G.R. No.

L-75697 June 18, 1987

VALENTIN TIO doing business under the name and style of OMI ENTERPRISES,
petitioner,
vs.
VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, MINISTER OF FINANCE, METRO MANILA
COMMISSION, CITY MAYOR and CITY TREASURER OF MANILA, respondents.

Nelson Y. Ng for petitioner.

The City Legal Officer for respondents City Mayor and City Treasurer.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

This petition was filed on September 1, 1986 by petitioner on his own behalf and
purportedly on behalf of other videogram operators adversely affected. It assails the
constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the
videogram industry (hereinafter briefly referred to as the BOARD). The Decree was
promulgated on October 5, 1985 and took effect on April 10, 1986, fifteen (15) days
after completion of its publication in the Official Gazette.

On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of the abovementioned decree,

Presidential Decree No. 1994 amended the National Internal Revenue Code providing,
inter alia:

SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on each processed video-tape
cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided,
That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax.

On October 23, 1986, the Greater Manila Theaters Association, Integrated Movie
Producers, Importers and Distributors Association of the Philippines, and Philippine
Motion Pictures Producers Association, hereinafter collectively referred to as the
Intervenors, were permitted by the Court to intervene in the case, over petitioner's
opposition, upon the allegations that intervention was necessary for the complete
protection of their rights and that their "survival and very existence is threatened by the
unregulated proliferation of film piracy." The Intervenors were thereafter allowed to file
their Comment in Intervention.

The rationale behind the enactment of the DECREE, is set out in its preambular clauses
as follows:

1. WHEREAS, the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including,

among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation
thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of moviehouses and theaters, and have
 caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a
tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other
taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in
government revenues;

2. WHEREAS, videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per

annum from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and such earnings have not
been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in
taxes each year;

3. WHEREAS, the unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected

the viability of the movie industry, particularly the more than 1,200 movie houses and
theaters throughout the country, and occasioned industry-wide displacement and
unemployment due to the shutdown of numerous moviehouses and theaters;

4. "WHEREAS, in order to ensure national economic recovery, it is imperative for the

Government to create an environment conducive to growth and development of all
business industries, including the movie industry which has an accumulated investment
of about P3 Billion;

5. WHEREAS, proper taxation of the activities of videogram establishments will not only
alleviate the dire financial condition of the movie industry upon which more than 75,000
families and 500,000 workers depend for their livelihood, but also provide an additional
source of revenue for the Government, and at the same time rationalize the heretofore
uncontrolled distribution of videograms;

6. WHEREAS, the rampant and unregulated showing of obscene videogram features

constitutes a clear and present danger to the moral and spiritual well-being of the youth,
and impairs the mandate of the Constitution for the State to support the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character and promote their
physical, intellectual, and social well-being;

7. WHEREAS, civic-minded citizens and groups have called for remedial measures to
curb these blatant malpractices which have flaunted our censorship and copyright laws;

8. WHEREAS, in the face of these grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the
people and betraying the national economic recovery program, bold emergency
measures must be adopted with dispatch; ... (Numbering of paragraphs supplied).

Petitioner's attack on the constitutionality of the DECREE rests on the following

grounds:

1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the
local government is a RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject matter thereof;

2. The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of trade
in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution;

3. There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast powers
conferred upon him by Amendment No. 6;

4. There is undue delegation of power and authority;

 5. The Decree is an ex-post facto law; and

6. There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance, which it is not.

We shall consider the foregoing objections in seriatim.

1. The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof" 1 is sufficiently complied with if the title be
comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to
achieve. It is not necessary that the title express each and every end that the statute
wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are
related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they
are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. 2 An act having a
single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no
matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to
the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing
for the method and means of carrying out the general object." 3 The rule also is that the
constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly construed as
to cripple or impede the power of legislation. 4 It should be given practical rather than
technical construction. 5

Tested by the foregoing criteria, petitioner's contention that the tax provision of the
DECREE is a rider is without merit. That section reads, inter alia:

Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. — Notwithstanding any

provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of
the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition
of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program.
Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and
the other fifty percent (50%) shall acrrue to the municipality where the tax is collected;
PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the
City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.

xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of, the general object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of the
video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The tax
provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool
for regulation 6 it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered
throughout the DECREE. The express purpose of the DECREE to include taxation of
the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled
distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5, supra. Those preambles
explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the measure. The title of the
DECREE, which is the creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, is comprehensive
enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its
provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives in the title or that the latter
be an index to the body of the DECREE. 7
2. Petitioner also submits that the thirty percent (30%) tax imposed is harsh and
oppressive, confiscatory, and in restraint of trade. However, it is beyond serious
question that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages,
or even definitely deters the activities taxed. 8 The power to impose taxes is one so
unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare
that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the discretion of the
authority which exercises it. 9 In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its
constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive
taxation. 10

The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure
prompted by the realization that earnings of videogram establishments of around P600
million per annum have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of
an additional source of revenue. It is an end-user tax, imposed on retailers for every
videogram they make available for public viewing. It is similar to the 30% amusement
tax imposed or borne by the movie industry which the theater-owners pay to the
government, but which is passed on to the entire cost of the admission ticket, thus
shifting the tax burden on the buying or the viewing public. It is a tax that is imposed
uniformly on all videogram operators.

The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the
need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy,
the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic
video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie
industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.

The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the
legislature to impose the tax was to favor one industry over another. 11

It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and
it has been repeatedly held that "inequities which result from a singling out of one
particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation". 12 Taxation
has been made the implement of the state's police power. 13

At bottom, the rate of tax is a matter better addressed to the taxing legislature.

3. Petitioner argues that there was no legal nor factual basis for the promulgation of the
DECREE by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution
providing that "whenever in the judgment of the President ... , there exists a grave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang
Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any
matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order
to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instructions,
which shall form part of the law of the land."

In refutation, the Intervenors and the Solicitor General's Office aver that the 8th
"whereas" clause sufficiently summarizes the justification in that grave emergencies
corroding the moral values of the people and betraying the national economic recovery
program necessitated bold emergency measures to be adopted with dispatch. Whatever
the reasons "in the judgment" of the then President, considering that the issue of the
validity of the exercise of legislative power under the said Amendment still pends
resolution in several other cases, we reserve resolution of the question raised at the
proper time.

4. Neither can it be successfully argued that the DECREE contains an undue delegation
of legislative power. The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to the BOARD
to "solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the government and
deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the heads or personnel of such agencies and
units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is not a delegation of the power to
legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its execution,
enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be
made." 14 Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to
solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized agencies
concerned being "subject to the direction and control of the BOARD." That the grant of
such authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the
DECREE as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will
not be without adequate remedy in law.

5. The DECREE is not violative of the ex post facto principle. An ex post facto law is,
among other categories, one which "alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes
conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense." It is petitioner's position that Section 15 of the DECREE in
providing that:

All videogram establishments in the Philippines are hereby given a period of forty-five
(45) days after the effectivity of this Decree within which to register with and secure a
permit from the BOARD to engage in the videogram business and to register with the
BOARD all their inventories of videograms, including videotapes, discs, cassettes or
other technical improvements or variations thereof, before they could be sold, leased, or
otherwise disposed of. Thereafter any videogram found in the possession of any person
engaged in the videogram business without the required proof of registration by the
BOARD, shall be prima facie evidence of violation of the Decree, whether the possession
of such videogram be for private showing and/or public exhibition.

raises immediately a prima facie evidence of violation of the DECREE when the
required proof of registration of any videogram cannot be presented and thus partakes
of the nature of an ex post facto law.

The argument is untenable. As this Court held in the recent case of Vallarta vs. Court of
Appeals, et al. 15
 ... it is now well settled that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law
providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption
founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be
sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence" (People vs. Mingoa 92 Phil. 856
[1953] at 858-59, citing 1 COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS, 639-641). And the "legislature may enact that when certain facts have
been proved that they shall be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the
accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be a rational connection between
the facts proved and the ultimate facts presumed so that the inference of the one from
proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection
between the two in common experience". 16

Applied to the challenged provision, there is no question that there is a rational

connection between the fact proved, which is non-registration, and the ultimate fact
presumed which is violation of the DECREE, besides the fact that the prima facie
presumption of violation of the DECREE attaches only after a forty-five-day period
counted from its effectivity and is, therefore, neither retrospective in character.

6. We do not share petitioner's fears that the video industry is being over-regulated and
being eased out of existence as if it were a nuisance. Being a relatively new industry,
the need for its regulation was apparent. While the underlying objective of the DECREE
is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at
bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film
piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the
availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films
and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the
drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video
establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and
municipal license fees are required to engage in business. 17

The enactment of the Decree since April 10, 1986 has not brought about the "demise"
of the video industry. On the contrary, video establishments are seen to have
proliferated in many places notwithstanding the 30% tax imposed.

In the last analysis, what petitioner basically questions is the necessity, wisdom and
expediency of the DECREE. These considerations, however, are primarily and
exclusively a matter of legislative concern.

Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be
the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of
separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each
department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion
not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate
branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as
there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants
submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms
and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar
as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent on its wisdom cannot be sustained.
18
In fine, petitioner has not overcome the presumption of validity which attaches to a
challenged statute. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us
in pronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 17122             February 27, 1922

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANG TANG HO, defendant-appellant.

Williams & Ferrier for appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.

JOHNS, J.:

At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act
penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under
extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the
Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and
regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose," the material provisions of
which are as follows:

Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any cause,

conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to
issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Council of State, temporary rules and
emergency measures for carrying out the purpose of this Act, to wit:

(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice or corn.

(b) To establish and maintain a government control of the distribution or sale of the
commodities referred to or have such distribution or sale made by the Government itself.

(c) To fix, from time to time the quantities of palay rice, or corn that a company or
individual may acquire, and the maximum sale price that the industrial or merchant may
demand.

(d) . . .
 SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful to destroy, limit, prevent or in any other manner obstruct the
production or milling of palay, rice or corn for the purpose of raising the prices thereof;
to corner or hoard said products as defined in section three of this Act; . . .

Section 3 defines what shall constitute a monopoly or hoarding of palay, rice or corn within the
meaning of this Act, but does not specify the price of rice or define any basic for fixing the price.

SEC. 4. The violations of any of the provisions of this Act or of the regulations, orders
and decrees promulgated in accordance therewith shall be punished by a fine of not more
than five thousands pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both, in
the discretion of the court: Provided, That in the case of companies or corporations the
manager or administrator shall be criminally liable.

SEC. 7. At any time that the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State,
shall consider that the public interest requires the application of the provisions of this
Act, he shall so declare by proclamation, and any provisions of other laws inconsistent
herewith shall from then on be temporarily suspended.

Upon the cessation of the reasons for which such proclamation was issued, the Governor-
General, with the consent of the Council of State, shall declare the application of this Act
to have likewise terminated, and all laws temporarily suspended by virtue of the same
shall again take effect, but such termination shall not prevent the prosecution of any
proceedings or cause begun prior to such termination, nor the filing of any proceedings
for an offense committed during the period covered by the Governor-General's
proclamation.

August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice
should be sold.

August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with
the sale of rice at an excessive price as follows:

The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of Executive Order No. 53 of the
Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, in relation with the
provisions of sections 1, 2 and 4 of Act No. 2868, committed as follows:

That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands,
the said Ang Tang Ho, voluntarily, illegally and criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one
ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P.80), which is a price greater than that fixed
by Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of
August, 1919, under the authority of section 1 of Act No. 2868. Contrary to law.

Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months' imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P500, from which he appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court erred in
finding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in finding the accused
guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing the sentence.
The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was approved
July 30, 1919; that the Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919;
and that the law was first published on the 13th of August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself
was first published on the 20th of August, 1919.

The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it
authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be noted
that section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, for any
cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to issue and promulgate
temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes of the Act. By its very
terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures is left to the discretion of
the Governor-General. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what
conditions or for what reasons the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it
may be issued "for any cause," and leaves the question as to what is "any cause" to the discretion
of the Governor-General. The Act also says: "For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn." The Legislature does not specify or define
what is "an extraordinary rise." That is also left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The
Act also says that the Governor-General, "with the consent of the Council of State," is authorized
to issue and promulgate "temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purposes
of this Act." It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure, or
how long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when
they shall take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or
defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole judgement and discretion of the
Governor-General to say what is or what is not "a cause," and what is or what is not "an
extraordinary rise in the price of rice," and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency
measure for the carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid
and the Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price at which rice should
be sold, any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal. There
may not have been any cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and there may not
have been an emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the existence of such facts and
issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller commits a crime.

By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United States all powers
are vested in the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of the Legislature to make
the law; of the Executive to execute the law; and of the Judiciary to construe the law. The
Legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the Executive has no authority to
make or construe the law, and the Judiciary has no power to make or execute the law. Subject to
the Constitution only, the power of each branch is supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is
for the Judiciary only to say when any Act of the Legislature is or is not constitutional.
Assuming, without deciding, that the Legislature itself has the power to fix the price at which
rice is to be sold, can it delegate that power to another, and, if so, was that power legally
delegated by Act No. 2868? In other words, does the Act delegate legislative power to the
Governor-General? By the Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and
the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-
General, or any one else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law.
If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize
the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the
Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other
hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act
remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-
General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.

The Supreme Court of the United States in what is known as the Granger Cases (94 U.S., 183-
187; 24 L. ed., 94), first laid down the rule:

Railroad companies are engaged in a public employment affecting the public interest and,
under the decision in Munn vs. Ill., ante, 77, are subject to legislative control as to their
rates of fare and freight unless protected by their charters.

The Illinois statute of Mar. 23, 1874, to establish reasonable maximum rates of charges
for the transportation of freights and passengers on the different railroads of the State is
not void as being repugnant to the Constitution of the United States or to that of the State.

It was there for the first time held in substance that a railroad was a public utility, and that, being
a public utility, the State had power to establish reasonable maximum freight and passenger
rates. This was followed by the State of Minnesota in enacting a similar law, providing for, and
empowering, a railroad commission to hear and determine what was a just and reasonable rate.
The constitutionality of this law was attacked and upheld by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in
a learned and exhaustive opinion by Justice Mitchell, in the case of State vs. Chicago, Milwaukee
& St. Paul ry. Co. (38 Minn., 281), in which the court held:

Regulations of railway tariffs — Conclusiveness of commission's tariffs. — Under Laws

1887, c. 10, sec. 8, the determination of the railroad and warehouse commission as to
what are equal and reasonable fares and rates for the transportation of persons and
property by a railway company is conclusive, and, in proceedings by mandamus to
compel compliance with the tariff of rates recommended and published by them, no issue
can be raised or inquiry had on that question.

Same — constitution — Delegation of power to commission. — The authority thus given

to the commission to determine, in the exercise of their discretion and judgement, what
are equal and reasonable rates, is not a delegation of legislative power.

It will be noted that the law creating the railroad commission expressly provides —

That all charges by any common carrier for the transportation of passengers and property
shall be equal and reasonable.

With that as a basis for the law, power is then given to the railroad commission to investigate all
the facts, to hear and determine what is a just and reasonable rate. Even then that law does not
make the violation of the order of the commission a crime. The only remedy is a civil
proceeding. It was there held —
 That the legislative itself has the power to regulate railroad charges is now too well
settled to require either argument or citation of authority.

The difference between the power to say what the law shall be, and the power to adopt
rules and regulations, or to investigate and determine the facts, in order to carry into
effect a law already passed, is apparent. The true distinction is between the delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
the conferring an authority or discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the
law.

The legislature enacts that all freights rates and passenger fares should be just and
reasonable. It had the undoubted power to fix these rates at whatever it deemed equal and
reasonable.

They have not delegated to the commission any authority or discretion as to what the law
shall be, — which would not be allowable, — but have merely conferred upon it an
authority and discretion, to be exercised in the execution of the law, and under and in
pursuance of it, which is entirely permissible. The legislature itself has passed upon the
expediency of the law, and what is shall be. The commission is intrusted with no
authority or discretion upon these questions. It can neither make nor unmake a single
provision of law. It is merely charged with the administration of the law, and with no
other power.

The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Dowling vs.
Lancoshire Ins. Co. (92 Wis., 63). The opinion says:

"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made."

The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy
should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all
others, without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to maters involving
the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act
could not possibly be put in use as an act in confirmity to which all fire insurance policies were
required to be issued.

The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in all its terms and
provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and nothing must be left to
the judgement of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form
and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in
futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

The delegation of legislative power was before the Supreme Court in United States vs. Grimaud
(220 U.S., 506; 55 L. ed., 563), where it was held that the rules and regulations of the Secretary
of Agriculture as to a trespass on government land in a forest reserve were valid constitutional.
The Act there provided that the Secretary of Agriculture ". . . may make such rules and
regulations and establish such service as will insure the object of such reservations; namely, to
regulate their occupancy and use, and to preserve the forests thereon from destruction; and any
violation of the provisions of this act or such rules and regulations shall be punished, . . ."

The brief of the United States Solicitor-General says:

In refusing permits to use a forest reservation for stock grazing, except upon stated terms
or in stated ways, the Secretary of Agriculture merely assert and enforces the proprietary
right of the United States over land which it owns. The regulation of the Secretary,
therefore, is not an exercise of legislative, or even of administrative, power; but is an
ordinary and legitimate refusal of the landowner's authorized agent to allow person
having no right in the land to use it as they will. The right of proprietary control is
altogether different from governmental authority.

The opinion says:

From the beginning of the government, various acts have been passed conferring upon
executive officers power to make rules and regulations, — not for the government of
their departments, but for administering the laws which did govern. None of these
statutes could confer legislative power. But when Congress had legislated power. But
when Congress had legislated and indicated its will, it could give to those who were to
act under such general provisions "power to fill up the details" by the establishment of
administrative rules and regulations, the violation of which could be punished by fine or
imprisonment fixed by Congress, or by penalties fixed by Congress, or measured by the
injury done.

That "Congress cannot delegate legislative power is a principle universally recognized as

vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the
Constitution."

If, after the passage of the act and the promulgation of the rule, the defendants drove and
grazed their sheep upon the reserve, in violation of the regulations, they were making an
unlawful use of the government's property. In doing so they thereby made themselves
liable to the penalty imposed by Congress.

The subjects as to which the Secretary can regulate are defined. The lands are set apart as a forest
reserve. He is required to make provisions to protect them from depredations and from harmful
uses. He is authorized 'to regulate the occupancy and use and to preserve the forests from
destruction.' A violation of reasonable rules regulating the use and occupancy of the property is
made a crime, not by the Secretary, but by Congress."

The above are leading cases in the United States on the question of delegating legislative power.
It will be noted that in the "Granger Cases," it was held that a railroad company was a public
corporation, and that a railroad was a public utility, and that, for such reasons, the legislature had
the power to fix and determine just and reasonable rates for freight and passengers.

The Minnesota case held that, so long as the rates were just and reasonable, the legislature could
delegate the power to ascertain the facts and determine from the facts what were just and
reasonable rates,. and that in vesting the commission with such power was not a delegation of
legislative power.

The Wisconsin case was a civil action founded upon a "Wisconsin standard policy of fire
insurance," and the court held that "the act, . . . wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what
the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to
take the place of all others, without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to
matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated."

The case of the United States Supreme Court, supra dealt with rules and regulations which were
promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture for Government land in the forest reserve.

These decisions hold that the legislative only can enact a law, and that it cannot delegate it
legislative authority.

The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of legislative power is pointed
out and clearly defined. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says:

That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to any other
department of the government, executive or judicial, is a fundamental principle in
constitutional law, essential to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government
established by the constitution.

Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of itself, it may
be provided that it shall become operative only upon some certain act or event, or, in like
manner, that its operation shall be suspended.

The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate
a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to
make, its own action to depend.

The Village of Little Chute enacted an ordinance which provides:

All saloons in said village shall be closed at 11 o'clock P.M. each day and remain closed
until 5 o'clock on the following morning, unless by special permission of the president.

Construing it in 136 Wis., 526; 128 A. S. R., 1100,1 the Supreme Court of that State says:

We regard the ordinance as void for two reasons; First, because it attempts to confer
arbitrary power upon an executive officer, and allows him, in executing the ordinance, to
make unjust and groundless discriminations among persons similarly situated; second,
 because the power to regulate saloons is a law-making power vested in the village board,
which cannot be delegated. A legislative body cannot delegate to a mere administrative
officer power to make a law, but it can make a law with provisions that it shall go into
effect or be suspended in its operations upon the ascertainment of a fact or state of facts
by an administrative officer or board. In the present case the ordinance by its terms gives
power to the president to decide arbitrary, and in the exercise of his own discretion, when
a saloon shall close. This is an attempt to vest legislative discretion in him, and cannot be
sustained.

The legal principle involved there is squarely in point here.

It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. 2868, and before any rules and regulations
were promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, even at a
peso per "ganta," and that he would not commit a crime, because there would be no law fixing
the price of rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime. That is to say, in the
absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that,
if the defendant committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General issued the
proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and
without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to a crime.

The Executive order2 provides:

(5) The maximum selling price of palay, rice or corn is hereby fixed, for the time being as
follows:

In Manila —

Palay at P6.75 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 29 centavos per ganta.

Rice at P15 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 63 centavos per ganta.

Corn at P8 per sack of 57½ kilos, or 34 centavos per ganta.

In the provinces producing palay, rice and corn, the maximum price shall be the Manila
price less the cost of transportation from the source of supply and necessary handling
expenses to the place of sale, to be determined by the provincial treasurers or their
deputies.

In provinces, obtaining their supplies from Manila or other producing provinces, the
maximum price shall be the authorized price at the place of supply or the Manila price as
the case may be, plus the transportation cost, from the place of supply and the necessary
handling expenses, to the place of sale, to be determined by the provincial treasurers or
their deputies.

(6) Provincial treasurers and their deputies are hereby directed to communicate with, and
execute all instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for the
 most effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in their respective
localities.

The law says that the Governor-General may fix "the maximum sale price that the industrial or
merchant may demand." The law is a general law and not a local or special law.

The proclamation undertakes to fix one price for rice in Manila and other and different prices in
other and different provinces in the Philippine Islands, and delegates the power to determine the
other and different prices to provincial treasurers and their deputies. Here, then, you would have
a delegation of legislative power to the Governor-General, and a delegation by him of that power
to provincial treasurers and their deputies, who "are hereby directed to communicate with, and
execute all instructions emanating from the Director of Commerce and Industry, for the most
effective and proper enforcement of the above regulations in their respective localities." The
issuance of the proclamation by the Governor-General was the exercise of the delegation of a
delegated power, and was even a sub delegation of that power.

Assuming that it is valid, Act No. 2868 is a general law and does not authorize the Governor-
General to fix one price of rice in Manila and another price in Iloilo. It only purports to authorize
him to fix the price of rice in the Philippine Islands under a law, which is General and uniform,
and not local or special. Under the terms of the law, the price of rice fixed in the proclamation
must be the same all over the Islands. There cannot be one price at Manila and another at Iloilo.
Again, it is a mater of common knowledge, and of which this court will take judicial notice, that
there are many kinds of rice with different and corresponding market values, and that there is a
wide range in the price, which varies with the grade and quality. Act No. 2868 makes no
distinction in price for the grade or quality of the rice, and the proclamation, upon which the
defendant was tried and convicted, fixes the selling price of rice in Manila "at P15 per sack of
57½ kilos, or 63 centavos per ganta," and is uniform as to all grades of rice, and says nothing
about grade or quality. Again, it will be noted that the law is confined to palay, rice and corn.
They are products of the Philippine Islands. Hemp, tobacco, coconut, chickens, eggs, and many
other things are also products. Any law which single out palay, rice or corn from the numerous
other products of the Islands is not general or uniform, but is a local or special law. If such a law
is valid, then by the same principle, the Governor-General could be authorized by proclamation
to fix the price of meat, eggs, chickens, coconut, hemp, and tobacco, or any other product of the
Islands. In the very nature of things, all of that class of laws should be general and uniform.
Otherwise, there would be an unjust discrimination of property rights, which, under the law,
must be equal and inform. Act No. 2868 is nothing more than a floating law, which, in the
discretion and by a proclamation of the Governor-General, makes it a floating crime to sell rice
at a price in excess of the proclamation, without regard to grade or quality.

When Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General
which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price.
In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the Governor-General to say what
was and what was not "any cause" for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not "an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn," and under certain undefined conditions to
fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether
a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced,
how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature did not
specify or define what was "any cause," or what was "an extraordinary rise in the price of rice,
palay or corn," Neither did it specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation
should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale
was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or
proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and the
defendant is charged with the sale "of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80)
which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53."

We are clearly of the opinion and hold that Act No. 2868, in so far as it undertakes to authorized
the Governor-General in his discretion to issue a proclamation, fixing the price of rice, and to
make the sale of rice in violation of the price of rice, and to make the sale of rice in violation of
the proclamation a crime, is unconstitutional and void.

It may be urged that there was an extraordinary rise in the price of rice and profiteering, which
worked a severe hardship on the poorer classes, and that an emergency existed, but the question
here presented is the constitutionality of a particular portion of a statute, and none of such
matters is an argument for, or against, its constitutionality.

The Constitution is something solid, permanent an substantial. Its stability protects the life,
liberty and property rights of the rich and the poor alike, and that protection ought not to change
with the wind or any emergency condition. The fundamental question involved in this case is the
right of the people of the Philippine Islands to be and live under a republican form of
government. We make the broad statement that no state or nation, living under republican form
of government, under the terms and conditions specified in Act No. 2868, has ever enacted a law
delegating the power to any one, to fix the price at which rice should be sold. That power can
never be delegated under a republican form of government.

In the fixing of the price at which the defendant should sell his rice, the law was not dealing with
government property. It was dealing with private property and private rights, which are sacred
under the Constitution. If this law should be sustained, upon the same principle and for the same
reason, the Legislature could authorize the Governor-General to fix the price of every product or
commodity in the Philippine Islands, and empower him to make it a crime to sell any product at
any other or different price.

It may be said that this was a war measure, and that for such reason the provision of the
Constitution should be suspended. But the Stubborn fact remains that at all times the judicial
power was in full force and effect, and that while that power was in force and effect, such a
provision of the Constitution could not be, and was not, suspended even in times of war. It may
be claimed that during the war, the United States Government undertook to, and did, fix the price
at which wheat and flour should be bought and sold, and that is true. There, the United States had
declared war, and at the time was at war with other nations, and it was a war measure, but it is
also true that in doing so, and as a part of the same act, the United States commandeered all the
wheat and flour, and took possession of it, either actual or constructive, and the government itself
became the owner of the wheat and flour, and fixed the price to be paid for it. That is not this
case. Here the rice sold was the personal and private property of the defendant, who sold it to one
of his customers. The government had not bought and did not claim to own the rice, or have any
interest in it, and at the time of the alleged sale, it was the personal, private property of the
defendant. It may be that the law was passed in the interest of the public, but the members of this
court have taken on solemn oath to uphold and defend the Constitution, and it ought not to be
construed to meet the changing winds or emergency conditions. Again, we say that no state or
nation under a republican form of government ever enacted a law authorizing any executive,
under the conditions states, to fix the price at which a price person would sell his own rice, and
make the broad statement that no decision of any court, on principle or by analogy, will ever be
found which sustains the constitutionality of the particular portion of Act No. 2868 here in
question. By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the power to
legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote
of the people of the Philippine Islands. As to the question here involved, the authority of the
Governor-General to fix the maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be sold in the
manner power in violation of the organic law.

This opinion is confined to the particular question here involved, which is the right of the
Governor-General, upon the terms and conditions stated in the Act, to fix the price of rice and
make it a crime to sell it at a higher price, and which holds that portions of the Act
unconstitutional. It does not decide or undertake to construe the constitutionality of any of the
remaining portions of the Act.

The judgment of the lower court is reversed, and the defendant discharged. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Street and Ostrand, JJ., concur.

Romualdez, J., concurs in the result.