People v.
Manantan
GR L-14129, 31 July 1962 (5 SCRA 684)
Facts: In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of that Province, Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54
of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the
finding of a probable cause that the crime charged was committed by the defendant. Thereafter,
the trial started upon defendant’s plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information
on the ground that as justice of the peace, the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, holding
that a justice of the peace is within the purview of Section 54. A second motion was filed by
defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in People
vs. Macaraeg, where it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on various motions and pleadings, the lower
court dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case
cited by the defense. Hence, the appeal by the Solicitor General.
Issue: Whether the justice of the peace was excluded from the coverage of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code
Held: Under the rule of Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est, a person, object or thing omitted
from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. The maxim “casus
omisus” can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. The
application of the rule of “casus omisus” does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is
criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing
has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. Substitution of terms is not omission. For in its
most extensive sense the term “judge” includes all officers appointed to decide litigated
questions while acting in that capacity, including justice of the peace, and even jurors, it is said,
who are judges of facts. The intention of the Legislature did not exclude the justice of the peace
from its operation. In Section 54, there is no necessity to include the justice of peace in the
enumeration, as previously made in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, as the
legislature has availed itself of the more generic and broader term “judge,” including therein all
kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, judges of the courts of Agrarian
Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.
The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order entered by the trial court and remanded the case
for trial on the merits.
Philippine British Assurance Co. vs. IAC
Facts:
Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money against Varian
Industrial Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. During the pendency of
the suit, private respondent succeeded in attaching some of the properties of Varian Industrial
Corporation upon the posting of a supersedeas bond. The latter in turn posted a counterbond in
the sum of P1,400,000.00 thru petitioner Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc. Respondent
Court ordered the execution pending appeal as prayed for. However, the writ of execution was
returned unsatisfied as Varian failed to deliver the previously attached personal properties upon
demand. Sycwin prayed that the surety (herein petitioner) be ordered to pay the value of its bond.
Issue:
whether an order of execution pending appeal of a judgment maybe enforced on the said bond.
Ruling:
It is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.
Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguere debemos."The rule, founded on logic, is a corollary
of the principle that general words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their
natural and general significance. The rule requires that a general term or phrase should not be
reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion from the
operation of the law. In other words, there should be no distinction in the application of a statute
where none is indicated. For courts are not authorized to distinguish where the law makes no
distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be but as they
find it and without regard to consequences.
A corollary of the principle is the rule that where the law does not make any exception, courts
may not except something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to
justify it. Thus where a statute grants a person against whom possession of "any land" is
unlawfully withheld the right to bring an action for unlawful detainer, this Court held that the
phrase "any land" includes all kinds of land, whether agricultural, residential, or mineral. Since
the law in this case does not make any distinction nor intended to make any exception, when it
speaks of "any judgment" which maybe charged against the counterbond, it should be interpreted
to refer not only to a final and executory judgment in the case but also a judgment pending
appeal.
Petition dismissed for lack of merit.
