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THIRD DIVISION

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC G.R. No. 217656

··woRKS AND HIGHWAYS,
Petitioner,
Present:

-versus- LEONEN, J, Chairperson,

HERNANDO,
INTING,
EDDIE MANALO, RODRIGO DELOS SANTOS, and
MEDIANISTA, CRISTAN A. ROSARIO, JJ
ACOSTA, TERESITA D.
SANTOS, ARCHEMED IS
SARMIENTO, JULIET M.
DATUL, OLIVIA 0. SALVADOR,
GIRALINE P. BELLEZA, JULIUS
N. ORTEGA, LORENZO C.
ACOSTA, JOSEPH S. TRIBIANA,
. ANALAINE S. TRIBIANA,
LORENA B. MUNAR, JUN JUN A.
DAVAO, WILLIAM A. MANALO,
PAZ I. VILLAR, PERCY M.
CARAG, PATRONA R. ROXAS,
PABLO P. RESPICIO, LINA M.
VALENZUELA, NEDELYN D.
CAJOTE, NOEL L.
HERNANDEZ, NORMA
MARTIN, MA. RODHORA
UBANA, LINDA LACARA,
NORMAN M. ILAC, MERCY 0.
RIVERA, JAIME LUMABAS,
JULITA PAJARON, CELESTINO
PEREZ, CONCHITA V.
NAVALES, REYNALDO V.
NAVALES, EDDIE V.
VILLAREY, VIRGILIO V.
Decision 2 G.R. No. 217656

ALEJANDRINO, MA. CECILIA P.

CALVES, EVANGELINE M.
MANALO, CONNIE D. BELZA,
SONIA G. EVANGELISTA,
JEAN OR DELA CRUZ,
MADELINE EVANGELISTA,
CATHERINE ANTONIO, JAi D.
HERNANDEZ, CYNTIA C.
HERNANDEZ, JULIE H.
DEPIEDRA, JENNIFER H.
BESMONTE, RICHARD Z.
DIZON, RICHARD H. DIZON,
JR., REYNALDO C.
HERNANDEZ, NOEL C.
HERNANDEZ, AUGUSTAH. DE
LEON, VICTORINO U.
HERNANDEZ, MARVIN C.
HERNANDEZ, LETICIA G.
GALO PE, DANIEL P.
MABANSAG, EDUARDO J.
MALABRIGA, VANGIE S.
NAVARRO, ANSARI P.
DITUCALAN, DIOSA P.
BAUTISTA, HALIL P.
DITUCALAN, CAIRODEN D.
PUNGINAGINA, CANDIDATO
PUNGINAGINA, RAIKEN P.
MACARAUB, JALIL MOKSIR,
ISIAS MELCHOR, ROMULO
NAVALES, RONALDO
GUEVARRA, ANDREA R. DELOS
REYES AND SHIELA R. DELOS
REYES, Promulgated:
Respondents. November 16, 2020 ,
°t'-\\ ~ \)C-~o-¾\
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

The mandate of our Constitution is clear: "Urban or rural poor

dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished, except in /':·
accordance with law and in a just and humane manner." 1

1
CONST., art. XIII, sec. 10.
Decision 3 G.R. No. 217656

This Court resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari2 assailing the
Decision3 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Regional Trial Court
Order4 denying the Department of Public Works and Highways' motion to
dismiss a Complaint seeking just compensation for their properties.

Eddie Manalo, Rodrigo Medianista, Cristan A. Acosta, Teresita D.

Santos, Archemedis Sarmiento, Juliet M. Datul, Olivia 0. Salvador, Giraline
P. Belleza, Julius N. Ortega, Lorenzo C. Acosta, Joseph S. Tribiana,
Analaine S. Tribiana, Lorena B. Munar, Jun Jun A. Davao, William A.
Manalo, Paz I. Villar, Percy M. Carag, Patrona R. Roxas, Pablo P. Respicio,
Lina M. Valenzuela, Nedelyn D. Cajote, Noel L. Hernandez, Norma Martin,
Ma. Rodhora Ubana, Linda Lacara, Norman M. Ilac, Mercy 0. Rivera,
Jaime Lumabas, Julita Pajaron, Celestino Perez, Conchita V. Navales,
Reynaldo V. Navales, Eddie V. Villarey, Virgilio V. Alejandrino, Ma.
Cecilia P. Calves, Evangeline M. Manalo, Connie D. Belza, Sonia G.
Evangelista, Jeanor Dela Cruz, Madeline Evangelista, Catherine Antonio, J ai
D. Hernandez, Cyntia C. Hernandez, Julie H. Depiedra, Jennifer H.
Besmonte, Richard Z. Dizon, Richard H. Dizon, Jr., Reynaldo C. Hernandez,
Noel C. Hernandez, Augusta H. De Leon, Victorino U. Hernandez, Marvin
C. Hernandez, Leticia G. Galope, Daniel P. Mabansag, Eduardo J.
Malabriga, Vangie S. Navan-o, Ansari P. Ditucalan, Diosa P. Bautista, Halil
P. Ditucalan, Cairoden D. Punginagina, Candidato Punginagina, Raiken P.
Macaraub, Jalil Moksir, Isias Melchor, Romulo Navales, Ronaldo Guevarra,
Andrea R. Delos Reyes, and Shiela R. Delos Reyes (collectively, Manalo, et
al.) are owners of residential structures on a parcel of land on Luzon
Avenue, Quezon City, owned by Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System. This parcel of land is directly affected by the Department of Public
Works and Highways' C-5 extension project, 5 an endeavor that would link
the South Luzon Expressway and the North Luzon Expressway. 6

On September 13, 2010, Manalo, et al. filed a Complaint before the

Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, seeking the detennination and
payment of just cmnpensation from the Department of Public Works and
Highways. 7

In their Complaint, Manalo, et al. alleged that despite its expropriation

power, the Department of Public Works and Highways neglected to initiate
an expropriation proceeding. They averred that the Department was "cutting
comers to hasten the completion of the project." 8

2
Rollo, pp. 9-25. Filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
I
3
Id. at 27--40. The March 19, 2015 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 121303 was penned by Associate
Justice Sesinando E. Villon and concwTed in by Associate Justices Rodil V. Zalameda (now a member
of this Court) and Pedro B. Corales of the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals, Manila.
4
Id. at 66--67. The May 5, 2011 Order in Civil Case No. Q-10-67907 was penned by Presiding Judge
Alexander S. Balut of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76.
5
Id. at 12.
6
Id. at 30.
7
Id. at 29.
8
Id. at 30.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 217656

Moreover, Manalo, et al. claimed that while the Department of Public•

Works and Highways made a voluntary offer of financial assistance to them,
the amount was "notoriously small" 9 that they had to tum down the offer. 10

Manalo, et al. also asserted that they should be paid the replacement
costs of their houses, as what happened with the informal settlers of
Barangay UP Campus. 11 Citing an August 6, 2008 Memorandum of
Agreement, which the Department of Public Works and Highways had
entered into with the Quezon City government, Manalo, et al. claimed that
the parties had acknowledged that they were informal settlers. 12 The
agreement states in part:

WHEREAS, to implement these proposed projects, there is a need

to relocate the affected squatters and to acquire the needed road right of
way;

ARTICLE II-RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PARTIES

2.1 Acquire and cleru.· at their own expense the needed Road Right~
of-Way that will be affected by the approach of the Construction of
Flyover Crossing [C]ommonwealth Avenue (Damayan Alley Side) and the
[c]onstruction/widening of Luzon Avenue including the clearing and
relocation of squatters/illegal shanties thereat. 13

Thus, Manalo, et al. prayed for the determination of just compensation

due to them, and that they be entitled to rights accruing to individuals whose
properties were expropriated for public use,· and to moral da111ages,
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. 14 ·

On November 15, 2010, the Quezon City Task Force Control and
Prevention of Illegal Structures and Squatting issued a Notice of Demolition,
asking Manalo, et al. to vacate the land and remove the structures within
seven days of receiving the notice. This came with financial assistance
worth P21,000.00 per family. Despite notice, Manalo, et al. refused to
vacate the property and accept the financial aid. 15

On January 19, 2011, the Department of Public Works and Highways

filed its Answer 16 praying that the Complaint be dismissed. 17 It alleged that

9
Id. at 31.
10 Id.
11
Id. at 66.
12
Id. at 66---(57.
13 Id.
14
Id. at 32.
15
Id. at 12.
16
Id. at 98-114.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 217656

Manalo, et al. were admittedly squatting on a government-owned property

without the owner's express consent. As such, the structures they built may
be demolished under Section 27 of Republic Act No. 7279. 18

The Department of Public Works and Highways also noted that it had
already offered Manalo, et al. cash compensation to show good faith and
honest intention to help them. It likewise refuted their claim of entitlement
to replacement costs, noting that they were only entitled to financial
assistance under Section 28 of Republic Act No. 7279. It also asserted that
expropriation was not the proper remedy, and that it may avail of summary
eviction and demolition under Republic Act No. 7279. 19

Finally, the Department of Public Works and Highways asserted that

since Manalo, et al. achnitted that the land was not their own, they were
builders in bad faith who, under Article 449 of the Civil Code, had no right
of reimbursement for the value of their structures. 20

Hearings were conducted on the special and affirmative defenses

interposed by the Department of Public Works and Highways on February
21, February 28, and March 7, 2011. 21

In a May 5, 2011 Order, 22 the Regional Trial Court denied the

Department of Public Works and Highways' prayer to dismiss Manalo, et
al.' s case. This, after it had found that the allegations in the Complaint had a
cause of action. 23 It disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the prayer for the dismissal

of this case is denied.

SO ORDERED. 24 (Emphasis in the original)

The Department of Public Works and Highways sought

reconsideration, but this was denied in the Regional Trial Court's June 30,
2011 Order. 25 Thus, it filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals. 26

j
17 Id. at 110.
18
Id. at 33-34.
19 Id. at 34-35.
20
Id. at 35.
21 Id.
22
Id. at 66-67.
23
Id. at 67.
24 Id.
25
Id. at 68.
26
Id. at 28-29.
Decision 6 G.R. No. 217656

In its March 19, 2015 Decision, 27 the Court of Appeals affirmed the
Regional Trial Court's findings. It held that the trial court did not gravely
abuse its discretion when it relied on the Memorandum of Agreement in
denying the prayer for the case's dismissal. 28 It disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for

Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed Orders
of respondent Judge Alexander S. Balut of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 29 (Emphasis in the original)

Thus, the Department of Public Works and Highways filed a Petition

for Review on Certiorari30 before this Court.

On July 5, 2016, respondents Manalo, et al. filed their Comment. 31

Petitioner then filed its Reply. 32

Petitioner insists that respondents' Complaint failed to state a cause of

action. It notes that the trial court should not have considered the
Memorandum of Agreement because it "was never identified, marked in
evidence[,] and formally offered during the hearing" for its motion to
dismiss. 33 In any case, petitioner claims that the Memorandum of
Agreement actually weakened respondents' case, because it revealed that the
obligation to relocate respondents rested with the Quezon City government,
not petitioner. 34

Citing Republic Act No. 7279, petitioner maintains that respondents

are only entitled to financial assistance and not just compensation equivalent·
to the replacement costs. It reasons that respondents were professional
squatters who may be summarily evicted and whose illegal structures may
be demolished. It reiterates that respondents were builders in bad faith who
are not entitled to any reimbursement. 35

On the other hand, respondents claim that their cause of action

remains undeniable, as they owned the structures that petitioner demolished
for the C-5 extension project. They also argue that the issue they raised was
whether they were entitled to just compensation, over which the trial court
J
27
Id. at 27-40.
28
Id. at 38-39.
29
Id. at 39.
30
Id. at 9-25.
31
Id. at 402-410.
32
Id.at431-439.
33
Id. at 15.
34
Id. at 16.
35
Id. at 18-19.
 Decision 7 G.R. No. 217656

had jurisdiction. 36 They also insist that they are entitled either to the
payment of just compensation or to a suitable relocation. 37

In rebuttal, petitioner merely reiterated the same arguments it had

raised in its Petition. 38

For this Court's resolution are the following issues:

First, whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the
Regional Trial Court did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying
petitioner Department of Public Works and Highways' prayer to dismiss
respondents Eddie Manalo, et al. 's Complaint;

Second, whether or not petitioner can extrajudicially and summarily

evict respondents and demolish their structures; and

Finally, whether or not respondents are entitled to just compensation

for their structures.

We deny the Petition.

Under the Rules of Court, "cause of action is the act or omission by

· which a party violates a right of another." 39 Thus, a complaint states a cause
of action if it sufficiently alleges the existence of three essential elements:
(1) the plaintiffs legal right; (2) the defendant's correlative obligation; and
(3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of plaintiffs legal right.
If there is no allegation that these elements concur, the complaint fails to
state a cause of action, and thus, becomes dismissible. 40

While often interchanged,failure to state a cause of action and lack of

cause of action are distinct grounds to dismiss an action. Failure to state a
cause of action, on one hand, "refers to the insufficiency of allegations in the
pleading," 41 and is a ground for a motion to dismiss. On the other hand, lack
of cause of action refers to a situation where the evidence does not prove the
!
36 Id. at 405.
37 Id. at 404.
38
Id. at431--435.
39
RULES OF COURT, Rule 2, sec. 2.
40
Zuniga-Santos v. Santos-Gran, 745 Phil. 171 (2014) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division] and
Macaslangv. Zamora, 664 Phil. 337 (2011) [Per J. Bersamin, Third Division].
41
Id.at177.
Decision 8 G.R. No. 217656

cause of action alleged in the pleading, or there 1s "insufficiency of the

factual basis for the action." 42

Moreover, failure to state a cause of action "may be raised at the

earliest stages" 43 of an action, but lack of cause of action "may be raised any
time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of
stipulations, admissions[,] or evidence presented[.]" 44

In Heirs of Pamaran v. Bank of Commerce, 45 this Court held that the

respondent's motion to dismiss by way of affirmative defense falls within
the failure to state a cause of action as a ground for dismissal. This is
because there had been no presentation of evidence yet, and the complaint
sufficiently stated a cause of action. This Court further distinguished
between failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action:

[A] distinction must be made between a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a cause of action under Section 1(g) of Rule 16, and the one under
Rule 33 of the Rules of Court.

In the first situation, the motion must be made before a responsive

pleading is filed; and it can be resolved only on the basis of the allegations
in the initiatory pleading. On the other hand, in the second instance, the
motion to dismiss must be filed after the plaintiff rested his case; and it can
be determined only on the basis of the evidence adduced by the plaintiff.
In the first case, it is immaterial if the allegations in the complaint are true
or false; however, in the second situation, the judge must determine the
truth or falsity of the allegations based on the evidence presented.

Stated differently, a motion to dismiss under Section 1(g) of Rule

16 is based on preliminary objections made before the trial while the
motion to dismiss under Rule 33 is a demurrer to evidence on the ground
of insufficiency of evidence, and is made only after the plaintiff rested his
case. 46 (Citations omitted)

Thus, in cases of dismissal for failure to state a cause of action, as in

this case, "the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material
allegations" 47 in the complaint. It delves into "whether the material
allegations, assuming these to be true, state ultimate facts which constitute·
plaintiffs cause of action[.]" 48 The test for determining whether a complaint
states a cause of action is "whether or not, admitting hypothetically the truth
of the allegations of fact made in the complaint, the judge may validly grant
the relief demanded in the complaint." 49
J
42 Id.
43
Id. at 177-178.
44
Id. at 178.
45
789 Phil. 42 (2016) [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division].
46
Id. at 50.
47
Dabuco v. Court ofAppeals, 379 Phil. 939, 949 (2000) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division].
48 Id.
49
China Road and Bridge Corp., v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 590, 599-600 (2000) [Per J. Bellosillo,
Second Division].
Decision 9 G.R. No. 217656

There are, however, exceptions to the rule that the allegations are
hypothetically admitted as true, namely: (a) if the falsity of the allegations
"is subject to judicial notice"; (b) "if such allegations are legally
impossible"; or ( c) "if these refer to facts which are inadmissible in
evidence"; or (d) "if by the record or document included in the pleading
these allegations appear unfounded." 50 None of these exceptions were
alleged to be present here.

Since the inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the
material allegations in the complaint, then generally, the "analysis should be
confined to the four corners of the complaint, and no other." 51 Here, in
moving to dismiss the case, petitioner alleged that respondents' Complaint
failed to state a cause of action. Thus, an examination of the Complaint is
necessary. Its pertinent portions read:

3. Plaintiffs who are informal settlers and not owners of the lots
are residence [sic] and owners of residential structures located at Luzon
Avenue, Quezon City, whose houses [were] situated directly along the
path of DPWH's ambitious Circumferential Road also known as C-5
extension project that will finally link South Luzon Express way to North
Luzon Express way [sic];

4. Obviously, the C-5 project was envisioned by traffic czars and

engineers to alleviate and decongest nearly the whole stretch of main
thoroughfares like EDSA and Camachile-Balintawak interchange, the bulk
of vehicles are therefore diverted to C-5 with an accesses [sic] to both
north and south super highways and vice-versa without negotiating the
perennially traffic clogged metropolitan roads. It was a noble project
indeed ultimately beneficial to the public particularly in the movement of
people and goods;

5. It is beyond dispute that defendant DPWH an agency of the

sovereign that has the sole and exclusive task, supervision and control of
all government projects. The sovereign power is so immense and potent
that it could take away any kind of property private of [sic] otherwise for
public use. Although the State guarantees private ownership, such
personal tenure will necessarily bowed [sic] down to sovereign's inherent
power of eminent domain when the exercise of expropriate becomes
indispensable to fulfill the government's avowed aim of serving the
interest of the great majority of the people;

"7. Surprisingly, defendant DPWH as an instrument of the

sovereign has the expropriation power but neglected to appropriately
initiate an expropriation proceeding in court through a verified complaint
impleading the plaintiffs whose prope11ies lie in the direct path of the
developing super highway. Yet, defendant DPWH is already exercising
and moving towards expropriation which seemed highly irregular

50
Dabuco v. Court ofAppeals, 379 Phil. 939 (2000) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division].
51
Zuniga-Santos v. Santos-Gran, 745 Phil. 171, 180 (2014) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, First Division].
Decision 10 G.R. No. 217656

considering that the Constitution and the Rules have provided a

mechanism in expropriation. Apparently, defendant DPWH is cutting
comers to hasten the completion of the project. Whatever the motive of
defendant DPWH noble or otherwise should submit to judicial process to
avoid any impression of irregularity and abuse;

8. Yet, defendant DPWH aware of its constitutional obligation to

plaintiffs as owners of the residential structures has made a voluntary offer
of financial aid package. But the amount offered by defendant DPWH to
the affected plaintiffs whose houses and homes will soon to be gobbled up
by the C-5 highway was notoriously small to pass the criteria of just
compensation. Evidently, the idea of just compensation does not malce
any sense at all with the defendant DPWH since its voluntary offer was
termed "financial assistance". Consequently, defendant DPWH's offer of
financial assistance was graciously turned down by plaintiffs;

9. With the sovereign power in their midst slowly creeping towards

plaintiffs' private homes and houses sans the property expropriation
proceedings so demanded by the Constitution and the Rules, plaintiffs are
frantically desperate to seek judicial remedy to prevent the threat or
incursion by dependant [sic] DPWH into their respective homes and
houses. Plaintiffs have no such means to match the sovereign power
gradually snealcing into their private homes except through the invocation
of judicial process;

11. Plaintiffs are unable to understand the present policy of

defendant DPWH of not imparting upon them its liberal and generous
treatment it bestowed to members of SAPADA who like them were also
informal settlers right across Commonwealth A venue, where their houses
and structures were duly compensated by defendant DPWH based on the
houses' estimated values[.] 52

Based on the allegations, and as aptly found by the lower courts, the
Complaint sufficiently states a cause of action. All the elements are present,
namely: ( 1) respondents owned the residential structures on Luzon Avenue, .
Quezon City, and they have rights embodied in the August 6, 2008
Memorandum of Agreement; (2) petitioner has the obligation to respect such
rights as it still has to comply with due process; and (3) petitioner's inaction
to give respondents what is due to them violates their rights. 53

Contrary to petitioner's contention that the Memorandum of

Agreement may not be considered, this Court has held in China Road and
Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals 54 that the trial court can consider all
the pleadings filed, including annexes, motions, and the evidence on record; /
for purpose of hypothetically admitting them without ruling on their truth or
falsity.

52
Rollo, pp. 84-86.
53
Id. at 38 and 66--67.
54
401 Phil. 590 (2000) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
Decision 11 G.R. No. 217656

Although generally, inquiry is limited to the four comers of the

complaint, inquiry may not be confined to the face of the complaint "if
culled (a) from annexes and other pleadings submitted by the parties; (b)
from documentary evidence admitted by stipulation which disclose facts
sufficient to defeat the claim; or (c) from evidence admitted in the course of
hearings related to the case. " 55

In any case, when petitioner offered respondents financial assistance,

respondents' right has already been acknowledged to have been violated. It
is of no moment that petitioner denied respondents' entitlement to just
compensation due to their being professional squatters. In Aquino v.
Quiazon, 56 if the allegations in a complaint furnish sufficient basis for the
suit, the complaint should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that
may be raised.

II

Judicial economy aims "to have cases prosecuted with the least cost to
the parties," 57 requiring that "unnecessary or frivolous reviews of orders by
the trial court, which facilitate the resolution of the main merits of the case,
be reviewed together with the main merits of the case." 58

In the interest of judicial economy, this Court proceeds to determine

the other issues raised by the parties.

Article III, Section 9 of the Constitution mandates that "[p ]rivate

property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation." The
State's inherent right to condemn private property is the power of eminent
domain or expropriation, which must comply with the following requisites to
be valid:

(1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into
private property must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry
into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4)
the property must be devoted to a public purpose or otherwise informally,
appropriately or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property

55
Aquino v. Quiazon, 755 Phil. 793, 814 (2015) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division] citing Philippine
Army v. Pamittan, 667 Phil. 440 (2011) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division]; and Dabuco v. Court of
J
Appeals, 379 Phil. 939 (2000) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division].
56
755 Phil. 793 (2015) [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
57
E. l Dupont De Nemours and Co. v. Francisco, 794 Phil. 97, 113 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second
Division] citing City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Export Zone, 748 Phil. 473 (2014) [Per J.
Leonen, Second Division]; and Salud v. Court of Appeals, 303 Phil. 397 (1994) [Per J. Puno, Second
Division].
58
Id. at 113-114.
Decision 12 G.R. No. 217656

for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him
of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. 59 (Citation omitted)

Expropriation may be judicially claimed by filing either: (a) a

complaint for expropriation by the expropriator; or (b) a complaint, or a
counterclaim, for compensation by the deprived landowner, which is
referred to as inverse expropriation. 60

Here, respondents admit that they are informal settlers, not lot owners. ·
They claim to be residents and owners of the residential structures on Luzon
Avenue in Quezon City, along the path of the C-5 extension project. 61 Thus,
the source of respondents' rights in the Constitution is not Article III,.
Section 9, but rather, Article XIII, Section 10.

Article XIII, Section 10 of the Constitution provides:

SECTION 10. Urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted

nor their dwellings demolished, except in accordance with law and in a
just and humane manner.

In relation, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8974, or An Act to

Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-Of-Way, Site or Location for National
Government Infrastructure Projects and for Other Purposes, states:

SECTION 9. Squatter Relocation. -The government through the

National Housing Authority, in coordination with the local government
units and implementing agencies concerned, shall establish and develop
squatter relocation sites, including the provision of adequate utilities and
services, in anticipation of squatters that have to he removed from· the
right-of-way or site of future infrastructure projects. Whenever applicable,
the concerned local government units shall provide and administer the
relocation sites.

In case the expropriated land is occupied by squatters, the court

shall issue the necessary writ of demolition for the purpose of dismantling
any and all structures found within the subject property. The
implementing agency shall take into account and observe diligently the
procedure provided for in Sections 28 and 29 of Republic Act No. 7279,
otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992.

Funds for the relocation sites shall come from appropriations for
the purpose under the General Appropriations Act, as well as from
appropriate infrastructure projects funds of the implementing agency
concerned. (Emphasis supplied)

59
J
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Citi Appliance MC. Corporation, G.R. No. 214546,.
October 9, 2019, <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/66296> [Per J. Leonen,
Third Division].
60 Id.
61
Rollo, p. 30.
Decision 13 G.R. No. 217656

Under Republic Act No. 8974, the court shall issue a writ of
I

demolition to dismantle thf structures found in the property. The

implementing agency shall 4liligently observe the procedure provided in
Sections 28 and 29 of Repu~lic Act No. 7279, or the Urban Development
and Housing Act of 1992, for when the expropriated land is occupied by
informal settlers. The relevant provisions of Republic Act No. 7279 states:

SECTION 27. Action Against Professional Squatters and

Squatting Syndicates. - The local government units, in cooperation with
the Philippine National Police, the Presidential Commission for the Urban
Poor (PCUP), and the PCUP-accredited urban poor organization in the
area, shall adopt measures to identify and effectively curtail the nefarious
and illegal activities of professional squatters and squatting syndicates, as
herein defined.

Any person or group identified as such shall be summarily evicted

and their dwellings or structures demolished, and shall be disqualified to
avail of the benefits of the Program. A public official who tolerates or
abets the commission of the abovementioned acts shall be dealt with in
accordance with existing laws.

For purposes of this Act, professional squatters or members of

squatting syndicates shall be imposed the penalty of six (6) years
imprisonment or a fine of not less than Sixty thousand pesos (P60,000.00)
but not more than One hundred thousand pesos (Pl00,000), or both, at the
discretion of the court.

SECTION 28. Eviction and Demolition. - Eviction or demolition

as a practice shall be discouraged. Eviction or demolition, however, may
be allowed under the following situations:

(a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros,

railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines,
waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads,
parks, and playgrounds;

(b) When government infrastructure projects with available

funding are about to be implemented; or

(c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition.

In the execution of eviction or demolition orders involving

underprivileged and homeless citizens, the following shall be mandatory:

(1) Notice upon the effected persons or entities at least thirty (30)
days prior to the date of eviction or demolition;

(2) Adequate consultations on the matter of settlement with the

duly designated representatives of the families to be resettled
and the affected communities in the areas where they are to be
relocated;
I
(3) Presence of local government officials or their representatives
during eviction or demolition;
Decision 14 G.R. No. 217656

(4) Proper identification of all persons taking part m th~

demolition;

(5) Execution of eviction or demolition only during regular office

hours from Mondays to Fridays and during good weather,
unless the affected families consent otherwise;

(6) No use of heavy equipment for demolition except for strnctures

that are permanent and of concrete materials;

(7) Proper uniforms for members of the Philippine National Police

who shall occupy the first line of law enforcement and observe
proper disturbance control procedures; and

(8) Adequate relocation, whether temporary or permanent:

Provided, however, That in cases of eviction and demolition
pursuant to a court order involving underprivileged and
homeless citizens, relocation shall be undertaken by the local
government unit concerned and the National Housing
Authority with the assistance of other government agencies
within forty-five (45) days from service of notice of final
judgment by the court, after which period the said order shall
be executed: Provided, further, That should relocation not be
possible within the said period, financial assistance in the
amount equivalent to the prevailing minimum daily wage
multiplied by sixty (60) days shall be extended to the affected
families by the local government unit concerned.

The Department of the Interior and Local Government and the

Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council shall jointly
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry out the above
provision.

SECTION 29. Resettlement. - Within two (2) years from the

effectivity of this Act, the local government units, in coordination with the
National Housing Authority, shall implement the relocation and
resettlement of persons living in danger areas such as esteros, railroad
tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and in other
public places as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds. The local
government unit, in coordination with the National Housing Authority,
shall provide relocation or resettlement sites with basic services and
facilities and access to employment and livelihood opportunities sufficient
to meet the basic needs of the affected families. 62 (Emphasis supplied)

Here, there is no allegation that a writ of demolition was procured

from the court, or that the procedures provided in Sections 28 and 29 of
Republic Act No. 7279 were observed, as mandated by Republic Act No.
8974. Instead, petitioner admits having offered financial assistance to
respondents, pursuant to Section 28(8) of Republic Act No. 7279. By doing'
this, petitioner acknowledges that respondents are underprivileged and
homeless citizens, entitled to due process of law, prior to their eviction and /
the demolition of their structures.

62
Republic Act No. 7279 (1992), secs. 27, 28, and 29.
Decision 15 G.R. No. 217656

Thus, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine

whether respondents had been prejudiced by the eviction and demolition of
their structures, and if properly substantiated, whether they are entitled to
damages.

Petitioner, however, insists that respondents are professional squatters

who may be summarily evicted and their structures demolished under
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 7279. Section 3(m) of the law defines
professional squatters as:

... individuals or groups who occupy lands without the express consent of
the landowner and who have sufficient income for legitimate housing.
The term shall also apply to persons who have previously been awarded
homelots or housing units by the Government but who sold, leased or
transferred the same to settle illegally in the same place or in another
urban area, and non-bona fide occupants and intruders of lands reserved
for socialized housing. The term shall not apply to individuals or groups
who simply rent land and housing from professional squatters or squatting
syndicates[.]

Petitioner, however, failed to substantiate this allegation.

Finally, this Court notes that the Metropolitan Waterworks and

Sewerage System, the owner of the land on which respondents' structures
were built, was not impleaded here. Hence, this Court cannot rule on the
issue of respondents' rights as builders in bad faith under the Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals'

March 19, 2015 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 121303 is AFFIRMED. This
case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
76 for appropriate action in accordance with this Decision, with due and
deliberate dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

/ Associate Justice
 ~ I J.

Decision 16 G.R. No. 217656

WE CONCUR:

ssociate Justice

HENRI~TING
,,,---
/
EOG~~ ,L. DELOS SANTOS
Associate Justice Associate Justice

. ROSARIO

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
· the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.