Case 2: City of Manila Vs Laguio [G.R. Nos.

118127, April 12,2005]

Facts:
The city of Manila came out with the Manila Ordinance No. 7738 which
prohibits the establishment or operation of businesses providing certain
forms of amusement, entertainment, services, and facilities in the
Ermita-Malate area in Manila. This ordinance is to include motels and
inns. The said ordinance is said to be a valid exercise of police power
of the State in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the
community.

Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) questioned the said

ordinance, arguing that it is an invalid exercise of police power as the
Local Government Code grants the City Council merely with the power
to regulate but not prohibit the establishment, operation, and
maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses,
and other similar establishments.

Issue:
Whether or not the abovementioned establishments are under the
scope of the City Council’s power to regulate or prohibit.

Ruling:
If it were the intention of Congress to confer upon the City Council the
power to prohibit the establishments enumerated in Section 1 of
the Ordinance, it would have so declared in uncertain terms by adding
them to the list of the matters it may prohibit under the above-quoted
Section

It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from the

establishments themselves. That these establishments are recognized
legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from another Section of the
Code. The same Section also defined “amusement” as a “pleasurable
diversion and entertainment,” “synonymous to relaxation, avocation,
pastime or fun;” and “amusement places” to include “theaters, cinemas,
concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement where one
seeks admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or
performances.” Thus, it can be inferred that the Code considers these
establishments as legitimate enterprises and activities.

It is well to recall the maxim reddendo singula singulis which means

that words in different parts of a statute must be referred to their
appropriate connection, giving to each in its place, its proper force and
effect, and, if possible, rendering none of them useless or superfluous,
even if strict grammatical construction demands otherwise. Likewise,
where words under consideration appear in different sections or are
widely dispersed throughout an act the same principle applies
G.R. No. 118127             April 12, 2005

CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in
his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, in their capacity as councilors of the City of
Manila, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.

seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch the validity of Ordinance
No. 7783 (the Ordinance) of the City of Manila.4
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of
operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. 5 

MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order (RTC Petition) 
7 

MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited
establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. 8

Enacted by the City Council on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor
9 

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING

CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-
MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES. 10

The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:

SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding, no person,
partnership, corporation or entity shall, in the Ermita-Malate area bounded by Teodoro M. Kalaw Sr.
Street in the North, Taft Avenue in the East, Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas Boulevard in the West,
pursuant to P.D. 499 be allowed or authorized to contract and engage in, any business providing
certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in
entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect
the social and moral welfare of the community, such as but not limited to:

1. Sauna Parlors
2. Massage Parlors
3. Karaoke Bars
4. Beerhouses
5. Night Clubs
6. Day Clubs
7. Super Clubs
8. Discotheques
9. Cabarets
10. Dance Halls
11. Motels
12. Inns
SEC. 2 The City Mayor, the City Treasurer or any person acting in behalf of the said officials are
prohibited from issuing permits, temporary or otherwise, or from granting licenses and accepting
payments for the operation of business enumerated in the preceding section.
SEC. 3. Owners and/or operator of establishments engaged in, or devoted to, the businesses
enumerated in Section 1 hereof are hereby given three (3) months from the date of approval of this
ordinance within which to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the
Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the
area, such as but not limited to: ALLOWED
1. Curio or antique shop
2. Souvenir Shops
3. Handicrafts display centers
4. Art galleries
5. Records and music shops
6. Restaurants
7. Coffee shops
8. Flower shops
9. Music lounge and sing-along restaurants, with well-defined activities for wholesome family
entertainment that cater to both local and foreign clientele.
10. Theaters engaged in the exhibition, not only of motion pictures but also of cultural shows, stage
and theatrical plays, art exhibitions, concerts and the like.
 11. Businesses allowable within the law and medium intensity districts as provided for in the zoning
ordinances for Metropolitan Manila, except new warehouse or open-storage depot, dock or yard,
motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery, or funeral
establishments.

SEC. 4. Any person violating any provisions of this ordinance, shall upon conviction, be punished
by imprisonment of one (1) year or fine of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, or both, violation
and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked
permanently.

MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its enumeration of prohibited
establishments, motels and inns such as MTDC's Victoria Court considering that these were not establishments for
"amusement" or "entertainment" and they were not "services or facilities for entertainment," nor did they use women
as "tools for entertainment," and neither did they "disturb the community," "annoy the inhabitants" or "adversely
affect the social and moral welfare of the community." 11

MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional for the following reasons:

(1) The City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as the Local Government Code of 1991 grants
to the City Council only the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns,
pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments;

(2) The Ordinance is void as it is violative of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 499 which specifically declared portions
13 

of the Ermita-Malate area as a commercial zone with certain restrictions;

(3) The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power as the compulsory closure of the motel
business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected;

(4) The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by punishing the operation of Victoria Court which was a
legitimate business prior to its enactment;

(5) The Ordinance violates MTDC's constitutional rights in that: (a) it is confiscatory and constitutes an invasion of
plaintiff's property rights; (b) the City Council has no power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance per
se nor does it have the power to extrajudicially destroy it; and

(6) The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law as no reasonable basis exists for
prohibiting the operation of motels and inns, but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar
establishments, and for prohibiting said business in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. 14

Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Local Government Code, which  reads,  thus:
16 

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the
legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

....

(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order to promote
the general welfare and for said purpose shall:

....

(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement
facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public
dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement;
regulate such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which
 tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of
the same; or, prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and
moral welfare of the community.

Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr. (Judge Laguio) issued an ex-parte temporary restraining order against the
enforcement of the Ordinance

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 778[3], of the City of Manila null and
void,

The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra
vires and therefore null and void.

it  must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. 37

The Code empowers the legislative bodies to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the province/city/municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the
proper exercise of the corporate powers of the province/city/ municipality provided under the Code. 42 

The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.

The Ordinance contravenes

the Constitution

In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is
unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.

The relevant constitutional provisions are the following:

SEC. 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion
of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy. 44

SEC. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men. 45

SEC. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of laws. 46

Sec. 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. 47

A. The Ordinance infringes
the Due Process Clause

The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat "(N)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law. . . ."48

The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights
of the people to due process and equal protection of the law.

Requisites for the valid exercise

of Police Power are not met

The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the
community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City
Council's police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly
oppressive.

It is undoubtedly one of the fundamental duties of the City of Manila to make all reasonable regulations looking to
the promotion of the moral and social values of the community. However, the worthy aim of fostering public morals
and the eradication of the community's social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it
can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of
businesses or their conversion into businesses "allowed" under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the
accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per
se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social
ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.

The City Council instead should regulate human conduct that occurs inside the establishments, but not to the
detriment of liberty and privacy which are covenants, premiums and blessings of democracy.

While petitioners' earnestness at curbing clearly objectionable social ills is commendable, they unwittingly punish
even the proprietors and operators of "wholesome," "innocent" establishments. In the instant case, there is a clear
invasion of personal or property rights,

Means employed are

constitutionally infirm

It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the
governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person's fundamental right
to liberty and property.

Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary
restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the
citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his
Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." In accordance with this case, the
68 

rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his
livelihood by any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty. 69

Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from unlawful government restraint; it must include
privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is the beginning of all freedomit is the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. 74

Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be
justified by a compelling state interest.

Modality employed is
unlawful taking

In addition, the Ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial
use of its property. The Ordinance in Section 1 thereof forbids the running of the enumerated businesses in the
77 

Ermita-Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its owners/operators to wind up business operations or to transfer
outside the area or convert said businesses into allowed businesses. An ordinance which permanently restricts the
use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized
as a taking of the property without just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of
78 

individuals.

The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9, that "private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation."

A restriction on use of property may also constitute a "taking" if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a
substantial public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the distinct investment-backed expectations of the
owner. 88
It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that
interferes with reasonable expectations for use.

The penalty of closure likewise constitutes unlawful taking that should be compensated by the government. The
burden on the owner to convert or transfer his business, otherwise it will be closed permanently after a subsequent
violation should be borne by the public as this end benefits them as a whole.

Worthy of note is an example derived from the U.S. of a reasonable regulation which is a far cry from the ill-
considered Ordinance enacted by the City Council.

The case of Ermita Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, it needs pointing
96 

out, is also different from this case in that what was involved therein was a measure which regulated the mode in
which motels may conduct business in order to put an end to practices which could encourage vice and immorality.
Necessarily, there was no valid objection on due process or equal protection grounds as the ordinance did not
prohibit motels. The Ordinance in this case however is not a regulatory measure but is an exercise of an assumed
power to prohibit.97

The foregoing premises show that the Ordinance is an unwarranted and unlawful curtailment of property and
personal rights of citizens. For being unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, even under the guise
of exercising police power, be upheld as valid.

B.  The Ordinance violates Equal

Protection Clause

Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification is reasonable, the law may
operate only on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection clause. The classification
103 

must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:

1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.

2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.

3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.

4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. 104

In the Court's view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging
houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and
usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension
houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments.

C.    The Ordinance is repugnant

to general laws; it is ultra vires

The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code as the latter merely empowers local government units to regulate,
and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.

The power of the City Council to regulate by ordinances the establishment, operation, and maintenance of motels,
hotels and other similar establishments is found in Section 458 (a) 4 (iv), which provides that:

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the
legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

.  .  .
 (4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order to promote
the general welfare and for said purpose shall:

.  .  .

(iv) Regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels,
motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and
transports .  .  .  .

.  .  .

(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement
facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public
dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement;
regulate such other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which
tend to disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of
the same; or, prohibit certain forms of amusement or entertainment in order to protect the social and
moral welfare of the community.

Clearly, with respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and
other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to
promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the
establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments.

It is well to recall the rulings of the Court in Kwong Sing v. City of Manila that:
106 

The word "regulate," as used in subsection (l), section 2444 of the Administrative Code, means and includes
the power to control, to govern, and to restrain; but "regulate" should not be construed as synonymous with
"suppress" or "prohibit."

The several powers of the City Council as provided in Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code, it is pertinent to
emphasize, are separated by semi-colons (;), the use of which indicates that the clauses in which these powers are
set forth are independent of each other albeit closely related to justify being put together in a single enumeration or
paragraph. These powers, therefore, should not be confused, commingled or consolidated as to create a
111 

conglomerated and unified power of regulation, suppression and prohibition. 112

The Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms of amusement or entertainment subject to
regulation among which are beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar
establishments (Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)), public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths, massage parlors,
and other places for entertainment or amusement (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)). This enumeration therefore cannot be
included as among "other events or activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to
disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants" or "certain forms of amusement or entertainment" which the City
Council may suspend, suppress or prohibit.

IMPORTANT
The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are expressly granted to it and those which are necessarily
implied or incidental to the exercise thereof.  By reason of its limited powers and the nature thereof, said powers are
to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting said powers
must be construed against the City Council. 113 

Moreover, it is a general rule in statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or
consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. Expressio unius est exclusio alterium.
This maxim is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of human mind. It is particularly applicable in
the construction of such statutes as create new rights or remedies, impose penalties or punishments, or otherwise
come under the rule of strict construction. 114

On the second point, it suffices to say that the Code being a later expression of the legislative will must necessarily
prevail and override the earlier law, the Revised Charter of Manila. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant, or
later statute repeals prior ones which are repugnant thereto. As between two laws on the same subject matter,
which are irreconcilably inconsistent, that which is passed later prevails, since it is the latest expression of legislative
will. If there is an inconsistency or repugnance between two statutes, both relating to the same subject matter,
116 

which cannot be removed by any fair and reasonable method of interpretation, it is the latest expression of the
legislative will which must prevail and override the earlier.117

Implied repeals are those which take place when a subsequently enacted law contains provisions contrary to those
of an existing law but no provisions expressly repealing them. Such repeals have been divided into two general
classes: those which occur where an act is so inconsistent or irreconcilable with an existing prior act that only one of
the two can remain in force and those which occur when an act covers the whole subject of an earlier act and is
intended to be a substitute therefor. The validity of such a repeal is sustained on the ground that the latest
expression of the legislative will should prevail. 118

In addition, Section 534(f) of the Code states that "All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with
any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." Thus, submitting to petitioners'
interpretation that the Revised Charter of Manila empowers the City Council to prohibit motels, that portion of the
Charter stating such must be considered repealed by the Code as it is at variance with the latter's provisions
granting the City Council mere regulatory powers.

It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the
abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects
the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It
can not be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community. It is a
legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A
motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention. 119

Notably, the City Council was conferred powers to prevent and prohibit certain activities and establishments in
another section of the Code which is reproduced as follows:

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the
legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city government, and in
this connection, shall:

.  .  .

(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose  appropriate penalties for habitual
drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy,  prostitution, establishment and maintenance of     
houses of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of chance,  fraudulent devices and ways to obtain
money or property, drug addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the
printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic materials or publications, and such other
activities inimical  to the welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city;

.  .  .

If it were the intention of Congress to confer upon the City Council the power to prohibit the establishments
enumerated in Section 1 of the Ordinance, it would have so declared in uncertain terms by adding them to the list of
the matters it may prohibit under the above-quoted Section. The Ordinance now vainly attempts to lump these
establishments with houses of ill-repute and expand the City Council's powers in the second and third clauses of
Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code in an effort to overreach its prohibitory powers. It is evident that these
establishments may only be regulated in their establishment, operation and maintenance.

It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from the establishments themselves. That these
establishments are recognized legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from another Section of the Code. Section 131
under the Title on Local Government Taxation expressly mentioned proprietors or operators of massage clinics,
sauna, Turkish and Swedish baths, hotels, motels and lodging houses as among the "contractors" defined in
paragraph (h) thereof.  The same Section also defined "amusement" as a "pleasurable diversion and
entertainment," "synonymous to relaxation, avocation, pastime or fun;" and "amusement places" to include
"theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement where one seeks admission to entertain
oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances." Thus, it can be inferred that the Code considers these
establishments as legitimate enterprises and activities.

It is well to recall the maxim reddendo singula singulis which means that words in different parts of a statute must be
referred to their appropriate connection, giving to each in its place, its proper force and effect, and, if possible,
rendering none of them useless or superfluous, even if strict grammatical construction demands otherwise.
Likewise, where words under consideration appear in different sections or are widely dispersed throughout an act
the same principle applies. 120

Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. As
correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial
area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except
warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any
machinery or funeral establishment.

The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the
council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law.

Petitioners contend that the Ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity. While this may be the rule, it has already
been held that although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance, such
presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the
ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence. The exercise of police power by the local government is valid
unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy
or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right. 124

Conclusion

The Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is
constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it
is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be
forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and
void.

Concededly, the challenged Ordinance was enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the public
for the cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of its social sins. Police power legislation of such character deserves the
full endorsement of the judiciary we reiterate our support for it. But inspite of its virtuous aims, the enactment of
the Ordinance has no statutory or constitutional authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies, in this case, the City
Council, cannot prohibit the operation of the enumerated establishments under Section 1 thereof or order their
transfer or conversion without infringing the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of laws
not even under the guise of police power.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Regional Trial Court declaring
the Ordinance void is AFFIRMED.  Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.