Guderian Н. «Achtung — Panzer!

» Die Entwicklung der Panzerwaffe, ihre Kampftaktik

und ihre operativen Möglichkeiten. — Stuttgart, 1937

1914. How did positional warfare come about? Lances against machine-guns 8
Waging war with inadequate weaponry 16
The Genesis of the Tank 23
The birth of a new WEAPON 44
The versailles DIKTAT 91
POST-WAR developments abroad 92
The german mechanized forces 111
Life in the panzer forces 121
The tactics of the panzer forces and their co-operation with the other arms 124
Warfare at the present day 141
The offensive 143
The most recent experience of war 149

Achtung Panzer
1914. How did positional warfare come about?
Lances against machine-

guns
The August sun shone down mercilessly on the low rolling country as it stretched from
the north-west bank of the Meuse at Liege westwards in the general direction of Brus-
sels. Between 5 and 8 August 2nd and 4th Cavalry Divisions, under General von der
Marwitz, crossed the Meuse at Liege on the Dutch-Belgian border, and on 10 August en-
countered numbers of the enemy who were dug in east and south-west of Tirlemont. The
Germans decided to outflank them to the north, and the two divisions were temporarily
disengaged and pulled back on 11 August to the area east of Saint-Trond, where they
rested. The exertions of these first days of the campaign were extremely demanding, and
as early as 6 August the Germans began to run alarmingly short of oats for their horses.
The earlier probing actions had established that the Belgian troops had withdrawn from

Ligne on Tirlemont, and that the Belgian Army would not deploy for action in front of the
line Louvain—Namur. Strong forces and fieldworks were identified behind the line of the
Gette running from Diest through Tirlemont to Judoigne.
From Tirlemont downstream the Gette itself formed an obstacle in its own right and was
augmented by the wet water meadows and a number of drainage ditches; north of Hae-
len they emptied into the Diemer, which flowed from the east by way of Hasselt. Down-
stream from that location the Diemer measured ten metres wide by two metres deep.
Vis-ibility was restricted by rows of trees and hedges, and many of the built-up areas and
fields were divided by wire fences. North of the Diemer a canal (again ten metres wide by
two metres deep) ran almost due north from Hasselt to Turnhout, where the Greater and
Lesser Nethe flowed into the mighty, fortified city-port of Antwerp on the Schelde.
Altogether the terrain and the way it had been developed posed considerable difficulties
in the path of cavalry when it was advancing along the roads; these difficulties became
downright intolerable as soon as the Germans tried to make their way cross-country on
horseback.
On 12 August General von der Marwitz sought to outflank the defended sector of the
Gette by a move northwards in the direction of Diest. With this intention he set 2nd Cav-

alry Division in motion by way of Hasselt, and 4th Cavalry Division (reinforced by 9th Ja-
ger Battalion and the cycle company of 7th Jager Battalion) by way of Alken and Steevort
to Haelen, while reconnaissance patrols crossed an imaginary line running from Hechtel
to Tirlemont by way of Beeringen and Diest. Ten Cavalry Brigade of 4th Cavalry Division
remained at Saint-Trond to protect the left flank, with a reconnaissance squadron posted
further south-west at Landen.

Second Cavalry Division seized a number of weapons in Hasselt, and after some delay it
marched at about noon to Steevort, on the Haelen road. Fourth Cavalry Division had al-
ready arrived at the same location, which meant that both divisions were now formed up
in line ahead on a road which lay uncomfortably close to the enemy front. During the
march General von der Marwitz ordered 4th Cavalry Division to open the passage of the
Gette at Haelen, with 2nd Cavalry Division taking the lead by pushing to Herck-la-Ville
and securing the ground northwards in the direction of Lummen. The patrols reported
that the crossing at Haelen was held by the enemy, and General von Gamier accordingly
brought his artillery into position west of Herck-la-Ville, while he deployed the reinforced
9th Jager Battalion on both sides of the Haelen road, and set 3 Cavalry Brigade the task
of outflanking the enemy to the south. Towards 1300 the Jagers seized the damaged
bridge over the Gette and penetrated to the western end of the village of Haelen. It was
now that the enemy artillery opened up — setting buildings ablaze, sweeping the village
street from end to end, and inflicting the first German casualties. The Germans now rec-
ognized that the heights west of Haelen were occupied by the enemy.
Meanwhile 3 Cavalry Brigade (2nd Cuirassier Regiment and 9th Ulan Regiment) with the
help of their pontoon wagons had made a passage of the Gette at Donck, south of Hae-
len, and were in the process of crossing the river. Seventeen Cavalry Brigade (17th and
18th Dragoon Regiments) had moved up immediately east of Haelen, and had desig-
nated 4th Squadron of the latter regiment as the reconnaissance squadron and sent it in
the direction of the infantry who were deployed and in action on the Haelen-Diest railway,
and the enemy artillery which had been identified at Houthem.
Our own artillery, which so far had given effective support to the attack on Haelen, now
had to change position to accompany the advance. The intended battery sites, which
were just west of Haelen, had first to be captured, and this mission was given to 17th
Dragoons, who were following immediately behind 4th (reconnaissance) Squadron of the
18th.
One event now overtook another with dramatic urgency. Fourth Squadron at once
headed westwards through Haelen in column of fours, with the intention of carrying out
the reconnaisance as had just been ordered. Seventeenth Dragoons came up behind
through the village in the same formation, as a preliminary to exploiting the road which
ran northwest towards Diest. Its two leading squadrons and the staff of the headquarters
meanwhile remained in column of fours along the road, since the hedges and fences pro-
hibited any kind of deployment. Third Squadron got entangled in wire fences and difficult
country west of the road. The direction of the German cavalry was betrayed by a mighty
cloud of dust, and Belgian skirmishers, machine-guns and batteries now opened a con-
centrated fire against the squadrons as they galloped from Haelen in their closed col-
umns. The effect was devastating. Afterwards the remnant of the German cavalry was
assembled at the western edge of Haelen, or just to the south of the village, while individ-
ual dragoons, who had lost their horses, kept up the fight alongside the Jagers.
Meanwhile our artillery had been able to take up position west of Haelen and open fire on
the enemy batteries at Houthem. The Germans hoped to hold down the Belgian artillery
fire sufficiently to permit 18th Dragoons to pass through Haelen in their turn, and then,
debouching by the exit which led south-west towards Velpen, spur on against the

heights. The deployment from column of twos had to be accomplished under a hail of ri-
fle and machine-gun fire. With standards flying the Germans moved into attack formation
with two squadrons making up the first line, and the third in echelon to the left rear, and
in the process the horsemen rolled over the foremost lines of the enemy skirmishers.

Then, however, the attack was shattered by an outburst of violent defensive fire among a
zone of hedges and barbed wire fences. The German losses were extremely heavy.
While these events were unfolding 3 Cavalry Brigade met its own fate. The brigade had
made a successful passage of the Gette at Donck, and it was there that it received the
order to sweep onwards and capture the enemy artillery. Without losing a moment the
regiment of Konigin Cuirassiers galloped through Velpen with a first line of three squad-
rons; this charge too was beaten off with severe losses. The regimental commander re-
newed the attack with the third squadron, which was still intact, and the remnants of the
first two squadrons. It was all in vain, and a third and last effort proved :o be no more
successful.
Just to the right of the cuirassiers 9th Uhlan Regiment was attacking in the direction of
Tuillerie-Ferme, with two squadrons in its first line and two in the second; after the first
line collapsed the second took up the attack, only to meet the same fate. After the failure
of the cavalry assault the push was continued in the direction of Houthem by the Jagers
who, from 1400, had the support of skirmishers from the Leibhusaren Brigade, who had
dismounted for combat on foot. The Germans took Liebroek to the north, and Velpen to
the south.
However the fact remains that for the first time in the war an attempt had been made to
charge modern weapons with cold steel, and the effort had miscarried.
What had the enemy being doing?
From 0500 on 10 August the Belgian cavalry division had been positioned behind the
Gette between Budingen and Diest, with the purpose jf holding that sector and pushing
reconnaissance patrols in the direction of Tongres, Beeringen and Quaedmechelen. The
villages of Budingen, Geet-Betz and Haelen had been put in a state of defence, and all
the bridges over :he Gette had been destroyed except for the two at Haelen and Zelck,
and these had been prepared for demolition. Enemy cavalry patrols had been beaten off.
On the morning of 12 August strong forces of German cavalry were detected on the
march for Hasselt. A request for reinforcements was accordingly made to the Belgian
high command, whereupon 4 Infantry Brigade was put at the disposal of the cavalry divi-
sion and had set out in the direction of Cortenaeken at 0815 on the day of the battle;
without pausing for rest the leading reinforcements accomplished a forced march of
twenty-one kilometres in crushing heat, and at 1600 they arrived on the scene of action
in the form of four weak battalions of infantry and a battery of artillery. This battery was
the first element of the Belgian forces to arrive, and after planting itself at Loxbergen it
had taken up the duel with the German batteries.

The Belgian positions at the beginning of the action are shown on Sketch Map 2. By
1600 most of the reserves had been fed into the infantry fight.
After his 4 Infantry Brigade had arrived, the Belgian divisional commander, General de
Witte, resolved on a counter-attack against Haelen on both sides of the Gette. The as-
sault was broken at Velpen by the fire of the German Jagers, machine-guns, the Leibhu-
saren and the artillery.
Towards 1830 General von der Marwitz broke off the action and assembled his forces
east of the Gette.
Four German cavalry regiments had taken part in the attack, and their losses amounted
to 24 officers, 468 men and 843 horses; total Belgian losses came to ten officers, 117
men and 100 horses.

10

What is notable about the action at Haelen? It represents a commitment of cavalry in

considerable force (if not simultaneously) against defending infantry and artillery. We see
essentially the same outcome in the larger attacks which were launched in the face of en-
emy fire on the other fronts, such as those of the Bavarian Uhlan Brigade at Lagarde on

11 August 1914, or 13th Dragoon Regiment at Borzymie on 12 November. This indicates

that the example of Haelen holds true for many other actions.
The original task of General von der Marwitz had been to advance against the line Ant-
werp - Brussels - Charleroi so as to pin down the Belgian, British and French forces in
Belgium. Nowadays it is fair to pose the question why von der Marwitz, once the Belgians
had been identified behind the Gette south of Diest, did not attempt to strike out north of
the Diemer. If he had succeeded in pinning down the Belgian north wing, he could have
executed the reconnaissance at least as far as the line running from Antwerp to Brussels
and operated against the enemy flanks - whether by an envelopment beyond the Diemer
in co-operation with the corps of First Army, or by making it difficult for the Belgians to
break free in the direction of Antwerp by barring the crossings of the Diemer and the
Dyle. It is also reasonable to ask why the attack on Haelen and the Gette, once it had
been decided, was not carried out on a broader front by the whole of the cavalry corps si-
multaneously, and initially at least by a dismounted assault, so as to win a sufficiently
wide bridgehead, break the cohesion of the defence, and then exploit the speed of the
horses to pursue the shattered enemy.
We discover the answer to these questions when we identify the notions by which the
cavalry in Germany - and indeed in foreign countries as well -were educated, equipped
and trained.
These ideas are expressed most clearly in the last set of pre-war regulations. They are
dated 1909, and the section on tactics opens with the words: 'Mounted action is the pre-
dominant way in which cavalry fights.' Ignoring the lessons of one-and-a-half centuries of
warfare, the authors of the regulations adhered not only to the spirit, but to a consider-
able extent also to the form, of the battle tactics of von Seydlitz [Frederick the Great's
cavalry commander], and they believed that they could brush aside all the intervening de-
velopments which had been dictated by the accelerating march of technology. The equip-
ment and weapons reveal a hankering after the great cavalry battles of the past, while
the training put an excessive emphasis on riding school perfection, drilling in close forma-
tions and the mounted attack.
We have seen the implications for the commanders and troops in the first actions of the
war. We have noted the price that had to be paid in blood. In all probability the reports
that Belgian cavalry were making a stand at Haelen led the Germans to believe that the
enemy were indeed drawing themselves up for mounted combat; the reports also in-
clined the Germans to underestimate the endurance and tactical effectiveness of the Bel-
gian cavalry in dismounted action. Here, as elsewhere, the result was a bloody repulse
which sapped the trust of the troops in their leadership, while exaggerating their respect
for the power of the enemy.
Von Schlieffen painted a picture of the modern battlefield as early as 1909, and it is as
valid now as it was then. 'Not a horseman will be seen. The cavalry will have to accom-
plish its tasks out of range of the infantry and artillery. Breech-loaders and machine-guns
will have banished the cavalryman quite mercilessly from the battlefield.'
On the question of operational reconnaissance by cavalry, the following verdict is deliv-
ered by the Reichsarchiv's Official History: 'It became only too clear at the outset of the
war, and along the whole battlefield, that in peacetime altogether excessive hopes had
been pinned on strategic reconnaissance by large bodies of cavalry. As a general rule
the probing cavalry managed to identify the enemy outpost line, but they were never able

11

tobreak through and ascertain what was going on in the enemy rear areas.' (Reichsarch-
iv, I, 126). In 1914 the high command overestimated the effectiveness of operational re-
connaissance by cavalry, but they neglected the new dimension of reconnaissance of-
fered by aircraft, even though some machines already had a range of more than four
hundred kilometres. The new aviation forces were therefore consigned to the headquar-
ters of the individual armies and corps, and the high command therefore received only a
patchy vision of the enemy deployment (Reichsarchiv, 1,12 7).

The march of the infantry To the sacrifical Altar

The finest army in the world had flooded like a wall of water across the Meuse and deep
into the enemy country to the south. Two months later, when the leaves were falling in
the autumn of 1914, the grey tide was ebbing - mistakes on the part of the high com-
mand, together with heavy losses and logistic problems had combined to bring about an
equilibrium of forces along the whole long front between the northern French border at

Lille and the Swiss mountains. Against this background the German command resolved
to deliver a powerful new blow by fresh forces. It was to be struck in October by our far
right wing in Flanders, and the aims were to prevent the front from sticking fast, and to
seize the chance of victory before it could elude us.
Hundreds of thousands of volunteers had flocked to the colours at the time of the mobili-
zation - lads brimming with enthusiasm, and older men who were ready for any sacrifice
that might be demanded of them. Now, after a sketchy training which rarely lasted more
than six weeks, they were hastening to the newly formed corps and divisions on the vari-
ous fronts. The new Fourth Army was composed of XXII, XXIII, XXVI and XXVII Reserve
Corps, together with III Reserve Corps and 4th Ersatz Division from Antwerp (which al-
ready had some combat experience) and a reasonably strong complement of heavy artil-
lery by the standards of the time. On 17 October the army, began to move from its start-
line running from Bruges to east of Courtrai, and made for the line of the Yser between
Nieuport and Ypres. In all probability no German soldiers had ever gone into battle with
1
such enthusiasm and elan as the men of these young regiments.

On 19 October contact was made with the enemy along the whole frontage of the army,
and on the next day the combat in Flanders, the First Battle of Ypres, began to unfold. In
addition to Fourth Army, attacking on its sector north of the Menin-Ypres road, the offen-
sive was opened simultaneously by the formations adjoining to the south, namely the
bat-tle-tested right-flanking corps of Sixth Army (V, IV and I Cavalry Corps; XIX, XIII, VII
and half of XIV Corps, with II Cavalry Corps behind) which had the task of striking west
and facilitating the advance of the new corps of Fourth Army over to their right.
We now turn to some features of the area designated for the attack. We first trace the
course of the Yser from its mouth on the coast at Nieuport upstream by way of Dixmude
to Noordschoote, and so to the Yser Canal, which runs by way of Steenstraate, Boe-
singhe, Ypres and Hollebeke to Comines. On each side of the Yser, from Dixmude to the
sea, extends a deep polder landscape, some of it lying below sea level, which is inter-
sected by numerous ditches and canals. The level of the water, and if necessary the in-
undation by the sea, is regulated by a system of sluices which has its most important
concentration at Nieuport. Mount Kemmel, 156 metres high, stands south of Ypres. From
here a circlet of ridges extends in a flattish arc through Wytschaete, Hollebeke, Ghelu-
velt, Zonnebeke and Westro-beeke in the direction of Dixmude. This feature was particu-
larly important for artillery observation in this otherwise flat landscape, where visibility
was heavily restricted by the numerous farmhouses, hedges, copses and villages. In
such terrain the direction of combat, expecially where inexperienced troops were con-
cerned, was severely degraded.

12

On 20 October the troops of the new regiments assaulted Dixmude, Houthulst, Poelkap-
pelle, Passchendaele and Becelaere, with the words of 'Deutschland iiber Alles' on their
lips. Their losses were extremely heavy, but the gains were reasonable enough.

On the night of 20/21 October came the order to continue the attack over the Yser. The
village of Langemarck and the crossroads at Broodseinde lay in the path of the troops.
The German artillery fired to supposedly destructive effect, after which the young regi-
ments renewed the attack. Reserves pushed forward, filling the gaps in the forward lines
as they were thinned out, but the result was only to increase the losses. The officers took
a personal part in fighting, but this did nothing to diminish the carnage caused by the en-
emy fire; the losses became uncountable, and the offensive potential of the Germans
drained away. A new bid was made to capture Langemarck on the 22nd. Not only did it
fail, but the Germans came under counter-attacks which showed that the resolution of
the enemy was still unbroken. Meanwhile a push farther to the north-west got as far as
the eastern edge of Bixschote, while an assault yet farther north reached the gates of
Dixmude. The fighting on 23 October rewarded our frightful losses with no gains whatso-
ever, and our troops had to call for entrenching tools and dig in. 'By the evening of 23
Oc-tober, after four days of battle, the first onslaught on the Yser Canal by the new corps
had been brought to a standstill.' (Reichsarchiv, V.317.)
The enemy had not been particularly strong, and yet our infantry did not have the offen-
sive strength to overcome them, even with reasonably powerful support from our heavy
artillery. The most noble self-sacrifice, the glowing enthusiasm and energetic command -
all proved unavailing. Nowadays it is fashionable-to allege that it had been a mistake to
choose this vital sector of the front as the place to commit the young and inexperienced
reserve corps, with their ageing leadership and patchy training. People who argue along
these lines fail to grasp the fact that the First Battle of Ypres shows that infantry lacks the
striking power to overcome an enemy, even when that enemy happens to be numerically
inferior. I am willing to concede that troops with combat experience might well have
gained the same results with fewer casualties; but it is doubtful whether their losses
would have been significantly lower, and more questionable still whether they would ac-
tually have scored a victory. We have to bear in mind that the inexperienced troops were
not the only ones to be committed to that last great offensive of 1914 in those streaming
wet days of October. The crack III Corps was in action on their right, and the combat-
tested divisions of Sixth Army were fighting on their left; their opponents were not notably
stronger or more battleworthy than the troops that faced the newly trained divisions, and
yet the Germans achieved no more on these sectors than elsewhere.

The Germans ran through most of their small stock of artillery ammunition, and from 24
October the attack petered out in individual engagements, and finally almost literally
drowned in floods of water. Two final attempts were made to exorcise the spectre of
deadlock on the Western Front. They concerned brigades and divisions of picked troops
which were withdrawn temporarily from the front line for this purpose, and yet both bids
failed in a series of bloody combats.
From 30 October to 3 November XV, II Bavarian and half of XIII corps were formed into
an 'Assault Group Fabeck', and five of the divisions were pushed into the attack on a
frontage of ten kilometres. The result was yet another bitter disappointment, and it was
not ameliorated by the piecemeal commitment of 6th Bavarian Reserve Division, 3rd
Pomeranian Division and elements of cavalry.

13
Finally, from 10 to 18 November, yet further resources of battle-tested troops assaulted
the Ypres Salient. Ninth Reserve Division went into action in III Reserve Corps' sector of
Fourth Army's front; 4th Jager Division and the composite Winkler Guard Division were
marched to join Sixth Army, where they were incorporated as the 'Assault Group Linsin-
gen' together with XV Corps , which was already in action qn the Menin-Ypres road.

On 10 November a number of fresh regiments captured Dixmude and made some prog-
ress at Drie Grachten and Het Sas; farther east, however, III Reserve Corps, its 9th Re-
serve Division in particular, met with no success. The division had been pushed into bat-
tle too soon and was badly mauled in the process. On 11 November the Guards and 4th
Division attacked on either side of the Menin-Ypres road and made only modest gains;
here again the casualties were heavy. The Germans saw that there was no hope of sig-
nificant progress for the time being, and the commanders of the two armies demanded to
be reinforced as a precondition for any further offensives.
The high command consequently instructed Seventh Army to give up one of its infantry
divisions to Sixth Army. In the same way Third Army yielded a further infantry division to
Fourth Army, accompanied by an infantry brigade from the Army Detachment of General
Strantz. The two divisions of reinforcements were represented by their infantry compo-
nents only and the artillery was left behind. In fact we had plenty of heavy guns, but the
high command had to economize on ammunition. In other words the intended attack was
deprived of its striking power from the outset - and in the circumstances of the time am-
munition should have been given higher priority than numbers of infantry. Fourth Army
recognized this fact and simply gave up the idea of any further attacks; Sixth Army threw
the Linsingen Group into an assault, which was bloodily repulsed, and then it too made
the painful decision to go over to positional warfare. 'On 18 November, between the sea
and the Douvre, 27 + German infantry divisions and one cavalry division were facing
twenty-two enemy infantry divisions and ten cavalry divisions.' (Reichsarchiv, VI,25.)
Between 10 and 18 November German losses on the sector of the offensive came to some
23,000 men. Over the entire span, from the middle of October until the beginning of
December, the losses of Fourth Army amounted to 39,000 killed and wounded and 13,000
missing; a combined total of 80,000 men for the two armies. All in all the First Bat-tle of Ypres
cost the Germans more than 100,000 troops, including the flower of its young

14

men and a large part of its resources of leadership. Enemy losses were: French: 41,300,
including 9,230 missing (Les Armies Franqaises dans la Grande Guerre, IV,554); British:
54,000, including 17,000 missing; Belgian: 15,000. In total the losses from August to No-
vember 1914 amounted to: Germans, 677,440; French, 854,000; British, 84,575.

Trench warfare and barbed wire

From the middle of November 1914 all movement ceased along the length of the West-
ern Front. This state of inertia had first set in along the Vosges sector, and it now ex-
tended to the coast. And it was in the coastal region that such offensive strength as re-
mained to both parties from the earlier battles had been finally expended in October and

November.
What had taken place? On the German side the concentration of offensive power had
taken the form of a stream of infantry reinforcements - the young reserve corps of Fourth
Army, and various corps, divisions and brigades of infantry from other sectors of the
front. They had had an adequate number of artillery pieces, but even at the beginning of
the battle they had had at their disposal only limited reserves of ammunition. The whole
emphasis of the German attacks was therefore put on the shock effect of the infantryman
with his bayonet. The enemy, on their side, were not able to match the Germans in terms
of numbers of combatants, and the French, British and Belgians were soon forced on to
the defensive. In this form of combat, however, the machine-guns and artillery proved
able to withstand the onslaught of superior masses of troops; the hail of fire from modern
weapons had shattered the charges of the German lancers in August, and it now pro-
ceeded to do the same to the bayonet attacks in October and November. It was fortunate
that the enemy too began to run short of ammunition, otherwise the disproportion in num-
bers which was experienced in the middle of November, when a quantity of German
corps had to be given up for the Eastern Front, would have been still more to the disad-
vantage of the Germans than it actually was.
The losses which both sides suffered in the flower of their infantry, the lack of ammuni-
tion, and the fact that the front line came to rest on its two extremities on the sea and the
Swiss mountains - all of these things together forced the armies to resort to the spade
and the erection of obstacles. Both sides lived in the hope that the incipient positional
warfare would prove to be no more than a temporary condition. Neither side was able to
steel itself to the pulling back to terrain better suited to a long-term defensive - they
feared that yielding ground which had cost so much blood would be interpreted as an
avowal of defeat.
The front therefore congealed along the line of the recent fighting, a state of affairs which
necessitated elaborate works of engineering and strong garrisons, and precipitated long-
drawn-out combats for patches of ground that were of only local significance. The next
step was for the belligerents to develop defensive systems consisting of stoutly built and
continuous trenches for the front-line troops and their reserves, supplemented by com-
munications trenches for the movements of reliefs and supplies. These positions were
protected by barbed wire obstacles which increased constantly in density and depth. For
the time being little use was made of rearward positions. The artillery was located close
enough to be able to take both the enemy infantry and artillery under fire - in other words
fairly far forward, and in no great depth; to begin with no special measures were taken to
2
provide protection for the guns.

The rival armies then addressed themselves to the business of improving their weapons
and equipment. In particular there was a considerable increase in the number of ma-
chine-guns - an augmentation which continued until the end of the war, and which raised
the status of the machine-gun; from having been an auxiliary weapon of the jnfantry, it

15

became its chief weapon, and in due course the machine-gun became the prime weapon
of the air forces as well. The quantity of artillery was also increased, and the pieces were
furnished with a quite unprecedented quantity of ammunition; every possible tube was
pressed into service, including a number of elderly models. The work of the engineers al-
so gained in significance; Minenwerfer and hand-grenades came into use, and bunkers,
demolitions, inundations and obstacles of all kinds gave the positions more and more the
character of fortresses.
Time showed that the Germans suffered more than the enemy from the way they held on
to positions that had been dictated by the needs of the moment, regardless of whether
they were suited for defence over a period of time. Then again, the habit of packing
forces into the front line was attended with a variety of evils. It reduced the number of
available reserves, it interfered with their training, it cut short their rest periods, and worst
of all it reduced the offensive forces which were desperately needed in the other theatres
of war, where they might have settled things more quickly. The situation of our enemies
improved with an uncomfortable speed, from our point of view, after the Allies decided to
discontinue the sending of large forces to subordinate theatres (as they had done at Gal-
lipoli) and instead concentrated all available reserves of troops, equipment and firepower
in France. This is not to say, however, that the decision was necessarily the best. Both
sides persuaded themselves that only through the commitment of extraordinary resour-
ces could they achieve success in battle on the Western Front, and they each strove by
different means to attain this end.

Waging war with inadequate weaponry

The artillery combat

While in November 1914 the Germans shifted the emphasis on the offensive to the East-
ern Front - unfortunately already too late to achieve decisive success - the French high
command decided to open an attack in the winter of 1914/15, so as to hinder the

Germans from sending further forces to the Eastern Front, and simultaneously exploit the
temporary weakness of the enemy in the west. In the words of General Joffre's army field
order of 17 December 1914, a decisive battle was to be fought to 'free the land once and
for all from the foreign invaders'. The possibility of breaking the vulnerable German lines
of communication led to the choice of Champagne as the location for the offensive;
additional advantages of this sector were the good communications on the French side,
and the uncomplicated nature of the terrain from the viewpoint of the attacker.
After four weeks of preparation the three corps of the French Fourth Army opened the of-
fensive on 20 December. Behind the three leading corps a further corps (I) was held in
reserve. The French put their numerical superiority on this sector of the attack at 100,000
men. They had at their disposal nineteen aircraft, 780 artillery pieces of all calibres
(which were powerful by the standards of the time) and the usual restrictions on the con-
sumption of ammunition were lifted. Altogether the artillery was going to play a consider-
ably greater role in the preparation and execution of the attack than in former battles.
By committing reserves on this impressive scale the French hoped to break through on
both sides of the Suippes-Attigny road. When the actual fighting began, however, the
French proved incapable of bringing the infantry of the three attacking corps into action
simultaneously. The battle then broke up into individual actions on the part of the various
corps and divisions. These combats were prolonged until New Year's Day, because the
artillery was frequently unable to destroy the obstructions in front of the German trenches
or silence the German machine-guns. Infantry assaults, which were delivered after heavy

16

artillery fire, alternated with days on end of purely artillery action; the trench and mine
warfare was incessant, and it was soon necessary to reinforce the engineers. In addition
the Germans used every pause in the offensive to launch powerful counter-attacks with
the purpose of winning back the sectors of trench they had lost.

At the turn of the year a new corps (III) was placed in readiness as army reserve behind
the French Fourth Army's front, and the former army reserve (I Corps) was now inserted
on the frontage of the offensive. However the bad weather and strong German counter-
blows delayed the execution of the new design. The offensive of the French Fourth Army
seemed to have 'broken down into a series of smaller actions, which were devoid of any
recognizable coherence, and which were interspersed with pauses which sapped their
momentum'. (Les Armees Franfaises dans la Grande Guerre, II, 225.) The army
commander had recourse to his artillery 'to persuade the enemy that the offensive was
still going on'. Cavalrymen were sent to the trenches to free the infantry for offensive ac-
tion, and the artillery of IV Corps was committed to the battle. The Germans dealt a coun-
terblow on 7 January, which was followed by powerful new French attacks on the 8th and
9th. A further failure on 13 January finally persuaded the commander of the French
Fourth Army, General de Langle, to terminate the offensive.
The French gained little, and nowadays they like to put the blame on the weather (Les
Armees Francaises dans la Grande Guerre, II, 231ff). Here we have to point out that in
those gloomy winter days the weather was just as bad for both sides. It is probably more
relevant that, despite their consistent and heavy superiority in infantry, the French were
unable to smash enough of the German obstacles, suppress the German machine-gun
fire or cripple the German artillery.
Now that the artillery had failed to achieve these tasks, the attacks by the French infantry
proved equally ineffective, again despite a considerable numerical superiority. The failure
was all the greater since the French neglected to launch simultaneous attacks under uni-
fied direction along the whole frontage of the army, but instead favoured local assaults on
individually selected points of the German positions. Although the French commander
began to doubt the validity of this form of attack, he could think of nothing better than
simply committing more materiel. Joffre himself emphasized the necessity of a longer ar-
tillery preparation and the employment of greater forces on a broader front. He ordered
the offensive to be resumed, the artillery battle to continue, and the building of a second
defensive system as a safeguard against a possible enemy breakthrough.
The debate on how to launch an attack from a state of positional warfare finally led the
French high command, in January y'1915, to advocate the massive commitment of infan-
try in deep formation on a comparatively narrow front, prepared and protected by an
overwhelming artillery barrage. General de Langle understood the 'massive commitment
of infantry' to mean the deployment for each of the main pushes of 'at least one battalion
per division, supported by subsidiary attacks on its flank, so as to pin down the enemy on
their entire frontage' (Les Armeees Francaises, II, 235).
The preparations for the new offensive encompassed the period from 15 January to 15
February 1915, and its execution lasted, with intermissions, from 16 February to 16
March. It began with two corps in the first line, one of the corps being reinforced by a fur-
ther division, and the other by a brigade of infantry. The French ranged 155,000 infantry,
8,000 cavalry and 819 guns (including 110 of heavy calibre) against a German force
which the French reckon to have numbered 81,000 infantry, 3,700 cavalry and 470 guns
(including 86 heavy).
In spite of the two-fold superiority on the side of the attackers, the results on the first days
were decidedly modest. As early as 17 February French IV Corps had to be made avail-able
from reserve. On the 18th the newly reconstituted French were hit by a German

17

counter-attack which recovered most of what had been lost on the previous days. On 22

February, after further and largely unproductive fighting, General Joffre wrote to the
commander-in-chief of Fourth Army: 'It would be unfortunate if your offensive created the
impression that we are incapable of breaking through the enemy lines, no matter how
powerful the means we employ, and at a time when the enemy strength on the Western
Front has been reduced to a minimum.' (Les Armees Francaises, 11,440.) He accompa-
nied these words with the order to continue the offensive in an energetic way. The at-
tacks resumed on 23 February after a few infantry reinforcements had arrived. The gains
were meagre.
From 25 February four French corps stood in the front line, with one (XVI) in reserve. On
27 February this too was sent forward as part of the process of forming a special 'Assault
Group Grossetti'. While Joffre held back the rest of this corps in closer reserve, he fed
one of its brigades into the offensive on 7 March, supported by eleven detachments of
field artillery and fifty heavy guns. Once more the gains amounted to very little.
Joffre now decided to make a last bid to smash through the German front by engaging
the main force of XVI Corps. The distinguishing feature of this offensive was the deploy-
ment of infantry in considerable depth, which signalled from the outset of the battle that
the French intended to select a narrow sector for their break-in; the leading assault units
were to be relieved after a short period in action, while the attack was to be sustained
over a period of days by troops from the rearward elements. Such a deployment re-
nounced any kind of breadth, and helped the Germans to concentrate their defensive re-
sources on the narrow break-in sector.
The last episode of the Battle of Champagne was played out in the fighting which raged from
12 to 16 March. The newly committed troops of XVI Corps achieved no more than those who
had already been fighting for a number of weeks. The reserves were ex-pended piecemeal.
The commanding general of XVI Corps reported quite justifiably on 14 March that 'in spite of
the sacrifices we have made, the offensive will yield unsatis-factory results as long as the
assaulting units remain unprotected against close-range flanking fire by the enemy' (Les
Armees Francaises, 11,468). In other words the offensive lacked breadth, the commitment of
forces did not match the objectives, and the resour-ces at the disposal of the attackers were
not equal to the means available to the defend-ers. General Grossetti, who had the
reputation of being something of a fire-eater, sug-gested that the French should counter by
launching three simultaneous but separate at-tacks against the objectives which had already
been set for him, and only afterwards use the ground thus gained as a base for a larger,
more coherent push to the north. The army command approved the proposal. It was
supposed to be put into effect on IS March, but the Germans got in a counter-attack first. On
16 and 17 March the French attacks again gained no more than insignificant local successes.
The army commander requested, and obtained, permission to terminate the offensive.
Altogether 4'/2 corps and three cavalry divisions were withdrawn from Fourth Army and
designated army reserves. In a few days the fighting degenerated into purely positional
warfare. General de Langle nevertheless believed he was right to assert that 'the thirty-two
days of offensive action on the part of

Fourth Army, as well as securing tangible gains, served to consolidate the morale of the
troops and raise their confidence in final victory'. (Les Armees FranQaises, 11,481.)
Probably one of the most important tactical lessons of this campaign is that the French
were in effect attacking a fortress which was unlimited in breadth and depth. The assault-
ing infantry made only slow headway, which gave the enemy the chance to lay out new
defences behind the positions which were being lost. Consequently the attackers were
unable to exploit their successes and achieve a breakthrough (Les Armees Francoises,
11,481).

18

All that the French had achieved in concrete terms was to capture 2,000 prisoners and
some equipment (though no artillery), together with trenches and positions which meas-
ured seven kilometres in breadth and at most half a kilometre in depth.

French losses totalled 1,646 officers and 91,786 men (Les Armees Francaises, 11,481),
as opposed to 1,100 officers and 45,000 men lost on the German side. The Germans
had taken about 2,700 prisoners. The German positions had been furnished with only a
few dugouts and they lacked tactical depth, but they had been held substantially intact
against a more than two-fold superiority, thanks to the courage of the troops, the effec-
tiveness of the machine-guns and artillery, and the inexhaustible activity of the engi-
neers. All of this was in despite of the unprecedented outlay of enemy artillery and am-
munition - the thunderous 'drum fire' which was to reverberate throughout every battle
from now until the end of the war.
Both sides claim victory in the winter battle in Champagne, the first 'artillery battle' of the
war. Closer investigation shows that the French had to pay an excessive price for insig-
nificant gains in terrain. The Germans had scanty reserves and feeble artillery with which
to hold their ground, which happened to be vital for the stability of their entire Western
Front. They nevertheless fulfilled this responsibility in an outstanding way, and we must
pay due tribute to Third Army.
The battle demonstrated that the French, for all their undoubted courage and double
superiorities in numbers and ammunition, were unable to break through positions which
the Germans certainly defended with great obstinacy, but which were not particularly
strong in themselves. The reason, once again, was that the defenders always had the
time to seal off the locations of the break-ins before the attacking troops, advancing step
by step, could exploit their initial successes.
The generals now had to ask themselves, how could they attack with any reasonable
chance of success in the future? The obvious thing was to augment the resources al-
ready available to the offensive: extend the frontage of the assault so as to pin down
more of the defenders at a time, and eliminate local activity on the flanks; one could also
build up the quantity of guns and ammunition in the hope of annihilating the defences
and obstacles and crippling the enemy artillery.
But novel weapons opened the prospect of something altogether more effective - and
poison gas, aircraft and armoured vehicles were already within the grasp of the technol-
ogy (5f the time. The Western Front, the most important theatre of the war, appeared to
be condemned to deadlock, yet it might prove possible to bring off a major success even
here, if some way could be found of employing the new devices - by themselves, or at
least in association with one another and with the older weapons - en masse and with the
advantage of surprise.
Surprise in any event seemed a worthwhile objective, because it might enable one to an-
ticipate countermeasures, secure concentrations en masse and enable one's mobile
forces to follow up any successes. These desiderata were easy to outline on paper, but
less easy to put into effect among the realities of the battlefield. As things turned out, the
real or supposed needs of the moment often led to the forces being thrown into action
too soon; sheer impatience sometimes led to miscalculations of this kind, and sometimes
also a feeling of distrust towards such new and unproven weapons.
Since surprise can have a dramatic impact in warfare, it will be rewarding to investigate
how the new weapons in question were actually employed, and what kind of impression
they made on the enemy. Our inquiry will also show whether the belligerents did any bet-
ter by employing the conventional alternative - a quantitive increase in the older genera-
tion of weapons.

19
Gas Warfare

We return to Flanders. It was there that a new weapon - poison gas in the form of chlor-
ine - had first come into use in February 1915, when the French employed rifle-gas gre-
nades against the Germans.

'In favourable weather the gas should be released from cylinders in the forward trenches,
so as to compel the enemy to abandon their positions.' (Reichsarchiv, VII.S3). So the in-

20

structions ran. In fact the officers at every level of command, as well as the troops, re-
garded gas with 'mistrust if not outright rejection' (Reichsarchiv, VII,30). For this reason
the Germans at first essayed only a small practical experiment, on the sector of their

Fourth Army. The army chose as its immediate objective the heights of Pilckem and the
ground to the east, hoping that if all went well the enemy would have to evacuate the
Ypres Salient and the Germans would gain the Yser Canal.
At that period chemical weapons came in two forms - gas shells and gas cylinders. The
design of the gas shells left a great deal to be desired, however, and there were not
enough propellant charges to secure an adequate density at the receiving end. For want
of anything better the Germans had to resort to releasing gas from cylinders. These were
to be planted in batteries in the forward trenches, and opened when the wind and other
climatic conditions were favourable. The heavy reliance on wind and weather proved to
be a severe drawback, for it was difficult for the Germans to determine the exact moment
of the attack, and this was the fundamental reason why they distrusted the new device.
They were also liable to casualties if the weather suddenly changed, or the cylinders
were damaged by enemy fire. That was why the Germans decided against using gas on
a large scale in their great breakthrough battle which was impending in Galicia, but set-
tled instead on the limited test in Flanders.
Six thousand cylinders containing 180,000 kilograms of chlorine gas were deployed on a
frontage of six kilometres on the sectors of XVIII and XXVI Reserve Corps. The cylinders
had originally been emplaced further to the west, but they had been moved to the new lo-
cation as a result of meteorological studies of the wind direction. After a number of de-
lays the long-awaited north wind set in on 22 April 1915, but unfortunately not until the
afternoon of that day. All the preparations had been made for an attack at first light, and
these now had to be changed. Furthermore the infantry now had to follow the cloud of
gas in full daylight, which might expose them to heavy casualties, and deny them the
time to exploit any successes. At 1800 German engineers opened the valves of the cylin-
ders, and a dense, whitish-yellow cloud, 600 to 900 metres deep, and extending to the
height of a man, was carried on the wind at a speed of between two and four metres a
second over the trenches of the French 87th and 45th Infantry Divisions. The enemy
were overcome by panic, and after firing a few shots they abandoned their trenches, suf-
fering heavily in the process. The French lost 15,000 men, of whom 5,000 were killed
and 2,470 were taken prisoner (including 1,800 uninjured). Losses in materiel included
fifty-one guns (of which four were of heavy calibre) and seventy machine-guns. Of the
two hundred prisoners who were suffering from the effects of gas, only twelve men, or 6
per cent, later died.

By the evening German gains measured eleven kilometres in breadth by a maximum

depth of rather more than two kilometres. A gap of some 31/2 kilometres had opened be-
tween the.Yser Canal and Saint-Julien. Regrettably the only force available to Fourth
Army to exploit this splendid success was half of 43rd Reserve Division, which was
standing at Houthulst, but was too widely deployed and too weak to be able to seize the
opportunity while it still existed. Over the following days the Germans enlarged the initial
success with the help of repeated gas attacks, and the British were finally compelled to
evacuate a considerable part of the Ypres Salient. By the time the battle ended on 9 May
German territorial gains covered an area some sixteen kilometres wide by a maximum
depth of more than five kilometres. The enemy had overcome their initial panic and very
rapidly learned to give themselves some protection by improvising masks. The Germans
themselves began to take heavy casualties.
Altogether over the thirteen days of the offensive the Germans lost 35,000 men, and the
enemy about 78,000.

21

When we review the Second Battle of Ypres and the winter battle in Champagne, and
compare the respective casualties, the ground that was won and the materiel captured, it
becomes evident that when a novel weapon is employed with the advantage of surprise it
can beat even battle-tested and brave troops who are equipped with modern armaments.

As a German one can only regret that the lack of confidence displayed in this new instru-
ment of war - however understandable this might have been -and the consequent failure
to hold sufficient reserves in readiness, prevented us from exploiting and expanding the
victory with the requisite speed. In future it will no longer be possible to attain surprise
through the novelty of gas as a weapon in itself, but only through the place and time we
choose to employ it, and the density with which it is applied. This does not rule out as yet
unexplored opportunities, especially if gas is used in concert with the older and estab-
lished techniques of the offensive. In all of this we must bear in mind that the enemy will
take protective countermeasures. These will be equally necessary for our own troops,
since the enemy will undoubtedly resort to gas warfare as well, and we will also have to
reckon with the danger of our own gas blowing back on us.
In the last war releasing gas from cylinders proved to be an unpredictable business,
which gave the impulse to a constant improvement in shells that were capable of being
fired by artillery or special gas projectors. The result was a weapon that was capable of
contaminating a selected area of ground, and crippling every living creature on it, without
having to score direct hits by shells or splinters. Among other things it offered the possi-
bility of combating enemy artillery in a way that proved beyond both sides in the battle in
Champagne.
On the other hand experiments in gas masks produced a genuine measure of defence
against gas. The masks were burdensome to carry, but if they were donned in time they
afforded the soldier an immediate protection. This in turn led to a search for substances
that were able to penetrate the respirators, and irritate the eyes and the respiratory or-
gans in such a way that the mask had to be torn from the face.
The original forms of gas were designed to facilitate the attack, and were comparatively
transient. Very soon, howewver, the combatants began to employ persistent agents
which contaminated the ground over a particular length of time, and so facilitated the de-
fensive. The principal substance in question was the so-called 'Yellow Cross', also
termed mustard gas. It was not long before chemical weapons became an inevitable
presence on every battlefield.
The competition between chemical weapons on the one hand, and masks and other
countermeasures on the other, was reminiscent of the struggle between artillery and ar-
mour. Both contests were conducted with considerable determination and varying for-
tune. Finally gas bombs were dropped from aircraft, which gave the range of chemical
weapons a further boost.

The Genesis of the Tank

In britain

A number of British officers were impressed by the defensive strength of machine-guns

and barbed wire, and as early as October 1914 they were inspired to embark on a coun-
ter in the form of an armoured vehicle (the data in this section are drawn principally from
Major-General Sir Ernest D. Swinton's book Eyewitness, London, Hodder and Stoughton,
1932, pp. 80ff). The model was the Holt Caterpillar Tractor. The running gear was an
endless track which gave the machine the potential to crush obstacles, cross trenches
and convey its armament under bullet-proof protection into the very midst of the enemy,

22

where it could annihilate the otherwise almost invulnerable machine-guns, and enable
one's own infantry to pass open ground without incurring intolerable casualties. These
pioneers therefore chose a totally different direction from the Germans, with their chemi-
cal weapons; while gas could be employed with no great delay, the British concept had
first to be put into tangible form and worked out in practice, which inevitably demanded
time. To begin with the all-mighty Secretary of State for War, Lord Kitchener, rejected the
notion of this 'machine-gun destroyer'. In 1898 Kitchener had been the victor at Omdur-
man, the battle on the Upper Nile where the British had defeated the army of the Mahdi -
and this also happened to be the first engagement in which they had employed this mur-
derous weapon. It seems that, under pressure of his work in the World War, he had for-
gotten just how destructive the machine-gun could be. Perhaps it had slipped Kitchener's
mind that not long after the battle he himself had expressed misgivings about what would
happen if the British, just like their unprotected native enemies, were called upon to at-
tack hostile machine-guns. It so happened that the experiences of the Boer War did not
leave the British commanders with any particularly clear impression of the effectiveness
3
of the machine-gun - this had to wait until the World War.

In December 1914 a memorandum [from Captain Maurice Hankey] finally got through to
Prime Minister Asquith. It urged, among other things, that the British ought to build arm-
oured machine-gun carriers with caterpillar tracks. The paper came to the notice of the
First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, who had very recently been concerned
with defending a naval air base at Dunkirk with armoured cars.. As wheeled vehicles the
armoured cars were road-bound, and Churchill wanted to have them equipped with
bridg-ing devices to enable them to cross infantry trenches and pass along stretches of
road which had been torn up by the Germans. On his own initiative he proposed the
construc-tion of steam-driven vehicles on the Holt-Caterpillar system, which could carry
armoured protection, machine-guns and the necessary crew. The Director of
Fortifications and Works was won over to the scheme, and so it was that support for the
new weapon grad-ually widened.
Meanwhile the British offensive at Neuve Chapelle and la Bassee had been wrecked by
barbed wire and machine-gun fire. The response was to assemble masses of troops,
guns and ammunition for yet further offensives. The British, in other words, were going to
fight like the Dervishes at Omdurman. To borrow the expression of von Schlieffen, it was
a combat of 'the man with his bayonet against the flying bullet, of the target against the
marksman' ('Cannae', in Vierteljahrshefle fur Truppenfuhrung und Heereskunde, 1910,
205). In the event both sides resorted to setting up broader belts of obstacles, and dig-
ging deeper trenches and dugouts; more and more the contest resembled a siege, and
on long stretches of the front the combatants tunnelled and fought underground.
At the beginning of June 1915 the then Lieutenant-Colonel Ernest D. Swinton, R.E., laid
before the British high command a paper on his machine-gun destroyer and how it
should be used. In his turn Field Marshal Sir John French passed on the proposal to the
War Office. This paper already contained in outline the essential technical and tactical
specifications for the later prototype, and it emphasized in particular the importance of
security, and the need to gain surprise through a full-scale attack: 'These machines
should be built at home secretly and their existence should not be disclosed until all are
ready. There should be no preliminary efforts made with a few machines, the result of
which would give the scheme away.' (Eyewitness, p. 131.)
In February 1915, after an unsuccessful experiment in obstacle-crossing by a laden Holt
Tractor, the British War Office had dismissed the idea of building 'landships'. The precise
wording was that the project was 'out of the question' — a phrase which is familiar to us
as well. But now at last the War Office was spurred into action by Swinton's memoran-

23

dum and the knowledge that the Royal Navy was continuing its efforts, and the result
was that it undertook further development in association with the Navy and the newly cre-
4
ated Ministry of Munitions.

In September 1915 an experimental machine called 'Little Willie' underwent an unsuc-

cessful test. But the device had not been built according to the latest specifications as
laid down by Swinton, and more promising was a wooden mock-up of a new machine
which was available for inspection at the same time. This was 'Mother', the later Mark I
Tank, which made its first appearance at the front exactly one year later. Lieutenant W.
G. Wilson, R.N., has described how the vehicle was built by W. Foster & Co., and how it
assumed the characteristic rhomboid form, with the upturned nose and the track leading
right round the hull. Firing trials were carried out with German machine-guns and ammu-
nition against steel plate. Likewise an experimental training ground was selected and fit-
ted out, complete with obstacles which corresponded to the German defences. The first
driving and live firing trials were carried out as early as January 1916. The British had
captured some German 50mm guns which were mounted in armoured cupolas, and
there was concern that the Germans might introduce small-calibre guns with armour-
piercing capability, which would have added greatly to the effectiveness of defence
against tanks. Appropriate countermeasures were therefore taken into consideration. For
the manpower base of the new armoured force, the British turned to the existing naval
armoured car squadron. Finally the name 'tank' — soon to be known throughout the
world — was chosen as cover for the new weapon.
On 2 February 1916 the first tank went through its paces before an audience of dignita-
ries including Lord Kitchener, Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lloyd George. The civilian ministers
were full of enthusiasm, but Lord Kitchener was sceptical. He refused to believe that the
war could be won by machines that would so easily be knocked out by the enemy's artil-
lery. This was at variance with the opinion of a number of officers from the front, who fav-
oured the new machine.
In the same month the indefatigable Swinton completed a memorandum on the future
employment of the tank. It is still worth reading today because of its clear-headedness
and what it has to say about the way armour is likely to be going. We accordingly quote a
5
number of passages:

'Since the chance of success of an attack by tanks lies almost entirely in its novelty and
in the element of surprise, it is obvious that no repetition of it will have the same opportu-
nity of succeeding as the first unexpected effort. It follows, therefore, that these machines
should not be used in driblets (for instance, as they may be produced), but that the fact of
their existence should be kept as secret as possible until the whole are ready to be
launched, together with the infantry assault, in one great combined operation. The extent
to which the attack is pressed, i.e., whether it is to be a step-by-step operation in which,
after artillery preparation, a strictly limited advance is made over the front concerned and
the gain of ground consolidated, and then, after the necessary pause to give time for a
renewed artillery preparation of the enemy's new front line a further limited advance is
made, and so on; or whether a violent effort is to be made to burst right through the ene-
my's defensive zone in one great rush, depends on the decision of the Commander-in-
Chief and the strategic needs of the situation. But, so far as is known, a step-by-step ad-
vance - which has the drawback of giving the enemy time to reinforce the sector threat-
ened - is not a course recommended for any positive advantages which it possesses. It is
a course which has been forced on us by the inability, with the means hitherto at our dis-
posal, of infantry even after an immense sacrifice of life to force their way through suc-
cessive lines of defence guarded by machine-guns and wire, of which none but the first
can be thoroughly battered by our artillery.'

24

'Not only, however, does it seem that the tanks will confer the power to force successive
comparatively unbattered defensive lines, but, as has been explained, the more speedy
and uninterrupted their advance the greater the chance of their surviving sufficiently long
to do this. It is possible, therefore, that an effort to break right through the enemy's defen-
sive zone in one day may now be contemplated as a feasible operation.' (Eyewitness,

203-4, 210.)
Swinton declares that in favourable terrain a daily average of twelve miles' progress is
feasible. He sets the capture of the enemy artillery as his objective, and since the bat-
teries will be deployed over a wide area the plan of attack must provide for a war of
movement that is capable of sweeping them up. He rightly identifies the artillery as the
most dangerous enemy of his new weapon, and states that the guns must be sup-
pressed by one's own artillery and aircraft. The employment of gas and smoke has been
discussed already.
It was fortunate for the Germans that from the outset the British shrank from following
these guidelines. After the successful experiments and demonstrations the command of
the British army in France put in an initial order for only forty tanks. Swinton protested,
and got the War Office to order one hundred machines all in one go. These were to be
produced by the Ministry of Munitions.
At the turn of 1915/16 the new arm was constituted as the 'Heavy Section of the Motor
Machine-Gun Service' at Siberia Camp, Bisley, under the command of Swinton, who now
held the temporary rank of colonel. The first complement of personnel was assigned at
the beginning of March - the officers and men had had some training on machine-guns,
and most of them appear to have had a first-class grounding in the technicalities of pow-
ered vehicles. Lieutenant Stern, R.N.V.R., and Lieutenant Wilson, R.N., who had already
worked on the development of the tank, were taken on the establishment as majors.
In April the order for the tanks under construction was increased to 150, of which 75 were
to be equipped with two guns and three machine-guns each, and the remaining 75 with
machine-guns only; they were dubbed respectively 'male' and 'female' tanks..In addition
to shells the tank gun was to fire canister rounds for close-range combat.
The new arm of service was organized initially in six companies of twenty-five tanks
each. Before the first tank rolled, however, the new commander in France, Sir Douglas
Haig, demanded tanks for his planned offensive on the Somme. This represented a very
great danger of feeding the novel weapon into action by penny packets before it was
6
ripe, so giving away the element of surprise.

Meanwhile the work of setting up the tank forces went ahead. Among other measures
Captain Martel, R.E. (of later fame) was given the task of creating a training area at Elve-
den in Suffolk. In the course of six weeks' work three battalions of engineers proceeded
to lay out a replica of a sector of the Somme battlefield. It was more than 1 1/2 miles in
width, and in depth it included the British front and support lines, no man's land, and the
first, second and third German lines, complete with obstacles, shell craters and soon.
A transmitter with a range of about three miles was tested to explore the practicability of
wireless communication, and an unsuccessful experiment was made in communicating
with aircraft by signal lamps. Communication between the tanks was to be carried out by
metal discs and small flags waved out of the manhole in the roof. The Navy supervised
the installation of de-magnetised compasses so that the tanks could stay on course.
From the beginning of June the fully equipped tanks arrived at Elveden and training could
proceed. While this work was in progress, the British high command resorted to the old
and usually ineffectual tactic of charging head-on against barbed wire and machine-guns.
The great six-corps offensive made negligible gains despite an unprecedented employ-
ment of artillery.

25
At the end of June the British tank, forces received a first visit from Colonel 1J. B. Esti-
enne, the creator of the French tank arm. He urged the British not to use their tanks be-
fore the French were ready with their own machines, in order to retain the element of sur-
prise.

When the first experimental batch of 150 tanks had been completed, the question arose
as to whether to order a further run, and so avoid the many disadvantages of a break in
production. However the British high command wished to acquire experience with a lim-
ited number of tanks on the battlefield before any new orders were placed. Still more ur-
gent was the desire to score some success on the Somme, where the battle so far had
bought tiny gains at an immense price, creating an unfavourable impression. In the mid-
dle of August a half company went to the front, and the other half followed later - which
meant that the process of fragmentation had begun. Shortly afterwards the British high
command forbade the further installation of wireless in tanks, because of the possibility of
interference with existing stations; likewise the use of kite-balloons, to fly signals for the
tanks, was forbidden lest they draw fire. Altogether a great deal was done to render the
direction of the new tank forces more difficult, and very little to help it along.
The first of the tank companies that arrived behind the front line in August 1916 had first
to put on a series of displays to satisfy the curiosity of various visitors, which brought with
it the danger of wearing out the machines prematurely. The second tank company ar-
rived in France only two days before it had to go into action; half its personnel had had
only one day's training in live firing. The third company arrived in France on 14 Septem-
ber, but before it could reach the front the first two companies attacked on the Somme on
the next day! The Battle of the Somme had been in progress for ten weeks, and yet the
attempt was now made to breathe new life into it with just thirty-two tanks. All the same
the first tank action in history resulted in the placing of an order for a further 1,000 ma-
7
chines.

Although the first true mass production of tanks had now got under way, one of the most
distinguished of the pioneers, Colonel Swinton, was left out in the cold. Colonel Hugh El-
les, R.E., was entrusted with the command of the tanks at the front, while the setting up
and training of the new units was handed over to a former brigade commander from the
8
infantry.

In france

In France, just as in Britain, only a handful of individuals had addressed themselves to

one of the most burning questions of the war, namely what is meant by 'shock'? (This
section makes extensive use of von Heigl's Die sckwerenfranzosischen Tanks; die italie-
nischen Tanks, Berlin, 192S). They concluded that there was no future in simply using
the existing weapons in ever-increasing quantities.

Quite independently of the British, the French too very rapidly hit on the notion of employ-ing
some kind of powered vehicle to overcome barbed wire obstacles. Working with Ma-jor
Boissin, Deputy J. L. Breton of the French National Assembly built a four-ton wire-cut-ting
tractor, which was tried out with a fair measure of success on 22 July 1916. The
Technical Section of the Engineers then tried to convert the Filtz Tractor, which was a
4Shp agricultural vehicle, to a machine-gun carrier. Ten of the machines were put
through practical tests in August 1915, but their cross-country performance was disap-
pointing.
The French efforts began to bear fruit only at the beginning of August 1916, when the then
Colonel Estienne, commander of the artillery of 6th Division, saw how the British were using
tracked vehicles, namely the Holt Caterpillars already mentioned, to haul heavy artillery. This
was enough to persuade him to press ahead with the development of

26

an armoured vehicle running on continuous tracks.

After two fruitless letters, Colonel Estienne submitted a third paper to the commander-in-
chief, General Joffre. We quote his own words:
'Twice within a year I have had the honour of drawing Your Excellency's attention to the
advantages of mobile armoured vehicles which are designed to facilitate the advance of
the infantry. In the course of the last offensive I became more and more convinced how
valuable such a kind of co-operation would be. I have completed a fresh and thorough
analysis of the technical and tactical problems of developing a suitable vehicle. It will
have a speed of more than six kilometres per hour, and will be capable of assisting the
passages of obstacles by our infantry, even when they are laden with rifles and packs,
and by our artillery.'
The outcome was that on 12 December 1915 Estienne was received by Joffre's chief of
staff, General Janin. In his presentation Estienne explained how important it was for a
large number of armoured vehicles to go into action at the same time. This, he said, was
the only way to guarantee complete surprise.
Estienne was given leave to go to Paris to solicit support among the authorities, and es-
pecially at the Ministry of Defence, and to find an industrial concern which would be will-
ing to take on the responsibility of construction, with all its risks. Renault's first response
was negative, but Estienne contacted M. Brillie who was one of the engineers at the
Schneider works, and he was able to convince him how urgent the task was. Brillie was
all the more disposed to take over the project since Schneiders were already experiment-
ing with the Holt Tractor. The works' chief engineer, Deloule, and the director Courville
lent a hand, and within a matter of days the team had created a design which was suit-
able for mass production. Some delays were occasioned by new experiments with the
Holt Tractor by the Direction des Services Automobiles, but in January 1916 Estienne
was able to gain an interview with Joffre and win him over for the project, with the result
that the French high command placed an order for four hundred vehicles.
Significantly, however, Estienne was pushed to one side by the technical authorities. He
resumed his old command on the Verdun front, where he was tied down for several
months.
The War Ministry proceeded to award the contract for a second batch of four hundred
tanks to Schneiders' competitors, the Saint-Chamond works, where the celebrated Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Rimailho was in charge of the development of the design. The resulting
Saint-Chamond vehicle was considerably larger and almost double the weight of the
Schneider tank. It had a forward-projecting field gun and a secondary armament of four
machine-guns.
In the middle of June 1916 the French high command learned that the British were also
at work building tanks. It now called Estienne to mind, and commissioned him to go to
England to see how the Allies were progressing. As already mentioned, Estienne imme-
diately sought to convey the importance of preserving surprise, and of holding back this
new weapon until it could be sent into action by the French and British simultaneously
and en masse. After he returned from England he set to work on a plan for a gigantic of-
fensive by the tanks of both armies, very much as was actually put into effect in 1918.
However the British did not have the nerve to wait until the French had caught up with
them.
When the first tanks were almost ready Estienne was appointed commander of the new
Artillerie d'assaut under the authority of the Direction des Services Automobiles.
Although in the meantime he had been promoted to general, there was a wide feeling
that he was an ill-used person who had already been 'put out to grass'.
On 15 August the first troop assembled at Fort Trou d'Enfer at Marly-le-Roi. It consisted

27
of alarmingly juvenile officers who had only just passed out of Fontainebleau, and of
equally inexperienced men, many of whom had never seen powered vehicles, and had
first to be trained as drivers in the schools at Chalons and Rupt. September saw the ar-
rival of the first Schneider tanks and the first Saint-Chamonds, and work could now be-
gin. It soon proved necessary to open a second and then a third training centre - at Cer-
cottes near Orleans, and Champlien at the southern edge of the forest of Compiegne.
Estienne divided the vehicles into 'batteries' of four tanks each; four batteries formed a
'group' under a captain or major; several such groups consituted a 'Groupement'. The
first group of Schneider tanks came into being in December 1916, and the second in Jan-
uary 1917.

The French now had to address themselves to the solving of the many technical difficul-
ties which had accumulated as a result of the sheer speed with which the development
had proceeded. It also became clear that the original thickness of armour was proof
against the ordinary German S round, but not the armour-piercing SmK. It was hardly
surprising that the original delivery dates could not be met as promised, and particular
difficulties were experienced with the heavy Saint-Chamonds, whose tracks were too
nar-row and exerted an excessive ground pressure, causing the tanks to dig into soft
ground and stick fast. The result was that the spring offensive of 1917 had to be carried
out ex-clusively with Schneider tanks.
It was only now, just before the first operational use of tanks, that General Estienne had
to recognize that the two existing types of French vehicle were far too cumbersome. He
set about designing a lighter, faster-moving tank which would weigh five or six tons at the
most, and carry a machine-gun or a light gun. In the summer of 1916 he presented him-
self once more to Renault, and this time he was able to win them over to his project. As
early as March 1917 Renault was able to demonstrate their celebrated and magnificently

28

successful model, and in May they received an order for 1,150 tanks, of which 650 were
to be armed with 37mm guns and the remainder with machine-guns. In October at Esti-
enne's urging the order was increased still further to 3,500 machines, and divided be-
tween the firms of Renault (1,850 vehicles), Berliet (800), Schneider (600) and Delaunay-

Belleville (280), while the Americans undertook to build a further 1,200 tanks. Two hun-
dred wireless tanks were ordered in addition. Unlike the medium tanks, the Chars legers
were divided into companies of three platoons of five vehicles each, making fifteen front-
line and ten reserve tanks per company.
But we have run somewhat ahead of events. Even before the first third of the Artillerie
d'assaut had been delivered the cry arose for the tanks to be thrown into action. The
same call had already been heard on the British sector, and in both cases the
commanders were unable to ignore it.
The first idea had been for the tanks to attack at Beauvraignes in March 1917, but this
was abandoned after the Germans withdrew to the Hindenburg Line. So it was that the
9
French tanks received their baptism of fire on the Aisne on 16 April 1917.

First deployments, mistakes and misgivings

We have examined some developments of interest behind the Allied lines. We now turn
to the struggle on the Western Front. On the basis of their experiences in the 'Winter Bat-
tle', the French devoted weeks of meticulous preparation to their forthcoming 'Autumn
Battle' in Champagne. The British were working on similar lines in Artois. The essential
differences from the earlier pushes consisted in a considerable reinforcement of the artil-
lery, a huge increase in its ammunition, a long-drawn-out period of artillery preparation,
and the extension of the artillery targets deep into the enemy rear. The fire was to be di-
rected with the help of a great number of observation aircraft.

The drum fire began on 22 September and the attack followed on the 25th. German guns
numbered only 1,823 as against the 4,085 of the French; in Champagne six German divi-
sions faced eighteen French, and in Artois twelve German divisions confronted twenty-
seven French and British divisions. These were just the front-line forces, and we have to
remember that the enemy had strong reserves, and the Germans very few.
The enemy put down a gigantic barrage (including gas shells in Champagne, and the British
attack was supported by cylinder gas). The infantry assault followed. The enemy achieved a
number of penetrations in both sectors, which in Champagne attained a depth of between
three and four kilometres between Tahure and the Navarin-FerrrJe, and up to 3 1/2
kilometres in Artois. There were times when the Germans were severely stretched because
of the painful lack of reserves, but on neither sector did the Allies achieve their intended
breakthrough. The offensive was prolonged by a series of mostly local actions which in Artois
lasted until 13 October, and in Champagne until the following day. Fighting on the defensive,
the Germans consumed 3,395,000 shells, and lost 2,800 officers and 130,000 men. The
enemy fired 5,457,000 shells, which figure includes the

British preparatory bombardment, but not the ammunition which the British expended
during the battle. Allied losses amounted to 247,000 men, a sacrifice which was com-
pletely out of proportion to the ground gained.
From these battles the Allies drew the tactical lesson that: 'In a future attempt at break-
through we should strive to win through a succession of combats, and not through an at-
tack in a single bound.' (Reichsarchiv, IX, 101.) In addition it was thought that the quan-
tity of artillery and the supply of ammunition must be increased still further, but no very
clear conclusions emerged about the effectiveness of gas.
The idea of conducting the offensive step by step - of breaking it down into individual ac-
tions - only played into the hands of the Germans. Large-scale surprise was now out of

29

the question, and the defenders had time to make' ready their reserves behind the threat-
ened sectors, and build additional positions to the rear. The Allies tried to make a virtue
out of necessity, and persuaded themselves that they had hit on a way of wearing down
the enemy reserves little by little until they could finally break through the weakened Ger-
man front. The artillery battle meanwhile degenerated into a war of attrition.

The German high command adopted essentially the same way of thinking, and they ap-
plied it at Verdun, after they had failed to take it by surprise in the spring of 1916. 'The
decision to take the fortress of Verdun by an accelerated attack is based on the well-es-
tablished efficacy of heavy and super-heavy artillery. To this end we must choose the
most suitable sector for the attack, and conduct the artillery strike in such a way that the
infantry breakthrough is bound to succeed.' The initial attack, with its 'crushing force',
was confined to the east bank of the Meuse, and even there it was limited to the north-
eastern corner of the Cotes Lorraines. (Reichsarchiv, X,58.)
Twelve hundred guns stood ready together with considerable stocks of ammunition. The
aim was to gain the objective 'in the first onrush', and it was emphasized that the attack
must 'on no account be allowed to bog down, so as to prevent the French from re-estab-
lishing themselves in rearward positions, or reorganizing their defences once we have
broken through'. In the event, however, the offensive was almost immediately converted
to a series of step-by-step pushes - a howling contradiction which was immediately evi-
dent to the troops who were responsible for putting the thing into effect. It was solely due
to the offensive spirit of the troops that they managed to push beyond their objectives
and score a number of successes which actually exceeded the expectations of the high
command. Such an episode was the capture of Fort Douaumont on 25 February, the fifth
day of the offensive. This fortification was stormed upon the independent initiative of
three officers who chose to ignore their assigned sector and the objective which had
been set for that day. The officers in question deserve to be named: Captain Haupt, First
Lieutenant von Brandis and Reserve Lieutenant Radtke of 24th Brandenburg Infantry
Regiment.

This was the high point of the 'accelerated attack', which now gave way to a battle of at-
trition. There were no reserves available behind III Brandenburg Corps to exploit its suc-
cess. On 26 February the high command turned down Fifth Army's request for reinforce-
ments to enable it to extend the attack to the west bank of the Meuse. By the 27th there
were signs of exhaustion among the attacking troops, enemy resistance was stiffening,
and casualties were rising. In the seven days of fighting since the start of the offensive
the Germans had lost 25,000 men, while taking eight kilometres of ground, 17,000 pris-
oners and eighty-three guns, but from now on gains would be made only step by step
and at disproportionate cost. The offensive was extended to the west bank of the Meuse
at the beginning of March, and an intensive use was made of gas in an attack at Fleury
on 23 June, but again no decisive successes were achieved.
After the battle of attrition at Verdun had been prolonged with extraordinary obstinacy for
four months, the enemy opened an offensive on their own account on the Somme. It was
delivered with unprecedented force, as we shall see. Meanwhile the wasting battle at
Verdun had made frightful inroads on the hitherto intact core of the German infantry, and
destroyed the confidence of the troops in their leadership. By the end of the fighting no less
than forty-seven German divisions had been engaged at Verdun, six of them twice over, and
the Germans had fired off 14,000,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, and taken 62,000
prisoners and two hundred guns. Over the same period the French had commit-ted seventy
divisions, thirteen of them twice over, and ten of them three times. The imbal-ance of forces
was all the greater since the French divisions comprised four regiments of infantry, and most
of the German divisions had only three. In dead, wounded and missing

30

the Germans lost 282,000 men, and the French 317,000. While the attack on Verdun tied
down the forces available to the Germans on the Western Front, it left the offensive po-
tential of the British completely intact, and weakened the French potential only in part,
and certainly not to the extent that was needed to disrupt the long-meditated enemy at-
tack on both banks of the Somme.

On 1 July 1916 the Anglo-French offensive struck the 12 Vz divisions of the German
Sec-ond Army. A preparatory bombardment from 3,000 guns had been raging from 24
June, and now seventeen divisions attacked in the first wave, with fourteen infantry and
three cavalry divisions following in reserve. The Allies had 309 aircraft available for the
battle, which gave them the mastery of the skies, and the 'German air defence was
confined to immediate close reconnaissance' (Reichsarchiv, X,347). The Germans had at
their dis-posal only 104 aircraft and 844 guns.
Dust, smoke and the morning mist covered the preparations of the enemy forces until
they burst forth at 0830, and by the end of the first day of the offensive they had won the
forward German trenches on a frontage of some twenty kilometres and to a depth of up
to 2Vz kilometres. These gains were expanded on the following night. There was a slack-
ening in the attacks from 3 July until they gradually increased again in force, which in-
duced German Second Army to call for the setting up of special machine-gun companies
and combined machine-gun/sharpshooter units. These worked extremely well and their
intervention often proved decisive.
On 14 July the battles flared up again with the launching of a major new offensive; its
gains, however, were small, and some of them were lost again when the Germans coun-
ter-attacked on the 18th. The Allies followed up with a further offensive on 20 July which
pitted sixteen divisions against eight German; this too was beaten off. After violent local
combats the enemy put in a powerful attack north of the Somme which was rewarded
with insignificant gains. The battle roared on with large-scale Allied pushes on 7 August,
16-18 August and 24 August, but these too were in vain.
By this time the Allies had lost 270,000 men and the Germans 200,000. The enemy had
broken into the German line over an area measuring twenty-five kilometres wide and at
most eight kilometres deep, but there was no question of an actual breakthough. Alto-
gether the fighting had ranged 106 enemy divisions against 57 1/2 German divisions.
The endurance of the British infantry had been severely tested in the process, and public
opinion at home was shaken. The British high command took due note and concluded
that it could justify fresh attacks only with the support of new weapons. The command
postponed the resumption of the attack until September, and decided to commit the first
of its newly arrived companies of tanks.
Thus the first thirty-two tanks rolled forward to the attack through the morning mist on IS
September. This was not a particularly large number, and the concentration was diluted
still further by the way the machines were divided between General Rawlinsons's Fourth
Army and General Cough's Reserve Army. In addition a number of tanks were inevitably
lost through mechanical failure. All of this was deplorable, and yet the appearance of
these few machines enabled the British to score their greatest success so far. Such was
the impact of this novel weapon. The offensive spirit of the British infantry revived at
once, as witness the celebrated message from an aircraft: 'A tank is walking up the high
street of Flers, with the British Army cheering behind it.' Public opinion also responded to
the good news from the front line. Naturally, however, a handful of tanks could not aim to
break through a German position which had been consolidated over the course of ten
weeks of heavy fighting; there were not nearly enough machines for that purpose.

31

After this first engagement Colo-

nel Elles was given field com-
mand of the British Tank Corps;
he held this post until the end of
the war and made a significant
contribution to the development
of this new arm of service. The
British high command now asked
for the construction of 1,000
10
tanks.
On 25 and 26 September thir-
teen tanks rolled against Thiepv-
al over ground that was boggy
and pock-marked with shell
holes; nine became stuck in the
craters, two more broke down,
and only two tanks actually
reached the village. One of these
machines, supported by a single
aircraft, nevertheless took more
than 1,000 metres of trench and
captured eight officers and 362
men; in less than one hour the
British infantry were able to se-
cure the gain with the loss of on-
ly five men.
But the action at Thiepval, like all
the rest that followed in the
course of the autumn, was car-
ried out by a small unit of tanks.
A very large number of machines was available, and yet no attempt was made to use this
force against a single objective. While all the other arms of the service, including ' air-craft,
were being concentrated on the battlefield in ever greater numbers, the British high command
did exactly the opposite with the tanks, even though it had originally approved what Swinton
had to say about concerted action. Swinton wrote with every justification:

'With the example before us of the stupendous mistake of the Germans'in first releasing
gas over a short sector, we, sixteen months later, with our eyes open, committed a simi-
lar error. We threw away a surprise.' (Eyewitness, 297.) This corresponds to a statement
in one of the British official accounts, which speaks of the sheer wastefulness of forfeiting
surprise in such a way, and again makes the comparison with the German use of gas at
Second Ypres.
Now the cat was out of the bag. The French, General Estienne in particular, were beside
themselves with fury, believing that they would now have to reckon with stronger German
countermeasures, and conceivably also with German tanks. But here they gave too much
credit to the Germans. Our high command admittedly called for experimental work on tanks,
and offered a reward for the recovery of the first British machine, but for the moment that was
all. Anti-tank ammunition for the infantry was neither requested not de-veloped, and on 17
November the army group commander Crown Prince Rupprecht is-sued the following order
of the day: 'Infantry can do little against tanks by themselves, but they must nevertheless be
schooled to believe that they can hold out in full confidence

32

that the artillery will intervene to exorcise the danger.' In other words the moral element
was supposed to beat the material, at least as far as the German infantry were con-
cerned!

The artillery did take countermeasures of a sort: twelve batteries of field artillery were re-
formed for this purpose, and five batteries of six field guns each were set up for close-
range combat. They were to be deployed immediately behind the front line, to engage
the tanks with armour-piercing shells. The engineers too were busy. They dug ditches
and tank traps, laid out minefields in suitable locations, and converted areas of ground to
swamps by damming streams. Finally the Minenwerfer were equipped with special car-
riages for low-trajectory fire.
When the summer battles were over the French and British prepared a great blow for the
spring of 1917. They planned to pin down the greater part of the German reserves by a
Franco-British attack at Arras, then break through the German front in the Champagne
hills and between Reims and the Chemin-des-Dames, and finally exploit the break-
through with powerful reserves. The British tanks were to support the attack at Arras,
while the French machines did the same at Berry-au-Bac on the Aisne.
The sixty available British machines were split up among the various corps for the battle
at Arras on 9 April. They performed some useful local services, but they were too dis-
persed to secure a large-scale success. However the British established that the Ger-
mans had no serious anti-tank defence, apart from the armour-piercing rounds for their
close-combat artillery. The Germans on their side captured their first British tank, evi-
dently one from the original batch. They performed tests against the machine's armour,
and found that the only effective weapons available to their infantry were the SmK round,
special cartridge loadings and Minenwerfer firing at low trajectory.
On 16 April 1917 the French tanks rolled forward to their baptism of fire at Berry-au-Bac.
They were deployed on Fifth Army's sector in two groups which had the mission of
break-ing through the German front in a single bound and within a span of twenty-four or
at most forty-eight hours, and then rolling up the defences to the east. The ground rose
gradually towards the German positions, but offered no particular difficulties. The area
was bordered to the east by the Aisne, to the west by the heights of Craonne, and div-
ided down the centre by the valley of the Aisne, a stream which was three metres wide
and bordered by water meadows and bushes. The battlefield was overlooked from the
north-east and north by the height of Prouvais, the high ground south of Amifontaine. The
only obstacles in the way of the tanks were the trenches of the two sides and the shell
holes, and even these scarcely existed north of the Corbeny-Guignicourt road. The main
danger was presented by the commanding observation posts available to the German ar-
tillery.
The offensive was preceded by a fourteen-day bombardment from 5,350 guns, which left
the Germans in no doubt as to the width and objectives of the attack, and enabled them
to arrange their defences in depth and bring up fresh forces - notably in the form of guns,
and reserves of infantry which were held ready for counter-attacks. On 4 April, indeed, a
successful counter-stroke by the German 10th Reserve Division at le Soldat, south-east
of Berry-au-Bac, captured 900 men together with a number of orders concerning the in-
tended attack. Altogether on this single day the French had to bring down defensive fire
from 250 new battery positions. In addition the German artillery was quicker off the mark
than before, and had greater material resources at its disposal. In fact the purposeful way
that Hindenburg and Ludendorff had fought their battles on the Eastern Front, as evident
in the 'Siegfried Manoeuvre', was now harvesting its first major success in the west. This
time there could be no question of the Germans being taken by surprise.
For their offensive the French put together sixteen infantry divisions, two brigades of Rus-

33

sian infantry, and a cavalry division. The attack was supported by 3,800 guns, more than

1,500 mortars and by no fewer than 128 Schneider tanks - by far the most powerful con-
centration of armour so far seen on any battlefield. The most important directives for the
French tank attack ran as follows (this section makes use of Lieutenant-Colonel Ferre's
'Le premier engagement des chars frangais', in Revue d'Infanterie, 1 April 1936):
'The tanks will accompany the infantry attack, opening the way though barbed wire ob-
stacles and covering the advance.
'The tanks are armed with artillery pieces and machine-guns, but their most potent weap-
on is simply to keep on going. They open fire at close range - 200 metres at most with
the gun, and 300 with the machine-gun; at longer range they will fire only in exceptional
circumstances.
'Tanks and infantry remain in close association during the combat, but the tanks do not
wait for the infantry, if they see an opportunity for going forward; once the attack has
opened the tanks advance on their objectives, and halt only when they encounter ob-
stacles which they cannot cross with the equipment available to them. When our infantry
catch up with a tank which is detained in this way, they must do everything possible to
help it to overcome the obstruction. If the infantry are held up by enemy resistance before
our tanks are on the scene, they must lie down and wait for the tanks to intervene. The
tanks will roll through them and on against the enemy, suppressing the hostile fire. In
such a way the tanks and infantry will lend mutual support as they advance towards their
common objective; they wait for one another only when their own resources do not allow
them to progress any further.'
A supplementary order was issued on 23 March, the purpose of which was to eliminate
ambiguities in the instructions just mentioned. This made it clear that the tanks were sup-
posed to fall in with the tactics of the infantry.
Sixteen tanks made up a 'group'. Five groups of this kind fought as the 'Groupement
Bos-sus' to the east of the Miette on the sector of XXXII Corps, while a further three were
des-ignated the 'Groupement Chaubes' to attack on the sector of V Corps, west of la
Ville-aux-Bois and the Miette. The initial advance was to be made in columns, upon
which the tanks were to deploy in line for combat with intervals of 45-50 metres between
the ma-chines. A special infantry company was assigned to each group, to help with
overcoming obstacles and in close-range combat. The attack was to follow a creeping
barrage, which was to lift 100 metres every five minutes.
The tanks were to intervene only when the offensive reached the third or fourth German
lines, to make up for the falling away of artillery, and to help the infantry forward. This
meant that they were go into action four hours after the opening of XXXII Corps' attack,
x
and 3 /2 hours after that of V Corps. On the day before the offensive the tanks were to
assemble in the area west and south-west of Cuiry-les-Chaudardes, and on the following
night the Groupement Bossus was to put itself in a state of readiness southwest of Pon-
tavert, and Groupement Chaubes in the wood south-west of Craonne. From there the
two forces were to set out respectively thirty and twenty minutes after the attack began.
We specify the details from the orders:

Groupement Bossus was to move in a single column by way of Pontavert to le Cholera,

where it would split into two columns - the left-hand column, consisting of the leading
three groups, to continue the advance between the le Cholera-Guignicourt road and the
Miette, while the right-hand column, comprising the two rearwards groups, pushed ini-
tially along the le Cholera-Guignicourt road and then, after crossing the first German line,
headed in the general direction of the Prouvais height. The approach was to be made in
single file, and only after the first German line had been passed was the column to de-
ploy into combat formation. The tanks had to wait for the barrage to cease, meanwhile

34

occupying the line they had reached four to five hours after the offensive opened. Only
then would they attack the third German line, and press on to Guignicourt and Prouvais;
last of all, the three left-hand groups would attack Provisieux. The objectives were subdi-
vided meticulously among the groups; after the attack they were to reassemble north-
west of Guignicourt. Repair teams came up behind each group, and every column was in
turn followed by a recovery group. Groupement Chaubes would likewise move in a single
column, north-westwards by way of le Temple Ferme towards Amifontaine. Once the first
German line had been crossed it was to form two columns, and then after crossing the
second line deploy into combat formation and proceed to the attack. After the attack it
would assemble west of Amifontaine.
Such at least were the plans of the high command. In the event the mighty preparatory
bombardment damaged only the first and second German lines, and these only in part;
the rearward defences were virtually unscathed. On 16 April the tanks were standing in
readiness at the appointed time; Groupement Bossus was up to strength, but Groupe-
ment Chaubes had lost eight tanks which had bogged down. As was stipulated in the
plan of attack, the infantry alone followed up behind the barrage. They took the first Ger-
man line with no great difficulty, but it was a different story at the second line. The French
arrived here between 1000 and 1100 only after they had suffered severe losses in heavy
fighting, and their gains were confined to a sector running from Caesar's Camp by way of
Mauchamps Ferme to the Old Mill south of Juvincourt; from here the line described a re-
entrant to la Ville-aux-Bois, which the French were unable to capture. Further to the west
the attack made no significant progress beyond the first German line, and at Craonne it
failed altogether.
Meanwhile Groupement Bossus set off at 0630 in a column measuring two kilometres
long. Progress was slow, because the road was encumbered with infantry and artillery.
At 0800 the head of the column reached the bridge over the Miette west of le Cholera; it
was under heavy German artillery fire, but only one machine was hit. Two tanks broke
down completely, arid two more got on the move again after being repaired. The escort-
ing infantry had prepared the passage over the French front line, which was passed with-
out difficulty, but the German front line occasioned a delay of forty-five minutes, and the
first tank did not reach le Cholera Ferme until 10IS. Here the supporting infantry had al-
ready been broken up by enemy artillery fire, and they lost contact with the tanks. At
1000 the western, or left-hand group deployed into the attack. Immediately Major Bos-
sus's tank received a direct hit on the top of the machine which killed the occupants and
set the tank on fire, depriving the attack of leadership at the decisive moment. We shall
now take up the story of the individual groups.
A few minutes later the foremost group crossed the German front line, accompanied by
weak units of the attacking infantry; over to the left there seemed to be French infantry
advancing on Juvincourt, but nobody was coming up on the right. Seven tanks managed
to cross the German trenches, but a further seven broke down. Shortly after 1200 the
seven surviving machines reached Hill 78, and crossed the third German line behind,
calling in vain on the infantry to follow. Two of the tanks were now put out of action, but
the crews seized a German dressing station and took a number of prisoners. Two more
tanks were shot up at 1315 and 1330 respectively. Finally the last three tanks made their
way back in order to regain contact with the infantry, and they encountered nine tanks of
the following group, the 6th, together with one of their own tanks which had been re-
paired.
The 6th Group had lost two tanks through breakdown when crossing the German second
line. On the far side it attacked pockets of German troops which had been interfering with
the advance of the French infantry, then lost five machines to artillery fire at a range of

35

between 1,800 and 2,000 metres, and finally deployed just to the right of the remnant of
the forward group, the 2nd. At 1430 the thirteen tanks of these two groups beat off a
powerful German counter-attack against Hill 78. Captain Chanoine, their joint
commander, decided against plunging on without support, since the infantry to the right
had been making no progress, and he recrossed the line south of Hill 78 so as to with-
draw out of reach of the enemy fire. A little later Chanoine was able to establish contact
with the commander of IS 1st Regiment of Infantry, which had now reached the area be-
tween Mau-champs Ferme and the Miette, and they concerted an attack with the limited
aim of recapturing Hill 78; the assault went ahead and the infantry reached the objective
between 1730 and 1800. By agreement with the regimental commander the tanks now
fell back along the Miette to le Cholera; in the attack they had lost one machine to artil-
lery fire, and another four which were stuck in shell craters.

Group 5 delivered the third attack. It deployed to the right next to Group 6, waited for the
artillery barrage to end and attacked at 1200. The French managed to take the third Ger-
man line and occupy it with their supporting infantry. The attack was continued by nine
tanks which drove through a copse to the north-east of the captured sector of the line,
and reached the Guignicourt-Amifontaine railway line without having encountered any
further obstacles or enemy fire. Here the French lost one tank to artillery fire and another
to a breakdown. Meanwhile Group S's commander had made contact with the
commander of the following regiment of infantry, the 162nd, only to be told that the regi-
ment had been too severely mauled to be able to continue the advance. Shortly after
1700 the tanks beat off a German counter-attack against the same regiment, and the ma-
chines were then withdrawn behind the infantry for the night.
Fourth in line came Group 9's attack. It was held up by other troops for a considerable
time at le Cholera, but thirteen tanks reached Mauchamps Ferme and launched their at-
tack from there at about 1300. They ran into artillery fire and were wiped out south-west
of the railway; the infantry did not follow them into the attack.
Last of all Group 4 advanced in two columns between the Miette valley to the west and
the valley of the Aisne to the east. It reunited on the second German line on the Aisne.
After considerable delays and losses the five leading tanks opened an attack at 1500 in
support of some infantry who were about 600 metres to the north and in a shaky condi-
tion. Two tanks were set on fire and the others returned after beating off a German
counterattack. The rest of the group pushed along the Aisne and was able to clear a
trench at 1530; two tanks were put out of action, but the supporting infantry of 94th Regi-
ment were able to follow up the success. The group was then withdrawn to its original as-
sembly area.
Finally we turn to the three groups of Groupement Chaubes, which set out from their
forming-up area at 0630. They advanced in a single column by way of le Temple Ferme,
but were spotted by German aircraft, tracked by artillery observers, and came under con-
centrated fire. A number of delays were occasioned by the fact that the supporting infan-
try failed to make passages in good time across the French and German trenches. The
commander's tank of the leading group was immobilized by a hit, and the following group
ran into the vehicles from behind. The German artillery fire increased all the time, and the
crews of the knocked-out tanks extricated their machine-guns and went into battle along-
side the infantry, who were likewise pinned down. In the evening no more than nine of
Groupement Chaubes' tanks were able to return to the assembly area under their own
power; essentially the group had been destroyed at a range of between three and six kil-
ometres by the indirect fire of one battery of field artillery, two batteries of heavy field ho-
witzers, one battery of 10.0cm guns and two mortar batteries. Under this fire the tanks
had been advancing at the pace of the supporting infantry.
 36

Altogether the attack of 16 April 1917 proved to be a costly failure. The tank crews num-
bered 720 men, and 180 of them, or 25 per cent, were dead, wounded or missing. Of 121
tanks which set out from the assembly areas, 81 were lost, including 28 through break-down,
seventeen through artillery hits alone, and 35 through fires occasioned by artillery.

A number of tanks caught fire without being hit at all. Twenty tanks were retrieved. The fi-
nal loss came to 76 tanks out of a grand total of 132, or 5 7 per cent.
After the battle the French drew the following conclusions from their failure:
(a) the tanks had inadequate cross-country mobility;
(b) the supporting infantry rendered virtually no help;
(c) no tank had been disabled by small-arms fire, and the armour had met expectations;
(d) on the other hand 57 tanks were knocked out by artillery fire: fifteen through direct
fire, and 37 through indirect fire - mostly from heavy-calibre guns. This was due to the ef-
fectiveness of the German artillery observation, and the fact that on 16 April the German
guns had been virtually untouched by the French artillery; in future something would
have to be done to beat down the defenders' guns and blind their observation posts;
(e) most of the losses had been sustained when the tanks were moving in column, or
during the holdups or deployments. Losses could be diminished by advancing in de-
ployed formation from the assembly areas, and these in turn should be located close be-
hind the infantry's start-line;
(f) the main reasons for the disappointing results of the tank attack were associated with
the failure of the offensive as a whole, which left the tanks vulnerable. The infantry had
been exhausted and decimated during the previous fighting, and they were in no condi-
tion to exploit the successes which the tanks had achieved in the general direction of
Guignicourt and the height of Prouvais;
(g) tanks, even when operating'individually, proved very effective against moving infan-
try, as was shown by the rapid collapse of the enemy counterattack west of Guignicourt;
(h) against dug-in infantry, however, lasting success could be achieved only when the at-
tacking infantry was in a position to exploit without delay; otherwise the gains of the tanks
proved to be as costly as they were useless. The French drew the further conclusion that
tanks must fight only in close assocation with infantry - a notion which dominates French
tactics even now.
From the German perspective we must also add:
(a) the French tanks executed their long approach marches at the infantry pace, and
along roads that were encumbered with other troops. These marches and the conse-
quent holdups could have been avoided;
(b) the French should have prepared a whole series of crossings of the Miette and their
own trenches, which would have permitted them to advance in deployed formation from
the assembly area;
(c) for the passage of the German trenches the French would have done better to assign
engineers rather than infantry to accompany the tanks;
(d) the individual groups attacked in succession at one-hourly intervals between 1100
and IS00, which made them easy targets for the concentrated fire of the German artillery.
The tank groups would have been better advised to move up from their assembly areas
in deployed formation and along cleared routes. This would have permitted a simultane-
ous attack, and made it a good deal more difficult for the Germans to hold them off;
(e) if the tanks had been committed earlier, say at about the time that the second Ger-
man line was under attack, they would have achieved a closer co-operation with the in-
fantry, before the latter were weakened through prolonged fighting and casualties;
(f) the barrage proved to be an obstacle in the way of a rapid advance by the tanks.
There was a need to explore other forms of artillery support;

37

(g) for all the mistakes in the way the assault had been prepared and carried out, the
tanks still managed to advance 2 to 2.S kilometres further than the infantry. The foot sol-
diers were unable to follow, despite the weak resistance on the part of the Germans and
the slowness of the tanks. We can only conclude that the main striking force of an offen-
sive resides in tanks, and it is a question of developing the other arms in such a way that
they can keep up with them;

(h) a complete breakthrough on 16 April 1917 would have been well within the bounds of
possibility, if only the tanks had been employed in a more effective way, and if the offen-
sive tactics of the other arms had been brought into full accord with the performance of
the new arm, the tank.
At that time, in 1917, the Germans were impressed by their successes in beating off the
attack, and they came to other conclusions. They should have entrusted the main re-
sponsibility for dealing with tanks to the direct fire batteries. Instead, the batteries in
question were gradually disbanded, since the Germans believed that they had a com-
plete anti-tank defence with the infantry firing SmK rounds and special cartridge loadings,
and the artillery, especially the heavy calibres, shooting from long range.
In France the disappointment at the failure of the attack on 16 April 1917 led to some vio-
lent criticisms being levelled against the tanks. However it was not long before the worth
of armour was vindicated in further combat, and indeed the contribution of the tanks had
already been recognized in official circles, as witness the GHQ Ordre general No. 76 of
20 April that year:
'The tanks were the first of our forces to penetrate the second enemy line in front of Ju-
vincourt, and they secured its conquest. This was their first appearance on the field of
battle, and they won for themselves a place of honour alongside their soldier comrades,
demonstrating what we may expect from the char d'assaut in the future.'
We turn now to the story of Groupement Lefebvre, with its two groups of Schneider tanks
and its single group of Saint-Chamonds. It had not been involved in the attack of 17 April
in Champagne, but was committed a little later, on 5 and 6 May, in the fighting at Manne-
jean farm and the mill at Laffaux. These were elements in an attack by 158th Infantry Di-
vision, the composite Division Brecard and 3rd Colonial Division, which had the limited
objective of pushing to the northern edge of the heights of the Chemin-des-Dames. Of
the available tanks 158th Infantry Division was assigned the Saint-Chamond group and a
'battery' (four tanks) of Schneiders; one group of Schneiders went to Division Brecard
and the remainder of the tanks stayed in reserve. On this occasion the splitting up of the
tanks was justified by the conformation of the terrain. The missions of the groups and
batteries were specified in detail, and 17th Light Infantry Battalion had been given a
lengthy training in infantry-tank co-operation. The terrain on the plateau of Chemin-des-
Dames was particularly suitable for tank operations because of the good going and the
well-sited assembly areas on the southern slopes. It also presented difficulties to the
Ger-mans in the way of observation. There were unfavourable features however; these
in-cluded the awkward approach routes, and a deep zone of craters after the French artil-
lery had tried in vain to clear the belts of wire with delayed-action fuzes; the shell holes
were to prove fatal to several of the tanks.
The subsequent attack was not particularly successful in itself, but the few gains that
were made were due primarily to the tank forces, which lost considerably less in ma-
chines and personnel than on the Aisne. Moreover the high command and the other
arms were pleased with what the tanks had done, which secured the future of the new
weapon. Just as had been shown on the Aisne, it was clear that armoured attacks could
gain lasting success only when they were followed up without delay by the infantry. Once
again this had not occurred, even though the tanks had given the agreed signals, and on

38
occasion even driven back to the infantry in an attempt to get the foot soldiers to occupy
the positions that had been cleared.

The French scored a rather greater success on 23 October 1917, when they attacked the
angle of the line at Laffaux. This time a considerably greater number of tanks was de-
voted to the assault. What was the wider background? The French had sustained heavy
casualties during the fighting in the spring of 1917, and by the autumn had had no alter-
native but to await the entry of the Americans, meanwhile confining themselves to a ser-
ies of small probes which were designed to improve the lie of the front line and try out
new tactics. Moreover the French intended to carry out a number of augmentations by
the summer of 1918 - increasing their heavy artillery two-fold, building 2,000-3,000 Re-
nault tanks, and assembling large stocks of gas and smoke shells.
One of the small enterprises in question was to capture the Chemin-des-Dames. The op-
eration was to begin with an attack on the Laffaux angle on a frontage of some eleven kil-
ometres. There was no question of being able to take the enemy by surprise, and by the
time the attack began the French had identified the presence of seven fresh German divi-
sions and sixty-four new batteries. The German positions were solidly built, and the belts
of barbed wire extended in some places to a depth of ten metres. The defending troops
had cover in the numerous shelters and dugouts. A rearward line stretched along the
north bank of the Ailette, and it lay beyond the objectives of the French attack. On the
other hand the ridge of the Chemin-des-Dames descended steeply to the north, which
among many sectors cramped the depth of the German positions and limited their fields

39

of fire, compelling the artillery observers to post themselves in the front line.

The French carried out the attack with six divisions in the first wave, and six more in the
second. The equipment and training of the troops had been fully restored since the
spring battles, and in particular the French had rehearsed co-operation with tanks, and
proved the ground with a number of probing attacks. The offensive was to be prepared
by 1,850 guns firing some 3,000,000 rounds, while sixty-eight tanks executed the as-
sault.
The tanks were organized into three groups of twelve Schneiders each, and two groups
each of fourteen Saint-Chamonds, with a number of tanks in reserve. Each group was
furnished with a combat supply element and a mobile workshop, while every groupement
had at its disposal a repair and replacement train. At the end of August two squadrons of
dismounted cuirassiers were assigned as close support infantry and trained in working
with the tanks, and the main body of assault infantry exercised jointly with the armour.
Aerial photographs underwent constant study, and the routes were reconnoitred and im-
proved.
The offensive was ushered in by a six-day bombardment. At the points where the tanks
were due to break in, the lanes through the obstacles were cleared by shells primed ex-
clusively with instantaneous fuzes, which did not have the usual effect of creating deep of
shell holes. Aircraft were ordered to report the progress of the attacking infantry and ar-
mour, and artillery spotter aircraft were assigned to keep an eye on the movement of en-
emy reserves and anti-tank artillery.
The tanks were distributed arnpng five of the six assaulting divisions. Tank liaison offi-
cers were attached to the commanders of the infantry regiments, while the senior officers
of the tank forces were located with the divisional commanders and the commanding
generals.
A number of losses were incurred while the French were in the process of entering the
assembly areas on the night before the attack. Half of Group 12, which was under the
right-hand division, namely the 38th, was eliminated through breakdowns and German
artillery fire; it was much the same story with Group 8, which was placed under 43rd Divi-
sion; Group 11 with 13th Division reached its start-line without serious trouble, as did
Group 31 (Saint-Chamonds) of 17th Division, and Group 33 (Saint-Chamonds) with 28th
Division. However only 52 out of a total of 68 tanks reached the start-line, which shows
how dangerous it was to keep tanks waiting within effective range of the enemy artillery,
even though the Germans did not know the tanks were coming up and their artillery
strikes amounted to no more than harassing fire on the roads during the night.
The tanks set off behind the infantry at 05:05, while it was still dark, and they continued
at the infantry pace. All the tanks of the right-hand group, the 12th, were hors de combat
before they could reach the first objective. Group 8 was able to enter the fight with six of
its tanks, though only after the French infantry had begun to advance on the second ob-
jective; the tanks moved forward in the space between the creeping barrage and the first
wave of infantry, and a number of machines followed later, after they had undergone me-
chanical repairs. By 11:00 eight tanks of this group had reached the objective, and cov-
ered the infantry while the troops were consolidating themselves there. Group 11 set off
with 13th Division according to plan, and played a considerable part in its subsequent
success, with twelve tanks reaching the objective. Group 31 did reasonably well, but
Group 33 failed to reach the first German trenches.
On 25 October the French reached the Ailette without any further help from their tanks.
By 1 November 1917 the Germans had evacuated the whole of the Chemin-des-Dames,
and in addition to their casualties they had lost 12,000 prisoners and 200 guns. French
losses amounted to 8,000 men, or 10 per cent of the total in action. Of the 68 tanks that

40

had been engaged: nineteen were lost during the fighting, though only eight of them were
lost to enemy action, the remainder became bogged down; twenty gained their objec-
tives; five functioned as wireless tanks.

The casualties among the tank crews amounted to 82, or 9 per cent, which was of the
same order as in the infantry. Most of the men had been hit when they were outside the
tanks or had opened the hatches to get their bearings.
On this occasion the French deduced the following:
(a) tanks became effective against fortified positions only after they had crossed the
zone of craters;
(b) flanking units were particularly vulnerable, and need special protection on this ac-
count;
(c) tank attacks must be carried out in depth. Objectives should be assigned not to indi-
vidual machines, but always to whole units at a time, in other words to platoons or
groups;
(d) the attempt to comnmunicate with infantry by flags had failed, and the only effective
means was by word of mouth;
(e) the tanks were liable to heavy losses whenever they were standing still within sight of
the enemy, and in future this should be demanded only in case of emergency;
(f) close co-operation with the infantry proved its worth - and indeed has remained the
fundamental tenet of French tank tactics until the present day (Commandant Perre, 'Les
Chars a la bataille de la Malmaison', in Revue d'Infanterie).
Concerning the last point we must add that being tied to the infantry as closely as they
were on 23 October 1917, the tanks avoided being wiped out only because the Germans
had no kind of anti-tank defence. The only effective anti-tank weapon available to them at
that time was their artillery, and the unfavourable local conditions made it almost impossi-
ble to use; otherwise those huge and trundling targets would have shared the fate of the
tanks on 16 April. In future such tactics will be suicidal.
So much for the first French tank battles. We return to the British, who had determined
on a mighty offensive in Flanders, at whose ports German U-boats were based. There
was no question of a surprise attack - quite the contrary! The intention was to gain
ground step by step, and only after that ground had been comprehensively pounded by
artillery, gassed, and if necessary blown up by subterranean mines. This was to be a bat-
tle of brute force and attrition, sedulously avoiding any kind of novel or untried technique
- indeed deliberately renouncing the possibility of exploiting any unexpected success
which might come the way of the British. Such was the thinking behind the Third Battle of
Ypres.
On 7 June 1917 the British blew up the German positions on the Wytschaete salient, de-
stroyed five German divisions and reached the Lys. This first blow secured the right flank
of the coming offensive which was preceded by four weeks of bombardment and lasted
until early December. The British tank forces were committed time and time again, but in-
variably in penny packets with strictly limited objectives, and frequently over the most un-
favourable terrain imaginable — ground which had been reduced to a swamp by rain and
11
shells. Seventy-six tanks were available at Wytschaete, and 216 at Third Ypres, but
they achieved little, and the blame lies with the defective tactics which were forced upon
them.

Did the other arms reap any greater rewards, after all their costly efforts? Nearly four
weeks of drum fire, which consumed 93,000 tons of artillery ammunition, together with
four months of heavy fighting and 400,000 casualties were the price of conquering a
stretch of ground which measured at the most nine kilometres deep by fourteen kilo-
metres wide. The Germans themselves lost 200,000 men, but they were able to prevent

41

a breakthrough, and the U-boat bases were left undisturbed. The great sacrifice was
squandered mindlessly, and yet it never occurred to the British high command that they
were going about the offensive in totally the wrong way, and that it was quite impossible
to conceal preparations for a push on this scale — giving the enemy time to take counter-
measures, and presenting the British, after they had won every step of ground in such a
costly way, with the prospect of having to overcome further lines to the rear. The com-
mand never appreciated that such a manner of fighting was no way to bring the war to a
rapid conclusion.
Any notion of surprise or speed had to give way before the tenacious attachment to brute
force and an unflinching application of fundamentally flawed methods. The terrain, the
weather, the physical and moral resources of the army - and ultimately also of the British
nation itself - became of little account in this unrelenting struggle. The blinkered mentality
of the high command also accounts for its lack of vision in other respects - no change of
12
tack at any price! For heaven's sake, no novel weapons! This was a period when the

British Tank Corps, like the French chars d'assaiit, stood within measurable distance of
disbandment, for they could do no better than the infantry in these muddy battles in Flan-
ders.

Mass production

Although the British high command was averse to any innovation in tactics, the British
and French armaments factories were set to work producing long runs of tanks, and the
experience of combat in 1917 was evaluated in both the technical and tactical dimen-
sions. By the summer of 1918 the British were supposed to have 1,000 tanks available
for service, and the French 3,500. In addition the Americans intended to arrive in the the-
13
atre with 1,200 tanks, arranged in twenty-five battalions. These figures were never ac-
tually reached because of difficulties with production, but the tank forces were now so
large that they had the means of expanding success beyond narrow tactical limits into
something of great operational significance. On the technical side the new models repre-
sented considerable advances in respect of cross-country mobility, range, speed, ar-
mour, armament and steering; tighter control was made possible by grouping tanks in
battalions and companies.

Before the high command could get its ideas in order about the deployment of tanks in
1918, whether for defensive or offensive purposes, there supervened an event in the late
autumn of 1917 which presented the importance of tanks in an altogether new light. Even
after the passage of years it is an episode which rewards our attention.

The birth of a new WEAPON

Cambrai

Since their first action, in September 1916, the British tank forces had not only aug-
mented their numbers, but undergone changes in organization and personnel. The origi-
nal six companies developed into nine battalions, which from July 1917 bore the name of
the 'Tank Corps'. In turn three brigades were formed of three battalions apiece. Each bat-
talion comprised three companies of four platoons of four tanks each, and was supported
by a mobile workshop.

The standard tank in the autumn of 1917 was the Mark IV. It resembled the Mark I of au-
tumn 1916 in external appearance, but its armour was proof against the SmK round, and
it carried an unditching beam which could be attached to the tracks to enable the ma-
chine to haul itself out of trenches. The tank weighed twenty-eight tons, and the 150 hp
42

43
Daimler engine gave it an average speed of three kilometres an hour, and a maximum of
six. The crew consisted of an officer and seven men, and it was armed with two 58mm
guns and four machine-guns in the 'male' version, or six machine-guns in the 'female'. It
had a range of twenty-four kilometres. In November 1917 the British had ready for action
14
378 such Mark IVs, and 98 older models which were used as supply tanks.

The Tank Corps was commanded by Brigadier (later Major-General) Hugh Elles, and his
staff included Major J. F. C. Fuller as chief of staff, Major G. le Q Martel, and Major F. E.
15
Hotblack, who was in charge of signals.
After the Third Ypres offensive had so clearly failed, the leaders of the Tank Corps asked
the high command for freedom to use the tanks in a more effective way. They were think-
ing along the same lines as Swinton's paper of February 1916, which had already been
16
approved by the high command, but then forgotten in the next year.

Three essential preconditions were laid down for the succcess of an attack by tanks: suit-
able ground, employment en masse and surprise. These deserve further exploration be-
fore we can proceed with our story.
Armoured forces are often criticized for the fact that they cannot be employed in every
conceivable kind of terrain - most obviously they might find it impossible to cross high
mountains, steep slopes, deep swamps or deep watercourses. But the same has been
true of every other vehicle in history - it is just a question of using whatever means lie at
hand, for the lack of anything better, and if necessary we will have to tackle obstacles of
this kind by making artificial passages or simply flying over them. It is true that technol-
ogy is striving constantly to improve the cross-country mobility of military vehicles, and
tanks in particular; a great deal has been achieved very recently, and we have every con-
fidence that still more significant advances will follow. However terrain remains a consid-
eration which will always have to be borne in mind.
It is no good sending armour into an attack over ground where it can have no real hope
of making progress. It is every bit as wrong to lay down a preparatory bombardment
which reduces the terrain to a lunar landscape, where even the most effective modern
machines — not to mention horse-drawn vehicles - will end up getting stuck. If the tanks
are to keep on the move they must be spared the problem of having to overcome broken
terrain when they are on the attack. We are very fond of designating 'axes of advance'
[Gefechtsstreifen], but they must not be drawn with geometrical rigidity across hill and
dale, across rivers and woods; for the tanks, at least, we must take account of the confor-
mation of the ground and the nature the of the surface. If the good going for the tanks
does not happen to suit the infantry and artillery, it may be necessary to direct the attack
of the armour along an axis which runs obliquely to that of the infantry. The main thing is
for the tanks to get at the enemy.
The question of suitable terrain is linked intimately with deployment en masse. As we
have seen from our historical examples, decisive success has never been achieved by
sending in tanks as small units, for whatever the reasons - perhaps there were not many
machines available in the first place, or perhaps the command decided to feed in a large
number of tanks in penny packets, as happened with the French on 16 April 1917. The
outcome was the same - the enemy always had time to organize an effective resistance.
Tanks in the World War were slow moving, and you could finish off a tank attack just by
laying down a concentrated fire of artillery.
The effect of artillery is much more patchy when it has to cope with a large number of
tanks attacking simultaneously, and this is true whether we are talking about the artillery
of the World War or the present-day antitank guns. But if we are to commit tanks en
masse we come back to our first point - we must in turn have suitable terrain for our at-
tack.

44

Surprise is the third precondition for a thoroughgoing success on the offensive. Since
time immemorial there have been lively, self-confident commanders who have exploited
the principle of surprise - the means whereby inferior forces may snatch victory, and turn
downright impossible conditions to their own advantage. The effects on the morale of
both parties are immense - but this very element of incalculably proves a deterrent to
ponderous spirits, and this is probably why they are so reluctant to embrace new weap-
ons, even when the inadequacy of the old ones is all too clear.
Surprise may hang upon the very novelty of the weapon in question. It takes consider-
able daring on the part of a commander to use a weapon for the first time, but in the
event of success the rewards will be all the greater. We have seen, however, that neither
the Germans with their poison gas nor the British with their tanks were willing to accept
the risk of employing new weapons en masse in a surprise attack. Once the fleeting op-
portunity had been missed, surprise could depend only on the kinds of time-honoured
techniques which had been used with the conventional weapons. Even then, however,
there remained considerable scope for catching the enemy off guard.
Apparently superficial technical advances may trigger surprises which can prove ex-
tremely painful for the enemy. Twenty years had passed since the Prussians had gone
over from their muzzle-loading infantry weapons to their breech-loading needle gun, and
yet it proved the key to victory in 1866 - their Austrian enemies had not appreciated the
magnitude of the technical advance, and they were astonished at the lethal effect of the
needle gun on the battlefield. Then again the.German 4.20cm mortar represented only
an increase in calibre on a type of piece that was already well established, but in 1914 it
smashed through the armour and concrete cover of the Belgian fortresses which had
been reputed to be impregnable. And yet the 420mm mortar, like the needle gun, had
been tested only on peacetime ranges before it was taken on campaign. There was no
question of waiting to see whether other armies were trying similar weapons in their own
wars, or indeed of establishing whether the foreigners had any such weapons at all - that
would have sacrificed surprise. On the contrary, the 420mm mortar was a carefully
guarded secret, and in the event surprise was total.
The same holds true of tanks in the last war. The prospects for surprise did not vanish al-
together even a year after the machines had first appeared in the field. After all, there
was no guarantee that the Germans would actually exploit the opportunity to come to
terms with a possible enemy use of tanks en masse, or likely improvements in design
and tactics. The potential for surprise had diminished only a certain amount, and the ex-
act degree depended very much on the Germans.
After the conventional weapons had failed, and one year after tanks had been misused
despite the protests of Swinton, their creator, the British high command at last yielded to
the tank officers, and put at their disposal those battleworthy units that remained from the
forces that had been squandered at Third Ypres. For the first tank battle in history Gener-
al Byng's Third Army was assigned: two corps of two divisions each; one cavalry corps of
five cavalry divisions; one Tank Corps of three brigades of two battalions each; 1,000
guns and a large number of aircraft.
And that was all. It fell short of what was needed to accomplish a major breakthrough,
even if the British managed to achieve surprise, and the only divisions that the Germans
could put against them were burnt-out ones. Ultimately, the British did not have the nec-
essary reserves. As for the scope of the attack, the plan envisaged a breakthrough be-
tween Gonnelieu and Havrincourt on a frontage of two corps with the help of tanks, thus
opening a way for the cavalry to pass through and exploit the success. The British evi-
dently intended to take Cambrai, but it is uncertain whether they had any further objec-
tives.

45

The terrain in question stretched to the north-east between Gonnelieu and Havrincourt,
and suited the offensive well enough. The rolling and predominantly open ground de-
scended gently to the River Schelde, which secured the right flank of the attack, as it
flowed from Banteux to Crevecoeur, passing to the east of Gonnelieu; the river then de-
scribed a sharp bend as it veered from north-east to north-west across the area of the at-
tack by way of Masnieres, Marcoing and Noyelles, and finally followed a gentle curve as
it inclined north-eastwards again in the direction of Cambrai. The Schelde and the paral-
lel Scarpe Canal were passable only by bridges. In front of the left wing the villages of

Fontaine-Notre-Dame and Bourlon, together with the intervening Bourlon Wood, formed
a kind of bastion which posed potential difficulties for the tanks. Between this bastion and
the Schelde the only obstacles in the way of the attack were presented by the various vil-
lages. However the walls and cellars offered the defenders good protection against
tanks, and demanded special attention on the part of the British if they were to be cap-
tured or suppressed.
The British knew that the sector chosen for the attack was held essentially by 54th Jager
Division and that, quite apart from the Tank Corps, the British had a six-fold superiority in
infantry and artillery alone. The British III Corps with its 12th, 20th and 6th Divisions was
going to attack to the east of a boundary stretching from the western edge of Ribecourt-
Ia-Tour to the western edge of the Bois des Neufs; the Slst and 62nd Divisions of IV
Corps were to attack to the west of the boundary. The first objective was a phase line ex-
tending from la Vacquerie to north of Havrincourt, passing by way of the railway to the
north of Ribecourt; the second phase line ran from le Pape to north of Flesquieres, and
the third from la Justice to Graincourt, passing to the south-west of Cantaing. As it ad-
vanced towards the Schelde III Corps would take over the protection of the northern
flank, while IV Corps continued its push in the direction of Fontaine-Notre-Dame. The
56th Division was to carry out a feint attack against the defences adjoining to the left be-
tween Queant and Inchy so as to divert the attention of the Germans. Further diversion-
ary attacks were to be launched to the right of the genuine attack, at the farm of Gille-
mont and to the left at Bullecourt. The 29th Division was ordered to follow up behind III
Corps' attack as reserve, and seize the line Masnieres-Rumilly-Marcoing.
Finally the cavalry would exploit the success. The 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions were to
execute a flanking attack to the south and east of Cambrai, and 1st Cavalry Division was
to do the same but to the west. In the process 1st Cavalry Division was to help the infan-
try to capture Cantaing and Fontaine-Notre-Dame (respectively north-west and north of
Cambrai), cut off Cambrai itself and unite with the cavalry working around to the east of
the town. There were plans to push units farther north to the Sensee stream, so as to dis-
rupt the German rearward communications.
This time the artillery departed from convention. The attack was to be ushered in by a
single artillery strike, in place of the lengthy preparatory fire and meticulous registration.
The German batteries, command posts and observation posts would be suppressed or
blinded with smoke, while long-range guns shot up the approach routes, villages and rail-
way stations in the German rear areas. In addition a creeping barrage would fall in front
of the attacking forces. The artillery reached its battery positions undetected by the Ger-
mans.
There were about as many aircraft as tanks, and the pilots and observers were told to
keep a sharp eye out for enemy reserves, and report any impending counter-attacks
without delay. The tanks were fully integrated in the plan of attack and the units were as-
signed to the various formations as follows:
III Corps
12th Division - two battalions, with 48. tanks in the first line, 24 in the second and twelve

46

in reserve;

20th Division - two battalions minus one company, with 30 tanks in the first line, 30 in the
second and eighteen in reserve;
6th Division - two battalions, with 48 tanks in the first line, 24 in the second and 23 in re-
serve;
29th Division (following up as reserve) - a single company, with twelve tanks in the third
line and two in reserve.
IV Corps
Slst Division - two battalions, with 42 tanks in the first line and 28 in the second;
62nd Division - one battalion, with 42 tanks in the first line and fourteen in the second.
Each unit was assigned a specific task, with the platoon counting as the smallest sub-
unit. Some of the units were told to break off as soon as they could and tackle the great-
est threat of all - the German artillery, which was also going to be taken under attack by
bomber aircraft.
Some of the features of the attack were rehearsed with the infantry beforehand. Fascines
were prepared and brought up on tanks, for crossing the broad German trenches. In de-
tail, 'male' tanks armed with guns would advance up to the defences, crushing the ob-
structions and suppressing the troops by fire, whereupon a 'female' would throw its fas-
cine into the trench. The little convoy would clamber across the line at this point and re-
peat the manoeuvre at the next trench. Captured trenches were to be kept clear by fire
until the British infantry arrived to take them over.
Even the British troops were kept in the dark about the purpose of the preparations. The
Tank Corps was assembled at Albert on the pretext of training, and two nights before the
attack moved forward to assembly areas behind the front, mainly in the Bois d'Havrin-
court. On the last night it advanced to the start-line immediately behind the foremost
trenches. The gloomy November weather hindered German reconnaissance.
Since March 1917 the Germans had been standing in the Hindenburg Line. This defen-
sive line had not arisen by chance out of previous fighting, like the defences on the other
sectors, but had been constructed after meticulous surveying and the experience of two
years of positional warfare. Nearest to the enemy extended an outpost trench protected
by belts of barbed wire. Next a number of strongpoints were established in the space be-
tween the outpost line and the first battle trench proper, which was more than three
metres broad and furnished with a large number of dugouts. Like the second battle
trench three hundred metres to the rear, it was covered by barbed wire obstacles averag-
ing thirty metres deep. Both battle trenches had good fields of fire, and a proliferation of
communication trenches enabled the Germans to move inside their defensive system
under cover. Some two kilometres behind this first position, a second position had been
laid out but not fully completed because of the lack of labour. It comprised merely a ser-
ies of hasty works extending from the 'enemy' side of Bourlon Wood to the Bois des
Neufs, and from there to the north bank of the Schelde. It is worth noting that Cambrai
was considered a quiet sector where battle-weary divisions from Flanders could recover.
In November 1917 the German forces on this tranquil stretch of the front consisted of
'Army Group Caudry' which stood under the command of XIII Corps. The 20th Landwehr
Division was deployed on both sides of the Cambrai-Bapaume road; the 54th Jager Divi-
sion occupied a frontage of eight kilometres between Havrincourt and la Vacquerie; the
9th Reserve Division adjoined to the south. The three infantry regiments of 54th Jager Di-
vision were arrayed shoulder-to-shoulder with two battalions each in the front line, and a
third occasionally resting. Only the first position was completed, the intermediate position
remaining empty.
As late as 16 November 1917 the commanders of Second Army had the impression that

47

no major attacks were to be anticipated in the immediate future. Reconnaissance patrols

on 18 November confirmed that the British 36th Division was holding the front at Tres-
cault, as before. The prisoners taken on this occasion said that the division was due to
be relieved by 51st Division, and that they had caught sight of tanks in Bois d'Havrin-
court; they added that an artillery preparation of several hours would precede an attack
that was planned for 20 November. On the 19th a prisoner confirmed that the British 20th

Division was still present. Enemy air activity and ground traffic were livelier than usual,
and a number of new batteries were •espied in the Bois d'Havrincourt. Otherwise 19 No-
vember passed peacefully, and there was no notable increase of registration fire on the
part of the British batteries.
The Germans took a number of countermeasures on the basis of the available reports, even
though there was no indication of a major attack in the old style, and in fact prison-ers taken
elsewhere repeated the same stories of intended attacks on their sectors as well. Late on the
evening of 19 November the Germans ordered a higher state of alert, and 54th Jager
Division's artillery laid down targeted and harassing fire on the nearest enemy trenches, and
artillery strikes on Bois d' Havrincourt, the village of Trescault and the approach routes. The
high command placed the left-hand regiment of 20th Landwehr Division, which was holding
the Havrincourt sector, under 54th Jager Division so as to ensure unity of command on the
likely scene of action. Likewise Army Group Caudry took under command 27th Reserve
Jager Regiment, the headquarters of an artillery de-tachment, and two batteries - all of which
were brought up from army reserve. It was giv-en out that reinforcements of batteries of
heavy artillery were to be expected for the 20th. The 27th Reserve Jager Regiment was
detailed for counter-attacks, and placed behind the two right-hand regimental sectors of 54th
Jager Division: part of its first battalion was assigned to 84th Jager Regiment and pushed
forward to Flesquieres, and part was lodged in Fontaine-Notre-Dame; the regimental
headquarters and the second battalion were positioned in Marcoing; the third battalion
remained in Cambrai as group reserve. In addition 54th Jager Division received two field
artillery detachments from 107th Jager Di-vision which had just arrived from the Eastern
Front; these were placed at Graincourt and

Flesquieres.
The Germans on the whole do not seem to have reckoned on a major British push; they
had every confidence in the strength of the Hindenburg Line. All the more remarkable
were the speedy and energetic measures of defence which, as we have just seen, were
undertaken on the initiative of Second Army, Army Group Caudry and 54th Jager Divi-
sion. It was unfortunate, however, that they neglected specific precautions against an
armoured attack: there were no guns in position that had an arc of fire capable of tackling
tanks at short range, and it seems that the infantry learned only very late about the possi-
bility of a tank attack, and consequently had very little SmK ammunition when the assault
arrived.
Dawn on 20 November came with a greyish light. There was a false alarm at 0600; a bar-
rage descended at Havrincourt and then everything fell quiet again. At 0715 the British
artillery barrage pounded the German positions, and all our troops took cover in the dug-outs,
leaving only sentries outside. On past experience several hours would now elapse before the
enemy infantry attacked, and the German artillery fired no more than a feeble barrage ahead
of our outpost line into the smoke and mist of that pale morning. The out-posts were taken by
surprise when suddenly indistinct black forms could be discerned. They were spitting fire, and
under their weight the strong and deep obstacle belt was cracking like matchwood. The alarm
was transmitted to the men in the trenches, and the troops hastened to their machine-guns
and tried to put up a defence. It was all in vain!

The tanks appeared not one at a time but in whole lines kilometres in length! The SmK

48

ammunition proved to be ineffective, the barrage could not be brought back from its im-
pact zone in front of the outposts, and there were few grenades available - and fewer still
which did any damage to the enemy machines as they kept up their fire. Effectively the

German infantrymen were defenceless, pinned down and unable to withstand the mighty
material superiority of the British. The only alternatives were death or surrender, since
nobody could make off to the rear and hope to survive under this fire.
Surely the reserves will counter-attack and help us out! The 54th Jager Division duly or-
dered the commander of 27th Reserve Jager Regiment to counter-attack with two battal-
ions and recover the lost trenches; the mission was exactly as laid down in regulations.
 49

But the headquarters of 108 Infantry Brigade was in charge of the infantry battle, and it
immediately countermanded the move; the counter-attack fell through, and the only unit
that could lend any help was 3rd Battalion, 27th Reserve Jager Regiment which had
been standing in group reserve at Cambrai.

A number of other units were brought up from 107th Jager Division, recently arrived from
the Eastern Front. At 0940 two battalions were set in motion by way of Masnieres, and a
further battalion in the direction of Crevecoeur, and they were placed under the respec-
tive commands of 54th Jager Division and 9th Reserve Division; another regiment was
pushed to Fontaine, Cantaing and Proville and put at the disposal of the Army Group
Caudry; the third regiment was placed in Cambrai as army reserve.
The reports from the front line remained scanty in the extreme. The ground mist ruled out
aerial reconnaissance, and the British creeping barrage rolled forward and impeded ob-
servation.
Meanwhile unit commands did their best to follow orders and put up an aggressive de-
fence. The 2nd Battalion, 27th Reserve Jager Regiment, advanced from Flesquieres to-
wards Havrincourt along two communication trenches. There were no accurate reports
as to what was going on, though the wounded talked of a great number of tanks. Ele-
ments of the companies then left the trenches in order to deploy across open ground. In
its eagerness to get forward the battalion ran into an attack by tanks and was largely
wiped out. The 387th Landwehr Jager Regiment, to the left of 84th Jagers, was overrun
and broken through; the adjoining 90th Reserve Jager Regiment fared no better, and
even its headquarters fell into the hands of the enemy. A slight relief came only when vis-
ibility improved and the tanks came within range of the artillery positioned around Marco-
ing.
The 19th Reserve Jager Regiment, forming the right wing of 9th Reserve Division, was
likewise hit by the tank attack and suffered very heavy casualties, though it continued to
hold Banteux and the line of the canal.
Within a short time the whole defensive system had been lost along the entire frontage of
the British offensive. Spearheaded by the tanks, the attack now flooded over the inter-
mediate position. There was just one exception, the village of Flesquieres, where the
Germans managed to hold firm, thanks to the solid construction of the houses and the
shelter available in the cellars which afforded a measure of protection against armour.
Moreover the commander of 27th Reserve Jager Regiment, Major Krebs, had taken over
the command at 0900 and given a number of apposite orders - for a start he called a halt
to those senseless and bloody counter-attacks against armour by unprotected infantry.
Krebs was now able to hold back at least the machine-gun company and a rifle company
of his 2nd Battalion, together with half of 1st Battalion, which was supposed to have at-
tacked regardless.
He established these forces in and near Flesquieres, together with the other half of 1st
Battalion which had come up on trucks from Fontaine-Notre-Dame and debussed south-
west of Cantaing. Elements of 84th Jager Regiment and 108th Pioneer Company came
under his command, and the Germans tied together hand-grenades in bundles as
charges. It was owing to this clear-headed direction, to the devotion of the six hundred
defenders, and above all to the magnificent support from the batteries of 108th and
282nd Field Artillery Regiments that Flesquieres was held until nightfall.
We may note here that the defence of Flesquieres shows that infantry are perfectly capa-
ble of holding a great variety of locations against armoured attack, provided that those
places are properly evaluated and exploited; conversely unsupported armour cannot al-
 17
ways be guaranteed to wipe out defending infantry. We shall have more to say on this
point later on.

50

At 1050 the commander of Army Group Caudry once more freed its reserve - 52nd Re-
serve Jager Regiment - and ordered 54th and 107th Jager Divisions to desist from fur-
ther counter-attacks, and instead hold their existing positions to the bitter end. Trucks
were made available to bring up the infantry, and cars for the headquarters. No reinforce-
ments could be expected before evening, however, and the situation remained critical in
the extreme. As General Ludendorff commented, 'We suffered an acutely painful lack of
trucks with which to bring up our troops.' (Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen, 393,
395.) The recruits from the training depots of the divisions in question were rushed up at
breakneck speed, and thirty men from 54th Jager Division's HQ were actually sent to
hold the Schelde Canal.

In this crisis the commander of 18 Reserve Infantry Brigade (of 9th Reserve Division),
Colonel von Gleich, was cool-headed enough to hang on to the existing bridgeheads
over the Schelde Canal, for he knew that they could be useful for a German counter-at-
tack. The villages of Banteux and Honnecourt therefore remained in German hands, and
northwards from Banteux to Crevecoeur 9th Reserve Division was able to hold a shallow
front along the western bank of the canal.
Marcoing fell to the British, after a brave defence on the part of a number of batteries,
and the enemy tanks were able to cross the canal at this point. The German survivors fell
back on Cantaing, though they had no hope of being able to hold it against a serious at-
tack. Noyelles was lost, although the Germans were able to blow up the bridge, which
was not the case elsewhere. The remains of 3rd Battalion, 27th Reserve Jager Regi-
ment, occupied the eastern bank of the canal between the sugar factory and the Ferme
du Flot; farther south 227th Reserve Jager Regiment of 107th Jager Division was able to
stop the enemy when they were in the process of crossing the canal at Masnieres. A
Canadian cavalry squadron, spurring towards Cambrai, attacked a German battery, but
was in turn thrown back with heavy losses by the troops of the field recruit depot of 54th
Jager Division who arrived on the scene at that juncture. The Germans had precious few
reserves available, however, and there was little hope of holding this sector either, once
the British made up their minds to attack in force. Incomprehensibly this attack never ma-
terialized.
Not until late in the afternoon did further reinforcements arrive from 10th Jager Division in
Cantaing, but they came just in time to break an attempt on the part of British 1st Cavalry
Division to push to the north on horseback. The Germans now formed a new line of de-
fence at Anneux and Cantaing, and at 0415 on 21 November Major Krebs was able to
carry out an undisturbed evacuation of Flesquieres, which had been defended so
bravely.
For the Germans the night of 20/21 November was a time of disquiet and uncertainty.
Would the enemy recognize and seize their opportunity? Did they have the reserves to
carry out a breakthrough on the operational scale? The German command strove to find
out where the front line actually ran, and to restore some kind of order amid the confu-
sion of its units.
Having described the course of events from the German side, we turn to the viewpoint of
the attackers.
We have shown how the tanks were distributed among the assaulting divisions. Essen-
tially the tanks would be attacking in two lines, with only one of the companies forming a
third line, being attached to 29th Division which was following up as a reserve. The two
lines of tanks were tied to the corresponding lines of infantry, with the result that the sec-
ond line of tanks was not at hand to help out the first in the event of trouble, or exploit
any opportunities which the first line might create. Altogether the disposition of the attack
was strictly linear, devoid of depth and devoid of tank reserves. Once the resources of

51

the Tank Corps were expended its command was virtually neutralized - like the direction
of the army as a whole. General Elles could do no more than direct whatever tanks he
could from his place in the leading tank of the central brigade.

At 0710 the tank assault left its start-line, one thousand metres from the enemy. At 0720, at
the same time as the tanks were crossing the front line, the British artillery strike and
creeping barrage descended in a mixture of high-explosive and smoke shells. The smoke
blinded the German artillery, but it also occasioned some disruption to the order of the tanks,
which were often reduced to finding their way by compass. The Hindenburg Line had been
accounted the strongest field position on the Western Front, but now the British took it with
effortless ease. They smashed through obstacles, crossed the trenches with the help of
fascines, and destroyed or captured all the troops holding the forward position

- and the same fate was shared by the German reserves when they arrived with their
counter-attacks. The British followed in a systematic way behind the slow march of their
creeping barrage, but by 1100 they had succeeded in reducing the whole of the German
defensive system with the exception of Flesquieres. The gun duel ended with the defeat
of the German batteries, but the pace of the attack remained slow, and the tanks suffered
severely whenever the German battery commanders were active enough to haul a few
guns out of their dug-in positions and fire over open sights.
Towards noon a decisive victory was within the grasp of the British. A considerable
stretch of the Schelde Canal was in their hands, from Crevecoeur to south-west of la Fo-
lie, together with most of the bridges. Wide gaps had opened in the German front be-
tween Crevecoeur and Masnieres, and again between Cantaing and Flesquieres. To the
east of Moeuvres the attacks had begun to roll up 20th Landwehr Division to the north.
Altogether, apart from a few pockets of resistance, the German defences had ceased to exist
on a frontage of twelve kilometres; the breakthrough had succeeded, and every-thing now
depended on whether the attackers could exploit the opportunity. Every hesita-tion, every
delay offered the defenders the possibility of bringing up reserves, forming a new front line
and putting the victory once more in doubt, after it seemed to have been won so easily and
speedily. As regards fresh infantry, the British had at their disposal on-ly 29th Division; the
only uncommitted tanks were the twelve machines attached to that division. However the
British high command also had available an entire cavalry corps of five divisions, which was
prized as a weapon particularly suited for exploiting a success. Broad lanes for the benefit of
the cavalry had already been forced through the German obstacles; thirty-two supply tanks
had been entrusted with this task, and two more had brought up special bridges for the
cavalry. From 1330 thirty combat tanks had been wait-ing impatiently for the cavalry at
Masnieres, and 29th Division was doing the same in the bridgehead at Marcoing. It was just
a question of following through the drama to the final act. In the event the cavalry did not
appear until about 1630 in the form of a single squad-ron at Masnieres, and somewhat
stronger forces at Cantaing, and they experienced a bloody repulse at the hands of the weak
units of 54th and 107th Jager Divisions. In fact the British had been attempting to get cavalry
to act in concert with tanks - to employ it at long last in the mobile mounted role on the
Western Front - and the attempt had failed.

The chance of victory had come and gone; five cavalry divisions had been unable to rip
through a thin screen of a few machine-guns and rifles.
By the evening of 20 November the first tank battle in history had come to an end. In a
few hours the strongest^ position on the Western Front had been broken on a frontage of
sixteen kilometres and to a depth of nine kilometres. Eight thousand prisoners and 100
guns had been captured, for a British loss of 4,000 men and 49 tanks. Cambrai was a
great British victory, and the bells rang out in London for the first time in the war. The
tanks had achieved a breathtaking successs, and fully justified their existence. Swinton

52

and Elles exchanged telegrams of congratulation.

But what did the British then do with the breach they had made in the German front?
There was every reason to expect a second and even greater blow, and a number of
measures were actually taken - two divisions were diverted to General Byng from forces
destined for Italy, while the French forwarded a reserve group of two infantry and two
cavalry divisions under General Degoutte to the neighbourhood of Peronne by rail and
truck. The British reserves were fed into action by driblets, however, and the French
did not materialize at all. Even the Tank Corps could field only part of its strength for the
fighting which lay ahead.
Meanwhile German reinforcements were pouring in from all sides. The situation on 21
November was still critical in the extreme, and the commander of Army Group Caudry re-
ported in the morning: 'I cannot conceal the seriousness of the position, if the enemy
keep up their attack with tanks before we receive more reinforcements in artillery. In that
case we will have no means of withstanding a further break-in and ultimately a full break-
through.' The 20th Landwehr Division had lost about two-thirds of its establishment, and
54th Jager Division was virtually wiped out. Once more the Goddess of Victory beckoned
the British on. And yet, if only Third Ypres had never happened! If only it were possible to
bring back to life all the divisions which had been sacrificed in that stupendous grinding
battle! Twenty-two million pounds had been expended on ammunition in that struggle —
if only they had been devoted to tanks instead!
The British spent the morning of 21 November preparing to launch the new attack. It was
badly co-ordinated, and when it was delivered it was supported by only forty-nine tanks
and achieved only a limited success. And yet the opportunities were there. In the after-
noon a number of British battalions advanced betwen Graincourt and Marcoing, actually
marching in close order to the sound of music and with their officers on horseback, with-
out being shot up by the German artillery. A number of tanks took Cantaing and pene-
trated Fontaine-Notre-Dame, but the infantry failed to exploit, even though a gap yawned
between the latter village and Bourlon Wood during the following night. A few machines
tried to push from the railway station at Marcoing against Cambrai, but a German battery
arrived in the nick of time and drove them off with some loss.
On 23 November and during the following days sixty-seven tanks were able to participate in
the attack, which focused mainly on the Bourlon massif. By 27 November the Germans still
held the villages of Bourlon and Fontaine-No tre-Dame, but the British now had Bour-lon
Wood itself. Although only a few tanks had been able to join in this last push, it had stretched
the nerves of the defenders tp breaking-point, and panic was averted only by the intervention
of a number of particularly vigorous and determined commanders. The fact that these officers
succeeded is nevertheless to the credit of the troops concerned.

On 27 November the British began to withdraw the tanks behind the front line for major
refits, some of the units departing by train. This was the day when General Ludendorff
announced at a conference at le Cateau that he had decided to launch an immediate
counter-attack. The preparations went ahead so swiftly that the Germans were able to
subject Bourlon Wood to a gas attack on the 29th, and assault it the next day after a one-
hour bombardment. The British were taken by surprise, especially on their southern sec-
tor, and they not only had to throw in their cavalry but retrieve with some urgency the
tanks that were already in the process of being transported away. On the night of 4/5 De-
cember the Germans recovered Bourlon Wood, after a tough fight, and by 6 December
they had not only regained large areas of the ground they had lost, but south of la Vac-
querie they took ground well beyond their old front line. If the Germans were unable to
push their success any farther, it was because of their lack of reserves, the diminished
battleworthiness of their divisions in the course of the fighting, and the poor organization

53

of their supply system. Altogether the Germans took 9,000 prisoners, 148 guns and the
more than 100 tanks which had been abandoned on the battlefield more or less dam-
aged since the battle opened on the 20th; the British on their side announced the capture
of 10,500 prisoners and 142 guns. The German disgrace of 20 November had been bril-
liantly expunged.

Before we turn to the lessons of Cambrai it is worth pausing to consider the overall Brit-
ish losses from 20 to 30 November 1917:
III Corps: 672 officers, 5,160 men;
IV Corps: 686 officers, 13,655 men; . Cavalry: 37 officers, 674 men;
The Tank Corps on 20 November: 118 officers, 530 men;
2 Tank Brigade from 20 November to 1 December: 67 officers, 360 men.
These figures show how the intervention of the tanks at Cambrai gained the same extent
of ground as the British had won at Ypres, but with far fewer losses and in an incompara-
bly shorter time. The statistics also indicate how the nine weak battalions of the Tank
Corps had fought with the greatest courage, and had shrunk from no sacrifice in their
18
striving for victory.
We turn now to the lessons which the attackers and defenders did learn, and also the
ones which they ought to have learned.
The British concluded that as a weapon the tanks had fulfilled their missions magnifi-
cently. However, a number of technical improvements were demanded - one-man steer-
ing, a more powerful engine, and a greater obstacle-crossing capability, together with the
need for a new type of fast tank for exploiting successful breakthroughs. In 1918 the first
three requirements were met in the Mark V, and the last in the Medium Mark A ('Whip-
pet') and the armoured car. On the organizational side the Tank Corps was built up to
five brigades with thirteen battalions. New machines were delivered in the course of the
winter, and the British were able to put in some useful training.
In expectation of a German offensive in the spring of 1918, the question arose as to how
the Tank Corps could best be employed in the defence. There were two possible courses
of action. One was to hold back the corps in army reserve until the direction of the main
German thrust had become clear, and then employ the tanks as a united formation on
the counterattack; this solution was supported by the success the tanks had achieved
when they had gone into action en masse at Cambrai, compared with the earlier failures
when they had fought as small units. The alternative was to break up the Corps into
small troops which would be stationed behind the front line as local reserves - at the risk
of having a large number of tanks standing around inactive in the hour of need on the
quiet sectors, while not enough machines were available to meet the enemy on the loca-
tion of the main break-in. The British high command chose the second course, with the
result that when the German offensive arrived the tanks scored only local successes; the
command drew the erroneous conclusion that tanks were not really battleworthy. So-
called experts declared that it was impossible to repeat the 'once-in-a-lifetime' surprise
victory at Cambrai, and cited as evidence the supposed failure of armour against the
German spring offensive. They neglected to say that they themselves were responsible
for the failure in question. The intended augmentation of the Tank Corps was deferred,
19
and some of the units were actually disbanded to make up the losses in infantry. A re-
assessment in favour of the tanks took place only after the action at Hamel on 4 July
1918.

As we have seen, the British overlooked a number of potentially valuable lessons from
their initial victory at Cambrai. For our purposes, however, it is v, orth stating that:
the extraordinary success of the tanks at Cambrai came from the fact that for the
first time ever they had been employed en masse on a broad front;

54

the success would have been greater still if the tank attack had been endowed
with greater depth, if mobile and effective reserves had been available and if, instead
of being content with taking the forward German positions, the British had striven
from the outset to strike to the full depth of the defensive system, eliminating
batteries, re-serves and headquarters in one blow, and if, finally, the air force had
been brought in to lend extensive tactical support.

The success of the tanks fell off markedly as soon as they were forced to attack indi-
vidually and in small units - a particularly dangerous practice now that the enemy
were beginning to come to terms with them.
The tank losses piled up, and the fewer the tanks that were available the more the infan-
try came under enfilade fire from both flanks, and the less they were able to exploit what-
ever successes the armour had achieved. The high command had clung to some mis-
conceptions about the worth of the conventional arms, particularly on'the offensive, and it
persisted in flinging them en masse into a series of bloody and abortive assaults; the new
weapons, by way of contrast, were almost invariably committed one at a time, bit by bit,
and scattered over a wide frontage. The high command then asked itself why so little had
been achieved when so much had been expected.
Beyond any doubt the Germans had sustained a painful blow on 20 November. Their
losses over the following days were also substantial, even when the tanks were attacking
individually. The existing obstacles proved unavailing against tanks, and the German ar-
tillery tactics were useless. Now that the enemy were able to roll over German trenches
without artillery preparation, they had nullified the tactic of the long-range defensive bar-
rage. The figures of German missing indicate that the infantry were too often helpless;
frequently it was a question of re-assembling the remains of the regiments as they
streamed back from the front without their weapons.
It is clear that the tank was a battle-winning weapon when it was employed en masse, as
at Cambrai, and now in 1918 the Germans had to reckon with the appearance of far
greater numbers and improved designs. There were two things which could be done:
bend every effort to augment the defensive capacity of the troops, and then create our
own tank forces -especially if we intended to go over to the attack ourselves. We shall
consider both courses in turn.
On the defensive side the Germans devised single-shot, anti-tank rifles and anti-tank ma-
chine-guns, firing 13mm bullets. In the event the machine-guns were not ready by 1918,
and only the rifles appeared in the front line. Minenwerfers were fitted with carriages for
low-trajectory fire, and each of the armies on the Western Front were assigned ten anti-
tank guns which were mounted on commercial.trucks. Tank traps and a number of anti-
tank minefields were emplaced, and in general more emphasis was put on protection
against tanks when new positions were being laid out. Artillery tactics too began to
change, as witness the deployment of individual guns well forward for anti-tank defence,
and the practice of attaching batteries to the regiments of assaulting infantry. Direct,
aimed fire by single rounds was given more significance, as opposed to mass bombard-
ments.
It must be admitted, however, that these measures did not amount to very much, and yet the
Germans did still less about creating a tank force on their own account. The War Min-istry
gave Number One Priority to accelerating the production of the A7V tank, and repair-ing the
British tanks captured at Cambrai, but that was about as far as it went. The ar-mour available
in 1918 consisted of no more than fifteen A7Vs and thirty captured British tanks, and they
had few spares to back them up - no decisive blow was possible with a force of these modest
dimensions. In fact the German infantry had performed so magnifi-cently in the counter-
attack at Cambrai on 30 November, that the German high command

55

attached no great significance to the offensive potential of tanks. It distrusted them any-
way, and after the difficulties the Germans had experienced with logistic support on that
occasion it seemed more worthwhile to acquire supply trucks with cross-country capabil-
ity. A number of the existing tank workshops were converted to this end, and a number of
the so-called Marienwagen duly put in an appearance, though in insufficient quantity.
The success of the counter-attack on 30 November confirmed the German high com-
mand in the conviction that on the Western Front, just as in the East, infantry and artillery
by themselves had the striking power to break through enemy positions, as long as the
attack came as a surprise and was launched in sufficient breadth and depth. This belief
was to a large extent justified; but just one consideration was overlooked in all the plan-
ning which went into the mighty spring offensive of 1918. If, as seemed likely, the con-
ventional arms managed to break into the enemy zone of defence, would they have the
speed to exploit and expand the break-in to a full breakthrough? In other words, did the
available means permit a tactical success to be developed into an operationally signifi-
cant victory? The question was all the more relevant because the enemy had the ability
to rush up troops to fill the gaps. Would the Germans also be able to cope with the likeli-
hood of even larger numbers of enemy tanks, capable of higher speeds and longer
ranges than before?
The events of 1918 were to give an unequivocal answer to all these questions.

1918. the german spring offensive. soissons and Amiens

After meticulous preparations the German Army concentrated all its strength in one
mighty effort to break the deadly embrace of the Allies by victory in the field on the West-
ern Front. There was no other way out, after the period of unrestricted U-boat warfare
had failed to produce the desired effect, and diplomatic efforts had proved fruitless. The
supreme command was in no doubt as to the magnitude of its task. General Ludendorff
had made this repeatedly clear in the preliminary conferences, and he addressed himself
with unflagging activity and inexhaustible application to driving forward the preparations
he believed were essential to the success of the offensive. As it embarked on this deci-
sive battle the whole army reposed its complete trust in the high command. The troops
identified themselves with the purposes of the leadership, and shared the resolve to mas-
ter a task which, in sheer human terms, was impossible.

In line with the tactical thinking of the time, success was to be achieved by an abbrevia-
ted artillery preparation, and completed by the infantry, who would attack according to a
number of improved principles which had been derived from recent experience. It was ur-
gent to open the offensive as soon as possible, so as to anticipate the flood of American
troops, and this limited time-span ruled out dealing the first blow in the damp fields of
Flanders, which became accessible only in April. However there was reasonably suitable
terrain on the line on either side of Saint-Quentin, even if it was obstructed somewhat by
the craters of the old Somme battlefield. If all went well, the push on the chosen sector
would split the British from the French, and enable the Germans to beat their enemies in
detail by a planned sequence of blows which would incline them to peace. One disadvan-
tage was that the attack on this southerly axis would hasten and facilitate the intervention
of the French forces. In the event the Germans were able to deceive the enemy as to
both the time and the place of the offensive, thanks to the skilful way the troops destined
for the attack were held back from the front line, and the care with which they were con-
cealed. About fifty of the German divisions were fully geared up for mobile warfare,
though the shortage of equipment and horses meant that something less ambitious had
20
to be demanded of the remaining divisions.

On 21 March the first wave of thirty-seven divisions stormed forward on both banks of the
56
Battle in Amiens 8 August “The Black Day”

57

Somme under cover of a barrage from 6,000 guns. The first blow was followed up on 6
April by an assault south of the Oise, and three days later by an attack on Armentieres
which led to the capture of the greater part of the Ypres Salient and the dominating

Mount Kemmel. The German offensive cost the British about 300,000 men; 65,000 pris-
oners and 769 guns fell into our hands, and the British were forced to destroy many more
guns and a great quantity of equipment. It amounted to the greatest success achieved on
the Western Front since trench warfare had begun. The British had only 140,000 troops'
left as replacements, and they were forced to call off an offensive which they had
planned in Palestine, as well as drawing two divisions from there and two more from
Italy, and lowering the age of the call-up.
For a time the Germans retained the initiative, but they were never able to achieve the in-
21
tended breakthrough. The advance of the German infantry divisions meanwhile slowed
down as it crossed the shell holes of the old Somme battlefield, and the enemy were
gradually able to parry the attack, principally by having recourse to the army-level motor
transport groups to throw forces against them.

We cannot declare categorically that the Germans would have accomplished the break-
through if they too had possessed mobile troops, but it is a question which we cannot
ignore when we look back on this episode. In view of the appalling condition of the roads
behind the German front at the time, and the considerable volume of transport which was
needed to sustain the infantry divisions and the artillery, it is very likely that only arm-
oured units with full cross-country mobility would have had any chance of success; the
opportunity was magnificent - of that there can be no doubt, for the enemy were heavily
depleted and in a state of considerable disarray.
The end of April brought the failure of a further bid to break through in the direction of
Amiens, and General Ludendorff now decided to attack across the Chemin-des-Dames
towards Paris. This time it was the French who were the targets, and the British were
able to make good use of the breathing-space. Forty-one German divisions and 1,158
batteries attacked the French on a frontage of 55 kilometres, and pushing rapidly forward
the Germans reached the Marne between Chateau-Thierry and Dormans during the peri-
od 27 May - 1 June. Fifty thousand men and sixty guns were captured. The next attack
was delivered at Noyon with the intention of relieving the pressure on the right flank of
the German Seventh Army. This was unable to begin before 9 June, however, and it
failed in the face of strong resistance by the French. The flank of Seventh Army was still
vulnerable at Soissons, just like the flank of the First Army at Reims. Some anxiety was
also aroused by the salients which the Germans had already made by their attacks in
Flanders and at Amiens, for these would make them vulnerable if they were pushed on to
the defensive. The German attack on the Chemin-des-Dames was a brilliant achieve-
ment in its own right, but it came to a halt at the Marne bridges and the forest of Villers-

Cotterets significantly enough when the French brought up tanks and rushed up infantry
on trucks. This episode also happened to be the first appearance of the light Renault
tank.
Ludendorff launched yet another attack, lest the initiative be wrested from him before the
Americans intervened and our other enemies had the opportunity to recover. The Sev-
enth and First Armies and elements of Third Army were to attack on each side of Reims
so as to secure the German salient on the Marne. This blow was to be accompanied by a
new offensive in Flanders. Employing the established tactics, 47 divisions and more than
2,000 batteries were to cross the Marne and take Reims, thus consolidating the German
gains against the French. However on this occasion the attack was betrayed and the
Germans failed to gain surprise. The French evacuated the eastern sector of the area of

58

attack, and established themselves in difficult country west of Reims with the help of rein-
forcements and tanks. On 17 July Ludendorff ordered the offensive to be terminated, and
the transfer of forces to Flanders began. The process was never completed.

The German tanks had taken an active part in the great offensive, but one cannot decide
battles with just forty-five tanks. These were organized in detachments of five tanks each.

The best way to make use of these scanty resources would have been to concentrate
them as a combined force on some point where we needed to gain a rapid decision, and
where the ground was reasonably favourable for the movement of tanks. But this was too
much for the high command to swallow, and, ignoring the lessons of Cambrai, the Ger-
mans employed the tanks in small units, and sometimes even as single machines which
were tied down to the infantry. Individually the tanks often did extremely well, but they
could exercise no influence on the course of events.
Here we should add that the accelerated artillery bombardment was a characteristic of
German tactics until the end of the war. Our experiences in the spring of 1918 indicated
that it still worked well on the offensive, but when the Germans were on the defensive it
proved of little avail against enemies who chose to attack with novel weapons and techni-
ques.
From the beginning of June there were disturbing signs that the Allies were indeed begin-
ning to fight in a new way, but it was on a small scale and did not receive the attention it
deserved.
As early as the end of May the balance of forces had changed to such an extent that on
the sector between the Oise and the Marne we had just 9'/2 divisions, largely exhausted
by having been on the attack for several days, which were pitted against HVz French di-
visions, most of them fresh. On the 31st the German Seventh Army attacked in the direc-
tion of Crepy-en-Valois and La Ferte-Milon, but it ran into stiff resistance, and in some lo-
cations the fresh enemy forces were able to launch successful counterattacks. Attacking
in several waves, the new light Renault tanks surprised 9th Jager Division between Missy
and Chaudun, and in addition gained the right flank of 14th Reserve Division. The Ger-
man artillery did not spot the tanks until too late, and for a time there was something of a
crisis. The French attack was beaten off, but the offensive capacity of the two German di-
visions had been crippled. On this day the progress of Seventh Army as a whole was
modest, for the French were able to bring up fresh forces by truck. The Germans had to
counter by committing their reserves.
Farther south the German 28th Reserve Division was pushed forward with the task of at-
tacking generally north-west in the direction of Chouy. The result was a fair degree of
confusion.
On 1 June the division proceeded to cross the Savieres stream and establish itself on the
west bank, but on its left wing it was repulsed from the village of Trosnes whose defence
included three tanks; the whole attack now ground to a halt. The division was already in a
dangerous situation when on 2 June it was sent forward on a broad front to take Villers-

Cotterets, and before the morning was out it ran into a French counterattack which was
spearheaded by tanks. The French were beaten off, thanks to the vigilance of the artil-
lery, but the German losses were severe. A new German division came up on the left,
which afforded some relief, and the 28th was able to assign its forces to a proper divisio-
nal reserve.
On 3 June the French committed still more tanks in their counterattacks, which aug-mented
the German losses. At 0530 28th Division attacked the sector Corey-Vouty-Fa-verolle with
lllth Reserve Jager Regiment on the right and 110th Reserve Jager Regiment on the left. At
first the Germans made good progress under cover of the morning mist which eliminated the
danger of French flanking fire. The respite came to an end when the

59

Germans encountered heavy defensive fire from machine-guns, artillery and fighter air-
craft, and finally at 0630 a further five tanks burst out of a wood north of Vouty and as-
sailed lllth Reserve Jager Regiment, breaking through the first lines of 3rd Battalion and
forcing a number of the troops to give way. Two of the tanks were immobilized by Mine-
nwerfer, but they continued to fire, and the remaining three machines turned north and
drove back 2nd Battalion. Corey was lost again. The three tanks now came under attack
by the riflemen of 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the lllth, 1st and 3rd Battalions, 109th Re-
serve Jager Regiment, and 3rd Battalion, 150th Jager Regiment. The five battalions to-
gether were ultimately able to put the tanks out of action and take the crews prisoner. But
just think for a moment! Five tanks with crews amounting to ten men had been able to re-
duce an entire division to disorder. In those 2 1/2 hours lllth Reserve Jager Regiment had
lost a total of nineteen officers and 514 men, of whom two officers and 178 men were
missing. There was now no question of 28th Reserve Division being able to resume the
offensive. The 2nd Guards Division likewise suffered heavily from the attentions of the
tanks, and on the same day Augusta Regiment lost twelve officers and nearly 600 men.
Again on 4 June French tanks were able to stop the Germans exploiting another push.
In these combats the French tanks seem to have been sent into action with strictly limited
aims, namely to prevent the Germans from penetrating the forest of Villers-Cotterets and to
secure a start-line for the intended offensive. These objectives were achieved. How well did
the German infantry fare against them? It had been 1 and three-quarter years since the first
ever appearance of tanks, on IS September 1916, and six months had elapsed since
Cambrai. What had actually been done to help the German infantry? What had they
managed to learn? What could they reasonably be expected to do, given the heavy inroads
that months of being on the offensive had made on their effectiveness?

The French had held back their tanks until the beginning of June, even though there had
been loud calls for them to be sent in every time the Germans had broken through. But
the commanders of the French tank forces had steeled themselves against such de-
mands even before the German offensive had begun, and they were determined not to
repeat the mistake the British had made in September 1916. They were adamant that
they would commit the tanks only en masse, and only when all the divisions of one of
their assault armies had been properly equipped with them. Because of manufacturing
difficulties this programme did not progress as rapidly as had been hoped and by 1 May
1918, in addition to the sixteen groups of Schneiders and six of Saint-Chamonds, the
French had at their disposal 216 Chars legers of which only 60 were immediately avail-
able for service. This was not very much, but by now the manufacturers and the tank
forces at least had the satisfaction of knowing that the same people, who earlier had put
the greatest obstacles in the way of tank development, were the ones who were now yell-
ing the loudest for tanks to be flung at the enemy.
As we have seen, at the junior level of command the French were perfectly willing to
work on the lines laid down by the tank officers. There were, however, a few exceptions,
and we shall note them here. On 5 April a force of six tanks went into action to support a
limited attack in the area of Sauvillers-Mongival; only one of the tanks reached the objec-
tive and the assault failed. Again, just six tanks were supposed to co-operate with a com-
pany of infantry to attack the park of Grivesnes; the tanks were successful in the short
term, but the infantry did not follow up and the French were unable to hold the park after
it had been captured. On 8 April, however, twelve tanks supported a successful attack on
two woods northwest of Moreuil and Morisel. On 28 May another twelve tanks enabled
the Americans to capture Cantigny and no machines were lost. The action at Chaudun
on 31 May did not turn out so well. The French were striving to hold up the German ad-

60

vance, and six platoons of Chars legers together with units of the Division Marocaine at-
tacked in an easterly direction straight off the line of march, and without preliminary re-
connaissance or co-ordination with the infantry. The push was made in the middle of the
day, across open ground, with no artillery support, no protection provided by mist, no aer-
ial support and without any attempt on the part of the French infantry to follow up. The
tanks were repulsed, whereupon they fell back to make contact with the infantry and then
resumed the assault. The process was repeated over and over again and always with the
same result. The tanks conquered an area twelve kilometres wide by two kilometres
deep, but it was all lost again because the infantry were unable to follow up. The troops
were exhausted, and the German machine-gunners kept up a deadly flanking fire against
the attack, which had been delivered on a narrow frontage.
Over the following days see-saw combats of this kind were repeated along the Savieres
stream, and the eastern edge of the forest of Villers-Cotterets. Ultimately nine companies
of tanks played a significant part in halting what the French saw as the most dangerous
of the German thrusts, aiming at Paris.
The French employed considerably greater tank forces against the German Gneisenau
Offensive which erupted on 9 June from the area of Noyon in the general direction of
Compiegne. On 10 June the push reached the line Mery—Belloy-Saint-Maur, with the
leading units penetrating to the Aronde. The French resolved on a counter-attack for the
morning of 11 June with four fresh divisions and four detachments or 'groupements' - two
of them of Schneiders and two of Saint-Chamonds. The French armour moved up in se-
cret during the night, and at 1000 a total of 160 tanks launched a surprise attack from the
start-line Courcelles-Epayelles-Mery-Wacque-moulin. They accomplished their mission,
which was to throw the Germans back into the valley of the Matz, and in the process they
destroyed a large number of machine-guns and inflicted heavy casualties among the
German infantry. But the tank forces also suffered severely (46 dead and 300 wounded,
and 70 machines) whenever the German artillery had good observation or could fire over
open sights. The attack had arrived very late, in full daylight, and because of this the
French infantry were immediately spotted immediately and the German artillery and ma-
chine-gun fire prevented them from keeping up with the tanks. The tanks had to stay up
front for a considerable time after they had reached their objectives, and French com-
mentators believe that the delay, together with the lack of infantry support, accounts for
the heavy losses. The area gained on this occasion measured eight kilometres wide by
up to three kilometres deep.
As the number of tank units increased in the course of 1918, so the French were able to
create tank regimental and brigade headquarters. The regiments were composed of a
varying number of units according to circumstances, and the brigades comprised three
regiments each.
From the middle of June the character of the fighting between the Marne and the Aisne
began to change; the French now aimed to win a good base for their forthcoming offen-
sive. Individual tank platoons and companies made a successful contribution in the
course of these actions, but the losses remained heavy, and confirmed the high com-
mand in their conviction that the only appropriate way to employ tanks was in attacks by
large numbers at a time. Yet again, on 16 and 17 July, three tank detachments of 502nd
Regiment were used in the old style - beating off German attacks on the Marne south of
Jaulgonne and Dormans; they lost fifteen of their machines. But while the gaze of the
Germans in the wide Marne salient was still directed towards the south and south-east, a
mighty storm had been brewing between the Marne and the Aisne, and it now burst upon
them at a particularly inconvenient time. The French high command entrusted two armies
- Mangin's Tenth Army north of the Ourcq and Degoutte's Sixth south of the river - to

61

carry out an attack without artillery preparation, but with the support of a large number of
tank units, on the model of Cambrai.

It was vital for the success of the offensive to keep the preparations secret. As far as the
tanks were concerned, the tank commanders with Tenth Army received the order to
move up their forces at midnight on 14 July; the tanks that were unable to travel by road
were unloaded from trains at Pierrefonds, Villers-Cotterets and Morienval on the 16th
and 17th; the assembly of Sixth Army's tanks had been completed on the 15th. On the
night of 17/18 July the tanks progressed to the start-line during a violent storm which cov-
ered their noise. The tables on pp. (98r9) indicate how the tanks were distributed among
the assaulting divisions.

While the French command concentrated 490 tanks for the main attack, the considerable
number of 180 machines remained inactive on the subordinate fronts. Sixth and Tenth
Armies were to attack simultaneously and by surprise, with the aim of eliminating the
'Chateau-Thierry Pocket', or at least making the nodal point of Soissons unusable by the
Germans. At the same time as Sixth and Tenth Armies attacked from west to east, Fifth
Army south of the Vesle was supposed to thrust in the opposite direction towards Arcis-
le-Ponsart, although the necessary order could be given only after it had become clear
that the German attack of 15 July had failed.
French Tenth Army was to attack at 0535 on lg July behind a creeping barrage. The first
phase line ran from Berzy-le-Sec by way of Chaudun to Vierzy. After the objective had
been reached II Cavalry Corps would exploit the success, with its 4th Cavalry Division
advancing from Taillefontaine (twelve kilometres behind the front line) by way of Chau-
dun and Hartennes to Fere-en-Tardenois, and its 6th Cavalry Division pushing from
Vaumoise (eighteen kilometres behind the front) through Vertes-Feuilles, Vierzy a'nd
Saint-Remy to Oulchy-le-Chateau. Second Cavalry Division was to follow the 4th as
corps reserve. Fighter aircraft were put at the disposal of the offensive, and six infantry
battalions, together with engineers, were held ready on trucks at Mortefontaine and Vil-
lers-Cotterets. Sixth Army was to set out at the same time as Tenth.
At OS 35 the French artillery opened a brief but intense barrage and the tanks and infan-
try stormed forward. The approach was screened by a light mist, and the Germans were
taken by surprise. As early as 0830 Tenth Army alone had effected penetrations of more
than three kilometres on a frontage of twelve, and by noon it had driven six kilometres in-
to the German defences along the decisive axis. In the afternoon the French confined
themselves to strictly limited gains, and not until evening did the arrival of fresh tanks
give the attack a new impetus, which carried the French two kilometres beyond Vierzy.
Tenth Army had made penetrations averaging five to six kilometres along a frontage of
fifteen kilometres, with local gains of nine kilometres; the advance of Sixth Army farther
south reached a depth of about five kilometres.
The offensive hit ten divisions of German Ninth and Seventh Armies, with seven divisions
ready in support. Their divisional frontages measured 4 1/2 to five kilometres, as against
the 2-kilometre frontages of the French assault divisions. The German troops were in a
thoroughly bad way; their heavy losses in the earlier offensives had not been made up,
there were few strong positions available, and their supplies were inadequate. Altogether
the combat effectiveness and endurance of the troops were not what they had been, and
when the French surprise attack arrived most of the German infantry were wiped out in
their positions and the artillery was lost.

62
And yet the attack was virtually over by 0840. How was it possible for the offensive to run out
of steam and the French gains to prove so insignificant? How do we account for an episode
like the one on the German right in Army Group Staabs' sector, where 241st Ja-ger Division,
after its southern wing had been annihilated by tanks, was able to withdraw half its
complement from its hitherto intact front line, and withdraw virtually unmolested by way of the
Aisne valley towards Soissons? Why were there complete intermissions in the French artillery
fire from noon onwards? How was the wreckage of llth Bavarian Jager Di-vision able to
occupy and hold the ridge west of Vauxbuin in the face of the victorious en-emy? For a time
the division in question had only two battalions left! In the afternoon rein-forcements brought
the complement up to seven, and in the evening to as many as nine!

In front the Germans could identify French forces regrouping for a new attack, as well as
artillery changing position, and tanks and even cavalry. And yet the Germans were given
a night in which to put their units in order and prepare an obstinate defence.
It was the same story with the neighbouring Army Group Watter to the south. When the
French artillery opened up the German supporting troops were put on alert, and the Ger-
man artillery laid down a barrage. Only the two right-hand divisions of the army group
were struck by the main thrust of the French attack. On this sector the French seized
Missy as early as 0820. The artillery of 42nd Jager Division offered what resistance it
could against the French tanks, which could hardly be seen in the high corn, but it had to

63
give way, and by 0830 the Germans had lost all the guns they had deployed to the west
of the Chaudun-Missy position. Nevertheless it was here that the Germans were able to
establish an organized defence. In the sector of 14th Reserve Division (with which three
regiments of 46th Reserve Division were also fighting) the Germans were surprised to
see that the French attack had ignored the deeply cut valley of the Savieres, with its
wooded banks; the French were content to keep the gorge under a suppressive fire while
they directed the main thrust of their attack along the heights to the north and south. The
reason was that the Savieres ravine offered little opportunity for tanks to deploy or oper-
ate effectively, and the French instead intended to capture it by a double turning move-
ment.

When the Germans made their appreciation of the terrain they had failed to take into ac-

64

count the nature of the French offensive tactics, an oversight which probably enabled the

French to achieve a still greater degree of surprise, and facilitated their breakthrough at
Vauxcastille. Thus IS9th Jager Division held out gallantly in the Savieres valley until it
was wiped out by the double envelopment. When the French broke through at 0600 only
one officer, four NCOs and six men escaped from 53rd Reserve Jager Regiment which
had adjoined to the left. The parent 14th Division lost its artillery. It took the last German
reserves, including even some companies of Landsturm, to occupy Vierzy at 0730.
Fourteenth Division's left-hand neighbour was 115th Jager Division, which was able to
beat off the French attack, except for one minor incursion. The reason? The enemy had
no tanks. However the division was being embraced by a double envelopment, and it had
to be pulled out in the evening.
By 0800 the German high command had a reasonably comprehensive view of the critical
situation of the front, and ordered its forces to occupy and hold a position running from
Chaudun through Vierzy to Mauloy. An additional regiment of infantry was assigned to
every division for this purpose, though no artillery was available. It is instructive to investi-
gate just how effective these measures turned out to be, especially since the enemy tank
attack hit the Army Group Watter with particular force and speed:
(a) The 109th Grenadier Regiment was put at the disposal of 42nd Jager Division, but its
two battalions arrived too late, for at 0930 the enemy had already taken the Chaudun po-
sition by a massive tank attack; nevertheless the tanks were prevented from advancing
any further by the regiment's assigned artillery, namely 2nd Battery, 14th Field Regiment.
(b) Fourteenth Reserve Division was assigned 40th Fusilier Regiment, which set out at
0845 from Visigneux for Lechelle and braved intense artillery fire to reach the ridge
south-west of Chaudun just before the French did; here it was able to hold out with the
help of its accompanying battery of artillery (3rd, 14th Field Artillery Regiment) and two
anti-tank platoons. The enemy attacks fell away from 1330, and the Germans were able
to put themselves in order and restore a measure of cohesion among their units. Only
one battery remained out of those which had been present at the beginning of the action,
but the lull in the fighting enabled the Germans to increase the number to five, accompa-
nied by supporting batteries of 40th Jager Regiment and 16th Reserve Jager Regiment.
(c) Second Reserve Jager Regiment had been placed under 155th Jager Division. It had
already been positioned immediately behind the front line in the Mauloy wood as corps
reserve. As early as 0730 two of its battalions were thrown into the battle, and the third
was made ready to intervene as well. It is notable that this division was in place at the
right time, and behind the only division that had not been hit by the tanks. The only artil-
lery lost was a single sub-group.
Army Group Watter still had a corps reserve available in the shape of an infantry regi-
ment at Villemontoire and another at Tigny. At 1400 group headquarters ordered the
main supply train and all the spare vehicles to be transferred to the north bank of the
Aisne, a move which was accomplished completely undisturbed. The 42nd Jager Regi-
ment was able to beat off isolated enemy pushes in the afternoon and evening, and the
German artillery knocked out a number of tanks in the process. In contrast an attack on
an altogether larger scale was aimed at 14th Reserve Division at 2030, and the interven-
tion of fresh tank forces by way of Vierzy brought about a French success in the way al-
ready mentioned. How was it that the attack of the French tank reserves came on the
scene so late? After all, it was only fourteen kilometres from their assembly area between
Puiseux and Fleury.
Army Group Winkler was in action to the left of the Watter group. The defensive tactics
were the same in both cases, and on this sector too the enemy avoided difficult features
of the ground that would have held up the attack, in this case the Buisson de Cresnes,

65

where 40th Jager Division (the northernmost division of the group) was spared the atten-
tion of the tanks, and was able to hold out for a reasonably long time. The French had an
initial success against 10th Bavarian Jager Division, after their tanks went into action on

0930, and they were able to penetrate about 3'/2 kilometres in the direction of Neuilly-
Saint-Front. Then, however, they were checked by the initiative of a number of junior
commanders. The German success is all the more remarkable since the main French
blow, complete with 132 tanks, was aimed at this division. How did this come about?
The answer lies in the way the tanks were incorporated with the infantry. Tenth Bavarian
Jager Division was attacked by two lines of French divisions - 2nd and 47th Divisions in
the first line, and 63rd in the second. It seems that the French had not intended that 63rd
Division come into action on the first day, and yet it was assigned thirty tanks, which
were consequently not available for the attack on 18 July. Of the remaining 102 tanks, 45
were placed under 2nd Division, and 57 under 47th; the divisions in turn subdivided the
tanks among their waves of infantry. The first shock was therefore delivered with only
part of the total tank forces. There followed a pause in the attack, while the French were
shifting their artillery, which permitted the Germans to restore their units to order. The
French did not put in a fresh attack until 1745, and it failed. Whether through lack of per-
ception, or lack of boldness, the French had failed to use their armour to maintain the im-
petus at the critical moment when their guns were changing position.
The German formation next in line was 78th Reserve Division. It did not come under
such direct pressure from the tanks as the others, but its northern flank became increas-
ingly vulnerable and it too had to pull back, losing some of its batteries in the process.
The Winkler Group received a significant reinforcement in the shape of 51st Reserve Di-
vision, which had been ordered to march north-west from the area of Beuvardes as early as
0720. Not long afterwards, at 1100, the first elements reached Armentieres-sur-Ourcq, south-
west of Oulchy-le-Chateau, eleven kilometres from the current front line. Just as had
happened farther north, the defenders had succeeded in moving up strong reserves in a
matter of hours, which shows just how little time is available for an attacking force to
accomplish a genuine breakthrough, even after it has brought off a complete surprise.

And that was back in 1918, when the Germans had to bring up most of their reserves on
foot! On 18 July the only German formation to be moved by trucks was 10th Jager Divi-
sion, which was transported from Beuvardes to Nampteuil-sous-Muret, Muret-et-Crouttes
and Droizy, and went into action on the same evening. In the present period of motorized
and airmobile reserves we must attach still greater importance to maintaining the speed
of the attack.
It remains only to mention the Corps Group Schoeler, which was deployed between
Saint-Gengoulph and the Marne at Chateau-Thierry. It was struck by the offensive only
on its far right wing, where it lost Courchamps.
By the evening of 18 July the French had made a successful break-in along a sector of
forty kilometres, the entire frontage of their attack. A considerable number of German di-
visions were on the verge of disorder and others had been badly mauled.
Why was it that the break-in did not develop into an actual breakthrough? The explana-
tion is of great relevance for the future employment, and consequently the organization of
armoured forces. Among other things our analysis must address the following issues:
(a) how the forces, and especially the tanks, were committed to the attack;
(b) the relevant tank tactics;
(c) the composition and employment of the reserves.

We shall examine these points one by one.

(a) The French high command adjudged correctly that the German forces in the Marne
salient, though numerically large, were badly placed, not least on account of the vulner-

66

ability of the main lines of communication, which ran through Soissons. The main blow
was therefore going to be struck from the west from the forest of Villers-Cotterets, and
the task was entrusted to Tenth Army. The high command further decided to depart from
their earlier practice, and mount a surprise attack on the model of Cambrai, employing
tanks en masse. Having determined on a thrust from Villers-Cotterets, the French should
then have concentrated all their available offensive capacity, by which we mean primarily
their tanks and aircraft, on the axis in question. Moreover Fifth, Ninth and Sixth Armies
should have done without tanks, so as to bolster the armour of Tenth Army. Lack of room
should not have been an issue - the French did not have such an enormous number of
tanks that Tenth Army could not have found space for them, especially if the French had
concentrated only as many of the conventional weapons as were needed for an effective
attack in the circumstances of positional warfare. Again, the terrain to the north and south
of the Ourcq presented the same degree of difficulty, and there was no particular reason
to divide the tanks among two armies. It is worth examining how the tanks could have
been employed, if all the units had been committed with Tenth Army, in other words north
of the Ourcq. Here we have to pay special attention to the deeply cut ravines which run
south from the Aisne, namely those of Pernant, Saconin-et-Breuil and the valley of the
Crise with its branches. The greater part of the tanks would have had to be directed
south of the first two gorges, in the general direction of Grand-Rozoy and Hartennes. (b)
From their earlier tank actions the French concluded that only the closest co-operation
with the infantry would turn an armoured attack to real advantage, promoting the conduct
of the battle as a whole. Tanks were accordingly assigned to each line of infantry, and
only the three newest and fastest tank detachments were held aside as army reserve.
Likewise to the French way of thinking it was possible to launch a successful attack with-
out a preparatory bombardment, but not without continuing artillery support, which could
be provided only by the creeping barrage. When the wall of fire reached its maximum
range there was only one thing to do - for the batteries to go forward. But moving great
masses of artillery was a matter of several hours, especially in the era of horse-drawn ar-
tillery, and while this was going on the assault forces - the infantry and tanks - had to
stop and wait just when they had the bit between their teeth. This was generally in open
ground where men and machines were exposed to observation and an increasingly lethal
fire from the defenders. So it was that the attackers gained surprise, only to throw it
away. There are also signs that the creeping barrage was applied in a rigid way, since it
did not touch a number of readily identifiable centres of resistance and strongpoints
which were sited in difficult terrain. These could not be tackled by the tanks, and the re-
sult was that the attacking infantry became hung up on the flanking fire. Experiences of
this kind will be repeated as long as the tank attack is coupled with unprotected infantry
and horse-drawn artillery.

The practice of subordinating tanks to each line of infantry also frustrated any attempt to
exploit the success of the first wave of armour in a speedy and energetic way. The senior
tank commanders were banished from the scene of action, and degraded as 'advisers' to
the higher headquarters, where they had a thankless task. During the battle they made
themselves unpopular because they seemed to disturb the smooth flow of operational
thought with their tactical demands and technical objections.
Afterwards they asked themselves where they had gone wrong, and set about the dismal
business of patching up the remnant of their once proud squadrons.
(c) The reserves of Tenth Army most directly concerned with the events of 18 July con-
sisted of:
Four infantry divisions, of which two were behind XX Corps and two behind XXX
Corps

67

Three cavalry divisions, of which two (at Taillefontaine) were behind XX

Corps, and two (at Vaumoise) behind XXX Corps

Three battalions on trucks at Mortefontaine behind XXX Corps
Three battalions on trucks at Vivieres behind XXX Corps
Three tank detachments between Fleury and Puiseux behind XXX Corps
By the standards of the time the French command believed it had made excellent provi-
sion for mobile and fast-moving reserves. It was right. All the same, the business of or-
ganizing and deploying the reserves seems to have occasioned a certain amount of fric-
tion, as we shall now see.
As early as 0815 the army commander ordered the Cavalry Corps to move up its various
divisions. The formations duly set off, but they made slow progress along the roads,
which were encumbered with other forces, and the result was to jam all the routes com-
pletely. At 1500 4th Cavalry Division reached Dommiers and Saint-Pierre-Aigle, and 6th
Cavalry Division arrived west of the farm of Vertes Feuilles. Only now did the truck-borne
infantry leave their assembly areas at Mortefontaine and Vivieres, just seven or eight
kilo-metres behind the old French front line. It soon be'came evident that there could be
no question of making any further progress on horseback, and the French had to be
content with sending a few detachments of riflemen towards Vierzy and the area to the
south, to be inserted among the infantry who were already in action there. Nothing more
was heard of the truck-borne infantry or of 2nd Cavalry Division; it seems that they were
sim-ply blockjng the roads.
We return to the three separate tank detachments, which consisted of the newest and
fastest machines, as already mentioned. Just after 1000 they received the order to send
two of the detachments in the wake of XX Corps, and the third after XXX Corps, though
with the restriction that they were to go into action only after the first line could make no
further headway. At 2000 the 1st Detachment supported the action of 2nd American Divi-
sion, advancing from Vauxcastille against the line Hartennes-Taux, and they were able to
push the infantry along with them for three or four kilometres. Otherwise only a single
company of the 2nd Detachment got into the fighting, at Lechelle; the results are un-
known. The rest of the tanks failed to get into action at all.
It would have been quite possible to combine the three detachments of Chars legers at-
tached to 501st Regiment, as a single formation under their regimental commander, and
push them forward in a simultaneous attack along the axis where the advance was mak-
ing the best progress, in other words in the direction of Hartennes. The necessary orders
should have been given with the least delay, and the regimental commanders and low-
ranking officers should have been subject to as few restrictions as possible, so as to en-
courage displays of initiative. As things went, even the most dashing leadership would
have been paralysed by the way the attack was tied to the progress of the creeping bar-
rage and the rate at which the batteries could change their positions.
Thus the tank reserves should have been held immediately to the rear of the foremost
lines, with the truck-borne infantry and engineers immediately behind the tank reserves
and ideally under their command. The mobile infantry and engineers in their turn ought to
have been pushed as far forward behind the tanks as the enemy fire permitted. They
would probably have done this briskly enough, since they were in a physically fresh con-
dition, unlike the infantry in the first line, who were exhausted by the fighting during the
morning.
The intervention of horsed cavalry should have been considered only after the break-
through had succeeded, when open country had been reached, and where there were no
barbed wire entanglements, no trenches and above all no machine-guns to interfere with
the speed and cross-country mobility of the mounted arm.

68

Three divisions were moved up from the infantry reserves on 18 July, and their place was
taken by a single front-line division and the Cavalry Corps. Orders were given to bring up
seven fresh divisions - mostly on trucks - for the 19th. Altogether on the first day of the
of-fensive the French had taken 12,000 prisoners and 250 guns.
The events of the 18th are worth reviewing in perspective, since it was the first time that
the French had combined the mass use of tanks with surprise.
The Germans had suffered a reverse of major proportions, and they at once got down to
investigating the reasons in detail. They agreed on one thing - the French had achieved a
total surprise, catching off guard not only the German troops but also to a considerable
extent the high command. After no French attack had materialized south of Soissons on
IS July, the Germans were probably inclined to believe that their own push on Epernay
had tied the French down. This was a miscalculation. But this miscalculation would have
been attended by no further effects - and indeed the French would probably have not at-
tempted a surprise attack at all - if the French had not had at their disposal the potent
new weapon of the tank. Soissons was the first battle in which tanks were employed in
anything like sufficient numbers, and with operational and not merely local objectives in
mind. If 400 tanks had gone into action at Cambrai in 1917, now a full 500 were commit-
ted by the French at Soissons. The frontage was admittedly narrower than at Cambrai,
and the blow was consequently no heavier; however the tank is the embodiment of the
power of the offensive, and employed as it was on both occasions with the element of
surprise, it took a heavy toll of the defenders in terms of blood and morale.
Returning to an earlier issue, it is depressing for us to have to relate that eight months
after Cambrai the German infantry and artillery still had no anti-tank weapons; perhaps
more depressing still is the failure to evolve any appropriate tactics to deal with this new
threat. For some time yet the Germans continued to pay a heavy price in blood before
they identified the root cause of their defeats, and recognized the need for an effective
defence against this new weapon which had appeared in the armoury of the offensive.
Unfortunately the Germans came around to the idea too late for it to have any influence
during the war, and they forgot it again while they were labouring under the restrictions of
the Versailles Diktat. At Soissons on 18 July the infantry never came to terms with the
armoured attack at all, and it was only in the afternoon that the artillery began to hit back
at the tanks from new and more intelligently chosen sites. This episode (and it was not
going to be the last) should have shattered the dream world of the people who had dis-
missed the surprise attack by tanks as a 'one-off weapon.
There were those who maintained that the German defence had failed because the front-
line strength of the infantry was low and the troops were psychologically exhausted. Con-
sidering the way the enemy attacked, however, stronger combatant forces would prob-
ably not have failed to avert the catastrophe, but would have been likely to increase the
losses. The men were undeniably in poor physical shape because of influenza and inad-
equate rations, but our brief narrative has revealed episodes of heroic endurance and
lively initiative which give the lie to any allegations of flagging morale. Our admiration will
only be increased by a detailed study of the combat record of individual divisions and
reg-iments.
Careful analysis of the fighting on 18 July reveals three fundamentally important reasons
for the German failure:
(a) successful surprise on the part of the French;
(b) the striking force of the French tanks, which made that surprise a reality;
(c) the fact that the German artillery, but especially the German infantry, had no effective
weapons or tactics with which to combat tanks.
Over the following days the German defeat assumed still larger dimensions, extending

69
beyond the tactical level and well into the operational sphere. The reason was that the

French drive on Soissons posed a dire threat to the communications of the German ar-
mies in the Marne salient, compelling the German command to evacuate the recent
gains on the south bank of the Marne, and withdraw the front line to behind the Vesle.
Ten German divisions were disbanded, as a result of the losses in dead, wounded and
prisoners, and the high command had to abandon the intended 'Hagen Offensive' in
Flan-ders. The Germans went on to the defensive along the entire Western Front and the
22
ini-tiative passed to the enemy.

From the perspective of the French, we have to ask why the attackers did not make a
breakthrough on the first day of the offensive and cut off the Marne salient there and
then. We have already noted that the French could have tied in the available tank units
more closely on the decisive sector of the offensive, namely on the frontage of Tenth
Army - a measure which would have given that army much greater striking power on the
vital axis of the plateau south of Soissons. But something more was required to acceler-
ate the tempo of the attack as a whole, and enable the French to exploit their surprise
more effectively. The trouble was that the pace of the armoured attack was dictated by
the progress of the other arms — the infantry, as they moved slowly forward and came
under the fire of hidden machine-guns, and the French artillery, with its systematic creep-
ing barrage and its changes of position — which took hours with its horse-drawn trans-
port. Meanwhile the tanks had to wait within range of steadily increasing fire from the de-
fenders. As long as this state of affairs continued the French could bring off break-ins,
but not proper breakthroughs, and the defenders were always able to consolidate a new
line. This meant that the French had to mount an entirely new attack - something which

70
Battle at Soissons

could not be improvised overnight — and the element of surprise vanished completely.

As things were managed in 1918, there could be no prospect of armoured support either,
for the tank forces were exhausted by the first day of action. Another consequence of in-
corporating the tanks so completely with the infantry formations was that only a propor-
tion of the machines ever got into combat; in the case of Tenth Army we are talking about
223 tanks of the 343 available; 120 were tied down with the rearmost infantry lines and
reserves, and were completely ineffective. The French undoubtedly made tactical gains
in the fighting on 18 July, but they were far from exploiting to the full the potential of the
new weapon, which derived from its speed, armoured protection and firepower.
The remaining French pushes represented nothing fundamentally new. Despite the loss
of 102 tanks Tenth Army still had 241 machines available on 19 July, but only 105 were
in action. Thirty-two tanks were engaged on 20 July, 100 on 21 July, and 82 on 23 July.
In the period between 18 and 20 July the Tenth Army lost altogether 248 tanks, at least
112 of them to artillery fire. 'Irrespective of range the artillery piece proved to be the main
enemy of the tank. Success in combat hung essentially on protection against the enemy
guns.' (Dutil, Les Chars d'assaut, Paris 1919.)
Let us now take stock of some developments in August 1918. At the beginning of that
month the French armnoured units consisted of ten battalions of Chars legers and eight
groupements of medium tanks (Schneiders and Saint-Chamonds).
The Germans, after they had beaten off the French attempt at breakthrough, withdrew
their front line sector by sector behind the Vesle. They arrived there on 2 August, having
suffered heavily in some courageous rearguard actions.
The German high command hoped that the hostile alliance had exhausted its offensive
capacity, and that the severely depleted German divisions would be granted a little res-
pite in the immediate future. It is not clear from the historical record whether the Germans
drew the appropriate lessons from the Battle of Soissons, and followed their useful habit
of communicating them without delay to the other sectors of the front. At all events there
is no evidence of a fundamental change in tactics, least of all in the artillery. Just as be-
fore, defensive fire was categorized as 'long-range barrage', 'short-range barrage', and
'annihilation fire' on identified or suspected concentrations. It should have been demon-
strated at Cambrai and only very recently at Soissons that defensive fire of this kind was
totally useless against surprise attack with tanks. These two actions, and the successful
defensive battle on the Aisne, showed that the real tank-killers were direct aimed fire by
batteries, the direct, individually aimed round, and on occasion well-observed fire from
heavy batteries. And yet at the beginning of August there was still no fundamental
change in the siting and modes of fire of the artillery.
It was the same story with Second Army, which held the westernmost projection of the
German front at Amiens. In August 1918 all the front-line divisions were compressed into
a single deep deployment, despite their weak combat strength. There was an almost
complete lack of strongpoints, and the artillery was sited where it was useless for anti-
tank defence. The result was that the enemy tanks were able to attack without being
bothered in any significant way by defensive positions, artificial or natural obstacles or ar-
tillery fire.
We should in no way blame the German infantry for the failure to strengthen their posi-
tions after the great spring offensive terminated on 24 April. It was partly a question of
the Germans clinging to the hope of resuming the offensive some day or another, and
partly the result of the exhaustion and numerical weakness of most of Second Army's
front-line troops. Dominating everything else, however, was the ceaseless rain of shells

71

which made labour on the trenches so extraordinarily difficult and costly, and destroyed
much of the work as soon as it had been finished. In addition long sectors of the front
were lost in the endless fighting, so that the enemy actually reaped the benefit of all the
effort the Germans had put into building strongpoints. Villers-Bretonneux and Hamel are
cases in point.

On 24 April 1918 Villers-Bretonneux was the scene of the first action of tank against tank,
and we shall return to it later in that context. We will just note here that the appearance of
German tanks in the field had the immediate effect of hastening the dispatch of further

British tanks to France. The British acted on the principle that the finest tanks in the world
were unable to withstand other tanks, and that the only way to meet an armoured attack
23
was to have a greater number of tanks of one's own.
Sixty new tanks were being delivered to the British every week, and the British attack on
Hamel on 2 July should have given the Germans an opportunity to evaluate the perform-
ance of the enemy machines by this stage in the war. The tanks in question were the
Mark Vs, and at the express wish of General Elles they received their baptism of fire in
an attack with a limited objective, namely the capture of Hamel by the Australians.
The assaulting infantry and the crews of the new tanks came to know and trust one an-
other in the course of joint training, and Colonel Fuller worked out tactical details with
some care. There was no preparatory bombardment, and at 0410 three Australian bri-
gades attacked with the support of sixty tanks and under cover of a creeping barrage of
72
smoke and high-explosives. The tanks started out 1,000 metres behind the leading line
of infantry, but they rapidly overhauled the foot soldiers and hastened to their objectives.
With the advantage of surprise, the assault crashed through the German lines on the en-
tire 4-kilometre frontage of the attack, wiping out most of the defenders, destroying 200
machine-guns and taking 1,500 prisoners. The Australians had 672 casualties and six-
teen of the tank personnel were wounded; six tanks were slightly damaged. Just half an
hour after the objective had been reached, four supply tanks laden with twenty-five tons
of engineer equipment arrived immediately behind the new front line. The action at Ha-
mel was possibly of minor importance in its own right, but it encouraged the British com-
24
mand to devise a new tank battle on the grand scale. Had the German leaders learned
any corresponding lessons for the defence? Evidently not.

On 23 July three French divisions attacked the bridgehead west of Moreuil with the sup-
port of a British tank battalion. Losses on this occasion were heavy, since, contrary to
plan, the attack opened only some time after first light; fifteen out of thirty-five tanks were
damaged, and fifty-four officers and men of the battalion were killed or wounded. Never-
theless the objectives were taken, together with 1,800 men, 275 machine-guns and a
number of artillery pieces.
These successes confirmed the confidence of the British high command in the striking-
power of their armoured forces, and it went ahead with preparing its mighty blow. For
weeks now the British had posssessed complete mastery of the air, which gave them a
detailed knowledge of the German positions, and further information from prisoners and
other sources left them in no doubt as to the state and deployment of the enemy forces.
So it was that nine German divisions had to face eight divisions of British and five of
French. Three British and two French infantry divisions and one British cavalry division
came up behind as reserves; the German reserve divisions numbered five. All the Allied
formations were rested and fully up to strength, which was the case with only two of the
German divisions. Saint-Chamond French Tank
And yet the- considerable numerical superiority of the British, Australian, Canadian and
French infantry, and of the enemy guns and ammunition would not have been enough in

73

themselves to guarantee a breakthrough of the German front, if the Allies had been
forced to depend on artillery fire and infantry assault alone. German infantry and ma-
chine-gunners had already beaten off other attacks. Nor can we ascribe our misfortune to
the fog which shrouded the battlefield on the morning of 8 August - after all it had been
foggy on the Somme and at Ypres, without the enemy turning it to tactical advantage!

No, none of this explains how we were overtaken by our sudden, appalling Black Day.
Our army was battle-tested, if no longer fully battleworthy. Our infantry were as deter-
mined as ever to stick it out; and accounts of the time speak of hardships, but also of a
spirit of soldierly defiance. Posterity will do an injustice to the self-sacrifice and courage
of many thousands of our soldiers if it alleges any collapse of nerve, panic at the sight of
tanks, or dereliction of duty in the presence of the enemy. If a few soldiers failed, they
cannot derogate from the heroic - and for that very reason - tragic, endurance of the
over-whelming majority of the combatants. It is in this perspective that we will investigate
the events of 8 August 1918.

This was the third time that the Germans had been confronted with a battle on the Cam-
brai model, and for the third time they allowed themselves to be taken by surprise. The
enemy deployed on the nights immediately before the storm, moving up in strict silence
and observing the most elaborate precautions. Diversionary convoys, traffic and activity
all served to conceal the assembly of the designated forces, namely the Canadian Corps
(which had a reputation for offensive-mindedness) and the Tank Corps.
The distribution of the tanks is given in our table, which presents the deployment of trops
from north to south.
On the night of 6/7 August the Tank Corps assembled three or four kilometres behind the
front line, and on the night of 7/8th moved forward to its start-line about one kilometre
from the front. From the way the tanks were assigned to the assaulting divisions we can
identify the way a number of axes of effort were formed among the Australian and Cana-
dian forces. Within the divisions, however, the allocation of the tanks indicates that, just
as had happened at Cambrai and Soissons, the tanks were tied in closely with the lines
of infantry; the two most modern and fastest-moving battalions, namely the 3rd and 6th,
which were equipped with Whippets, were placed under the Cavalry Corps, which was
three divisions strong, and deployed between Cachy and Amiens to exploit the success
and complete the breakthrough. The attack was timed to begin at OS00, and the artillery
was to be employed partly to put down a creeping barrage of smoke and high-explosives
in front of the assaulting infantry and tanks, and partly to suppress the German batteries
and other long-range targets. The 500 aircraft were likewise incorporated in the plan of
attack, whether directing fire and carrying out combat reconnaissance, or attacking tar-
gets in depth.

The first targets lay 1 1/2 to three kilometres deep in the German defences and they
were to be reached by 0720, but the German batteries facing British III Corps remained
completely outside these initial objectives; the Australian attack was to reach only the
most advanced German batteries. The Canadian attack was to penetrate considerably
deeper, embracing most of the German gun positions on their sector, but on the French
front again only a few batteries came under attack. While most of the German batteries
remained untouched, British III Corps push north of the Somme was to be delayed for an
hour, and its blow south of the river for two hours, so as to permit the rearward waves to
come up and continue the attack, and for the artillery to finish changing positions. After
this pause - under the muzzles of the German guns, as already indicated! - the creeping
barrage ceased and the attack was to be supported by artillery acting in accordance with
the procedures for mobile warfare.
The second objective took in the German batteries on the whole 30-kilometre frontage of

74

the attack, while the third phase line fell just short of the quarters of the German reserve
divisions, even though their location must surely have been known to the enemy. When
the attack resumed at 0920 it was to continue without a pause. This was when the Cav-
alry Corps was supposed to advance with one division to the north of the Luce and an-
other to the south, then overtake the infantry, continue to the third objective, hold it until
the infantry came up, and finally push to the final objective, the railway between

Chaulnes and Roye.

The French opened fire simultaneously with the British at 0520, but waited for three-quar-ters
of an hour for the bombardment to take effect before the attack of the first line, which
consisted of three divisions of infantry without tanks. Only after the French had taken the
dominating heights west of the Avre would 153rd Division with the two battalions of
Chars legers proceed through the first line of infantry and drive in the direction of Hang-
est-en-Santerre. For a considerable time, therefore, the French were in danger of making
slower progress than their Canadian neighbours, which left the latter vulnerable to flank-
ing fire. The German artillery made the best of this opportunity, especially to shoot up the
tanks on the right wing of the Canadians.
Once again the enemy had made the mistake of tying down the tanks to the infantry and
artillery, and on this occasion they extended it to their most promising weapons, the two
most mobile battalions with their Whippet tanks, which were linked with cavalry which
had no place on the modern battlefield. Confined within this rigid framework, did there re-
main any chance of the offensive achieving a triumphal breakthrough? Hardly. Neverthe-
less the attack put the Germans through some alarmingly dangerous experiences, as we
shall now outline.
The Allied armies went into battle confident of victory, while the Germans awaited their
fate anxiously from day to day. On 6 August a German aircraft reported one hundred
tanks on the move from Ailly-sur-Noye to Morisel. The Germans took no particular fright.
On 7 August a chance hit blew up twenty-four supply tanks laden with ammunition and
fuel in an orchard at Villers-Bretonneux. Again it aroused no suspicion. At 0520 on 8 Au-
gust the enemy attack crashed through the morning mist on a frontage of thirty-two kilo-
metres. The Germans were taken utterly by surprise. They had not reckoned on a mass
assault by armour, and they were powerless to meet it. Bayonets were completely use-
less. It was a matter of chance whether machine-guns, hand-grenades or Minenwerfer
did any damage. Artillery alone would have been at all successful, if it had been em-
ployed in the right way; as things were, gunners would have had a difficult, almost impos-
sible task when the feeble light of early morning was dimmed still further by natural and
artificial fog, when dust and smoke were thrown up by the creeping barrage, and a con-
fusing multitude of targets hove into view at very close range. In fact no useful guns at all
were available in the German infantry's combat zone. What could the German troops in
their wretched shell holes possibly do when they saw the tanks rolling towards them? If
they fired on the machines, or the enemy infantry coming up behind, they would be de-
tected by the tanks and wiped out; if they held their fire some of them might escape being
seen and destroyed by the tanks, but the enemy infantry would approach unscathed and
take them prisoner. In the circumstances of the combat of 8 August 1918 the German in-
fantry were defenceless in the face of certain destruction.

The movement of the British tanks was timed to ensure that they were crossing their own
front line when the barrage opened. The creeping barrage dwelt for an initial three mi-
nutes on the foremost German trenches, then lifted by one hundred metres every two mi-
nutes. Later on the progression became slower, lifting every three minutes, and then only
every four minutes. The tanks and infantry followed a short distance behind the curtain of
shells. In addition to the creeping barrage the British directed a heavy fire against bat-

75

teries, approach routes, villages, camps and combat positions. Within a short time all
communications were destroyed, the telephone lines were torn up and the signal lamps
were unusable - only wireless communication remained largely intact, but the transmis-
sions were incapable of giving any clear picture of the situation in the forward combat
zone. Messengers and runners simply did not come back. Only one thing was clear - that
the enemy were dealing an almighty blow.

The Germans girded themselves for action as best they could; all intact guns and Mine-
nwerfer discharged an 'annihilation fire' into the fog; but they were pathetically few in
number and they were shooting blindly at ground from which in all probability the enemy
had already departed. Where could the guns safely fire without endangering our own
troops? Exactly how far had the enemy reached? In what direction should the reserves
counterattack? Should the machine-guns in the rear open fire without positive identifica-
tion of the enemy? A growing uncertainty gripped officers and men alike among the Ger-
man reserves and batteries.
We shall now consider the course of the British attack in sequence from north to south:
On III Corps' sector 12th jind 18th Divisions reached their objectives between 0730 and
0800.
In one of the episodes, 18th Division's single tank company attacked along the Corbie-
Braye road, destroyed the greater part of 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 123rd Infantry Regi-
ment, and had a clear run to the German batteries which were standing defenceless in
the fog in the woods of Tallies and Gressaire. However the British officers obeyed their
instructions to the letter - not to go beyond their closely defined objectives, and to ob-
serve the stipulated pause in the attack. The tanks remained motionless until the fog
lifted, and the German batteries (which were still devoid of infantry support) were now
able to hold their ground.
Accompanied by two companies of tanks, British 58th Division reached its objective long
before the German infantry reserves could come up to protect their batteries. Here again
the intermission in the British attack turned to the advantage of the Germans, who by
1115 had occupied and consolidated the important position of the 'canal hill' north of Chi-
pilly, undisturbed by the enemy. When the fog cleared, after 0945, the Germans were
able to direct a flanking fire against the Australians who were advancing south of the
Somme, which disrupted their progress considerably.
Along the whole frontage of the British corps it was impossible to get the attack moving
again after the pause; the second objective was never reached, and the single favour-
able opportunity for pressing on with the offensive had flitted by. A few British units got as
far as the foremost German batteries, but the artillery was able to hold its positions.
We turn to the Australian Corps, where 48 of the available 144 tanks were assigned to
the four brigades of the first line of infantry (Australian 3rd and 2nd Divisions) on a front-
age of six kilometres. This wave was under orders to penetrate three kilometres and
reach its first objective at 0720. A two-hour pause was then supposed to ensue, during
which the second line of infantry, comprising Australian 4th and 5th Divisions with 96
tanks, moved forward through the first line. Despite the very scanty complement of tanks
the first enemy wave was able to capture the German positions along the le Hamel—
Cerisy road to the south by 0720, according to plan. It seems that the tanks now went
counter to orders and exploited the opportunity on their own initiative - at least the fog
was still lingering when they pressed on beyond the first phase line and proceeded to
capture the batteries south-west of Cerisy. Not long afterwards an action broke out in
202nd Reserve Jager Regiment's positions south-east of Cerisy; the fighting went on un-
til the gallant defenders, having destroyed a number of tanks, finally withdrew north-east
over the Somme. The tanks now overran 13th Jager Division's combat and reserve bat-
 76

talions; as early as 0630 the severely-wounded commander of its 13th Jager Regiment
was taken prisoner; a battery had already been lost at 0620, and the officers of 15th Ja-
ger Regiment's were wounded and captured. The Australians reached their objectives at

0720, according to plan. There was absolutely nobody to defend the mist-covered ground
which stretched between them and 13th Jager Division's batteries which still had ten light and
eight heavy guns serviceable. The two-hour pause now supervened, but the Ger-mans failed
to make any use of it and bring up reserves to protect the artillery. The Aus-tralians resumed
the attack, and took the whole of the artillery between 0920 and 1000.

Towards 1030 German reserves tried to hold the ravine south of Morcourt, but already by
1100 they had been enveloped by the tanks and their position was hopeless; half an hour
later they were wiped out by the combined fire of aircraft, machine-guns and tanks, and
the Australians reached their second objective on schedule. Only a few troops were
available to the Germans to occupy Hill 84 west of Proyart, and after Australian infantry
had paved the way the defenders came under attack at 1230 by aircraft and tanks work-
ing in concert. With this gain the enemy had attained their objectives for the day and
brought their advance to an end. Quite possibly their aggressive spirit had been tem-
pered by the effective flanking fire which, as we have seen, came from the intact German
batteries north of the Somme.
To the south of Australian 3rd Division, the attack by Australian 2nd Division had likewise
developed as was laid down, the assaulting troops penetrating the advanced batteries
between 0700 and 0730. However the pause in the attack, together with the lifting of the
fog, permitted the rearmost German batteries at Bayonvillers to inflict some local losses
on the tanks, when they reappeared on the scene, and the gunners were able to hold out
until 0950. The German infantry, or rather what was left of them, remained along the axis
of the Villers-Bretonneux-Harbonnieres-Lihons road until the Australians and Canadians
resumed the attack, and they then fell back to the east of Harbonnieres. The six German
batteries around Marcelcave lay within the first enemy objective, and they were lost early
on; the batteries lying outside the phase line at Pierret wood were able to keep up their
fire for two hours more. At 0920 Australian 5th Division with its fresh tanks passed
through 2nd Division on its way to the next objective. All that the Germans could set
against them by that time were seven companies of riflemen and three companies of ma-
chine-guns, with a weak battalion behind. There was no artillery left. The German re-
serves essayed a counter-attack against Bayonvillers, but they were halted by enemy
tanks and aircraft at the 'Roman gorge' 2+ kilometres to the north-east. 'The battalion
broke up under the impossibility of offering any defence against tanks. It was literally
smashed to pieces.' (Schlachten des Weltkrieges, XXXVI, 124.) At this juncture the arm-
oured cars of 17th Tank Battalion appeared on the Roman Road. They were moving so
fast that the German gunners were unable to take a bead on them, and they played hav-
oc among the columns of German vehicles seeking to escape. The British aircraft
dropped smoke bombs on the Roman gorge, which blinded the defenders further to the
east and helped the British armour to approach unobserved. The enemy took Harbon-
nieres, and reached their third objective at noon.
The Canadian Corps, which also had a reputation for aggressiveness, was on the attack
to the south of the Australians. Canadian 2nd Division's assault was spearheaded by a
tank battalion, and the impact fell mainly on 148th Jager Regiment of 141st Jager Divi-
sion; the corresponding push of Canadian 1st Division was likewise led by a battalion of
tanks, and it hit 117th Jager Division. This was an excellent formation which was fully up
to combat strength, and it had a fine leader in Major-General Hoefer. All the same, two of
the infantry regimental commanders of the division were taken prisoner, and the third
died a hero's death. The Canadians had slipped through the German barrage, which was

77

not particularly powerful, and taken their first objective, and with it most of the German
batteries. Every attempt at resistance was broken by the way the Canadians mounted a
turning movement to the north, and only when the Canadians halted, after reaching their
third objective, were the Germans able to form a new front west of Rozieres.

Canadian 3rd Division struck at 225th Jager Division and very rapidly broke into the val-
ley of the Luce, though further south the 'black wood', which extended behind the main
road from Domart-sur-la-Luce to Mezieres, was impenetrable to tanks, and the Germans
were able to stand there until about 0830. In spite of this holdup the attack on the second
objective opened up more or less on time and reached its goal at 1030. The Germans
had only fifteen guns with which to oppose the advance, and they were unable to bring
up any infantry reinforcements. Supported by fresh tanks, Canadian 4th Division and Brit-
ish 3rd Cavalry Division continued the push in the direction of Beaucourt. The time was
shortly after 1100.
Between 1100 and 1200 the two corps, Australian and Canadian, managed to break through
the German forward battle zone, and take all the German artillery with the excep-tion of a few
guns. The only forces that the Germans could throw against them were a few battalions
which had been resting in the rear; while they were still on their way they were badly mauled
by aircraft and long-range artillery fire. So feeble had the German re-sistance become that in
places the enemy were able to proceed in column of march.

Now it was just a question of completing the breakthrough.

The British high command believed that the Cavalry Corps was a particularly suitable in-
strument for this purpose, and it had tried to augment its striking power by putting under
its command the two newest and fastest tank battalions, which fielded 96 Whippets, as
we have seen. These, inevitably, were parcelled out among the various formations.
The Cavalry Corps formed two lines. British 1st Cavalry Division was ordered to overtake
the infantry north of the Luce as rapidly as possible, while British 3rd Cavalry Division did
the same to the south of the stream; they were to reach the third objective, wait there un-
til the infantry arrived, and then push on to the Chaulnes-Roye road, with the British 2nd
Cavalry Division following in the second line. The Whippet battalions drove in front of the
first-line divisions, so as to cover the horse soldiers and open lanes through the wire. By
1015 the first-line divisions had reached a line between Ignaucourt and Marcelcave, and
they now deployed to fulfil their missions. Sixteen tanks were allocated to each brigade of
three cavalry regiments and a mounted battery. They then advanced in the following or-
der: 1st Cavalry Division - 1 Cavalry Brigade against Harbonnieres; 9 Cavalry Brigade by
way of Guillaucourt against Rosieres-en-Santerre; 2 Cavalry Brigade against Caix;
3rd Cavalry Division - 7 Cavalry Brigade through Cayeux against Caix; 6 Cavalry Brigade
against le Quesnel; Canadian Cavalry Brigade against Beaucourt.
First Cavalry Brigade penetrated the farthest, coming to a halt in front of Framerville and
Vauvillers. The others never got as far as their third objective, which was where their
main task, the breakthrough to the railway between Chaulnes and Roye, was supposed
to begin. It is not too much to say that the cavalry could not have progressed as far as
they did without the protection of the tanks. Where a mounted advance was attempted in
larger formations, it invariably collapsed with heavy casualties in a matter of minutes, as
witness the action of 6 Cavalry Brigade south-east of Cayeux or the Canadian Cavalry
Brigade's at Beaucourt, even though the Germans had no coherent line of defence be-
tween Caix and Beaucourt. Just 2 1/2 companies of German engineers, standing in Caix
and to the south-west, were sufficient to bring 3rd Cavalry Division's advance to a halt,
and they gave way only when the tanks opened their attack and drove them back to the
north of Beaufort. No more than a few troops of cavalry were able to move here and
there over the battlefield. The second line of cavalry was not sent into action.

78

Towards noon 17th Tank Battalion with its twelve armoured cars advanced through the
lines of infantry and cavalry, which were still pinned to the ground, and penetrated
through and beyond the villages of Framerville and Proyart. The tanks wrought dire con-
fusion in the rear of the German front lines, inflicted heavy losses on columns and re-
serves, and held on in the neighbourhood of the two villages for several hours without
suffering any losses - but also without any attempt on the part of the other British forces
to follow them beyond their third objective. It was not until about 1830 that the German
reserves entered Proyart and Framerville, finally closing a gap several kilometres wide.

For six hours, until the late evening, it had stood open to a British breakthrough; there
had been hardly any German defenders in the way, and effectively no artillery at all. But
the British were unwilling to depart from the battle plan because it had been laid down by
generals who were protagonists of combat by infantry, artillery and even cavalry - in oth-
er words by men who did not know how to make use of the most powerful punch avail-
able to them. British aircraft successfully attacked and pinned down the German re-
serves, tanks were at hand in considerable numbers, and no German resistance to
speak of had been encountered. All of this was of no avail - the British did nothing.
The French XXXI Corps was attacking south of the Canadian Corps. Contrary to the pro-
cedure of British neighbours, the French put in a 45-minute artillery barrage before they
attacked. The first assault was to be delivered by three infantry divisions without the sup-
port of armour, but then the French 153rd Divsion was to come storming through accom-
panied by three battalions of tanks. The success of the initial break-in was due to the col-
lapse of the Germans who faced the Canadians further north. Very shortly afterwards
153rd Division went into action with its tanks and made some tangible progress. However
at times the French attack hung well behind that of the Canadian right wing, where the
flanking fire of the German artillery was consequently able to inflict heavy losses on the
tanks supporting the Canadian attack.
The battle burnt itself out when the summer night descended on the field between 2200
and 2300, and '. . . by then the German Army had experienced its greatest reverse since
the beginning of the war'. (Schlachten des Weltkrieges, XXXVI, 196.) Eight divisions had
been almost completely smashed, and eight more had been hard hit; in a matter of hours
the Germans had lost 700 officers and 27,000 men (including 16,000 prisoners) and
more than 400 guns. The enemy had effected a break-in on a breadth of 32 kilometres
and a depth of 12 kilometres; not until evening were the strenuous efforts of the Germans
able to establish a new line, and they owed it to the inactivity of the enemy. It is true that
our enemies had been unable to accomplish a worthwhile operational breakthrough, and
it is equally true that there was no longer any immediate danger of a complete collapse of
the Western Front. However the effect of this mighty blow on the German high command
was, inevitably, extraordinarily great.
Even now old-timers like us re-live that feeling of impending doom which overtook us on
that day in August. General Ludendorff had been the soul of German endurance for two
years, and we can imagine how he felt when even he was forced to conlude that the war
must be brought to an end, and that even his own titanic strength could not avert our
fate. In reality there was no other way out. The Battle of Soissons led to the disbandment
of ten divisions; a few weeks later the events of 8 August cost us the same number. The
German Army's power of resistance faced an inevitable decline, while fresh forces
streamed ceaselessly to the armies of the enemy alliance. One million Americans, and
incalculable numbers of tanks and aircraft were ready for the Alliance as early as the au-
tumn of 1918. There was absolutely no prospect that the military situation would be any
better for us in 1919. Ten days after the Battle of Amiens an Imperial council in Spa de-
cided to open peace negotiations at a suitable opportunity. Meanwhile the war was to be

79
25
conducted on the defensive.

Before we follow the operational and political consequences of 8 August any farther, we
should pause to consider the tactics of the two parties, and those of the enemy in particu-
lar.
As we have seen, the Germans had planned their defence to meet a conventional artil-
lery and infantry attack, but they had done virtually nothing for anti-tank defence. There
was no attempt to establish the main line of defence in terrain that was impassable or
even difficult for tanks, and no attempt was made to site the artilllery - our only effective
anti-tank weapon - for direct fire. There were no other means of defence at all. The expe-
riences of 18 July and 8 August teach us that any serious defence against tanks must be
established behind tank-proof obstacles if we are not to expose our infantry and artillery
to annihilation. Without such protection it is of no real use in itself to equip the infantry di-
visions with a full array of antitank weapons, since the effect of these devices depends
on so many chance considerations. In the future, combat in the open field will be unthink-
able unless we can match the enemy in terms of tanks.
As for the attack, the battle of 8 August represents the third total success for the Cambrai
recipe. We must applaud the decision to renounce artillery preparation in favour of a sur-
prise attack, the painstaking measures of concealment, and the teamwork among the as-
saulting troops. The effectiveness of the attack rested on the tank, and the chosen
ground was obstacle-free. There were 500 tanks in the push, which was the same as at
26
Soissons and only 100 more than at Cambrai; it is therefore wrong to speak about an
'undreamt of increase' or 'an unprecedented mass' of tanks. (Schlachten des Weltk-
rieges, XXXVI,221,222.) An 'unprecedented increase' in tanks is something which lies in
the future.

In some respects the British could have done better with their tanks than they did. It
would have been perfectly easy for the British commander-in-chief to have had^a far
greater number of machines available for 8 August, if only he had recognized more
clearly the battle-winning potential of tanks, and exerted greater pressure on the manu-
facturers in Britain. The breadth of the tank attack was broader than at Cambrai, it lacked
depth, and it was tied in too closely with the infantry and the Cavalry Corps, especially in
the second line, and it therefore lacked the speed and independence which were needed
to exploit the initial success.
The artillery tactics matched the objectives of the offensive and the way the tanks were
intended to fight. On the other hand the objectives themselves should have been se-
lected better than they were, after the previous experiences of the British. We may cite
the two-hour halt not long after the attack began, the closeness of the first objective, and
the fixing of the final objective for the tanks and the infantry divisions immediately before
the positions of the German reserve divisions. Only these miscalculations on the part of
the British enabled the feeble German artillery to recover some of its effectiveness, or the
defenders to establish a weak new line on the evening of the battle. It would have been a
different story if the British had liberated their tanks from the conventional arms, which
were inherently slow and vulnerable to machine-gun fire, and if they had struck simulta-
neously into the full depth of the German defensive system, the details of which were
perfectly well known to them. Then it would have been a moral certainty that the British
would have destroyed the defenders in short order and broken through their entire front.
At Amiens the British had available:
(a) for action against the German reserve divisions and command centres — the Whip-
pets and armoured cars, as well as a large number of aircraft;
(b) for action against the German artillery and infantry — the two lines of heavy tanks, of
which the second was comparatively weak, since it only had to destroy the defenceless

80

German infantry; this line was the only element which needed to be tied to the pace of
the British infantry in the early stages, and otherwise there was nothing to prevent the ar-
mour taking full advantage of its speed.

By noon on 8 August, despite their generally slow procedures, the British were standing
at the equivalent of an open door. And yet again the cavalry showed themselves quite
unfitted to appear on the modern battlefield, just as at Cambrai and Soissons. Although
von Schlieffen recognized this fact in 1909 and presented it in his article in unchallenge-
able terms, we are still reading of people who try to argue the opposite, and call for the
reintroduction of cavalry at the army level - in fact for heaping up human beings and ani-
mals which have little inherent combat value. They will achieve nothing in a future war,
now that we have to reckon with the multiplication of machine-guns, the buildup of tanks
and aircraft, and the possible employment of chemical weapons. Cavalry now have only
an insignificant advantage in speed over infantry, especially when we make the compari-
son with motorized forces; in recent years the development of off-road vehicles, and es-
pecially those with tracks, has virtually equalled, and probably even surpassed, the
much-vaunted superiority of the mounted arm in cross-country mobility. In all other re-
spects cavalry are at an outright disadvantage. Until 8 August Sir Douglas Haig had sed-
ulously spared his 27 regiments of cavalry. No doubt the horsemen had plenty of elan
and offensive spirit, but these qualities would have shown to much better advantage if
the cavalry had gone into action in the form of tank squadrons. As it was, they were
thrown away in fruitless attacks. 'In a matter of minutes the mounted attack collapsed in
the face of our fire, which was extraordinarily violent, especially from our heavy and light
machine-guns.

I shall never forget the sight - how the cavalry pushed forward, and was converted in the
next instant into a mass of horses, weltering in their blood, hobbling on shattered limbs,
or galloping riderless through our lines of infantry.' (Schlachten des Weltkrieges, XXXVI,
27
186.)

Von Schlieffen's verdict is equally valid in other respects. Mounted cavalry represent a
large and vulnerable target, and they are helpless to a frightening degree, even whey
they are accompanied by tanks. Things can only get worse. There is every prospect that
tanks will continue to develop at the present impressive pace, whereas the performance
of the horse cannot be improved to any significant degree; in other words, the gap be-
tween the two arms will expand rather than diminish, and any attempt to bind the unequal
partners together can only act to the disadvantge of the tanks, and consequently of the
whole.
We end with a review of the continuation of the battle between 9 and
II August. There was nothing new in what was achieved or how it was done. Excluding
five tanks which broke down, the armour lost: 8 August: 100 machines out of the 415 in
action; 9 August: 39 out of 145; 10 August: 30 out of 67; 11 August: an unknown number
out of 38.
Those 100 tanks that were lost on 8 August had been knocked out by the German artil-
lery, which took advantage of the respite granted by our enemies; however the German
losses in guns came to 400, which was not a particularly advantageous trade-off.
The Battle of Amiens caused no alterations of tactics on the part of either the attackers or the
defenders. Changes were probably ruled out in any case, given the speed of events over the
following weeks, the falling-away of Germany's allies, and the decline in the combat-
effectiveness of the German Army itself. However we must be careful not to re-gard the
events of 1918, and especially the battle of August, as some kind of culmination. On the
contrary; those events were the beginning, not the conclusion of a total revolution in tactics
and therefore of operational potentials. This revolution was the result of the ap-

81

pearance of new weapons in ever greater numbers. Why, then, did the weapons in ques-
tion not bring about a total collapse of the defence every time they went into action? The
reason is that they were underestimated at the time of the war, and by the Allies no less
than the Germans. This misappreciation led in turn to the misuse of those weapons in
the field.
The end of the war. the war in the air. tank warfare. chemical warfare. u-
boat warfare.

French successes on 18 August 1918 and British on 2 September were both scored
through a heavy commitment of tanks, and they led to the withdrawal of the German front
to the Hindenburg Line, from where the German offensive had embarked with such high
hopes in the spring. On 12 September the Allies took the Saint-Mihiel salient between the
Meuse and the Moselle, assisted by 232 French tanks which attacked from the south, ex-
ploiting the most favourable ground. However the French tanks came to a halt in the
afternoon and were immobilized for the next twenty-four hours, simply because the
Amer-ican military police would not allow their convoys of fuel to pass through.

On IS September the German high command wrote to the Kaiser: 'No doubt can remain
that the enemy will continue their offensive through the autumn. They have the neces-
sary means, thanks to the stream of American forces and the mass employment of
tanks. On our side we will keep up the fight, not to hold ground as such, but with the
object of letting the enemy wear themselves out while we maintain the battleworthiness
of our own army.' (Schwertfeger, Das Weltkriegsende, 100.) This strategy fitted the
circumstances of the time, though it does not seem to have been followed through with
sufficient vigour. In any event our continuing combat losses and the decline in our
strength led to the dis-bandment of further divisions, the reduction in the establishment of
the battalion from four companies to three, and in some cases the diminution of the
battalions in the regiment from three to two.
On IS September 1918 the Austrians published a peace note which brought home just
how serious the situation was. On the same day the Bulgarian front collapsed in
Macedo-nia, and the Turkish front in Palestine followed suit on 18 September. On 25
September the Bulgarians sued for peace. 28 September brought a conference between
Field Mar-shal Hinden-burg and General Ludendorff, in which they decided that the war
must be brought to an end through a request for an immediate armistice. The Kaiser
gave his as-sent the next day, and a further consequence was the re-casting of the
government on the parliamentary model.
On 30 September General Ludendorff declared at a conference that 'The conduct of the
war on the Western Front has been reduced to a game of chance, due chiefly to the ef-
fect of the tanks; the high command no longer has a firm basis for its calculations.'
(Schwertfeger, 128.)
Berlin was the scene of the fateful gathering of the party leaders on 2 October, when a
representative of the high command reported on the situation at the front. He urged the
necessity of an armistice, citing the 'action of the tanks, which we are unable to counter,
and the state of our replacements'. (Schwertfeger, 134.) On 3 October the German Gov-
ernment addressed a request for an armistice to the President of the United States.
This deserves to be underlined. When the representative of the high command asked for
an immediate armistice he did so on two grounds, of which the first was the enemy supe-
riority in tanks. It is fair to assume that the deputy was as well informed on the views of
the front-line soldiers as he was about the thinking of our military leadership. This was a
grave and tragic hour, and objective calculations alone could have induced the high com-
mand to make such a request. As for the reasons presented at the meeting, these too
 82

must have been the product of weighty and conscientious examination.

The war was continued in the form of a costly defensive battle until the armistice came
in-to effect on 11 November. On 26 September the Americans attacked between the Ar-
gonne and the Meuse with 411 tanks; the French Fourth Army opened a simultaneous
push with the support of 654 machines. The British joined in with an offensive at Cambrai
on 27 September, followed by the Belgians in Flanders on 28 September.
The details of the American attack are instructive. Co-operation with the armour did not
work particularly well, and the reasons are the unsuitable terrain chosen for the advance,
and the frequent counter-orders which were issued from the second day of the attack on-
wards. On many occasions the infantry failed to exploit the armoured successes, with the
result that a great number of tanks fell into the hands of the Germans. The conclusion
must be that even completely fresh, unused and fully battle-worthy infantrymen, like the
Americans, showed that they had no inherent striking power in the face of machine-guns,
and were often incapable of following the armour, slow-moving though it was in those
times. To a still greater degree than with the British and French attacks, the battle on the
second day degenerated into costly and unproductive local actions. The French Fourth
Army went about things differently. They opened their attack across the shell-cratered
landscape of the old battlefields, but they did not commit their tanks until they had taken
the ground and made it practicable. To this work they assigned 2,800 labourers, who
completed it on 28 September, along with clearing lanes through the anti-tank obstacles,
mines and trenches. This army lost only two tanks to mines.

In the fighting on 27 and 28 September it became clear that the French infantry no longer
had the strength to utilize the success of the tanks. We frequently encounter phrases
such as the following: 'The tanks put the defenders to flight, but the infantry failed to
reach their objective.' (Dutil.) This shortcoming became the more evident the more the
battle degenerated into scrappy combats. Conversely, the better the attack was directed,
and the greater the number of tanks that went into action, the more rewarding were the
results. On 29 September there was a temporary falling-off in the combat readiness of
the machines, and only a few units took part in the actions on the 30th. By 1 October al-
together 180 tanks were once more ready for service, and the French had taken a total of
12,000 prisoners and 300 guns. The French resumed the offensive on the 3rd. It went
well, though by 8 October, when Fourth Army's tank forces were exhausted, they had
lost 40 per cent of their officers, 33 per cent of their men, and 39 per cent of their tanks.
Of the 184 tanks which fell out of action, 56 had been disabled by artillery fire, and two
through mines, while the rest had broken down; 167 were repaired and soon back in
service, 17 were lost for good and two were missing.

Tank units were used virtually everywhere in the fighting that took place during the pur-
suit in October, though many of them had to drop out through mechanical wear towards
the end of the month. The main enemy turned out to be field guns employed in the anti-
tank role, and sometimes also Minenwerfer firing at low trajectory. By way of contrast the
losses to mines were few, evidently because the minefields were inadequately camou-
flaged, but perhaps also because the enemy might have been informed as to their
where-abouts.
The salient feature of all the October battles was the way the tanks were flung into com-
bat without any planning. All the lessons of 18 July and 8 August seem to have been cast
aside, and there was not a single occasion on which the huge quantities of tanks now
available (in the order of 4,500 at the very least) were directed at a common objective, si-
multaneously, and with due co-ordination. Indeed, the choice of ground for attack often
seems to have been made from political rather than military considerations. There was
no real need for haste and disorder of this kind - after all, the Allies knew the prospects

83

for the Germans only too well!

By 1 October the French had 2,653 tanks, and the monthly production had attained a
rate of 620 machines.
The Armistice brought an end to hostilities on 11 November 1918.
We must now ask how well the various categories of weapons were performing by the
end of the war. We will then proceed to examine the lessons which influenced post-war
developments.
Until it ended, the fighting on the Western Front bore essentially the character of position-
al warfare, even if very few properly engineered defences were constructed in the closing
weeks. This was a type of combat in which the machine-gun became the dominant
weap-on, and made life difficult or impossible for unprotected soldiers and horses. The
posi-tions ultimately evolved into wired, dug-in machine-gun nests which were secured
by out-posts and communication trenches, and which relied for close-range defence on
the hand-grenade as well as the machine-guns themselves. To the rear extended a deep
ar-ray of covered batteries and troops on standby.
Unsupported infantry were quite unable to tackle a defence of this kind. The machine-
guns offered such small and insignificant targets that the attacker required a huge outlay
in artillery and ammunition to silence them - and if only a few machine-guns survived
they could usually shatter an attack by considerably greater forces. In the best cases the
cost of an infantry attack was entirely disproportionate to the gains, not least because the
facility of motor transport made it possible for the defenders to bring up their reserves in
good time; conversely, instead of the intended breakthrough and operational exploitation,
the attacker had to be content with making a salient into the enemy line, with all its at-
tendant tactical disadvantages.
It follows that if infantrymen are reduced essentially to becoming machine-gunners, the
negative strength of their weapons makes them primarily suitable for the defensive role in the
post-war world. The offensive power of infantry extends no further than the range of their
machine-guns and the other integral weapons, and even then only after everything that lies
beyond their limited objectives had been suppressed by other weapons, and in particular the
artillery. If the artillery in question fails in its task of total suppression — si-lencing the greater
part of the machine-guns, crippling the batteries, and in general con-quering ground by fire -
one's own infantry will be unable to occupy and hold it.

The conquest of an objective by artillery demands a considerable expenditure of ammu-nition

by a great number of batteries. Preparing an artillery attack therefore becomes a time-
consuming and highly-visible business, which detracts from the chances of achiev-ing
surprise. If short artillery bombardments are desirable in principle, their actual effect is open
to question. Long artillery bombardments reduce the area of the attack to a land-scape of
shell holes, impede the movement of vehicles from the rear, and the exploitation of any initial
success. The depth of the artillery attack depends not so much on the actual range of the
guns as the facilities for observation, and to carry it through to success de-pends on an
accurate knowledge of the enemy deployments, otherwise we will be unable to engage the
targets directly and will use up more ammunition than we can replace. The artillery, like the
infantry, has to limit its attack to one objective at a time, because it must change position
afterwards. This pause turns to the advantage of the defence. When the attack is resumed —
usually in not such a systematic way as in the first bombardment — it does not fall on empty
space, but upon a new defensive line where the enemy deploy-ment is usually unknown, and
which is consequently a hard nut for the infantry to crack.

While the offensive striking power of artillery proved to be far more formidable than that
of the infantry, it remained too slow-acting, too wasteful and too subject to chance to be
able to secure a rapid breakthrough.

84

The cavalry had been the third main arm in 1914, and yet by 1918 its useful work had
been confined to carrying messages and executing short-range reconnaissances under
the command structure of the infantry divisions. Otherwise the cavalrymen were reduced
to mounted infantry, and they should be assessed accordingly.

It was the other way around with the air forces, which were used mainly for reconnais-
sance at the beginning of the war, but became an extremely important weapon as the
conflict wore on. Aircraft in the reconnaissance and artillery observation roles were a nui-
sance to the enemy ground troops, because they forced them to take various measures
of concealment and make use of the hours of darkness, but it was the ground-attack air-
craft that became the immediate threat. The Germans suffered from the attentions of the
enemy aircraft on the Somme and at Ypres, and in the course of 1918 the superiority of
the Allies in the air became more tangible still. While enemy air raids against the German
homeland were rare and not particularly effective, aircraft intervened to significant pur-
pose in the ground battle, as at Amiens on 8 August 1918. They created disorder in the
German rearmost communications, they hindered the movement of reserves, they took
German batteries under actual attack, they laid smoke-screens in front of occupied
ground, and they reported the progress of the attack. All of this was of material influence
on the course of the ground fighting, especially when the aircraft were acting in co-ordi-
nation with tanks. Aircraft became an offensive weapon of the first order, distinguished by
their great speed, range and effect on target. If their initial development experienced a
check when hostilities came to an end in 1918, they had already shown their potential
clearly enough to those who were on the receiving end.
To act to decisive effect, the air forces still need a partner on the ground that is able to
overcome the defensive strength of modern weapons speedily enough to expand the
break-in to a full breakthrough, exploiting both the initial success of the offensive and the
work of the aircraft. The conventional ground forces too stand in need of a partner of this
kind - and in fact in future wars they will have little offensive capacity without it. This part-
ner, this new weapon, is represented by the tank. We have already described in some
detail the influence which armour exercised on the conduct of war since it first appeared
in September 1916. We have not touched on the reasons why the Germans virtually re-
nounced the idea of creating tank forces of their own, but the consequences of this fail-
ure are only too evident, and they were made still worse by the lack of any suitable anti-
tank weapons, or even an intelligent use of the available artillery for this purpose.
The importance that the enemy attached to tanks may be deduced by the construction
programme for 1919. The Allies intended to increase their armoured establishments as
follows: Britain from 2,000 machines to 7,000; France from 2,653 to between 8,000 and
10,000; The United States to 10,000.
By way of contrast the Germans intended to build up only from 45 to 800.
While the British concentrated on building heavy and medium tanks, the French and
Americans up to 1918 put the emphasis on the light Renault. General Estienne, however,
was of the opinion that the French would be faced with the problem of overcoming formi-
dable German defences in the following year, and as early as February 1918 he urged
the building of heavy tanks: 'The decisive attack will follow in the wake of the heavy
tanks, which will smash a way through the entire zone of obstacles, and not just for the
infantry, but the horse-drawn artillery and the other tanks as well. The infantrymen will be
following immediately behind the light tanks, which are their loyal and inseparable com-
panions, and they will have every confidence that success on this first day will give the
offensive an added impetus, instead of exhausting it.' (Dutil, 26.) Estienne had in mind a
continuous offensive which would incorporate surprise at the strategic level, and was to
be sustained by a rapid movement of reserves and supplies. It seems that the British

85

minister Winston Churchill was thinking along the same lines when, in July 1918, he told
the Imperial General Staff that full reliance could be placed on the construction figures
predicted for 1919, and that it should therefore lose no time in working out the most suit-
able tactics for the offensive. The Armistice supervened before our enemies could put
their designs into practical effect, but the tank augmentations intended for 1919 are proof
enough of their intentions. It is clear that the tank, as the embodiment of the ground at-
tack, had risen to rank alongside the air forces in their offensive role.
Chemical substances were the third of the new weapons to arise in the World War. They
suited the defenders to just about the same degree as the attackers, and so they cannot
be counted as an exclusive asset of the offensive. For offensive purposes, short-term
chemical weapons are used on ground over which our own troops will be attacking. Con-
versely it suits the defenders to employ persistent agents to contaminate terrain over a
length of time - this is particularly useful in the case of a retreat, for it may help our forces
28
to disengage. Motorized troops are in fact the only forces that are capable of crossing
contaminated ground at speed.

The U-boat was the fourth device to take on an unsuspected significance. The Germans
had stolen a march on their enemies in technical development, and the war might have
taken a different course if the German government had had the nerve to make timely and
unrestricted use of the weapon.
Sooner or later every new weapon conjures up countermeasures. Offensive air power
has already been met by anti-aircraft units utilizing artillery pieces, machine-guns,
searchlights and nets, camouflage and blackouts, and by fighter aircraft which can meet
the enemy in their own element.
Chemical weapons can be rendered ineffective by masks and protective clothing, or by
chemical neutralizers.
The Allied war against U-boats was conducted by nets and destroyers, aircraft and
depth-charges, the convoy system, but chiefly and most effectively by propaganda and
diplomatic pressure. Germany allowed itself to be intimidated.
As we have already noted, the least of all was done for anti-tank defence. Neither suit-
able guns nor machine-guns were deployed by the end of hostilities, and the German
13mm anti-tank rifle was largely ineffective. Only the engineers went to the trouble of put-
ting up any kind of defence, when they set out obstacles and mines. In contrast the artil-
lery failed to adopt the new tactics that were needed to render speedy and efficacious
help to the infantrymen against the tank, which was a particularly dangerous enemy of
theirs. This was particularly relevant during the war, when artillery was the only useful
weapon against armour. Things have admittedly changed a great deal since then.
For centuries now the Germans have regarded the infantry as the principal arm of serv-
ice, and in the World War they assumed that infantrymen would be equal to any task that
was set before them, no matter how difficult, and not excluding anti-tank defence. This
was demanding altogether too much.
To sum up, two of the new weapons that emerged in the World War, tanks and aircraft,
predominantly augmented the power of the defence, while chemical devices and U-boats
served the offensive and defensive modes to an equal degree.
At the time of the war engine-powered offensive weapons were in their infancy, and even
now they stand only at the beginning of their development. As early as 1918, however,
they worked to decisive effect, and our victorious enemies concluded that they must
henceforward deny them to the Germans.

86

The versailles DIKTAT

The paragraphs of Part V of the shameful Treaty of Versailles were conceived in a spirit
of hate. We are no longer bound by them, but it is a salutary exercise to call them to mind
every now and then. The German Army, as permitted by their provisions, was small and
incapable of further development. But the most irksome feature was not the numerical
weakness, or the obligation of twelve-year service. It was the prohibition of all modern
weapons.

The field army was forbidden to possess heavy artillery, with the exception of a few
heavy fortress guns and naval and coastal artillery, which opened the way for a measure
of cautious experimentation. But the air forces, the tank forces and the U-boat forces
29
were destroyed and forbidden outright, and the possession of chemical weapons was
likewise prohibited. The German Army was reduced to 21 regiments of infantry, eighteen
of cavalry and seven of artillery, with a few weak auxiliary units. Essentially it had been
reduced to a police force, incapable of conducting even a colonial war in modern condi-
tions.

In accordance with the Peace Treaty of 31 August 1919 the German National Assembly
passed a relevant law of implementation, where we read in Paragraph 24:
Punishments of up to six months' imprisonment, detention, or fines of up to 100,000
marks will be imposed on whoever acts contrary to the provisions of the Peace Treaty in
Germany in the following respects:
1. ...
2. ...
3. Manufactures armoured vehicles, tanks or similar machines, which may be turned to
military use.)

In terms of armament and equipment the army represented scarcely any advance on that
of 1914. Most striking of all was the large number of regiments of cavalry in proportion to
those of infantry and artillery. After the Armistice the enemy had all the time they needed
to make the peace conditions just as disagreeable and shameful as they could, and it is
unlikely that they had our best interests at heart when they came to determine the com-
position of our army. There could be no mistake: Germany was forced to accept an army
that not only lacked any kind of offensive potential, but was incapable of putting up a sus-
tained defensive. The only tactics that matched our military capacity would have been
those of a 'fighting retreat', and, given our chronic weakness in ammunition as well as
manpower, this would have degenerated in a matter of days into a disorderly flight.
It is true that the army retained its old defiant, warlike and offensive spirit, as befitted its
glorious traditions. This was all well and good, and was a credit to its commanders, espe-
cially Colonel-General von Seeckt. But we were forbidden just those weapons that had
shown the greatest importance and striking-power in the last war, and, lacking an every-
day acquaintance with them, the army was in real danger of letting them slip from its
mind altogether, or at least under-valuing them to a greater or lesser extent.
The heavy artillery could still function to a certain degree, as we have noted. The Luft-
waffe and the.U-boat service, although relatively new arms, had a body of officers that
had come into being in the course of the war, and a tradition that was already several
years old. Gas countermeasures could and did go forward.
It was much more difficult for the tank forces. In the war we had effectively denied our-selves
an armoured 'service' as such, for our forty-five machines were too few to consti-tute anything
of the sort. All that remained were the scanty experiences which a number of individuals
carried in their heads, and with a few exceptions these men left the army as a result of the
reductions. Up to 8 August 1918 we had shut our eyes to what tanks had

87

achieved up to that time, and indeed the directions in which they might develop. After the
war the progress of armour in foreign countries was for years on end concealed from us
altogether, or at best we gained only fragmentary glimpses. Our peacetime manoeuvres
were innocent of tanks or anti-tank weapons. When, finally, canvas mock-ups appeared
at exercises, they had to be pushed or carried by troops against the infantry and artillery.

They looked frankly comical, which was not the way to convey the image of a kind of
deadly enemy, or persuade the other arms to do anything about altering their tactics,
which reverted increasingly to those of 1914. We had experienced periods of reaction
even after wars we had won, like the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1, whose lessons
were incorporated only in the Drill Regulations of 1888. But never had regression been
more marked than after 1918.
In awareness of these dangers the Germans furnished their dummy tanks with motors. Since,
however, the Peace Treaty allowed the army literally 'one' tracked vehicle, we could simulate
a tank attack with any appearance of reality only on particularly favourable and obstacle-free
terrain; in other words mostly on drill squares. The self-propelled mock-ups worked to the
extent that they at last persuaded officers and men to devote a little thought to anti-tank
defence, with the result that we introduced wooden guns which were supposed to represent
anti-tank guns. How unpretentious we had become! I remember how proud we were when
we made the tin turrets of our 'tanks' traversible, and were able to simulate machine-gun fire
by a little blank firing machine. What joy we took in our first smoke generator! But our
greatest secrets were our forbidden Riibezahl Tractors [called after the mythical giant of the
Riesengebirge in Silesia] which were based on the clanking commercial tractor. With this
machine we essayed our tank company tactics under condi-tions of the greatest secrecy at
Grafenwohr.

In those years only a few officers devoted themselves to a detailed and genuinely profes-
sional study of the development of armour in its tactical and technical aspects. They were
limited almost exclusively to the motor transport branch [Kraftfahrtruppe], and what a tiny
circle they were! But how we prize the memory of that time when we wore the rose-red piping
of that branch of service! How we recall all the work we put in, how we strove after
knowledge, our search to identify the likely development of this new weapon, the weapon of
the future! In those years was laid the foundation of the discipline, comradeship and soldierly
and technical proficiency on which alone the German mechanized and tank forces could
have arisen when, finally, we were free of the restrictions on our armament. We who wore the
rose-red piping have every right to be proud of such a groundwork: we recall with gratitude
the men who in those years of trial carried forward the tank arm and its development, and
prepared so effectively for its present rise.

POST-WAR developments abroad

While Germany laboured under the dictates of that infamous Treaty of peace, our for-

mer enemies retained their full freedom of action. 'The weapons which brought us vic-
tory are in a state of constant activity. Tanks and aircraft show almost daily advances.'
(General Debeney, in Revue des deux Mondes, 15 September 1934.) Here we will
sketch in the technical and tactical developments affecting the various kinds of armoured
vehicles, together with the weapons and resources of anti-tank defence. On this basis we
can begin to discuss the future development of the devices in question, see how they
shape up against one another, and evaluate their roles in the context of the army as a
whole.
We will break down the treatment as follows:
the technical development of the main types of armoured vehicles;

88

the evolution of tactical concepts in those armies that have the most significant tank
forces, and finally
 the present state of anti-tank defence.

Technical developments

The characteristics of armoured vehicles ought to correspond to the way we intend to

employ them. We will categorize and describe them accordingly:

(a) By far the greater number of armoured vehicles should be destined for combat —
combat against conventional forces, but more especially against anti-tank weapons and
enemy armoured vehicles. We call these machines 'tanks' (Panzerkampfwagen). Under
this designation they are categorized either according to weight as light, medium or
heavy tanks, or, since weight is a fairly arbitrary and vague definition, more usefully by
their primary armament as machine-gun-, light-, medium- or heavy-gun tanks. Tanks
must be capable of crossing difficult ground, and of giving their crews protection at close
range at least against small-arms fire, and at medium range against anti-tank guns. They
must possess all-round traverse for their primary armament, good vision, easy transport-
ability and sufficient speed for their purpose.
(b) Armoured reconnaissance vehicles (Panzerspahwageri) are used for scouting, and
they must accordingly have a higher turn of speed than tanks. However they must
possess a reasonable degree of cross-country mobility,
and this must be all the greater if they are destined to work closely with the tank units.
For operational reconnaissance, where speed is at a premium, a common solution is
wheeled vehicles with two to four sets of wheels and all-wheel drive (as in the Auto-mi-
trailleuses de decouverte). Tactical reconnaissance has a frequent need for off-road and
cross-country mobility, which is answered by half-tracks or wheel-track convertibles
(Räderraupenfahrzeuge, Automitrailleuses de reconnaissance). Combat reconnaissance
is carried out in immediate association with the fighting units, and demands fully-tracked
vehicles with complete cross-country mobility.
(c) Special tasks require appropriately specialized vehicles. This has given rise to am-
phibious tanks for swimming across water, radio tanks or command vehicles for signals
and the transmission of orders, and bridge-laying and mine-plough tanks for the engi-
neers.
We can see even at first glance the progress in design between the tanks of 1917 and
those of 1937, comparing for example the British Mark V which fought at Amiens (No. 7)
with the heavy Vickers Independent (No. 16), or the French Saint-Chamond (No. 11) with
the Char 3 C (No. 17). It calls to mind the similar advances in warships and aircraft,
which have acquired greater sleekness of line, simplicity and serviceability, becoming in
the process more technically 'beautiful'.
The innards have improved in step with the externals. The most diverse designs of run-ning
gear offer far greater endurance than at the time of the last war; they can be used on hard-
topped roads, and they have made tanks largely independent of special trans-porters.
Suspensions have also shown a notable improvement, which eases the strain on the crew
and provides a more stable platform when the tank is firing. Engines are more powerful. The
British Mark V, for example, had a iSOhp engine; the modern Vickers Inde-pendent weighs
about the same, at 32 tons, but has a 3SOhp engine, yielding improve-ments in climbing
30
ability as well as speed. This opens the prospect of a freer tactical de-ployment of armoured
forces, and of bringing operational objectives within their reach - it had been the earlier
limitations on range which as late as 1918 had brought many of the more high-flown
schemes of our enemies down to earth. Since the war, the effectiveness of armour protection
has increased many times over in respect of thickness, conforma-

89

tion, and the quality of the steel. All armoured vehicles worthy of the name are com-
pletely proof against small-arms fire, and most gun tanks can also withstand the smaller
anti-tank guns. The contest between armour and gun has been taken at least as far
among the tank forces as among the navy and the air forces.

Since the war the emphasis in the armament of tanks has been less on the number of
weapons that can be taken on board, than on the performance of the gun, its suitability
for the narrow dimensions of the tank, and the way it is mounted. We need only to com-
pare the arcs of fire of the sponson gun of the British Mark V (No. 7) and the bow-
mounted gun of the Saint-Chamond (No. 11) with the turret guns of the Vickers Inde-
pendent (No. 16) and the Char 3 C (No. 17) which give us the 360-degree arc of fire that
is really needed. Gun sights likewise have been greatly improved by good optics.
Visibility is still not ideal, but at least it is better than before, thanks to optical provision for
the driver, and improvements in the form of the slits to resist the entry of shell splinters
31
and bullet splash. All of this gives the crew better protection against injury. Most of the
larger tanks now have special command cupolas which free the tank commander from
having to serve the gun, and give him what he needs for effective control - especially of
the larger units - namely unrestricted vision of the whole vehicle and over a field of 360
degrees, independently of the orientation of the main turret. Considerable use is made of
movable mantlets to secure the necessary field of vision for the commander; periscopes
have to serve instead in smaller tanks which do not have commanders' cupolas.

Communication between the members of a tank crew is effected by lights, speaking

tubes, internal telephones and other devices. For external communication nearly all com-
mand tanks have radio transmitters and receivers, while all other modern tanks have ra-
dio receivers; the company commanders of the World War, hastening ahead of their
tanks on foot or horseback, are figures of the past. The continuing development of radio
apparatus is of great relevance to the direction of larger tank formations and their deploy-
ment for tasks in depth.
Armoured reconnaissance vehicles have made comparable progress. In the last war the
chassis used to have two fixed axles, mostly with rear-axle drive only; the tyres were of
solid rubber, and the total weight of the vehicle frequently approached the limit of what
the chassis could bear. Reconnaissance vehicles of that type were usable only on firm
roads, and they were therefore very sensitive to obstacles. This was a fundamental defi-
ciency which meant that they were not much good at carrying out the various reconnais-
ance tasks which fell to their lot, and made them virtually useless on the shell-torn battle-
fields of the Western Front. We encountered them when the French were holding off the
German offensive against the Chemin-des-Dames, and when the British sent them for-
ward in pursuit at Amiens on 8 August. The Germans did not employ them at all.
The improvements after the war were concerned most immediately with the driving prop-
erties and cross-country mobility in particular. A number of directions were followed -
two-axle drive, the introduction of a third and later a fourth axle (No. 30) with appropriate
drives, the swinging half-axles, and bullet-proof pneumatic tyres. In many models steer-
ing was extended to all wheels, and heavy armoured reconnaissance cars were
equipped with the facility of additional steering from the rear. Spare wheels were at-
tached on a rotating mounting on a dead axle, which helped to prevent the hull from
grounding on uneven terrain. Auxiliary tracks (No. 30) helped in climbing obstacles and
crossing soft ground. The facility of driving on both wheels and tracks gave rise to the
wheeled/tracked convertible armoured vehicle (Räderraupenpanzer), and we finally take
note of the 'hermaphrodite' half-track, a speciality of the French, in which the rear wheels
are replaced by tracks, while front-wheel steering is retained.
It is true to say that that the various improvements in the chassis of armoured reconnais-

90

sance vehicles came at the right time to answer the call which now arose for operational,
tactical and combat reconnaissance, but the development is far from complete. As re-
gards their suspensions the armoured reconnaissance vehicles have undergone an evo-
lution similar to those of their close relatives, the tanks, with the difference that armour
protection mostly gives place to greater speed and range, with particular attention being
paid to the signals equipment.

Inevitably the technical advances in armoured reconnaissance vehicles proceed in close

and mutually beneficial association with those of commercial vehicles of all kinds. As
early as the World War commercial vehicles played an important role in the transporta-
tion of headquarters officers, troops and supplies. Since the war a wide and accelerating
phenomenon has been the partial or total extension of powered vehicles to forces of all
kinds. This process is called the 'mechanization of the army'. The first element to be af-
fected was the high command. Isn't it nowadays inconceivable to imagine a commanding
general on horseback on the battlefield, let alone a divisional commander? The officers
who experienced the facility of powered transport certainly found it very welcome. The
next step was the mechanization of the signals and communications units, a significant
part of the heavy artillery, the engineers and almost the whole of the logistic system.
Then came the setting up of motorized machine-gun and infantry units, and of army-level
transport groups which were capable of carrying all kinds of forces and equipment.
The final process was to extend the new dimension of mobility to whole weapons at a
time, and above all to mechanize the one arm of service which in its existing form was in-
capable of answering the demands of modern war, namely the cavalry. This develop-
ment was at its most thoroughgoing in Britain, where the entire cavalry was mechanized,
with the exception of a few mounted regiments which were left in the structure of the in-
fantry divisions for reconnaissance tasks. As was announced in the press in December
1935, the cavalry was going to be mechanized because the mounted cavalry divisions
lacked the speed, range and striking-power that were demanded in modern mechanized
warfare. The French went about things rather more slowly, and out of their five cavalry di-
visions two have been completely mechanized, and the others by two-thirds. In contrast
the Russians still maintain a large force of cavalry, despite the huge extent of the mecha-
nization of their army.
There was an especially urgent need to mechanize the auxiliary units which were des-
tined to act with the armoured reconnaissance and tank units. This call gave rise to mo-
torized experimental infantry brigades and light mechanized artillery and engineers in
Britain, and to Dragons portes, light artillery and engineers in France, and similar ele-
ments in Russia and elsewhere.
A final impulse was the restoration of German military capacity, which presented other
countries with the requirement for a mechanized anti-tank defence.

Tactical developments

The notions concerning tank forces are extraordinarily numerous and diverse, and it is
hardly surprising that they have given rise to a great variety of combat and transportation
vehicles, and, on the organizational side, to armoured combat units and mechanized
forces of all kinds. From all of this we must try to form a picture of the development of the
mechanized army of the future. The process is extremely exciting, and we shall trace it
with reference to the three military powers that have been of the greatest relevance to
the progress of armoured forces in Europe, namely Britain, France and Russia.
After the war the British withdrew to their island fastness and slashed the numbers of their
army. They scrapped or sold off most of their combat vehicles, and retained only the newest
types for exercises, and as a base for experimenting with their designs for a mod-

91

ern army.

The following principles have determined the evolution of the British tank forces. Britain
needs its army in the first place to protect its Empire. If, however, a large-scale war broke
out on the continent of Europe, the best help that could be rendered to allies would be in
the shape of a small but highly mobile army, possessing great striking and offensive
power. This would be more useful than sending conventional divisions of infantry or cav-
alry, since Britain's allies had plenty of those already. What mattered was to commit the
kind of force that would express Britain's industrial proficiency, namely a comprehen-
sively motorized and mechanized army which could move at great speed and strike to
great effect. In such a modern form even a small army could represent an important,
32
even decisive, accession of strength to an ally. The tank forces would play an essential
role in the new army, and this was why particular attention was paid to their develop-
ment. Among other things they would, in contrast to the last war, have to reckon with a
strong anti-tank defence.

Since it was impossible to predict the outcome of the contest between gun and armour, and it
was conceivable that the anti-tank gun might gain the upper hand, the main em-phasis of
British post-war development was put not so much on armour protection as oth-er
considerations - a compact and agile tank, effective means of command and control, and the
ability to deliver a mass attack by surprise at the decisive spot. It was hoped that speed of
movement, and exploitation of terrain and smoke-screens would lessen the danger from the
anti-tank defence, and enable the assault to be pressed home success-fully. There followed
the inevitable conclusion that the tank assault must be separated from that of the infantry, if
not immediately and totally, at least at a very early stage in their joint attack. Again it was
argued that if self-preservation dictated that the tanks must part company with the infantry
sooner or later, it was better to do so in a systematic way, and come to terms with whatever
the tactical consequences happened to be.
What were the advantages of the tanks acting independently, and exploiting their greater
range and speed? A successful attack would bring a swift victory, which would assume
considerable dimensions in breadth and depth; the enemy reserves, and most impor-
tantly the motorized or even armoured units, would arrive on the scene too late. Here
was the solution to the hitherto intractable problem — how to exploit success. Break-
through and pursuit again became a real possibility, and war would assume or maintain
the character of a war of movement. The tank forces would gain not only a local, tactical
importance on the battlefield, but one which extended into the operational sphere of the
theatre of war as a whole.
What, on the other hand, were the disadvantages of separating the tanks from the infan-
try? If the tank forces got too far ahead of the other troops, or veered too far out to their
flanks, the tanks might be able to win a great deal of ground, but not hold it for any length
of time. Again, unsupported tanks might not be able to cope with an awkward type of de-
fence in difficult terrain. On their side the infantry might feel at a disadvantage without im-
mediate and constant support from the tanks, and their objectives might appear impossi-
ble, or at best attainable only at an intolerable price.
In order to overcome the first of these disadvantages, the one relating to unsupported ar-
mour, the protagonists of mechanization - General Fuller, Martel, Liddell Hart and others
33
- advocated reinforcing the all-tank units by infantry and artillery mounted on perma-
nently assigned armoured vehicles, together with mechanized engineers, and signals,
support and supply elements.

This reasoning engendered the instructions published in 1927 under the title Provisional
Instruction for Tank and Armoured Car Training, Part 2, and also the Experimental Mech-
anized Brigade which was set up in the same year. This formation was composed of

92

tanks and mechanized infantry and artillery, and was organized into a reconnaissance
group consisting of: one company of light tanks; two companies of armoured scouting ve-
hicles; a main group comprising one battalion of medium tanks, one towed motorized
field artillery detachment, one light battery on self-propelled carriages, one machine-gun
battalion, one engineer company and one signals company. In 1928 the brigade was
des-ignated the 'Armoured Force'. This body represented the first ever experiment with a
completely modern tactical formation, which was powered by the internal combustion en-
gine alone, and which did not possess a single horse. It was intended to secure the co-
operation of the conventional arms with the tank forces, and the solution was to motorize
the older elements completely - indeed totally mechanize some of them - enabling them
to follow the tanks at speed on the march and on the battlefield, or at least as far as ene-
my action permitted. The instructions just mentioned laid down the guidelines for the de-
ployment of tanks within the novel formation, and ensured full freedom of action for future
developments. However it appears that the mechanical developments at that time did not
keep pace with the conceptual ones, at least to judge by some of the difficulties which
arose on exercises. As a result there was something of a reaction concerning the deploy-
ment of tanks, which was the central issue.
In 1929 on the initiative of the General Staff, two experimental infantry brigades were
formed. These consisted of a light tank battalion, a mortar company, and three battalions
of infantry which normally marched on foot, but which could be transported on trucks if
the need arose. In other words, mechanized forces and marching infantry were combined
in a formation of pretty small dimensions. A number of exercises in the following years
re-vealed shortcomings, notably that the tanks forfeited speed as a consequence of
being tied so closely to the infantry.
34
In 1932 an all-armoured force took the field on exercise. The year 1934 saw the estab-
lishment of an armoured formation which for the first time was reinforced by comple-
ments of all the other arms to provide a tank brigade consisting of: one light and three
mixed battalions; one truck-borne infantry brigade of three battalions; one armoured re-
connaissance detachment of three companies; four batteries of light artillery; two anti-air-
craft batteries; one signals, one engineer and one medical company, and a supply train.
The command of this force was entrusted to a general who had little experience in the
handling of tanks, and who showed a certain lack of assurance in the way he went about
his work. Snags arose in both the scenario and the direction of the manoeuvres. The op-
eration supposed a raid in the rear of a hostile army. The force accomplished the very
considerable march demanded of it and duly arrived in the enemy rear where, however, it
failed to carry out any particularly bold strokes. The command was simply too cautious,
and as a result not a great deal was learned about the tactical handling of the force, and
35
still less about the actual direction of combat. All the same the lessons seemed to point
in a single direction, to judge by what followed in December 1935, when the entire British
cavalry was united with the tank brigade in the 'Mechanized Mobile Division', except for
regiments designated as divisional reconnaissance detachments. Although the names of
the old cavalry regiments were retained for the sake of tradition, the decision signified the
complete transformation of army-level cavalry into an armoured force. The revolution af-
fected not only the British regular army in England, but extended to the forces overseas,
36
and above all the troops in Egypt.

The 'Mechanized Mobile Division' comprises two mechanized cavalry brigades each of
one armoured reconnaissance regiment, one motorized cavalry (rifle) regiment and one
light regiment of cavalry tanks, together with the existing four-battalion tank brigade and
a corresponding number of artillery batteries and supporting services. It has incorporated
the bulk of the tank forces of the British Expeditionary Force in a well-articulated forma-

93

tion capable of operational deployment. In addition the British seem to be planning to set
37
up further tank battalions which will be at the disposal of the individual armies, and
whose main task is said to be co-operation with the infantry. At the time of writing two
such battalions already exist. According to the most recent reports the British intend to in-
crease their tank forces to a total of fourteen battalions.

To sum up, the post-war developments in Britain indicate the concentration of the greater
part of the tank forces, including the former cavalry regiments, into an operational forma-
tion under unified command, and we can also identify the intention to create further tank
units under army command for co-operation with the infantry. If we categorize the former
cavalry regiments as battalions (which matches their combat power), the Mechanized
Mobile Division is made up of two reconnaissance battalions, three light and two mixed
tank battalions, and two rifle battlions, with artillery and supporting services. The empha-
sis in the armament of the division is plainly with the tank forces.
Within the tank units we can distinguish between light armoured reconnaissance battal-
ions, which are equipped with the necessary reconnaissance vehicles, and light and
mixed combat tank battalions. In the light battalions the companies each comprise
seven-teen light tanks and two or three close-support tanks; in the mixed battalions they
contain six medium and seven light tanks, and two or three close-support tanks.
The combination of light, medium and close-support tanks within the same company per-
mits a very fluid conduct of the battle, with the armoured self-propelled artillery keeping
up with the attack, and guaranteeing fire support for the light and medium tanks when
they are engaged in close-range combat. The tank attack therefore becomes independ-
ent of the support from conventional artillery, which can follow the advance of tanks only
as far as the gunners can keep their progress under observation. The way their
armoured forces are arranged leads to the conclusion that the British intend to entrust
their tanks with tasks extending deep into the enemy rear, and therefore to endow even
the smallest units with considerable freedom of action.
The French have chosen a different path from the British in every respect. In 1918 they
were relieved of the immediate threat from their eastern neighbours, and yet they re-
tained their massive level of armaments, which they saw as a potent means of enforcing
their policies on their defenceless former enemies. One of the consequences was that
their tactics and their operational objectives were largely shaped by the vast quantity of

94

equipment which remained from 1918, and its technical capacities. Thus the French tank
forces retained the light Renault (No. 10) as their main vehicle - a slow, short-ranged ma-
chine which was destined mainly for immediate co-operation with the infantry. However,
the potential enemy was weak and virtually devoid of anti-tank capability, and the French
tactical notions seemed to promise victory within a reasonably short time.
The one immediate shortcoming was the fact that the Renault had only limited climbing,
obstacle-crossing and wading ability, and was therefore unsuitable for attacking positions
in difficult terrain. For decisive victory in this context the need was not so much for
speedy, wide-ranging tank forces in the operational dimension, as large, heavy tanks
which could meet those specific technical requirements. This was probably why at the
end of the war the French took over a number of heavy British Mark Vs, and continued
the development of new types of heavy tanks which had been proposed by Estienne dur-
ing the war. The weight of these machines grew from 50 to 69, and again from 74 to 92
tons. The Char D could climb at 45 degrees, surmount an obstacle three metres high,
cross a gap six metres wide, and wade to a depth of 3.5 metres - these are capabilities
which must be taken into account by works of fortification with any claim to be secure
against tanks. It hardly needs to be said that the French designated these armoured
monsters as 'defensive weapons'. When the proposal was made at the Geneva disarma-
ment conference to ban all offensive weapons, the French proposed that heavy assault
tanks should be defined as beginning only at more than 92 tons.

As long as the French were dealing with a defenceless Germany, they could be confident
enough about the shape their own offensive tactics ought to take: in the last war most in-
fantry attacks had been broken by the defensive fire of machine-guns, but now the ma-
chine-guns would be tackled by the light tanks, with the mass assault by infantry follow-
ing immediately behind. The strong defensive positions would be overcome mainly by the
heavy breakthrough tanks, which would make the breaches for the penetration.
It soon became clear, however, that the chief threat to the breakthrough was presented
by motorized reserves; that being so, motorized assault troops were needed to exploit
the initial success. The shortage of military manpower in the post-war years ruled out the
setting up of completely new formations, and indicated instead the partial or total trans-
formation of the forces that were least able to meet the demands of modern warfare in ef-
fectiveness and striking power, namely the cavalry. In about 1923 the French began ex-
periments to convert their cavalry to a motorized and up-to-date force. This process de-
veloped in a number of directions, which are not always easy for us to trace.
Operational or long-range reconnaissance was clearly beyond the capability of mounted
scouts. The answer lay in the multi-wheeled armoured reconnaissance vehicles which
were produced by the firm of Berliet. Armoured reconnaissance vehicles were also suit-
able for tactical, or close-range reconnaissance when the rearward wheels were replaced
by tracks, which increased cross-country mobility. Such half-tracks or hermaphrodites
are represented by the Citroen-Kegresse and the Panhard-Kegresse (No. 28), which are
of particular significance in the development of French armoured vehicles. They are also
used to transport the motorized infantry, the Dragons portes, who are intended to support
the armoured reconnaissance vehicles.
After a period of evolution which extended over several years, the French experiments fi-
nally produced in 1932 the new Type 32 Cavalry Division, which consists of two mounted
and two motorized brigades, in addition to the armoured reconnaissance units. As far as
we can ascertain this type of division consists of: Divisional headquarters, with an aerial
and photographic detachment; Two cavalry brigades of two regiments apiece, each regi-
ment comprising one headquarters squadron, four mounted squadrons, one machine-
gun squadron, and one supporting weapons squadron;

95
One motorized brigade of one
tank regiment, and one regi-
ment of three battalions of
Dragons portes'.

One artillery regiment of two

light detachments and one
heavy detachment; Engineers,
signals units, anti-tank weap-
ons and supporting services.
The division's tank regiment,
listed above, is composed of a
motorized reconnaissance de-
tachment of motor-cycles and
twelve armoured reconnais-
sance vehicles, and a tank de-
tachment of twenty reconnais-
sance vehicles and twenty-four
reconnaissance tanks, produc-
ing a total ratio of combat to re-
 connaissance vehicles of 24 :
32. The division numbers some
13,000 men, 4,000 horses,
1,5SO motorized vehicles and
38
800 motor-cycles.

The constitution of the Cavalry

Division was tested in the course
of several years of exer-cises
and large-scale manoeu-

vres. Despite all the assurances that had been given by the enthusiasts of the noble
horse, the combination of animal and engine proved of more harm than benefit for mili-
tary purposes. If the motorized element went ahead of the other forces they won ground
which was of theoretically great use for the attack and established early contact with the
enemy; but then they had to wait a long time, often too long, for the mounted brigades to
come up, and before that happened the precious ground was liable to be given up again,
frequently with large losses of valuable equipment. A number of officers concluded that
the advantages of powered vehicles must be exploited to the full, and they urged repeat-
edly that motorizing the entire division would make it far more effective. A more immedi-
ate way of bringing together horse and engine was to send the cavalry brigades out first,,
and hold back the motorized brigade in reserve until the focal point of the battle had been
identified and the brigade could intervene. In practice the procedures turned out to be too
complicated for the short distance which the motorized force often had to cover, and the
cavalry units could have done the same more effectively. In addition the pace of the
whole division was tied to that of the horse. Table

These were the reasons why as early as 1933 the French had begun experimenting with
a fully mechanized division, and the result was the Division legere mechanique. We do
not have precise details of how it is organized, though in outline it is made up of the fol-
lowing elements: Divisional headquarters, with auxiliary elements and aerial detach-
ments; One armoured regiment for reconnaissance; One tank brigade for combat; One
dragoon brigade on motor vehicles;
One artillery regiment of two light detachments and one heavy detachment; Engineers,

96

signals and rear service personnel.

The total strength stands at about 13,000 men and 3,500 powered vehicles (including
1,000 motor-cyles). The division has about 250 tanks, of which approximately 90 are for
39
combat and the rest for tactical and operational reconnaissance. In contrast the Type
32 Division has 56 tanks, of which 24 are for combat.
The Type 32 Division has itself undergone detailed reviews, which have resulted in a
second Type 32 Division being converted to a fully motorized division, with a third divi-
sion to follow in 1937.
We have seen enough to recognize that the divisional establishments of reconnaissance
vehicles are very high in proportion to those of combat vehicles. It is fair to conclude that
the Division legere mechanique is destined primarily for reconnaissance tasks and is un-
suitable for serious combat - an imbalance which is the legacy of the origins of the divi-
sions in the cavalry. It is an open question how long this state of affairs will last, but the
weakness of the structure has undoubtedly been recognized, as is shown by a speech by
the Minister of War Daladier, announcing that in 1937 France intended to experiment
with a heavy tank division - in other words one that was capable of offensive action. Da-
ladier made his standpoint clear in the following passages:
Traddition to the army of the people - the conscript army - do we not stand in need of a
professional army or a special force of tank divisions, composed exclusively of long-serv-
ing soldiers? There are some who envisage this body as a force capable of immediate
action, a shock army. Others welcome it as a means of shortening the term of active con-
script service, or eventually doing away with it altogether.
'But at root we all strive for speed and striking power.
'It has already been mentioned from this platform how in 1933, in full agreement with the
High Command, I created the first Division legere mechanique. A second is in the proc-
ess of formation, and a third will follow.
All three divisions will consist of fully trained men and have the necessary means of
transport fully under their command.
'It is my belief that the light divisions must be supplemented by a number of heavy divi-
sions. We will undertake a number of very important experiments with this division at the
end of the coming summer [1937],
'We need a much more specialized army. We must have various kinds of divisions for
various tasks. In all of these momentous questions I am in full agreement with the High
Command, which is just as determined as I am to furnish the French Army with every-
thing that modern technology has to offer.' (France Militaire, No. 16, 565-6.)
Nearly all armies cling to the notion that operational reconnaissance must be carried out
by cavalry divisions or by their successors, the light mechanized divisions. But is not this
concept outmoded or plainly wrong? The original cavalry divisions were never intended
exclusively for reconnaissance. When Napoleon I, their creator, set up divisions of cuir-
assiers, dragoons and light cavalry, he destined the first two exclusively for combat roles,
and only the light divisions primarily for operational reconnaissance. In the nineteenth
century European cavalry was intended, organized and trained for decision in battle - an
objective which was rarely attained, since breech-loading rifles appeared in the mean-
time and made the cavalry incapable of winning battles by cold steel. In the campaigns of
1866 and 1870-1 cavalry achieved very little in the shape of operational reconnaissance,
perhaps because of its imbalanced peacetime training. Only after the failure of cold steel
in the battle-winning role did there arise the desire and (because of the attachment to
sword and lance) also the need to find new purposes for cavalry.
Operational reconnaissance was recognized as one such task - and there was some-
thing to be said for it before aircraft and tanks were invented. But it is questionable

97

whether there was any need to employ whole divisions or even whole cavalry corps for
this purpose, especially when they were organied in such a way that every element was
capable of the reconnaissance role, but not a single one of them had enough combat po-
tential, by which we mean firepower, to break any kind of serious resistance. It might
have been better to destine only part of the cavalry regiments for reconnaissance, with
the appropriate training and equipment, leaving the greater part of the division for the
combat role. This notion would have led to the constitution of specialized reconnaissance
regiments with light armament and a small complement of vehicles, but good means of
communication, and distinct combat regiments and brigades with plenty of heavy arma-
ment, plenty of ammunition and a sufficiency of artillery. In all likelihood the cavalry in the

World War would have been better at combat and reconnaissance than it actually was.
Perhaps the cavalrymen should have rid themselves of the idea that reconnaissance was
their private kingdom, and paid more attention to building up their combat power - which
again might have resulted in the formation of more solid and usable cavalry divisions be-
fore the war.
If we follow our chain of reasoning to the present time, we must raise the question
whether it has been a good idea to fit our large mechanized formations primarily with re-
connaissance vehicles, at the expense of their effectiveness in serious combat. Our res-
ervations appear all the more justified since operational reconnaissance must fall chiefly
to the air forces, since they can reach more deeply into the enemy rear and work more
speedily than ground reconnaissance. Operational ground reconnaissance should there-
fore be seen as a supplement to aerial reconnaissance. Europe is a relatively small thea-
tre of war, and this work can therefore be carried out by small, but fast-moving and com-
bat-capable reconnaissance forces, which can receive rapid support in case of need from
the mechanized combat formations.
It is clear from Monsieur Daladier's address that the development of equipment and the
fitting out of their forces have progressed sufficiently far to enable the French to proceed
with full-scale field trials with a heavy tank division - in other words a division furnished
mainly with battle tanks.
A number of authorities have emphasized for a considerable time that the technical de-
velopment of the tank must be expressed in tactical and operational terms that match its
capability, and the French too will come to recognize this truth. The Future will surely tri-
umph over the Perpetual Yesterday, and more specificially over post-war training regula-
tions which were compiled under conditions which no longer obtain. The Division de
choc proposed by Charles de Gaulle in 1934 (Vers I'armee de metier, Paris) is
40
approaching reality.

We are sufficiently acquainted with the industrial performance and military aptitude of the
French to be in no danger of underestimating our western neighbours. It would therefore
be as well to reckon before long on the appearance of heavy French tank divisions, built
around a core of modern tanks, equipped with light, medium and even heavy artillery,
and possibly the necessary motorized support in the shape of reconnaissance, infantry,
gunners, engineers and auxiliary services.
Our review of the French armoured forces leads to the following conclusions. The arm-
oured equipment remaining from the last war was technically primitive and would have
been usable only in close co-operation with the infantry and on good ground. It predi-
cated also a likely enemy who was denied anti-tank weapons, tanks and motorized battle
worthy reserves. As long as these conditions prevailed the French were sure of winning
through, even if they attacked in a slow and methodical way, and their pace was tied to
that of the infantry. The only snags might have been caused by encountering natural or
artificial obstacles that were beyond the capacity of the light Renault tanks. In such cases
 98

the French intended to use an appropriate number of heavy breakthrough tanks.

The rearmament of Germany changed the picture almost overnight. The predominance
of the French tanks came to an abrupt end, and the French had to reckon first with seri-
ous anti-tank defence, then with hostile tank forces, and finally with large self-contained
motorized and mechanized formations. This was a death blow to the theory and practice
of keeping the tanks bound to the infantry, and scattering them more or less evenly
among the attacking units. Where was the sense in spreading tanks over the frontage of
the offensive when anti-tank defence could spring up anywhere, taking a toll of the ar-
mour when the attack was confined by the terrain into a few narrow avenues of ap-
proach? Was there not a need for speed if one was to exploit success and prevent the
41
enemy from focusing their forces on the threatened spot and counter-attacking?

The French Minister for War and the high command were therefore acting quite sensibly
when they converted their cavalry to mechanized forces. Proceeding with the same logic,
they are now concentrating their heavily armed and heavily armoured tanks into heavy
armoured divisions, the Divisions de choc.
'Once tanks became considerably faster than infantry, the limited concept of tanks as in-
fantry support was gradually replaced by the notion of large mechanized formations.
They are not confined to breakthrough battle tanks in the narrow sense. They also incor-
porate reconnaissance elements, and cross-country transport to carry the necessary
min-imum of infantry and artillery immediately behind the tanks, so as to secure the
ground which the armour has conquered. The newly acquired characteristic of the tank,
its speed, can be exploited at the first blow. It is now possible to think of employing large
mechanized formations independently.
'Here is something new to match the tactics of the present day, and here also lies the
possibility of restoring mobility to warfare.
'The large mechanized formations are the real instrument of the offensive . . . Striking-
power and speed open a new world of possibilities.' (Lieutenant-Colonel Langon, in La
Francemilitaire, 1937, No. 178.)
If it is a question of breaking an enemy force in full defensive posture, then in future the
heavy tank divisions will open the way for their lighter brothers, and the motorized and
horse-drawn formations will follow. If, however, there is a considerable distance between
the two belligerents, and it is a matter of enveloping and turning movements, the light
tank divisions can hasten ahead and secure important features of the ground, and fix and
hold up hostile troop movements and strike at the enemy communications, thereby facili-
tating the advance and deployment of the heavy tank and motorized divisions. In any
case the opening encounters will be carried out in co-operation with tanks, where the lo-
calities are suitable, and as the battle goes on the armoured forces will increase in signifi-
cance rather than diminish.
At the beginning of 1937 French possessed rather more than 3,000 light and heavy
pieces of artillery (excluding fortress and anti-tank guns) and more than 4,500 tanks;
which means that the number of tanks exceeds by a wide margin the number of guns,
even in the peacetime army. No other country shows such a disproportion between ar-
mour and artillery. Figures like these give us food for thought!
The tank forces in Russia developed on different lines from those in Britain and France.
In the World War the mighty Russian army had no tanks; it did not have the indigenous
industry to manufacture its own machines, and geographical isolation prevented it import-
ing tanks from its allies. Only in the Civil War did a few tanks fall into Russian hands. The
absence of armour meant that in the war against Poland a large force of cavalry was able
to play a decisive role under the energetic leadership of Budenny, admittedly against an
enemy who was badly led and had little defensive capacity.

99

After the Civil War Russia addressed itself with urgency to the task of building an indige-
nous armaments industry. This process inevitably extended over many years because of
a total lack of direction and expertise; but now it must be regarded as largely complete.

Over the same period the Russians studied the progress that foreigners were making in
every field of technology, and how they might copy it. Tanks and their auxiliary weapons
also came under this scrutiny.
The Russian practice was to buy and test the leading models of foreign tanks, and then
42
build reproductions adapted as necessary to Russian conditions and requirements.
The same freedom from tradition and technical preconceptions is shown in the way the
Rus-sians have developed their tactics. As far as we can judge from outside, every one
of their twenty-three armoured corps has a regiment of battle tanks, quite apart from
further regiments which stand at the disposal of higher levels of command. A number of
auxiliary forces have also been set up - motorized infantry divisions and rifle brigades,
towed and self-propelled artillery, reconnaissance and other motorized units - though it is
not yet possible to identify permanent groupings in large formations.

On the other hand we can form a reasonably good picture of how the Russians intend to
employ these modern forces of theirs. The evidence comes from military literature and
the reports of their various exercises. 'A decisive success', in the words of Kryshanovsky,
'is attainable only through the simultaneous destruction of the main enemy deployment to
its entire depth, in both tactical and operational dimensions. This demands the action of
strong, fast-moving forces which possess great striking power and mobility.' (M. J. Kurt-
zinski, Taktik schneller Verbande, Potsdam.) The Russians seek to put the principle of
the simultaneous destruction of the whole deployment into practical effect through the
way they will arrange their 'motor mechanized' forces for the attack. To this end they dis-
tinguish between three kinds of formation:
1. NPP = Immediate Infantry Support;
2. DPP = Long-range Infantry Support;
3. DD = Long-range Forces.
The NPP Forces are built around the 6-ton Vickers-Armstrong-Ruskii AT 26 tank, which
is armed with a 59mm gun and two machine-guns, and is proof against armour-piercing
small-arms ammunition. Twenty-six of these tanks at a time will provide cover for 35 ma-
chine-gun tanks, the Vickers-Carden-Loyd-Russky T 27, which is lightly armoured but
has good climbing capability. The establishment of NPP tanks is completed by twenty
light BA 27 tanks with a 37mm gun, and a few little 'Bronieford' tanks. The designation
'Immediate Infantry Support' sums up the purpose of these forces. To fulfil their mission,
however, they need the protection of tanks of a more formidable kind, which can smash
through strong positions and eliminate the artillery and anti-tank defences. This work is
assigned to the DPP formations.
The Long-range Infantry Support Forces are built around heavy breakthrough tanks
(Types M I and M II), which have a 75mm gun as their primary armament, together with
one or two armour-piercing guns of smaller calibre and some machine-guns. For their
light armour the DPP forces are equipped with a number of Vickers-Armstrong-Russky 6-
tonners and Vickers-Carden-Loyd amphibious tanks.
Once the DPP and NPP forces have succeded in breaking through the enemy front and
pinning down the defenders, the DD forces will exploit and, with plentiful air support, ad-
vance against the enemy command centres, reserves, lines of communication and rear-
ward installations. For this purpose they have a particularly fast tank, which they have
adapted from an American design, namely the Christie-Russky 34 (No. 23) with its 47mm
gun and single machine-gun. The armour is pretty thin, but the vehicle has a range of
400 kilometres, and a speed of 110 kilometres per hour on wheels and 60 on tracks. Alto-

100

gether the Christie-Russky is a particularly well-designed and tested machine. In addition

the DPP units are equipped with a large number of armoured reconnaissance vehicles
and 6-wheel Ford amphibious variants armed with 37mm guns and machine-guns.

Basically there is something to be said for the way the Russians have organized their
forces: rapid and long-ranged tanks to operate in the enemy depth; heavily armoured
tanks with heavy guns to do battle with the enemy tanks, anti-tank weapons and artillery
on the main battlefield; light tanks mostly armed with machine-guns to clear the infantry
combat zone. On the other hand the triple classification of tasks demands a whole inven-
tory of specialized tanks, with all the attendant disadvantages.
The number of Russian tanks is put at 10,000 machines, and the armoured reconnais-
sance vehicles at 1,200. These are figures of an impressive order, not least because the
43
armour will be acting in co-operation with a powerful and modern air force, and it will
gain added potency if the Russians manage to bring their road and rail network into a
usable condition. In 1936 large-scale exercises were held in the Belorussian and Mos-
cow Military Districts. The object was to test the co-ordination of the motor-mechanized
forces with the infantry and cavalry divisions, but especially with the air force, which for
the first time carried out major descents of air-landed troops in the enemy rear under the
protection of paratroops - seeking to tie down enemy reserves, or to complete envelop-
ments by the ground forces. On the same occasion a number of specially adapted air-
craft transported and landed light armour.

A number of foreign powers have taken up the idea of paratroops and air-landed forces
from the Russians. Opinions are as divided as to their usefulness as they are on the sub-
ject of tanks. Some authorities treat them as a joke; others say that Central Europe is so
densely populated that air drops and landings will be pinpointed, brought under attack
and neutralized in short order. But, as with all innovations in the field of military technol-
ogy, it is unwise to jump to conclusions before undertaking a serious examination of the
pros and cons of new forces and the necessary countermeasures. Otherwise there will
be some painful surprises in store when it comes to real combat.
Russia possesses the strongest army in the world, numerically and in terms of the mod-
ernity of its weapons and equipment. The Russians have the world's largest air force as
well, and they are striving to bring their navy up to the same level. The transport system
is still inadequate, but they are working hard in that direction also. Russia has ample raw
materials, and a mighty armaments industry has been set up in the depths of that vast
empire. The time has passed when the Russians had no instinct for technology; we will
have to reckon on the Russians being able to master and build their own machines, and
with the fact that such a transformation in the Russians' fundamental mentality confronts
44
us with the Eastern Question in a form more serious than ever before in history.

We have seen how since 1918 the tactical development of armoured forces in the three
most important military states of Europe has followed the technical development only
step by step, and has sometimes lagged behind. It proved difficult - especially in official
circles in Britain and France — for the authorities to free themselves from conceptions in-
herited from the past, or hammered home during four years of static warfare. Not infre-
quently the forces of reaction proved to be stronger than the urge to progress. No wonder
that the smaller states, with their limited resources, chose to wait and see how the organ-
ization and deployment of armoured forces shaped up elsewhere. These states are
therefore irrelevant to our purpose. It is a different story with the development and
present state of anti-tank defence, which have an immediate bearing on our investiga-
tions.

101

Anti-tank defence

Germany's decision not to build tanks relieved the enemy Alliance of the need to provide
for anti-tank defence in the years from 1916 to 1918; the Germans on their side underes-
timated the importance of the new tank weapon in general, which meant that they too ne-
glected anti-tank defence. The consequence was that Germany was beaten.

Having identified the causes of that defeat, Germany's first concern was to cast about for
means of defence against its potential enemies — they were armed with tanks and they
were lurking on every side. We therefore looked into the whole question of anti-tank de-
fence, and took a number of practical measures as a result. In its turn the restoration of
German military sovereignty - and with it the certainty that Germany would acquire tanks
— has meant that for several years now the other powers too have had to look hard at
45
defence against tanks. We will first examine the basic principles.
Nature herself offers the most effective protection against tanks, though she does not
necessarily offer it in every location and at all seasons of the year. Steep slopes, broad
and deep waters, ditches, and dense and tall woodlands may present absolute barriers
to tanks; the ground behind such obstacles is termed 'tank-proof (Panzersicher). Less
pronounced obstacles will make the movement of tanks more slow and difficult; built-up
areas too may have the effect of holding up tanks, and providing good protection behind
walls and in houses and cellars. Such terrain is described as 'restricted for tanks' (Pan-
zerhemmend). Open, lightly wooded country with variable cover tends to facilitate the
armoured attack, and is called 'favourable for tanks' (Panzergünstig).
The defenders will strive to exploit 'tank-proof terrain for their own purposes, siting their
defences there, or using it to support one or both of their flanks. 'Restricted' terrain is
eas-ier to find; it is a considerable asset to anti-tank defence, and it increases the time in
which the anti-tank weapons can take their effect. Sometimes the engineers will be able
to make conditional obstacles into absolute ones, for example by scarping slopes and
ditches, creating inundations and swamps, making abatis of sufficient height, breadth
and depth around the edges of woods. Artificial obstacles can be established in open ter-
rain in the form of iron rails embedded in concrete, and stakes, concrete walls, concrete
pyramids, rolls of wire and mines.
However Nature is not always lavish in providing 'tank-proof or even 'restricted' terrain;
the availability of time, labour, materials and munitions will limit the extent of artificial ob-
stacles and how far we can adapt the ground, and the effectiveness of such barriers is in
any case conditioned by how well they are concealed and what kind of resistance they
can present to obstacle-clearing parties. Also the military task and situation might leave
the defenders with no option but to make a stand in terrain that favours tanks. All of this
means that defending troops need armour-piercing weapons, otherwise they might find
themselves in a situation like that of the German infantry in 1918, defenceless and faced
with an impossible task. Even if frontal attacks are ruled out, the enemy might still break
through on a neighbouring sector and present a sudden threat to a flank. Effective anti-
tank weapons are consequently an essential part of the equipment of all forces, but the
infantry in particular.
Anti-tank weapons can be accounted completely effective only if they act speedily
enough to smash the enemy attack before it can reach the main line of infantry defence.
If the attack is contained at a later stage it will only be at the cost of heavy casualties
among the infantry, and perhaps also their complete destruction - a case of 'the
operation was successful but the patient died'. Infantry anti-tank weapon's must therefore
be light and compact enough to be used in the front line, but sufficiently responsive and
long-ranged to halt the attack in the way just outlined.
We will take some figures as an example. Enemy tanks are launching an attack at a

102

speed of 12 kilometres per hour, covering 1,000 metres in five minutes. Let us suppose
that the defenders have a gun which can get off eight aimed rounds a minute at an effec-
tive range of 600 metres; placed at the forward edge of the infantry combat zone, such a
weapon can fire 24 rounds before the tanks break into the position; this figure rises to 40
rounds for a weapon with an effective range of 1,000 metres. The corresponding figures
for an automatic weapon, firing in short bursts, are 100 rounds per minute instead of 8,
which produces 300 rounds at an effective range of 600 metres, and 500 at an effective
range of 1,000 metres. Calibre for calibre, the automatic weapon's greater volume of fire
must nevertheless be bought at the price of heavier and bulkier gun and ammunition.

In the British peacetime army the fourth battalions of their infantry brigades have motor-
ized anti-tank companies equipped with sixteen automatic cannon of 20mm calibre.
France has introduced automatic 25mm cannon, and every infantry battalion is to be as-
signed three guns of this kind towed by tractors (No. 21). Germany has 37mm guns (No.
43) towed by a 6-wheeled powered vehicle. A variety of lighter anti-tank weapons of
12mm and greater, the so-called 'anti-tank rifles' (Tankbüchseri), are currently under de-
velopment; served by a small detachment, they are of approximately the same dimen-
sions as machine-guns but are capable of piercing armour only at short range. It seems
that no final decision has yet been taken whether to introduce weapons of this sort into
service, though the British are conducting trials with a 12mm anti-tank rifle which weighs
16 kilograms, has a rate of fire of between six and eight rounds a minute, and is effective
against light armour up to 450 metres. (Militär-Wochenblatt, 1937, No. 48.)
It would be wrong to conclude from this that infantry are now able to overcome the threat
from armour. It is well within the capacity of military technology to produce tanks that give
full protection against weapons of such a calibre, and yet have full motorized mobility and
do not exceed the load limits of road bridges. Such tanks already exist, notably in
France. The weapons mentioned above will be ineffective against an assault by heavy
tanks of this kind, and if the enemy choose to put heavy tanks in their first wave they will
not only wipe out the light anti-tank defences, but allow a swarm of light tanks to come
forward; these, being invulnerable to armour-piercing rounds of small-arms calibre, will
finish off the infantry as well as complete the breakthrough.
This danger may be countered by introducing anti-tank guns of heavy calibre. They are
already under development. Indeed we have a report (Militdr-Wochenblatt, 1937, No. 46)
of a British vehicle-drawn, Vickers 75mm anti-tank gun of this kind. The carriage permits
an all-round traverse, and the gun fires a 6.5kg round with an initial muzzle velocity of
595 metres per second and a muzzle pressure of 117 metric tons. The duel between
artil-lery and armour has existed for some time in naval and siege warfare, and it has
now spread to tank combat, and it will extend inevitably to war in the air. But, just as we
should not stop building warships, fortresses and aircraft simply because of the armour-
piercing capacity of heavy and super-heavy guns, so the undeniable strength of anti-tank
defence does not mean that that the building of tanks has become of no purpose on this
account. If we fell in with that line of argument we would have to agree that General Dou-
het's conclusion was valid generally, and not just for Italy, when he argued that air forces
alone retain the capacity for offensive action, and land forces will have to content them-
selves with standing on the defensive. Douhet's views have in fact been hotly contested,
and especially by those who stress that land warfare is as decisive as ever it was, and
that land forces still have adequate offensive capability. If we wrote off armour as a bat-
tle-winning instrument we would simply be back in the position of the Germans between
1916 and 1918, when they renounced the use of tanks. In fact it would spell the end of
successful offensive action in ground warfare.
Let us return to the contest between tank and gun, and apply it to our own circumstan-

103

ces. We must do everything we can to promote anti-tank defence, and work just as hard
to guarantee successful counter-attacks through the instrument of powerful tank forces of
our own. Logically, from the standpoint of the defender, we need guns and ammunition
capable of combating the most formidable types of tank known. Our existing heavy ord-
nance has range and penetrating power in plenty, but it lacks the mobility and speed to
meet a surprise attack by heavy breakthrough tanks; it is also deficient in rapidity of re-
sponse and traverse, and its sighting mechanism is unsuitable for tracking fast-moving
targets. The current medium and heavy artillery therefore has a reasonable, but by no
means assured, chance of success against heavy breakthrough tanks. The lesson is that
we need new types of guns.

Mines are another valuable asset of anti-tank defence. They can be laid at short notice in
the requisite breadth and depth, and they can be readily concealed in any fairly broken
ground. This kind of defence will be by no means easy for the enemy tank forces to iden-
tify, and they will suffer heavy losses if they do not carry out proper reconnaissances,
and have not been able to clear lanes through the minefields by artillery fire or mine-
clearance parties. All of this makes the mine a formidable enemy to the tank.
The use of mines is restricted by the stocks available, and still more by the precautionary
measures which the existence of minefields inevitably imposes on the defending troops.
Extensive minefields are in fact a severe limitation on the defenders' freedom of move-
ment. Irregular groupings of mines and the scattering of individual mines avert this dan-
ger in the short term, but they still represent a danger to our own troops. The actual loca-
tion of the mines is usually known only to the engineers who have laid them. The other
arms are generally less well informed, especially if there are frequent changes in the
troops who are holding the positions in question. This disadvantage becomes all the
more marked for the defenders in the case of mobile warfare, even when they are on the
retreat and do not intend to consolidate on a new line.
To sum up, anti-tank defence is founded on the natural or artificial obstacles which the
ground presents to armour, on the additional obstructions that we lay across the area of
the attack in the form of mines, and on the fire of anti-tank guns of various calibres. We
can therefore distinguish between two main categories of anti-tank defence:
rigid, immobile forms which are conditioned by the ground, or are strongly
emplaced;
mobile weapons that are designed to meet the situation in almost any terrain.
Both forms must be exploited. In the sectors where we intend to limit ourselves to the de-
fensive, the static types can be employed in systematic barriers of the kind we find in
modern defensive systems; the mobile forces can act as reinforcements and mobile re-
serves for the static defences, but in addition they will be able to move swiftly to offer a
defence wherever it might be needed in unfortified ground. The static forms emphasize
terrain, systematic reconnaissance, and the availability of labour, materials and time; the
mobile forms depend on the existence of suitable defensive forces, but will spring into ac-
tion whenever and wherever the call comes.
Anti-tank units and engineers are the most suitable forces for anti-tank defence, but for
combat against unarmoured troops they must be backed up by the firepower of machine-
guns - and if necessary artillery as well - and by reconnaissance and communications el-
ements. Thus, in addition to the anti-tank weapons which are incorporated permanently
in the divisional structure, there may also be blocking units (Sperrverbande) standing at
the disposal of the high command. Bearing in mind the nature of the attack, the prospect
of a successful defence may well hang upon the speed with which these forces can
move up and get into the fight. It is almost impossible to exaggerate the value of troops
of this kind - fast, endowed with strong defensive combat value, and specially trained and
equipped for their work.

104
The german mechanized forces

The era of the dummy tanks. military sovereignty

Germany's mechanized troops did not spring into being fully formed like Pallas Athena
from the forehead of Zeus. On the contrary, their evolution was a long-drawn-out story of
deprivation under the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, and they had to
contend - and contend still - with the opposition provoked in our own camp through their
sheer novelty and unfamiliarity.

Under the old War Ministry (Reichswehrministerium), the Inspectorate of Mechanized

Forces (Inspektion der Kraftfahrtruppen) was the only organ of the army responsible for
the concept of mechanization as a whole, and consequently of maintaining the tradition
of the weak German tank forces of the World War. In addition to the work of mechanizing
the army in general, the efforts of the Inspectorate extended in two directions. The first
was to explore the business of transporting troops by truck. A number of exercises were
arranged to this end, beginning with the Harz Exercise of 1921. This was directed by the
current Inspector, Major-General von Tschischwitz, and concerned the movement of a
single battalion. In later years a number of reinforced battalions and regiments were put
through a large number of trials - lengthy cross-country marches, and shorter ones in the
course of manoeuvres - and in the process the Inspectorate learned a great deal about
how to prepare and manage large-scale transport by truck.
The second direction involved the setting up of a core of tank troops, albeit under condi-
tions of the greatest difficulty. The Allies permitted us to have nothing more than the so-
called 'armoured trucks for the transportation of personnel' — by which the French and
British understood a goods truck with a sheet iron superstructure. After long negotiations
they finally permitted the armoured vehicle depicted in Plate 31, which had vertical sides
and no traversible turret or permanently mounted weapons. By devising a chassis with 4-
wheel drive and rear steering we were able to build a vehicle which had a certain value
for dealing with internal disorders in Germany, and, as we shall see, was usable in train-
ing. The armour proved to be too heavy for the chassis, without being proof against the
rifle-calibre armour-piercing round, and we were so short of resources that we were un-
able to build even the limited number of vehicles allowed by the terms of that disgraceful
treaty. All the same we put it to use in the first of
our officer training courses, when the machine saw service in a number of small-scale
exercises, especially in reconnaissance work. We acquired some useful lessons as a re-
sult. Here, indeed, was the first spark of inspiration for developing the motorized forces
into a proper tank arm, and it was never going to be extinguished.
Since the Treaty of Versailles forbade us to manufacture tracked vehicles, we had the
idea of building multi-wheeled vehicles which would have a certain amount of cross-
country mobility. We accordingly began to devise a number of 8- and 10-wheeled ma-
chines. However it was specified at the same time that the vehicles must be amphibious,
which led to some very complicated and bulky machines that were subject to a great
number of teething troubles. In spite of efforts extending over several years it proved im-
possible to build vehicles of this kind that could be of any use in war.
The same period saw the first projects for tanks with caterpillar tracks. Development went
ahead slowly, however, because the emphasis in the training of the mechanized troops
had to shift to logistic transportation.
A later Inspector, General von Vollard-Bockelberg, recognized how inefficient it was to
keep on training all the diverse elements of the mechanized forces as a single body-
tanks along with motor-cycles, columns of trucks, ambulances and so on. Instead he in-

105

stituted a separation of functions, though the work inevitably had to proceed under condi-
tions of the greatest secrecy, on account of the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Ver-
sailles.

Mock-ups were mounted on Hanomag chassis, and several companies of 'tanks' were
formed, and duly went through their paces with this forbidden weapon under the aston-
ished gaze of the other troops on exercises. Clumsy though they were, they showed the
need for effective anti-tank weapons, and kept alive a debate of sorts concerning tank
operations and anti-tank defence.
Motor-cyclists were concentrated in a Motor Cycle Rifle Company (Kraftradschiitzenkom-
pagnie), and in the manouevres of 1928 they were used for the first time in association
with the existing 'tanks' and mechanized infantry.
Courses were held for the officers of the mechanized forces, and they extended beyond
technicalities to the actual tactics, and the co-operation of the mechanized forces with the
other services. It was not long before limited numbers of officers of those arms were also
admitted to the courses.
In this and the following years the officers of the Kraftfahrlehrstab ( Motor Transport In-
structional Staff ) not only established uniform tactical and technical principles within their
own branch of the service, but engaged in detailed discussions which laid down the
guidelines for a rebuilding of the German tank forces - or at least as far as this was possi-
ble through theoretical studies and our practical exercises with the mock-ups. In later
years the Kraftfahrlehrstab became the foundation of the Kraft-fahrlehrschule (Mecha-
nized Forces Instructional School) of the new army.
General von Stülpnagel continued the work of organizing and training along the lines that
had been pioneered by his predecessors. The motorized detachments were reinforced
by a number of motorized squadrons comprising one company each of motor-cyles, arm-
oured reconnaissance vehicles, 'tanks' and anti-tank troops. Inevitably they were all still
equipped with dummy vehicles and wooden guns.
On 1 April 1931 the former chief of staff, General Lutz, was appointed Inspector of Motor-
ized Forces. His earlier career had been in the technical branches, and during the war he
had functioned as commander of the motor transport of one of our armies.
On instructions from army command, General Lutz conducted two sets of three exercises
each on the respective training areas of Grafenwohr and Juterbog. The purpose was to
train a dummy tank detachment in working with a reinforced infantry regiment, and to
gain some experience of antitank defence. These six exercises provided a useful
stimula-tion for the later build-up of our tank forces in general, as well as helping to set
the speci-fications for our future tanks and given the immediate impetus for a number of
design projects. Foreign literature and machines underwent careful examination, as a
means of tapping the experience of the other countries that had been constructing tanks
for the last sixteen years. All the same our later prototypes were not immune from
developmental problems, because one cannot replace long experience of building real
tanks by imitation or work on the drawing-board.
In the autumn of 1932 four motorized reconnaissance detachments and a composite mo-
tor-cyle battalion took part for the first time in the large-scale exercises. The organization
stood up very well, and the efforts of our new forces and their officers earned consider-
able applause. This cheered us no end, and we pushed ahead with the work of develop-
ment.
However there remained one obstacle - the fact that our military and political leadership
lacked the nerve to free itself from the Versailles restrictions. As far as our own arm was
concerned this decisive step was accomplished almost overnight, when executive power
was transferred to Adolf Hitler on 30 January 1933. The armour plates of our 'mock-ups'

106

became visibly stronger, and were now proof against the attentions of the street urchins
who used to amuse themselves by boring holes through them. The wooden guns were
banished. The reconnaissance detachments were increased to four companies each,
anti-tank detachments were organized in three companies, and we began experiments
with motorized infantry and tanks.
By 1 July 1934 the experimental work had attained such dimensions that it became nec-
essary to set up a special Command of the Tank Forces (Kommando der Panzertrup-
pen), which was entrusted to its first commanding general, Lieutenant-General Lutz, the
former Inspector. The task of the new command was to continue the experiments with
the mechanized forces, and explore and test the tactical structures that might put these
new formations to the most effective use. In the autumn of 1935 the various cogitations
and practical exercises culminated in large experimental manoeuvres at Munsterlager, of
which the most important result was the decision to establish three panzer (armoured) di-
visions. These were formed on 16 October 1935 under the overall authority of the Arm-
oured Forces, and command of the individual authorities was entrusted respectively to
Lieutenant-General Baron von Weichs, Lieutenant-General Fessmann and myself. The
tank and anti-tank forces, the motorized infantry and the reconnaissance detachments as
a whole were constituted as a new arm of the service under the designation of Motorized
l
Combat Forces (Kraftfahrkampftruppen). We shall now turn to the individual branches.

Armoured and motorized reconnaissance

The purpose of reconnaissance is to provide the commander with an accurate assess-

ment of what the enemy is doing; in effect information of this kind furnishes the basis for
command decisions. Reconnaissance is categorized according, to the means of collect-
ing intelligence into aerial reconnaissance, ground reconnaissance, signals intelligence
(telephonic, wireless and so on), information obtained through spies and other means.

The various agencies of intelligence are complementary, and, if one fails, another must
take its place. Military reconnaissance is further subdivided into the operational, tactical

107

and combat levels. Operational reconnaissance is a long-range affair which is at the

service of the high command, and is carried out primarily through the air forces. However
the air forces are unable to determine unconditionally whether such and such an area is
occupied or not. Good enemy camouflage, night and fog, bad weather, extensive moun-
tains and forests and large built-up areas can all render reconnaissance difficult or down-
right impossible. Aerial reconnaissance is incapable of keeping up a constant surveil-
lance, or of maintaining contact with the enemy. Aerial reconnaissance has undeniable
advantages - its difficulty of interception, its speed and its great range - but it cannot dis-
pense with the need for good ground-based reconnaissance.

It it is to be of any use, intelligence must reach the commander with the minimum of de-
lay, and speed and security are at a premium. That is why the horse has been replaced
by the motor vehicle, and especially for operational and tactical reconnaissance. By defi-
nition the scouts must keep ahead of the forces who are supposed to follow them.
Mounted reconnaissance is therefore suitable only for infantry divisions, and even here
there is a growing demand for motorized reconnaissance, because of improvements in
the cross-country mobility of vehicles.
Motorized ground reconnaissance is carried out by armoured reconnaissance vehicles.
Operational reconnaissance demands considerable range and speed on the part of the
vehicles, considerable combat power in terms of armament and armour, and long-range
wireless apparatus. Since operational reconnaissance is conducted mainly on roads, the
preference is for wheeled vehicles, which are given a measure of cross-country mobility
by multi-wheel drive and rear steering. In closer contact with the enemy, reconnaissance
is accomplished by light armoured vehicles or motor-cycles. Half-tracks or wheel-track
convertibles are suitable for tactical reconnaissance, which calls for greater cross-country
mobility, and combat reconnaissance is answered mainly by tracked vehicles. Most of
the armoured reconnaissance vehicles have armoured-piercing guns.
Several armoured reconnaissance vehicles together make up an armoured reconnais-
sance troop (Panzerspähtrupp), though the actual strength and composition is deter-
mined by the task, and engineers, motorized infantry and heavy weapons may be at-
tached as the need arises. The armoured reconnaissance troops seek out and maintain
contact with the enemy - by night as well as day. Until the main force engages they re-
port by dispatch rider, telephone or wireless. It is sometimes said that the crews of arm-
oured reconnaisance vehicles are effectively blind and deaf. That simply is not true.
When they are close to the enemy the reconnaissance forces advance by bounds from
one observation post to the next, keeping their eyes and ears open all the time; if neces-
sary they will drive up to good viewpoints, and they will leave their vehicles if this helps
them to catch sounds better, especially at night. Good drivers will always keep their ve-
hicles well concealed, and they are careful not to barge straight into antitank positions.
The engines of modern tanks make no more noise than the clatter of hooves, and they
are certainly quieter than neighing horses. Armoured reconnaissance vehicles and forces
are incomparably better than cavalry in respect of combat power, speed and facilities of
communication, and they will run short of fuel only when their commanders do not know
their job. At present their most immediate weakness is that they do not have full cross-
country mobility; but that is something which will come in time.
A certain number of light and heavy armoured reconnaissance troops form an armoured
reconnaissance company (Panzerspähkompanie). Several armoured reconnaissance
companies, with infantry on motor-cycles or in vehicles, together with heavy weapons and
engineers, make up a reconnaissance detachment (Aufkldrungsabteilung). The headquarters
of the armoured reconaissance detachment acts as a sustaining and direct-ing agency. It
helps the reconnaissance detachments to keep going for several days on

108

end, by providing reliefs and drawing on its reserves, and it has the ability to project them
along a new avenue of advance which may come as a surprise to the enemy.

The reconnaissance detachments are responsible for seeking out and reporting as much
as they can, without drawing attention to themselves. They must be speedy and agile,
have a good range, possess good means of communication, and be responsive to com-
mand. The smaller they are, the better they will be at their work. Their combat power,
and in particular their armament and protection, must be adequate to enable them to pre-
vail against their enemy counterparts. If their task demands something heavier in the way
of fighting capacity, this must be forwarded to them as necessary.
In combat the armoured reconaissance troops and detachments act mostly on the offen-sive,
which is the best way to destroy the reconnaissance capability of the enemy and enhance
our own. We should exploit any opportunities which arise to inflict damage on the enemy, as
long as fighting can be combined with the primary mission of reconnais-sance. If heavier
vehicles are not available, modern armoured reconnaissance vehicles have sufficient
firepower to be employed in a variety of combat roles - pursuit, covering a retreat, throwing
out screens in front of the other forces, and securing the flanks and rear. Altogether our
reconnaissance detachments are an excellent instrument for conducting operational
reconnaissance over considerable distances for the high command or the army
headquarters, and they are just as good at providing tactical reconnaissance for armoured
divisions, other motorized formations or indeed any forces that are transported on vehicles.
As the first elements to come in contact with the enemy, the reconnaissance detachments
must be organized in peacetime just as they will be in war. There will be lit-tle opportunity to
play around with them if we are overtaken by sudden developments, and, if commanders,
troops and the auxiliary arms are thrown into action without having settled down together, this
would put a question mark against our ability to carry out re-connaissance at the outset of
hostilies, when it is so important. In other words it would be nothing short of a crime. This is a
consideration that ought to outweigh all the supposed interference with training; the problems
here are trivial - we have coped with them so far, and we will do so in the future. In any case
they weigh heavily only with commanders who are unfamiliar with the work of motorized
reconnaissance.

The reconnaissance detachments were the first of the four branches of our motorized
forces to come into being after we regained our military sovereignty, and they are particu-
larly close to our hearts. They have established the conduct of reconnaissance on mod-
ern principles which answer the peculiar needs of the armoured forces very well; indeed
they are an essential component of those forces - qualifying in virtue of their ancestry,
equipment, armament, training and leadership,

Anti-tank detachments

After we had created serviceable armoured reconnaissance detachments, our next prior-
ity was to form an effective defence against enemy armoured reconnaissance vehicles
and tanks. This task involved all arms of the service.

The infantry regiments were given an integral anti-tank defence in the form of a four-
teenth company which was armed with 37mm guns; the cavalry too were equipped with
this weapon. The engineers in their turn developed anti-tank mines, and a variety of ob-
stacles which they created from combinations of wire, stakes, abatis, inundations and
ditches. The artillery set to work improving its capability against tanks at all ranges by
learning to position its guns more effectively and by new fire tactics. A whole system of
anti-tank defence came into being, and the need now arose to extend it in depth and cre-
ate anti-tank reserves which would be put at the disposal of the higher levels of com-
mand. The Inspectorate of Mechanized Forces had already conducted highly successful

109

experiments with a 37mm gun on pneumatic tyres, and it now had the task of setting up
highly mobile and, consequently, motorized anti-tank detachments for the commanders
in question. These detachments were duly furnished to all the larger formations of the
army. They developed their tactics in co-operation with the armoured forces, and they
were able to enhance the defensive capacity of the army as a whole against one of its
most dangerous enemies, the tank.

The anti-tank detachments (Panzerabwehrabteilungeri) have the responsibility for provid-

ing protection for their parent formations whether they are at rest, on the move or in ac-
tion. This also helps to preserve the defensive capability of the other arms, by relieving
them of the need to divert assets of their own to anti-tank defence. By themselves or,
bet-ter still, in association with the engineers, the machine-guns and artillery, the anti-
tank detachments also provide a means of halting unexpected enemy armoured thrusts,
con-taining breakthroughs and checking envelopments and outflanking movements, and
so giving our command the time to devise appropriate countermeasures. Forces
assigned to this work are called 'blocking units' (Sperrverbände).
Leading the anti-tank detachments is a demanding business. On the one hand we have
to site them in good time in locations from where they can use the full range of their guns
to protect the forces or places for which they are responsible; however they must not be-
tray themselves before the enemy tanks put in an appearance, and they need a degree
of cover against hostile artillery. In addition their fire positions ought to be on tank-proof
or at least tank-restricted ground. If they are unable to keep their firepower intact to sur-
prise the tanks when they actually arrive, or if they are caught by the tanks when they are
on the move, the whole defence will be compromised.
The commanders can do a great deal to facilitate the work of anti-tank defence by mak-
ing intelligent choices of the rest areas, approach routes and above all the gun positions.
One can dispense with anti-tank guns in tank-proof or tank-restricted ground, and con-
centrate them instead to defend terrain that offers good going for armour. As far as their
equipment, time and labour allows, the engineers must also play their part by accentuat-
ing natural obstacles, and securing dead ground by barriers. However the engineers
can't do much in this respect while in the offensive role when protection against enemy
counter-attacks must rest entirely with the antitank guns; during the advance the guns
must be kept sufficiently far forward to be able to consolidate whatever gains have been
made.
The penetrating power of the anti-tank rounds is of crucial importance for the success of
the defence. If the attackers' tanks are impervious to most of the fire aimed at them, they
will overcome not only the anti-tank guns but ultimately also the defending infantry and
engineers - and this latter task can be accomplished even by the light tanks of the enemy
rear echelons. It is a different story when we have guns that can pierce all the available
tanks of the attacking forces, and when those guns are sited at the decisive place at the
right time. In that case a successful tank attack will be purchased at an excessive price,
or become simply out of the question. Effective use of anti-tank guns also depends on:
(a) terrain: steep slopes and undulating ground are unfavourable for the defence;
(b) on how the ground cover changes with the season: anti-tank guns are designed to be
low-lying for the sake of concealment, and good fire positions might be difficult to find in
summer [because of the vegetation];
(c) on the time of day and the weather: darkness and poor light at the beginning and end
of the day make aiming difficult and prevent the guns being used to their full range. Mist
and rain have the same effect by obscuring the optics of sights with droplets; it is also dif-
ficult to aim into the sun;
(d) on the effects of enemy artillery fire, even when it happens to be no more than throw-
 110

ing up dust and smoke, and laying down smoke-screens.

The anti-tank gunners will be put to a hard test if a number of these circumstances hap-
pen to coincide, and if the enemy put in a surprise attack with massed armour. Only
superbly trained and highly disciplined troops with good nerves will be able to withstand
such an ordeal. We have every confidence that we possess troops of this kind.

Tank forces

Our reconnaissance and anti-tank detachments were new creations which had no coun-
terparts in foreign armies. For tank forces, however, there were a whole series of prece-
dents in all the most important military states. We have already described how they de-
veloped during the war and afterwards in Britain, France and Russia. The Inspectorate of

Armoured Forces therefore had the difficult responsibility of deciding which of the dispa-
rate foreign models he should recommend to our own high command as the most suit-
able for German conditions, or whether indeed to form an entirely new doctrine.
Two things at least were clear: we could not pursue British, French and Russian tactics at the
same time. Secondly we could not fashion a doctrine of our own when we were en-tirely
devoid of practical experience, and indeed had no more than a sketchy knowledge, of the
wartime experiences of the French and British. After mature consideration it was decided
that, until we had accumulated sufficient experience on our own account, we should base
ourselves principally on the British notions, as expressed in Provisional In-structions on Tank
and Armoured Car Training, Part II, 1927. This document was clearly set out, and it not only
offered the pointers we needed for our own experiments, but opened the avenues for
development that seemed to be closed off in the better-known

French regulations of the period, which sought to tie down the tanks to the infantry. The
high command approved, and so it was that until 1933 the intellectual training of the offi-
cer corps of the motorized troops of the future tank force was carried out according to the
British regulations. By now German views on armoured warfare were being expressed
more and more vocally, and they emerged partly from our cogitations and partly from
what we had learned from our experiences with the dummy tank units. The German no-
tions had much in common with thinking abroad, but also a number of distinctive fea-
tures.
Leaving aside special German circumstances for the moment, it is worth asking what, in
general terms, conditions the formation of doctrine? Relevant factors are the geographi-
cal situation of a country, the strength or weakness of its borders, its raw materials, its in-
dustry and the state of its armaments compared with those of its neighbours. These influ-
ences, and especially the latter, make an immediate impression and trigger off demands
for a response to meet altered circumstances. When, however, an arm of the service is
under development, the fundamental task is not to keep up with every passing current of
opinion; on the contrary, it is important to preserve a certain detachment from the moods
and trends of the moment. We have to identify clear objectives after a due process of
consideration, and then maintain purposeful technical developments over the whole span
of time they will need for their fruition. Continuity is attainable only when the development
is invested in the same hands over the long term, and when those hands can act with the
necessary authority. Unified direction is all the more important when new arms of the
service are in the infancy of their technical and tactical formation, and of their equipment
and training. Even in later years, when the development does not have to proceed at
such a breakneck speed as at present, there will still be cogent reasons why the potential
of mechanized forces will be exploited to the full only when they are constituted as a full
branch of the army.

To resolve such issues it is vital to establish the basic purpose of the tank forces. Are

111

they intended to storm fortresses and permanent defensive positions, or to carry out op-
erational envelopments and turning movements in the open field; to act at the tactical lev-
el, making breakthroughs on our own account and checking enemy breakthroughs and
envelopments; or will they be no more than armoured machine-gun carriers working in
close cooperation with the infantry? Will we try to resolve an imposed deadlock by one
mighty, concentrated commitment of our main offensive weapons? Or will we renounce
their inherent potential for speedy, far-reaching movement, for the sake of tying our-
selves to the snail's pace of the infantry and the artillery batteries, thereby renouncing all
prospect of a speedy decision to the battle and the war?

The days are long past when tanks were an auxiliary of the infantry; in fact we may al-
most assume the contrary, since the French hold that any infantry attack without tanks is
no longer practicable. But we won't go into those arguments any further.
It is patently absurd to make the conscious decision not to exploit the potential of a weap-
on to the full. For that reason the specifications for the ultimate development of the weap-
on must be set as high as seems practicable at the time. If, for example, we can possess
the wherewithal to attack at speed, it seems ridiculous to force the tanks to offer slow-
moving targets to enemy fire, just because old-fashioned infantry would otherwise be un-
able to keep up with them. Now that technology can put the infantry in armoured escort
vehicles which can move every bit as fast as the tanks, it is the tank which must deter-
mine the speed of the infantry; the French have grasped this point, and they have placed
their Dragons portes in armoured carriers. Again, it makes no sense to bring a tank at-
tack to a halt for several hours simply to enable horse-drawn artillery to change position,
when it is now technically possible to tow guns by powered vehicles or mount them on
armoured self-propelled carriages, and to provide their gun detachments and forward ob-
servers with the mobility of armoured vehicles. The tanks must not follow on the artillery,
but the other way around.

Tanks will lose the capacity to concentrate on the decisive spot if they are incorporated
as organic elements of all the infantry divisions. Many of the machines will end up in ter-
rain that stops them or slows them down, exposing them to heavy losses, and they will
be forced to accord with the slow-moving tactics of horse-drawn artillery and marching in-
fantry. The possibility of speed is killed stone dead, and we forfeit all real hope of attain-
ing surprise and decisive success in combat. We will find it difficult to employ tanks en
masse - and the increasing anti-tank capacity of all armies means that the concentration
of armour is still more important for victory than it was in 1917. We will be unable to hold
rearward lines and reserves of tanks, and lose thereby the means of exploiting at speed
any successes on the part of the first echelon. We will grant the enemy time to bring up
reserves, re-establish themselves in rearward defences, beat off our enveloping move-
ments and concentrate for counter-attacks.
We now proceed to the selection of the types of tanks, their armament, their protection,
how they are organized and how they will be furnished with complementary and auxiliary
weapons. These will in turn be determined by the ends for which the tanks are intended.
Tanks do not need to be particularly fast when they are destined only for co-operating
with the infantry, and when we do not form any kind of armoured spearhead to deal with
the enemy's defences and artillery. However they do require very strong armour because
they will be moving slowly and be exposed to artillery and anti-tank fire over a consider-
able length of time, especially when the range closes. Their armament consists of ma-
chine-guns and at least a small-calibre primary armament, so as to provide them with a
modicum of defence against enemy tanks, or artillery pieces with gun shields which
might appear at long range. Infantry escort tanks of this sort are organized in small units
as far as detachment level, and they are neither trained nor equipped for combat in large

112
formations. Their senior officers become no more than advisers to the infantry headquar-
ters, and tactical responsibility for their employment shifts to the middle and lower-rank-
ing officers of the infantry. The result will be that the tanks will be employed in penny
packets, as was the British and French armour in 1918, though with much smaller pros-
pects of success than then.

What, on the other hand, are the specifications for tanks that are intended to break into
enemy positions in battle, or execute deep breakthroughs aimed at reaching the enemy
comand centres and reserves and destroying the hostile artillery? They need at least a
partial covering of armour that is impervious to most of the anti-tank weapons. They re-
quire greater speed and range than do the infantry-escort tanks, and an armament of
ma-chine-guns and a gun up to 75mm calibre. Their gap-crossing, wading and crushing
ca-pabilities should be sufficient to enable them to deal with field fortifications. Lightly
arm-oured machine-gun carriers may be attached to the tank formations for the purpose
of clearing the infantry combat zone; they are sufficient for this work, since most of the
de-fending artillery will have been knocked out by our heavy tanks.
Such tank forces must be concentrated in large formations, and provided with the com-
plementary and auxiliary weapons they need for independence of action, just like the in-
fantry divisions. Their immediate leadership has been already trained for this work in
peacetime, and the responsibility for committing them lies with the high command. They
are deployed en masse in both breadth and depth. They strive to exploit tactical success
into the operational dimension. Enemy armoured attacks will unfailingly come in the fu-
ture, but we will be able to meet them in tank-to-tank combat by large formations trained
for this kind of fighting. Concentration of the available armoured forces will always be
more effective than dispersing them, irrespective of whether we are talking about a de-
fensive or an offensive posture, a breakthrough or an envelopment, a pursuit or a coun-
ter-attack.
The final category of tanks covers those that are destined to storm fortresses or perma-

113

nent positions. In addition to their strong armour and heavy armament (up to ISOmm),
they must have considerable obstacle-crossing and wading capacity and great crushing
power. When one is building tanks of this kind one very rapidly arrives at weights of from

70 to 100 tons, something which only the French have so far been able to achieve. There
will never be many heavy tanks of this kind, and they will be used either independently or
within the structure of the tank forces, according to the mission. They represent an ex-
tremely dangerous threat and are not to be underestimated.
Germany has attached great importance to the principle of the unified leadership and
training of the armoured forces. Drawing on wartime lessons, we have renounced any
idea of limiting tanks to the role of infantry escorts, and from the outset we have been de-
termined to create an arm that is trained to fight in large formations and will be equal to
any task that might fall to it in the course of time. The panzer (armoured) divisions were
founded in accordance with this philosophy, and they embrace tanks, and everything
those tanks need in the form of supporting and complementary arms — all of them in am-
ple number, and all of them, it goes without saying, fully motorized.
Within the tank regiments, every detachment is furnished with the machine-guns and the
varieties of artillery it needs to wage fire-fights at short, medium and long range, and to
answer the urgent call to meet an enemy tank attack with a sufficient number of armour-
piercing weapons. One last element is required to ensure that the various calibres are
used to their fullest effect - for the tank brigade and regimental commanders to deploy
them in a way that answers the needs of the situation, and to take care in assigning their
missions.

Motorized infantry

The experience of combat in 1917 and 1918 shows that infantry and tanks can work to-
gether effectively only when they are put through frequent and thorough training in the
business of co-operation. This works best and most consistently when a certain number
of infantry units are incorporated permanently with the tank units in a larger formation.

We have seen how, when the war was still in progress, the French placed an infantry
company on permanent assignment with every detachment of tanks in preparation for the
Battle of the Aisne in 1917. The 17th Light Infantry Battalion played this role in the first
attck on the Chemin-des-Dames; likewise two battalions of dismounted cuirassiers were
attached to the tanks for the assault on the Laffaux angle (see p. 69). Of course at that
time the infantry followed their tanks on foot, since there were no cross-country vehicles
available, and the objectives of the attacks were limited. Nowadays the French have in-
troduced the dragoon brigade on armoured half-tracks as a component part of the Divi-
sion legere mechanique. The aim is the same. It is clear that ever since tanks appeared
the French have adhered to the notion of permanent infantry support for tanks, and have
followed this line quite logically in developing special formations for operational deploy-
ment. Two things are needed to accomplish a tank attack at speed and exploit and ex-
pand any success without wasting time - equipment and means of transport that answer
that call for speed, but also specialized tactical training and constant practise.
We do not possess armoured cross-country vehicles for transportation. Those of our in-fantry
units that are destined for co-operation with tanks are therefore moved partly by motor-cycles
and partly on cross-country trucks. The motor-cyle infantry have already performed well on
reconnaissance in association with armoured reconnaissance ve-hicles, and they can be
used for a whole variety of functions, since they are speedy, easy to conceal, and can make
their way along any kind of road and across any terrain that is not altogether too difficult. We
have plenty of good motor-cycles in Germany and replace-ments present no problem. The
truck-borne infantry are protected against the elements,

114

and in addition to the men and their equipment the vehicles carry extra loads such as
ammunition, entrenching tools and engineering requisites, together with rations for sev-
eral days. The present trucks are too bulky to be ideal; they have difficulty in negotiating
narrow roads with sharp bends, and they are hard to conceal.

As we have already indicated, the main tasks of motorized supporting infantry are to fol-
low up at speed behind the tank attacks, and exploit and complete their successes with-
out delay. They need to put down a heavy volume of fire, and require a correspondingly
large complement of machine-guns and ammunition. It is debatable whether the striking
power of infantry really resides in the bayonet, and more questionable still in the case of
motorized troops, since the shock power of tank formations is invested in the tanks and
their fire power. The French have drawn the appropriate conclusion and have equipped
all their infantry companies with sixteen light machine-guns each, as opposed to the nine
of their German counterparts. Combat is not a question of storming ahead with the bayo-
net, but of engaging the enemy with our firepower and concentrating it on the decisive
point.
According to General Field Marshal Graf von Moltke firepower has an offensive charac-
ter: 'On occasion it can act as an agent of total destruction, deciding the issue on its own
account.' (Verordnungen fur die hoheren Truppenfuhrer, 24 June 1869.) He could main-
tain even in those days that front-line infantry firing at speed could defeat even the most
desperate enemies. In his own words: 'The bayonets of the charging troops are power-
less against them; the attackers' rifles might be every bit as good, but what use can you
make of them when you are in movement and incapable of controlling your weapon?'
(Ibid.) Von Moltke's perception is now eighty years old, but it has still not completely sunk
into the consciousness of our army. In 1913, just before war broke out, the German
infan-try looked on machine-guns as no more than an auxiliary weapon: 'Here we must
put on record the warning that the value of this weapon should not be overestimated; we
must not follow the error of the French in 1870-1, when they acclaimed the Mitrailleuse
as all-conquering. The most decisive arm in battle is the infantry. When riflemen are in
dire trouble, let alone in something less than dire trouble, they must not fall into the bad
habit of looking for help from their supporting weapons - the machine-guns. Rather they
must find in themselves the resources to surmount their difficulties.' (Vierteljahrshefte filr
Trup-penfuhrung und Heereskunde, 1913, 314). Nowadays we hear the same 'warnings'
di-rected against the call to augment the number of machine-guns and, it hardly needs to
be said, against our own views on tanks.

What we desire is a modern and fast-moving force of infantry, possessing strong fire
power, and specially equipped, organized and trained in permanent co-operation with
tanks.

Life in the panzer forces

After the rough outlines for the tactical and technical development of our new panzer forces
had been worked out, we had to provide for their maintenance and training. The first priority
was to determine the establishment - which was more difficult than it might seem, when one
considers that we could draw on virtually no experience to evaluate the needs of our future
armoured forces. We reviewed the relevant passage in the history of the British and French
in the last war, and we identified the kinds of demands that a fu-ture war might make on us.
From all of this we deduced the following principles: The pan-zer forces had to be ready to
spring to action in the event of hostilities. It followed that their peacetime establishment must
permit them to take the field without having to recall reserves on a large scale, or resort to
untrained recruits. The following organization was

115
the result:
Combat Company:
Company headquarters - the permanent entourage of the company
commander
Reconnaissance and signals personnel
Double crews for the tanks
Tank maintenance technicians
Armourers
Supply and internal service personnel
Detachment Headquarters:
Reconnaissance platoon
Signals platoon
Medical officer
Detachment engineer
Workshop with supervisors and technicians
Armourer
Regiment:
Reconnaissance platoon
Signals platoon
Regimental band
Regimental engineer
On this basis we went ahead with choosing the garrison locations, drawing up plans for
the barracks, and procuring training areas, ranges, clothing, equipment and weapons.
While all due economy had to be observed, we made up our minds to do everything pos-
sible to promote the training of the forces and give them agreeable conditions of life.
Our choice of garrison locations was influenced strongly by the facilities available for
training, and especially our requirement for extensive and varied terrain for exercises. On
occasion a number of neighbouring garrisons were assigned a large common training
area.
The barracks comprised two types of building. The accommodation blocks, together with
rooms for offices and other administrative purposes, kitchens and canteens. Second, the
technical accommodation with garages, workshops, tank parks, small-arms ranges and
zeroing-in ranges. All the buildings were constructed to the same standards for accom-
modation and hygiene that obtained throughout the army.
Such are the surroundings in which the recruits for the panzer forces are trained. As
else-where in the army they begin with basic instruction in posture, saluting, drill and
weap-ons. The recruit intakes are admitted every October, and before long they are
grouped according to their progress and aptitude as drivers, gunners or signallers, and
receive specialized training as well as the basic groundwork. Only a matter of months
later the men proceed to crew training; great attention is paid here to perfecting
cooperation be-tween the gunner and the driver, on which so much depends in action,
and finally the crew fuses into a single unit where the individual identifies himself with the
whole. Mean-while the dispatch riders and scouts, the technicians and armourers all
proceed with their specialized instruction. Needless to say the further training is not
rigidly compartmental-ized. The drivers and gunners have to learn enough of one
another's skills to be able to help one another out, and understand what their comrades
are doing. In addition many of the tank gunners are trained also as signallers.
The tank drivers are responsible for the condition of their vehicles, and they have to be
able to carry out minor repairs by themselves or with the assistance of the other mem-
bers of the crew. They must be skilled enough drivers to save the vehicle and the crew

116

from needless wear and tear, and in action they must help the gunner by driving
smoothly and making intelligent use of the ground. A high degree of vigilance is required
to overcome the restricted vision provided by slits or the driver's optics, not least in condi-
tions of heat and dust, cold and ice, darkness or fog. The drivers begin their instruction in
open-topped training vehicles and then proceed to enclosed tanks. There is likewise a
progressive increase in the demands that are made on drivers in overcoming difficult ter-
rain and driving in formation.
The responsibility of the gunners extends to the weapons, ammunition, signals equip-
ment and, in two-man tanks, also to command of the whole vehicle. In the semi-darkness
of the enclosed turret and while being tossed about, the gunner must be able to display a
consistent mastery of his weapon - clearing stoppages, and never failing to keep a close
eye on the ground outside. The survival of the vehicle and its crew comes down to the
marksmanship, courage and resolution of the gunner.
Live-fire training begins in the open air. It is continued in the tanks, first of all at the halt,
and then with the tank moving at various speeds and in various directions — straight at
the enemy, or with the hull at oblique or perpendicular angles to the alignment of the tur-
ret, and the gunner aiming variously at static or moving targets. The process is com-
pleted by battle firing at unit level. The use of simulators, such as firing from small-calibre
weapons mounted in static mock-ups, spares the wear on vehicles and armament, and
promotes something that is absolutely essential - constant practice in gunlaying.
The tank commander co-ordinates the efforts of his crew, and sees that his tank works
with the rest of the unit. He frequently operates the radio and signals equipment. In turn
one of the chief tasks of the company commanders is to ensure that tha tank
commanders receive the specialized training they require.
Crew training culminates in the process of unit training, which builds up to large-scale ex-
ercises and manoeuvres which are held towards the end of the military year.
Service in the panzer forces is fine and varied, and every tankman is proud to belong to
this new arm, which is dedicated to the offensive. But panzer service is also demanding;
it requires young men of sound consitution and mind, with cheerful hearts and deter-
mined will. Tank service builds small unit cohesion in a quite remarkable way; there can
be no distinctions - officers, NCOs and men alike share the same testing conditions of
combat, and everyone must play his part to the full.
Armoured equipment is expensive and rather complicated, which calls for a fairly large
establishment of long-service soldiers. Just as the officers and NCOs need sound tactical
and technical training, so a core of good engineers and technicians is required to attend
and service the machines.
The Mechanized Forces School (Kraftfahrtruppenschule) provides the necessary knowl-
edge and skills. It contains the headquarters and directing staff, and has instructional and
experimental departments as well as running the tactical, technical and gunnery courses.
The tactical courses provide training and further education for the officers and senior en-
signs of the mechanized forces, together with the training of reserve officers as company
commanders, and a grounding for officers of the other arms in the principles and work of
the mechanized forces.
The technical courses embrace the schooling of the NCOs, motor transport sergeants
and maintenance technicians, the instruction and examination of specialized tradesmen,
and the technical training of the officers and engineers of the mechanized forces.
The gunnery courses on the firing range serve both to train gunnery instructors, and to
try out new gunnery tactics, equipment and instructional aids.
The instructional department provides the demonstration troops for the courses, and si-
multaneously trains its soldiers as NCOs.

117

The experimental department tests vehicles and components for the army as a whole. Its
most significant commissions in recent times have been to test the durability of tyres of
synthetic rubber (Buna) in extended service, and see how synthetic fuels perform over
long journeys. The department also contains the 'sports staff (Sportstaffel) which repre-
sents the Wehrmacht in major motor sports events.

The school has a splendid and thoroughly serviceable home at Wunsdorf, near Berlin.
This short review of our life and work ought to be enough to show that our panzer forces
are engaged in a great variety of activities, and that they are in a state of active develop-
ment. Almost every day we have to confront new problems, explore new avenues, and all
the time we continue to make progress. We have room only for lively, open-minded spi-
rits. We have to overcome the inertia of the individual, just like the immovability of the
broad mass. Only when the panzer forces are full of verve, only when they are fanatically
committed to progress, will they win through and achieve their great aim, which is to re-
store the offensive power of the army.

The tactics of the panzer forces and their co-operation with the
other arms
The tactics of the panzer forces

We have seen in earlier chapters why and how tanks came into being, how they devel-
oped during the war and afterwards, and what were the thoughts of the godparents when
the German armoured forces were born. We now turn from the history of events to the
theoretical base. Here we will present a picture of the composition and tactics of modern
tank forces, without losing our grasp on technical realities. It is our belief that the panzer
forces have something of value to contribute to the army, and we will show how they fit in
with the framework as a whole, and how they can best co-operate with the other arms.
By way of illustration we shall set our panzer forces the task of gaining a decisive victory.
This they are supposed to accomplish by launching a concentrated surprise attack
against a line of enemy field fortifications, aiming at a point which has been selected by
our commander and which is favourable for the deployment of tanks. We have chosen
the breakthrough of an enemy position as our example, in preference to alternatives such
as mobile operations, envelopments or pursuits, since a breakthrough is perhaps the
most demanding mission that could be set.
In this instance we are uncertain whether the defenders have laid out minefields. But we
know for sure that their anti-tank weapons are capable of piercing our tanks at entry an-
gles in excess of sixty degrees and ranges up to six hundred metres, and that they have
about as many tanks as we have.
The attackers now have to choose their method of assault, considering first of all what el-
ements of the enemy defence are respectively the most and the least dangerous. If their are
46
mines in front of their positions, they could exact a heavy toll on our tanks. Mines are
therefore to be regarded as an enemy of an extremely dangerous order, and we must clear
them at least in part before the armoured assault proper can break into the infantry combat
zone. The work of identifying and clearing mines falls - as does the creation of practicable
lanes through other obstructions - to the engineers. They approach the ob-stacles under
cover of darkness or fog and, protected by artillery and machine-gun fire, set about clearing
lanes for the tanks. Perhaps they will even have armour protection of their own; a number of
foreign countries have for some years been conducting reason-ably successful experiments
with mine plough tanks and bridge-laying tanks.

All of this means that the panzer engineers will in all probability have to accompany the

118

first of the assaulting waves in any breakthrough battle. They must be trained to locate
mines and other obstacles under cover of darkness and mist and render them harmless,
and they must be given the vehicles and equipment they need for this task.
 47
We next have to reckon with the anti-tank guns. These will be deployed throughout the
entire depth of the zone of defence; those in the infantry combat zone will be already in
position and ready to open fire, and farther to the rear some of them at least will be held
ready to move. As regards their performance, we have already assumed that they can
pierce our armour at sufficiently vertical angles up to a range of six hundred metres.

The attacker must now do something to attenuate the fire of the guns in question. He
cannot afford to go on to assault secondary objectives as long as he is under their muz-
zles, which leaves him with no alternatives but to destroy them outright, or arrange to
have them silenced or blinded by other weapons.
To destroy anti-tank guns our tanks must either take them under direct fire at the halt
from behind cover, or overwhelm them by a mass attack. In addition the anti-tank guns
can be suppressed by artillery or machine-gun fire, or blinded by smoke - this process
can extend to guns lying outside the reach of the tanks themselves, for example in
woods or villages that are not being subjected to direct attack, or in ground that is inac-
cessible to armour. But within the tanks' own combat zone nothing short of the destruc-
tion of the defence will do, if we are to develop the attack into a successful breakthrough.
The best times for such an assault are at first light or when there is a light mist, for the
defensive weapons cannot be used out to their full range, and the gunners will find them-
selves at a severe disadvantage when the tanks suddenly burst upon them. At the begin-ning
of the attack the alarm will have gone out to the rearmost anti-tank units, and they will now be
seeking to get into position. The attacking forces must therefore penetrate the defensive zone
in great force and at great speed, so as to catch the anti-tank units while they are still moving
up, and destroy them. Otherwise, when the sun comes up, the at-tackers will be suddenly
confronted by a new defensive line extending immediately be-hind the forward battle zone,
and it will be a costly and time-consuming business to break through, especially if the
attackers have progressed beyond the reach of their own guns.

The enemy artillery batteries will be playing an active part in the defence, and they must
be brought under attack at the same time as we are dealing with the anti-tank guns deep
inside the defensive zone.
In our model we have postulated the existence of comparable forces of enemy tanks. But
when exactly will they appear? They may no longer be able to render direct help to their
own infantry, but they will certainly not be happy to see their artillery fall into our hands. It
is when we take up the combat with the enemy artillery that we can reckon on the arrival
of the enemy tanks. Many advantages are now on the side of the defenders -especially
knowledge of the terrain, and the fact that they are in good order whereas the attackers
48
will already be in some disarray. The tank's most dangerous enemy is another tank. If
we are unable to defeat the enemy armour the breakthrough has as good as failed, for
our infantry and artillery will be unable to make any further progress. Everything comes
down to delaying the intervention of the enemy anti-tank reserves and tanks, and getting
in fast and deep into the zone of the hostile command centres and reserves with our own
effective tank forces - and by 'effective' we mean forces that are capable of waging a
tank battle. The best way of delaying the intervention of reserves is through aircraft, and
this is probably one of their most important contributions to the ground battle. Useful work
can also be done by long-range artillery, as long as we can determine with reasonable
certainty the enemy approach routes or assembly areas.
As we have seen, the breakthrough battle imposes some pretty tough demands on the
tanks. Success is probably attainable only when the entire defensive system can be

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brought under attack at more or less the same time. When the attack begins the enemy
hinterland must be subjected to vigilant aerial surveillance so as to identify the movement
of enemy reserves and direct our combat aircraft against them. The air forces must bend
their efforts to preventing or at least delaying the flow of those reserves to the location of
the breakthrough. On the ground the main weapons of the breakthrough remain the
tanks. They will have overcome the minefields and the obstacles, and now they are de-
ployed in depth in several echelons to attack and beat down the elements of the defence
in rapid succession -the assembly areas of the enemy reserves, the command centres,
the zone of the artillery batteries and the mobile anti-tank defence, and finally the infantry
battle zone; of all these actions the victory over the anti-tank defences and the tank re-
serves is the most significant. If we win that combat, we at once have forces that are free
to institute the pursuit and roll up those sectors of the front that are still holding out; the
work of dealing with the enemy batteries and completing the clearing-out of the infantry
battle zone may be left to fairly weak tank units, while our own infantry can proceed with
exploiting the success of our armour. If, on the contrary, we fail to beat down the enemy
tank-defences and defeat the enemy tanks, the breakthrough has failed, even if we man-
age to wreak some destruction in the infantry battle zone. In that case the battle will end
as it usually ended in the World War, with a bloody and costly breakthrough that often left
the attacker in a worse tactical posture - in a salient with vulnerable flanks -than before.

It is therefore of great importance to strive to bring the entire depth of the enemy defence
49
under simultaneous attack. This ambitious task can be fulfilled only by a large force of
tanks deployed in sufficient depth, and with tank units and tank leaders who have learned
to fight in large formations and, when the enemy puts up an unexpected resistance, to
smash that resistance with speed and resolution.

In addition to depth, the breakthrough attack also needs a broad enough frontage to
make it difficult for the enemy to bring the central axis under flanking fire. If a tank attack
is so narrow that the area of the assault is actually enfiladed by machine-gun fire, the
oth-er arms will be unable to follow the tanks, and no durable success will be achieved.

We may summarize the requirements for a decisive tank attack by the concepts of: suit-
able terrain, surprise and mass attack in the necessary breadth and depth.
We will now describe in detail the tactics whereby the tanks fulfil this mission, and we will
then be in a position to see how the other arms may contribute to the success of the at-
tack. We have assumed that most of our tanks are equipped with machine-guns and ar-
mour-piercing weapons, and are equally capable of doing battle with enemy tanks, anti-
tank weapons and infantry. Our companies also incorporate a number of machine-gun
tanks for reconnaissance, communications and the less demanding combat tasks. The
tank detachments should be equipped with tanks with big guns on the model of the Brit-
ish 'close support tanks'. Several detachments form a regiment, and several regiments
form a brigade.
Tank forces are directed by radio, and the smaller units from company downwards also
by visual signals. As long as radio silence has to be observed, orders and reports can be
transmitted by means of aircraft, vehicles or telephone. Commanders ride in the com-
mand tanks, which are followed by the necessary radio tanks for secure communication
with superiors and subordinates. We should strive for aerial reconnaissance of the area
of the attack beforehand. The average marching speed of tank units is 20 kilometres per
hour in daylight, and 12-16 kilometres at night; in favourable weather and on good going
the combat speed is 16 kilometres per hour.
The assault is preceded by reconnaissance covering the approach routes and assembly
areas, the likely ground for our attack and the enemy we may expect there. The basis for
the plan of attack is provided by the study of maps, evaluation of aerial photographs, in-

120

terrogation of prisoners and other sources of intelligence.

Successful surprise is of absolutely fundamental importance for the chances of victory.

The greater operational and tactical mobility of armoured forces lends itself particularly
well to surprise, provided that the preparations for the attack on the part of all arms are
kept as concentrated and as short as possible, the approach marches are accomplished
under cover of darkness, the flow of supplies is concealed, and the movement of traffic at
night is kept under close control. We assume that the tank forces are brought up to their
assembly areas by night and without lights, using routes that have been identified before-
hand, and which are well signposted and have been kept clear for them. As a general
rule the assembly areas should be out of range of the enemy artillery, so that our forces
can make themselves ready for the battle, change their crews after the long approach
marches, distribute rations and establish contact with the other arms. However, depar-
tures from this rule may be occasioned by difficulties of terrain and other considerations.
The forces make their initial deployment (Entfaltung) for the attack from their assembly
areas. This must be accomplished early enough to enable them to cross their own front
line at the appointed time. Initial deployment means taking up formation in the breadth
and depth intended for the later attack, though the individual units mostly remain in col-
umn of march in order to exploit the available routes, make an easier passage of defiles,
and pass with the minimum of disruption through the other forces already in place, not
least the signals elements. We will use feint attacks, smoke-screens, artillery fire and air
activity to keep the enemy in the dark as to where we intended to make-our break-in.
Immediately before going into action, usually in the last available cover, the forces ac-
complish their full deployment (Aufmarsch) into combat formation; this is a particularly
dif-ficult manoeuvre if the terrain has restricted the initial deployment to an excessively
nar-row frontage. Our tank forces must be trained to carry out speedy approach marches
and deployments by night, or they will find themselves engaged in lengthy preparations
under the noses of the enemy, liable to detection and heavy casualties, and they will
jeopardize the element of surprise.
From the deployment to the opening of the fire-fight the attackers make whatever use
they can of the ground and then, when the enemy is in sight, they deliver the assault at
full speed. For the fire-fight, however, the speed must be moderated and, if the situation
permit, it can be conducted from the halt.
The outcome of the fire-fight essentially determines the outcome of the tank attack. The
individual lines of the attack, and the leading wave in particular, must present a strong
front with plenty of fire power; the following lines lend immediate support and keep the
gaps constantly filled. It is easier for the anti-tank guns to pick off individual tanks when
the attacker tries to break into the enemy battle zone in a thin, dispersed assault; when
the breakthrough is made on a broad front and accompanied by heavy fire from the
tanks, the defensive array is much more likely to be overrun, broken through and rolled
up from the flanks and rear.
We now come to combat formations. These are of greater moment for the armour than
for the other forces, because they must permit the tanks to use their weapons effectively
without getting in one another's way, and because the formations must facilitate the use
of ground and thereby enable the machines to take cover and lend mutual support. The
simpler the formations are, the more easy they will be to maintain, and the speedier the
transmission of orders will be.
The smallest combat unit is the platoon, which is made up of between three and five ma-
chines in the case of the heavy and medium companies, and five and seven within the
light companies. Platoons are not usually subdivided further. In combat the platoons
move across country in line or wedge with intervals of about fifty metres between the ve-

121

hicles. The platoon commanders usually take up station in the middle or at the head of the
array; they are responsible for maintaining the formation, speed and place of the pla-toon
within the company, and they must also maintain reconnaissance or at least obser-vation to
the front and any open flanks and, in the case of the last line, to the rear as well.

The march formation is the column, and on the battlefield the double column as well.
For the attack the companies are deployed in waves (Welleri), the detachments in lines
(Linien), and the larger tank formations in lines of battle (Trefferi). All the commanders
stay well forward during the assault, so that they can keep their units constantly in view,
and bring their personal influence to bear without delay.
Light companies in the first line are often assigned individual platoons of medium (gun)
tanks for close support.
Each line of battle and each of the component units is to be given a clearly defined com-
bat mission. The nature of the task will depend on the considerations already outlined. If
it be feasible, the objectives of the attack and the relevant landmarks should be pointed
out to the subordinate commanders on the spot, thus ensuring that the direction of the at-
tack will be maintained despite any smoke or dust. If this prove impossible, because of ir-
regular ground, mist or darkness, we resort to the compass.
The intervals and formations of the rearward lines and battle lines are defined by the na-
ture of the mission, the terrain, the deployment of the next forces to follow through, and
fi-nally by the impact of enemy weapons and how the combat actually goes. Here it is im-
portant to remember that the rearmost units must be in a position to lend speedy support
to those in front, while maintaining their own freedom of movement — this is the way to
avoid bunching up and offering targets to hostile artillery and aircraft, if the movement
happens to be interrupted. It will also permit the rearmost units to be diverted in other di-
rections.
The attack moves at speed, and as soon as it closes to effective range we go over to the
fire-fight. It will be waged by the individual lines of battle according to their particular mis-
sions. The most valuable characteristic of the tank is its capacity to deliver effective and
close-range fire against clearly identified targets, and to destroy them with just a few
rounds. The tank also has the capability of suppressing areas suspected of being held by
the enemy, and objectives that may or may not be defended - though this work uses up a
great deal of ammunition. We distinguish between fire at the halt and fire pn the move.
The first should be preferred if the combat situation and the cohesion of the unit permit
the tanks to stop and fire; but there will be no alternative to firing on the move if that is
dictated by enemy action or the necessity of keeping the attack together. Firing at the
halt permits the gun to fire probably to good effect out to the limit of visbility; whenfiring
on the move the machine-guns are effective up to 400 metres and the guns up to 1,000
metres.
It will often prove possible for the progress of the leading units to be covered by the rear-
most waves and lines, which can lay down a long-range supporting fire at the halt.
In addition to their fire, the tanks can crush enemy equipment, obstacles and cover and,
on occasion, enemy personnel. This capacity depends on the weight and engine power
of the tank, and to a certain degree on its climbing ability and external shape.
The so-called moral effect of the tank depends ultimately on its physical effect - the im-pact of
its fire and its crushing power. In the last war the moral effect was very potent, de-spite efforts
to diminish it, and the fundamental reason was that the Germans had insuffi-cient anti-tank
defences and hardly any tanks of their own. In future, the moral effect will be that much the
less as. an opponent attains greater equality in those respects. It is therefore of the utmost
importance to make an accurate evaluation of the enemy capacity in tanks and anti-tank
weapons; here we must take as much account of the technical side

122

- how the equipment performs - as the organizational and tactical aspects, which take in
questions of leadership and deployment.

Tanks are naturally most effective when they are directed against completely defence-
less targets or at least targets incapable of putting up an adequate defence. Tanks are
al-so effective against badly concealed objectives, or those positioned in terrain that is
ac-cessible to armour; conversely the effect falls away in the face of strong opposition,
good concealment or cover, and objectives in restrictive or prohibitive ground.
In this context we must add a few words on tank versus tank combat. Military literature
tends to steer clear of this subject, invoking as an excuse our lack of experience. This at-
titude cannot be sustained over the long term. We will be unfailingly presented with the
reality of tank versus tank action in the future, as we have already established, and the
outcome of the battle will depend on the issue of that combat, irrespective of whether we
are cast in the role of attackers or defenders.
In the last war there were just two clashes of German and British tanks, at Villers-Breton-
neux on 24 April 1918, and at Niergnies-Seranvillers on 18 October of the same year.
We shall present the essential features in outline.

The tank action at villers-bretonneux

At 034S on 24 April 1918 the German artillery opened up in preparation for an attack on
the sectors held by British III Corps and French XXXI Corps. The bombardment was sus-
tained with great violence for three hours and at 0645, in dense fog, the German attack
was launched on a frontage extending from north of Villers-Bretonneux to the wood of
Senecat (three kilometres south-west of Thennes). There were three divisions in the Ger-
man first line, namely 228th Jagers, 4th Guards and 77th Jager Reserve. They took
under command the following numbers of tanks: three with 228th Jager Division; six with
4th Guards Division; four with 77th Jager Division.

These thirteen machines were all we had available at the time.

When the bombardment began the German tanks went off to the assembly areas, from
where they set out a few minutes before the attack opened, in order to be able to cross
their own front line on time. At first the assault made slow progress, since the thick fog
limited visibility to fifty metres, and the contact between tanks and infantry was immedi-
ately lost. Whenever the British offered the least resistance the German troops stopped,
hung about and sometimes even fell back. Towards 1100, however, the fog lifted, and
the infantry resumed contact with the tanks and began to make more rapid progress.
The three tanks with 228th Jager Division gained their objective, and were then ordered
to assemble at Viencourt.
On the frontage of the central division, 4th Guards, four of the tanks likewise reached
their objective; one tank stuck in a shell crater, and the sixth broke down from engine fail-
ure.
On the sector of the left-hand division, 77th Reserve, one of the tanks managed to si-
lence several machine-gun positions and stretches of trench, but towards 084S it be-
came lodged sideways in a sandpit and was unable to get out (it was later retrieved and
spirited away by a French recovery team working between the lines). The second ma-
chine destroyed a number of machine-gun positions and actually came within 700 metres
of the edge of Cachy village, which it took under gun and machine-gun fire.
The third tank likewise accounted for a number of machine-guns, cleared several hun-
dred metres of trench and, having reached its objective, was on the point of turning
around to return to its assembly area. The fourth tank was doing the same, after it had
joined in the fire attack on Cachy.
At this juncture the second tank spotted three British tanks emerging from the southern

123

tip of the wood of Arquenne - two females in the lead and a male Mark IV following. What
had been happening? As a safeguard against any German attack the British had sent a
tank company ahead into the wood of Blangy from where a platoon of three tanks was
pushed first into the wood of 1'Abbe and then, because of the German artillery fire, to a
position behind the southern tip of the Arquenne wood. Between 1000 and 1100 the pla-
toon in question received the rather vague order to secure the Cagny blocking position.

As soon as they left cover the two female Mark IVs spotted four German tanks and at
once advanced to attack the nearest machine. The German tank immediately faced
about and, taking advantage of some cover, opened fire. One of the British females was
seen to be hit, and both machines gave up the attack. The third British tank, the Male
Mark IV, now materialized at two hundred metres from the German tank and scored sev-
eral hits with a 57mm gun. Five of the crew were killed; the survivors abandoned the
tank, though they were able to reoccupy it later and bring it back behind their own lines.
The commander of the male Mark IV lost contact with the other German tanks — in fact
they had returned to their assembly area, knowing nothing of the action that had just tak-
en place. Shortly afterwards the British tank was knocked out by a direct hit.
A little later seven British Whippets pushed out from Cachy, evidently on reconnaissance.
They caused considerable disorder and casualties among the German infantry, but they were
detected by the third German tank under Lieutenant Bitter, who was in the process of turning
round, as we have seen. Bitter restored contact with the infantry and went over to the attack.
He engaged the British tank on the far right at a range of 200 metres and set it on fire with
the second round; he then fired at the tank 700 metres away on the far

124

left and again set it ablaze with his second shot. Unfortunately the spring of his firing pin
broke at this moment, but he opened fire with his machine-gun on the second British tank
from the left and was able to knock it out. Surprisingly the remaining four Whippets
meanwhile made an about turn and drove back towards Cachy. The German tank pur-
sued and proceeded to silence the enemy at the nearest edge of Cachy by fire at a range
of 150 metres, which enabled the German infantry to establish themselves 400 metres
50
from the village. At 1445 Bitter returned to the assembly area.
The tank action at niergnies-seranvillers

On 8 October 1918 the British attacked between Cambrai and Saint-Quentin with the
support of sixteen battalions of tanks, of which 12th Battalion went into action south of

Cambrai, where it was distributed among four of the assaulting corps. Initially the attack
went well, but in the morning mist it ran into a counter-attack by German tanks - namely
ten captured British Mark IVs, which were advancing under cover of a smokescreen. The
leading British tank commander took the approaching black shapes for friendly ma-
chines, as was only natural, but he was disabused when he came under fire at fifty
metres. The British were able to hit the leading German tank, but four of their own spear-
head tanks were rapidly put out of action, and it seems that some at least of the crews
were unaware of the enemy presence as they hastened towards their doom. A British
tank officer managed to get hold of a gun which had been captured from German troops,
and he was able to put a further German tank out of action, leaving the Germans with
two machine-gun tanks. One of the surviving machines was disabled shortly afterwards,
while the other had to make off to escape the attentions of a British machine.
North of Seranvillers, meanwhile, two British gun tanks encountered two German ma-
chine-gun tanks and, inevitably, soon knocked them out. In this way the British were able
beat off the German counter-attack. Their own infantry had fled before the German tanks,
but now they came on again and seized their objectives.
These were the only tank actions of the war. They were admittedly small in scale, but
they furnish some valuable lessons:
1. When tanks advance against an enemy who has weapons that can penetrate their ar-
mour, while they cannot repay them in the same coin, they have no alternative but to re-treat.
More specifically, tanks armed with machine-guns only are powerless against tanks that have
guns as their primary armament, and possess armour that is impervious to ar-mour-piercing
rounds of small-arms calibre. This old truth has been confirmed recently in

Spain.
2. The tank's most dangerous enemy is another tank. As soon as a tank force identifies
enemy machines, and is in a state to do battle with them, that force is duty bound to drop
all its other missions and engage in combat. This also happens to be the best service we
can render to our own infantry, since they will be in as much danger as our tanks if the
enemy manage to break through with an armoured counter-attack.
3. Tank versus tank combat is decided by fire. We must therefore bring our tanks to
with-in effective range of the enemy, making use of ground so as to present a small and
elu-sive target. The tanks must strive to improve their chances of a hit by firing at the
51
halt, es-pecially when they first open fire. It is also important to make use of good light
and fa-vourable wind.

4. We cannot be content with training for individual combats of tank against tank. We
must reckon on the appearance of large forces of tanks, and it ismuch more useful to
work out how to manage combat on this scale. In actions of this kind we cannot avoid
having to fire on the move:
(a) as a protection against the increasingly effective enemy fire;
 125

(b) in order to frustrate enemy outflanking or enveloping movements, whether through

committing reserves or manoeuvring with the forces that are already engaged;
(c) to outflank or envelop the enemy through our own reserves, and concentrate our
forces so as to pit a greater number of our own tanks against a smaller number of the en-
emy. It follows that armoured combat demands strict discipline, good fire control and
good training on the ranges. Command, and especially the commitment of the re-serves,
is facilitated by maintaining formation among the units, and observing the pre-scribed
speeds. Supposing the armament of the combatants to be approximately equal, victory in
the tank battle, as in the combat by other arms, will go to the side that has the
advantages of superior, firm and resolute command, and has laid the foundations for
such leadership in good time.
5. The other weapons, and the artillery and anti-tank guns in particular, must not be con-
tent with the role of passive spectators during the armoured battle. On the contrary, it is
their obligation to contribute to the utmost of their power to the victory of our tanks. Here
again the lessons of Spain have confirmed those of 1918.
The tank attack terminates with the redeployment of the units for further missions - these
may consist in completing the breakthrough, pressing ahead with the pursuit, rolling up
sectors of the front that are still holding out, or checking or smashing enemy reserves
that are on their way up. In the event of our attack failing, we must reassemble our forces
in a suitable location.
Assembly areas can seldom be fixed in advance, and their location is usually determined
only after the attack has come to an end. Assembly areas must have cover against direct
fire and aerial observation, must facilitate readiness of combat at short notice, and must
be properly secured. The assembly areas are where ammunition and fuel are replen-
ished, the men are fed, losses are replaced, and burnt-out units replaced by fresh ones.
If necessary, the combat supply train must be brought up to the same locations.

The Co-operation of thanks with the other Arms

Tanks are unable by themselves to meet all the combat tasks which come their way; the
other arms will be needed as well, for example to deal with difficult terrain, artificial ob-
stacles, or anti-tank weapons sited in 'tank-prohibited' ground. In this requirement the
tanks differ in no respect from the other arms, and inter-arm co-operation is therefore a
matter of fundamental importance. Everyone is agreed on this basic point, but the difficul-
ties creep in when one goes a little farther, namely when we begin to ask about the 'how'
of co-operation.

Here we may distinguish between three schools of thought. One of them continues to re-
gard the infantry as the 'Queen of the Battlefield', just as in earlier days; the single great
weapon which all the other arms must dedicate themselves to serve, if necessary by de-
nying themselves some important advantages. For such people the infantry remain the
'Bearer of Victory'. They focus their attention on the fire of the enemy heavy weapons,
which represents the immediate threat to the foot soldiers. The main function of the tank
is therefore seen as the destruction of those weapons, and the tanks are supposed to ac-
company the infantry not just at the start of the battle but right through to the end. These
folk forget that clearing the infantry battle zone is not such a mighty undertaking after all,
and that it may be accomplished safely and easily by a handful of machine-gun tanks —
as long as those tanks are given the opportunity to go about their work undisturbed. This
opportunity was a reality in 1918, but it certainly does not exist nowadays. In fact the de-
fence has acquired such tremendous power that the enemy anti-tank guns and artillery
observation posts must be eliminated before the assault begins, otherwise the tanks that
are sent into the infantry battle zone will be unfailingly destroyed. From the viewpoint of

126

the tank forces, the most important mission is not infantry support, but to destroy the ene-
my anti-tank defences and suppress or blind the enemy artillery; when that has been ac-
complished the tanks will indeed render the infantry the support they need - rapidly, thor-
oughly, exhaustively and economically.

The same holds true from the perspective of the high command, if we are striving for de-
cisive victory on the grand scale, and not just an infantry attack which has limited objec-
tives and which is carried out at the infantry pace. It makes no sense to dispatch tanks
straight into the infantry battle zone to seek out hidden machine-gun positions, while im-
mediately to the rear the defenders are left in peace to build a new line or prepare
counterattacks. These tactics were tried dozens of times during the World War -they
failed on every occasion, and they will inevitably do so in the future. A modern style of
leadership, in full command of the weapons at its disposal, will instead aim for a rapid de-
cision, and will therefore place demands of an altogether higher order on its tanks - de-
mands which must stretch them to the limits of their capabilities, since the commander
will otherwise throw away his trump card.
The proper assessment of the limits of those capabilities is a matter of decisive impor-
tance. One school, as we have seen, wishes to draw the bounds too tightly, but another
is inclined to extend them altogether too far. Its adherents dream of grand operations,
raids into the enemy rear, surprises, and fortresses and fortified zones which will fall into
our hands with effortless ease. But it is more than doubtful whether a future war will ever
begin with the freedom of movement which the Germans enjoyed to a certain degree in
1914, after they had captured Liege. In all likelihood there will be a need for an immedi-
ate battle involving fortresses or defended positions; the attacker must achieve a break-
through if he is to win freedom of movement, and even then he must exploit very smartly
if the front is not to congeal almost immediately; for this is just the stage when the de-
fender has a chance to use his own mobile forces to telling advantage.
This chain of argument has given rise to a third school of thought. Its protagonists argue
that, without departing from what is technically feasible, tanks can do something more
than act as mere train-bearers to the infantry, or leaders of the infantry cortege - the most
that our first school would allow. At the same time the third school takes all due account
of the actual obstacle-crossing capabilities of tanks, and their real prospects in combat
against anti-tank defences and the enemy armour - they have no wish to throw their
tanks away to no purpose. This school of thought also bases its case on a number of fur-
ther principles:
1. that infantry are strong on the defensive, but their offensive capacity is feeble, or at
least slow-acting, because of the defensive power of the modern infantry weapons
they have to face;
2. that artillery fire of the most powerful kind is still insufficient to guarantee rapid and
deep break-ins of the enemy battle zone;
3. that the existence of enemy motorized and armoured reserves rules out the possibil-
ity of decisive victory through conventional breakthrough tactics.
To this way of thinking there is a need to gain a tactical decision with the speed conso-
nant with the modern era of aircraft and tanks, and then exploit it into the operational di-
mension. How do we do it? - by elevating the air and tank forces to the status of main
arms of the service. Only experience of actual combat will show whether these efforts will
be rewarded. One thing is certain, that the former offensive tactics, using conventional
weapons, failed to achieve a decisive success in the course of four years of bloody war.
In other words they have no future validity.
We therefore aim at achieving a sweeping victory by the means advocated by our third
school, namely a breakthrough which will lead to a pursuit, and the rolling up of the intact

127

sectors of the enemy front. When co-operation with the other arms is discussed, it must
therefore be in the context of the requirements of the armoured attack.

For this purpose we have derived from the last war the three requisites for the success of
a tank attack: suitable terrain, surprise, and the concentration of all available forces at the
decisive point — in other words attacking en masse. The frontage must be broad enough
to prevent the axis coming under flanking fire; otherwise the tank attack itself may be
successful, but the unarmoured forces, especially the infantry, will be unable to follow up.
In the last war the French and British attacked on frontages which already extended to
twenty and thirty kilometres; in the war of tomorrow the attacks will be at least as broad,
and very likely considerably deeper, because of the strength of the' defences which we
have to overcome, the greater distances to the final objectives, and the need to roll up
the stretches of the front where the enemy are still holding.
52
We have no desire to impose a rigid tactical framework, but in general we foresee the
assaulting armoured forces deployed in four lines of battle: the first line should pin down
the enemy reserves, including the tanks, and knock out the headquarters and control
centres; it should eliminate the antitank weapons it finds on the way there, but not other-
wise get embroiled in fighting. The second line has the task of destroying the enemy artil-
lery and any anti-tank defences active in its neighbourhood. The third line should bring
our own infantry up through the enemy infantry battle zone, and in the process eliminate
opposition from the infantry so thoroughly that the supporting arms of the tanks are able
to follow up. We can form a fourth line only if we have a very considerable number of
tanks, but it serves as a reserve at the disposal of the high command, and for rolling up
intact sectors of the front. The whole, mighty assault must break into the enemy defences
simultaneously and on a broad front, and press on to its objective in a series of continu-
ous waves. After they have achieved their initial tasks it is the common responsibility of
all the lines of battle to press forward, so as to be at hand for the imminent tank battle.
Our first line must be very strong, for the armoured battle is difficult work and will invaria-
bly fall to its lot; the second and third lines may be weaker. The strength of the fourth line
depends on the situation and the terrain. If we find firm support for the flanks, we can
probably get away with covering them by anti-tank guns and other weapons; open flanks
and wings usually demand protection through several echelons of tanks deployed in
depth.

The attack is preceded by the process of reconnaissance and scouting, the approach
and the assembly.

Reconnaissance is primarily the work of aircraft, supplemented by motorized reconnais-

sance detachments or other units already in contact with the enemy. The agents of re-
connaissance must be faster than most at least of the troops who are coming up behind
them, and they must transmit their reports to their directing officer with the least delay.
Reconnaissance for a tank attack must establish the enemy's defensive deployment, es-
pecially the arrangement of his reserves, and among these again the anti-tank guns and
the armoured forces in particular. Reconnaissance must extend well behind the front line,
since motorized forces can cover considerable distances in a matter of hours. It is on the
basis of this intelligence that the commander determines not only the missions and the
offensive deployment of his armoured forces, but the intervention of the air forces in the
ground battle. Reconnaissance can further identify the natural and artificial obstacles,
and photographic reconnaissance is especially useful in this respect. The findings of aer-
ial reconnaissance can be supplemented by ground reconnaissance and scouting. Care-
ful study of maps is essential, if one wishes to avert unpleasant surprises.
It is most important that the process of reconnaissance and scouting should not betray
the location of the intended attack to the enemy; security is also to be observed with re-

128

gard to our own troops. Before the Battle of Cambrai, for example, General Elles and

Lieutenant-Colonel Fuller went to the length of disguising themselves by removing their

patches and wearing dark glasses.
Concealment is of fundamental importance for the approach and assembly of our forces,
if we are to maintain surprise. There was once a time when no great importance was at-
tached to concealment, but the events of 1917 and 1918 speak so clearly to the contrary
that we must enter here into some further detail. Concealment against aerial reconnais-
sance is effected through speed of assembly before the attack opens, by moving up in
darkness without the use of lights, and by sedulous concealment of the assembly areas.
Radio interception is frustrated by observing strict radio silence until the battle opens.
Anti-aircraft defences and measures against aerial reconnaissance must be thought
through carefully, but should not be designed in such a way that they might of them-
selves give a clue as to our intentions.
Once the attack begins, the operational and tactical aerial reconnaissance must be sup-
plemented by combat reconnaissance. Its findings are invaluable to the lank
commanders, and they must be got to them as rapidly as possible, for example by radio,
or throwing messages from aircraft -minutes can be of decisive importance when the en-
emy have established new defences or even brough their own tanks on to the scene.
Smooth cooperation with the air forces is the product of frequent joint training.
With the opening of the attack two further weapons acquire considerable significance for
the tank forces, namely the artillery and the engineers.
The immediate issues concerning the artillery are whether the tank attack is to be ush-
ered in by a bombardment of longer or shorter duration, and whether we will dispense
with this particular calling-card altogether. Opinions on the point are divided. Some offi-
cers maintain that fire is indispensible, and that 'resort to artillery firepower is an essential
preparation for the armoured attack'. The opposing school cites the examples of Cam-
brai, Soissons and Amiens and wishes to delay artillery support until the assault begins.
One thing is indisputable - the shorter the artillery preparation the better. A prolonged
bombardment betrays the location - and to some degree also the time — of the attack,
and permits the defenders to place their reserves in readiness, occupy rearward posi-
tions, and perhaps also prepare withdrawals and counter-attacks which will occur at un-
expected and unpleasant places - as at Reims on 15 July, with the riposte following on
18 July at Soissons. Long bombardments churn up the ground and make it difficult going
for all arms, but particularly inconvenient for the tanks, which are supposed to get ahead
quickly. However a short bombardment may be indispensible to provide protection for the
engineers, if they have to open lanes for the tanks by clearing obstacles, or building path-
ways over watercourses or swamps.
Assembling large quantities of guns and their ammunition is a time-consuming and all too
visible process which may put surprise at risk. I: seems best to do away with the artillery
preparation altogether, and burs: upon the enemy with the advantage of complete sur-prise.
Once the attack has opened, however, it must be supported by the artillery.

The missions of the artillery are to suppress targets and geographical features which the
tanks cannot tackle themselves (villages, for example, or woodlands, steep hillsides,
watery or boggy terrain), to hold down or blind likely observation posts and locations of
anti-tank weapons, or to destroy identified targets which might impede the tanks. Long-
range artillery can usefully seal off the area of the attack, and harass identified or sus-
pected command centres and assembly areas, or be held in readiness to cover the tank
attack as it progresses.
Once the tank attack opens, the artillery usually has to lift its fire from the area of the as-
sault. When the artillery is in static positions it can support the armoured assault only to

129

the limit of vision of the observers. If the observers are able to go along with the attack,
the cover is extended to the full range of the guns, but when this limit too is reached the
artillery will have to change position, which will detract from its effectiveness.

To follow a successful tank attack is absolutely out of the question for horse-drawn artil-
lery, and quite difficult even for guns towed by vehicles. What do our tank forces want
and need? It is artillery support that is fast-moving and sufficiently well-protected to follow
immediately behind them. As well as having its specialized form of mobility, the support-
ing artillery requires specialized skills, and these are acquired through joint training with
the tanks. Here it is worth mentioning that it is more demanding to direct armoured mo-
bile artillery than the conventional artillery assigned to the infantry divisions. The mobile
guns have to do their work over a shorter period of time, and have to deal with a greater
variety of targets. The armoured attack has no need of a concentrated, pre-planned artil-
lery barrage; no battering away at positions until they are ready to be stormed. Its call is
for a responsive, fast-moving and accurate type of artillery, capable of following the as-
sault with all the speed that it will acquire when it is commanded properly.
Among the other questions relating to the use of artillery in the armoured attack are the
use of smoke and the application of chemical weapons.
If Nature has failed to oblige us with fog to blind the enemy defensive weapons and ob-
servers, the artillery must provide a substitute in the form of smoke. In accordance with
the timetable of the tank attack, we will lay down smoke to blind enemy observation posts
and the suspected locations of anti-tank weapons, and along the edges of villages and
woods; the effect will extend over a certain length of time, and is intended to enable our
tanks to approach unseen, or drive past unscathed on their way to execute an envelop-
ing movement. As the attack progresses, smoke will also be put down at the gunners'
own initiative or at the call of the tanks. Here the purpose will be to blind identified targets
such as anti-tank guns or, if necessary, enemy tanks as well. If the attack turns out badly,
smoke can facilitate our disengagement from the enemy.
In addition to smoke shells and generators, tanks have the capacity to create their own
smoke. This is attended with certain disadvantages. As the source of the smoke is usu-
ally identifiable, this may betray the location of the tank, or the direction in which it is
going. Tanks often end up driving in their own smoke and become blind, or they stand
out all too clearly against their self-generated cloud. As a general rule, therefore, we ad-
vocate the use of smoke by tanks only in favourable wind conditions; however it can
prove a useful aid in disengaging from the enemy, as already mentioned.
Chemical weapons have little effect on tank crews. Inside the tank, protection against
poison gas is offered by masks and overpressure; the structure of the tank itself gives
protection against blistering agents such as mustard gas (Yellow Cross). One of the
great advantages of tanks is their imperviousness to chemical weapons.
So much for artillery. Engineers too must lend the tanks a hand during the preparations
for the attack or, at the latest, at the beginning of the assault. Before the attack gets
under way it is important to make the approach routes practicable, not least when they lie
across country. Route signs are needed to guide movement at night. The engineers must
also provide pathways over watercourses, swamps or soft going, and reinforce bridges
53
that are too weak to bear tanks.

The work of the engineers becomes far more testing when the attack begins. The de-
fenders will have done their best to site their strongpoints in ground that is difficult or im-
possible for tanks, and where this is not available they will have covered their positions
by obstacles, and mines in particular. Their identification and clearance is an extremely
difficult but extremely urgent task that is mostly carried out immediately before the enemy
front line - which means inside the enemy's most effective range. Moreover the work usu-

130

ally has to be done in the greatest haste, since the defenders take the beginning of ob-
stacle clearance as the sign of an imminent attack, and they use every minute to consoli-
date themselves. Even when the work of the engineers goes forward under the protec-
tion of artillery and smoke and the heavy infantry weapons, there can be no guarantee
that the defence has been suppressed; when engineers are assigned to work with tanks,
there is therefore no alternative but to put some at least of their personnel in armoured
vehicles fitted with equipment for detecting and clearing mines. Amphibious and bridge-
laying tanks are good for surmounting watercourses, and we have seen prototypes of
such vehicles in Britain, Italy and Soviet Russia. Speed of execution must be the overrid-
ing requirement for the engineers, just as for the other arms involved with working with
the tanks. These Panzerpioniere therefore need special gear and training. In addition the
army engineers will find themselves concerned not only with anti-tank defence, but co-
operating with our own armour on the attack.

We will now assume that artillery support and skilful work by the engineers has helped
the tanks to break into the enemy defensive zone, and that the attack is well under way.
The break-in will occasion a falling-off in the enemy resistance in the outer combat zone,
but a feverish activity further to the hostile rear, for all the available reserves will be
streaming towards the fighting — in the air and on the ground - armoured and unarm-
oured forces alike. The immediate responsibility of halting the flow of enemy reserves
falls to the tactical aircraft, which must cast aside all other work in favour of intervening in
the ground battle at this decisive moment. However the slackening of resistance in the
outer combat zone must be exploited by every means; every arm, not least the infantry,
must press forward at all speed.
Before the tank attack opens our infantry will have been making preparations to support
the armour and exploit its progress. Some of the heavy infantry weapons will keep the
battlefield under surveillance, ready to shoot up anti-tank guns as they appear, and some
will be participating in the general fire plan to maintain a suppressive fire on areas by-
passed by the tanks. The teams of horses for the supporting weapons will have been
kept as far forward as is consonant with safety, and likewise the reserves will have
closed up tightly in expectation of moving forward into the attack.
As soon as the tanks have had any noticeable effect on the enemy, the opportunity must
be exploited without delay; in some places the results will be transitory, and a number of
the enemy machine-guns will re-open fire. The best recipe for a sure and economical
success is therefore to exploit the initial surprise of the enemy by means of an immediate
advance. The infantry should be under no illusions: the tanks can cripple the enemy and
knock a hole in their defensive system, but they cannot dispense with the need for infan-
54
try combat. This is by no means a bad thing for our own infantry, for it demonstrates
that they have an essential part in the common battle.

The infantry combat will now focus on whatever strongpoints have been spared or left
un-identified during the tank battle. The task of the infantry will be facilitated by the fact
that the strongpoints can be turned and surrounded by exploiting the avenues already
cleared by the tanks. Moreover some of the tanks are usually assigned for co-operation
with the infantry, at least for the duration of the combat in the infantry battle zone.
We have every confidence that we will be able to render the infantry material help when
the armoured attack itself turns out well. But we must emphasize yet again that the es-
sential precondition is victory in a thrust which the tanks carry deep into the enemy de-
fences, aiming at their principal foes - the hostile tanks, anti-tank guns and artillery.
The tanks will go ahead of the infantry when an extensive tract of open ground has to be
traversed before the break-in. When the two sides are in close contact and the terrain fa-
vours the attack, the tanks will attack simultaneously with the infantry; the infantry will

131
have to attack under artillery cover ahead of the tanks when we need to overcome initial
obstacles - a stretch of river, for example, or barriers or minefields - before the tanks can
intervene.

There is no need for the infantry and tank attacks to proceed on the same axes; of the
two it is the armoured thrust that is the more strongly influenced by the topography. If,
however, the axis is the same, and the tanks have no alternative but to drive through in-
fantry already deployed, the infantry must take up formations that will permit their own
advance to continue at speed, while enabling the tanks to distinguish the infantry units in
half light or in fog. Otherwise there will be a danger of accidents and of our own troops
opening fire on one another.
It is a physically taxing business for infantry to accompany a successful tank attack on
foot; they must be specially conditioned for this purpose, and be fitted out with light
equipment and suitable clothing. The quickest and most effective way to exploit the suc-
cess of the tanks is by motorized infantry, especially if the soldiers' vehicles are arm-
oured and have complete cross-country mobility, as with the French Dragons portes. If
such rifle units were united permanently with tanks in a single formation, it would form a
comradeship in arms in time of peace - a comradeship that would prove its worth when
we come to seek the decision in the field. The benefits in terms of morale would be at
least as great as the tactical ones.
We hear some people claim that infantry are powerless without tanks, and that every
divi-sion of infantry must therefore take a detachment of tanks under its command.
Others ar-rive at the same conclusion from precisely the opposite direction, maintaining
that infan-try remain the chief arm just as before. Whether they underestimate or
overestimate the infantry, they nevertheless agree on one thing - the tanks must be split
up! Whatever one may say about the present offensive capacity of infantry, it is
undeniable that just about the worst service you could perform for the infantry would be
to divide the armour, if only in part. Many infantry divisions will of necessity have to fight
on the defensive for greater or lesser periods of time; they can make do with anti-tank
weapons. Willy-nilly, other in-fantry divisions must go over to the attack, and many of
them will do so over ground that is difficult or impossible for tanks. If we were to
subordinate tanks to all of these divisions as organic elements, we would end up with
that many fewer tanks at the point where we seek the main decision, and where their
intervention would be the most rewarding. This is when the infantry really need tanks,
and if they are deprived of them by some organi-zational blunder they will have to pay for
it - as always - in their blood. A number of dis-cerning officers of infantry are in full
agreement on this point, and they urge that armour be concentrated in large formations.
We have already touched on the co-operation between air forces and armour. As al-
ready mentioned, aircraft can halt the movement of enemy reserves, especially the mo-
torized and armoured forces, towards the location of the decisive battle. There may well
be a need for air attacks on road and rail traffic, command centres and the whole com-
munications system, as well as troop accommodation, and identified assembly areas,
batteries and antitank forces. We do not underestimate the difficulty of hitting small, well-
camouflaged targets, or of destroying moving objects when we have no clear idea where
they will be when the offensive opens. However aircraft worked to telling effect as long
ago as 1918, and the attacker can hardly dispense with their co-operation nowadays.
The missions just outlined can be accomplished still more thoroughly and permanently by
paratroops and air-landing forces. Comparatively small airborne forces can hinder the in-
tervention of unarmoured reserves in a very unpleasant way. Important locations in the
enemy rear can be seized from the air, and turned into strongpoints and logistic bases for the
approaching tank offensive. In co-operation with tanks, the airborne forces could in-

132

flict considerable damage and disruption on rearward communications and establish-

ments, and even take airfields under attack. At the very least airborne forces will provide
a very rapid means of exploiting air strikes, and of converting their effect - which is usu-
ally transitory - to something more permanent.

Air strikes will have a considerable effect on the armoured forces of the enemy, which
means that adequate air cover acquires some significance for our own tank forces. The
tank forces themselves are fairly resistant to air attack. It takes a direct hit or a near-miss
to knock out or damage a tank, and the tanks can provide their own air defence through
camouflage and anti-aircraft weapons. However tank forces can be hit badly by an air at-
tack if it happens to catch them when they are resting, or their crews are out of the ve-
hicles. Moroever it is difficult to provide protection for the auxiliary arms of the tanks and
for the supply train, whose vehicles are mostly soft-skinned. They need special anti-air-
craft weapons of their own.
These supporting units also require a complement of anti-tank weapons and the latter
will also be needed to secure forming-up areas, halts on the march, assembly and rest
areas. They can also play an important part in the tank battle by covering the initial points
of departure and forward assembly areas of the tank forces, and also their flanks and
rear.
In the World War the shortcomings of the signals and communications systems
greatly impeded the command of tank forces, and their cooperation with the other arms.
Tank company commanders were sometimes reduced to accompanying their forces on
horseback, to exercise a modicum of control, and they had to make considerable use of
runners. Here is the origin of the accusation that tanks are 'deaf. This shortcoming has
now been overcome by that magnificent ^invention, the wireless telegraph and its rela-
tion, the voice radio. Every modern tank has a radio receiver, and every command tank is
55
equipped with both receiver and transmitter. Tank units are now under guaranteed
command and control. Inside the larger tanks are various devices to enable the crew
members to communicate with one another.

Radio is likewise the principal medium of control between tank units and the other forces,
and radios are the main equipment of the signals elements which provide the communi-
cations for the tank units and their supporting arms. Telegraphic and optical communica-
tions have become generally unusable because of the speed of mechanized forces, the
way they have extended in breadth and depth both on the march and in action, and the
dust and smoke of the battlefield. However visual signals are used up to company level
as a replacement for radios in case of breakdown.
Telephones are employed during quiet spells, when the forces are being held in readi-
ness over long periods of time, and (not excluding the postal telephone network) for ap-
proach marches behind our own front line.
Basically the signals elements maintain the communications between commanders and
their sub-units, be ween commanders and their own superiors, and with whatever neigh-
bouring forces, aircraft and other units are engaged in the common task. The signallers
must remain in the closest contact with the commanders to whom they are assigned. In
combat these commanders will be right up front with their tanks, which means that arm-
oured radio vehicles with full cross-country capability are essential for the panzer signals
elements.
In combat the transmission of orders are conveyed to the rapidly moving armoured forces in
different and much shorter forms than with the infantry divisions. Reports and orders get
through much more quickly when we adopt abbreviated voice procedures and prearranged
signals for contingencies. The only way to secure good communications within the tank
forces and their co-operation with the other arms is through constant prac-

133

tise, and specialized tactical and technical training. Tank forces are indeed 'deaf when
they do not have signals units of this kind, and the same holds true of their superior offi-
cers, their neighbours and their sister arms - deaf to the events which are being played
out around them.

Lastly we must devote some words to the question of the supply of tank forces and their
supporting arms. Until quite recently the objections most frequently raised against a mas-
sive programme-of mechanization in general, and the setting up of a large tank force in
particular, concerned the difficulties in the supplies of fuel and rubber. These objections
carried some weight at the time, but we are delighted to be able to say that they will
56
cease to do so in the near future. We owe this to the comprehensive measures that
have been taken in the Reich's Four Year Plan to assure the synthetic manufacture of
fuel and rubber.

We are still left with the problem of getting the fuel and tyres to the mechanized forces in
good time, together with their ammunition, rations, medical services, workshops and re-
placement personnel. In this respect we must strive to limit the rearward services to the
necessary minimum, so as not to complicate the management of the tank forces. The
solution lies in the total mechanization of the supply system.
When we trace the process of argument that we have followed over the last few sections,
we are left with a number of salient issues which concern the organization and training
not just of the tank forces, but of the other arms that are destined to work with them.
These issues in fact go to the heart of eternal problems of defence and attack, and the
various means by which they might be resolved.

Warfare at the present day

The defensive

When the World War ended in 1918, the defensive had attained a strength which was
unprecedented for centuries. It was the defensive that had derived the chief benefit from
the buildup of the resources of the infantry, artillery and engineers that had taken place
during that conflict. The air and tank forces had made the main contribution on the
offensive side, but in 1918 they were both arrested in their infancy, and were therefore
unable to display their full potential — a fact which exercises a considerable influence
even today. Despite the clear warnings of 1918 the inclination is still to underestimate
these two new arms of the service, rather than otherwise.

Let us say for the sake of argument that air and tank forces did not exist at the present
time, and then go on to examine the implications for the attack and the defence. The un-
avoidable conclusions are that it would be far more difficult than it was even in 1918 for
an attacker to gain a decisive victory over a defender of approximately equal force; that a
very considerable superiority in materiel and quantity would still offer no guarantee of
success, and that if we wished (or for the lack of time were forced) to gain an offensive
victory, we would have to cast around for some entirely novel means of attack.
How has the situation on the continent of Europe developed since 1918? Permanent
frontier fortifications have come into being, and they surpass anything seen since the
time of the Romans; in some countries they form continuous defensive zones and are in
a state of active armament. The garrisons, weapons and ammunition are all securely
lodged in shell-proof accommodation; obstacles have been laid out and the facilities for
communication have been established. The garrisons are in permanent residence in the
fortifications even in time of peace, and they have been separated organizationally from
the field army. Skilful use has been made of all the advantages the terrain has to offer,

134

and the natural and artificial defences are complementary. It is fair to assume that, be-
hind the border fortifications, a number of rearward defences already exist, and that
others have been laid out for future development. We know from the World War just how
rapidly such lines may be strengthened to frustrate attack by greatly superior convention-
al forces.

Even if we managed to bring off surprise against fortifications of this kind, the penetra-
tions would be checked by fast-moving motorized reserves, giving the defenders time to
organize their countermeasures. As early as 1916-18 modern means of transport, and
trucks in particular, acquired great and undeniable defensive value.
It is out of the question to think of assaulting fortifications like this with the weapons of
1916; the only result would be that the offensive would be exhausted in a weary battle of
attrition in which the attacking forces would find themselves at a severe disadvantage
and suffer accordingly.
But it does not end there. We also have to take into account the way that various coun-
tries have gone on to organize their defences since 1918. A number of states without
permanently mobilized forces have chosen to lay out defences along the most important
sectors of their national frontiers. These works will be located in terrain that is inaccessi-
ble to tanks, or at least offers protection against all realistically foreseeable kinds of ar-
mour. They will have ample anti-tank weapons, enjoying meticulously surveyed fields of
fire. All due attention will have been paid to the camouflage and anti-aircraft defence of
these assets. Behind ramparts of this kind the defensive will have extraordinary potency
against even the modern offensive weapons of aircraft and tanks. Something altogether
new in the way of offensive power would be needed to smash such a defence in a rea-
sonably short time.
Nations that have been endowed by Nature with predominantly strong borders, and who
are able to defend the rest of their territory in the way just described, possess indeed a
high degree of security. If the neighbours of such nations have not followed their exam-
ple, the fortifications also serve to offer good cover for the deployment of an offensive
army.
It is a different matter when countries do not have natural frontiers, and when they are
devoid of continuous and strong border fortications on the lines of the Roman limes as
we find elsewhere. Nations in that situation will be able to confront the attacker only with
discontinuous fortresses, helped out at best with light intermediate works. Positions of
that kind offer reasonable protection against conventional weapons, but not if the enemy
is able to employ air forces and tanks. If the attacker gains surprise, he will not find it par-
ticularly difficult to penetrate through the gaps.
When countries are indeed surrounded by a modern Great Wall of China they enjoy such
a high degree of security that it seems they could dispense with their tanks, and rely on
the strength of their fortifications, the impregnability of their obstacles, and the excellence
of their anti-tank weapons. In fact they are very far from doing so. They happen to be just
the nations that have created particularly large tank forces, well suited for attacking for-
tresses, and the ones which subject their armed forces to constant augmentation and
modernization. There are two explanations. Either they know that even the strongest for-
tresses have their Achilles' heel, or they plan to open a surprise attack on their own ac-
count - which is perfectly feasible, since they are in a state of constant readiness.
Countries without Chinese Walls must therefore reckon on the attacker gaining initial suc-
cess with the advantage of surprise, and effecting break-ins of varying speed and depth.

For the break-ins the attacker will make little use of his infantry divisions, and still less of
his divisions of cavalry; he is much more likely to commit his heavy breakthrough tanks in
his first line of battle, with the light armour and all kinds of motorized supporting arms fol-

135

lowing up. Simultaneously with the ground assault the attacker will strike with his air
forces, with the intention of crippling the defenders' air forces, imposing delays on the
movement of defending troops - especially the tanks and other motorized units - and de-
stroying the command system. The air and tank assaults will be especially effective if the
defenders are slow to set their own forces in movement. If a lack of space compels the
defender to do all he can to limit the depth of the break-in, he will have to be particularly
quick on his feet, and under an obligation to match the enemy in the air and on the
ground with equal, if not locally superior, forces.

As far as tanks are concerned, superiority on at least the local level is attainable only by
concentrating all the available forces - scattering the tanks equally among armies, corps
and divisions is a recipe for permanent inferiority on the decisive sectors. The business
of deciding where to concentrate the armoured forces for the decisive defensive battle
will be simplified if, because of difficulties of terrain, the deployment of the larger motor-
ized and tank formations by attacker and defender alike is restricted to particular areas. It
would be a grave mistake to commit tanks to areas where you do not wish to stage a de-
cisive battle, or where this is ruled out altogether by topographical obstacles. Weak
block-ing forces would be adequate for sectors of this kind.
Where do we end up, when we scatter our resources of tanks in a defensive posture,
strung out equally all along the front line? We end up by being defeated, just like the Brit-
ish in 1918! In contrast the French held back their tanks for a successful counter-offen-
57
sive, and this gave them victory in the Battle of Soissons in July 1918.

The offensive
58
Every attacker needs striking power, whether he intends to deliver a strategic surprise,
as outlined above, or launch a breakthrough or a counterblow from a posture of defence.
What exactly do we mean by striking power? Does it reside in our bayonets, in the rifles
of our infantry, or even in our machine-guns and artillery? Can they really move quickly
enough with the motive capacity of men and horses? Do bodies of riflemen armed with
the bayonet and the M 1898 Carbine genuinely represent the striking power of the infan-
try? Is it realistic to expect that these men, who are effectively defenceless for most of
the duration of the combat, can go on to launch a 'storm' against machine-guns, and still
show a moral superiority over defenders who are firing from cover? Will we not make the
same mistake which in 1806 caused the Prussians to advance proudly against the foe
without firing a shot, and then, so as not to disturb the alignment of their heads, opened
battalion volleys without taking aim, and indeed without lying down under enemy fire?

The Austrians in 1866, the British in the Boer War in 1899, the Russians in Manchuria in
1904, and the young Germans in Flanders in 1914 — they all relied on the bayonet. And
what was the result? Do we really have to go through all that again?
Incredibly enough one is still accounted a heretic if one dares to assail the sacred cow of
infantry shock action, as invested in the bayonet. It is timely to repeat what General Field
Marshal von Moltke wrote and said on this point more than eighty years ago now: 'Since
the defenders have a distinct tactical advantage in a fire fight, and since the Prussian
needle gun is better than the infantry weapons of foreign armies, there is more reason
than ever for the Prussian army to fight on the defensive.' (Moltkes taktischstrategische
Aufsatze, Foreword, xii.) He taught that, 'Even when you are on the attack you must
shake the enemy by bringing fire to bear on them, before you carry through with the bay-
onet.' He cautioned, '. . .in practice this was probably what actually happened in the at-
tack as recommended and employed by Frederick the Great; people at the present day
are nevertheless very fond of describing it as "getting stuck in with the bayonet".'
(Moltke,
56.) He described the action at Hagelsberg in 1813, the great day of the Landwehr with

136

its celebrated bayonet charge, which cost the enemy the grand total of between 30 and

35 dead, and he concluded, 'The statistics indicate that it was not the bayonet attack
which determined the outcome at Hagelsberg, but the other way around - the bayonet at-
tack was carried through because the issue had been decided already.' (Moltke, 57.)
In the era of machine-guns and hand-grenades the bayonet has surrendered still more of its
significance. As early as 1914 striking power resided in firepower - which for the infan-try
meant their machine-guns and other heavy weapons, and for the higher, divisional level, the
artillery. If this striking power was adequate, as it was on the Eastern Front, and in Romania,
Serbia and Italy, the attacks succeeded. Where it was inadequate, as on the

Western Front, the attacks failed.

Striking power as expressed in firepower attained gigantic proportions in the World War,
whether measured in quantity of ammunition, calibre of artillery or the length of the bom-
bardments. And yet as a general rule it was incapable of smashing the enemy resistance
quickly enough or completely enough to attain more than a deep break-in of the defen-
sive system; or at least not on the Western Front, which was the decisive theatre of the
war. On the contrary, the long duration of the bombardment, which was considered nec-
essary to gain the decisive effect, gave the defenders time for countermeasures - bring-
ing up their reserves, or if necessary falling back. Very often the first sign of an imminent
offensive was enough to trigger a decision on the part of the defenders to withdraw; such
counter-moves were prepared with care, so that the enemy blow fell on empty air at the
decisive moment, or the attacker simply abandoned the assault altogether. The best ex-
amples are the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line in 1917, and the French fall-
back at Reims in 1918.
The World War proved that striking power does not consist in firepower alone, however
furious and long-drawn-out it might be. It is no good converting firm ground to a lunar
landscape by an unaimed area bombardment; you must bring fire to bear on the enemy
by closing to close range, identifying the targets that pose the greatest hindrance to the
attack, and annihilating them by direct fire.
In the time of Frederick the Great it was still possible to come at the enemy with cold
steel in the form of the infantry bayonet and the cavalry sword, relying on the muscle
power of men and horses. Those days have long passed, and even in the Seven Years
War General von Winterfeldt could write to the king: 'We simply won't make it if we ad-
vance with shouldered muskets a.nd without firing.' In fact a precondition for the success
of shock action was that the enemy were already rattled by fire. Even the celebrated
charges of the Bayreuth Dragoons at Hohenfriedberg [1745] and Seydlitz's at Rossbach
[1757] were aimed at infantry that had already been shattered. Attacks against unbroken
infantry were indecisive, as was shown at the Battle of Zorndorf [1758].
The need for preparatory fire before an attack grew in proportion to the increasing range,
speed of fire and penetrating power of weapons. These developments chiefly benefited
the defensive, and they culminated in the attritional or artillery battles of the World War.
And yet at the present day even the strongest firepower is no longer adequate to permit
us to advance with sufficient speed and 'bring fire to bear on the enemy'. The only weap-
on of any use in this respect happens to be an ancient one, by which we mean armour.
Armour had fallen out of use in olden times not because it could not be made thick
enough to offer protection against firearms, but because men and horses were simply not
strong enough to carry armour of such dimensions! This power was then supplied by the
invention of the internal combustion engine. It was now possible to move armoured ve-
hicles and their crews unscathed by small-arms fire until they closed with the enemy, and
were able to bring them under direct fire and wipe them out. Motorized armoured ve-
hicles also had the crushing capacity to cross and destroy the dreaded belts of barbed
 137

wire, and the obstacle-crossing capability to overcome trenches and other obstructions.

In late 1917 and in 1918 the true striking power of the Allied armies was therefore inher-
ent in the tanks, after the 'impregnable' Hindenburg Line had been broken through at
Cambrai in a single morning.
What after all is striking power? It is the power that enables combatants to get close enough
to destroy the enemy with their weapons. Only forces that possess this capacity can be
reckoned to have true striking power, in other words, have true offensive capacity. After the
experiences of the last war we are not boasting when we proclaim that, out of all the
weapons of ground warfare, the tank has this striking power to the highest degree.

Post-war developments have not presented the avid military world with anything better.
For better or worse soldiers will have to come to terms with the tank, however difficult it
might be for individuals to change their ways.
When the greatest striking power of the offensive resides in a particular weapon, this
weapon must claim the right to use that power according to its own rules. It will be the
main battle-winning weapon, wherever it is put into action, and the other weapons must
accommodate themselves to its needs. What is at issue is therefore not helping a
particu-lar weapon, however tradition-laden it might be, to score a measure of success,
but of winning the battles of the future, and of winning them so completely, so speedily,
and so comprehensively that they will bring the war to a rapid conclusion. All the
weapons must co-operate to this end, gauging their own performance and demands
according to those of the arms that have the greatest striking power.
The tank forces are at once the youngest of all the arms, and the one with the highest
de-gree of such striking power. They must therefore advance their claims on their own
ac-count, since there is no country in the world where the other arms will concede these
of their own free will. The more effective the developments in anti-tank defence, the more
difficult will be the armoured attack, and the more forcibly and loudly the tankmen must
press their demands.

Now, as before, these tactical requirements come down to three: Surprise; Deployment
en masse; Suitable terrain.
These are the preconditions for the success of any kind of tank attack, and they will de-
termine the organization of the armoured forces in war and peace, their weapons and de-
velopment, and finally the selection of their commanders and troops.
Surprise may be attained through speedy and well-concealed movements, through the
appropriate preparation and execution of the attack, and through new weapons of unpre-
cedented capability. The rapid execution of the armoured attack is of decisive importance
for the outcome of the battle; the supporting arms that are destined for permanent co-op-
eration with the tanks must accordingly be just as .fast-moving as the tanks themselves,
and they must also be united with the tanks in an all-arms formation in peacetime. It is a
different story when the tanks do not have supporting arms of this kind. They end up
going into action with forces that have never settled into teams with them, that are slow-
moving, and which therefore deprive the tanks of the capability to thrust fast and deep in-
to the enemy. In other words they throw away their greatest asset.
Great things may hang upon military equipment of a novel kind — impenetrable armour,
for example, or an excellent gun, or an unusual turn of speed. When preparations are
proceeding in peacetime it is therefore most important to preserve the greatest secrecy in
the field of military technology. As already mentioned, the prime example of security and
its benefits is represented by 'Big Bertha', the 420mm gun which shattered the Belgian
and north French fortresses in 1914.

The principle of deployment en masse - the concentration of forces where we seek to

gain the decision - is actually one that is valid for all arms. And yet in Germany and else-

138

where there are many voices who maintain that the contrary is true of tanks. This is a vio-
lation of one of the first principles of war, and we cannot accept it passively in peacetime
if we are to avoid the most condign punishment in the case of hostilities. If we once ac-
cept the principle of deployment en masse — the concentration of force on the decisive
point - we must draw the necessary conclusions in terms of organization. Deployment en
masse can be accomplished in actual warfare only if the tank forces and their
commanders have learned how to fight in large formations in peacetime. In the case of
mobile troops, and their leaders, it is very much more difficult to improvise from the
ground upwards than it is with the infantry.

As for the terrain, the tank forces should be committed only where there are no obstacles
that exceed the capacity of their machines; otherwise the armoured attack will break on
the terrain. It is, for example, thoroughly misleading on exercise to dig a ditch that is im-
possible for a particular type of tank to cross, then force the tank to tackle it by binding
or-ders, and finally broadcast the 'failure' of the machine or the tank forces as a whole. It
is no less absurd to require light machine-gun tanks to assault a fortress or a large city.
This would not even be demanded of light artillery - a big task calls for a heavy calibre of
weapon. Tanks have a certain capacity, just like men and animals; when one's demands
exceed that capacity, they will fail.
Since we cannot hope to find favourable terrain for tanks everywhere, we must strive to
employ them where they can move and show their striking power to the best advantage -
or at least in sufficient force, breadth and depth, and with the element of surprise. It is al-
so a question of organizing the tanks in mixed armoured formations that are capable of
59
meeting their assigned tasks, and of training their commanders in an appropriate way.

In the last war the tanks invariably came off badly when they were fed into action in
penny packets - and that was at a time when the Germans had hardly any kind of organ-
ized defence. In a future war, however, both sides will have had the opportunity to come
to terms with tanks and devise appropriate measures of anti-tank defence in time of
peace. In such a context there will be horrible consequences attendant on any misuse of
tanks. How might such a misuse arise? It is most likely to derive from a mistaken
appreci-ation of the respective effectiveness of the defensive and the armoured
offensive. A de-fective organization of the armour could all too easily result.
As far as ground combat is concerned, we consider that the best chance of success for
the offensive in modem warfare lies in deploying armour en masse, in suitable terrain
and with the advantage of surprise. We must emphasize that any success on the part of
the attack must be exploited speedily by the other arms, if it is not to lose its effect after a
short period of time. But it is also our conviction that aerial warfare, as well as ground
combat, must be influenced to a significant degree by the existence of tank forces.

Aircraft and tanks

We have often mentioned the role of aerial reconnaissance and tactical aircraft in the
support of armoured attacks. But it can also work the other way round, with the opera-
tions of tank forces promoting the ends of aerial warfare. One could imagine how at the
beginning of a war the armoured forces could strike at vital enemy airfields or other rele-
vant objectives close to the border; again, after successes on the ground at a later stage
of the war, the tactical aircraft, airlanding troops and tank forces could be assigned com-
mon objectives deep in the enemy rear, with the aim of breaking the enemy's power of
resistance with the least loss of life. This is a concept of warfare which has so far re-
ceived little attention - the pundits have been too preoccupied with the questions of infan-
try support and the initial tactical decision in ground combat. But we do not have to be
60
out-and-out disciples of Douhet to be persuaded of the great significance of air forces

139

for a future war, and to go on from there to explore how success in the air could be ex-
ploited for ground warfare, which would in turn consolidate the aerial victory. Here again
it comes down to striving for a common victory, and looking beyond the interests of an in-
dividual arm of the service.

Questions of supply and transport

The extensive mechanization of the army has raised two important issues: how will the
army as a whole be supplied with fuel, spares and replacement vehicles? And how will
we be able to move our large mechanized formations, and especially the ones that are
road-bound? A positive answer to these two requirements is a precondition for the de-
ployment of large tank formations, not least for their use in the operational dimension.

As far as fuel is concerned, German's consumption in 1935 came to 1,920,000 metric

tons. The figures for 1936 are made up of: 1,382,620 tons of imported petrol and oil;
444,600 (approx.) tons of synthetic fuel; 210,000 tons of spirits (Spiritusbeimischung).
These means that in 1936 two-thirds of German peacetime needs still had to be met by
imports. However the Four Year Plan has provided in a comprehensive way for synthetic
fuel production, which will change the picture significantly and free us in the foreseeable
future from the need to import petrol and oil.
In addition the calls on fuel can be diminished by using alternative sources of energy,
which will have their primary application in civilian life; here we have in mind various
forms of motors driven by gas or electricity.
It will likewise not be long before Germany is independent of imports of foreign rubber.
An efficient motor and engineering industry is a prerequisite for a sustained replenish-
ment of military vehicles and spares. The following figures will give an overview of how
we stand in comparison with the major industrialized nations:
Production of Motor Vehicles
1
9
3
1935 6
7
7
.
74.1% United 2
United States States %
B
r
i
t
a 7.
i 8
Britain 9.1% n %
G
e
r
m
a 4.
n 8
France 5.3% y %
F
r
a
n 3.
c 5
Germany 4.7% e %
C
a
n
a 3.
d 4
Canada 3.1% a %
I
t
a 0.
l 9
Italy 1.2% y %
O
t
h
e 2.
r 4
Others 2.5% s %
The United States, Canada and Germany have therefore been able to increase their
share of world production, with Germany rising from fourth to third place — a favourable
position which means that in the event of war we will be able to maintain the level of our
mechanized forces and our motorized rearward services.
In all of this it is important to site most of our centres of production in localities where they
are secure, and out of the way of immediate ground or air attack. The products must also
be assigned in a rational way to the various end-users — the army, the navy, the Luft-
waffe and the domestic economy. Moreover the productive capacity of the factories must
be guaranteed by ensuring that they can hang on to their skilled labour and their engi-
neers and fitters in the event of war.
The network of highways and roads is of fundamental importance for the movement of
mechanized forces, and especially at the outbreak of war, when large numbers of com-
mercial road-bound vehicles will have to be requisitioned and incorporated in the field for-
mations. The construction of German highways has suffered from many decades of par-
simonious neglect. The reason was that the German federal government, as the respon-sible
organ, devoted most of its attention to building railways, and dumped the responsi-

140

bility for the roads on the lesser authorities - the provinces, circles and local administra-
tions - which meant that hundreds, indeed thousands of bodies were responsible for
maintaining the roads. The advent of motorized traffic had no immediate effect on this
traditional structure, and the 'autonomous rights' of the provinces remained sacrosanct,
even when they had become largely a dead letter.

The Fiihrer is a man of vision. He has recognized the enormous significance for motor-
ized traffic of a programme of road construction which is massive in scale and carried
through on consistent principles. The Reich has taken under its wing the main through
roads, and instituted the construction of highways of a unique kind, our autobahns. The
initial programme is for 7,000 kilometres of autobahn which will link the main cities of the
country. These highways are broad and unencumbered by crossings and counterflowing
traffic, and they will permit the maintenance of high and steady speeds over long
stretches - permit us, in other words, to exploit powered vehicles to the full for the first
time ever.
The military significance of good roads for powered vehicles is self-evident. But a peace-
time road network, no matter how dense, can never meet all the unexpected tactical and
operational demands of warfare. In the old days soldiers usually had to make do with the
roads available in peacetime, which were built with economic considerations in mind. But
the War of 1914-18 demonstrated demands on road construction of a massive order; we
just have to call to mind the road conditions in front of Verdun, on the Somme and in
Flanders, the endless plank roads on the Eastern Front, and the difficulties which the ar-
mies experienced with the roads in Mesopotamia and Palestine.
The achievements of the Italians in building roads in Abyssinia are particularly impres-
sive, and generally it was only the existence of these roads that permitted them to make
extensive use of their motorized forces.
In this context we may draw the following conclusions from the Italian campaign against
Abyssinia:
1. The peacetime road network has an undeniable influence on the operations of an
army and how it works at the tactical level; both sides usually avail themselves of the
network, which is known to them both and set down on maps.
2. The peacetime road network is, however, not incapable of expansion; in wartime it
can and must be adapted to the operations we have in mind, and extended accordingly.
3. Some extensions may be in the form of permanent roads — but these are expensive
in terms of time and labour, and they will be located by the enemy aerial reconnaissance.
It will often be sufficient to construct soft-topped routes which are good enough for
tracked and cross-country vehicles. Roads of this description can be built at some speed,
and under favourable conditions they may escape undetected by reconnaissance for a
considerable time.
4. The speed with which soft-topped, roads can be built is something that helps the
movement of the other arms, as well as the sudden irruption of mechanized forces.
5. The mobile armies of the future must therefore have a sufficient number of road-con-
struction units, equipped with modern machines and tools.

The most recent experience of war

The most recent examples of the deployment of tank forces are represented by the Ital-
ian campaign in Abyssinia, which we have just mentioned, and the fighting which is still in
progress in Spain.

In Abyssinia the Italians put into the field about 300 Fiat Ansaldo tanks. They were
equipped with machine-guns only, and did not have traversible turrets. The fixed posi-
tions of the machine-guns put the Italians at a disadvantage, and particularly when the

141

tanks were employed one at a time, which enabled the natives to board the machines
and kill the crews through the vision slits, which were inadequately protected. On the oth-
er hand the tanks operated to generally good effect in spite of the difficulties presented
by terrain and climate - neither the sandy deserts nor the high mountains proved to be in-
surmountable obstacles. However there is a limit to the lessons that are relevant for war-
fare in Europe, since the Abyssinians had no anti-tank defence and no armour of their
own.
When we look at the categories of the Italian tanks, we see that they performed their
tasks well, whether the armoured reconnaissance vehicles on scouting missions, or the
tanks which operated with motorized infantry in a variety of assaults. Altogether the ar-
mour helped the Italians to finish off the campaign as quickly as they did.
The war in Spain offers a somewhat greater range of experiences. As far as we can tell,
the Reds use the.Russian-made Vickers 6-ton tank, which is armed with a 4mm gun and
one or two machine-guns. With its full equipment the tank weighs eight tons, and its most
important areas are impervious to armour-piercing small-arms fire. The Nationalists have
employed only machine-gun tanks, which are armed with two machine-guns mounted in
a revolving turret. These too are proof against machine-gun fire. Apart from some cap-
tured vehicles, it appears that General Franco's forces have no gun tanks proper, though
they are equipped with a number of 37mm anti-tank guns.
So far no more than fifty tanks have appeared in action at a single time, which leads us
to suspect that neither side has a particularly great number of tanks, or any heavy tanks
with thick armour and powerful guns at all, in addition to the light tanks already men-
tioned. When we look at the numbers of machines available, and their types, there
seems little prospect of tanks being able to bring off a rapid and decisive victory in this
conflict.
It is not at all surprising that the Nationalists have held back from sending their tanks
across open country in the face of the Russian tank guns' long-range fire; the enemy
show the same bashfulness in respect of Franco's anti-tank guns.
The terrain on the western sector of the front must be accounted difficult in the extreme.
Of the three conditions for a successful tank battle - surprise, deployment en masse, and
suitable terrain - only the first is at all attainable, and then only if the belligerents are skil-
ful enough. So far neither of the two parties seems to have attempted to deploy all its
available forces in one go; as for the choice of terrain, we can only comment that a great
city like Madrid is not exactly a suitable setting for an attack by machine-gun tanks.
The reports of the fighting are fragmentary, but it does seem that tanks have been com-
mitted in all the major actions, and that as a general rule the infantry do not advance until
the armour has done its work. In the process the tanks have inevitably suffered a number
of losses, but this a fate which they share with all arms.
On the technical side there will undoubtedly be an accumulation of lessons over the
course of time, even if it is premature to assess them just now.
As far as the tank crews and commanders are concerned, the war has emphasized the
old need for long service and professional training - a few weeks are simply not enough
to enable the Spanish soldier to acquire a complete command of the modern machines
of war. There are also indications that the high command still does not have the experi-
ence to be able to use tanks properly.
With this we have reached the limits of what we can deduce in the way of conclusions
and lessons from the available reports of what has been happening in Spain.
61
In our opinion neither the war in Abyssinia nor the Spanish Civil War can offer a kind of
'general test' of the effectiveness of armour — the numbers and models of the tanks are
too few, and the actions have been too onesided and too small in scale. However the two

142

conflicts may well provide a number of pointers as to the technical and tactical develop-
ment of armour, and we will have to investigate them attentively and derive what lessons
we can. All the same they have in general terms given us no reason to abandon the prin-
ciples we have already set out.

Notes
1
The operations of the major cavalry formations in 1914 was a subject which had fascinated Gu-
derian for years before he wrote Achtung - Panzer! These operations had formed an important
topic of his military history teaching in the twenties and he had written about them for the mili-tary
press. See 'Bewegliche Truppenkorper (Eine kriegsgeschichtliche Studie)' in the Militdr-Wo-
chenblatt, No. 19, 1927, pp. 687-94.
2
This quotation from the German official history about the ineffectiveness of cavalry for strategic
reconnaissance, when taken together with von Schlieffen's statement quoted earlier about its lack
of combat power, is pretty damning. Guderian was right that as far as western Europe was
concerned horsed cavalry was approaching the end of its useful life. But we must make some
allowance for Guderian's polemical purpose in writing this book. For a more sympathetic treat-
ment of cavalry in the First . World War see S. D. Badsey, The British Army and the Arme Blan-
che Controversy 1871 — 1921, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 1981. 3. In
Great Britain First Ypres is remembered mainly as the battle which bled white the regular British
Expeditionary Force of 1914. Guderian reminds us that German losses were also grievous and
that the battle was a major strategic defeat for Germany. One of the standard accounts in English
is A. Farrar-Hockley, The Death of an Army (Barker), 1967.

231

3
Guderian's almost total reliance on Swinton does cause some weaknesses in his account of the
genesis of the tank. Swinton was one of the first to advocate an armoured, tracked, cross-country
vehicle as an aid to the offensive on the Western Front. But Guderian does not make it suffi-
ciently clear that the actual development of the tank in Britain had relatively little to do with
Swinton. The War Office was over-worked and Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War,
had virtually no interest in Swinton's concept. After some rather half-hearted trials the War Of-fice
abandoned the idea. The early development of tanks, or 'Landships' as they were at first called,
was carried out under the aegis of an Admiralty committee set up at the insistence of Winston
Churchill, the First Lord. Swinton knew nothing about this committee until its work was quite
advanced. For the Navy's side of the story see Rear-Admiral Sir Murray Sueter, The Evolu-tion of
the Tank (Hutchinson), 1937, passim.

4
Guderian's account is somewhat garbled here. Churchill was indeed an early enthusiast for
some sort of armoured cross-country vehicle as a solution to the problem of attacking trenches
and was aware of the existence of caterpillar tracks. He lacked detailed engineering knowl-edge,
however, anti did not specifically recommend the Holt system. As First Lord of the Ad-miralty,
however, he was in a position to put to work on the problem men whose technical knowl-edge
greatly exceeded his own. The successful rhomboidal landship design of Walter Wilson,
employing tracks designed by William Tritton, was the result of this. A useful and concise ac-
count of the genesis of the tank in Britain can be found in David Fletcher, Landships (HMSO),
1984.
5
This document, 'Notes on the Employment of Tanks', February 1916, is quoted in full in Swin-

ton's book, Eyewitness (Hodder and Stoughton), 1932, pp. 198214, and is available in the Stern
Papers in the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (LCMH) King's College London.
6
No charge of unwillingness to make use of new technology can be made to stick against Haig
over the issue of tanks in 1916. Guderian's charge of impatience to use them derives from Swin-
ton and is much more valid. For those interested in exploring further Haig's attitude to tanks in
1916 the relevant documents are: Haig to War Office, 9 February 1916 and 1 May 1916, WO
32/5754 and Haig to War Office 2 October 1916, WO 158/836, Public Record Office (PRO), Kew.
7
The order for 1,000 tanks is contained in Haig to War Office 2 October 1916, WO 158/836
(PRO).
8
Guderian is referring to General F. G. Anley. See J. F. C. Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconven-tional
Soldier (Nicholson and Watson), 1936, p. 112.

9
Guderian's account of the early development of tanks in France seems to be derived largely
from the French Official History and Dutil's Les Chars d'Assaut. There is still no schol-arly
account in English of the French development and use of tanks in the First World War.
10
The standard account of the initial British use of tanks on the Somme is Basil Liddell Hart, The
Tanks, Vol. I (Cassell) 1959, pp. 71-81. Liddell Hart points out that the message printed in an
English newspaper as having been reported by an air observer (and recorded by Guder-ian) that
a tank was walking up the High Street of Flers with the British Army cheering behind it had a
basis in reality but was rather embellished.

11 The battle which Guderian here refers to as Wytschaete will be more familiar to British
readers as Messines. This limited action was one of the best planned and executed of all British
attacks in the First World War. The contemporary official analysis of the performance of tanks at
Messines is in the Kew branch of the Public Record Office (PRO) WO 158/858.

12 This very extreme denunciation of the British GHQ seems to be derived largely from
Fuller's, Memoirs, especially pp. 13642 but there are also passages very hostile to GHQ in
Swinton's

Eyewitness.
13 On Allied plans in late 1917 to mass-produce tanks for the 1918 campaign the relevant
British War Office file is (PRO) WO 158/813. Guderian omits to mention that by this stage in the
war
there was a considerable degree of inter-Allied planning in tank production matters. The most
remarkable feature of this co-operation was a large, jointly financed Anglo-American tank factory
which began to be established early in 1918 at Chateauroux in France. See Memorandum by
Stern, 26 April 1918, Fuller Papers, Tank Museum, Bovington.
14
The best modern account of the technical development of British tanks in the First World War is
David Fletcher, Landships (HMSO), 1983, passim.

232

15 On this truly remarkable collection of personalities the best contemporary source is a

privately printed booklet Tank Corps H.Q. which is in the library of the Tank Museum at
Bovington. All the personalities are referred to by pseudonyms but the Tank Museum's library
staff have man-aged to provide a key.

16 In fact Fuller claims that at this stage he had never seen a copy of Swinton's paper of
February 1916, though he admired it when, early in 1918, he finally did see it. Fuller, Memoirs of
an
Unconventional Soldier (Nicholson and Watson), 1936, p. 169.
17
This conclusion is a vitally important one for German armour doctrine as Guderian preached it.
Guderian had an acute sense of the limitations of tanks and of their need for co-operation with
infantry and artillery. In Great Britain, however, in the late twenties and thirties, some of the
leading .ights of the Royal Tank Corps became impatient Lvith the problems of co-operating with
truck-borne nfantry and towed artillery, which had different nobility characteristics from theirs. The
habit of nind which developed in the Royal Tank Corps ivant garde is well illustrated in remarks
made by Colonel Eric Offord during an interview with the \merican historian Harold Winton. 'We
didn't want in all tank army but what could we do? The nfantry were in buses (i.e., trucks), they
couldn't :ome with us. The artillery were..... obstructive. They never put the rounds where you
needed them; md when you called it always came too late.' Vinton, To Change An Army (Bras-
sey's) 1988, p. 10, note 23. The RTC developed an increasing endency to operate tanks on their
own, with scant egard for infantry and artillery co-operation. This endency was later to have
disas-trous consequences on some occasions in the Western Desert.
18 There is no documented, scholarly account of ^ambrai. Guderian's version appears to be
based on iublished German accounts and on Fuller's Memoirs. Liddell Hart's short account in The
Tanks, Vol. I (Cassell), 1959, pp. 12853, appears carefully researched and is very readable, but
naturally very partisan on the Tank Corps' behalf and not documented at all. A longer account —
Bryan Cooper, The Ironclads of Cambrai (Souvenir), 1967 is also undocumented.

19 On 30 April 1918 Haig issued an order reducing the establishment of the Tank Corps in
France by one brigade and three battalions - about a fifth. In fact, however, the Tank Corps was
well be-low its projected establishment and Haig's proposal does not seem to have involved the
dis-bandment of existing units. Some Tank Corps personnel (three battalions) were to be used,
tem-porarily, as Lewis gun detachments, in view of a shortage of infantry in France. For Haig's
order and Fuller's predictably hostile reaction to it see Haig to War Office, 30 April 1918, Fuller
Papers, B45, Tank Museum, Boving-ton. See also Fuller, Memoirs, pp. 26977.

20 Guderian here rightly identifies the great unsolved problem of the German Army in 1918
as that of pursuing the enemy vigorously once he had been thrown out of his defensive positions.
In Brit-ish military parlance this was called 'exploitation'. By employing the technique (developed
by their artillery expert, Colonel Bruchmuller) of relatively short but extremely intensive artillery
bombard-ments -coupled with the infiltration tactics of the Storm-troops - the Germans were able
to smash right through Allied defensive positions, reaching the gun line on several occasions in
the spring and early summer of 1918. The inadequacy of. the German arrangements for pursuit,
however, al-lowed Allied armies to retreat in relatively good order and eventually to regain their
cohesion. John Terraine, To Win A War (Sidgwick and Jackson), 1978, pp. 5974. It does not suit
Guderian's purpose to emphasise in this book the progress that had been made in infantry tactics
in the Ger-man Army between 1914 and 1918. For a recent account of this see Bruce
Gudmundsson, Storm Troop Tactics (Praeger), 1989, passim.

233

21
Guderian writes that the Germans never achieved Durchbruch (breakthrough) in 1918. He is in
some danger here of confusing English language readers. The Germans did smash right through
the defensive positions of, for example, the British Fifth Army on the Somme in March. The prob-
lem was that no* Allied army actually disintegrated (as might have happened if the Germans had
found some way of mounting more vigorous pursuits) and thus the Allies were able to maintain a
more or less continuous, if sometimes very ragged, front. Guderian here uses the term Durch-
bruch (breakthrough) to mean irretrievable disruption of an entire front rather than merely
penetration right through a particular defensive position. The latter he refers to as a break-in.
Most British military authors would tend to use the term 'break-in' to describe a penetra-tion part-
way through a defensive position, 'breakthrough' to describe penetration all the way through and
'exploitation' to describe the process of pursuing an enemy with a view to making the penetration
of his position decisive. A British military author would be more likely to say of the Germans in
1918 that they achieved breakthrough repeatedly.

22
Guderian here identifies the Battle of Soissons as the critical turning-point of the Western
Front campaign of 1918 and, by implication, of the war as a whole. This battle is almost com-
pletely unknown in Great Britain by the title Guderian gives it. Those interested in the military his-
tory of the First World War know it as the 'Second Battle of the Marne'. But considering its great
significance it is remarkable how little is available on it in the English language. There i
s

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23 It is not clear on what evidence Guderian believes that the German tank attack at Villers-
Bre-tonneux speeded up British tank delivery, but it is true that cuts in the Tank Corps earlier
decided on were cancelled not long after this battle. Liddell Hart, op. cit., p. 167.

24 Guderian probably used Fuller's account of Hamel. His opinion of this battle echoes
Fuller's exactly. Fuller, Memoirs, pp. 289-90.
25 Here, discussing 8 August, and again when describing the events of 30 September 1918,
Gu-

derian effectively dismisses the 'Stab in the Back' myth which Hitler propagated in Mein Kampf.
Hitler seems to deny the reality of the army's defeat and blame the unsatisfactory end to the war
on the treachery of Jews and Socialists. (A. Hitler, My Struggle (Hurst and Blackett), 1933, pp.
91-2.) Guderian admits with refreshing frankness the conclusive defeat of the German Army on
the Western Front. It is perhaps surprising that in a supposedly totalitarian state a senior officer
could, in effect, contradict the published opinion of the head of state not only with impunity but
without the intervention of a censor.
26 Guderian's figures are open to question here. The regimental history gives the Tank
Corps' total strength at Amiens at 604 though this includes supply tanks. The fighting tanks
included 324 heavy tanks and 96 Whippets - a total of 420, of which 415 saw action. The same
work is less precise about the figure for Cambrai, merely saying that it was 'over 300'. Liddell Hart,
The Tanks Vol. I (1959), pp. 128 and 177. Fuller quotes the figures for Cambrai as 376 fighting
tanks and a total, including supply tanks, of 474. Fuller, Memoirs, p. 187. It does seem that
Amiens was a sig-nificantly bigger tank operation than any previous British effort though the
German High Com-mand must have had singularly little imagination if a tank attack on this scale
was 'undreamt of.

27 Guderian seems to have drawn on several accounts of Amiens. The opinion he forms of
the

significance of the battle is, however, virtually identical with that of Fuller in Memoirs, pp. 291317.

28 Most modern authorities on chemical warfare would agree with Guderian that chemical
weapon use generally tends to slow the pace of operations. Guderian here offers an important
clue as to why the Germans did not use these weapons in the early stages of the Second World
War. E. M. Spiers, Chemical Warfare (Macmillan), 1986, p. 66. 17. The last sentence is very
strange. So far from being intimidated, in the spring of 1917 the German High Command decided,
upon unre-stricted submarine warfare, knowing that there was a high probability that this would
bring the United States into the war. This did indeed happen in April and it proved fatal to German
ambi-tions. See Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War (Norton), 1967, pp. 306-9.

29 (Note: Article 171 of the Treaty of Versailles stipulates in Paragraph 3: Germany is

likewise for-bidden to manufacture or import armoured vehicles, tanks, or similar machines which
may be turned to military use.)

234

30 Guderian was clearly impressed with the Vickers Independent. It had a 3pdr gun in an all-
round traverse turret and four machine-guns in sub-turrets. It was intended to be capable of
operating without close infantry support and it could achieve 20mph. It looked impressive but had
a number of design faults. It was never put into mass production for financial reasons. David
Fletcher, Mech-anized Force (HMSO), 1991, pp. 24-5.

31 Bullet splash'. This is the phenomenon! of the interior of a tank being spattered with bullet
fragments. These could inflict extremely painful wounds. David Fletcher, Landships (HMSO),
1984, p. 16.

32 Guderian's argument here about the best kind of Field Force for Great Britain to adopt is
similar to that put forward at one stage by Basil Liddell Hart — a small but highly mechanized
force would be best. The five-division Field Force which the British General Staff planned from
1935 on-wards was to be quite highly mechanized by the standards of other armies at the time
and was to include one armoured division. But the Army got a very low priority in British
rearmament and
from January 1938 to February 1939 the General Staff was operating under what amounted to a
ban on preparations specifically intended for a campaign on the Continent. The development of
British armoured forces suffered accordingly. Liddell Hart was one of those in Britain most op-
posed to the preparation of a Field Force for the Continent in these years. The standard work on
the British Army between the wars is Brian Bond, British Military Policy Between The Two World
Wars (Oxford), 1980.
33
In this context Guderian is, perhaps, somewhat over-generous to Fuller and Liddell Hart - credit-ing
them with his own logic. Neither of them was as convinced of the importance of having infantry closely
integrated with tanks as was Guderian himself. The Experimental Mechanical Force (EMF) of 19278
was actually the idea of George Lindsay - a Royal Tank Corps (RTC) officer whom Gu-derian does not
mention - though Fuller played a significant role in establishing it and Liddell Hart commented on it at
length in the Daily Telegraph. Lindsay and Fuller were insistent on keeping conventionally armed
infantry out of the force though they wanted to include a battalion of motor-ized machine-gunners. One
particularly interesting feature of the EMF was the inclusion of 'Birch guns' -self-propelled ISpdrs. The
self-propelled gun concept in the British Army went back to the First World War when the Tank Corps
ran Gun Carrier tanks. Post-war interest in the concept by the Royal Artillery was, however, short-lived.
See J. P. Harris and F. H. Toase, Armoured Warfare (Batsford), 1990, pp. 327 and Winton, To Change
An Army (Brassey's), 1988, p. 92.

The EMF experienced difficulties in the cooperation of different arms that had differing mobility
characteristics. After 1928 the thinking of Fuller and some other leading British tank enthusiasts
became increasingly tank-centred. They played down the need for co-operation with other arms.
Fuller arrived at a particularly extreme and unsound position in his major theoretical work on ar-
mour, Lectures on F.S.R. HI (Sifton Praed), 1932. Guderian does not appear to have been famili-
ar with this, though he used Fuller's memoirs which were published later. For a discussion of Full-
er's thought at this stage see B. H. Reid, /. F. C. Fuller: Military Thinker (Macmillan), 1987, pp.
160-3. Reid largely dismisses the common belief that Liddell Hart was more perceptive than Fuller
in seeing the need for intimate co-operation between infantry and tanks.
34
Guderian is wrong about the year. The 1st Brigade RTC, an experimental formation, was
assembled, under the command of Charles Broad, during the training season of 1931. See Harris
and Toase, op. cit., pp. 37-40.

35
Guderian's account of the Mobile Force exercise of 1934 is generally accurate but he gets one
fact badly wrong. The Mobile Force was commanded by George Lindsay, one of the most promi-
nent and experienced RTC officers of the day. Guderian is probably getting confused with the
EMF of 1927 which was commanded by an infantry brigadier -Collins, who had no previous ar-
mour experience. The disappointing showing of the 1934 Mobile Force is attributable partly to the
ground rules for the exercise having been laid by Major-General 'Jock' Burnett-Stuart in such a
way as to make its life as difficult as possible, partly to unfair umpiring, and partly to a dispute be-
tween Lindsay and his most important subordinate commander - Hobart. The best account is
Winton, To Change An Army (Brassey's), 1988, pp. 174-83.

235
36
The decision
to create a mechanized Mobile Division to replace the horsed cavalry division
was taken by Field Marshal Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd, Chief of the Imperial General
Staff, late in 1934. The decision to mechanize the entire cavalry of the line was set out in a major
document (PRO - W.O. 32/4612) prepared under Mont-gomery-Massingberd's direction, in
September 1935. Entitled 'The Future Reorganization of the British Army', this document at-
tempted to map out the army's development for the next five years. See Harris and Toase, op. cit.,
pp. 42-4.
37
Guderian was right. In addition to their Mobile (armoured) Division the British set up 'Army Tank
Battalions' equipped with slow but heavily armoured 'Infantry Tanks' for close co-operation with
infantry advancing on their feet. Liddell Hart, The Tanks, Vol. I(Cassell), 1959, pp. 337-8.

38 The French persisted with hybrid tank-cavalry divisions. They still had five of these - of a
type called Divisions Legeres Cavaleries - in 1940. Guderian was correct in predicting that their
com-bat power would be negligible. Robert Icks, Famous Tank Battles (Profile), 1972, pp. 102-14.

39 Guderian is here discussing what the French called Divisions Legeres Mecaniques
(DLMs), the nearest thing they had to panzer divisions. In 1940 there were still only three, with a
fourth in the
process of creation. Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, Armour (Stevens), I960, pp. 64-7.
40
Guderian was partly right. The French did belatedly create Divisions Cuirassees de Reserve
(DCRs). These were armoured divisions which included some very heavy tanks - Char Bs. But the
divisional structure was faulty, the number of tanks inadequate and the Char B (despite its
impressive size, armour and armament) had design faults one of which, a one-man turret, was
also found in the Somua, the best tank held in the DLMs. There were three DCRs in May 1940
with a fourth, commanded by Charles de Gaulle, in the process of formation. The first three were
sent against the German bridgeheads over the Meuse but proved very ill-adapted to
piecemeal by the seven panzer
long road marches, arrived in bits and were destroyed divi-
sions in that sector. Gunsburg, Divided and
Conquered (Greenwood Press), 1979, pp. 68-
9.
41 Guderian's logic is compelling. The French, however, still had more than half of their tanks
split up in small units for co-operation with infantry divisions in 1940. See R. Icks, op. cit., pp. 102-
3.

42 A particular example of the greater technical sophistication Guderian is here discussing is

the Russian acquisition of a prototype designed by American inventor, Christie, which
incorporated
his
revolutionary suspension system. The
ish tanks (lik
based on it e the
work extremely well and used it
cit., pp. 191-2 and 225-9.
43 Guderian is here somewhat over-estimating the Red Air Force. Despite its enormous size
it proved neither very powerful nor modern and was totally outclassed by the Germans in 1941. It
was not until 1943 that the Soviets were beginning to achieve air parity on their front. Alexander
Boyd, The Soviet Air Force (Macdonald and Jane's), 1977, pp. 88-124 and 167-84.

44 Guderian is extremely prophetic here. His insight may derive partly from a visit to Russia
in 1933 during which he saw a Soviet tank factory. His claim in his memoirs that he opposed
Opera-tion 'Barbarossa' must be taken seriously in view of the evidence of this passage.
Guderian, Pan-zer Leader (Arrow), 1990, pp. 142-4.

45 This is, of course, a gross over-statement of the importance of tanks in the First World
War, made for effect.
46 This entire chapter is derived from an earlier article of the same title: 'Die Panzertruppen
und ihr Zusammenwirken mit den anderen Waffen', in: Militarwissenschaftliche Rundschau^ issue
5/1936, pp. 606-26. The French Army was very short of anti-tank mines in 1940. Alistair Home, To
Lose A Battle (Macmillan), 1969, pp. 158 and 165. But mines were later to play a crucial role in
armoured warfare, most notably in the Western Desert and on the Eastern Front.

47 This prediction was to hold good for the later stages of the Second World War, One of the
rea-sons for the ease with which the Germans succeeded in 1940 was that at the breakthrough
sector they selected on the Meuse the French were desperately short of anti-tank guns. Home,
op. cit. p. 158.

236

48 In 1937 when Guderian wrote this last sentence it was a bold statement. Today it is one of
the most well-worn of military axioms.
49 The concept which Guderian outlines in this paragraph and the last, of attacking the
whole depth of the enemy's defences simultaneously, is very reminiscent of the writings of the
great
Russian military thinker of the inter-war period, Marshal Tukhachevsky, who called the con-cept
'Deep Battle'. See R. Simpkins, Deep Battle: The Brainchild-of Marshal Tukhachevsky
(Brassey's), 1987, passim.
50
For British reaction to the first tank versus tank clash see Elles to General Staff GHQ, 26 April
1918. B40, Fuller Papers, Tank Museum.

51
In preferring stationary fire to fire on the move Guderian once again demonstrates his grasp of
tactical realities. In the 1930s and 1940s this was the only way for tank gunners to achieve ac-
curacy. On the move a tank was a hopelessly unstable gun platform. Yet in Great Britain between
the wars the Royal Tank Corps made a shibboleth of fire on the move and this was taught at the
RTC gunnery school at Lulworth almost to the exclusion of stationary fire. See Liddell Hart, The
Tanks, Vol. I, pp. 228-9. Percy Hobart, the leading light of the RTC in the mid-late thir-ties, the
man who raised and trained 7th Armoured Division in Egypt, was a fanatical advocate of fire on
the move. See Hobart to Liddell Hart 21 September 1936, para. 4, LH l/376/35(a)b., Liddell Hart
Papers, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (LHCMA) King's College London (KCL). The
extent to which this difference in tactical doctrine affected the course of British-German tank bat-
tles in the desert is a subject worthy of investigation.

52
In practice the panzer forces were to demonstrate enormous pragmatism and flexibility. In the
crucial Meuse crossing operation of 13 May 1940 Guderian's XIX Corps led with its engi-neer and
infantry components, the tanks following later. F. K. Roth-burst, Guderian's XIX Pan-zer Corps
And The Battle of France (Praeger), 1990, pp. 72-81.

53
Guderian's commonsense and breadth of vision are apparent in the stress he places on the
panzer divisions' sapper components. This contrasts markedly with the views of Percy Hobart, the
most radical of the British tank enthusiasts, who, at about the time Guderian wrote Achtung -
Panzer!, was advocating a small and almost all-tank armoured division with no integral sapper
component - even though he was an ex-engineer himself. Organization of Higher Mobile
Formations, 3 February 1937, LH 15/11/6, Liddell Hart Papers, LHCMA, KCL.

54 Again Guderian's attitude to co-operation between tanks and other arms is worth
contrasting with that of Hobart, the leading light of the British Royal Tank Corps at this time.
Hobart saw the need for only a tiny amount of infantry (one battalion) in the armoured division and
even that was to play little role in mobile operations. LH 15/11/6 and 15/11/7, 28 September 1937,
Liddell Hart Papers, LHCMA, KCL.
55 The radio provision in the German armoured divisions was better than in those of any
other army at the outbreak of the Second World War. This was an enormous advantage in terms
of tac-tical flexibility. Harris and Toase, Armoured Warfare (Batsford), 1990, p. 59.

56 Guderian was rather over-optimistic on the synthetic fuel issue. In fact in the closing
stages of

the war, especially after they had lost access to Roumanian resources, the Germans suffered
serious fuel shortage.
57 From a post-Second World War vantage-point this passage has a certain irony. The
French, whom Guderian here praises for their concentration of armour for the counter-stroke at
Soissons in 1918, in 1940 made precisely the error which Guderian accuses the British of making
in 1918, spreading their armour right across the front. Icks, Famous Tank Battles (Profile), 1972,
p.

103.
58 The German word Guderian uses (here translated as striking power) is Stosskraft.
Kenneth Macksey has rendered it as 'dynamic punch'. See Macksey, Guderian (Macdonald and
Jane's), 1975, p. 45. There is in fact no exact English equivalent.

237

59
The basic principles of large numbers, suitable ground and surprise had been laid down by
Swinton as early as February 1916. See Notes On The Employment Of 'Tanks' by Swinton, Stern
Papers, LHCMA, KCL. Printed in Swinton, Eyewitness (Hodder and Stoughton), 1932, pp. 198-
214. Guderian adds the critical insight that tanks in the future will only fulfil their poten-tial when
fully integrated with other arms in a well-balanced mechanized formation under commanders
trained to think in all-arms terms. It was this last insight which (generally speaking) the British
Royal Tank Corps, and later the Royal Armoured Corps, did not adequately share in the late
thirties and early forties. Of the British thinkers, George Lindsay was the nearest to seeing the
point but his influence tragically waned after 1934. See Winton, To Change An Army (Brassey's)
1988, pp. 177-83.
60
Douhet was an Italian theorist who, in the 1920s, preached in his book The Command of the Air
(1928) the doctrine that the next war would be decided by massive bombardment of cities at the
opening of hostilities. Guderian believed in air power but is here clearly rejecting Douhet in favour
of the closest possible co-operation between air forces and mechanized ground forces. Guderian
had explored the impact of air power on
'Truppen auf Kraftwagen und Fliegerabwehr',
der Luftwaffe auf die Infanterietaktik' in the
1924 and 'Der Einfluss Austrian journal Militär-
u
n Technische Mitteilungen, LIX, 1928, pp.
wissenschaftliche d 507-12.
61
Guderian was right virtually to dismiss Spain as a source of tactical and operational lessons for
armour. Field Marshal Sir Cyril Deverell, the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff at the time,
similarly dismissed the Spanish experience on the grounds that tanks had been too badly handled
there to draw any lessons. He continued to believe that tanks were very important for the break-
through role. Liddell Hart, however, was increasingly doubtful whether tanks could over-come the
great strength of the defence and Spain appears to have reinforced these doubts. Talk with
Deverell, 29 June 1937, LH 11/1937/56, Liddell Hart Papers, LHCMA, KCL.
1
The divisional commander was mistaken in thinking that his troops were out of fuel. After regulating the fuel stocks in the hands
of the troops it proved possible to continue the advance. One must always distrust the report of troop commanders:
'We have no fuel.' Generally they have. But if they become tired they lack fuel. That is a common experience of war with
the forward troops. During the campaign in France there was no lack of fuel— good staff work can avoid this calamity.
Lat-er in the war we often had a real scarcity of fuel because of the destruction of our industry. But in 1940 it was only a
ques-tion of transport and easy to solve.
2
Spitta was the name of the Battalion Commander.
1
Quoted in English in the original.
62 Heinkel He 111P2 Kampfgeschwader 55. This was the first model of the He 111 to have
the gla-zed nose profile.
63 In connection with the Corps Order for the attack across the Meuse it is to be noted that
very careful training of the divisions prior to the opening of the Western Campaign greatly
facilitated the issuing of the order. During the night 12th-13th May, 1940, the divisions issued
orders to their unit commanders which began: "Attack in accordance with map exercise carried
out on............"It was only thanks to these very thorough preliminary studies that it proved possible
to carry out the preparations for the attack in the very limited time available. Only minor alterations
to the plan as laid down during the map exercise proved necessary.

64 These two preliminary orders were based on the orders for the map exercise carried out
in Ko-blenz. They served as directive until the final orders for the attack across the Meuse were
issued.

238

65
The Reichswehr (German for "Imperial Defence") formed the military organization of Germany from
1919 until 1935, when it was renamed the Wehrmacht ("Defence Force"). At the end of World War I,
the forces of the German Empire had mostly split up, the men making their way ho-me individually or in
small groups. Many of them joined the Freikorps ("Free Corps"), a collection of volunteer paramilitary
units that were involved in revolution and border clashes between 1918 and 1923. The newly formed
Weimar Republic did need a military though, and on 6 March 1919 a decree established the Vorläufige
Reichswehr ("Provisional National Defence"), consisting of a Vorläufige Reichsheer ("Provisional
National Army") and a Vorläufige Reichsmarine ("Provisional National Navy"). On 30 September 1919,
the army was reorganized as the Übergangsheer ("Transitional Army"). About 400,000 men served in
the armed forces. This lasted until 1 January 1921, when the Reichswehr was officially established
according to the limitations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles (Articles 159 to 213). The Reichswehr
was a unified organization composed of the following: The Reichsheer, an army consisting of two group
command; seven infantry divi-sions, and; three cavalry divisions; The Reichsmarine, a navy with a
limited number of certain types of ships and boats. No submarines were allowed. The Reichswehr was
limited to a standing army of 100,000 men, and a navy of 15,000. The establishment of a general staff
was prohibited. Heavy weapons such as artillery above the calibre of 105 mm (for naval guns, above
205 mm), ar-moured vehicles, submarines and capital ships were forbidden, as were aircraft of any
kind. Com-pliance with these restrictions was monitored until 1927 by the Military Inter-Allied
Commission of Control. Despite the limitations on its size, their analysis of the loss of World War I,
research and development, secret testing abroad (in cooperation with the Red Army) and planning for
"better ti-mes" went on. As well, although forbidden to have a general staff, the army continued to
conduct the typical functions of a general staff under the disguised name of Truppenamt ("Troop
Office"). During this time, many of the future leaders of the Wehrmacht — such as Heinz Guderian —
first formulated the ideas that they were to use so effectively a few years later.