THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF

COMPARATIVE
POLITICS
Edited by

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 c H A P T E R 4

T H E C A S ES T U D Y :
WHAT IT IS AND
WHAT IT DOES

JOHN GERRING

Two centuries after Le Play's pioneering work, the various disciplines of the social
sciences continue to produce a vast number of case studies, many of which have
entered the pantheon of classicworks. fudging by the large volume of recent scholarly
output the case study research design plays a central role in anthropology, arche-
ology, business,education, history, medicine, political science,psychology, social
work, and sociology (Gerring 2oo7a, ch. r). Even in economics and political econ-
omy, fields not usually noted for their receptivenessto case-basedwork, there has
been something of a renaissance.Recent studies of economic growth have turned to
casestudies of unusual countries such as Botswana,Korea, and Mauritius.r Debates
on the relationship between trade and growth and the IMF and growth have likewise
combined cross-nationalregressionevidencewith in-depth (quantitative and quali-
tative) caseanalysis(srinivasan and Bhagwati ry99; vreeland zoo3). work on ethnic
politics and ethnic conflict has exploited within-country variation or small-N cross-
country comparisons (Abadie and Gardeazabal zoo3; chandra zoo4; posner zoo4).
By the standard of praxis, therefore, it would appear that the method of the case
study is solidly ensconced, perhaps even thriving. Arguably, we are witnessing a
movement away from a variable-centered approach to causality in the social sciences
and towards a case-basedapproach.

I Acemoglu,
lohnson, and Robinson (zoo3), chernoff and warner (zooz), Rodrik (zoo3). See also
studies focused on particular firms or regions, e.g. Coase 1959,2ooo.
 THE CASE STUDY 91

Indeed, the statistical analysis of cross-caseobservational data has been subjected

to increasing scrutiny in recent years. It no longer seems self-evident, even to
nomothetically inclined scholars, that non-experimental data drawn from nation-
states, cities, social movements, civil conflicts, or other complex phenomena
should be treated in standard regression formats. The complaints are myriad,
and oft-reviewed.2 They include: (a) the problem of arriving at an adequate
specification of the causal model, given a plethora of plausible models, and the
associatedproblem of modeling interactions among these covariates;(b) identifi-
cation problems, which cannot always be corrected by instrumental variable tech-
"extreme"
niques; (c) the problem of counterfactuals, i.e. extrapolating or
interpolating results from a general model where the extrapolations extend beyond
the observable data points; (d) problems posed by influential cases; (e) the
arbitrariness of standard significance tests; (f) the misleading precision of point
"curve-fitting"
estimates in the context of models; (g) the problem of finding an
appropriate estimator and modeling temporal autocorrelation in pooled time
series; (h) the difficulty of identifring causal mechanisms; and last, but certainly
not least, (i) the ubiquitous problem of faulty data drawn from a variety of
questionable sources. Most of these difficulties may be understood as the by-
product of causal variables that offer limited variation through time and cases
that are extremely heterogeneous.
A principal factor driving the general discontent with cross-case observational
researchis a new-found interest in experimental models of social scientific research.
Following the pioneering work of Donald Campbell (1988;Cook and CampbellryZg)
and Donald Rubin (rgZ+), methodologists have taken a hard look at the regression
model and discovered something rather obvious but at the same time crucially
important: this research bears only a faint relationship to the true experiment, for
all the reasons noted above. The current excitement generated by matching estim-
ators, natural experiments, and field experiments may be understood as a move
toward a quasi-experimental, and frequently case-basedanalysis of causal relations.
Arguably, this is because the experimental ideal is often better approximated by a
small number of casesthat are closely related to one another, or by a single case
observed over time, than by a large sample of heterogeneous units.
A third factor militating towards case-basedanalysis is the development of a series
of alternatives to the standard linear/additive model of cross-case analysis, thus
establishing a more variegated set of tools to capture the complexity of social
behavior (see Brady and Collier zoo4). Charles Ragin and associateshave shown us
how to deal with situations where multiple causal paths lead to the same set of
outcomes, a seriesof techniques known as Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)
("Symposium: Qualitative Comparative Analysis" zoo4). Andrew Abbott has
worked out a method that maps causal sequencesacross cases,known as optimal
sequencematching (Abbott zoor; Abbott and Forrest 1986;Abbott and Tsay zooo).

2 ForgeneraldiscussionofthefollowingpointsseeAchen(1986),Freedman(r99r),Kittel(rggg,zooS),
Kittel and Winner (zoo5), Manski (1993),Winship and Morgan (rqqq), Winship and Sobel (zoo4).
92 JOHN GERRING

Bear Braumoeller, Gary Goertz, |ack Levy, and Harvey starr have defended the
importance of necessary-condition arguments in the social sciences,and have
shown how these arguments might be analyzed.(Braumoeller and Goertz 2ooo;
Goertz zoo3; Goertz and Lely forthcoming; Goertz and Starr zoo3). |ames Fearon,
Ned Lebow, Philip Tetlock, and others have explored the role of counterfactual
thought experiments in the analysis of individual case histories (Fearon r99r;
Lebow zooo; Tetlock and Belkin 1996). colin Elman has developed a typological
method of analyzing cases(Elman zoo5). David collier,Iack Goldstone, peter Hall,
|ames Mahoney, and Dietrich Rueschemeyerhave worked to revitalize the compara-
tive and comparative-historical methods (collier 1993;Goldstone r997i Hall zoo3;
Mahoney and Rueschemeyerzoo3). And scores of researchershave attacked the
problem of how to convert the relevant details of a temporally constructed narrative
into standardized formats so that casescan be meaningfully compared (Abell r9g7,
zoo4;Abbotttggzi Buthe zooz; Griffin 1993).while not all of these techniques are,
strictly speaking,casestudy techniques-since they sometimes involve a large num-
ber of cases-they do move us closer to a case-basedunderstanding of causation
insofar as they preserve the texture and detail of individual cases,features that are
often lost in large-N cross-caseanalysis.
A fourth factor concerns the recent marriage of rational choice tools with case
study analysis,sometimes referred to as an "analytic narrative" (Bates et al. r99g).
whether the technique is qualitative or quantitative, scholars equipped with eco-
nomic models are turning, increasingly,to casestudiesin order to test the theoretical
predictions of a general model, investigatecausal mechanisms, and/or explain the
featuresofa key case.
Finally, epistemological shifts in recent decadeshave enhanced the attractivenessof
the casestudy format. The "positivist" model of explanation, which informed work
in the social sciencesthrough most of the twentieth century, tended to downplay the
importance of causal mechanisms in the analysis of causal relations. Famously,
Milton Friedman (1953)argued that the only criterion of a model was to be found
in its accurateprediction of outcomes. The verisimilitude of the model, its accurate
depiction of reality, was besidethe point. In recent years,this explanatory trope has
come under challengefrom "realists," who claim (among other things) that causal
analysis should pay close attention to causal mechanisms (e.g. Bunge ry97; LittIe
1998).within political scienceand sociology, the identification of a specific mech-
anism-a causal pathway-has come to be seen as integral to causal analysis,
regardless of whether the model in question is formal or informal or whether the
evidenceis qualitative or quantitative (Achen zooz; Elster 1998;Georgeand Bennett
zoo5; Hedstrom and swedberg 1998).Given this new-found (or at least newly self-
conscious) interest in mechanisms,it is not surprising that social scientistswould
turn to casestudies as a mode of causalinvestigation.
For all the reasonsstated above, one might intuit that social scienceis moving
towards a case-basedunderstanding of causalrelations. Yet, this movement, insofar
as it exists, has scarcely been acknowledged, and would certainly be challenged by
many close observers-including some of those cited in the foregoing passages.
 THE CASE STUDY 93

The fact is that the case study research design is still viewed by most methodol-
ogists with extreme circumspection. A work that focuses its attention on a single
"mere"
example of a broader phenomenon is apt to be described as a casestudy, and
is often identified with loosely framed and non-generalizabletheories, biased case
selection, informal and undisciplined researchdesigns,weak empirical leverage (too
many variables and too few cases),subjective conclusions, non-replicability, and
causal determinism. To some, the term case study is an ambiguous designation
"inferential
covering a multitude of felonies."3
The quasi-mystical qualities associatedwith the case study persist to this day. In
"scientists"
the field of psychology, a gulf separates engaged in cross-caseresearch
"practitioners"
and engaged in clinical research, usually focused on several cases
(Hersen and Barlow t976, zr). In the fields of political scienceand sociology, case
"soft"
study researchersare acknowledged to be on the side of hard disciplines. And
across fields, the persisting case study orientations of anthropology, education, law
social work, and various other fields and subfieldsrelegatethem to the non-rigorous,
non-systematic,non-scientific, non-positivist end of the academicspectrum.
The methodological status of the casestudy is still, officially, suspect. Even among
its defenders there is confusion over the virtues and vices of this ambiguous research
design. Practitioners continue to ply their trade but have difficulty articulating what
it is they are doing, methodologically speaking.The casestudy survivesin a curious
methodological limbo.
This leads to a paradox: although much of what we know about the empirical
world has been generatedby casestudies and casestudies continue to constitute a
large proportion of work generatedby the social sciencedisciplines, the casestudy
method is poorly understood.
How can we make senseof the profound disjuncture between the acknowledged
contributions of this genre to the various disciplines of social scienceand its mal-
igned status within these disciplines? If casestudies are methodologically flawed, why
do they persist?Should they be rehabilitated, or suppressed?How fruitful ls this style
of research?
In this chapter, I provide a reconstructed definition ofthe casestudy approach to
researchwith special emphasis on comparative politics, a field that has been closely
identified with this method since its birth. Basedon this definition, I then explore a
seriesofcontrasts between casestudy and cross-casestudy research.Thesecontrasts
are intended to illuminate the characteristic strengths and weaklesses ("affinities")
of these tvvo researchdesigns,not to vindicate one or the other. The effort of this
chapter is to understand this persisting methodological debate as a matter of
tradeoffs. Case studies and cross-casestudies explore the world in different ways.
Yet, properly constituted, there is no reason that case study results cannot be

3 Achen and Snidal (1989: 16o). See also Geddes (r99o, zoo3), Goldthorpe (1997), King, Keohane, and
Verba (rq9+), Lieberson (985: ro7-r5, t992, 1994), Lijphart l97t 6g-4), Odell (zoo4), Sekhon (zoo4),
Smelser G9n: 45,57). It should be noted that these rwiters, while critical of the casestudy format, are not
necessarily opposed to case studies per se (that is to say,they should not be classified as opponentsof the
casestudy).
94 JOHN GERRING

synthesizedwith resultsgainedfrom cross-caseanalysis,and vice versa.My hope,

therefore,is that this chapterwill contribute to breakingdown the boundariesthat
haveseparatedtheserival genreswithin the subfieldof comparativepolitics.
t
r D E p IN ITIONS

The key term of this chapter is, admittedly, a definitional morass. To refer to a work
"case
as a study" might mean: that its method is qualitative, small-N; that the
researchis holistic, thick (a more or lesscomprehensiveexamination of a phenom-
enon); that it utilizes a particular tyryeof evidence(e.g. ethnographic, clinical, non-
experimental,non-survey based,participant observation,processtracing, historical,
textual, or field research);that its method of evidence gathering is naturalistic (a
"real-life
context"); that the researchinvestigatesthe properties of a single observa-
tion; or that the research investigatesthe properties of a single phenomenon'
instance, or example. Evidently, researchershave many things in mind when they
talk about casestudy research.Confusion is compounded by the existence of a large
number of near-synonyms-single unit, single subject,single case,N:1, casebased,
casecontrol, casehistory, casemethod, caserecord, casework, clinical research,and
so forth. As a result of this profusion of terms and meanings, proponents and
opponents of the casestudy marshal a wide range of arguments but do not seem
any closer to agreement than when this debate was first broached severaldecadesago.
Can we reconstruct this concept in a clearer, more productive fashion? In order to
do so we must understand how the key terms-case and case study-are situated
within a neighborhood of related terms. In this crowded semantic field, each term is
defined in relation to others.And in the context of a specificwork or researchterrain,
they all take their meaning from a specificinference.(The readershould bear in mind
that any change in the inference, and the meaning of all the key terms will probably
change.)My attempt here will be to provide a single,determinate, definition of these
key terms. Of course, researchersmay choose to define these terms in many different
ways. However, for purposes of methodological discussion it is helpful to enforce a
uniform vocabulary.
Let us stipulate that a caseconnotes a spatially delimited phenomenon (a unit)
observedat a single point in time or over some period of time. It comprisesthe sort
of phenomena that an inference attempts to explain. Thus, in a study that attempts to
explain certain featuresofnation-states, casesare comprised ofnation-states (across
some temporal frame). In a study that attempts to explain the behavior of individ-
uals, individuals comprise the cases.And so forth. Each casemay provide a single
observation or multiple (within-case) observations.
For students of comparative politics, the archetlpal caseis the dominant political
unit of our time, the nation-state. However, the study of smaller social and political
 THE CASE STUDY 95

units (regions, cities, villages, communities, social groups, families) or specific

institutions (political parties, interest groups, businesses)is equally common in
other subfields, and perhaps increasingly so in comparative politics. Whatever the
chosen unit, the methodological issuesattached to the casestudy have nothing to do
with the size of the individual cases.A casemay be created out of any phenomenon so
long as it has identifiable boundaries and comprises the primary object of an
inference.
Note that the spatial boundaries of a case are often more apparent than its
temporal boundaries. We know more or less, where a country begins and ends,
even though we may have difficulty explaining when a country begins and ends. Yet,
some temporal boundaries must be assumed.This is particularly important when
casesconsist of discrete sysnts-61ises, revolutions, legislative acts, and so forth-
within a single unit. Occasionally, the temporal boundaries of a case are more
obvious than its spatial boundaries. This is true when the phenomena under study
are eventful but the unit undergoing the event is amorphous. For example, if one is
studying terrorist attacks it may not be clear how the spatial unit of analysisshould
be understood, but the eventsthemselvesmay be well bounded.
A casestudy may be understood as the intensive study of a single case for the
purpose ofunderstanding a larger classofcases (a population). Casestudy research
may incorporate several cases.However, at a certain point it will no longer be
possible to investigate those casesintensively. At the point where the emphasis of a
study shifts from the individual caseto a sample of caseswe shall say that a study is
cross-case.Evidently, the distinction between a case study and cross-casestudy is a
continuum. The fewer casesthere are, and the more intensively they are studied, the
more a work merits the appellation case study. Even so, this proves to be a useful
distinction, for much follows from it.
A few additional terms will now be formally defined.
An observatioris the most basic element of any empirical endeavor.Convention-
ally, the number of observations in an analysis is referred to with the letter N.
(Confusingly, N may also be used to designate the number of casesin a study, a
usagethat I shall try to avoid.) A single observation may be understood as containing
severaldimensions, each of which may be measured (acrossdisparateobservations)
as a variable. Where the proposition is causal, these may be subdivided into depen-
dent (Y) and independent(X) variables. The dependent variable refers to the outcome
of an investigation. The independent variable refers to the explanatory (causal)
factor, that which the outcome is supposedlydependent on.
Note that a casemay consistof a single observation (N:r). This would be true, for
example, in a cross-sectionalanalysisof multiple cases.In a casestudy, however,the
case under study always provides more than one observation. These may be con-
structed diachronically (by observing the caseor some subset of within-case units
through time) or synchronically (by observingwithin-case variation at a singlepoint
in time).
This is a clue to the fact that casestudies and cross-caseusually operate at different
levelsof analysis.The casestudy is tlpically focusedon within-case variation (if there
T
3

I
f
96 IOHN GERRING

a cross-casecomponent it is probably secondary).The cross-casestudy, as the name

suggests,is typically focused on cross-casevariation (if there is also within-case
variation, it is secondary in importance). They have the same object in view-the
explanation of a population of cases-but they go about this task differently. I
!

A sample consists of whatever casesare subjected to formal analysis; they are the
immediate subject of a study or casestudy. (Confusingly, the sample may also refer to
the observations under study, and will be so used at various points in this narrative.
But at present, we treat the sample as consisting of cases.)Technically, one might say
that in a casestudy the sample consists of the case or casesthat are subjected to
intensive study. However, usually when one uses the term sample one is implying
"sample-based
that the number of casesis rather large. Thus, work" will be under-
stood as referring to large-N cross-casemethods-the opposite of casestudy work.
Again, the only feature distinguishing the casestudy format from a sample-based(or
"cross-case")
researchdesign is the number of casesfalling within the sample-one
or a few versus many. Casestudies, like large-N samples,seekto represent, in all ways
relevant to the proposition at hand, a population of cases.A seriesof casestudies
might therefore be referred to as a sample if they are relatively brief and relatively
numerous; it is a matter of emphasisand of degree.The more casestudies one has,
the less intensively each one is studied, and the more confident one is in their
representativeness (of some broader population), the more likely one is to describe
them as a sample rather than a seriesof casestudies.For practical reasons-unless,
that is, a study is extraordinarily long-the case study research format is usually
limited to a dozen casesor less.A single caseis not at all unusual.
The sample restswithin a population of casesto which a given proposition refers.
The population of an inference is thus equivalent to the breadth or scope of a
proposition. (I use the terms proposition, hypothesis,inference, and argument inler-
changeably.) Note that most samples are not exhaustive; hence the use of the term
sample, referring to sampling from a population. Occasionally, however, the sample
equalsthe population ofan inference;all potential casesare studied.
For those familiar with the rectangular form of a dataset it may be helpful to
conceptualize observations as rows, variables as columns, and casesas either groups
of observations or individual observations.

2 Wner rs A CASgSrupv Goop Fon?CesE Sruov

VERSUS CNOSS-CASE ANALYSIS

I havearguedthat the casestudy approachto researchis most usefullydefinedasthe

intensivestudyof a singleunit or a smallnumberof units (thecases),
for the purpose
of understandinga largerclassof similar units (a populationof cases).This is put
 THE CASE STUDY 97

forth as a minimal definition of the topic.a I now proceed to discuss the non-
definitional attributes of the casestudy-attributes that are often, but not invariably,
associatedwith the casestudy method. These will be understood as methodological
affinities flowing from a minimal definition of the concept.s
The case study research design exhibits characteristic strengths and weaknesses
relative to its large-N cross-casecousin. Thesetradeoffs derive, first ofall, from basic
research goals such as (r) whether the study is oriented toward hypothesis gener-
ating or hypothesis testing, (z) whether internal or external validity is prioritized,
(3) whether insight into causal mechanisms or causal effects is more valuable,
and (+) whether the scope of the causal inference is deep or broad. These tradeoffs
also hinge on the shapeof the empirical universe,i.e. (i) whether the population of
casesunder study is heterogeneousor homogeneous, (6) whether the causal rela-
tionship of interest is strong or weak, (Z) whether useful variation on key parameters
within that population is rare or common, and (A) whether available data are
concentratedor dispersed.
Along each of these dimensions, case study research has an affrnity for the
first factor and cross-caseresearchhas an affinity for the second,as summarized in
Table 4.r. To clari$., these tradeoffs represent methodological ffinities, not invariant
laws. Exceptions can be found to each one. Even so, these general tendencies are often

Table 4.r Casestudy and cross-caseresearchdesigns:affinities and tradeoffs

Affinity

Casestudy study
Cross-case

goals
Research
1. Hypothesis Generating Testing
2. Validity lnternal External
insight
3. Causal Mechanisms Effects
4. Scopeof proposition Deep Broad
Empiricalfactors
5. Population
of cases Heterogeneous Homegeneous
6. Causal
strength Strong Weak
7. Usefulvariation Rare Common
L Dataavailability Concentrated Dispersed

a My intention is to include only those attributes commonly associated with the case study method
that are always rmplied by our use of the term, excluding those attributes that are sometimes violated by
"ethnography"
standard usage. Thus, I chose not to include as a defining feature ofthe case study, since
many case studies (so called) are not ethnographic. For further discussion of minimal definitions see
Gerring (zoor, ch. 4), Gerring and Barresi (zoo3), Sartori (1976).
s These additional attributes might also be understood as comprising an ideal-type ("maximal")
definition ofthe topic (Gerring zoor, ch.4; Gerring and Barresi zoo3).
98 IOHN GERRING

noted in case study research and have been reproduced in multiple disciplines and
subdisciplines over the course of many decades.
It should be stressedthat each of these tradeoffs carries a ceteris paribus caveat.
Case studies are more useful for generating new hypotheses, all other things
being equal. The reader must bear in mind that many additional factors also
rightly influence a writer's choice of research design, and they may lean in the
other direction. Ceteris are not alwaysparibus. One should not jump to conclusions
about the research design appropriate to a given setting without considering
the entire range of issues involved-some of which may be more important than
others.

3. HvporHEsrs: GnNnnerrNc vERSUSTnsrtNc

Social scienceresearchinvolves a quest for new theories as well as a testing ofexisting

"conjectures" "refutations."6
theories; it is comprised of both and Regrettably, social
science methodology has focused almost exclusively on the latter. The conjectural
element of social scienceis usually dismissedas a matter of guesswork,inspiration, or
luck-a leap of faith, and hence a poor subject for methodological reflection.T Yet, it
will readily be granted that many works of social science, including most of the
acknowledged classics,are seminal rather than definitive. Their classic status derives
from the introduction of a new idea or a new perspective that is subsequently
subjected to more rigorous (and refutable) analysis. Indeed, it is difficult to devise
a program of falsification the first time a new theory is proposed. Path-breaking
research,almost by definition, is protean. Subsequentresearchon that topic tends to
be more definitive insofar as its primary task is limited: to verify or falsiff a pre-
existing hypothesis. Thus, the world of social science may be usefully divided
according to the predominant goal undertaken in a given study, either hypothesis
generating or hypothesis testing There are two moments of empirical research, a
lightbulb moment and a skeptical moment, each of which is essentialto the progress
of a discipline.s

6 Popper (1969).
7 Karl Popper (quoted in King, Keohane, and Verba ry94, r4) writes: "there is no such thing as a logical
'an
method of having new ideas... Discovery contains irrational element,' or a'creative intuition."' One
recent collection ofessays and interviews takes new ideas as its special focus (Munck and Snyder zooT),
though it may be doubted whether there are generalizable results.
8 Gerring (zoor, ch. ro). The tradeoffbetween these two styles of research is implicit in Achen and
Snidal (rgSg), who criticize the case study for its deiicits in the latter genre but also acknowledge the
benefits of the case study along the former dimension (rq8q, 16z-8). Reichenbach also distinguished
"context "context
betlveen a ofdiscovery," and a ofjustification." Likewise, Peirce's concept of abduction
recognizesthe importance ofa generativecomponent in science.
 THE CASE STUDY 99

Case studies enjoy a natural advantage in research of an exploratory nature.

Several millennia ago, Hippocrates reported what were, arguably, the first case
studies ever conducted. They were fourteen in number.e Darwin's insights into the
process of human evolution came after his travels to a few select locations, notably
Easter Island. Freud's revolutionary work on human psychology was constructed
from a close observation of fewer than a dozen clinical cases.Piaget formulated his
theory of human cognitive development while watching his own two children as they
passed from childhood to adulthood. L6vi-Strauss's struituralist theory of human
cultures built on the analysis of several North and South American tribes. Douglass
North's neo-institutionalist theory of economic developmentwas constructedlargely
through a close analysis of a handful of early developing states (primarily England,
the Netherlands, and the United States;.toMany other examples might be cited of
seminal ideas that derived from the intensive study of a few key cases.
Evidently, the sheer number of examples of a given phenomenon does not, by
itself, produce insight. It may only confuse. How many times did Newton observe
apples fall before he recognized the nature of gravity? This is an apocrlphal example,
but it illustrates a central point: case studies may be more useful than cross-case
studieswhen a subjectis being encounteredfor the first time or is being consideredin
a fundamentally new way. After reviewing the case study approach to medical
research, one researcherfinds that although casereports are commonly regarded as
the lowest or weakest form of evidence, they are nonethelessunderstood to comprise
"the
first line of evidence." The hallmark of casereporting, according to Jan Vanden-
"is
broucke, to recognizethe unexpected."This is where discoverybegins.ll
The advantagesthat casestudies offer in work of an exploratory nature may also
serve as impediments in work of a confirmatory/disconfirmatory nature. Let us
briefly explore why this might be so.12
Tiaditionally, scientific methodology has been defined by a segregation of conjec-
ture and refutation. One should not be allowed to contaminate the other.l3Yet,in the
"Light-
real world of social science,inspiration is often associatedwith perspiration.
bulb" moments arise from a close engagementwith the particular facts of a particular
case.Inspiration is more likely to occur in the laboratory than in the shower.
The circular quality of conjecture and refutation is particularly apparent in case
"casing"-
study research. Charles Ragin notes that case study research is all about
defining the topic, including the hypothesis(es)of primary interest, the outcome,
and the set of casesthat offer relevant information vis-i-vis the hypothesis.la A study
of the French Revolution may be conceptualizedas a study of revolution, of social
revolution, of revolt, of political violence, and so forth. Each of these topics entails a
different population and a different set of causal factors. A good deal of authorial

s Bonoma (1985:r99). Some of the following examples are discussed in Patton (zooz, z4).
ro North and Weingast (rq8q); North and Thomas (1973).
rr Vandenbroucke (zoor,
33r).
12 For discussion of this tradeoffin the context of economic growth theory seeTemple (1999,oo).
Geddes (zoo3), King, Keohane, and Verba (1994),Popper (ty4lt969).
Ragin (1992).
100 IOHN GERRING

intervention is necessaryin the course of defining a case study topic, for there is a
"subjectivity"
great deal of evidentiary leeway. Yet, the of casestudy research allows
for the generation of a great number of hypotheses, insights that might not be
apparent to the cross-case researcher who works with a thinner set of empirical
data acrossa large number of casesand with a more determinate (fixed) definition of
cases,variables, and outcomes. It is the very fuzziness of casestudies that grants them
an advantage in researchat the exploratory stage,for the single-casestudy allows one
to test a multitude of hlpotheses in a rough-and-ready way. Nor is this an entirely
"conjectural"
process. The relationships discovered among different elements of a
single casehave a prima facie causalconnection: they are all at the sceneof the crime.
This is revelatory when one is at an early stageof analysis,for at that point there is no
identifiable suspect and the crime itself may be difficult to discern. The fact that A, B
and C are present at the expected times and places (relative to some outcome of
interest) is sufficient to establish them as independent variables. Proximal evidence is
"plausibility
all that is required. Hence, the common identification of casestudies as
"pilot "heuristic "exploratory" "theory-building"
probes," studies," studies," and
exercises.rs
A large-N cross-study, by contrast, generally allows for the testing of only a few
hypotheses but does so with a somewhat greater degree of confidence' as is appro-
priate to work whose primary purpose is to test an extant theory. There is less room
for authorial intervention because evidence gathered from a cross-case research
design can be interpreted in a limited number of ways. It is therefore more reliable.
Another way of stating the point is to say that while casestudies lean toward \pe r
errors (falsely rejecting the null hypothesis), cross-casestudies lean toward Type z
errors (failing to reject the false null hlpothesis). This explains why casestudies are
more likely to be paradigm generating,while cross-casestudiestoil in the prosaic but
highly structured field of normal science.
I do not mean to suggest that case studies never serve to confirm or disconfirm
hpotheses. Evidence drawn from a single case may falsifu a necessaryor sufficient
hlpothesis, as discussed below Additionally, case studies are often useful for the
purpose of elucidating causalmechanisms,and this obviously affectsthe plausibility
of an X/Y relationship. However, general theories rarely offer the kind of detailed and
determinate predictions on within-case variation that would allow one to reject a
hypothesis through pattern matching (without additional cross-caseevidence).
"crucial"
Theory testing is not the casestudy's strong suit. The selection of casesis
at pains to overcome the fact that the cross-caseN is minimal. Thus, one is unlikely
to reject a hypothesis, or to consider it definitively proved, on the basis of the study of
a single case.
Harry Eckstein himself acknowledges that his argument for casestudies as a form
of theory confirmation is largely hypothetical. At the time of writing, severaldecades
ago, he could not point to any social science study where a crucial case study had
performed the heroic role assignedto it.16I suspectthat this is still more or lesstrue.

t5 Eckstein (1975),Ragin Gggz,t99Z), Rueschemeyerand Stephens(1997). t6 Eckstein (1975)

 THE CASE STUDY

"We
Indeed, it is true even of experimental case studies in the natural sciences. must
recognize," note Donald Campbell and Julian Stanley,

that continuous, multiple experimentation is more typical of science than once-and-for-all

definitive experiments. The experiments we do today, if successful,will need replication and
cross-validation at other times under other conditions before they can become an established
part of science... fE]ven though we recognize experimentation as the basic language of
"crucial
proof...we should not expect that experiments" which pit opposing theories will
be likely to have clear-cut outcomes. When one finds, for example, that competent observers
advocate strongly divergent points of view, it seemslikely on a priori grounds that both have
observed something valid about the natural situation, and that both represent a part of the
truth. The stronger the controversy, the more likely this is. Thus we might expect in such cases
an experimental outcome with mixed results, or with the balance of truth varying subtly from
experiment to experiment. The more mature focus. . . avoids crucial experiments and instead
studies dimensional relationships and interactions along many degrees of the experimental
variables.lT

A single case study is still a single shot-a single example of a larger phenomenon.
The tradeoff between hlpothesis generating and hypothesis testing helps us to
reconcile the enthusiasm of case study researchers and the skepticism of case study
critics. They are both right, for the looseness ofcase study research is a boon to new
conceptualizations just as it is a bane to falsification.

4. VRrrprry: INTERNAL vERSUSExrnnNer

Questions of validity are often distinguished according to those that are internql to
the sample under study and those that are external (i.e. applying to a broader-
unstudied-population). Cross-caseresearchis always more representativeof the
population of interestthan casestudy research,so long as some sensibleprocedure of
case selection is followed (presumably some version of random sampling). Case
study research suffers problems of representativenessbecause it includes, by defini-
tion, only a small number of casesof some more generalphenomenon. Are the men
chosen by Robert Lane typical of white, immigrant, working-class, American
males?l8Is Middletown representativeof other cities in America?le These sorts of
questions forever haunt case study research.This means that case study research is
generally weaker with respect to external validity than its cross-casecousin.
The corresponding virtue of case study research is its internal validity. Often,
though not invariably, it is easier to establish the veracity of a causal relationship
pertaining to a single case(or a small number of cases)than for a larger set of cases.
Casestudy researcherssharethe bias of experimentalists in this regard: they tend to be

17 Campbell and Stanley (rq6:: :). r8 Lane (1962). re Lynd and Lynd (tgzgltgS6).
 JOHN GERRING

more disturbedby threatsto within-samplevalidity than by threatsto out-of-sample

validity. Thus, it seemsappropriate to regard the tradeoff betweenexternal and
internalvalidiry like other tradeoffs,asintrinsicto the cross-case/single-case
choice
of research design.

S. Ceuser lNsrcnr: Ceuser MncHANTsMSvERSUS

Ceuser Epppcrs

A third tradeoffconcerns the sort ofinsight into causation that a researcherintends

to achieve.Two goals may be usefully distinguished. The first concerns an estimate of
the causal ffict, the second concerns the investigation of a causal mechanism(i.e.
pathway from X to Y).
By causal effect I refer to two things: (a) the magnitude of a causal relationship (the
expectedeffect on Yofa given changein Xacross a population ofcases) and (b) the
relative precision or uncertainty associatedwith that point estimate.Evidently, it is
difficult to arrive at a reliable estimate of causal effectsacrossa population of casesby
looking at only a single caseor a small number of cases.(The one exceptionwould be
an experiment in which a given case can be tested repeatedly, returning to a virgin
condition after each test. But here one facesinevitable questions about the represen-
tativenessof that much-studied case.)20 Thus, the estimateof a causalef[ect is almost
always grounded in cross-caseevidence.
It is now well establishedthat causal arguments depend not only on measuring
causal efflects,but also on the identification of a causal mechanism.2rx must be
connectedwith lin a plausible fashion; otherwise, it is unclear whether a pattern of
covariation is truly causal in nature, or what the causal interaction might be.
Moreover, without a clear understanding of the causal pathway(s) at work in a causal
relationship it is impossible to accurately specifr the model, to identify possible
instruments for the regressorof interest (if there are problems of endogeneity),or to
interpret the results.22Thus, causalmechanismsare presumed in every estimateof a
mean (average)causaleffect.

20 Note that the intensive study of a single unit

may be a perfectly appropriate way to estimate causal
effects within that unit. Thus, if one is interested in the relationship between welfare benefits and work
effort in the United States one might obtain a more accurate assessmentby examining data drawn from
the USA alone, rather than crossnationally. However, since the resulting generalization does not extend
beyond the unit in question it is not a case study in the usual sense.
2r Achen (zooz), Dessler (r99r), Elster (1998),
George and Bennett (zoo5), Gerring (zoo5), Hedstrom
and Swedberg(r99s), Mahoney (zoor), Tilly (zoor).
22 In a discussion of instrumental variables in
two-stage least-squares analysis, Angrist and Krueger
(zoor: 8) note that "good instruments often come from detailed knowledge of the economic mechanism,
institutions determining the regressor of interest."
 THE CASE STUDY 103

In the task of investigating causal mechanisms, cross-case studies are often

not so illuminating. It has become a common criticism of large-N cross-national
research-e.g. into the causesof growth, democracy, civil war, and other national-
level outcomes-that such studies demonstrate correlations between inputs and
outputs without clarifring the reasons for those correlations (i.e. clear causal
pathways). We learn, for example, that infant mortality is strongly correlated with
state failure;23 but it is quite another matter to interpret this finding, which is
consistent with a number of different causal mechanisms. Sudden increasesin infant
mortality might be the product of famine, of social unrest, of new diseasevectors, of
government repression, and of countless other factors, some of which might be
expected to impact the stability of states, and others of which are more likely to be
a result of state instability.
Casestudies, if well constructed, may allow one to peer into the box of causality to
locate the intermediate factors lying between some structural causeand its purported
"see"
effect. Ideally, they allow one to X and Yinteract-Hume's billiard ball crossing
the table and hitting a secondball.2aBarney Glaserand Anselm Strausspoint out that
"general
in fieldwork relations are often discovered in vivo; that is, the field worker
literally seesthem occur."2sWhen studying decisional behavior casestudy research
may offer insight into the intentions, the reasoningcapabilities,and the information-
processingproceduresof the actors involved in a given setting. Thus, Dennis Chong
usesin-depth interviews with a very small sample of respondentsin order to better
understand the processby which people reach decisions about civil liberties issues.
Chong comments:

One of the advantages of the in-depth interview over the masssurveyis that it recordsmore
fully how subjectsarrive at their opinions. While we cannot actuallyobservethe underlying
mental processthat gives rise to their responses,we can witness many of its outward
manifestations.The way subjectsramble,hesitate,stumble,and meanderas they formulate
their answerstips us offto how they arethinking and reasoningthrough politicalissues.26

Similarly, the investigation of a single casemay allow one to test the causal implica-
tions of a theory, thus providing corroborating evidence for a causal argument. This
is sometimes referred to as pattern matching (Campbell rg88).
Dietrich Rueschemeyerand Iohn Stephens offer an example of how an examin-
ation of causal mechanisms may call into question a general theory based on cross-
case evidence. The thesis of interest concerns the role of British colonialism in
fostering democrary among postcolonial regimes.In particular, the authors investi-
"the
gate the diffusion hlpothesis, that democracy was enhanced by transfer of
British governmental and representative institutions and the tutoring of the colonial

23 Goldstone et al. (zooo).

2a This has something to do with the existence of process-tracing evidence, a matter discussed below.
But it is not necessarily predicated on this sort ofevidence. Sensitive time-series data, another specialty of
the case study, is also relevant to the question of causal mechanisms.
2s Glaser and Strauss(rg6l, +o).
26 Chong(rqq:,86s).Forotherexamplesofin-depthinterviewingseeHochschild(r98r),Lane(t962).
ro4 IOHN GERRING

people in the ways of British government."On the basis of in-depth analysisof

severalcasesthe authorsreport:
We did find evidence of this diffirsion effect in the British settler colonies of North America and
the Antipodes; but in the West Indies, the historical record points to a different connection
between British rule and democracy. There the British colonial administration opposed
"tutored"
suffrage extension, and only the white elites were in the representative institutions.
But, critically, we argued on the basis of the contrast with Central America, British colonialism
did prevent the local plantation elites from controlling the local state and responding to the
labor rebellion of the r93os with massive repression. Against the adamant opposition of that
elite, the British colonial rulers responded with concessions which allowed for the growth of
the party-union complexes rooted in the black middle and working classes,which formed the
backbone of the later movement for democracy and independence. Thus, the narrative
histories of these casesindicate that the robust statistical relation between British colonialism
and democracy is produced only in part by diffirsion. The interaction of class forces, state
power, and colonial policy must be brought in to fully account for the statistical result.2z

Whether or not Rueschemeyer and Stephens are correct in their conclusions need not
concern us here. What is critical, however, is that any attempt to deal with this
question of causal mechanisms is heavily reliant on evidence drawn from case
studies. In this instance, as in many others, the question of causal pathways is simply
too diffrcult, requiring too many poorly measured or unmeasurable variables, to
allow for accuratecross-sectionalanalysis.28
To be sure, causal mechanisms do not always require explicit attention. They may
be quite obvious. And in other circumstances,they may be amenableto cross-case
investigation. For example, a sizeableliterature addressesthe causal relationship
between trade openness and the welfare state. The usual empirical finding is that
more open economies are associatedwith higher social welfare spending. The
question then becomeswhy such a robust correlation exists.What are the plausible
interconnections between trade opennessand social welfare spending?One possible
causalpath, suggestedby David Cameron,2eis that increasedtrade opennessleadsto
greater domestic economic vulnerability to external shocks (due, for instance, to
changing terms of trade). If so, one should find a robust correlation between annual
variations in a country's terms of trade (a measure of economic vulnerability) and
social welfare spending. As it happens, the correlation is not robust and this leads
some commentators to doubt whether the putative causalmechanism proposed by
David Cameron and many others is actually at work.3o Thus, in instances where
an intervening variable can be effectively operationalized across a large sample of
casesit may be possible to test causal mechanismswithout resorting to casestudy
investigation.3r

27 Rueschemeyerand Stephens(rggz,6z).
28 Other good examples ofwithin-case research that shed light on a broader theory can be found in
Martin (1992);Martin and Swank (zoo4); Thies (zoor); Young (1999).
2e Cameron (1978).
:o Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (zoor).
3r Foradditionalexamplesofthisnature,seeFeng(zoo3);PapyrakisandGerlagh(zoo3);Ross(zoot).
 THE CASE STUDY 105

Even so, the opportunities for investigating causal pathways are generally more
apparent in a case study format. Consider the contrast between formulating a
siandardized survey for a large group of respondentsand formulating an in-depth
interview with a single subject or a small set of subjects, such as that undertaken by
Dennis Chong in the previous example. In the latter situation, the researcheris able
to probe into details that would be impossible to delve into, let alone anticipate, in a
standardized survey. She may also be in a better position to make judgements as to
the veracity and reliability of the respondent. Tiacing causal mechanisms is about
cultivating sensitivity to a local context. Often, these local contexts are essential to
cross-casetesting. Yet, the same factors that render casestudies useful for micro-level
investigation also make them less useful for measuring mean (average) causal effects.
It is a classic tradeoff.

6 Scops oF PRoPosITIoN:
Dsnp vERSUSBnoen

The utility of a casestudy mode of analysisis in part a product of the scope of the
causal argument that a researcherwishes to prove or demonstrate. Arguments that
strive for great breadth are usually in greater need of cross-caseevidence; causal
argumentsrestrictedto a small set of casescan more plausibly subsiston the basisof a
single-casestudy. The extensive/intensive tradeoff is fairly commonsensical.32A case
study of France probably offers more useful evidence for an argument about Europe
than for an argument about the whole world. Propositional breadth and evidentiary
breadth generally go hand in hand.
Granted, there are a variety of ways in which single-casestudies can credibly claim
to provide evidencefor causalpropositions of broad reach-e.g. by choosing cases
that are especiallyrepresentativeof the phenomenon under study ("typical" cases)or
by choosing casesthat representthe most difficult scenario for a given proposition
and are thus biased against the attainment of certain results ("crucial" cases).Even
so, a proposition with a narrow scopeis more conducive to casestudy analysisthan a
proposition with a broad purview, all other things being equal. The breadth of an
inference thus constitutes one factor, among many, in determining the utility of the
case study mode of analysis. This is reflected in the hesitancy of many case study
researchersto invoke determinate causal propositions with great reach -"covering
laws," in the idiom of philosophy of science.
By the same token, one of the primary virtues of the case study method is the
depth of analysis that it offers. One may think of depth as referring to the detail,

32 Eckstein (t975,o2).
 106 JOHN GERRING

richness,completeness,wholeness,or the degreeof variance in an outcome that is

accounted for by an explanation. The casestudy researcher'scomplaint about the
thinness of cross-caseanalysis is well taken; such studies often have little to say about
individual cases.Otherwise stated, cross-casestudies are likely to explain only a small
portion of the variance with respect to a given outcome. They approach that
outcome at a very general level. Typically, a cross-casestudy aims only to explain
the occurrence/non-occurrence of a revolution, while a casestudy might also strive
to explain specific features of that event-why it occurred when it did and in the way
that it did. Case studies are thus rightly identified with "holistic" analysis and with
"thick"
the description of events.33
Whether to strive for breadth or depth is not a question that can be answered in
any definitive way. All we can safely conclude is that researchersinvariably face a
choice betweenknowing more about less,or lessabout more. The casestudy method
may be defended,as well as criticized, along these lines.3aIndeed, arguments about
"contextual
the sensitivity" of casestudies are perhaps more precisely (and fairly)
understood as arguments about depth and breadth. The casestudy researcherwho
feelsthat cross-caseresearchon a topic is insensitiveto context is usually not arguing
that nothing at all is consistent across the chosen cases.Rather, the case study
researcher's complaint is that much more could be said-accurately-about the
phenomenon in question with a reduction in inferential scope.:s
Indeed, I believethat a number of traditional issuesrelated to casestudy research
can be understood as the product of this basic tradeoff. For example, case study
researchis often lauded for its holistic approach to the study of social phenomena in
which behavior is observed in natural settings. Cross-caseresearch,by contrast, is
criticized for its construction of artificial research designs that decontextualize the
realm of social behavior by employing abstract variables that seem to bear little
relationship to the phenomena of interest.36These associatedcongratulations and
critiques may be understood as a conscious choice on the part of case study
researchersto privilege depth over breadth.

7 THE PopurerroN or Cesns: HETERocENEous

V E R S U SH OU OCENEOUS

The choice between a casestudy and cross-casestyle ofanalysis is driven not only by
the goals of the researcher,as reviewed above, but also by the shape of the empirical

33 I am using the term "thick" in a somewhat different way

than in Geeftz (ry4).
3a See Ragin (zooo, zz).
3s Ragin (1987, ch. z). Herbert Blumer's (rg6g, ch
7) complaints, however, are more far-reaching.
36 Orum, Feagin, and Sjoberg (r99r,
7).
 THE CASE STUDY ro7

universe that the researcheris attempting to understand. Consider, for starters, that
the logic of cross-caseanalysisis premised on some degree of cross-unit compar-
ability (unit homogeneity). Casesmust be similar to each other in whatever respects
might affect the causal relationship that the writer is investigating, or such differences
"apples
must be controlled for. Uncontrolled heterogeneity means that casesare and
oranges;"one cannot learn anything about underlying causal processes by comparing
their histories. The underlying factors of interest mean different things in dififerent
contexts (conceptual stretching) or the X/Y relationship of interest is different in
different contexts (unit heterogeneity).
Case study researchersare often suspicious of large-sample research, which,
they suspect, contains heterogeneous caseswhose differences cannot easily be mod-
"Variable-oriented" "homogenizing
eled. researchis said to involve unrealistic as-
sumptions."37In the field of international relations, for example, it is common
to classify cases according to whether they are deterrence failures or deterrence
"the
successes.However, Alexander George and Richard Smoke point out that
separation of the dependent variable into only two subclasses,deterrence success
and deterrence failure," neglectsthe great variety of ways in which deterrence can fail.
Deterrence,in their view has many independent causalpaths (causal equifinality),
and these paths may be obscured when a study lumps heterogeneous casesinto a
common sample.38
Another example, drawn from clinical work in psychology, concerns heterogeneity
among a sample of individuals. Michel Hersen and David Barlow explain:

Descriptionsof resultsfrom 5o casesprovide a more convincingdemonstrationof the

effectivenessof a given technique than separatedescriptionsof 5o individual cases.The
major difficulty with this approach,however,is that the categoryin which theseclients are
"Neurotics,"
classified most always becomes unmanageablyheterogeneous. [for exam-
ple],...may havelessin common than any group of people one would choose randomly.
When casesare described individually, however, a clinician standsa better chanceof gleaning
some important information, since specific problems and specific proceduresare usually
describedin more detail. When one lumps casestogether in broadly defined categories,
individual casedescriptionsare lost and the ensuingreport of percentagesuccessbecomes
meaningless.3e

Under circumstances of extreme caseheterogeneity, the researchermay decide that

she is better off focusing on a single caseor a small number of relatively homoge-
neous cases.Within-case evidence,or cross-caseevidencedrawn from a handful of
most-similar cases,may be more useful than cross-caseevidence,even though the
ultimate interest of the investigator is in a broader population of cases.(Suppose
one has a population of very heterogeneouscases,one or two of which undergo
quasi-experimentaltransformations. Probably, one gains greater insight into causal

37 Ragin (zooo:35). Seealso Abbott (rg9o); Bendix (rq6:); Meehl (rgS+);Przeworski and Teune (r97o,
8-9); Ragin (t987; zoo4, n4); Znaniecki (rq:4, zlo-t).
38 George and Smoke (tgl+, St+).
3e Hersen and Barlow (tgl6, rt).
ro8 IOHN GERRING

patterns throughout the population by examining these cases in detail than by

undertaking some large-N cross-caseanalysis.) By the same token, if the cases
available for study are relatively homogeneous, then the methodological argument
for cross-caseanalysisis correspondingly strong. The inclusion of additional casesis
unlikely to compromise the results of the investigation becausethese additional cases
are sufficiently similar to provide useful information.
The issueof population heterogeneity/homogeneitymay be understood, therefore,
as a tradeoffbetween N (observations)and K (variables).If, in the quest to explain a
particular phenomenon, each potential case offers only one observation and also
requires one control variable (to neutralize heterogeneitiesin the resulting sample),
then one loses degrees of freedom with each additional case. There is no point in
using cross-caseanalysis or in extending a two-case study to further cases.If, on the
other hand, each additional case is relatively cheap-if no control variables are
needed or if the additional case offers more than one useful observation (through
time)-then a cross-caseresearchdesign may be warranted.aoTo put the matter
more simply, when adjacent casesare unit homogeneous the addition of more cases
is easy,for there is no (or very little) heterogeneity to model. When adjacent casesare
heterogeneousadditional casesare expensive,for every added heterogeneouselement
must be correctly modeled, and each modeling adjustment requires a separate(and
probably unverifiable) assumption. The more background assumptions are required
in order to make a causal inference, the more tenuous that inference is; it is not
simply a question of attaining statisticalsignificance.The ceterisparibus assumption
at the core of all causalanalysisis brought into question. In any case,the argument
between casestudy and cross-caseresearchdesignsis not about causal complexity
per se (in the sensein which this concept is usually employed), but rather about the
tradeoff between N and K in a particular empirical realm, and about the ability to
model caseheterogeneitythrough statisticallegerdemain.al
Before concluding this discussion it is important to point out that researchers'
judgements about case comparability are not, strictly speaking, matters that can be
empirically verified. To be sure, one can look-and ought to look-for empirical
patterns among potential cases.If those patterns are strong then the assumption of
case comparability seems reasonably secure, and if they are not then there are
grounds for doubt. However, debates about case comparability usually concern
borderline instances.Consider that many phenomena of interest to social scientists
are not rigidly bounded. If one is studying democraciesthere is alwaysthe question
of how to define a democracy, and therefore of determining how high or low the
threshold for inclusion in the sample should be. Researchershave different ideas
about this, and these ideas can hardly be tested in a rigorous fashion. Similarly, there

ao Shalev (1998).
ar To be sure, if adjacent cases are identical" the phenomenon of interest is invariant then the
researcher gains nothing at all by studying more examples of a phenomenon, for the results obtained
with the first case will simply be replicated. However, virtually all phenomena of interest to social
scientistshave some degreeofheterogeneity (casesare not identical), some stochasticelement. Thus, the
theoretical possibility of identical, invariant casesis rarely met in practice.
 THE CASE STUDY 109

are long-standing disputes about whether it makes sense to lump poor and rich
societiestogether in a singlesample,or whether theseconstitute distinct populations.
"developed" "undeveloped")
Again, the borderline betweenpoor and rich (or and is
blurry, and the notion of hiving off one from the other for separate analysis
questionable, and unresolvable on purely empirical grounds. There is no safe (or
"conservative")
way to proceed. A final sticking point concerns the cultural/historical
component of social phenomena. Many case study researchersfeel that to compare
societies with vastly different cultures and historical trajectories is meaningless.
Yet, many cross-case researchers feel that to restrict one's analltic focus to a
single cultural or geographic region is highly arbitrary, and equally meaningless. In
these situations, it is evidently the choice of the researcherhow to understand case
homogeneity/heterogeneityacrossthe potential populations of an inference.Where
do like casesend and unlike casesbegin?
Becausethis issue is not, strictly speaking, empirical it may be referred to as an
ontological element of researchdesign. An ontology is a vision of the world as it really
is, a more or lesscoherent set of assumptionsabout how the world works, a research
Weltanschauung analogous to a Kuhnian paradigm.a2 While it seems odd to bring
ontological issuesinto a discussionof social sciencemethodology it may be granted
that social science research is not a purely empirical endeavor. What one finds
is contingent upon what one looks fot and what one looks for is to some extent
contingent upon what one expectsto find. Stereotypically, casestudy researcherstend
"lumpy"
to have a vision of the world; they seecountries, communities, and persons
as highly individualized phenomena. Cross-caseresearchers,by contrast, have a less
dif[erentiated vision of the world; they are more likely to believe that things are pretty
much the same everywhere, at least as respects basic causal processes.These basic
assumptions, or ontologies, drive many of the choices made by researcherswhen
scoping out appropriate ground for research.

8 Ceuser SrnnNcrH: STRoNGvERSUS

WEer

Regardlessof whether the population is homogeneous or heterogeneous,causal

relationships are easierto study if the causal effect is strong, rather than weak. Causal
"strength,"
as I use the term here, refers to the magnitude and consistency of X's effect
on Yacross a population of cases.(lt invokes both the shapeof the evidenceat hand
and whatever priors might be relevant to an interpretation of that evidence.) Where
X has a strong effect on Y it will be relatively easy to study this relationship. Weak

a2 Gutting (rqso);Hall (zoo3);Kuhn (rg6zhgtoH);Wolin (tq68).

110 JOHN GERRING

relationships, by contrast, are often diffrcult to discern. This much is commonsen-

sical, and applies to all research designs.
For our purposes,what is significant is that weak causalrelationshipsare particu-
larly opaque when encountered in a casestudy format. Thus, there is a methodological
affinity between weak causal relationships and large-N cross-case analysis, and
between strong causal relationships and casestudy analysis.
This point is clearestat the extremes. The strongest speciesof causal relationships I
may be referred to as deterministic, where X is assumed to be necessary andlor
sufficient for Y's occurrence. A necessaryand sufficient cause accounts for all of the
variation on Y. A suffrcient causeaccounts for all ofthe variation in certain instances
ofY. A necessarycauseaccounts, by itself, for the absenceofY. In all three situations,
the relationship is usually assumed to be perfectly consistent, i.e. invariant. There are
no exceptions.
It should be clear why casestudy research designs have an easier time addressing
causesof this type. Consider that a deterministic causal proposition can be disproved
with a single case.a3For example, the reigning theory of political stability once
stipulated that only in countries that were relatively homogeneous, or where existing
heterogeneity was mitigated by cross-cutting cleavages,would social peace endure.aa
Arend Lijphart's case study of the Netherlands, a country with reinforcing social
cleavagesand very little social conflict, disproved this deterministic theory on the
basis of a single case.45(One may dispute whether the original theory is correctly
understood as deterministic. However, if it ls, then it has been decisively refuted by a
single case study.) Proving an invariant causal argument generally requires more
cases.However, it is not nearly as complicated as proving a probabilistic argument
for the simple reason that one assumes invariant relationships; consequently, the
single caseunder study carries more weight.
Magnitude and consistency-the tlvo components of causal strength-are usually
matters of degree.It follows that the more tenuous the connection between X and Y, the
more difficult it will be to addressin a casestudy format. This is becausethe causal
mechanisms connecting X with Yare lesslikely to be detectablein a single casewhen the
total impact is slight or highly irregular. It is no surprise, therefore, that the casestudy
researchdesign has, from the very beginning, been associatedwith causal arguments
that are deterministic, while cross-caseresearchhas been associatedwith causal argu-
"probabilistic"
ments that are assumedto be minimal in strength and in consistency.a6
(Strictly speaking, causal magnitude and consistency are independent features of a
causal relationship. However, becausethey tend to covary and becausewe tend to
conceptualize them in tandem, I treat them as components of a single dimension.)

a3 Dion (1998).
aa Almond (1956);Bentley Q9o8lt967); Lipset (196o11963); Truman (r95r).
+s Lijphart (1968); see also Lijphart (rg6g). For additional examples of case studies disconfirming
general propositions of a deterministic nature see Allen (1961); Lipset, Trow, and Coleman (1956);
Njolstad (r99o); discussion in Rogowski (rSss).
a6 Znaniecki (1934).Seealso discussion in Robinson (r95r).
 THE CASE STUDY lll

Noq let us now consider an example drawn from the other extreme. There is
generally assumed to be a weak relationship between regime type and economic
performance. Democracy, if it has any effect on economic growth at all, probably has
only a slight effect over the near-to-medium term, and this effect is probably
characterizedby many exceptions (casesthat do not fit the general pattern). This is
because many things other than democracy affect a country's growth performance
and because there may be a significant stochastic component in economic growth
(factors that cannot be modeled in a generalway). Becauseof the diffrrse nature of
this relationship it will probably be difficult to gain insight by looking at a single case.
Weak relationships are difficult to observe in one instance. Note that even if there
seems to be a strong relationship between democracy and economic growth in a
given country it may be questioned whether this caseis actually typical of the larger
population of interest, given that we have already stipulated that the typical magni-
tude of this relationship is diminutive and irregular. Of course, the weakness of
democracy's presumed relationship to growth is also a handicap in cross-case
analysis.A good deal of criticism has been directed toward studies of this type,
where findings are rarely robust.aTEven so, it seemsclear that if there ls a relationship
between democrary and growth it is more likely to be perceptible in a large cross-case
setting. The positive hypothesis, as well as the null hypothesis, is better approached in
a sample rather than in a case.

g Usnpur VenrerloN: Renn vERSUS

CouvtoN

When analyzing causal relationships we must be concerned not onlywith the strength
of an X/Y relationship but alsowith the distribution of evidenceacrossavailablecases.
Specifically, we must be concerned with the distribution of useful variation-under-
stood asvariation (temporal or spatial) on relevantparametersthat might yield clues
about a causal relationship. It follows that where useful variation is rare-i.e. limited
to a few cases-the casestudy format recommends itself. Where, on the other hand,
useful variation is common, a cross-casemethod of analysismay be more defensible.
Consider a phenomenon like social revolution, an outcome that occursvery rarely.
The empirical distribution on this variable, if we count each country-year as an
observation,consistsof thousands of non-revolutions (o) and just a few revolutions
"revolutionary"
(r). Intuitively, it seemsclear that the few casesare of great interest.
We need to know as much as possible about them, for they exemplify all the variation
that we have at our disposal.In this circumstance,a casestudy mode of analysisis

47 Kittel (t999, zoo5); Kittel and Winner (zoo5); Levine and Renelt (rgsz); Temple (r9gq).
Lt2 JOHN GERRING

difficult to avoid, though it might be combined with a large-N cross-caseanalysis.As

it happens,many outcomes of interestto social scientistsare quite rare, so the issueis
by no means trivial.a8
By way of contrast, consider a phenomenon like turnover, understoodas a situation
where a ruling party or coalition is voted out of office. Tirrnover occurs within most
democratic countries on a regular basis, so the distribution of observations on this
variable (incumbenry/tumover) is relatively even acrossthe universe of country-years.
There are lots of instances of both outcomes. Under these circumstances a cross-case
researchdesign seemsplausible, for the variation acrosscasesis regularly distributed.
Another sort of variation concerns that which might occur within a given case.
suppose that only one or two caseswithin a large population exhibit quasi-experi-
mental qualities: the factor of special interest varies, and there is no corresponding
change in other factors that might affect the outcome. Clearly, we are likely to learn a
great deal from studying this particular case-perhaps a lot more than we might
learn from studying hundreds of additional casesthat deviate from the experimental
ideal. But again, if many caseshave this experimental quality, there is little point in
restricting ourselvesto a single example; a cross-caseresearchdesign may be justified.
A final sort ofvariation concerns the characteristics exhibited by a caserelative to a
particular theory that is under investigation.Supposethat a caseprovides a "crucial"
test for a theory: it fits that theory's predictions so perfectly and so precisely that no
other explanation could plausibly account for the performance of the case. If no
other crucial casespresent themselves,then an intensive study of this particular case
is de rigueur. Of course, if many such caseslie within the population then it may be
possible to study them all at once (with some sort of numeric reduction of the
relevant parameters).
The generalpoint here is that the distribution of useful variation acrossa popu-
lation of casesmatters a great deal in the choice between casestudy and cross-case
researchdesisns.

10 Dera AverreBrlrry: CoNcnNTRATED

V E R S U SD T SPERSPO

I have left the most prosaic factor for last. Sometimes,one's choice of researchdesign
is driven by the quality and quantity of information that is currently available, or

a8 Consider the following topics and their-extremely rare-instances of variation: early industrial-
ization (England, the Netherlands), fascism (Germany, Italy), the use ofnuclear weapons (United States),
world war (WWI, WWII), single non-transferable vote electoral systems (Jordan, Taiwan, Vanuatu,
pre-reform fapan), electoral system reforms within established democracies (France, Italy, Japan, New
"rareness"
Zealand, Thailand). The problem of is less common where parameters are scalar, rather than
dichotomous. But there are still plenty of examples of phenomena whose distributions are skewed by
a few outliers, e.g. population (China, India), personal wealth (Bill Gates, Warren Buffett), ethnic
heterogeneity (Papua New Guinea).
 THE CASE STUDY r13

could be easily gathered, on a given question. This is a practical matter, and is

distinct from the actual (ontological) shape of the world. It concdrns, rather, what
we know about the former at a given point in time.ae The question of evidence may
be posed as follows: How much do we know about the casesat hand that might be
relevant to the causal question of interest, and how precise, certain, and case
comparable is that data? An evidence-rich environment is one where all relevant
factors are measurable, where these measurements are relatively precise, where they
are rendered in comparable terms across cases, and where one can be relatively
confident that the information is, indeed, accurate.An evidence-poor environment
is the opposite.
The question of available evidence impinges upon choices in researchdesign when
one considersits distribution acrossa population of cases.If relevant information is
concentratedin a single case,or if it is contained in incommensurableformats across
a population of cases,then a casestudy mode of analysisis almost unavoidable.If, on
the other hand, it is evenly distributed acrossthe population-i.e. we are equally well
informed about all cases-and is casecomparable,then there is little to recommend a
narrow focus. (I employ data, evidence, and information as synonyms in this
section.)
Consider the simplest sort of example, where information is truly limited to one or
a few cases.Accurate historical data on infant mortality and other indices of human
development are currently available for only a handful of countries (these include
Chile, Egypt, India, Jamaica, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, the United States, and several
European countries).soThis data problem is not likely to be rectified in future years,
as it is exceedingly difficult to measure infant mortality except by public or private
records. Consequently, anyone studying this general subject is likely to rely heavily on
thesecases,where in-depth analysisis possibleand profitable. Indeed, it is not clear
whether any large-N cross-caseanalysis is possible prior to the twentieth century.
Here, a casestudy format is virtually prescribed, and a cross-caseformat proscribed.
Other problems of evidenceare more subtle. Let us dwell for the moment on the
question of data comparability. In their study of social security spending, Mulligan,
Gil. and Sala-i-Martin note that

although our spendingand design numbers are of good quality, there are some missing
observationsand, evenwith all the observations,it is difficult to reducethe variety of elderly
subsidiesto one or two numbers.For this reason,casestudiesare an importantpart of our
analysis,since those studies do not require numbers that are comparableacrossa large
number of countries.Our casestudy analysisutilizes data from a variety of country-specific
"socialsecurity"or "democracy"to one singlenumber.sl
sources,sowe do not haveto reduce

Here, the incommensurability of the evidencemilitates towards a casestudy format.

In the event that the authors (or subsequentanalysts)discover a coding systemthat
provides reasonably valid cross-casemeasures of social security, democracy, and

ae Of course, what we know about the potential casesis not independent of the underlying reality; it is,
nonetheless, not entirely dependent on that reality.
50 Gerring (zoo7b) st Muliigan, Gil, and Sala-i-Martin (zooz, r3).
rr4 JOHN GERRING

other relevant concepts then our state ofknowledge about the subject is changed, and
a cross-caseresearchdesign is rendered more plausible.
Importantly, the state of evidence on a topic is never entirely fixed. Investigators
may gather additional data, recode existing data, or discover new repositories of data.
Thus, when discussing the question of evidence one must consider the quality and
quantity of evidence that couldbe gathered on a given question, given sufficient time
and resources. Here it is appropriate to observe that collecting new data, and
correcting existing data, is usually easier in a case study format than in a large-N
cross-caseformat. It will be diffrcult to rectifr data problems if one's casesnumber in
the hundreds or thousands.There are simply too many data points to allow for this.
One might consider this issue in the context of recent work on democrary. There is
general skepticism among scholars with respect to the viability of extant global
indicators intended to capture this complex concept (".g. by Freedom House and
by the Polity IV data project).s2 Measurement error, aggregation problems, and
questions of conceptual validity are rampant. When dealing with a single country
or a single continent it is possible to overcome some of these faults by manually
recoding the countries of interest.s3The casestudy format often gives the researcher
an opportunity to fact-check, to consult multiple sources, to go back to primary
materials, and to overcome whatever biases may affect the secondary literature.
Needless to say, this is not a feasible approach for an individual investigator if
one's project encompassesevery country in the world. The best one can usually
manage, under the circumstances, is some form of convergent validation (by which
different indices of the same concept are compared) or small adjustments in the
coding intended to correct for aggregation problems or measurement error.5a
For the same reason, the collection of original data is typically more diffrcult in
cross-case analysis than in case study analysis, involving Sreater expense' greater
difficulties in identiffing and coding cases,learning foreign languages,traveling, and
so forth. Whatever can be done for a set of casescan usually be done more easily for a
single case.
It should be kept in mind that many of the countries of concern to anthropolo-
gists,economists,historians, political scientists,and sociologistsare still terra incog-
nita. Outside the OECD, and with the exception of a few large countries that have
receivedcareful attention from scholars(e.g.India, Brazil, China), most countries of
the world are not well covered by the social scienceliterature. Any statement that one
might wish to make about, say,Botswana, will be difficult to veri$' if one has recourse
only to secondary materials. And these-very limited-secondary sources are not
necessarilyof the most reliable sort. Thus, if one wishes to say something about
political patterns obtaining in roughly 90 percent of the world's countries and if one
wishes to go beyond matters that can be captured in standard statistics collected by
the World Bank and the IMF and other agencies(and these can also be very sketchy

s2 Bollen (1993);Bowman, Lehoucq, and Mahoney (zoo5); Munck and Verkuilen (zooz); Treier and
fackman (zoo5).
53 Bowman, Lehoucq, and Mahoney (zoo5). sa Bollen (rqgt); Tieier and jackman (zoo5).
 THE CASE STUDY 115

when lesser-studiedcountries are concerned) one is more or lessobliged to conduct a

casestudy. Of course, one could, in principle, gather similar information acrossall
relevant cases.However, such an enterprise faces formidable logistical difficulties.
Thus, for practical reasons,casestudies are sometimes the most defensible alternative
when the researcheris faced with an information-poor environment.
However, this point is easily turned on its head. Datasetsare now available to study
many problems of concern to the social sciences.Thus, it may not be necessaryto
collect original information for one's book, article, or dissertation. Sometimes in-
depth single-caseanalysis is more time consuming than cross-caseanalysis.If so,
there is no informational advantageto a casestudy format. Indeed, it may be easierto
utilize existing information for a cross-caseanalysis, particularly when a case study
format imposes hurdles of its own-e.g. travel to distant climes, risk of personal
injury, expense, and so forth. It is interesting to note that some observers consider
"relatively
casestudies to be more expensive in time and resources."s5
Whatever the specific logistical hurdles, it is a general truth that the shape of the
evidence-that which is currently available and that which might feasibly be col-
lected by an a111ls1-often has a strong influence on an investigator's choice of
researchdesigns.Where the evidencefor particular casesis richer and more accurate
there is a strong prima facie argument for a casestudy format focusedon those cases.
Where, by contrast, the relevant evidence is equally good for all potential cases,and is
comparable across those cases,there is no reason to shy away from cross-case
analysis. Indeed, there may be little to gain from casestudy formats.

11 CoNcruSIoNS

At the outset, I took note of the severedisjuncture that has opened up between an
often-maligned methodology and a heavily practiced method. The case study is
disrespected but nonetheless regularly employed. Indeed, it remains the workhorse
of most disciplines and subfields in the social sciences.Hoq then, can one make
senseof this schizophreniabetween methodological theory and praxis?
The torment of the casestudy begins with its definitional penumbra. Frequently,
this key term is conflated with a set of disparate methodological traits that are not
definitionally entailed. My first objective, therefore, was to craft a narrower and more
useful concept for purposesof methodological discussion.The casestudy, I argued,is
best defined as an intensive study of a single casewith an aim to generalize across a
larger set of cases.It follows from this definition that casestudies may be small- or
large-N, qualitative or quantitative, experimental or observational, synchronic or
diachronic. It also follows that the case study research design comports with any

ss Stoecker(rggr,qr).
u6 IOHN GERRING

macrotheoretical framework or paradigm-e.g. behavioralism, rational choice, in-

stitutionalism, or interpretivism. It is not epistemologically distinct. What differ-
entiates the case study from the cross-case study is simply its way of defining
observations,not its analysisof those observationsor its method of modeling causal
relations. The case study research design constructs its observations from a single
caseor a small number of cases,while cross-caseresearchdesignsconstruct obser-
vations across multiple cases.Cross-caseand case study researchoperate, for the
most part, at different levels of analysis.
The travails of the casestudy are not simply definitional. They are also rooted in an
insufficient appreciation of the methodological tradeoffs that this method calls forth.
At least eight characteristic strengths and weaknessesmust be considered. Ceteris
paribus, case studies are more useful when the strategy of research is exploratory
rather than confirmatory/disconfirmatory, when internal validity is given preference
over external validity, when insight into causal mechanisms is prioritized over insight
into causal effects, when propositional depth is prized over breadth, when the
population of interest is heterogeneous rather than homogeneous, when causal
relationships are strong rather than weak, when useful information about key
parameters is available only for a few cases,and when the available data are concen-
trated rather than dispersed.
Although I do not have the spaceto discuss other issuesin this venue, it is worth
mentioning that other considerations may also come into play in a researcher's
choice between a case study and cross-casestudy research format. However, these
additional issues-e.g. causal complexity and the state of research on a topic-do
not appear to have clear methodological af6.nities. They may augur one way, or the
other.
My objective throughout this chapter is to restore a greater senseof meaning'
purpose, and integrity to the case study method. It is hoped that by offering a
narrower and more carefully bounded definition of this method the case study
may be rescuedfrom some of its most persistent ambiguities. And it is hoped that
the characteristic strengths of this method, as well as its limitations, will be more
apparent to producers and consumers of case study research.The case study is a
useful tool for some researchobjectives,but not all.

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