. Witness?

A: Whereas the first party failed to pay the said loan to the second party and as of February
10, 2003, the outstanding obligation which is due and demandable principal and interest
and other charges included amounts to ₱1,800,000.00 pesos, sir.

xxxx
 Q: You are now changing your answer[.] [I]t now includes interest and other charges, based
on this document?

A: Yes, based on that document, sir.43

Third, the Dacion en Pago,mentioned that the ₱1,800,000.00 loan was secured by a real
estate mortgage. However, no document was ever presented to prove this real estate
mortgage aside from it being mentioned in the Dacion en Pago itself.

ATTY. DE CASTRO:

Q: Would you know if there is any other document like a supplement to that Credit Line
Agreement referring to this 1.8 million peso loan by Mr. Yung Sam Kang which says that
there was a subsequent collateralization or security given by Mr. Yung [Sam]

Kang for the loan?

xxxx

A: The [dacion en pago], sir.44

Fourth,the Dacion en Pago was first mentioned only two (2) months after Suzuki and Samin
demanded the delivery of the titles sometime in August 2003,and after Suzuki caused the
annotation of his affidavit of adverse claim. Records show that it was only on October 9, 2003,
when Orion, through its counsel, Cristobal Balbin Mapile & Associates first spoke of the Dacion en
Pago.45 Not even Perez mentioned any Dacion en Pago on October 1, 2003, when he personally
received a letter demanding the delivery of the titles.Instead, Perez refused to accept the letter
and opted to first consult with his lawyer. 46

Notably, even the October 9, 2003 letter contained material inconsistencies in its recital of facts
surrounding the execution of the Dacion en Pago. In particular, it mentioned that "on [September
4, 2002], after paying the original loan, [Kang] applied and was granted a new Credit Line Facility
by [Orion] x x x for ONE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱1,800,000.00)." Perez,
however, testified that there was "no cash movement" in the original ₱1,000,000.00 loan. In his
testimony, he said:

COURT:

xxxx

Q: Would you remember what was the subject matter of that real estate mortgage for that
first ₱1,000,000.00 loan?

A: It’s a condominium Unit in Cityland, sir.

xxxx

Q: Would you recall if there was any payment by Mr. Yung Sam Kang of this ₱1,000,000.00
loan?

A: None sir.

Q: No payments?
 A: None sir.

Q: And from 1999 to 2002, there was no payment, either by way of payment to the
principal, by way ofpayment of interest, there was no payment by Mr. Yung Sam Kang of
this loan?

A: Literally, there was no actual cash movement, sir.

Q: There was no actual cash?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And yet despite no payment, the bank Orion Savings Bank still extended an ₱800,000.00
additional right?

A: Yes, sir.47

Fifth, it is undisputed that notwithstanding the supposed execution of theDacion en Pago on

February 2, 2003, Kang remained in possession of the condominium unit. In fact, nothing in the
records shows that Orion even bothered to take possession of the property even six (6) months
after the supposed date of execution of the Dacion en Pago. Kang was even able to transfer
possession of the condominium unit to Suzuki, who then made immediate improvements thereon.
If Orion really purchased the condominium unit on February 2, 2003 and claimed to be its true
owner, why did it not assert its ownership immediately after the alleged sale took place? Why did
it have to assert its ownership only after Suzuki demanded the delivery of the titles? These gaps
have remained unanswered and unfilled.

In Suntay v. CA,48 we held that the most prominent index of simulation is the complete absence
of anattempt on the part of the vendee to assert his rights of ownership over the property in
question. After the sale, the vendee should have entered the land and occupied the premises. The
absence of any attempt on the part of Orion to assert its right of dominion over the property
allegedly soldto it is a clear badge of fraud. That notwithstanding the execution of the Dacion en
Pago, Kang remained in possession of the disputed condominium unit – from the time of the
execution of the Dacion en Pagountil the property’s subsequent transfer to Suzuki – unmistakably
strengthens the fictitious nature of the Dacion en Pago.

These circumstances, aside from the glaring inconsistencies in the documents and testimony of
Orion’s witness, indubitably prove the spurious nature of the Dacion en Pago.

The fact that the Dacion en Pago

is a notarized document does not
support the conclusion that the
sale it embodies is a true
conveyance

Public instruments are evidence of the facts that gave rise to their execution and are to be
considered as containing all the terms of the agreement. 49 While a notarized document enjoys this
presumption, "the fact that a deed is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its
contents."50 The presumption of regularity of notarized documents is not absolute and may be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 51

In the present case, the presumption cannot apply because the regularity in the execution of the
Dacion en Pago and the loan documents was challenged in the proceedings below where their
prima facievalidity was overthrown by the highly questionable circumstances surrounding their
execution.52

Effect of the PRA restriction on

the validity of Suzuki’s title to the
property

Orion argues that the PRA restriction in CCT No. 18186 affects the conveyance to Suzuki. In
particular, Orion assails the status of Suzuki as a purchaser in good faith in view of the express
PRA restriction contained in CCT No. 18186. 53

We reject this suggested approachoutright because, to our mind, the PRA restriction cannot affect
the conveyance in favor of Suzuki. On this particular point, we concur withthe following findings
of the CA:

x x x the annotation merely servesas a warning to the owner who holds a Special Resident Retiree’s
Visa(SRRV) that he shall lose his visa if he disposes his property which serves as his investment
in order to qualify for such status. Section 14 of the Implementing Investment Guidelines under
Rule VIII-A of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Executive Order No. 1037, Creating the
Philippine Retirement Park System Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purpose ( otherwise
known as the Philippine Retirement Authority) states:

Section 14. Should the retiree-investor withdraw his investment from the Philippines, or transfer
the same to another domestic enterprise, orsell, convey or transfer his condominium unit or units
to another person, natural or juridical without the prior approval of the Authority, the Special
Resident Retiree’s Visa issued to him, and/or unmarried minor child or children[,] may be cancelled
or revoked by the Philippine Government, through the appropriate government department or
agency, upon recommendation of the Authority.54

Moreover, Orion should not be allowed to successfully assail the good faith of Suzuki on the basis
of the PRA restriction. Orion knew of the PRA restriction when it transacted with Kang. Incidentally,
Orion admitted accommodating Kang’s request to cancel the mortgage annotation despite the lack
of payment to circumvent the PRA restriction. Orion, thus, is estopped from impugning the validity
of the conveyance in favor of Suzuki on the basis of the PRA restriction that Orion itself ignored
and "attempted" to circumvent.

With the conclusion that Orion failed to prove the authenticity of the Dacion en Pago, we see no
reason for the application of the rules on double sale under Article 1544 of the New Civil Code.
Suzuki, moreover, successfully adduced sufficient evidence to establish the validity of conveyance
in his favor.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner
Orion Savings Bank.

G.R. No. 202039, August 14, 2019

ANGELITA SIMUNDAC-KEPPEL, PETITIONER, v. GEORG KEPPEL, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, C.J.:
The courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws. To have evidentiary weight in a judicial
proceeding, the foreign laws should be alleged and proved like any other material fact.

This Case

By this appeal, the petitioner assails the decision promulgated on September 26, 2011 1 by the
Court of Appeals (CA) that reversed the judgment rendered on June 21, 2006 2 by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City in Civil Case No. 96-048.

Antecedents

As summarized by the CA, the factual antecedents are as follows:

In November 1972, petitioner Angelita Simundac Keppel (Angelita) left the Philippines to work in
Germany as a nurse. In the hospital where Angelita worked, she met Reynaldo Macaraig
(Reynaldo), also a nurse and fellow Filipino who had become a naturalized German citizen. They
fell in love and got married in Germany on 12 June 1976. Angelita and Reynaldo's union produced
a son.

After a few years of marriage, Angelita became attracted to another German nurse and co-
employee, Georg Keppel (Georg). Like Angelita, Georg was married to a Filipina nurse, with whom
he had two children. Eventually, the attraction between Angelita and Georg developed into an
intimate affair. Not long after that, Reynaldo discovered Angelita's infidelity and they separated.

In the meantime, in February 1986, Angelita became a naturalized German citizen. Angelita and
her son left Germany to go home to the Philippines, where they planned to start over.

While in the Philippines, Angelita continued communicating with Georg through letters and
telephone calls. In July 1987, Georg's wife divorced him, and so Georg felt free to come to the
Philippines to meet Angelita's family in September 1987.

In December 1987, Angelita returned to Germany to file divorce proceedings against Reynaldo,
and she obtained the divorce decree she sought in June 1988. Shortly thereafter, Angelita and
Georg got married in Germany on 30 August 1988. On 21 November 1989, Angelita gave birth in
Germany to a daughter, whom they named Liselotte.

In 1991, Angelita and Georg entered into an agreement for the complete separation of their
properties. At that time, Georg resigned from his job. To make matters worse, Georg was
diagnosed with early multiple sclerosis and could not work. Since Angelita's income was barely
enough to support them all, they decided to return and settle permanently in the Philippines in
1992.

Angelita bought a lot in Muntinlupa on which they had a house built in 1993. She also put up a
commercial building – which earned rentals – on another lot in Muntinlupa, which she and her first
husband, Reynaldo, previously bought together. The rest of Angelita's savings from Germany went
into putting up a school with her other family members and relatives.

Angelita earned a considerable income from her business ventures, which she shared with Georg.
However, Angelita stopped giving Georg money in 1994 when she discovered that Georg was
having extramarital affairs.
Claiming that Georg was beating her up, Angelita and her two children left their home in March
1996. Being the registered owner of their family home, Angelita sold the same to her sister.
Despite said sale, Georg refused to vacate the house.

On 26 March 1996, Angelita filed the instant petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of
Georg's alleged psychological incapacity. Georg opposed the petition, insisting that the court
should only issue a decree of legal separation with the consequent division of their properties and
determination of Liselotte's custody. Angelita countered that there were no properties to divide
between them because all the real properties that she acquired in the Philippines belong solely to
her as a consequence of the agreement for complete separation of property that they previously
executed in Germany in 1991.

During trial, Angelita presented evidence of Georg's psychological incapacity through medical
reports and the like, as well as the contract for separation of property. On the other hand, Georg
presented evidence of the properties that they acquired during their marriage that he thinks should
be divided equally between them.3

Judgment of the RTC

On June 21, 2006, the RTC rendered judgment declaring the marriage of Angelita and Georg null
and void, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

[T]he marriage between spouses ANGELITA SIMUNDAC and GEORG KEPPEL which was
solemnized on August 30, 1988 in Dulsburg, Germany, is hereby declared as null and void
a)
in view of the psychological incapacity of defendant to perform the essential marital
obligations;

[A]ll the real and personal properties including the businesses subject of the instant suit is
b)
(sic) hereby declared as forming part of the paraphernal property of petitioner;

c) [T]he spouses are directed to equally support their minor child Lisselotte Angela Keppel;

[T]he custody of the minor child is hereby declared as belonging to herein petitioner, the
d) mother, without prejudice to the visitorial rights accorded by law to defendant, unless the
said minor child chooses her father's custody, herein defendant.

SO ORDERED.4

The RTC found both of the parties psychologically incapacitated but considered Georg's incapacity
to be more severe on the basis of the clinical finding that he had manifested an anti-social or
psychopathic type of personality that translated to the symptomatic tendency to deceive and injure
Angelita. The RTC declared that as to the properties of the parties to be distributed after the
dissolution of the marriage, the business and personal properties should be allocated to Angelita
pursuant to the "Matrimony Property Agreement;" and that the lands should exclusively belong to
Angelita inasmuch as Georg, being a German citizen, was absolutely prohibited from owning lands
pursuant to Section 7, Article XVII of the Constitution.

Decision of the CA

On September 26, 2011, the CA promulgated its decision on appeal, reversing the RTC's findings,
and thereby dismissing the complaint, disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated 21 June 2006, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 256,
Muntinlupa City in Civil Case No. 96-048 for Annulment of Marriage and Custody of Minor Child
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except for the trial court's declaration that all properties acquired
in the Philippines by Angelita Simundac Keppel belong to her alone. The complaint is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.5

The CA observed that Angelita did not prove the allegations in her complaint because she did not
present the original of her divorce decree from Reynaldo Macaraig, her first spouse; that she did
not also prove the German law that capacitated her to marry Georg; that in the eyes of the court,
therefore, there could be no annulment of the marriage between Angelita and Georg to speak of
because under Philippine law, Angelita had remained married to Reynaldo; that Angelita's evidence
was insufficient to prove that either of the parties herein had been psychologically incapacitated
to comply with essential marital obligations inasmuch as anti-social behavior did not equate to
psychological incapacity; and that the properties of the couple exclusively belonged to Angelita
because Georg could not own lands in the Philippines.

Issues

In this appeal, Angelita posits that the CA erred in not declaring her marriage with Georg null and
void inasmuch as Georg was suffering from psychological incapacity that rendered him incapable
to fulfill his essential marital obligations as borne out by the medical findings; that being then a
German citizen, she need not prove the dissolution of her marriage with Reynaldo, or the validity
of her marriage with Georg because Philippine law did not apply in both instances; and that as
alleged in her petition she had recently re-acquired her Filipino citizenship. 6

Georg counters that the evidence presented was not sufficient basis to conclude that he was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations; and that the prohibition
against land ownership by aliens did not apply because the bulk of the properties of the spouses
consisted of personal properties that were not covered by the Constitutional prohibition.

Did the CA err in sustaining the validity of the marriage of the parties? Are the lower courts correct
in awarding all the properties of the spouses in favor of Angelita?

Ruling of the Court

The appeal fails to impress.

I.
Under the Nationality Principle, the petitioner
cannot invoke Article 36 of the Family Code
unless there is a German law that allows her to do so

A fundamental and obvious defect of Angelita's petition for annulment of marriage is that it seeks
a relief improper under Philippine law in light of both Georg and Angelita being German citizens,
not Filipinos, at the time of the filing thereof. Based on the Nationality Principle, which is followed
in this jurisdiction, and pursuant to which laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad,7 it was the pertinent German law that governed. In short, Philippine law finds no
application herein as far as the family rights and obligations of the parties who are foreign nationals
are concerned

In Morisono v. Morisono,8 we summarized the treatment of foreign divorce judgments in this

jurisdiction, thus:

The rules on divorce prevailing in this jurisdiction can be summed up as follows: first, Philippine
laws do not provide for absolute divorce, and hence, the courts cannot grant the same; second,
consistent with Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code, the marital bond between two (2) Filipino
citizens cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad; third, an absolute
divorce obtained abroad by a couple who are both aliens may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws; and fourth, in
mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry. [Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis]

Accordingly, the petition for annulment initiated by Angelita fails scrutiny through the lens of the
Nationality Principle.

Firstly, what governs the marriage of the parties is German, not Philippine, law, and this rendered
it incumbent upon Angelita to allege and prove the applicable German law. We reiterate that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws; hence, the existence and contents of such laws
are regarded as questions of fact, and, as such, must be alleged and proved like any other disputed
fact.9 Proof of the relevant German law may consist of any of the following, namely: (1) official
publications of the law; or (2) copy attested to by the officer having legal custody of the foreign
law. If the official record is not kept in the Philippines, the copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept; and (b) authenticated by the seal of
his office.10 Angelita did not comply with the requirements for pleading and proof of the relevant
German law.

And, secondly, Angelita overlooked that German and Philippine laws on annulment of
marriage might not be the same. In other words, the remedy of annulment of the marriage due
to psychological incapacity afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code might not be available for
her. In the absence of a showing of her right to this remedy in accordance with German law,
therefore, the petition should be dismissed.

II.
Assuming the remedy was proper, the petitioner did not
prove the respondent's psychological incapacity

Even if we were now to adhere to the concept of processual presumption, 11 and assume that the
German law was similar to the Philippine law as to allow the action under Article 36 of the Family
Code to be brought by one against the other party herein, we would still affirm the CA's dismissal
of the petition brought under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Notable from the RTC's disquisition is the fact that the psychiatrists found that both parties had
suffered from anti-social behavior that became the basis for the trial court's conclusion that they
had been both psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential martial obligations. Therein
lay the reason why we must affirm the CA.

Jurisprudentially speaking, psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family

Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will. The disorder consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the
essentials of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that
is, the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the
procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. Proving that a spouse did not meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married
person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so
because of some psychological illness.12

Psychological incapacity is unlike any other disorder that would invalidate a marriage. It should
refer to a mental incapacity that causes a party to be incognitive of the basic marital covenants
such as those enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code and must be characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability.13

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 the Court issued the following guidelines for the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish
the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the
person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as
not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage.
The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's."
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must
have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other
words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated
in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

Here, however, the petitioner presented no evidence to show that the anti-social behavior
manifested by both parties had been grave, and had existed at the time of the celebration of the
marriage as to render the parties incapable of performing all the essential marital obligations
provided by law. As the records bear out, the medical experts merely concluded that the behavior
was grave enough as to incapacitate the parties from the performance of their essential marital
relationship because the parties exhibited symptoms of an anti-social personality disorder. Also,
the incapacity was not established to have existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
In short, the conclusion about the parties being psychologically incapacitated was not founded on
sufficient evidence.

III.
Former Filipinos have the limited right to own
public agricultural lands in the Philippines

We next deal with the ownership of lands by aliens.

Properties accumulated by a married couple may either be real or personal. While the RTC awarded
herein all personal properties in favor of Angelita pursuant to the "Matrimonial Property
Agreement" executed in Germany, it ignored that such agreement was governed by the national
law of the contracting parties; and that the forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other
public instruments should be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. 15

Angelita did not allege and prove the German law that allowed her to enter into and adopt the
regime of complete separation of property through the "Matrimonial Property Agreement." In the
absence of such allegation and proof, the German law was presumed to be the same as that of
the Philippines.

In this connection, we further point out Article 77 of the Family Code declares that marriage
settlements and any modification thereof shall be made in writing and signed by the
parties prior to the celebration of the marriage. Assuming that the relevant German law was
similar to the Philippine law, the "Matrimonial Property Agreement," being entered into by the
parties in 1991, or a few years after the celebration of their marriage on August 30, 1988, could
not be enforced for being in contravention of a mandatory law. 16
Also, with the parties being married on August 30, 1988, the provisions of the Family Code should
govern. Pursuant to Article 75 of the Family Code, the property relations between the spouses
were governed by the absolute community of property. This would then entitle Georg to half of
the personal properties of the community property.

As to the real properties of the parties, several factual considerations were apparently overlooked,
or were not established.

Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states that: "Save in cases of hereditary succession,
no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." It seems clear, however, that
the lower courts were too quick to pronounce that Georg, being a German citizen, was
automatically disqualified from owning lands in the Philippines. Without disputing the inherent
validity of the pronouncement, we nonetheless opine that the lower courts missed to take note of
the fact that Angelita, in view of her having admitted that she herself had been a German citizen,
suffered the same disqualification as Georg. Consequently, the lower courts' pronouncement
awarding all real properties in favor of Angelita could be devoid of legal basis as to her.

At best, an alien could have enjoyed a limited right to own lands. Section 8, Article XII of the
Constitution provides: "Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private
lands, subject to limitations provided by law." Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8179 (An Act Amending
the Foreign Investments Act of 1991) also states:

Sec. 10. Other Rights of Natural Born Citizen Pursuant to the Provisions of Article XII, Section 8
of the Constitution. — Any natural born citizen who has lost his Philippine citizenship and who has
the legal capacity to enter into a contract under Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private
land up to a maximum area of five thousand (5,000) square meters in the case of urban land or
three (3) hectares in the case of rural land to be used by him for business or other purposes. In
the case of married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted: Provided, That
if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum herein fixed.

In case the transferee already owns urban or rural land for business or other purposes, he shall
still be entitled to be a transferee of additional urban or rural land for business or other purposes
which when added to those already owned by him shall not exceed the maximum areas herein
authorized.

A transferee under this Act may acquire not more than two (2) lots which should be situated in
different municipalities or cities anywhere in the Philippines: Provided, That the total land area
thereof shall not exceed five thousand (5,000) square meters in the case of urban land or three
(3) hectares in the case of rural land for use by him for business or other purposes. A transferee
who has already acquired urban land shall be disqualified from acquiring rural land area and vice
versa.

As the foregoing indicates, Angelita did not have any unlimited right to own lands. On the other
hand, the records were not clear on whether or not she had owned real property as allowed by
law. It was imperative for the lower courts to determine so. Hence, remand for further proceedings
is called for.

It is true that Angelita stated in her petition that she had meanwhile re-acquired Filipino
citizenship.17 This statement remained unsubstantiated, but the impact thereof would be far
reaching if the statement was true, for there would then be no need to determine whether or not
Angelita had complied with Section 5 of R.A. No. 8179. Thus, the remand of the case will enable
the parties to adduce evidence on this aspect of the case, particularly to provide factual basis to
determine whether or not Angelita had validly re-acquired her Filipino citizenship; and, if she had,
to ascertain what would be the extent of her ownership of the real assets pertaining to the
marriage. If the remand should establish that she had remained a foreigner, it must next be
determined whether or not she complied with the limits defined or set by R.A. No. 8179 regarding
her land ownership. The trial court shall award her the real property that complied with the limits
of the law, and inform the Office of the Solicitor General for purposes of a proper disposition of
any excess land whose ownership violated the law.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on September 26, 2011 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89297 subject to
the MODIFICATION that the personal properties of the parties are to be equally divided between
them; and REMANDS the case to the court of origin for the determination of the issues deriving
from the petitioner's re-acquisition of her Filipino citizenship as far as the ownership of the land
pertaining to the parties is concerned consistent with this decision.

KARL WILLIAM YUTA MAGNO SUZUKI A.K.A. YUTA HAYASHI, PETITIONER, VS. OFFICE
OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

INTING, J.:

This resolves the Petition1 for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Adoption Decree seeking to reverse
and set aside the Order2 dated November 21, 2013 of Branch 192, Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Marikina City in JDRC Case No. 2013-2279-MK. The assailed RTC Order dismissed the Petition3 for
Judicial Recognition of Foreign Adoption Decree filed by Karl William Yuta Magno Suzuki a.k.a.
Yuta Hayashi (petitioner).

The Antecedents

Petitioner was born on April 4, 1988 in Manila to Mr. Sadao Kumai Suzuki, a Japanese national,
and Ms. Lorlie. Lopez Magno (Lorlie), a Filipino citizen.4 Petitioner's parents were married on
December 29, 1987.5 Based on Identification Certificate No. 08-19540,6 issued by the Bureau of
Immigration on March 31, 2008, petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

On June 12, 1997, petitioner's parents divorced.7 On December 6, 2002, Lorlie married another
Japanese national, Mr. Hikaru Hayashi (Hayashi), in San Juan City, Metro Manila.8

On November 9, 2004, petitioner, then 16 years old, was adopted by Hayashi based on Japanese
law. This was reflected in Hayashi's Koseki or Family Register.9 The Koseki and its English
translation were both authenticated at the Philippine Consulate General on May 15, 2007.10

At 24 years old, petitioner sought to be recognized in the Philippines his adoption by Hayashi under
Japanese law. Thus, on May 24, 2013, he filed a Petition11 for Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Adoption Decree before the RTC of Marikina City.

On June 4, 2013, the RTC issued an Order12 requiring the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to
file its comment on the petition. In its Comment/Opposition13 dated November 4, 2013, the OSG
alleged that the present legislation shows a strong intent to regulate adoption by aliens.14 It
contended that Executive Order No. (EO) 9115 provides certain conditions before an alien may
adopt Filipino citizens. Likewise, it argued that the Family Code provides limits on who are allowed
to adopt Filipino citizens.16 Moreover, it claimed that an adoption is only valid if made within the
legal framework on adoption as enunciated in Republic Act No. (RA) 8043 known as the Inter-
Country Adoption Act of 1995, and RA 8552 known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998. The
OSG concluded that petitioner's adoption is not in accordance with the laws, and thus, should not
be allowed.

On November 21, 2013, the RTC issued the assailed Order17 dismissing the petition for being
contrary to law and public policy. The RTC was of the view that the judicial recognition sought
would render nugatory the local laws on adoption. The dispositive portion of the RTC Order reads:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for further Proceedings is hereby DENIED, for lack of merit. The instant
petition is hereby DISMISSED, for being contrary to law and public policy.

SO ORDERED.18

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,19 which the RTC denied in its Order20 dated April
23, 2014. The RTC was convinced that RA 8043 (Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995) and RA 8552
(Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) govern all adoptions of Filipino citizens.21

Furthermore, the RTC ruled that even assuming that the adoption of petitioner is valid under the
Japanese law, Philippine courts are not automatically obliged to recognize its validity. The RTC
stated that under Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, there must be a "judgment or final
order of a tribunal of a foreign country." The RTC noted that the petition merely alleges the fact
of registration of petitioner's adoption in the Family Register of Hayashi and fails to present any
judgment or final order issued by a Japanese tribunal.22

Aggrieved, petitioner, on pure questions of law, directly filed before the Court the present petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

On August 7, 2017, the Court issued a Resolution23 requiring the parties to submit their respective
memoranda within 30 days from notice.

In his Memorandum,24 petitioner claimed that: (1) the National Statistics Office25 Memorandum
Circular No. 2007-00826 dated September 24, 2007 which establishes the guidelines for the
registration in the civil registry of foreign judgments/orders, includes adoption in its coverage; (2)
Rule 53 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993,27 issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar-
General (OCRG), states that a decree of adoption issued by a foreign court is acceptable for
registration in the Philippines and can be issued only in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila;
(3) Rule 9 of Circular No. 90-228 dated March 28, 1990, also issued by the OCRG, allows a decree
of adoption issued by a foreign court to be accepted for registration in the Philippines; and (4)
that the modem trend is to encourage adoption and that every reasonable intendment should be
sustained to promote such objective.

On the other hand, the OSG in its Memorandum29 reiterated that: (1) petitioner's adoption is
subject to the Philippine laws; (2) the Philippine laws manifest a strong legislative intent to
regulate adoption; (3) an adoption is valid only if made within the framework enunciated in RA
8043 and RA 8552; (4) petitioner's adoption was not performed under RA 8043; and (5) the
adoption was not made pursuant to RA 8552.30

The present petition relies upon the following ground:

THE RTC ERRED IN RULING THAT UNDER PHILIPPINE-JURISDICTION A JUDICIAL RECOGNITION

OF A FOREIGN DECREE OF ADOPTION IS NOT ALLOWED.31
Our Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

The RTC erroneously ruled that a foreign judgment of adoption of a Filipino citizen cannot be
judicially recognized based on the view that such recognition would render nugatory the Philippine
laws on adoption. It bears to emphasize that there are two parties involved in an adoption process:
the adopter and the adoptee. The RTC in this case failed to consider that Hayashi, the adopter, is
a Japanese citizen.

Article 15 of the Civil Code states that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad." Owing to this nationality principle, the Philippine laws on adoption are thus binding
on petitioner. However, with respect to the case of Hayashi, who is a Japanese citizen, it bears
stressing that the Philippine courts are: precluded from deciding on his "family rights and duties,
or on [his] status, condition and legal capacity" concerning the foreign judgment to which he is a
party.32 Thus, as to the foreign judgment of adoption obtained by Hayashi, if it is proven as a
fact, the Philippine courts are limited to the determination of whether to extend its effect to
petitioner, the Filipino party.

By definition, adoption is "the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter,
possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child."33 It is a juridical act, a proceeding in
rem which creates a relationship that is similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and
filiation.34 The process of adoption therefore fixes a status, viz., that of parent and child.35 More
technically, it is an act by which relations of paternity and affiliation are recognized as legally
existing between persons not so related by nature.36

Adoption has also been defined as the taking into one's family of the child of another as son or
daughter and heir and conferring on it a title to the rights and privileges of such. The purpose of
the proceeding for adoption is to effect this new status of relationship between the child and its
adoptive parents, the change of name which frequently accompanies adoption being more an
incident than the object of the proceeding.37

Adoption creates a status that is closely assimilated to legitimate paternity and filiation with
corresponding rights and duties that necessarily flow from it, including, but not necessarily limited
to, the exercise of parental authority, use of surname of the adopter by the adopted, as well as
support and successional rights.38

Indeed, matters relating to adoption are subject to regulation by the State.39 In the Philippines,
the general provisions on adoption are found in Articles 133 to 193, Title VII of EO 209, Series of
1987, entitled "The Family Code of the Philippines" (Family Code). Under the Family Code, not all
persons are qualified to adopt. Articles 183 and 184 provide limitations, viz.:

Art. 183. A person of age and in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights may adopt,
provided he is in a position to support and care for his children, legitimate or illegitimate, in
keeping with the means of the family.

xxxx

In addition, the adopter must be at least sixteen years older than the person to be adopted, unless
the adopter is the parent by nature of the adopted, or is the spouse of the legitimate parent of the
person to be adopted.
Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt:

(1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final accounts
rendered upon the termination of their guardianship relation;

(2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;

(3) An alien, except:

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;

(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or

(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her
spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter.

Aliens nut included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the
rules on inter-country adoptions as may be provided by law. (Italics supplied.)

Based on Article 184 of the Family Code, Hayashi falls under exception (b) of item (3). He is a
Japanese citizen married to Lorlie, a Filipino. Under the Philippine law, it is therefore valid and
legal for Hayashi to adopt petitioner, the legitimate child of Lorlie. Further, the rules on inter-
country adoptions of Filipino children as mentioned in the last paragraph of Article 184 do not
apply to him.

Special laws on adoption have been passed by Congress subsequent to the promulgation of the
Family Code. In 1995, RA 804340 was enacted to establish the rules governing inter-country
adoptions of Filipino children. The Inter-Country Adoption Board (ICAB) was created to serve as
the central authority in matters relating to inter-country adoptions.41 Meanwhile, in 1998, RA
855242 was passed to set out the rules and policies on domestic adoption.

As already mentioned, the rules on inter-country adoption are not applicable in the case of Hayashi
pursuant to Article 184(3)(b) of the Family Code. Specifically, the provisions of RA 8043 do not
apply to him. Besides, as provided in Section 8 thereof, "only a legally free child may be the
subject of inter-country adoption." By definition, a "legally-free child" means a child who has been
voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the Department of Social Welfare and Development, in
accordance with the Child and Youth Welfare Code.43 Petitioner is not a "legally-free child" within
the contemplation of the law; hence, he may not be the subject of inter-country adoption.

On the other hand, the rules on domestic adoption under RA 8552 have the following pertinent
provisions with respect to eligibility:

ARTICLE III
Eligibility

SECTION 7. Who May Adopt. — The following may adopt:

(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil, capacity and legal rights, of
good moral character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude,
emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years
older than the adoptee, and who is in a position to support and care for his/her children in
keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference
 between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the
biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee's parent;

(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals:
Provided, That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines,
that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior
to the filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption
decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or
any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her
country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her
adopted son/daughter: Provided, Further, That the requirements on residency and
certification of the alien's qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the
following:

(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th)
degree of consanguinity or affinity; or

(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or

(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her
spouse a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the
Filipino spouse; or

(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and
clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
However, that the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the
other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.

SECTION 8. Who May Be Adopted. — The following may be adopted:

(a) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has been administratively or judicially
declared available for adoption;

(b) The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse;

(c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter to improve his/her status to that of

legitimacy;

(d) A person of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently
considered and treated by the adopter(s) as his/her own child since minority;

(e) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or

 (f) A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has died: Provided, That no proceedings
shall be initiated within six (6) months from the time of death of said parent(s). (Italics
supplied.)

Apparently, the adoption of petitioner by Hayashi may be validly effected in accordance with the
provisions of RA 8552. However, the Court disagrees with the RTC's view that adoption decrees
involving Filipino citizens obtained abroad cannot be judicially recognized in the Philippines for
being contrary to law and public policy.

As emphasized by Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos (Justice Delos Santos), the availability
of RA 8552 as a means to adopt petitioner should not automatically foreclose proceedings to
recognize his adoption decree obtained under Japanese law. Justice Delos Santos reminds that the
principle behind the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment derives its force not only
from our Rules of Court but from the fact that such act of recognition is considered part of what
is considered as the "generally accepted principles of international law."44 It is characterized as
such because aside from the widespread practice among States accepting in principle the need for
such recognition and enforcement, the procedure for recognition and enforcement is embodied in
the rules of law, whether statutory or jurisprudential, in various foreign jurisdictions.45

As already established, the adoption by an alien of the legitimate child of his/her Filipino spouse
is valid and legal based on Article 184(3) (b) of the Family Code and Section 7(b)(i), Article III of
RA 8552. Thus, contrary to the RTC's sweeping conclusion against foreign adoption decrees, the
Court finds that the adoption of petitioner by Hayashi, if proven as a fact, can be judicially
recognized in the Philippines. Justice Delos Santos aptly propounds that the rules on domestic
adoption should not be pitted against the recognition of a foreign adoption decree; instead, the
better course of action is to reconcile them and give effect to their respective purposes.

Judicial recognition of a foreign judgment is allowed under Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, viz.:

SEC. 48. Effect of Foreign Judgments or Final Orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order of
a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as
follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title to the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by
a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. (Italics supplied.)

To emphasize, the rule states that the foreign judgment against a person is already "presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties." Upon judicial recognition of the foreign judgment, the
right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation
of entry in the civil registry.46

In Mijares v. Hon. Rañada,47 the Court extensively discussed the underlying principles for the
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the Philippine jurisdiction:
There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to
recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However,
generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the
Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as
binding result from the combination two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent
practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the
practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.

While the definite conceptual parameters of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
have not been authoritatively established, the Court can assert with certainty that, such an
undertaking is among those generally accepted principles of international law. As earlier
demonstrated, there is a widespread practice among states accepting in principle the need for
such recognition and enforcement, albeit subject to limitations of varying degrees. The fact that
there is no binding universal treaty governing the practice is not indicative of a widespread
rejection of the principle, but only a disagreement as to the imposable specific rules governing the
procedure for recognition and enforcement.

Aside from the widespread practice, it is indubitable that the procedure for recognition
and.enforcement is embodied in the rules of law, whether statutory or jurisprudential, adopted in
various foreign jurisdictions. In the Philippines, this is evidenced primarily by Section 48, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court which has existed in its current form since the early 1900s. Certainly, the
Philippine legal system has long ago accepted into its jurisprudence and procedural rules the
viability of an action for enforcement of foreign judgment, as well as the requisites for such valid
enforcement, as derived from internationally accepted doctrities. Again, there may be distinctions
as to the rules adopted by each, particular state, but they all prescind from the premise that there
is a rule of law obliging states to allow for, however generally, the recognition and enforcement of
a foreign judgment. The bare principle, to our mind, has attained the status of opinio juris in
international practice.

This is a significant proposition, as it acknowledges that the procedure and requisites outlined in
Section 48, Rule 39 derive their efficacy not merely from the procedural rule, but by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution. Rules of procedure are promulgated by the Supreme
Court, and could very well be abrogated or revised by the high court itself. Yet the Supreme Court
is obliged, as are all State Components, to obey the laws of the land, including generally accepted
principles of international law which form part thereof, such as those ensuring the qualified
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.

Thus, relative to the enforcement of foreign judgments in the Philippines, it emerges that there is
a general right recognized within our body of laws, and affirmed by the Constitution, to seek
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, as well as a right to defend against such
enforcement on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact.48 (Italics supplied.)

It is an established international legal principle that final judgments of foreign courts of competent
jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious subject to certain conditions that
vary in different countries.49 "In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts and
incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign, law."50 They
are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of the foreign judgment in the
Philippines.51 Thus, in a foreign judgment relating to the status of adoption involving a citizen of
a foreign country, Philippine courts will only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino
party.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine: (1) whether the foreign judgment is
contrary to an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is
able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e., want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.52 Absent any inconsistency
with public policy or adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations.53

For Philippine courts to judicially recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of an adoption
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the
foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. Thus, as held in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.:54

x x x To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven
as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication
or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office
which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the
proper diplomatic or consular officci1 of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated
by the seal of office.55

Accordingly, the Court deems it proper to remand the case to Branch 192, RTC, Marikina City for
further proceedings. To emphasize, recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment or final
order require only proof of fact of such foreign judgment or final order. Furthermore, the
recognition of the foreign judgment of adoption is a subsequent event that establishes a new
status, right, and fact affecting petitioner. If duly proven, the foreign judgment needs to be
reflected in the Philippine civil registry.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated November 21, 2013 and April 23, 2014
of Branch 192, Regional Trial Court, Marikina City in JDRC Case No. 2013-2279-MK
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition
for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

G.R. No. L-54919 May 30, 1984

POLLY CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. TOMAS T. LEONIDAS, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVIII,
Court of First Instance of Manila and NENITA CAMPOS PAGUIA, respondents.

Ermelo P. Guzman for petitioner.

Armando Z. Gonzales for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari, seeking to annul the order of the respondent judge of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXXVIII, which admitted to and allowed the probate
of the last will and testament of Adoracion C. Campos, after an ex-parte presentation of evidence
by herein private respondent.

On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner Hermogenes
Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C.
Medina as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes Campos was the only compulsory heir, he executed
an Affidavit of Adjudication under Rule 74, Section I of the Rules of Court whereby he adjudicated
unto himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.

Eleven months after, on November 25, 1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of
a will of the deceased, Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly executed in the United States and
for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix.

In her petition, Nenita alleged that the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death
and was a permanent resident of 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the
testatrix died in Manila on January 31, 1977 while temporarily residing with her sister at 2167
Leveriza, Malate, Manila; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made her last wig and testament
on July 10, 1975, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo Barzaga of
New Jersey as executor; that after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented,
probated, allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wins at the County of Philadelphia, U.S.A.,
that Clement L. McLaughlin, the administrator who was appointed after Dr. Barzaga had declined
and waived his appointment as executor in favor of the former, is also a resident of Philadelphia,
U.S.A., and that therefore, there is an urgent need for the appointment of an administratrix to
administer and eventually distribute the properties of the estate located in the Philippines.

On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner
alleging among other things, that he has every reason to believe that the will in question is a
forgery; that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if pertinent
American laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they
would work injustice and injury to him.

On December 1, 1978, however, the petitioner through his counsel, Atty. Franco Loyola, filed a
Motion to Dismiss Opposition (With Waiver of Rights or Interests) stating that he "has been able
to verify the veracity thereof (of the will) and now confirms the same to be truly the probated will
of his daughter Adoracion." Hence, an ex-parte presentation of evidence for the reprobate of the
questioned will was made.

On January 10, 1979, the respondent judge issued an order, to wit:

 At the hearing, it has been satisfactorily established that Adoracion C. Campos, in her
lifetime, was a citizen of the United States of America with a permanent residence at 4633
Ditman Street, Philadelphia, PA 19124, (Exhibit D) that when alive, Adoracion C. Campos
executed a Last Will and Testament in the county of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.,
according to the laws thereat (Exhibits E-3 to E-3-b) that while in temporary sojourn in the
Philippines, Adoracion C. Campos died in the City of Manila (Exhibit C) leaving property both
in the Philippines and in the United States of America; that the Last Will and Testament of
the late Adoracion C. Campos was admitted and granted probate by the Orphan's Court
Division of the Court of Common Pleas, the probate court of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, County of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and letters of administration were issued in
favor of Clement J. McLaughlin all in accordance with the laws of the said foreign country
on procedure and allowance of wills (Exhibits E to E-10); and that the petitioner is not
suffering from any disqualification which would render her unfit as administratrix of the
estate in the Philippines of the late Adoracion C. Campos.

WHEREFORE, the Last Will and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos is hereby
admitted to and allowed probate in the Philippines, and Nenita Campos Paguia is hereby
appointed Administratrix of the estate of said decedent; let Letters of Administration with
the Will annexed issue in favor of said Administratrix upon her filing of a bond in the amount
of P5,000.00 conditioned under the provisions of Section I, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.

Another manifestation was filed by the petitioner on April 14, 1979, confirming the withdrawal of
his opposition, acknowledging the same to be his voluntary act and deed.

On May 25, 1979, Hermogenes Campos filed a petition for relief, praying that the order allowing
the will be set aside on the ground that the withdrawal of his opposition to the same was secured
through fraudulent means. According to him, the "Motion to Dismiss Opposition" was inserted
among the papers which he signed in connection with two Deeds of Conditional Sales which he
executed with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). He also
alleged that the lawyer who filed the withdrawal of the opposition was not his counsel-of-record
in the special proceedings case.

The petition for relief was set for hearing but the petitioner failed to appear. He made several
motions for postponement until the hearing was set on May 29, 1980.

On May 18, 1980, petitioner filed another motion entitled "Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside the
Order of January 10, 1979, and/or dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. In this motion, the
notice of hearing provided:

Please include this motion in your calendar for hearing on May 29, 1980 at 8:30 in
the morning for submission for reconsideration and resolution of the Honorable Court.
Until this Motion is resolved, may I also request for the future setting of the case for
hearing on the Oppositor's motion to set aside previously filed.

The hearing of May 29, 1980 was re-set by the court for June 19, 1980. When the case was called
for hearing on this date, the counsel for petitioner tried to argue his motion to vacate instead of
adducing evidence in support of the petition for relief. Thus, the respondent judge issued an order
dismissing the petition for relief for failure to present evidence in support thereof. Petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. In the same order, respondent judge also
denied the motion to vacate for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.

Meanwhile, on June 6,1982, petitioner Hermogenes Campos died and left a will, which, incidentally
has been questioned by the respondent, his children and forced heirs as, on its face, patently null
and void, and a fabrication, appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix of his last will and
testament. Cayetano, therefore, filed a motion to substitute herself as petitioner in the instant
case which was granted by the court on September 13, 1982.

A motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the rights of the petitioner Hermogenes
Campos merged upon his death with the rights of the respondent and her sisters, only remaining
children and forced heirs was denied on September 12, 1983.

Petitioner Cayetano persists with the allegations that the respondent judge acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction when:

1) He ruled the petitioner lost his standing in court deprived the Right to Notice (sic) upon
the filing of the Motion to Dismiss opposition with waiver of rights or interests against the
estate of deceased Adoracion C. Campos, thus, paving the way for the hearing ex-parte of
the petition for the probate of decedent will.

2) He ruled that petitioner can waive, renounce or repudiate (not made in a public or
authenticated instrument), or by way of a petition presented to the court but by way of a
motion presented prior to an order for the distribution of the estate-the law especially
providing that repudiation of an inheritance must be presented, within 30 days after it has
issued an order for the distribution of the estate in accordance with the rules of Court.

3) He ruled that the right of a forced heir to his legitime can be divested by a decree
admitting a will to probate in which no provision is made for the forced heir in complete
disregard of Law of Succession

4) He denied petitioner's petition for Relief on the ground that no evidence was adduced to
support the Petition for Relief when no Notice nor hearing was set to afford petitioner to
prove the merit of his petition — a denial of the due process and a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

5) He acquired no jurisdiction over the testate case, the fact that the Testator at the time
of death was a usual resident of Dasmariñas, Cavite, consequently Cavite Court of First
Instance has exclusive jurisdiction over the case (De Borja vs. Tan, G.R. No. L-7792, July
1955).

The first two issues raised by the petitioner are anchored on the allegation that the respondent
judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he allowed the withdrawal of the petitioner's
opposition to the reprobate of the will.

We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. No proof was adduced
to support petitioner's contention that the motion to withdraw was secured through fraudulent
means and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his counsel of record. The records show that after the
firing of the contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a manifestation wherein he
confirmed that the Motion to Dismiss Opposition was his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the
time the motion was filed, the petitioner's former counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long
withdrawn from the case and had been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed the
motion. The present petitioner cannot, therefore, maintain that the old man's attorney of record
was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the motion. Since the withdrawal was in order, the
respondent judge acted correctly in hearing the probate of the will ex-parte, there being no other
opposition to the same.
The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a general rule, the
probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution
thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared
that the will has been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that
the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet
the issue. (Maninang vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478).

In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the reprobate
of Adoracion's will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his legitime which was reserved by
the law for him.

This contention is without merit.

Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent
judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have sufficiently
established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen and a permanent
resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the
Civil Code which respectively provide:

Art. 16 par. (2).

xxx xxx xxx

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

Art. 1039.

Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

the law which governs Adoracion Campo's will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the
national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not
provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete
stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to the
sound and established public policy and would run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine
Law.

It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as provided for
by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply. This was
squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358) wherein we ruled:

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved
in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the
amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions
must prevail over general ones.

xxx xxx xxx

 The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of
Texas, U.S.A., and under the law of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine Law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

As regards the alleged absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief, the records wig bear
the fact that what was repeatedly scheduled for hearing on separate dates until June 19, 1980
was the petitioner's petition for relief and not his motion to vacate the order of January 10, 1979.
There is no reason why the petitioner should have been led to believe otherwise. The court even
admonished the petitioner's failing to adduce evidence when his petition for relief was repeatedly
set for hearing. There was no denial of due process. The fact that he requested "for the future
setting of the case for hearing . . ." did not mean that at the next hearing, the motion to vacate
would be heard and given preference in lieu of the petition for relief. Furthermore, such request
should be embodied in a motion and not in a mere notice of hearing.

Finally, we find the contention of the petition as to the issue of jurisdiction utterly devoid of merit.
Under Rule 73, Section 1, of the Rules of Court, it is provided that:

SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant

of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had
estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court,
so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court,
in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the Court of
First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion
at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of Pennsylvania, United States of
America and not a "usual resident of Cavite" as alleged by the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is
now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in the petition for relief. It is
a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief,
against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction. (See Saulog Transit, Inc. vs. Hon. Manuel Lazaro, et al., G. R. No. 63 284, April 4,
1984).

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 139868 June 8, 2006

ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, Petitioner,

vs.
CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON, Respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who
have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill
(Kyle). On July 29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to
Richard, who was also designated as executor. 1 The will was admitted to probate before the
Orphan’s Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as executor due to
Richard’s renunciation of his appointment. 2 The court also named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta
(petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary
administrator.3

In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two
children, namely, Kimberly and Kevin.

On October 12, 1982, Audrey’s will was also admitted to probate by the then Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch 25, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special Proceeding No. 9625. 4 As
administrator of Audrey’s estate in the Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of
the following properties: (1) Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate with improvements located at
28 Pili Avenue, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, valued at P764,865.00 (Makati property); (2)
a current account in Audrey’s name with a cash balance of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of
stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00. 5

On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to
respondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to
Kyle.6 The will was also admitted to probate by the Orphan’s Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland,
U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was likewise appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty.
William Quasha or any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as
ancillary administrator.

Richard’s will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
138, docketed as Special Proceeding No. M-888. 7 Atty. Quasha was appointed as ancillary
administrator on July 24, 1986. 8

On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625, a motion to declare Richard
and Kyle as heirs of Audrey.9 Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project of partition of
Audrey’s estate, with Richard being apportioned the ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property,
48.333 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current account; and Kyle,
the ¼ undivided interest in the Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc.,
and P3,104.49 in cash.10

The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court in its Order dated
February 12, 1988.11 The trial court also issued an Order on April 7, 1988, directing the Register
of Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT No. 69792 in the name of Richard and to issue a new title in the
joint names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey (¾ undivided interest) and Kyle (¼ undivided
interest); directing the Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333 shares to the Estate of
W. Richard Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the Citibank to release the amount
of P12,417.97 to the ancillary administrator for distribution to the heirs. 12

Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued on June 23, 1988, TCT No. 155823 in the
names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and Kyle. 13

Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding No. M-888 also filed a project of
partition wherein 2/5 of Richard’s ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated to
respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richard’s three children. This was opposed by
respondent on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a legacy passes to the
legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy."14 Since
Richard left his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G
Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property should be given
to respondent.

The trial court found merit in respondent’s opposition, and in its Order dated December 6, 1991,
disapproved the project of partition insofar as it affects the Makati property. The trial court also
adjudicated Richard’s entire ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property to respondent. 15

On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an amended complaint for
the annulment of the trial court’s Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, issued in
Special Proceeding No. 9625.16 Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached his
fiduciary duty when he disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the distribution of Audrey’s
estate in accordance with her will. Respondent argued that since Audrey devised her entire estate
to Richard, then the Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely ¾
thereof, and since Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests over the A/G
Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati property should now pertain to respondent.

Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondent’s allegations. Petitioner contended that he acted in
good faith in submitting the project of partition before the trial court in Special Proceeding No.
9625, as he had no knowledge of the State of Maryland’s laws on testate and intestate succession.
Petitioner alleged that he believed that it is to the "best interests of the surviving children that
Philippine law be applied as they would receive their just shares." Petitioner also alleged that the
orders sought to be annulled are already final and executory, and cannot be set aside.

On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial court’s Orders dated
February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, in Special Proceeding No. 9625. 17 The dispositive portion of
the assailed Decision provides:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of February 12, 1998 and April 7, 1988 are hereby ANNULLED
and, in lieu thereof, a new one is entered ordering:

(a) The adjudication of the entire estate of Audrey O’Neill Guersey in favor of the estate of
W. Richard Guersey; and

(b) The cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15583 of the Makati City Registry
and the issuance of a new title in the name of the estate of W. Richard Guersey.

SO ORDERED.18

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA per Resolution dated
August 27, 1999.19

Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging that
the CA gravely erred in not holding that:

A) THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988 AND 07 APRIL 1988 IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS NO.
9625 "IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE WILL OF THE DECEASED
AUDREY GUERSEY, ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR", ARE VALID AND
BINDING AND HAVE LONG BECOME FINAL AND HAVE BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED AND
EXECUTED AND CAN NO LONGER BE ANNULLED.
 B) THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR HAVING ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, DID NOT COMMIT
FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES AS
ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR OF AUDREY O’NEIL GUERSEY’S ESTATE IN THE PHILIPPINES,
AND THAT NO FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, WAS EMPLOYED BY [HIM] IN
PROCURING SAID ORDERS.20

Petitioner reiterates his arguments before the CA that the Orders dated February 12, 1988 and
April 7, 1988 can no longer be annulled because it is a final judgment, which is "conclusive upon
the administration as to all matters involved in such judgment or order, and will determine for all
time and in all courts, as far as the parties to the proceedings are concerned, all matters therein
determined," and the same has already been executed. 21

Petitioner also contends that that he acted in good faith in performing his duties as an ancillary
administrator. He maintains that at the time of the filing of the project of partition, he was not
aware of the relevant laws of the State of Maryland, such that the partition was made in accordance
with Philippine laws. Petitioner also imputes knowledge on the part of respondent with regard to
the terms of Aubrey’s will, stating that as early as 1984, he already apprised respondent of the
contents of the will and how the estate will be divided. 22

Respondent argues that petitioner’s breach of his fiduciary duty as ancillary administrator of
Aubrey’s estate amounted to extrinsic fraud. According to respondent, petitioner was duty-bound
to follow the express terms of Aubrey’s will, and his denial of knowledge of the laws of Maryland
cannot stand because petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm and it was his duty to
know the relevant laws.

Respondent also states that she was not able to file any opposition to the project of partition
because she was not a party thereto and she learned of the provision of Aubrey’s will bequeathing
entirely her estate to Richard only after Atty. Ancheta filed a project of partition in Special
Proceeding No. M-888 for the settlement of Richard’s estate.

A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate
in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes
final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem. 23 However, in exceptional cases, a final
decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. 24 Further, in
Ramon v. Ortuzar,25 the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a
final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or
through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. 26

The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on October 20, 1993, before the issuance of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; hence, the applicable law is Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P.
129) or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. An annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129
may be based on the ground that a judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment
was obtained by extrinsic fraud.27 For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has
to be extrinsic or actual,28 and must be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud. 29

In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the annulment of the RTC
Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in respondent’s cause and
found that petitioner’s failure to follow the terms of Audrey’s will, despite the latter’s declaration
of good faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it
is the national law of the decedent that is applicable, hence, petitioner should have distributed
Aubrey’s estate in accordance with the terms of her will. The CA also found that petitioner was
prompted to distribute Audrey’s estate in accordance with Philippine laws in order to equally
benefit Audrey and Richard Guersey’s adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill.
Petitioner contends that respondent’s cause of action had already prescribed because as early as
1984, respondent was already well aware of the terms of Audrey’s will, 30 and the complaint was
filed only in 1993. Respondent, on the other hand, justified her lack of immediate action by saying
that she had no opportunity to question petitioner’s acts since she was not a party to Special
Proceeding No. 9625, and it was only after Atty. Ancheta filed the project of partition in Special
Proceeding No. M-888, reducing her inheritance in the estate of Richard that she was prompted
to seek another counsel to protect her interest. 31

It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic
fraud commences to run from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondent’s
knowledge of the terms of Audrey’s will is immaterial in this case since it is not the fraud
complained of. Rather, it is petitioner’s failure to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the
State of Maryland that is the fraudulent act, or in this case, omission, alleged to have been
committed against respondent, and therefore, the four-year period should be counted from the
time of respondent’s discovery thereof.

Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of partition of Richard’s estate, the opposition
thereto, and the order of the trial court disallowing the project of partition in Special Proceeding
No. M-888 were all done in 1991.32 Respondent cannot be faulted for letting the assailed orders
to lapse into finality since it was only through Special Proceeding No. M-888 that she came to
comprehend the ramifications of petitioner’s acts. Obviously, respondent had no other recourse
under the circumstances but to file the annulment case. Since the action for annulment was filed
in 1993, clearly, the same has not yet prescribed.

Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. In Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,33 the Court stated that "man in his ingenuity and fertile imagination will always contrive
new schemes to fool the unwary."

There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one the
effect of which prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his
case to the court, or where it operates upon matters, not pertaining to the judgment itself, but to
the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy. In
other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation
which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented
from exhibiting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent.
Fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case,
by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a
false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had any knowledge of the suit,
being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without
authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has never been a
real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained
to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing. 34

The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. 35

Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate. As such, he occupies a position of the
highest trust and confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable diligence and act in entire
good faith in the performance of that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the safety
of the estate nor is he expected to be infallible, yet the same degree of prudence, care and
judgment which a person of a fair average capacity and ability exercises in similar transactions of
his own, serves as the standard by which his conduct is to be judged. 36
Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according to the terms
of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision
annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be upheld.

It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During
the reprobate of her will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown, among others, that at the
time of Audrey’s death, she was residing in the Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.;
her Last Will and Testament dated August 18, 1972 was executed and probated before the
Orphan’s Court in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was duly authenticated and certified by the
Register of Wills of Baltimore City and attested by the Chief Judge of said court; the will was
admitted by the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore City on September 7, 1979; and the will was
authenticated by the Secretary of State of Maryland and the Vice Consul of the Philippine Embassy.

Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, especially with regard as to who are
her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided in
Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.

However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is governed by the law of
the nation of the decedent."

As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved Outside
the Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:

SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.—When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters
testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters testamentary or
of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate,
after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be disposed of
according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall
be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons
who are inhabitants of another state or country. (Emphasis supplied)

While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized
to take judicial notice of them;37 however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate,
was duty-bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland. 38

Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland on
Estates and Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such law is the same as the
Philippine law on wills and succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws
and totally disregarded the terms of Audrey’s will. The obvious result was that there was no fair
submission of the case before the trial court or a judicious appreciation of the evidence presented.

Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was made in good faith. The Court cannot
accept petitioner’s protestation. How can petitioner honestly presume that Philippine laws apply
when as early as the reprobate of Audrey’s will before the trial court in 1982, it was already
brought to fore that Audrey was a U.S. citizen, domiciled in the State of Maryland. As asserted by
respondent, petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm, with a "big legal staff and a
large library."39 He had all the legal resources to determine the applicable law. It was incumbent
upon him to exercise his functions as ancillary administrator with reasonable diligence, and to
discharge the trust reposed on him faithfully. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to perform his
fiduciary duties.

Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that the trial court failed
to consider said law when it issued the assailed RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7,
1988, declaring Richard and Kyle as Audrey’s heirs, and distributing Audrey’s estate according to
the project of partition submitted by petitioner. This eventually prejudiced respondent and
deprived her of her full successional right to the Makati property.

In GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Bldgs., Inc., 40 the Court held that when the rule that the
negligence or mistake of counsel binds the client deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and
becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto
and to prevent a miscarriage of justice, and the court has the power to except a particular case
from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.

The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his responsibilities as ancillary administrator of
Audrey’s estate. The CA likewise observed that the distribution made by petitioner was prompted
by his concern over Kyle, whom petitioner believed should equally benefit from the Makati
property. The CA correctly stated, which the Court adopts, thus:

In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and responsibilities, defendant Alonzo H.
Ancheta invokes the principle which presumes the law of the forum to be the same as the foreign
law (Beam vs. Yatco, 82 Phil. 30, 38) in the absence of evidence adduced to prove the latter law
(Slade Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil. 205, 210). In defending his actions in the light of the foregoing
principle, however, it appears that the defendant lost sight of the fact that his primary
responsibility as ancillary administrator was to distribute the subject estate in accordance with the
will of Audrey O’Neill Guersey. Considering the principle established under Article 16 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, as well as the citizenship and the avowed domicile of the decedent, it goes
without saying that the defendant was also duty-bound to prove the pertinent laws of Maryland
on the matter.

The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to prove the national law of Audrey
O’Neill Guersey during the proceedings before the court a quo. While there is claim of good faith
in distributing the subject estate in accordance with the Philippine laws, the defendant appears to
put his actuations in a different light as indicated in a portion of his direct examination, to wit:

xxx

It would seem, therefore, that the eventual distribution of the estate of Audrey O’Neill Guersey
was prompted by defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s concern that the subject realty equally benefit
the plaintiff’s adopted daughter Kyle Guersey.

Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s action appears to have breached
his duties and responsibilities as ancillary administrator of the subject estate. While such breach
of duty admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances,
the fiduciary nature of the said defendant’s position, as well as the resultant frustration
of the decedent’s last will, combine to create a circumstance that is tantamount to
extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s omission to prove the national laws of the
decedent and to follow the latter’s last will, in sum, resulted in the procurement of the subject
orders without a fair submission of the real issues involved in the case. 41 (Emphasis supplied)

This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, but a total disregard
of the law as a result of petitioner’s abject failure to discharge his fiduciary duties. It does not rest
upon petitioner’s pleasure as to which law should be made applicable under the circumstances.
His onus is clear. Respondent was thus excluded from enjoying full rights to the Makati property
through no fault or negligence of her own, as petitioner’s omission was beyond her control. She
was in no position to analyze the legal implications of petitioner’s omission and it was belatedly
that she realized the adverse consequence of the same. The end result was a miscarriage of
justice. In cases like this, the courts have the legal and moral duty to provide judicial aid to parties
who are deprived of their rights.42

The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special Proceeding No. M-888 noted the
law of the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, as follows:

Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the Public General Laws of
Maryland on Estates and Trusts, "all property of a decedent shall be subject to the estate of
decedents law, and upon his death shall pass directly to the personal representative, who shall
hold the legal title for administration and distribution," while Section 4-408 expressly provides
that "unless a contrary intent is expressly indicated in the will, a legacy passes to the legatee the
entire interest of the testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy". Section 7-101,
Title 7, Sub-Title 1, on the other hand, declares that "a personal representative is a fiduciary" and
as such he is "under the general duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in
accordance with the terms of the will and the estate of decedents law as expeditiously and with
as little sacrifice of value as is reasonable under the circumstances". 43

In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate, consisting of the following: (1) Audrey’s
conjugal share in the Makati property; (2) the cash amount of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares
of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00. All these properties passed on to Richard upon
Audrey’s death. Meanwhile, Richard, in his will, bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except
for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. When Richard
subsequently died, the entire Makati property should have then passed on to respondent. This, of
course, assumes the proposition that the law of the State of Maryland which allows "a legacy to
pass to the legatee the entire estate of the testator in the property which is the subject of the
legacy," was sufficiently proven in Special Proceeding No. 9625. Nevertheless, the Court may take
judicial notice thereof in view of the ruling in Bohanan v. Bohanan. 44 Therein, the Court took
judicial notice of the law of Nevada despite failure to prove the same. The Court held, viz.:

We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that
during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of
P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws, was
introduced in evidence by appellants' (herein) counsel as Exhibit "2" (See pp. 77-79, Vol. II, and
t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again said law was presented by the counsel
for the executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on January
23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (see Records, Court of First Instance, Vol. 1).

In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted
provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained
to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada Laws of
1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having been offered at the
hearing of the project of partition.
In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been brought to record
before the CA, and the trial court in Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately took note of the
same in disapproving the proposed project of partition of Richard’s estate, not to mention that
petitioner or any other interested person for that matter, does not dispute the existence or validity
of said law, then Audrey’s and Richard’s estate should be distributed according to their respective
wills, and not according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. Consequently, the entire
Makati property belongs to respondent.

Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion in Santos v. Manarang, 45 wrote:

A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force and
effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the
declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law
in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak after
they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them to do so x x x All
doubts must be resolved in favor of the testator's having meant just what he said.

Honorable as it seems, petitioner’s motive in equitably distributing Audrey’s estate cannot prevail
over Audrey’s and Richard’s wishes. As stated in Bellis v. Bellis: 46

x x x whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress
has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically
chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national Law.
Specific provisions must prevail over general ones. 47

Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey and Richard Guersey were American
citizens who owned real property in the Philippines, although records do not show when and how
the Guerseys acquired the Makati property.

Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution, the privilege to acquire and exploit
lands of the public domain, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and to operate public
utilities, were reserved to Filipinos and entities owned or controlled by them. In Republic v.
Quasha,48 the Court clarified that the Parity Rights Amendment of 1946, which re-opened to
American citizens and business enterprises the right in the acquisition of lands of the public
domain, the disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of natural resources of the
Philippines, does not include the acquisition or exploitation of private agricultural lands. The
prohibition against acquisition of private lands by aliens was carried on to the 1973 Constitution
under Article XIV, Section 14, with the exception of private lands acquired by hereditary succession
and when the transfer was made to a former natural-born citizen, as provided in Section 15, Article
XIV. As it now stands, Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986 Constitution explicitly prohibits
non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands or to lands of the public domain,
except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born
citizen.

In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who
subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. 49 In this case, since the Makati
property had already passed on to respondent who is a Filipino, then whatever flaw, if any, that
attended the acquisition by the Guerseys of the Makati property is now inconsequential, as the
objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18, 1999 and the Resolution dated
August 27, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.