NRDC-GR HERALD

THE MAGAZINE OF NATO RAPID DEPLOYABLE CORPS-GREECE

January - June 2021 / Issue 16

LIVEX “CENTAUR 21” -

“DEFENDER EUROPE 21”
Italian Division
“Vittorio Veneto”
Inclusive Leadership:
Managing Diversity
Warfare Economics
An Overall Review of
NATO Covid-19 Response
 NRDC·GR January - June 2021/Issue 16

Overview erald NRDC-GR HERALD

EDITORIAL BOARD
COMMUNICATION DIVISION/Public Affairs Office (PAO)
Chief PAO
OF-5 (GRC A) Athanasios PAPATHANASIOU EDITORIAL
D.Chief PAO
OF-4 (GRC A) Paschalis KAMPOURIS
PA SO Dear reader,
OF-4 (GRC A) Nikolaos BARMPERIS
Production As the entire world tries to get back to normalcy
OF-1 (GRC A) Georgios THEODOROU
Combat Camera following the COVID-19 pandemic, we get even closer to
OR-7 (GRC A) Konstantinos BALAMPANOS
OR-6 (GRC A) Alexandros ATSKAKANIS a new landmark for NRDC-GR; Exercise “STEADFAST
Communication Information LEDA 2021”. This means following “old” procedures and
Tel.: +30 2310 882452 / IVSN 451-2452 timetables (planning circles, documentation revisions,
email: [email protected], email: [email protected]
www.nrdc.gr Twitter: @NRDC-GR adjusted battle rhythms, etc.) but operating under “new”
Facebook: NATO Rapid Deployeable Corps - Greece conditions (wearing masks, social distancing, etc.). Even
YouTube Channel: www.youtube.com/user/nrdcgreece
so, we are more than confident about our success!
Commander’s Corner
NRDC-GR Commander’s Corner p.01 Probably those inside our organization that were more
affected by the protective measures against the pandemic
Affiliated Units were our interns. They were not able to be physically
• LIVEX “CENTAUR 21” - “DEFENDER EUROPE 21” p.02
• “Vittorio Veneto” Division: present at the HQ premises at the desired rate and they
Realignment to a NATO Headquarters p.08
had to work harder (remotely) to fill the gap. But they
Articles managed this difficult situation well; maybe better than we
• Operations Planning for Retrieving an Occupied Territory
expected! As a “reward” for their efforts and successful
after its Surrounding: Restrictions by the Law of Armed completion of the undertaken projects we host many of
Conflict and International Humanitarian Law p.13
• Big Data and Social Media Analysis: their articles in this issue; more than ever! Please be fair on
Innovative Ideas for NATO p.18 your “evaluation” about their writings; bare in mind that they
• NATO’s Role in Arms Control, Disarmament and
Non-Proliferation: Dealing with Crises in Modern Times p.21 are still young students or graduates. Yet, we feel confident
• Warfare Economics p.26
• An Overall Review of NATO Covid-19 Response p.30 about the future and one of the reasons we are optimistic is
• The Puzzle/Enigma of Strategic Autonomy - EU-NATO
Synergy p.34 the quality of our youth!
• Inclusive Leadership: Managing Diversity in
a Multinational Working Environment p.40
• Historical Logistics Challenges: Enjoy all the interesting articles we host in this issue
The Spanish Road (1567-1659) p.45 and allow us, the Public Affairs Office team to acknowledge
• Logistics and the Gulf War p.51
• NATO’s Role in Peace Support Operations the writers for their contribution. It is more than valuable
(Non Article 5 Crisis Management Operations) p.55
and strengthens the goal of PAO to inform NRDC-GR
Visits - Community Relations Staff, NATO community and the Public about our latest
• NRDC-GR Change of Command p.58 developments and more. Please, bear in mind that the
• ARRC Commander Visit p.59
• LANDCOM Commander Visit p.60 views expressed in the articles are those of the contributing
• NRDC-GR Officers’ Medals Award p.61 writers and do not represent the official opinion of NRDC-
• US Military Attaché Visit p.61
GR or NATO.
Seminars - Conferences
• The Multi Corps Land Component Command (MC LCC) See you in the next one!
Seminar - Deep Dive on the new NRDC-GR Role p.62
• NRDC-GR Internship Induction Training 2021 p.63
• IKAROS I-21 Seminar p.64 Very respectfully,
• STEADFAST LEDA 21 Crisis Response Planning p.65
• Operational Order Development for STEADFAST LEDA 21 p.66
OF-5 (GRC A) Athanasios PAPATHANASIOU
ON THE COVER NRDC-GR Chief Public Affairs Officer
2021 Soldier of the affiliated 71st Airmobile Brigade (GRC A)
Standing ready...

NRDC·GR NRDC·GR
erald Herald
 Commander’s Corner
response to challenges. ideas, operational experiences,
The Alliance was and lessons learned and best
still is responsible to practices with the other NFS HQs,
achieve Deterrence are the guarantee of success.
and if necessary ensure The continuous communication
the Collective Defence amongst Staffs and the recent
of its member states, visits at NRDC-GR of the
as the North Atlantic Commanders of LANDCOM, Lt
Treaty dictates and so Gen (USA A) Roger L. CLOUTIER
successfully does since Jr. and ARRC, Lt Gen (GBR A) Sir
1949. Edward SMYTH-OSBOURNE,
point out the common approach
In this context, I would inside the NATO community
like to focus on the regarding the Security and
demanding and unique Defence.
task, our mission as
NRDC-GR and the roles We are already at the final
that may be assumed. stage of preparation for the
(Not only do these roles Exercise ‘’STEADFAST LEDA
remain significant, but 2021’’ (STLE21), that will be
also keep constantly executed simultaneously in
being upgraded). For our Greece, Poland, Spain and the
HQ, its new role since the 1st of United Kingdom, from the 23rd
Dear Herald Readers,
January and for the next three of November until the 2nd of
years will be that of Multi Corps December 2021. STLE21 will be
I am more than glad for having
Land Component Command the highlight of our preparation
the chance to address you and to
(MC LCC). Taking into account as MC LCC and our cooperation
express my appreciation for the
the different orientation that with other HQs (LANDCOM,
great work that the NATO Rapid
NATO and its entities had ARRC, MNC NE, NRDC-ESP,
Deployable Corps – Greece
for many years, the need for US V Corps) and NATO entities
personnel fulfills on a daily basis,
experimentation, development (JFTC).
especially in these difficult times,
and testing of procedures and With these thoughts and my
since we are already in the second
practices, seems tight in time best wishes for health, mental
year of the COVID-19 pandemic
and challenging at all levels (of fortitude and optimism, I leave you
and our lives have changed in
professionalism, collective effort, to study the interesting articles
ways and to a degree that no one
cooperation, etc.)
imagined until 2019. that our magazine hosts.
However, what remains Allow me to stress that we
Respectfully,
the same is our mission, the should turn whatever obstacles
continuous efforts for improve- into driving force, but also that
ment and experimentation, the we are not alone when facing Anastasios SPANOS
need for successful execution of this challenge! The exceptional Lieutenant General (GRC A)
training activities and effective cooperation and the exchange of

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LIVEX “CENTAUR 21” - “DEFENDER EUROPE 21”

LIVEX “CENTAUR - 21” was a Armored BDE, 71st Air Mobile BDE Petrochori Xanthi, Greece from 17 to
bilateral Force-on-Force exercise, and 1st Army Aviation BDE of the 25 May 21.
agreed and designed between the Hellenic Army and the 1st Battalion
Hellenic Army General Staff and -167 Infantry Regiment/53 Infantry The exercise was connected
United States Army Europe and Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) of the with the “DEFENDER - Europe 21”,
Africa. It was conducted by the XXV United States National Guard, at an annual large-scale US Army-led,
multinational, joint exercise designed
to build readiness and interoperability
between USA, NATO and partner
militaries. This year’s exercise:

1. Focused on building
operational readiness and
interoperability with a greater number
of NATO allies and partners over a
wider area of operations.

2. Was defensive in nature

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Pic. 5, 6, 7: “Black Bats” in Poland

and focused on responding to crisis if maritime routes bridging Europe, Asia

necessary. and Africa.

3. Demonstrated that the U.S. Among the principal aims of the

commitment to NATO is iron clad. exercise was to highlight the efficiency
on planning and executing common
4. Integrated approximately operations at the Tactical level, using
28,000 members of armed forces a two-way simulation system giving
from 26 nations conducting nearly participants an opportunity to explore
simultaneous operations across more options and take tactical risks, to offer
than 30 training areas in 12 countries. unique perspectives and insights that
complement other forms of training,
5. Included strict COVID
prevention and mitigation measures,
such as pre-deployment COVID
testing and quarantining.

6. Had significant involvement

of the US Air Force and US Navy.

7. Utilized key ground and

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to integrate different methods, tools

and techniques and to develop
interoperability between Hellenic and
US Armies.

The main phases of the exercise

included:

Phase 1 / 17th May 21. During

this Phase, Interoperability tests
and other technical procedures took
place. An Opening Ceremony was
organized, with all the participants, in
order to achieve familiarization and
create bonds of partnership. Finally,
the troops were briefed on various
issues, such as safety instructions
and general information of the training
area and an on spot reconnaissance

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was executed. executed on the automated pop-up

targets, which were contributed by
Phase 2 / 18-24 May 21. During the 7th Army Training Command/
this Phase the personnel from both Training Support Activities Europe.
nations, was trained in critical selected The training activities also included:
Combat Functions and processes,
in order to achieve the respective 1. Convoy and Ambush Ops,
Training Objectives. During training,
special focus was put on both, 2. Execution of Squad Live Fire,
offensive and defensive operations,
3. Tactical Combat Casualty
with the participation of combined
Care (TCCC) training,
forces, utilizing elements of Air-Mobile
and Special Operations Forces, Land 4. Check point ops,
Aviation Forces, Armor, Mechanized
and Motorized Infantry, Artillery and 5. Command Post infiltration
Combat Engineer. Defensive and during Night and
offensive operations were examined
simultaneously with the use of 6. Urban offensive and
MILES gear and all the live fires were defensive operations training and

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exercise.

7. The coronary of the fore-

mentioned training was a high intensity
combined arms live fire exercise, that
took place on the 24th May 21, which
was also the Distinguished Visitors
Day of the exercise

Phase 3 / 25th May 21. This Phase

was devoted to the Assessment and
the After-Action Review (AAR) of
the exercise. DV Day was attended
amongst others by:

- Deputy Minister of the Ministry

of National Defence of the Hellenic
Republic, Alkiviadis Stefanis.

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Charalampos Lalousis (GRC A). countries and NATO are significant.

- USA Consulate in
Thessaloniki, Consul General Ms.
Elizabeth K. Lee

- USAREUR-AF Commanding
General, General Christofer Cavoli
(USA A).

- British Field Army Commander,

Lieutenant General Ralph William
Kosmas KRITSIS
Wooddisse (GBR A).
OF-5 (GRC A)
- USA Ambassador in Athens, Chief of Staff
The Exercise was totally XX Armoured Division
Mr. Jeffrey Payat
successful and strengthened the
ties between the two Armies and
- Deputy Chief of the Hellenic
especially the participating personnel.
National Defence General Staff, Vice
It is a common decision to continue
Admiral Ioannis Drymousis (GRC N).
organizing and conducting training
- Chief of Hellenic Army activities like «CENTAUR - 21» since
General Staff, Lieutenant General the benefits for the participating

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“VITTORIO VENETO” DIVISION:
REALIGNMENT TO A NATO HEADQUARTERS
link to the Italian city where the last member countries, Multinational
victorious battle of the First World Division-South (MND-S HQ) started
War occurred. Moreover, it marked the journey to become a Command
the end the war on the Italian front included in the NATO Force Structure.
and when the ‘Risorgimento’ dream The new multinational Command will
of a unified Italy finally came true. be implemented within the framework
Additionally, the “Vittorio Veneto” of “Vittorio Veneto” Division HQs.
Division also incorporates and
The new Headquarters will
celebrates the traditions of the “Friuli”
exercise its functions in all operations
Division, that was reconstituted in
to support the three essential core
“Vittorio Veneto” Division motto: July 2013 in Florence. This includes
tasks of NATO: Collective Defence,
Sit Nomen Omen(The name is an omen) strong historical and spiritual ties with
Crisis Management and Cooperative
the “Friuli” Brigade whose soldiers
Security, as a Division level Command.
distinguished themselves during the
The realignment of MND-S HQs
History Second World War under the banner
will be marked by two fundamental
of values such as Country, Honour,
The “Vittorio Veneto” Division was milestones: the achievement of
Loyalty, Freedom and Sacrifice.
established in Florence on July 1, Initial Operational Capability (IOC),
2019 as a result of the transformation projected for 2021 (TBC), which
National to Multinational
of a National military unit and the will certify initial connectivity and
renaming of the “Friuli” Division. In October 2019, with the support interoperability capabilities with the
The name of the Division is a direct of the Italian Government and NATO NATO Command and Control chain of

Column of Ariete C1 tanks of “Ariete” Armored Brigade

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SP Howitzer PzH 2000 of “Ariete” Armored Brigade during an exercise in Monteromano training area

command. Finally, the declaration of Alliance. Brigades and subordinate units to

Full Operational Capability (FOC), to maintain a high level of readiness,
be achieved by 2024, will validate that Mission, Commander’s vision conduct planned operational and
MND-S is fully capable of supporting training commitments and execute
operations or missions for the Alliance. Currently, the “Vittorio Veneto” other unplanned tasks. The four
Once FOC is achieved, MND-S HQs Division represents a modern and organic manoeuver brigades include
can be included in the Command fully operational unit. Its mission is the Folgore airborne Bde, the 132nd
rotation plan as a tool available to the to train and prepare its manoeuvre Ariete (armoured) Bde, the Pozzuolo
del Friuli cav Bde and Friuli Aviation
Bde. The Headquarters Support
Group completes its organizational
table.

The “Vittorio Veneto” Commander

directed a three-year plan that
organically integrates all the future
activities of the Division Headquarters
and its Brigades and units, up
to regimental level. The whole
organization will collectively work to
develop, consolidate and maintain the
capability to respond to full spectrum
capabilities, while preserving the
ability to adapt to unexpected events.
This requirement, while even more
challenging and complex during the
Paratrooper - Pathfinder of “Folgore” Paratroopers Brigade ready for a free fall pandemic, is essential for the “Vittorio

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Recovery of “Friuli” Airmobile Brigade personnel by winch

Veneto” to remain resilient and ready. with national regulations, the ITA In accordance with its higher
Additionally, with force protection as Army and the Higher HQ direction Headquarters Commander’s vision,
a priority, the Division is establishing and guidance, to protect personal and the Division’s operational approach
protocols and processes, consistent equipment. includes four Lines of Development
(LOD):

— LOD 1 Training and

Operations: including all activities
that achieve and consolidate full
spectrum operational capabilities
with high operational readiness and
adaptability;

— LOD 2 Infrastructure and

Territory: maintaining efficient
infrastructure and strengthening
relations with local civil authorities to
maintain and improve the reputation
of the Army in public’s eyes;

— LOD 3 Personnel: enhance

leadership, professionalism,
“Friuli” Airmobile Brigade MEDEVAC Training consolidate our military identity,

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develop skills, and create the Accordingly, the framework and

conditions that support the well-being training plan for the next three years
of personnel; will ensure that the Division is ready to
execute the following key tasks: Pasquale DI BISCEGLIE
— LOD 4 Multinational HQ: OF-4 (ITA A)
Recalibration to NATO MND-S HQ. — fulfil relevant national and Chief JVB
Vittorio Veneto Division

Centauro armored vehicle of the Genova Cavalleria Regiment, “Pozzuolo del Friuli” Cavalry Brigade
international operational and training conditions of limited mobility; — create and consolidate
commitments; an effective control system of
— develop and consolidate
professional skills and training, to be
— set high training and autonomous tactical thinking;
adopted at all levels according to a
operational standards focusing
— create effective and standard Division model;
on warfighting training and on the
competent leadership, strengthening
planning and executing high intensity — frequently revise risk
the chain of command at all levels
combined army tactical activities in assessments and the associated
(focusing on Bn and Regiment
complex scenarios; mitigation measures to preserve the
Commanders);
health and safety of personnel under
— prepare and train units
— implement the actions that all circumstances.
capable of moving, fighting,
will realign the Division Headquarters
supplying, rescuing, communicating The End State is resilient
to a multinational unit, without
day and night, to operate in degraded subordinate units that are capable of
compromising the ability to carry out
environments and with reduced executing national and international
national tasks;
possibility of using technology, in commitments and the Vittorio Veneto

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Marines of the Serenissima Regiment, “Pozzuolo del Friuli” Cavalry Brigade

Headquarters and Support Group the rapid evolution of the operational will have the capacity to contribute
are ready to realign to a NATO contexts within which they operate, to the projection of stability with
multinational Headquarters in line requires flexibility from military units. Defence Capacity Building activities
with the roadmap established by the We are constantly searching for in countries at risk of instability.
higher Authorities. the best possible configurations to The future holds new and exciting
respond effectively to the operational challenges for the “Vittorio Veneto”
While the realignment process
needs associated with changing Division, and the strength, dedication
is still awaiting final approval, but
threats. The aforementioned and professionalism of its men and
nearing completion, recalibrating as
environment is another motivation for women will guarantee our success.
MDS-HQ is a challenge and significant
the “Vittorio Veneto” Division HQs to
opportunity. Recalibrating will teach
transform to support the future needs
our staff to grow and learn as a NATO
of NATO.
FS HQ in a multinational environment.
As HQ MND-S, the “Vittorio
The Future Veneto” Division HQs will be prepared
to exercise Command and Control in
The instability and uncertainty of
NATO land operations within the entire
international geopolitics, the evolution Pasquale DI BISCEGLIE
spectrum of missions envisaged for OF-4 (ITA A)
of different threats, the complexity that
the divisional level. Furthermore, it Chief JVB
characterizes the modus operandi and Vittorio Veneto Division

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OPERATIONS PLANNING FOR RETRIEVING AN OCCUPIED
TERRITORY AFTER ITS SURROUNDING:
RESTRICTIONS BY THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
Imagine a scenario in which any restrictions posed by International our case, in the Ally’s civilians, they
enemy forces invade NATO territory. Law that operations planning will require very subtle handling in order
In consequence, the principle of have to consider in this phase? How not to violate the International Law of
collective defense established by the does the existence of civilians in the Armed Conflict and the International
article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty is occupied territory affect the means Humanitarian Law, and therefore they
lawfully activated by the North Atlantic and intensity of the force that can be pose a risk of impacting negatively
Council. The Allied forces successfully used? on the Alliance’s public image. The
conduct operations to reestablish following analysis examines the
Indeed, this scenario is not so
peace and security, the enemy is restrictions established by these two
far-fetched. Even an enemy that is at
being dislocated and defeated, NATO areas of Public International Law, but
the brink of defeat can benefit from
is winning. Yet, isolated enemy forces we should keep in mind that there
occupying a region in the member’s
still occupy an area of the member may be more limitations imposed by
territory. Such an act can lead to the
state territory, for example a city or the Host Nation
creation of a threat from the inside
a region containing villages. NATO
and thus deter NATO’s military
forces surround the area and prevent Restrictions by the Law of Armed
advancing. In addition, the enemy
the enemy from being reinforced. Of Conflict
could aim at the creation of a “frozen
course, NATO is still in a favorable
conflict” status. What is more, as such All military actions for the
position of power. All that is left is to
operations may implicate casualties restoration of the occupied and
retake this specific area. But is it as
in the civilian population, and, in surrounded area must comply with
easy as it appears to be? Are there
the principles of the Law of Armed
Conflict. At all cases, the principles
of military necessity, distinction,
proportionality and humanity must be
applied when using force.

A. The principle of proportionality

Based on the principle of

proportionality, an estimation of the
collateral damage should be made
before any decision to use force. The
possibility of human losses should not
be excessive in comparison with the
concrete and direct military advantage
expected. Avoiding excessive

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destruction, capture or neutralization,
in the circumstances ruling at the time,
offers a definite military advantage.”

According to article 27 of the

1907 Hague Regulations2 “in sieges
and bombardments, all necessary
steps must be taken to spare, as far
as possible, buildings dedicated to
religion, art, science, or charitable
purposes, historic monuments,
hospitals, and places where the sick
The ‘Black death’ played out as the biggest human tragedy of medieval Europe. and wounded are collected, provided
they are not being used at the time for
military purposes. It is the duty of the
besieged to indicate the presence of
such buildings or places by distinctive
losses in human lives should be the objects and military objectives. To and visible signs, which shall be
primary goal in every stage of the spare civilians and civilian population notified to the enemy beforehand.”
operation. Therefore bombardment, from hostilities and their effects, it is
non-precision airstrikes and/or wide essential to define who and what may
B2. Attack on dual-use
artillery strikes constitute excessive be attacked1.
objects
use of force and shall not be under
consideration. On the other hand, B1. Attack on civilian A dual-use object serves
military operations by ground forces objects both civilian and military purposes.
for the infiltration of the area and the Particularly in times of war, the
neutralization of the enemy forces There is a general rule on military uses civilian infrastructure,
with as few human life losses as the protection of civilian objects, telecommunications and logistics also
possible are more in accordance with regulated in article 52 of the Additional for military purposes. In industrialized
the principle of proportionality. Protocol I. According to this article countries, power-generating stations
“Civilian objects shall not be the object are crucial for civilian access to clean
of attack or reprisals. Civilian objects water, but they also provide power to
B. The principle of military
are all objects which are not military war industries – and in an integrated
distinction
objectives as defined in paragraph power grid all stations provide power
According to the uncontroversial 2. Attacks shall be limited strictly to to both. When a certain object is
principle of military distinction, which military objectives. In so far as objects used for both military and civilian
is expressively regulated in the article are concerned, military objectives are purposes, it may be held that even
48 of the Additional Protocol I, parties limited to those objects which by their a secondary military use turns it into
to an armed conflict must distinguish nature, location, purpose or use make a military objective. However, if the
between the civilian population and an effective contribution to military effects on the civilian use of the object
combatants and between civilian action and whose total or partial imply excessive damages to civilians,

1
Marco Sassòli, Legitimate Targets Of Attacks Under International Humanitarian Law, International Humanitarian Law Research Initiative
2
Convention (Iv) Respecting The Laws And Customs Of War On Land. Annex To The Convention: Regulations Respecting The Laws And Customs
Of War On Land - Section Ii : Hostilities - Chapter I : Means Of Injuring The Enemy, Sieges, And Bombardments - Regulations: Art. 27.

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an attack on such a dual-use object Armed forces confronted shields is expressively prohibited
may nevertheless be unlawful under with human shields are faced with by the Third Geneva Convention4
the proportionality rule. Under the the dilemma between causing civil (concerning prisoners of war),
wording of Protocol I, an attack on casualties that may undermine the Fourth Geneva Convention5
a dual-use object is, in any event, the legitimacy of their actions and (concerning protected civilians) and
unlawful if the effect on the civilian refraining from an attack which the Additional Protocol I6 (concerning
aspect is intended. results in military disadvantages. An civilians in general). Under the Statute
attack of a legitimate target that is of the International Criminal Court,
Sometimes, a civilian object
shielded by protected persons incurs “utilizing the presence of a civilian
can turn into a military objective.
collateral damage. While this may be or other protected person to render
In cases where there is doubt as to
justified by the anticipated concrete certain points, areas or military forces
whether a civilian object has turned
and direct military advantage, thus immune from military operations”
into a military objective, the [1977]
would be lawful according to the constitutes a war crime in international
Additional Protocols state that one
principle of proportionality under IHL, armed conflicts.7 Also, the prohibition
is to assume that it is not a military
civilian casualties may undermine an of using human s hields is contained
objective unless proven otherwise
attacker’s acceptance and support in numerous military manuals8 and
(article 52.3 ADI).
among the population where the national legislations.9
fighting takes place, the domestic
C. Human Shields The prohibition against using
constituencies and the international
human shields covers only the “civilian
community. If the collateral damage is
population or individual civilians” but
C1.Prohibition not justified by the anticipated concrete
not civilian objects. Camouflage, such
and direct military advantage, the
The human shield is a legal, as hiding military assets in civilian
attack would even qualify as an IHL
military and political term denoting a objects or making them look like
violation committed by the attacker.
non-combatant (or a group of non- civilian objects, is permitted by IHL.
Refraining from attacking, however,
combatants) who is either forced may require additional efforts to Furthermore, the use of
or volunteers to shield a legitimate combat the target and expose troops human shields is prohibited under the
military target to deter the enemy from to higher risks. The restraints in military Law of Armed Conflict because it is
attacking it. It requires an intentional action resulting from human shields contrary to the principle of distinction
co-location of military objectives and thus may significantly hamper the and violates the obligation to take
civilians or persons hors de combat achievement of military objectives3. feasible precautions to separate
with the specific intent of trying to
civilians and military objectives.
prevent the targeting of those military In the context of international
objectives. armed conflicts, the use of human

3
Τobias Vestner, Addressing the Use of Human Shields, Strategic Security Analysis, December 2019, Issue 8, Geneva Centre for Security Policy
4
Third Geneva Convention, Article 23, first paragraph
5
Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 28
6
Additional Protocol I, Article 51(7) (adopted by consensus)
7
ICC Statute, Article 8(2)(b)(xxiii)
8
See, e.g., the military manuals of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France,
Germany, Israel, Italy, Kenya, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States.
9
The legislation of the following states criminalizes - either explicitly or implicitly by reference to the Geneva Conventions or the Rome Statute - the
use of human shields: Australia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Belarus, Burundi, Canada, Congo, Croatia, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Iraq, Ireland, Lithuania, Mali, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea,
Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Tajikistan, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay and Yemen.

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C2. Operational and counterproductive because they may suffer hunger because of deprivation
Tactical Measures to Circumvent allow assembling further civilians to of food sources or supplies.
Human Shields increase the incidental harm. Delaying
This prohibition can be found in
or suspending an attack may be the
The use of human shields various international conventions.
only option in this case.
by the opposing party constitutes a Article 54(1) of the 1977 Additional
war crime. Yet this does not legitimize Protocol I provides: “Starvation of
NATO forces to attack military Restrictions by International civilians as a method of warfare is
objectives protected by civilians. Humanitarian Law prohibited.” Article 14 of the 1977
Additional Protocol II provides:
From a legal perspective,
A. The prohibition of starvation “Starvation of civilians as a method
precautionary measures can support
under IHL. of combat is prohibited.” According
operational decision-making when
to Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the 1998
faced with human shields. The use Starvation of civilians as a method
ICC Statute, “[i]ntentionally using
of weapons and tactics that can harm of warfare/combat is expressly
starvation of civilians as a method of
civilians used for shielding military prohibited in both international and
warfare by depriving them of objects
objectives should be minimized or non-international armed conflict. This
indispensable to their survival,
completely avoided. Warning before prohibition is extremely relevant in
including willfully impeding relief
an attack is also a precautionary the occasion that a siege takes place,
supplies as provided for under the
measure. This alerts civilians and which in the case of a surrounded
Geneva Conventions” constitutes
other protected persons, especially occupied territory is highly possible.
a war crime in international armed
when they are not aware that they are The right to food is violated not only
conflicts.
being used as human shields, and when a lack of food or denial of
gives them time to get away from the access to it causes death, but also Of course, allowing sieges
target. Warnings might, however, be when the population is caused to and prohibiting starvation are not

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and military decisions to prevent the
compatible at first sight. A key issue useless objects indispensable to
prolongation of the war. What is more,
here is whether siege warfare when the survival of the civilian population
each move needs to be accompanied
civilians are present is indirectly (e.g., foodstuffs, agricultural areas,
by careful planning and estimation of
prohibited by the prohibition of crops, livestock, drinking water and
possible collateral damage, otherwise
starvation of civilians since, in practice, irrigation systems) for the specific
it may undermine the legitimacy of
civilians will be the first to suffer from purpose of denying these items for
the operation by violating the Law of
deprivations arising out of the siege- their sustenance value to the civilian
Armed Conflict and the International
induced isolation. What matters population or the adverse party.
Humanitarian Law.
here is how the prohibition against
Incidental starvation is therefore
starvation is interpreted. The most
also prohibited under certain (not all)
popular view seems to be that sieges
circumstances. Article 54(2) covers
are not prohibited even if they cause
only situations where the belligerent
starvation, as long as their purpose
party deprives the enemy of existing
is to achieve a military objective and
resources (see ‘attack, destroy,
not to starve the civilian population.
remove or render useless’), not when
It’s difficult to prove that the purpose
it prevents the enemy from being
of the siege is the starvation of
resupplied. Paraskevi THEOFANOUS
civilians. However, failing to attempt GRC CIV
an evacuation of civilians or at least Resuming, the Additional Intern
the most vulnerable among them, NRDC-GR/LEGAD
Protocols considerably restrict the
coupled with a denial of humanitarian possibility to resort to sieges because
assistance should suffice to indicate in practice sieges will almost inevitably
that the purpose of the siege is to have the side effect of starving
starve civilians. the civilian population or forcing
its movement. On the other hand,
B. The prohibition of incidental isolating the territory and preventing
starvation under IHL. the belligerent from receiving supplies
complies with the API.
Many acts can indirectly lead
to the starvation of civilians. Such
Conclusion
acts are also prohibited by the
Additional Protocols. As a corollary Retaking a temporarily occupied
to the prohibition of starvation of territory, especially by force, can be
civilians, IHL also prohibits attacking, a very difficult task. Its complexity
destroying, removing or rendering calls for quick but effective political

References:
– North Atlantic Treaty, 1949.
– Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I), 8 June 1977.
– Convention (IV) Respecting The Laws And Customs Of War On Land and Annex To The Convention: Regulations Respecting The Laws And
Customs Of War On Land.
– Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949.
– Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Geneva, 12 August 1949.
– Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

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BIG DATA AND SOCIAL MEDIA ANALYSIS:
INNOVATIVE IDEAS FOR NATO
In recent years big data dominate
the field of social media analysis since
they provide unique opportunities and
new characteristics and parameters.
According to the social scientists, “we
are living in the era of Big Data”. Big
data are a large volume of data that
can be used for complex analysis and
allows organizations to improve their
efficiency. Big data are so large and
complex that none of the traditional
data management tools (a centralize
database architecture stores and
maintains the data in a fixed format or
functions. network with more than 2,32 billion
fields in a file) can store it or process it
monthly active users. The audience
efficiently. Big data can be described Some examples of popular
of Facebook is approximately on the
by the following four characteristics: social media platforms and their
age of 35-60+ and it’s a platform that
huge in Volume, high in Velocity, characteristics are:
organizations use to share news.
diverse in Variety and Variability.
Twitter is fast-paced and provides People reach Facebook pages to
Social media monitoring can be a great way to establish an audience. find out more about their owners’
enhanced and achieve exceptional It’s an easy and simple platform with culture and values. The popularity
results with big data. There is 326 million active monthly users. of Facebook makes it familiar and
seemingly endless number of The platform can be used for news people feel safe in it. Facebook is a
channels that can spread information updates, quotes or inspiration but way to link audiences to organizations
to users. Which are the suitable allows limited number of characters. and to show the reasons why they
channels for a specific purpose? Twitter is great for polls, images, should trust them.
What is the number of people/users videos, plain links in order to track
Social media, in many cases, have
that must be monitored? What kind of audience reactions and opinions.
become a conduit for unsubstantiated
information to keep track of? These Twitter is one of the most efficient
information, such as rumors,
are some of the questions need to platforms to build relationships with
hoaxes, and conspiracy theories.
be answered in order to use big data an audience.
Contemporary conflicts, especially
efficiently. It is important to make such
Instagram is a platform suitable those that fall within the hybrid
distinctions as the conversations on
for visualizations and images, so an spectrum, increasingly play out over
Twitter differ from those on Instagram,
account should be “attractive”. Images social media aiming to manipulate the
Facebook and WhatsApp, as do
of a high resolution and the account, space. Disinformation on social media
the ages of users, their geographic
must “tell a story” behind the user. The appears in many shapes and norms.
locations, and the overall missions of
audience of the Instagram is younger Malicious use of social media poses
the different platforms. Each platform
(approximately 18-35 years old). a clear security challenge or even
attracts different audiences and
Facebook is the biggest social threat. The opportunities provided by
provides different opportunities and
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new digital technologies are exploited measuring the impact of a message will and data mining, organizations can
to undermine trust in democratic be different from that for discovering analyze untapped data sources to gain
institutions and legitimate news the source and spread of a message. new insights resulting in significantly
sources, to distort public discourse It is not enough to identify what the better and faster decisions. By
and opinion formation, to influence message is, why it is being spread, deploying listening tools and sentiment
elections and short-circuit decision- and which networks are spreading it; it analytics complemented with human
making processes. The speed at is also important to identify the original intelligence, organizations can filter
which information flows between source. However, in many cases out noise and extract the critical and
users and the changing types of attribution can be nearly impossible. required data. Through tools that
data generated, complicate the Attribution is particularly important analyze big data it´s possible to gain
picture even more. Big data provide in cases of government-sponsored the macro view and see relationships
new technics and tools so as to disinformation, where it might lead between actors and between topics of
identify and track disinformation and to international action, sanctions, or discourse.
malicious actors. The huge volume issues between countries. Among the
of data provides the opportunity of a challenges of social media monitoring NATO and Big Data
quick and coordinated approach in by using API is the platform itself.
Social media give the ability
the new hybrid warfare. The user has to constantly navigate
to big organizations like NATO, to
through restrictions and limitations
Social media monitoring with big engage quickly and dynamically
imposed by the platforms. Language
data requires advanced technological with widespread audiences in an
can also be a challenge when
capabilities, using an application economical and effective manner.
attempting to monitor social media.
programming interface (API: set of They have become important tools
programming code that enables data Big data target specific audience for NATO messaging, outreach and
transmission between one software and give the possibility to extract communication with both internal
product and another) or a web scraper valuable insights from social network and external audiences. Social
(refers to the extraction of data from a activities. Big data are received from media analysis through big data can
website. This information is collected social media platforms in order to provide to NATO new opportunities
and then exported into a format that is be analyzed for insights that lead to and extend the existing abilities for
more useful for the user) works best. better decisions and strategic moves. research and planning in military
Various API tools exist for researchers They provide useful information about operations. Research can identify
with limited funding to aggregate and an effective content analysis based influential audiences and information
analyze data. Identifying who, what, on the behavioral patterns of users. needs, which will inform decisions
and how to monitor will depend on the Meta-analysis (the examination of such as appropriate messages,
desirable findings. The procedure for data from a number of independent preferred delivery methods and
studies of the same project) of required intensity. Especially, a
big data can lead to strategic properly researched plan will help the
decisions in social media NATO to anticipate possible issues
environment. Analytics tools and adapt more easily to situations.
of big data support predictive Finally, a plan will help you maximize
and prescriptive analysis the capacities of other units or
and enable users to analyze commands. Multi-media contextual
large amounts of data. analytics techniques that harvest
Using advanced analytics forensic social and digital media will
techniques such as text boost agility of military operations
analytics, machine learning both in the physical and information

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to support operations.

Conclusion
Big data have been hailed as the
key to crucial insights into human
behavior accelerating innovation.
Big data and Social Media promise
to change the digital environment,
since untapped opportunities are
emerging. Big data analytics fuel the
tools that help organizations fulfill
public expectations. By knowing how
to effectively measure the value of
social activities, organizations can
domains through deep understanding engagement decisions, keep track of gain critical insights that allow them
of adversaries’ perspectives, intents, the demographics, understand the to improve and promote their goals
and threats. This integration of sentiments of the audience and build and content. Finally, there is a need
analytics is critical in the current effective social media strategies and for critical data analysis, utilizing
complex environment where campaigns. digital methods for capturing and
adversaries operate with information- analyzing social media according to
Data Literacy (describes the
based tactics designed to achieve platform dynamics. NATO can benefit
ability to read, work with, analyze,
strategic goals. and explore big data which will give
and argue with data) within NATO is
the opportunity to enhance audience
Big data allow NATO to approach needed in order to achieve the most
engagement, perform better on social
the public in a more personalized way suitable function of big data analysis.
media platforms and shape its content
based on users choices and likes. It Steps are being taken to adjust
based on the needs of the public.
gives in-depth insights and a holistic NATO information systems (and
understanding of an audience, which system managers) to a data-centric
results in enhancing retention and paradigm. It is clear that NATO is on
elevate their trust. Big data will help a steep learning curve as it deploys
NATO to reach and strengthen its data-centric technology to support
relationships with the audience after its mission. However, NATO is not
identifying the most effective platform, starting from scratch and has valuable
time and format for their posts. experience in the analysis of open-
Ioanna ESKIADI
Big data will allow the Alliance to sources intelligence, tools for data
GRC CIV
identify social media trends and gain analysis and visualization and the Intern
insights, which can be used to make application of data centric technology NRDC-GR/PAO
Sources:
Blunt, R., Riley, C., Richter, M., Street, M., & Drabkin, D. (2018, May). Using data analytics and machine learning to assess NATO’s information
environment. In IST-160 specialists meeting on Big data and artificial intelligence for military decision making, Bordeaux.
Bowman, E. K., Madahar, B., Hagan, T., Burghouts, G., & Overlier, L. Content-Based Multimedia Analytics for Big Data Challenges.
Felt, M. (2016). Social media and the social sciences: How researchers employ Big Data analytics. Big Data & Society, 3(1), 2053951716645828
NATO ACO/ACT, Digital Media Management, SHAPE. Retrieved from https://shape.nato.int/resources/3/website/Digital_Media_Management_
Guide.pdf
Twetman, H., Paramonova, M. and Hanley, M., (2020, December). Social media monitoring: a primer. Methods, tools, and applications for monitor-
ing the social media space. Published by the NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence.

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NATO’S ROLE IN ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT
AND NON-PROLIFERATION:
DEALING WITH CRISES IN MODERN TIMES
NATO history of ADN policies
NATO has played an important
role in shaping the history of the global
nuclear order (Nuti L. 2021), although
the Alliance as such has never been
a formal party to an arms control
treaty.1 In fact, by serving as a forum
for exchanges among allies, it has
helped them manage their divergent
views and thus reach important
agreements in the arms control,
disarmament, and non-proliferation
(ADN) field. NATO was actually
instrumental in the development of played historically by the Alliance, The Euro-Atlantic effort has
much of the contemporary ADN’s it is necessary to specify that it has therefore been to find a compromise
architecture, including the Treaty been increasingly difficult for NATO to between the need to maintain a
on the Non–Proliferation of Nuclear reconcile the two logics of deterrence deterrent posture - as an essential
Weapons (NPT), which is still the only and arms control. part of NATO’s nuclear identity - and
global instrument regarding this field. the growing importance of taking
During the Cold War the issue of
However, the Alliance also into account nuclear arms control as
arms control represented a way to
provided the platform to negotiate a prerequisite for ensuring both the
contain the bipolar confrontation, a
and implement the most important international and the allies security.
de-escalation tool, especially after the
treaties regarding conventional arms Berlin and the Cuban Missile crises. The “two-track” policy of
control regimes, such as: The Vienna The dialogue on ADN has been deterrence and defense on the one
2

Document, the Treaty on Conventional therefore the fundamental principle hand and dialogue on the other has
Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) or to maintain the equilibrium originated long been maintained by the Alliance,
the Open Skies Treaty. In addition, from the logic of the deterrence. and was also reflected in the 2010
the United States has used NATO to NATO Strategic Concept. The latter
consult with allies on several bilateral After the end of the Cold War, some
contains a very clear reference to
treaties with the former Soviet Union, member countries increasingly came
both logics in question, stating that: “It
such as the Strategic Arms Limitation out in favor of effective disarmament
commits NATO to the goal of creating
Talks (SALT) and The Strategic Arms measures, and the tension between
the conditions for a world without
Reduction Treaty (START). the two approaches (deterrence
nuclear weapons – but reconfirms
and arms control) became more
Despite the important role that, as long as there are nuclear
controversial than before.
1
L. NUTI, “NATO’s Role in Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Arms Control: A (Critical) History”, IAI Papers, January 2021, p.38.
2
R. GOTTEMOELLER, S. HILL, “NATO’s Current and Future Support for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non–proliferation”, IAI Papers, December
2020, p. 5.

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weapons in the world, NATO will Finally, it is also worth mentioning Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) and the
remain a nuclear Alliance”.3 the risk but also the opportunity subsequent demise of the agreement,
posed by emerging and disruptive announced by the United States in
In light of the current strategic
technologies (EDTs) in the field of 2019, it seems clear that there is a
environment, many scholars
armaments, that urgently require new need to take up the issues regarding
(Gottemoeller R. former NATO Deputy
systems of regulation, verification, the area of ADN.6
Secretary General; Nuti L. Professor
and control.
of History of International Relations Likewise, it is clear that all such
at Roma Tre University; Kubiak K. It is therefore not surprising that developments are affecting the
Senior Policy Fellow at European at the High-level NATO Conference security environment of NATO allies
Leadership Network) believe that it on Arms Control and Disarmament, and pose risks to the international
is very unlikely that NATO’s attitude in 2019, NATO Secretary General stability. The Secretary General
on ADN will change. Indeed, there Jens Stoltenberg stated: “These Jens Stoltenberg’s words at the
are numerous ongoing developments are tough times for arms control”.4 16th Annual NATO Conference on
that affect and threaten the security Notwithstanding NATO could still play Weapons of Mass Destruction, Arms
environment, starting with Russia’s a critically important role in the ADN Control, Disarmament and Non-
growing posture of force, reflected field, by interpreting this moment as Proliferation underlined that concerns
in an increased weapons systems an “opportunity and a chance to look regarding the proliferation of nuclear
development and exercise program. to the future”.5 weapons are legitimate and it seems
remote to imagine a complete
Certainly, there are many other
NATO’s future role in Arms nuclear disarmament.7 This feeling of
actors and factors that influence the
Control, Disarmament and Non- disillusionment with disarmament is
international security environment and
Proliferation - food for thought widespread among the allies.
negatively affect the effectiveness of
all present and future measures in the The global nuclear order, built Consequently, this particular
field of ADN. These include: the strong around the NPT, seems to have situation leads to a reflection on
restraint placed by the Democratic reached an uncertain point. Growing what will be the next steps to take in
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) challenges are threatening the order to ensure a secure international
on nuclear arms control; The chemical stability of the international security. environment. And, at the same time,
attacks in Syria; China’s progress on We are witnessing the decline of to think about who is eligible to bring
nuclear development, which now nuclear agreements and the violation forward the dialogue on ADN.
more than ever requires NATO to of them, as well as, in some states, a In this regard, the Atlantic Alliance
make an effort to involve Beijing in constant modernisation of the nuclear could take on a significant role in the
arms control and non-proliferation arsenals. area of ADN in the future for many
negotiations. Generally, it is no
Following the Russian different reasons. First, NATO has
longer possible to avoid considering
Federation’s proven breach of the political base and the appropriate
China a determining variable in the
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear institutional framework (such as the
international security framework.

3
NATO, Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of The Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Lisbon 2010, Preface, point 4
4
Jens Stoltenberg, Speech by NATO Secretary General at the High-level NATO Conference on Arms Control and Disarmament, 23 October 2019,
available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_169930.htm.
5
R. GOTTEMOELLER, S. HILL, op. cit., p. 3.
6
NATO, Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 2 August 2019, available at: https://www.nato.
int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_168164.htm.
Cfr. Jens Stoltenberg, Speech by NATO Secretary General at the 16th Annual NATO Conference on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Arms Control,
7

Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, 10 November 2020, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_179405.htm.

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Non-Proliferation Committee within non-proliferation so far. point to highlight what are the most
the NAC) in which discussions on pressing issues that NATO should
ADN could take place. Second Adapting NATO’s ADN policy to focus on in order to advance its
NATO has also the expertise and new realities contribution in ADN policies.
experience in military operations and
During the High-level NATO The first important action that
training, education and the technical
Conference on Arms Control and NATO should take is to renew its
knowledge to create new arms
Disarmament, in 2019, the Secretary commitment to the NPT and ensure
control measures. Last but not least,
General stated that: “[…] if arms its credibility through it, considering
NATO has an extensive network of
control is to remain effective it needs that: “The NPT remains the essential
partnerships that could influence the
to adapt.” He also pointed out “[…] four bulwark against the spread of
spread of best practices also in non –
areas where we could act together nuclear weapons, the cornerstone
allies countries.
to reflect these new realities”.8 of the global non-proliferation and
Thus, this could be the right These refer to: the implementation disarmament architecture […]”.9 So an
moment for NATO to play a significant of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; effective treaty would help to reduce
role and bring this issue to the fore, the development of new rules and the Alliance’s major security threats,
promote changes and revise the standards for emerging technologies; but it needs to be strengthened
existing policies, adapting them to the modernization of the Vienna and receive a great support from all
current and future challenges. It could Document and the adaptation of the Member States.
play an important moderating role in nuclear arms control regimes to new This year the Review Conference
this area and even try to involve in the realities. will take place in occasion of the 50th
discussion nations that have not been
These areas offer a good starting anniversary of the NPT (actually 2020
party to agreements and treaties on
was the 50th Anniversary, but due to
the Covid-19 pandemic situation it
was postponed). NATO should use its
existing structure as a place to share
and coordinate the allies position and
use the Conference as a springboard
to present a set of common proposals
with the objective to preserve and
implement the treaty.
Another interesting point regards
the importance to develop new rules
and standards for the emerging and
disruptive technologies. In particular,
several concerns regard the
development, especially by countries
that often are not following the global
rules and are not part of any nuclear
agreement. Hence, it is vital to analyse

Jens Stoltenberg, Speech by NATO Secretary General at the High-level NATO Conference on Arms Control and Disarmament, 23 October
8 - 13 - 14

2019, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_169930.htm.

9
NATO, North Atlantic Council Statement on the 50th Anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 5 March 2020, avail-
able at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_174104.htm?selectedLocale=en.

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The last issue to be dealt with
is the entry into force of the Treaty
on the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons (TPNW) in January 2021.15
This treaty triggered quite a few
discussions within the Alliance since
it was criticised that it doesn’t have
support from nuclear countries and
it could undermine the NPT creating
division among its member states.
In addition, the fact that it is lacking
of verification mechanisms was
underlined. Promoted by the United
Nations and supported by 122 states,
what are the opportunities and the It is important for NATO to make its
this treaty has its origins in a group of
risks deriving from the EDTs and contribution and take the lead in
non-nuclear weapons states which
deepen the research given from the modernising this document, in the light
focused on the serious humanitarian
correlation of nuclear arms and EDTs. of the changed international security
consequences of a nuclear war. The
At the moment this topic remains context as the Secretary General
humanitarian arguments need to reach
widely unexplored. In fact: “So far, said: “There is more military activity
an important attention from NATO,
NATO’s delivery of the Emerging and in Europe than we have seen for
as “the humanitarian perspective will
Disruptive Technology Implementation decades”,13 that requires a revision of
become part of the new global nuclear
Roadmap does not include a nuclear what was agreed in Vienna. Actually,
order – the very same order that
component”.10 Therefore, advancing “NATO allies and our partners have
NATO needs to shape”.16
the discussion and proposing new agreed on proposals for the most
measures in this field would reinforce comprehensive modernisation This last point suggests that it is
the strategic stability of the Alliance package of the Vienna Document no longer possible to exclude from the
and facilitate an approach towards since 1994. To reduce the risk of ADN dialogue this perspective, that is
China, which is at the cutting edge in miscalculation and accidents on land, increasingly felt by many states fearing
developing these technologies. at sea and in the air”.14 Furthermore, the risk of destructive consequences
it is worth mentioning that within of a potential nuclear escalation. So,
A third point of focus is the
the Organization for Security and while until now the emphasis has
revision of the Vienna Document.11
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) a often been on maintaining a balance
Adopted in 1990, this document is
review process is already underway, between deterrence and arms control
the main framework for confidence
to which NATO could contribute by efforts, the humanitarian approach
and security building measures, with
providing a strong political support towards nuclear weapons needs
the aim to increase transparency and
and highlighting proposals agreed space and support, in particular from
verification in the military sphere.12
within the allied countries. the allies.
10
K. KUBIAK, “Reviewing NATO’s Non-proliferation and Disarmament Policy”, IAI Papers, February 2021, p. 12.
OSCE, Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence – and Security – Building Measures, 30 November 2011, available at: https://www.osce.org/files/f/
11

documents/a/4/86597.pdf.
12
Cfr. R. GOTTEMOELLER, S. HILL, op. cit., p. 8.
15
UNITED NATIONS – GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 7 July 2017, available at: http://undocs.org/A/
CONF.229/2017/8.
16
K. KUBIAK, op. cit., p. 12.

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Conclusions Moreover, since the issue has to rethink their security priorities and
huge implications for every security the role played by military forces, in
The analysis carried out shows
and defence policy of any state in the view of the potentially serious threats
that even if the moment to advance the
world and NATO is the only actor that that are maturing during the current
issue of ADN is particularly difficult,
could bring Europe and the United crisis. In this regard, a new deepening
NATO has all the potential to become
States together, it is vital that the of ADN-related activities could be not
the centre of the dialogue. NATO’s
Alliance develops a comprehensive only an excellent starting point but also
long tradition as a major proponent of
approach to it. an essential action in the framework
arms control treaties can only be an
of countering and preventing future
asset and shape what will be a new For this reason, it is important
threats to international security.
global nuclear order, adapting it to to promote diplomatic spaces and
new challenges. opportunities for dialogue, starting
by strengthening existing structures.
The four areas of action described
A NATO leadership on future ADN
are just some of the fields in which
progress could also have several
NATO can make a strong contribution
benefits for the Alliance itself, in terms
and many other initiatives could be
of increasing its prestige, stability,
integrated, among them certainly
credibility as well as its level of
actions aimed at risk reduction and
security. Maria Vittoria CORRADO Giada MOSANER
the promotion of more stringent
ITA CIV ITA CIV
verification methods with regard to Finally, given the current crisis
Intern Intern
the current measures used in arms caused by Covid-19 pandemic, NRDC-GR/STRATCOM NRDC-GR/PAO
control. governments are faced with the need

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WARFARE ECONOMICS
Executive summary
What is warfare economics? How
does a country fund and allocate
resources before, during and after
warfare conditions, and what are the
results of such disruptive conflicts?
Warfare economics encompasses
all the economic conditions that
facilitate war, the resources that
countries need to finance and
distribute during war and the economic
environment after disruptive conflicts.
The following report captures the
complicated and intertwined set of
conditions which lead to war, highlights
the importance of providing the right
resources to the involved parties because of insufficient raw materials significantly from regular operating
during each stage of war, illustrates and agricultural space, in order to economies. Typically countries
the consequences of conflict and gain more wealth or because of rising experience economic hardship and
presents an outlook of this century’s population growth and inadequate the economic pain of depression
current geopolitical situation. living space. Furthermore, territorial embraces political change. Populism
gain could be the result of the arises and extremist leaders emerge
1. Conditions leading to warfare rise of nationalism or caused by in both the political right and left. These
imperialism. Another main reason internal conflicts between the political
Is war hardwired in human nature,
countries come into external conflict is parties cause reactionary leaders
or did warfare arise after creating
religious differences, within the same to come to power. A prime example
organized societies and under specific
dogma or between different religion. worth mentioning is the economic
preconditions? This controversial
Moreover, revenge has been a key and political conditions in Germany
topic has been studied and discussed
factor in many wars in history. It is after World War I and before World
by anthropologists and historians over
steered by mischief and can cause an War II. The funding of war equipment
the years. Nevertheless, throughout
endless chain of disruptive conflicts. during World War I and treaty of
history we observe countries coming
For example, the war on terror was Versailles caused an unbearable
into armed conflict with each other,
initiated by the 09/11 attacks on the fiscal deficit for Germany. As a result,
driven by different incentives. This
World Trade Centre. the country suffered immensely from
section aims to discuss the main
hyperinflation, which fueled the rise of
reasons these countries come into It should be underlined that
the far-right wing (National Socialist
conflict, as detailed below. economic and political circumstances
German Workers Party) and Hitler as
are strongly interconnected, and
One main cause of warfare is the a leader.
play a vital role in triggering wars.
need for territorial gain. A country
The observed political and economic
may attempt to annex new territories
landscape before war differs

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2. War economies
A war economy describes the
transition of a country’s operating
economy to that steered towards
war production. It captures the set of
mandatory actions a country takes
before, during and after warfare. The
analysis of a war economy reveals
a state where countries utilize their
economic power to increase their Figure 1
production of weaponry, military without the need of mass labor power. Moreover, in pre-war economies,
funding, and resource allocation in For instance, the government of the countries form alliances and assist
order to prepare and endure a war. United States created and funded each other with funds and/or
This section will break down the its “atomic weapons development military equipment. However, each
analysis in three different stages of program” during World War II and used governmental entity has each own
war economies; pre-war economies, the world’s first atomic bomb over incentives and usually countries with
during warfare economies and post- Hiroshima.1 It is also important to note the most economic power over-lend
war economies. that the increased military spending weaker countries. The consequences
For pre-war economies, the aim acts as a fiscal stimulus which in of a country getting into a lot of debt
of each country is to create and apply return increases the Gross Domestic are devastating.
a strategic plan, in order to distribute Product (GDP) and decreases the
During warfare, the most important
the government budget to necessary unemployment rate due to the raise of
priority for each country is to maintain
resources at an efficient manner. military service. This economic policy
a steady supply of resources, such
That includes a variety of important of excessive spending for military
as military equipment, raw materials
issues that need to be addressed purposes is supported by the theory of
and medical aid. In most cases, it has
strategically to ensure the country’s “Military Keynesianism” and was used
been observed that the aggregate
security and competitiveness over by the National Socialist Germany
demand for such resources exceeds
the opponent. One main issue to and the United States before and
the aggregate supply that is offered
be addressed during planning is after World War II. The contingencies
in a specific timeframe. In order to
the armature of soldiers that will be undertaken by countries to shift to a
diminish the gap between supply
entering the battlefield. Specifically, war economy will be illustrated by the
and demand, governmental entities
the government must utilize their following charts; the first chart shows
control the distribution of resources,
military budget to fund military the increase in military personnel and
goods and services. For example,
products such as vehicles, weapons the second in military spending, by
during World War II, the United States
and armor, proportional to their military averaging a number of war cases.
implemented a “rationing” system,
personnel. Furthermore, nations use It should be pointed out that both
where the federal government set
their military budget to fund research military personnel and spending (as
limits on purchasing certain high-
and development for accelerated a percent of the population and GDP
demand items.3 This enforces limits
technological progress, which results respectively) roughly increased by
on individual consumption and
in the creation of destructive weapons four times, as depicted in Figure 1.2
therefore allows the governmental

1
History.com Editors, Published by A&E Television Networks (2009, November 18). Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Retrieved from https://
2
Dalio, R. (2018). Principles for navigating big debt crises. Westport, CT: Bridgewater.
3
Marshall V. (2018, July 11). Rationing: The National WWII Museum: New Orleans.

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entities to control the allocation of their In extreme cases, such as disruptive conflicts negatively impact
recourses more efficiently. Ultimately, Germany after World War I (1918- societies on a microeconomic and a
it should be emphasized that a war’s 1924), countries inevitably experience macroeconomic scale. This section is
outcome is highly determined by the hyperinflation, which leads to focused on the effects of war in society
availability of such resources. devastating economic and political caused by the atrocities of warfare, as
consequences. It should be noted well as war economies.
When the war ends, the participating
that the countries that experience
countries need to transition from a Firstly, it is evident that warfare
inflationary depression -debt crisis
war economy to a normal operating inevitably results in many casualties
and hyperinflation- have common
economy. Typically, they enter a state of innocent civilians. In other words,
post-war conditions, such as large
of economic recession because of the armed conflict leads to the decline
budget deficits, negative real interest
big contraction of military spending of human population overall.
rates and lack of reserve currency. In
and the increased unemployment Unfortunately, deaths and violent
the previous example, by the end of
rate of people formerly working for events cause extensive emotional and
World War I, Germany met all those
the military. Furthermore, the post- psychological stress to individuals.
conditions. In order to avert their
war economic environment consists The psychological damage can be
severely depressed economic state,
of big war debts that countries short term or long term. In cases of
Germany policy makers had to apply
attempt to diminish with periods of permanent psychological trauma,
strict monetary restrictions, negotiate
deleveraging. However, the economic individuals usually get diagnosed with
with the Allies, and enforce austerity
environment of each country varies, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
measures.
as it depends on the final results of , particularly veterans that were
the disruptive conflict. Specifically, the exposed to the violence of disruptive
countries that lost the war experience 3. Repercussions of disruptive conflict.4
a deeper depression, and apply conflict
It is also important to cover the
more aggressive monetary and fiscal Warfare has devastating impact of the previously discussed
policies. Such policies may include consequences on the economy, as economic depression to society.
money printing or/and cutting down illustrated in the previous chapter. Specifically, economic hardship
their reserves which usually results in These consequences reveal that directly shifts the labor dynamics of
the increase of inflation rates.
a country; labor demand decreases,
cuts in wages are enforced, military
service is made redundant and
unemployment rates rise sharply.
Furthermore, the labor force size
decreases because of the casualties
of civilians and the movements of
refugees. If the labor force decreases
and unemployment increases, poverty
increases and the economic inequality
gap noticeably becomes bigger.
Moreover, with an increased
economic deficit and a decreased
labor force, countries are unable to
repair the infrastructure destructed

4
VA.gov: Veterans Affairs. (2018, July 24)

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during the armed conflict. Particularly, endure economic depression, minor trade war observed over the
the educational infrastructure, the destroyed infrastructure, increase of past year. There are strong indications
healthcare infrastructure, the services unemployment and income inequality. that the internal political conflict and
and transportation infrastructure Evidence of the devastating external friction between rising and
remain damaged or destroyed after consequences of war can usually be incumbent powers will lead to a war
the end of warfare. This affects the found decades after the war ended. in the near future. Nevertheless, as
civilians’ quality of life and society as a technology advances and education
whole. For instance, the destruction of 4. Closing statement is broadly available, there is hope
educational institutions cause serious for mankind to look back at history,
disruptions, such as a potential future Humanity continuously evolves reconsider diplomacy and negotiation
increase of unemployment caused by over time and disruptive conflicts against disruptive conflict and avoid
the lack of education, low economic can be avoided by a unanimous the destruction and division of nations.
productivity and rise of violent desire for peacekeeping. With the
crimes. Furthermore, the destruction rise of globalization, organizations
of healthcare infrastructure has such as the United Nations,5
disastrous consequences to the encourage diplomacy and negotiation
wellbeing of civilians, since the as means to resolve conflicting
demand for physical and mental interests. Another example of such
support that people seek after an organization would be the North
traumatic and violent experiences will Atlantic Treaty Organization, which
eventually exceed the supply that the forms a political and military alliance
healthcare institutions can offer. between thirty member countries, and
therefore prevents the rise of conflict. Electra KOUPATSARI
In conclusion, societies suffer GRC CIV
However, globalization encourages
Intern
deeply from disruptive conflicts; different types of war by its nature. NRDC-GR/G8
on a micro-scale, people endure For example, the big geopolitical
psychological and physical health differences between the United States
issues. On a macro-scale, countries and China have already led into a

5
About Us. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.un.org/en/about-us

References:
- Dalio, R., 2018. Principles for Navigation Big Dept Crises. 1st ed. Glendinning Pl Westport: Greenleaf Book Group, pp.61-108.
- Dalio, R., 2021. Our 2021 Global Outlook. [online] Bridgewater.
- Owlcation - Education. 2021. The 8 Main Reasons for War.
- The role of military expenditure and arms imports in the Greek debt crisis 2021.
- Encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net. 2021. Organization of War Economies | International Encyclopedia of the First World War
(WW1).
- History.com Editors, Published by A&E Television Networks (2009, November 18). Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
- VA.gov: Veterans Affairs. (2018, July 24).
- Marshall V. (2018, July 11). Rationing: The National WWII Museum: New Orleans.
- About Us. (n.d.).

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AN OVERALL REVIEW OF
NATO COVID-19 RESPONSE
Introduction establish that this health crisis would Adjusting to the pandemic
not turn into a security one.1
2020 shocked the globe when NATO was determined to prevent
a highly infective respiratory In early 2020, Governments had any of these risks and preserve the
virus emerged and disrupted the to focus on their domestic issues that Alliance’s credible and effective
expected course of developments. included the lack of experience in deterrence and defence capabilities.
COVID-19 posed an imminent threat dealing with such a contagious virus, The Alliance followed and deepened
for everyone - to both civilians and the numerous COVID-19 cases and its protocol for hybrid threats3 and
military personnel - and its spreading the lack of medical equipment, such took action in various fields.
diverged, from the perspective of time as face masks, ICUs etc. A parallel
and intensiveness, in every European opening of a new “front” in the case of • Operations and Missions
country. For this particular reason, the an armed attack would not only further
Allies had a different understanding of deteriorate the social, economic and As it’s widely known, NATO
the scale of this threat. Nevertheless, health situation but also risk a delayed has ongoing military operations and
NATO’s primary priority was to and inefficient response to that threat. missions in several parts of the world,
such as the one in Kosovo or the
one in Afghanistan. These missions
adjusted fairly easily to the pandemic’s
condition and contributed decisively in
various fields.

The enhanced Forward

Presence (eFP) Battle Group in the
Baltic Sea Region (BSR) preserved
its readiness and capabilities and
continued to be a determining
deterrence asset in the region
despite the challenges that arose by
COVID-19.4

NATO’s KFOR mission has

been proven to be invaluable for the
local community during the pandemic.
In various instances, the personnel
NATO flags at the NATO Headquarters2 of KFOR came to the aid of the local
1
Giovanna De Maio, “NATO’s Response to COVID-19: Lessons for Resilience and Readiness” (Brookings, October 28, 2020), 3
2
U. S. Secretary of Defense, 200212-D-AP390-7095, February 12, 2020, Photo, February 12, 2020
3
Sten Rynning, “A Renewed Collective Defense Bargain? NATO in COVID’s Shadow,” NDC POLICY BRIEF (NATO Defense College, September
2020), 1
4
De Maio, “NATO’s Response to COVID-19,” 3

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population and authorities. There
are many examples including, but
are not limited to, the donation of
medical supplies by Turkey, Poland,
Austria and KFOR itself to Kosovo’s
authorities, as well as the sanitation
of public buildings by Italy’s 7th CBRN
(Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear) Defense Regiment.6

The Resolute Support

mission in Afghanistan built two field
hospitals in the airfields of Bagram
and Kandahar, while Afghan troops
switched to online training conducted
by JFTC in Poland.7
KFOR providing assistance to local communities in Kosovo
to help fight the COVID-19 pandemic5
• Training and Exercises

One of the largest areas of

operation of the Organization is that
of training and exercises. However,
given the circumstances, this sector
had to allow for restrictions and
redesign.

Prime examples of these

limitations can be seen in two
main exercises; BALTOPS and
DEFENDER-Europe 20. The first is
an annual military exercise that is
conducted in the Baltic Sea and for
the year 2020, it was limited to the
sole use of air and maritime assets,
excluding any amphibious drills to South Carolina National Guard unit prepares for DEFENDER-Europe 20
prevent COVID-19 from spreading to deploy the largest number of Russian aggression in the BSR.
amongst the sailors.8 forces in Europe - 20.000 soldiers In March of 2020, the size and the
- since the end of the Cold-War. Its scope of the exercise were altered,
The latter was a longtime
main objective was to test the Allied due to the new health restrictions
planned U.S.-led exercise that aimed
strategic readiness in the event of and the worries regarding the large

5
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization, KFOR Providing Assistance to Local Communities in Kosovo to Help Fight He COVID-19 Pandemic, April
6, 2020, Photo, April 6, 2020
6
Mario Col. Renna, “NATO RESPONSE TO COVID-19,” KFOR CHRONICLE, May 2020, 9
Jozsef Szpisjak, “Can Virtual Exercise Replace Traditional Residential Pre-Deployment Training? :: JFTC - NATO,” JOINT FORCE TRAINING
7

CENTRE, July 23, 2020

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movement of land elements. One year Commission, the G7 Rapid Response COVID-19 Task Force. This Force
later, DEFENDER-Europe 21 returns Mechanism, the United Nations and its was established within the Supreme
dynamically with the simultaneous Verified campaign and the U.S. State Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and
operation of 28.000 troops in 12 Department’s Global Engagement its objective is to coordinate military
different countries, while at all times Center”.10 support and activities to ensure the
respecting COVID-19 safety protocols most effective utilization of Allied
and measures. COVID-19 Initiatives and EU military resources. The Task Force
Cooperation relied heavily on the already-existed
• Disinformation Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response
Despite the nations’ tendency Coordination Center (EADRCC).
One of the most worrying to turn to their domestic affairs as a The latter functioned as a clearing-
threats during the era of the pandemic result of the pandemic, NATO focused house system for coordinating both
came in the form of disinformation. on its operational functions by utilizing requests for and offers of international
Reports indicated that China and its outstanding capabilities in crisis assistance of NATO and partner
Russia took advantage of people’s management, which is based on the countries as well as the UN Office
willingness to be informed and that close coordination of civilian and for the Coordination of Humanitarian
they spread false and defamatory military personnel as well as material. Affairs (UN OCHA). There are
information regarding the Alliance. several instances where international
A result of the Foreign Affairs
NATO was subject to coordinated assistance was provided; some
Ministers’ VTC in April of 2020
information attacks, such as the one of them include the donation of
was the authorization to create a
of April 2020, where a fake letter - ventilators from the United States,
supposedly sent by the Secretary-
General - informed about NATO’s
decision to withdraw its troops due
to an outbreak of COVID-19 within
NATO’s multinational battlegroup
in Lithuania. Another instance of a
disinformation campaign was when
Russian state-controlled media and
pro-Kremlin outlets contended that
NATO labs created COVID-19.9

NATO tackled these attempts

through its Public Diplomacy Division,
which kept track of and reported this
kind of information and checked them
by cooperating “with the European
Union through the European External
Action Service and the European Coronavirus response: second C-17 cargo plane arrives in Romania11

8
Sebastian Sprenger, “Warships Mass in the Baltic Sea for a Coronavirus-Conscious Battle Drill,” Defense News, June 4, 2020
9
NATO, “NATO’s Approach to Countering Disinformation: A Focus on COVID-19,” NATO, July 17, 2020
10
NATO
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Coronavirus Response: Second C-17 Cargo Plane Arrives in Romania, March 28, 2020, photo, March
11

28, 2020

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Hungary and Slovakia, personal initiative, which aimed to ease and Conclusion
protective equipment from Germany, speed up the process of military
surface disinfectant from Latvia and With vaccines now circulating and
flights with humanitarian causes.
the donation of a field hospital from the prospect of freeing ourselves from
There was also frequent exchange
Norway to North Macedonia.12 this pandemic getting even closer, we
of information between the EADRCC
can now certainly say that a major
and the EU Emergency Response
To curb the pandemic, NATO security crisis was avoided. The
Coordination Centre, something that
utilized the Strategic Airlift Capability Alliance’s capabilities and initiatives
was also happening between NATO’s
(SAC) and the Strategic Airlift played a pivotal and vital role in curbing
COVID-19 Task Force and its EU
International Solution (SALIS) the pandemic and deterring any
counterpart, created by the European
programmes, which are managed by external threats; either conventional
External Action Service (EEAS).15
the NATO Support and Procurement or hybrid. What is certain is that the
Lastly, the cooperation between
Agency (NSPA). These two Lessons Learned from addressing the
NATO and the EU was also seen in
programmes allowed the timely pandemic’s consequences are going
the medical field where the two parts
delivery of over 1,000 tonnes of to be plenty and invaluable for the
had already founded in 2018 the
medical supplies to the Allies.13 future of NATO and its members.
Multinational Medical Coordination
As far as partnerships are Center (MMCC) and the European
concerned, NATO always remained Medical Command (EMC), whose
in contact with the European task is to provide coordinating support
Union. In particular, the Alliance to the medical services of NATO and
coordinated with EUROCONTROL EU.
for the NATO Rapid Air Mobility

Stavros PIPERIDIS
GRC CIV
Intern
NRDC-GR/G5

Coronavirus response: Allied plane brings 45 tons of supplies to Bucharest14

12
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO’s Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic” (Public Diplomacy Division (PDD) – Press & Media Section,
February 2021)
13
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Coronavirus Response: Allied Plane Brings 45 Tons of Supplies to Bucharest, March 26, 2020, photo,
14

March 26, 2020

15
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO’s Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic.”

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THE PUZZLE/ENIGMA OF STRATEGIC AUTONOMY -

EU-NATO SYNERGY
Our political institutions work remarkably well. They are designed to clang against each other.
The noise is democracy at work.
Michael Novak
(Philosopher, journalist, novelist, and diplomat)

Introduction Some also wonder, if it is a tool for later became the Common Security
collaborative strategic alliances in the and Defense Policy (CSDP) with
The concept of European Strategic
new era of globalization. the Lisbon Treaty (2009), where
Autonomy (ESA) is evidenced by
the political substance of the WEU
a dialogue of controversy over the
Situational Awareness became part of the EU Treaty and
European Union’s (EU) role as a global
especially through 42, (7) article.
player on the planet’s chessboard, in The architectural debate that now In December 1999, at the Helsinki
a changing world. Interdependence surrounds the vague term of strategic European Council, the Headline Goal
is a tool of power between coalitions autonomy is almost 70 years old. It was established with a time horizon
as well as individuals in the complex dates back to the Brussels Treaty of of 2003. This concerned the Union’s
post-bipolar scene or a security 1948 and the Paris Agreements of operational capability, and it sought
environment consisting of “traditional 1954-55, which occurred during the to build a 60,000-strong military force
and non-traditional threats,” or founding of the Western European capable of carrying out the tasks of
old and “new types of wars.”1 The Union (WEU). The birth of this term the Petersberg missions. As such, this
narratives of the Global Strategy, is attributed to the French White activated the military component of
NATO 2030 and the Strategic Paper on Defense published in June the European Regional Development
Compass, are “guides” to the renewal 1994.4 Since then, the Franco-British Fund (ERDF), which was further
of strategic doctrine and emphasize Declaration of Saint-Malo of December strengthened by the establishment of
the EU-NATO synergy, which is 4, 1998, stated that “the Union must the Rapid Reaction Mechanism at the
increasingly important in the context have the capacity for autonomous Göteborg European Council of 2001.
of a polycentric world order or, as action, backed by credible military In December 2003, the Brussels
Amitav Acharya (2017) characterizes, forces and the ability to decide the European Council adopted the
a «multiplex world».2 This old concept means of using them to respond to European Security Strategy (ESS or
raised the question in the twenty- first international crisis.”5 In essence, Security Strategy), and in May passed
century of the “Euro-Atlantic security the European Security and Defense the Headline Goal 2010.
dilemma” or what Granovetter (1973) Policy (ESDP) was established with
called «the strength of weak ties».3 the Cologne Declaration (1999) and

1
At this point it is worth noting that in relation to the “new type” of war different names were given, such as a) high-tech war or technological war
(Edwards, 1986c), endless war (Klare, 1972), Cyberwar (Der Derian , 1991), hypermodern war (Haraway, personal communication, 1991), Cy-
ber-warfare information war, netwar (Arquillaand Ronfeldt, 1993), war amongst people (Brown et al. 2019).
2
Acharya, “After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World Order,” 271-285
3
Granovetter, “The Strength of Weak Ties,” 1360-380.
4
The 1994 document contains the first six instances of the concept : pages 49, 50, 52, 78, and 139.
5
CVCE.eu,“Déclaration franco-britannique de Saint-Malo,” 1-2.

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In 2013 the concept of strategic Weaponization of strategic auto- But to this day, the key problem
autonomy was adopted by the nomy of terminology remains, as “strategic
Commission under the title “Towards autonomy” has become an umbrella
United States President Trump’s
a more competitive and efficient term. It is used recklessly to describe
controversial leadership sparked
European defense and security the EU’s ability and skill to turn its quest
recent debate over the strategic
sector.” The Commission also stated for autonomy into a reasonable reality,
autonomy of transatlantic security,
that European Defense Technology or, as Charles Michel, President of the
and the pandemic highlighted
and Industrial Base (EDTIB) is a European Council states, “it is goal #
the danger of Europe’s “strategic
key element in Europe’s ability to 1 for our generation. For Europe, this
downturn”.7 The Franco-German
ensure the security of its citizens by is the real start of the 21st century”.11
schism at the November 2020 talks
prioritizing the security of supply of Additionally, and as the High
between the French President
and access to critical technologies Representative of the EU (HR/VP)
Emanuel Macron and the German
and operational dominance. However, Josep Borrell (2020) emphasized in an
Minister of Defence Annegret Kramp-
the term was reborn in the EU global era of heightened global uncertainty,
Karrenbauer reinforced the need
strategy (2016) through the broader we must “strengthen our ability to
for strategic autonomy in terms of
approach of the EU’S ambition to act autonomously as a Union and
sovereignty. However, the President
operate, as a Global Actor, because make the EU a better global partner
of the European Commission,
the international environment and security provider”.12 The fear of a
Ursula Von der Leyen, in the need
changed and the visible effects strategic transatlantic disengagement
for more Europe declared that “The
of globalization and digitalization is a narrative of national divisions, but
EU there will never be a military
transformed the international order, at its core, Emanuel Macron pointed
alliance”,8 whereas Annegret Kramp-
leading to the rise of the ‘’Yellow Peril’’ out, “European defense cooperation
Karrenbauer stressed that Europeans
or what is currently referred to as the should not be conceived as an
must abandon “illusions” of European
“New Great Power Rivalry”. Europe alternative to NATO”.13 Moreover,
strategic autonomy. Several scholars
finds itself in this contest between Annegret Kramp - Karrenbauer
have described this attitude as
China and the United States and has mentioned that “We must become
reflecting the EU “underperforming”
to make a parallel strategic choice more European in order to remain
in the implementation of many of its
because, its main threat comes from transatlantic”.14
external strategic objectives and the
the instability of the Islamic world and
“open strategic autonomy”9 through Strategic Autonomy according
the management of North Africa by
free trade, as well as the promotion to the Security and Defense Plan in
developing an economic model that
of separate proposals such as the European Union Global Strategy
can offset the uncontrolled migration
greenhouse gas emission standards (EUGS) is the EU’s ability to act in
flows within it.6
and data protection.10 security and defense together with
partners when it can, alone when it

6
Mahbubani, “Has the West lost it?: A provocation,” under the West on Autopilot.
7
Paris: Ministry of Armed Forces, “Strategic Update 2021,” 25-26.
8
Emmott, “EU creates defence and space branch ‘to complement NATO,” under “File photo.”
9
Paris: Ministry of Armed Forces, “Strategic Update 2021,” 25-26.
10
European Commission, “Horizon Europe Strategic Plan (2021 – 2024),”7-9
11
Michel, “European Strategic autonomy is goal #1 for our generation,”Twitter.
12
Borrell, “European security and defence: the way forward,” 21 June 2020.
13
President Emmanuel Macron’s speech at the Munich Security Conference Special Edition 2021, 19 February 2021.
14
Kramp-Karrenbauer, Second Keynote Speech, (Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg, 2019).

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must.15 Given the variety of definitions, “freedom through dependence”, of ESA can now be described as a
it is important to distinguish the distinguishing three visions that are model with four (4) dimensions:
term from its various cognates such due to different national attitudes:
(a) political autonomy: based
as sovereignty, independence,
a) autonomy as on “EU + x”(after Brexit).
unilateralism, autarky, isolation and
responsibility: recognition of the
rejection of alliances, as it is a state (b) institutional autonomy:
transatlantic relationship through
that acts as a precondition and has through the structures such as the
the EU, and the division of NATO’s
an internal and external component political and Security Committee,
responsibilities
in the foundations of multilateralism EU Military Committee and Military
according to rules. More specifically, b) as hedging: in the Staff as well as Military Planning and
according to the Greek roots of the scenario where US shifts her interest Conduct Capability
term auto “self” and nomos “law” elsewhere. Compensation does not
strategic autonomy can be defined (c) capabilities autonomy:
reduce dependency but represents
as the idea that the self (Europe, the fulfilling the commitments they made
a smart strategy leading to overall
EU) will have the ability, in terms of on Defense Investment Pledge and
alignment
capacity and capabilities, to set its under PESCO.
own priorities through domestic, c) as emancipation:
(d) Industrial autonomy:
European and international laws. the inseparable linking of operational
spreading the principles of the internal
In other words, strategic autonomy and political autonomy with industrial
market through third party access to
could be the answer to the enigma of autonomy.17
markets on a quid pro quo basis.19
European power, the key to which they
Particularly, It is noteworthy that
thought was power through norms
many experts mention “Strategic Si vis pacem, para bellum
and acting hastily in world politics as
autonomy” through military and
a humanitarian - normative, civilian, NATO, the world’s largest defense
defense perspectives, but after the
civilizing – power. This view, however, and stability provider, consists of
current EUGS, they expanded the
has been extensively criticized,16 the world’s two largest economic
meaning of encompassing areas such
because in the last decade, the EU players—the EU and the US —and
as industrial and digital capabilities
seems to have lost its distinctiveness three nuclear powers—France, the
with the ultimate goal to include all
as a normative actor in international UK, and the US – encompassing
policy areas, designating back to the
relations. nearly a billion people and half of
idea of a “Geopolitical Committee”.
It turns out to be a contested Also, an attempt has been made to the global GDP across a space that
concept that has many different give a holistic approach to a capable stretches from the Pacific coast of
definitions, although the concept Europe that not only speaks as a North America to the Black Sea.
usually refers to maximizing capacity mild power but also responds to the Cooperation between the EU and
in matters of defense. This attitude is language “demand of power” without NATO, in addition to the convergence
referred to the EU by several scholars, removing from its grammar, the on a list of seventy-four issues of joint
and the definitional paradox involves concept of cooperation.18 Thus, the action, must lead to the necessary
two processes “freedom to act” and extended and expanded meaning political adjustment of NATO, as this is

15
Council of the European Union, “Implementation Plan on Security and Defence (14392/16),” 4.
16
Hyde-Price, “Normative ‘power,” 217–234.
17
Fiott, “Strategic autonomy: towards ‘European sovereignty’in defence,”3-4.
18
Beaune, “Europe after COVID” in Atlantic Council’s “Future Europe Initiative.”
19
International Centre for Defence and Security, “European strategic autonomy: operationalising a buzzword,” VI.

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a “basic requirement for its survival”.20 Defence (CARD), the Military through its “Belt and Road Initiative,”23
This adjustment will be achieved Planning and Conduct Capacity which can be used as a diplomatic
through political consultations at the (MPCC), the European Peace Facility security tool. On the other hand,
highest level but also by ensuring (EPF), military mobility, and EU rapid- since the Obama administration, we
institutionalized interaction and response facilities, including combat see the US necessary consolidation
coordination with the EU. European units and civilian capabilities. At this of the EU’s industrial regime, which
defense capabilities are fully aligned point, the US is challenged to move will serve EU autonomy when the
with the basic principles of the NATO away from what David Calleo calls the US shifts its focus to the Indo-Pacific.
Defense Planning Process (NDPP), “monopoly fantasy,”21 while ESA is for The European defense industry has
while the overall strategy provides some a means to Europe’s complete already been strengthened by the
the instruments of the European autonomy from the US. Unblocking signing of the Investment Commitment
Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent should be replaced by an equal—and in 2014, which set as its main goal the
Structured Cooperation (PESCO) thus more sustainable—transatlantic increase of defense spending to two
that ensure there is no overlap of relationship, with membership in percent of its GDP by 2024—with 20
responsibilities. alliances such as EU and NATO percent spent on major equipment, as
acting as a compensatory force well as diplomatic emergency exits.24
In the context of the alliance, in
against such monopolistic tendencies.
2016 the EU and NATO adopted a Expanding the agenda beyond
For, as Kissinger (2014) points out, “A
Joint Declaration that formulated a defense is a necessary adaptation
balance of power does not guarantee
new type of relationship, where in the to the current challenges of rapid
peace on its own, but it can limit the
new “imperatus” is broken into seven technological transformation in areas
scope and frequency of fundamental
common sectors: such as climate change and cyber
challenges and limit the likelihood
warfare. The establishment of a
a) Countering hybrid threats, of success when they occur”.22 Τhis
common “norm” of threat perception
kind of “balance of power” can be
b) Operational cooperation in the through the adoption of a “Global
established by Biden’s presidency
maritime domain, Example of Politics”25 by “reflexive
with a cyclical revival of the EU–NATO
power,” is also essential. As is the
partnership, based on a common
c) Cyber security and defense, belief that international authority
vision. The instrumentalization of
is above national sovereignty and
d) Defense capabilities, EU “enlargement” through liberal-
that shielding a common security
democratic social and political
e) Defense industry and research, through strategic autonomy is critical.
transformation can be reinforced,
The strategic compass, a German
f) Exercises, and despite the temporary reactions of
initiative, creates an axis to identify
Poland and Hungary simulating the
e) Resilience of partners. “common threats” while linking
scenario of democratic rebirth. The
the EU’s strategic operational and
challenge lies in China’s continued
Contributing to this is the capability needs. Strategic autonomy
presence as a key competitor that
strengthening of PESCO, the is an affirmation of the EU’s global
needs to limit its range. China is
Coordinated Annual Review on dynamism, and all policy papers
developing its economic presence

20
Reflection-Group-Final-Report, “ΝΑΤΟ 2030,” 64.
21
Calleo, “Follies of power: America’s Unipolar Fantasy,” 75.
22
Kissinger, “World Order,” 10.
23
Janardhan, “Belt and Road Initiative: China’s Diplomatic-Security Tool in the Gulf,” 1-2.
24
Moller and Rynning, “Revitalizing Transatlantic Relations: NATO 2030 and Beyond,” 183–185.
25
Zürn, “A theory of global governance: Authority, legitimacy, and contestation,” 248, 258.

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represent attempts to build a “strategic EDF. However, by doing so, the EU between the China-US-Russia
culture”26 that helps clarify the Union’s shifts the military dimension into the triangle will be a key challenge in
role in the world and thus increase its hands of (European) states rather which the EU-NATO synergy will act
influence. The 2016 global strategy than the EU, at least for the next few as a balancing force. According to the
of HR/VP Federica Mogherini is years. Moreover, Brattberg (2021)30 NIC Global Trends Report, A More
mentioned five times and nourishes suggests building a stronger European Contested World 2040, there are
“the ambition of the strategy of pillar in NATO rather than rhetorical five (5) possible future scenarios, as
autonomy” “in an international system discussions on vague concepts such elaborated below:
based on rules and multilateral as autonomy while also acknowledging
A. Renaissance of Democracies:
cooperation”.27 Community cultivates Europe’s responsibility culminating in
Under America’s leadership, a culture
the “we-feeling” and burden-sharing, a continued transatlantic engagement
of cooperation is established through
which is also the central demand of the US. At the same time, Lațici
the revival of democracies and
of the US that fueled the renewal (2021)31 confirms that a stronger
Western values.
of the divisive debate on strategic European pillar in NATO is consistent
autonomy under Trump. The use of with the EU’s ambitions for strategic B. A World Adrift: Russia aligns
joint military mechanisms under the autonomy, while Sten Rynning (2021) with China as a smaller partner,
auspices of ESDP and CSDP reveals states that NATO works best when while China’s economic and military
this evolution and outlines a “possible it functions as a concert of member coercion fails to win the World
establishment of an effective and states that is a “compromise between Championship
relatively coherent European security the strategic cultures of the US,
policy and strategic culture”.28 Canada, and Europe”.32 C. Competitive Coexistence: In
this scenario, the United States and
In this context, Tardy (2021)29 The future of the NATO-EU China will prosper and compete for
makes a bold proposal that compares synergy will be influenced by leadership in a bifurcated world.
the parallel agendas of NATO and addressing the COVID 19 crisis and
the EU in light of NATO’s burden- climate change, while establishing a D. Separate Silos: Globalization
sharing and distinguishes the benefits culture of open democracy. Increased breaks down and economic and
of synergy in the security sector economic interdependence will security groups emerge to protect the
through role-sharing as first or second reduce the likelihood of conventional country from increasing threats.
responders. NATO will be the first war between major powers but
E. Tragedy and Mobilization:
responder in collective defense, could influence operations such
There is a bottom-up change due to
while the EU as second responder as economic espionage and cyber
the devastating global environmental
would be responsible for overall crisis attacks that require coordinated action.
crisis that leads to a collapse of global
management and human security Competition for political influence,
food chains.33
activities and focus on capability governance models, technological
development through PESCO and dominance and strategic advantage Moreover, NATO 2030 seeks to

26
Krotz and, Maher, “International Relations Theory and the Rise of European Foreign and Security Policy,” 565, and Mälksoo, “From the ESS to
the EU Global Strategy: External Policy, Internal Purpose,” 374-388. 27Cornish, and Edwards, “The strategic culture of the European Union: a prog-
ress report,”801.
27
Eugs, “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe,”5.
28
Tardy,“For a New NATO-EU,” 2. 29 Brattberg, “Middle Power Diplomacy in an Age of US-China Tensions,” 219-238.
30
Lațici, “From one master of survival to another: a tardigrade’s plea for NATO2030,” 2.
31
Calleo, “Follies of Power: America’s Unipolar Fantasy,” 16.
32
National Intelligence Council (US), “Global trends 2040- A more contested world,” 108- 120.
33
Bjerg & Rynning, “Revitalizing Transatlantic Relations: NATO 2030 and Beyond,”181-192.

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outline a new raison d’être concerning of establishing a Center of Excellence
organization». The “complementarity
the need for political adaptation for Democratic Resilience, are also
between NATO and the EU is in
and modernization of NATO. High important additions to an adaptation
the interest of both organizations”39
on the agenda is security, which policy. Indeed, in NATO’s search for
because modern challenges require
characterizes the resilience of the relevance of notion of security as
a degree of smart diplomacy as
Alliance in an open and stable a “trade-off”35 is redefined, and the
war simply changes shape, and
international order. The mix of present call for open-source security in the
the world passes through the third
challenges, however, requires a 21st century is being addressed. The
period of “renewed dynamism”.40
revision of the 2010 strategy and goal of all security alliances based
The EU and NATO should and can
calls for a 360-degree shift, redefining on Article 5 “collective defense” and
play complementary and reinforcing
the future of collective defense from transnational relations is at the core
roles, and have a relationship of
the top-down to resist international of the success of transforming a zero-
“cooperative competition.”41
rivals (Russia and China), protect sum game into a cooperative one.
collaborators (e.g. Australia, Japan Specifically, the EU and NATΟ could
and India), but furthermore in playing “create an institutionalised staff link
a role in crisis management to through a permanent political liaison
include areas such as cyber security element in NATO’s International Staff
and space, and in broadening its (IS) and the European External Action
geographic horizons to include the Service (EEAS)”.36
Indian Ocean and North Atlantic /
Arctic.34 Conclusion Athina PAPAPAVLOU
GRC CIV
The need for change is also In essence, the EU and NATO Intern
emphasized, not least in the must work hand in hand as strong NRDC-GR/G5
presentation of 138 proposals by the allies, as they are mutually reinforcing
ten 10 experts, the complexity of which because the world’s security is
lies, among other things, in the parallel “interconnected”.37 Most importantly,
but synchronous confrontation of they must work together because
systemic rivalry found in a persistently their security is «interrelated».38
aggressive Russia as well as the NATO 2030 and the Strategic
rise of China and the growing role of Compass’ joint action all these years
Emerging and Disruptive Technologies is the answer to any concerns about
(EDT). Meanwhile, the necessary the termination or the impossibility
revision of the 2014 Green Defense of joint coexistence. The future is
Framework and the optimal use of uncertain, and NATO and EU will
the Science for Peace and Security complement each other based on
program, together with the scenario the «comparative advantage of each

34
TEDx Schneier, “The security mirage,” in 18.47 minute.
35
Reflection Group, Final Report, “NATO2030,”15.
36
EEA,2019b,“Countering Hybrid Threats,” 16–17.
37
Smith, “Countering Hybrid Threats. Paris: in Lindstrom G. and Tardy T. (editors) The EU and NATO.”
38
Mesterhazy, “NATO-EU Cooperation after Warsaw,”5.
39
Papaioannou, “Strengthening EU-NATO relations.”Under, “How did the institutional relationship evolve?”
40
Locatelli et al.,“Intra-allied competition and alliance durability,” 345–362.

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INCLUSIVE LEADERSHIP: MANAGING DIVERSITY

IN A MULTINATIONAL WORKING ENVIRONMENT
organizations understand that a to overall success. Diversity and
diverse workforce can be the primary inclusion together lay the foundation
source of competitive advantage. of sustainability and development.
However merely having a diversive It could be said that diversity is
organization is not enough. the ingredients and inclusion the
directions of a recipe.
Inclusion is acting in a way
to make this wide range work. It Recent research has revealed that
is about sustaining an operating organizations focusing on inclusion
atmosphere during which all people experience individuals with higher
are treated fairly and respectfully, levels of performance and accomplish
granted equal opportunities, and their mission. Nonhomogeneous
can participate in the organization’s teams focus more on facts, process
© NATO
goal accomplishments. Members of those facts more methodologically,
Diversity and Inclusion in dominant and non-dominant groups, and are more innovative. Employees/
Workplace represented or under-represented staff are more productive, creative,
groups, do not face discrimination and collaborative, and satisfied. They have
Modern society is marked by inequity, when included. For example, more unique ideas based on their
diversity, shaped by technological men in most societies are the dominant background. They communicate more
evolution and globalization in a world gender group and concentrate more effectively, make better decisions,
more complicated and interconnected economic and cultural power. A first openly express their opinions,
than ever before. Workplaces are look on inclusion could be that all other manage risks better, tend to resolve
characterized by a collage of diversive gender classifications, considered as interpersonal conflicts easier, and
individuals with inherent differences, non-dominant, have equal access, are more likely to recommend their
such as gender, age, nationality, and use of the processes, as the supervisors. Hence, organizations
along with acquired ones, such as dominant men group has. attract diverse individuals, have a
personality style, socio-economic better reputation, and positive Public
status, industry experience, and Inclusion in the workplace is of
Relations.
career path. great importance for any organization
aiming to build a strong sense of Inclusion describes the processes
Diversity refers to “the key connection and belonging, and an that help everyone in an organization
elements that make us individuals engaging culture. We feel included feel valued and respected regardless
and thus different (e.g., nationality, when we use our voice, when we their differences. People feel valued
gender, age, race or ethnic participate in the decision-making when they feel important and useful.
origin, religion, or belief, cultural processes within a group, when Two factors that encourage a sense
background, sexual orientation or we use the amount of power we of being valued are belonging and
disability). Diversity describes the have within the group, and when uniqueness. Belonging refers to
workplace an organization seeks we feel we actually belong there. feeling accepted, just as a person
to create to benefit from a wide When people feel the sense of is. It also refers to feel included in
range of identities incorporated by belonging, they positively engage formal and informal networks and to
individuals. Global and multinational within the organization leading feel the same person at home and

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work. Belonging “is about how you
feel when you are at work. Do you
feel valued? Should you be there?
Do your insights, commentary, and
perspectives matter?”.

Uniqueness means that each

person is one of a kind and appreciated
because of the multiple qualities that
possesses. A female colleague once
shared her experience. Colleagues
and supervisors often wanted her to
represent their unit. They asked for
her advice on gender issues. They
invited her to share meetings to make
them diverse, without considering Diversity and inclusion, belonging, and engagement coexist
other ways she could contribute. For
example, they did not consult her
for her expertise she was trained
for. As a result, she did not feel fully
appreciated and doubted whether she
belonged in that organization or not.

Respect is often related to

communication. People feel
disrespected when others ignore,
interrupt, mispronounce their name,
or make fun of their accent. Two
factors are especially important for
members of non-dominant groups
to feel respected: equity and non-
discrimination. Individuals are included when they feel valued and respected

Equity attempts to identify the meals as well could be a step towards inclusion. Inclusion is not an end state.
specific needs and requirements of equity, whereas, in terms of equality, It is an ongoing process. Diversity
each group. It then tries to provide an organization should provide and inclusion practices are not simple
solutions according to the differing meat meal options for everyone. and easy-going. In order to become
needs by bridging the gap between Non-discrimination refers to fair and inclusive an organization needs to be
dominant and non-dominant groups. unprejudiced treatment especially for fully committed and dedicated.
It refers to unbiased treatment and groups who have faced inequities. Organizations should establish
offers varying levels of support based
fair employee/staff decisions, equal
on needs. On the contrary, equality Inclusive Organizations and access to resources, and a sense
provides the same options, rules, Inclusive Leadership of teamwork. They should provide
and opportunities for everyone.
Slogans, policies, trainings, protection from mistreatment, a work-
Providing meal options for vegans,
fancy promoting, or communication life balance, and urge everyone to bring
and vegetarians along with meat
campaigns alone do not produce authentic selves to work. Moreover,

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they should strive to establish Characteristics of Inclusive Motivated by a deep sense of fairness
core values including compassion, Leaders and inspired by their values, they
empathy, self-awareness, judgment, become a visible role model. They
Based on studies inclusive leaders
and intellectual integrity. Diversity and invest in human capital understanding
demonstrate six characteristics.
inclusion efforts need to be led by the the positive impact of this attitude on
These are commitment, courage,
organization’s top leadership. the organization.
cognizance of bias, curiosity, cultural
Effective leaders are inclusive intelligence, and collaboration. Leaders demonstrate commitment
leaders. These leaders are expected Leaders who approach everyday when they accept personal
to be supportive, committed, activities using these characteristics responsibility for creating a more
compassionate, fair, trustworthy, create an environment where diverse inclusive working environment, when
flexible, inspiring, inquisitive, humble, ideas are accepted, and diverse they behave so that everyone is treated
courageous, empowering, impartial, individuals demonstrate performance fairly and respectfully and become
authentic, adaptable, resilient, equal to their full potential. They aware of their uniqueness. They also
empathetic, creative, innovative, and also create more cooperations demonstrate this characteristic when
self-aware. with diverse organizations. These processes are transparent and meet
characteristics are not inherent and individuals’ needs. They properly
Being self-aware means being
can be developed. allocate resources, meaning money,
fully present. Inclusive leaders try
time for knowing their staff, mentoring,
to clearly understand themselves
Commitment sponsoring, and energy.
and figure out others’ opinion about
them. They monitor their emotions Inclusive leaders are committed.
and look for the impact of their They do not just declare committed
emotions on others. They ask for but they also act in such a way.
360-degree feedback and act upon
it to improve themselves, to cope
with their weaknesses and hidden
biases. They avoid being defensive
when they receive negative feedback,
thus encouraging others to express
freely themselves. They are humble
because they know that they do not
know everything and at the same time
they recognize that they need to set up
an inclusive platform where everyone
has the same access to contribute to
finding solutions.

Studies show that self-aware Charampos STACHTARIS

OF-4 (GRC A)
leaders are more likely to meet their
SO1 Exercises
business goals by achieving high NRDC-GR/G7
performance. Leaders gain the trust
of team members and increase their
own credibility. Organizations are less
likely to experience internal conflict.

Individuals are included when they feel valued and respected

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Courage minimize biases. cultural groups within organizations
shape the relations among staff.
Courage is shown by
Curiosity
understanding personal weaknesses, By being mindful of cultural
sharing power, insisting on their Leaders who exhibit curiosity ask intelligence leaders care about
values, and promoting accountability. for answers instead of providing them. executing in a cross-cultural
These leaders are modest and They show no fear if others judge environment. They are aware of the
humble. They know they do not know them as unconfident, incompetent, similarities and differences of cultures
everything and admit it. They are not unintelligent, or insufficient. As and identify how organizations’
afraid of revealing their limitations. humans are promoted and given everyday activities are affected.
They dare to reexamine and modify higher positions in organizations, they They organize strategy accordingly,
strongly established processes to assume they need less to learn. But and they are ready to adapt to
develop inclusive behaviors and inclusive leaders are open-minded various cross-cultural environment
encourage diversity. and more than willing to expand their situations. For example, meeting with
knowledge. an Asian colleague requires having
Cognizance of Bias a behavioral strategy to establish
Curiosity is beneficial for a trustful environment while, at the
Bias causes discrimination. leaders. It improves deep rational same time, individuals operating in a
Everyone is subject to it. Explicit thinking and decision-making. It cross-cultural workplace need to be
biases refer to the attitudes and advances innovation and diminishes flexible and adaptive in case of an
beliefs we have about a person or group conflict. It increases unexpected or unofficial discussion
cluster on an aware level. Implicit better communication, and team with a member of a culturally diverse
biases are attitudes or stereotypes effectiveness. Curious leaders are group.
that influence our understanding, respected because of their efforts.
actions, associated selections in They stimulate trust and collaboration
Collaboration
an unconscious manner. There among their personnel.
are personal and process biases. Inclusive leaders create a
Leaders demonstrate curiosity
Individuals show personal biases teamwork culture. They encourage
when they are committed to lifelong
whereas organizations show process and support cooperation between
learning. Curious leaders seek to
ones. Αn implicit process bias could diverse individuals. They insist on
understand their people by making
affect recruitment or promotion maintaining a workplace where
questions and engaging with respect
methodology. the staff feels welcome to think
and empathy. They are patient, they
independently. They encourage their
Inclusive leaders address personal do not make hustle judgments, and
personnel to work together more
and process biases in several ways. support diverse ideas.
effectively and thrive upon their
They recognize that all individuals
professional development.
are influenced by stereotypes and Cultural Intelligence
prejudice. They are aware of the term Collaboration is found in
privilege and how this affects persons Several cultural factors affect workplaces when team members give
opportunities. They understand how the way individuals interact within an their opinions and manage challenging
privileged persons benefit, and on organization, and consequently have tasks freely. It is also found where
the other hand how people, who do a strong influence in the workplace. diverse teams are formed, and when
not have similar advantages, face Some are nationality, gender, race, team conflicts are expected and
obstacles. They seek to acquire skills ethnicity, age group, sexual orientation, addressed appropriately.
to manage implicit biases. They review religion, and organization’s role.
Moreover, organization’s culture, and COVID-19 Pandemic: Effects on
and revise policies and procedures to

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though not on the same scale as at and actively supporting and practicing
crisis peak. inclusive leadership are decisive
factors for making individuals
According to recent research,
feel engaged and belonging,
a key challenge to this reforming
ultimately leading to mission
workplace appears to be that it is more
success. Organizations, leaders,
difficult to establish new relationships
and colleagues are key relations in
rather than preserving the existed
establishing an inclusive working
ones. Additionally, some processes
environment. As our society and
“She Runs, He Runs, We Run” mixed when executed face to face appear
workplace become more diversive,
relay event, which brings together partic- to have better results rather than in a
ipants of all ages and ranks, as well as organizations need to be more
virtual environment. These processes
their family members – 2017. © NATO intensive about inclusion.
include negotiations, critical
Diversity and Inclusion decisions, brainstorming sessions,
Virtual or hybrid work has been etc. Therefore, organizations are
more and more adopted by many in danger of experiencing less
organizations due to the COVID-19 collaboration leading to less inclusive
pandemic. It has also broadened workplaces and lower levels of new
the traditional meaning of working development.
environment which prior to the
pandemic mainly included working Conclusion
Georgios CHAROUSIS
in the same physical place. After the OF-3 (GRC A)
People are the most treasured
pandemic, it is expected that remote Training Manager
resource for every organization. MPSOTC
work and virtual events (conferences,
Investing in diversity and inclusion,
meetings, etc.) will probably continue,

References:
- Kevin Cashman (2017). The Global Leadership Dilemma: To Be Inclusive Or Not To Be Inclusive?
- Anthony Paradiso (2020). The Importance of Inclusion in the Workplace.
- Kellie Wong (2020). The Quick Guide to Diversity and Inclusion in the Workplace.
- Eric Arthrell, Carolyn Lawrence, Jodi Baker Calamai, Alex Morris (2019). Status, fear, and solitude. Men and gender equality at the top.
- Juliet Bourke, 王大威 (2017). Diversity and inclusion: The reality gap.
- Jeff Waldman (2016). The Importance of Diversity and Inclusion On Employee Engagement.
- David Rock, Heidi Grant (2016). Why Diverse Teams Are Smarter.
- Wharton School (2019). Beyond Diversity: How Firms Are Cultivating a Sense of Belonging.
- Culture Amp. “Six Ways to Foster Belonging in the Workplace”.
- Michael C. Bush (2018). “This is what makes employees happy at work”.
- Chiradeep BasuMallick (2020). Five reasons to focus on equity alongside diversity and inclusion.
- Kristie Rogers (2018). Do Your Employees Feel Respected? Show workers that they’re valued, and your business will flourish.
- Andrea Alexander, Bonnie Dowling, Sara Prince (2021). Reimagining the virtual workplace around inclusion and engagement.
- Malini Janakiraman Inclusive Leadership: Critical for a Competitive Advantage.
- NATO Diversity and Inclusion Annual Report 2019.
- Bernadette Dillon, Juliet Bourke (2016). 6 Characteristics of Inclusive Leaders.
- Susan Lund, Anu Madgavkar, James Manyika, Sven Smit, Kweilin Ellingrud, Mary Meaney, and Olivia Robinson (2021).
- Deloitte (2016). Six Signature Traits of Inclusive Leadership.
- Peter Bailinson, William Decherd, Diana Ellsworth and Maital Guttman (2020). Understanding organizational barriers to a more inclusive work-
place.

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HISTORICAL LOGISTICS CHALLENGES:

THE SPANISH ROAD (1567-1659)

Historical Framework

The Spanish Empire that King

Philip II had inherited from his father
Charles I in Europe included the
present-day territories of Belgium and
Netherlands. Part of their hierarchy
did not accept the Spanish dominance
and soon the attempts commenced
against the Spanish governors
besides they were Flemish or Dutch
natives. The conflict was called “the
Low Countries’ Wars” lasted over 80
years and affected also all Habsburgs
Kings.

Although the first twelve years theory”. Its main argument was that if deployment.
were very successful for the Spanish the Dutch revolt was not suppressed
forces -the Flanders Army- 15 main by force and their attempt was Setting up the forces: the distance
towns were occupied after rebels’ prolonged, the Habsburg power would dilemma.
military defeats, they were forced to come crashing down as a house of
change the tactical procedures into cards, provoking rebellion in another To face this problem all routes
guerrilla ones. Consequently, the end Spanish outpost like Milan or Naples. were studied. At first, the fastest
of the conflict was far to conclude in a strategy movement was by sea and,
short-term period. And what is more, Also, as the Low Countries’ wars consequently, the logical route was
the European powers rivals as France persisted and became an international to depart from the ports of northern
and England were ready to take confrontation the domino theory was Spain, cross the English Channel,
advantage to tear the Major Empire gaining momentum: as long as Spain and reach the southern Flemish ports.
in that time, by supporting directly or could make its enemies fight in the During the 1540-50s Spanish ships
indirectly any war against it. Netherlands, they could not attack from the Cantabrian coast had been
Spain.2 travelling those seas safely, but in
Then, as professor Geoffrey 1558 hostilities with England started
Parker stated,1 the Habsburgs Spanish As a result of this Strategy, the
and this would be a major setback.
Empire was the first European power decision taken was to firmly maintain
The English pirates, the Dutch Sea
to deploy sophisticated arguments those territories under the Spanish
beggars who even dared to make
of global strategy to justify its foreign Sovereign and it was required to
raids on the Bay of Biscay with a fleet
policy choices; later world powers mobilize an Army recruited from Spain
of 70 ships, the French Huguenots
re-use them all, it was the “domino and Italy and keep it well-sustained
from the port of la Rochelle, and even
during all phases of its activation and
1
The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road. Chapter 5. The Army of Flanders and Grand Strategy pages 109-110.
2
JP 4-0 Joint Logistics, Feb 2019.

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the strategy movement started in
Castile to the ports of Barcelona
and Cartagena; and they travelled
by sea to Genoa. From 1528, the
Genoa Republic had linked its
destinies to the Spanish monarchy
becoming not only a great financial
supporter and occasional ally, but
also providing the main seaport
of disembarkation for troops and
equipment in Italy. As reciprocity
compensation, Spain protected
the Republic against its enemies,
especially against the French, to
the Royal Navy prohibited the use of guarantee the Genoese possession
the English Channel for the Spanish of Corsica.
ships.
From Genoa, the troops were
This situation forced the study leading to Milan, capital of Lombardy,
of alternative land routes, which where the forces of Naples and Sicily
materialized on the so-called Spanish joined the famous “Spanish Tercios”3
Road, devised by Cardinal Granvela and they constituted the main land
in 1563 when Philip II planned to visit forces strength. Beyond Lombardy its neutrality.
the Netherlands. The advantage of was the Duchy of Savoy, which was
this route was that it spread almost a traditional ally, reaffirmed by the Next was the Duchy of Lorraine.
entirely through territories that Treaty of Groenendal (26 March Located between the Meuse and
belonged to the Hispanic Monarchy or 1559), whose friendship with Spain Rhine rivers, linked the Franco-County
its allies. Cardinal Granvela planned was reinforced by its poor geography, with Luxembourg. Although from 1547
this route based on pre-existing paths which caused it to be permanently a treaty between Spain and France
used by merchants. Traders who at the mercy of the neighboring ensured its neutrality, the Dukes of
moved with their wares from France to France, although the weakness of the Lorraine ignored it to intervene in the
Italy normally crossed the Mont Cenis Valois after Henry II’s death allowed French wars of religion at the head of
and Maurienne passes in winter and some stability by ensuring a corridor the Catholic league.
the Little St. Bernard pass and the between Milan and the Franco-
Tarantaise Valley in summer. Both After Lorraine, the troops passed
County.
routes were suitable for pack-mules through Luxembourg, but there would
and boasted numerous fully equipped The Franco-County was a small still be a territory outside the domains
sites to rest. territory inserted on the border of the monarchy: Liege, completely
with France that was ruled by the surrounded by territories of the
Netherlands. It was bound to remain Habsburgs but it was a safe ally.
Allies Agreements
neutral by a treaty signed in 1508,
The Spanish Habsburgs insisted a clause of that treaty allowed free Alternative routes
on recruiting soldiers from their own transit through it, so that the troops
territories as much as possible, then could cross it without compromising Once France was able to solve its
internal problems, it became a threat

Unit comprised between 10 and 12 companies (3000 men) commanded by Maestre de Campo, included three specialties: Pike men, Harquebusiers
3

& Musketeers. It was inspired in Legio Romana structure.

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to the delicate balance that guaranteed the safety of the route.
The French king launched several attacks on Burgundy (1595,
1597) that damaged the Franco-County by briefly interrupting the
corridor and forcing the way east. But the main problem came
up as a result of a territorial conflict between France and Savoy.
In 1600 France decided to seek compensation by occupying all
Piedmont territories to the Rhone, thus putting in grave danger the
continuity of the Spanish Road. Immediately, Spanish diplomacy
was launched, demanding a safe route that would guarantee the
passage of its armies. France then proposed an alternate route
through the Swiss cantons. The new itinerary crossed the Catholic
cantons of the Swiss confederation and the result of 30 years of
negotiations was a treaty with the Grisons who controlled the
Engadine and Valtelina passages.

Again, the loss of Alsace by the Habsburgs in 1621 forced

Spain to act in the heart of the Empire. The situation could not be
more critical, because that same year the twelve-year truce with
the Dutch rebels without was concluded and neither side doing
anything to extend it. Meanwhile, France had been poisoning
relations between Spain and the Swiss cantons, repeatedly
disrupting the flow of soldiers. Again the road was moving to the
east, it crossed southern Germany from Juliers, bordering the north
of Milan by Valtelina, to the republic of Venice, his only trusted
ally in Italy outside the upstart Savoy. However, the Valtelina War
(1621–39) was decided on the side of the Grisons when France
intervened in their favor occupying the valley in 1624.
The successes of Louis XIII with the occupation of Savoy
in 1630-31 and of Lorraine in 1632-33 resulted in the definitive
loss of the military corridors used by Spain. The annexation of
these territories would be justified under the pretext that both had
attempted to dethrone the French monarchs on several occasions,
but for Richelieu it was for purely strategic reasons.
For its part, Spain tried to remedy Flanders’ isolation by
increasing recruitment in the Tyrol and Rhine regions. In 1634
a Spanish-imperial Army in front of Ferdinand of Austria, the
Cardinal-infant, defeats the Swedish and Protestant forces at
the Battle of Noerdlinger briefly opening the way from the Alps to
Brussels.

First Expedition
The route started in 1567 and the Duke of Alba and 10.000
troops were the first travelers on his journey to become the new
governor of the Netherlands. To prepare the route, the Duke of
Alba ordered opening widenings in the steep valley that rises from
Novalesa by Ferreira to the Cenis Pass to a team of 300 sappers,

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with a ferry or a bridge. with or without compensation. The
increase in the size of the armies and
This system, to use in the scale of military operations in the
combination of local’s sixteenth century was intensified the
guides, engineers, burden of this casual arrangements
cartographers and scouts and it was all the more difficult to find
in an advanced party, large communities to support them.
was also adopted by the The solution to ensure logistics on
follow-up expeditions. the way brought up the “staples or
As a result the Spanish étapes” which was a concept used
road, like all others routes by French traders for several years.
consisted of several It was adapted by the military as
parallel or semi-parallel centres where supplies were stored
strings of fixed points- and camped, some of them were
essential bridges, fords or fixed and others were provisionally
ferries which connected mounted in accordance with the route
the community large on which the troops would move.
enough to accommodate
travelers decently- and Don Cristobal de Benavente,
the tracks between them. former inspector-general to the Army
of Flanders Army, had to explain to
the Cortes of Castile the advantages
which would go through the troops, Feeding and lodging a marching of a system where:
building and dismantling makeshift Army: The staple or étape
bridges in his wake. He even took Instead of giving money to every
over a painter who accompanied The additional problem was how soldier to support himself on the
the expedition to draw maps and to feed and lodge the troops, whereas march…it is given to the place where
panoramic views of the army route. it also had to include civilians who he has to spend the night, obliging to
In addition, guides from each region accompanied them as lackeys and provide all the necessary food, giving
were hired. The Duke of Alba’s authorized women and children, specifics orders, as in an étape, about
guide was Ferdinand of Lannoy, as well as horses and mules. For how much bread wine, meat cheese
the cartographer who made such a example, Alba’s Expedition included and other provisions should be given to
precise map of the Franco-County 9.611 soldiers and 965 warhorses each soldier, and sending in advance
that the Duke blocked its publication and it was planned to feed 16000 a commissioner who would arrange
for ten years to keep the established “mouths” and 3000 horses. Feeding this obligations in the same place
routes secret. this mobile group for one or two where the soldiers have to spend the
months came with a serious dilemma. night, just as has to be done for the
Thanks to these preparations, To establish permanent storage sites same after they disembark in Genoa,
the expeditions crossed the along the road, as it was done in the making étapes for them in Lombardy
mountains smoothly, despite initial Staging Area in Milan, cannot and the Grisons, or in Savoy, Lorraine
difficult weather. An advanced party be afforded for one or two expeditions and Luxemburg.
preceded each expedition to check per year.
the route and refurbish surviving Nevertheless, the system was
sections of paved road or The traditional method of both simple and sensible. One
improvedifficult passages with provisioning European Armies was village became the centre, the staple,
bridges or causeways. They also primitive: everything necessary for the where troops’ food was collected
provided all rivers in the Army’s path soldiers was requisitioned on the spot, and distributed. The feeding was

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agreed previously by an offer and it
was accepted by military suppliers’
officers who signed a contract called
“capitulation” that fixed the amount
of food to be provided and the prices
they would demand for it. If the
troops slept in beds,4 the houses
in the étape and the surrounding
villages received special chits,
called billets of lodgement. They
stipulated the number of persons to
be accommodated in each house and
Spanish Troops Convoy to the Flanders Wars in 1643 painted by Augusto Ferrer-Dal-
the number of horses to be stabled. mau (Barcelona 1964) original title: “The Spanish Road”.
After the troops left, the merchants
and the householders presented the
capitulations and billets of lodgement
to the local tax-collectors claimed
their outlays against future or past tax
liability.

Troops using the Spanish Road

encountered two sorts of military
étape. The first type, founded only in
Savoy, was permanent and offered
accommodation as well as food.
All communities in the étape area
contributed to the cost of providing
food and services under the Savoy
ducal representative, as modern
Host Nation Support; and all shared thus benefited everyone; The Army Movements and transportation.
the profit or loss. After troops had ensured that the troops were properly
In addition to food, the étapes
left, the area came back to its normal fed; soldiers got their rations without
often had to provide the troops with
commercial activities but it was delay and usually on credit; and the
baggage transport. In Alpine valleys,
enriched with those extra ones. contractors received prompt payment
where carriage was by pack-mules
for the food they provided. But, of
The second type was quite and each company on would require
course, in the sixteenth century no
different since relatively few between twenty and forty mules. It
system of relative complexity could
merchants travelled regularly between was not easy to concentrate enough
function without any occasional
Chambery to Brussels. The initiative, animals at a single place and time.
disaster. Mainly this would happen
therefore, came from the provincial Once they left the Alpine valleys, four-
when contractors overreached
governments either acting directly or wheeled cars transported the troops´
themselves and failed to get their
through private contractors to supply baggage. Each company required
provisions in time and at the proper
the troops. The contract system between two and four cars, depending
étape.5
4
Only when they and their horses could not survive at night in the open.
5
Those situations forced locals communities to prepare improvised support to the troops and consequently, soldiers claimed the lack of preparations
and normally the extra cost of the services. There are some well reported cases in 1601 in the étape of Beaume-les-Dames and in 1603 in the town
of Pontarlier, both in Franche-Comté.

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the quantity of baggage. As it was not at intervals of one day´s march, the the formidable logistical problems
easy to collect so many vehicles to second detachment reaching the posed by the distance and geography,
address this problem, special contract étape used by the fist the previous the Monarchy managed to assemble
were negotiated with carters of Bresse night, and so on. Only when the and maintain a large army hundreds
in Savoy or Lorraine to guarantee commander feared an attack, as Alba of miles from its political center.
transport along the whole length of did in 1567 after he left Savoy, did
The way that the Spanish Road
the Road. a large expedition close ranks and
march as a single unit. was planned and executed reminds
The advanced preparations of concepts that nowadays are very
-roads, food, accommodations and Despite the fact that the adverse realistic: secure strategic movements
transports- naturally increased the weather conditions could invalidate for the land forces by host nation
speed with which troops could be even the most elaborate preparations agreements; integrated advanced
brought to the front. If everything for overnight and could force to use party to prepare the routes, Host nation
went according to plan, a regiment improvised tracks and change pre- support and use of contractors for
would cover the journey from Milan used étapes, the infrastructure that supplies (class I) and transportation;
to Namur, some 1000 kilometres, in created the Spanish Road marked the introduction of the staples similar
just over one month. An expedition a vast improvement on any other to the staging areas and to be ready to
of 5,000 men in February 1578 took previous system for moving troops use alternative routes even providing
only 32 days (crossing the Alps in the to a distant theatre of operations. force protection to the convoys,
depths winter), while another in 1582 The étapes cushioned the civilian all of them are very familiar to the
took 34 days-over 30 kms a day for population against the violence and NATO logistics community after five
just over one month: a remarkable destruction normally associated centuries.
achievement for any army in any age. with the passage of troops. Where
To conclude, the Spanish Road
The normal speed of troops using the they nevertheless occurred, the
was one of the most amazing logistics
Spanish Road averaged 20 kms a government would pay compensation.
feats carried out by an army at any
day, with average duration of 48 days. Even more the cost of each expedition
period in the military history.
See the chart. to the state remained modest: an
average of 50 florins to send each
The overall speed of an expedition Spanish and Italian soldier from
often reflected the manner in which Lombardy to the Netherlands.
it travelled. A force of 3000 men or
less might have marched along the
Spanish Road as single contingent Conclusions
but larger forces normally travelled in As Professor Parker wrote:
sections. If possible each contingent ingenuity and tenacity therefore Rufino CALLEJA
would receive a cavalry escort for its enabled Habsburg Spain to make its OF-5 (ESP A)
defence,6 and the different divisions military expatriation system work - ACOS
of the army would follow each other NRDC-GR/G4
and at surprisingly little cost. Despite

6
Similar to modern Force Protection concept.

References:
- The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road (1567-1659)¨. Editorial Cambridge Second Edition 2004, Professor Geoffrey Parker.
- A Pike in Flanders. The epic of the Spanish Road. Editorial EDAF 2007.Mr. Maríinez Laínez.
- The Spanish Tercios and the Spanish Road. Editorial EDAF 2012.Mr. Maríinez Laínez.
- A path, a History and a Legacy: The Spanish Road through the Tercios¨. Spanish Army Magazine “Ejército” number 869 September 2013. Several
authors
- The Spanish Road and theTercios´ footprint in Europe. 2014 Exhibition booklet. Several Authors.

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LOGISTICS AND THE GULF WAR

The Gulf War was underwritten

by logistics. Building the theater
infrastructure, deploying forces,
sustaining the campaign and bringing
the forces “Desert Shield” and “Desert
Storm” was the close coordination
between the logistical and operational
Commands and the Commanders’
understanding that logistics must
dovetail with the mission and concept
of operations of the projected force.
The Theater mission, Concept of
Operations and Scheme of Maneuver
are examined to bring out the criticality Figure 1
of logistics in effecting surprise and naval forces, with two US Army Corps Units, they were also responsible for
deception. and a USMC Corps equivalent. US maintaining the Coalition’s military
land forces required logistic support equipment at readiness rates that
Support, Maintenance, and and sustainment for 300,000 men, generally exceeded peacetime rates -
Logistics 12,400 tracked and 114,000 wheeled in spite of desert conditions.
vehicles, 38,000 containers and
There is no sustainability During the last 14 days before the
1,800 helicopters during the ground
without logistics, and logistics involved launching of “Desert Storm”, the US
offensive.
a massive effort during the Gulf War. Army had to deploy forward almost
All of the forces of the Coalition had to 115,000 short tons of munitions,
Deploying Sustainability
improvise and develop new methods more that 29 million meals and 36
of support, maintenance, and The US had to unload more than million gallons of fuel. The four US
logistics systems. For Great Britain 500 ships and 9,000 aircraft to supply military services issued up to 19
and France, this meant developing its ground forces and 1,800,000 tons million gallons of fuel a day during
new division-level and air force of ship cargo from ports to combat the peak operations. During the land
sustainability systems on what was units. The total air and sealift effort for operations, the XVIII Corps required
often an ad hoc basis. For countries land forces is summarized in Figure 5,000 short tons of ammunition and
like Saudi Arabia it meant shifting to 2. The in-theater effort took 3,568 2.1 million gallons of fuel per day. By
both a major new role in Host Nation supply convoys traveling a total of 35 the end of ΄΄Desert Sword΄΄ logistics
support, and restructuring its system million miles over some 2,746 miles of had served over 94 million meals,
to support offensive operations across roadway in the theater. It shipped and pumped 1 billion gallons of fuel,
the Kuwaiti border. received more than 115,000 tracked delivered 31,000 short tons of mail,
and wheeled vehicles, and more and shipped 13,000 short tons.
It was the US however, that faced
than $2.5 billion worth of munitions.
the most serious problems in terms This endeavor faced a
Logistics Units also constructed more
of land force sustainment, because it series of problems which caused
than $615 million worth of support
had to deploy massive land, air, and serious implications for the future.
facilities. Alongside with sustainment
United States Central Command
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(USCENTCOM), the US Army, and
the United States Marine Corps
(USMC) had never really planned
anything approaching the scale of
the movement and logistic support
required by Desert Storm.

Similarly, the US Transportation

Command was able to cope with many
aspects of the required sealift and
airlift, but it took time to organize so
complex a lift effort, and the five and Air and Sealift Required to Deploy US Land Forces
one-half months granted by Desert Figure 2
Shield were critical to its success.
wide-range of problems. Although service support units, and had little
The Transportation Command did not
troops began arriving as early as capability to support themselves. This
have a detailed mobilization plan to
August 9, 1990, the US Army - as made the US heavily dependent on
shift to support of a major war, and
central manager for all of the services Host Nation Support, although no
had significant information and data
in-theater - had no Logistics C2 formal agreement existed for such
processing problems. It took months
headquarters in the theater, and support. This was resolved temporarily
to overcome lift shortfalls, and even
deployment of such headquarters when Saudi Arabia agreed to provide
after lift became available, deliveries
was delayed because it was not all food, water, fuel, facilities, and
often averaged a three week delay
considered as high priority forces. transportation for free, but it was not
compared to the USCENTCOM’s
This meant that the US Army had until October 17, that the US began
desired arrival in theater.
to improvise a Logistics Staff, and it serious negotiations to create a more
Once major logistics movements was only on August 19, that the US formal agreement, which was not
began, a number of additional was able to create an Army Center completed until mid-November. Saudi
problems arose. Changes in (ARCENT) Support Command Arabia then gave US $760 million to
USCENTCOM’s requirements (SUPCOM) (Provisional). This cover past expenses. This indicates
and priorities for land forces often Command eventually had more the need to reach such agreements
created new major lift problems. than 750 personnel, of which more before major contingencies arise.
USCENTCOM rarely informed the than 60% were from the Reserves
The US Army was dependent
Transportation Command for changes component. It also came to include
on Reserve Units for certain key
that occurred, and changes in sea both a theater support Command
functions like water purification,
and airlift had to be made without and two Corps Commands. This
storage, distribution, petroleum
warning. Army units failed to provide experience indicates the need to fully
operating units, supply and service
the proper shipping data, and ships plan for major regional contingencies
companies, and truck units. This
were misloaded or underloaded, air before a crisis begins, and the need
meant that it had to relay on Host
base facilities were over-saturated, to have rapidly deployable Logistics
Nation Support and contract support
and seaports often shipped cargo on Commands or maintain the cadre of
until these units were called up and
a first-in first out basis, regardless of such Commands in theater.
deployed. It became apparent that
priority.
This ad hoc Logistics Command revisions were needed to the total
In-Theater Logistics Systems theater faced further problems force concept to ensure that US Army
because combat forces were sent forces could be properly supported
In-theater logistics presented a ahead without their combat and in rapid deployments without being

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theater.

This decision not only presented

major new problems in stocking fuel
and creating suitable distribution
systems, but it also required major
efforts to stock and deploy munitions
-which could only be moved efficiently
in large quantities by sea. The US
had already experienced serious
problems in moving munitions.
The Army lacked adequate active
Rations for the troops. combat, service support manpower,
Unloading at a Saudi Port and Units to handle moving and
dependent on Reserves. could only do so because it mobilized deploying ammunition once the
large National Guard and Army flow of movement by sea began on
Changes in the timing, size, August 17, and many key munitions
Reserves support forces.
and character of the combat forces did not reach adequate levels even
being deployed created problems List of some of the daily logistic for defensive purposes until the USS
for in-theater logistic, as well as and support problems that the US Cleveland reached the theater on
strategic lift, because each change Army and other services encountered September 21. New problems arose
in combat forces meant new logistic during this period show an impressive when the US decided to replace its M1
requirements, and sometimes series of detailed mistakes, misuse of tanks (with 105mm guns) with M1A1
critical lift space delivered the wrong lift capability, delays, and operational (with 120mm guns), which required a
parts and equipment. The general problems that might have been swap-out of tank Ammunition.
problems in tactical communications largely avoidable with prior planning,
in US forces meant that insufficient proper communications and proper As time went on, the US had to
communications capability was automation of the logistic system. build up a truly massive land theater lift
available, and that logistics units often system. As it has been noted earlier,
These problems make it clear that the US Army had to acquire twice as
had to use commercial tele-phones. In
the US found that its contingency plan- many HETs from other countries as
many cases, logistics requests had to
ning for logistics and sustainment fell it could deploy from within its own
be sent by courier, leading to delays
far short of its actual requirements resources. This logistic lift, however,
of 8 up to 15 days from the Company
to meet the new tempo of warfare did not meet US Army or common user
level to transfer to the US.
employed in Desert Storm. These needs. The US had to obtain more
During peak operations, requests initial problems were compounded, than 4,000 trucks, flatbeds, lowboys,
rose to as many as 10,700 per however, by the failure to fully exercise water and POL tankers, refrigeration,
day, cho-king the system, wasting logistics and support in the war games and trailers to supplement its medium
manpower on courier operations, before Desert Shield/Storm, and by and heavy transport assets, plus
leading to multiple re-quests and the decision on November, 1990 to nearly 2,000 4X4s from Japan. During
status queries, and an abuse of the massively reinforce US land forces for the 21 days before the land Campaign
priority system that led 64.9% of all the liberation of Kuwait. This decision began, 2,100 of the 3,500 convoy
requests to be called high priority. The required the US to stock 60 days of vehicles were Saudi, and 1,400 were
Army was also forced to deploy 72% supply for a much larger force, when US Army. Convoys logged more than
of its truck Companies to the region the defense concept for Desert Shield 35 million miles, and included 1,700
to support only 25% of its Divisions. It only required 30 days of supply in moves by HET, and 10,100 by flatbed
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truck. The US Army had to use more Cleaning equipment to meet US entry until hostilities ceased on 28 February
than 2,000 civilian drivers, and 3,000 requirements was a far larger effort 1991. Clearly, the competence of
soldiers as back-up drivers whereas than had been calculated before logisticians was an enabling factor
CENTAF had its own truck fleet of 100 the war. Most equipment showed in the successful combat operations
tractor trailers and tankers and 200 considerably more wear than had against the forces of Iraq. Desert
drivers. been calculated. Reserve units that Shield/Storm validated training,
were specialized in handling the doctrine, and organization for support.
Every increase in the amount
required effort used political contacts Nevertheless, the lessons learned
of movement and stocks deployed
to return early - abandoning their duty from Desert Shield/Storm may be
also required the US to improve a
and forcing untrained fulltime actives used to refine force structure, improve
new material distribution system and
to learn the task. Many unused items training, and revise doctrine even now
constantly improvise new approaches
shipped to the Gulf could not be in the 21st century.
to consumables storage. The need for
accounted for, and many packing
logistic and sustainment adaptations
materials had been used for other
and fixes increased as US forces
purposes.
acquired more experience in operating
equipment in the desert.
Conclusion
Furthermore, the US then had to
The Desert Shield/Storm logistics
reverse much of its effort after the
effort was unprecedented in recent
war to repair, clean, and reship the
military history. Throughout the Nikolaos POULIOS
equipment that it was sent overseas OF-4 (GRC A)
deployment logistics was an integral
during the conflict. This effort created Battle Captain
part of the plan, if not the vital part, NRDC-GR/RSPT
a whole new set of problems.

Bibliography
- “Military Lessons of the Gulf War’’, London, Greenhill, 1991
- ‘’The Gulf War Assessed’’, Arms and Armor, London, 1992.
- “Logistics in the Gulf War,” RUSI Journal, Autumn, 1991.
- “Success Behind the ‘Storm Front’,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 11, 1991, and Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final
Report, Department of Defense, April, 1992, Brigadier General Robert H. Scales.
- “Operation Desert Storm: Transportation and Distribution of Equipment and Supplies in Southwest Asia, Washington, GAO/NSIAD-92-30, December,
1991.
- Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report, Department of Defense, April, 1992.
- Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, The Logistics Perspective, Arlington, Association of the US Army, September, 1991.
- “Desert Shield/Desert Storm: US Transportation Command’s Support of Operation,” Washington, GAO/NSIAD-92-54, January, 1992.
- Lt. General William G. Pagonis with Jeffery L. Cruikshank, Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War, Cambridge,
Harvard Business School Press, 1992.
- The interview with General Pagonis in Defense Week, November 2, 1992, and Lt. General Henry J. Hatch and Janet A. McDonnell, “Laying the
Groundwork for Theater Operations, Military Review, March, 1992.
- “Unleashing the Might of Materials Handling,” Modern Materials Handling, July 4, 1991.
- “Operation Desert Storm: Army’s Use of Water Purification Equipment, Washington, GAO/NSIAD-91-325, September, 1991.
- Lt. General William G. Pagonis with Jeffery L. Cruikshank, in Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership and Logistics from the Gulf War,
- The chronology for Desert Shield in Part II of Volume V of Eliot A. Cohen, editor, ‘’The Gulf War Air Power Survey’’.
- “Seabased Logistics,” Memorandum from the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Secretary of the Navy, “Preliminary Report on Lessons
Learned During Desert Storm,” March 8, 1991.
- Brigadier General Charles C. Krulak, “CSS in the Desert,” Marine Corps Gazette, October, 1991.
- Murray Hammick,”Lost in the Pipeline: Speed Stretched Logistics to the Limit,” International Defense Review, 9/1991.
- “Operation Desert Storm: Increased Work Loads at Army Depots Created Supply Backlogs,” Washington, GAO/NSIAD-92-152, April, 1992.
- “Operation Desert Storm: Lack of Accountability Over Material During Redeployment,” Washington, GAO/NSIAD-92-258, September, 1992.

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NATO’S ROLE IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

(NON ARTICLE 5 CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS)
In the ”Charter of The United members of UN Security council were foreign authority. This is one of the
Nations” which was signed on directly involved in the crisis so it was reasons why regional organizations
26 June 1945, in San Francisco decided for resolution of the General may step in.
at the conclusion of the United Assembly to initiate the mission.
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter
Nation Conference on International
After the Cold War period, when refers to regional organizations, such
Organizations, there isn’t any
many PSOs were vetoed by various as NATO in the context of appropriate
explicit reference to Peace Support
members of the UN Security Council, action in maintenance of international
Operations (PSOs).
there was sensible increment in peace and security.
Nevertheless, this cornerstone number of such operations. In
NATO’s North Atlantic Council
document provides the foundation to “An Agenda for Peace” written by
(NAC) may decide to intervene in
the PSOs. Secretary General Boutros–Ghali in
crises beyond NATO borders to help
1992, he pointed out that 13 PSOs
The initial step to initiate such strengthen, uphold or restore peace
have been conducted from 1945 to
operations is a resolution issued by and security.
1987 and the same number from
the UN Security Council.
1987 to 1992. According to NATO doctrine,
After the mandate and the duration PSOs can include conflict prevention,
Unfortunately, in some cases,
have been established by UN Security peacemaking, peace enforcement,
the different points of view within the
Council, UN Secretary General (SG) peacekeeping and peacebuilding.
UN Security council limited the scope
is de facto in lead. He will start talks These different types of peace support
of the resolution undermining the
with the member nations willing efforts do not represent a sequential
effectiveness of the entire mission.
to participate, which will decide in process where one necessarily has to
autonomy, the numbers of troops and In addition, many countries are lead to the next.
vehicles to commit to the PSO. UN reluctant to delegate Operational
SG will also appoint an Operational Control (OPCON) directly under a
Commander on the ground.

The different national contingents

under the Operational commander
appointed remain dependent on
their respective nation from an
administrative and logistic point of
view.

The only exception to this process

was one of the first PSOs, the United
Emergency Force (UNEF) which
instead was established directly by
UN General Assembly to end the
Suez Crisis in 1956. In fact, in this
extremely fragile situation some

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Conflict Prevention to implement the mandate.

A peace support effort to identify Peace Enforcement

and monitor the potential causes
A peace support effort designed to
of conflict, and take timely action to
end hostilities through the application
prevent the occurrence, escalation, or
of a range of coercive measures,
resumption of hostilities.
including the use of military force. It
The purpose of conflict prevention is likely to be conducted without the Instead, when a PSO (e.g. Peace
is to keep inter-state and intra-state strategic consent of some, if not all, of Enforcement) is conducted without
disputes from escalating into armed the major conflicting parties. the strategic consent of some, if not
conflict. all, of the major conflicting parties,
The purpose of peace enforcement
Peacemaking is to restore peace and security in it will require UN Security Council
situations where, for example, the authorization in accordance with
A peace support effort conducted Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In such
UN Security Council has authorized
after the initiation of a conflict to secure instances, the UN is likely to authorize
coercive action on the basis of the
a ceasefire or peaceful settlement a third party, whether it is a regional
existence of a threat to the peace or
involving primarily diplomatic action security actor, such as NATO, or a
an act of aggression.
supported, when necessary, by direct coalition of states to implement the
or indirect use of military assets. Peacebuilding mandate.

Peacemaking involves primarily A peace support effort designed Since the end of the Cold War,
diplomatic-led activities aimed at to reduce the risk of relapsing into NATO has become increasingly
establishing a negotiated agreement conflict by addressing the underlying involved in PSOs, deploying in
between major conflicting parties, causes of conflict and the longer- support of the wider interests of the
such as a ceasefire or peace term needs of the people. It requires international community. NATO’s
agreement, and is conducted after a a commitment to a long-term process first three peace-support operations
conflict has started. and may run concurrently with other took place in Europe in Bosnia and
types of peace support efforts. Herzegovina and in Kosovo.
Peacekeeping
Although Peacebuilding is In December 1992, the Alliance
A peace support effort designed
predominantly a civilian-led, military stated that it was ready to support
to assist the implementation of
support may be required to help PSOs under the authority of the UN
a ceasefire or peace settlement
build the capacity of specific security Security Council.
and to help lay the foundations for
related processes, such as security
sustainable peace. It is conducted Between 1992 and 1995, the
sector reform.
with the strategic consent of all major Alliance took several key decisions
conflicting parties. A PSO (e.g. Peacekeeping) can which led to enforce, a UN embargo
be conducted under the authority of and sanctions in the Adriatic Sea
The purpose of peacekeeping is
Chapter VI of the UN Charter, when and a no-fly zone over Bosnia and
to prevent the recurrence of conflict,
it is based on the strategic consent of Herzegovina.
mitigate humanitarian crises and help
the major conflicting parties following
to develop state authority where state The Alliance also provided close
a peace settlement or ceasefire,
capacity and legitimacy is weak or air support to the UN Protection
where a cessation of hostilities has
contested. The Peace Support Force Force (UNPROFOR) and authorized
occurred.
(PSF) should be prepared to use force air strikes to relieve the siege of

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 Αrticles
Since June 1999, In October 2003, Resolution
NATO has been leading a 1510 opened the way for a wider role
peacekeeping operation for ISAF to support the government of
in Kosovo in support of Afghanistan in regions of the country
wider international efforts beyond the confines of the capital.
to build peace and stability
When the NATO Charter was
in the contested province.
established in 1949 by the Treaty of
The NATO-led Kosovo
Washington, there was no mention of
Force (KFOR), deployed
any relationship with the UN Security
Sarajevo and other threatened areas in the wake of a 78-day air
Council because the ultimate scope
designated by the United Nations as campaign launched by the Alliance
was the Collective defense of the
safe areas. in March 1999 to halt and reverse
Member States (Article 5 operations).
the humanitarian catastrophe that
Under the terms of the General Yet, over the years the Alliance proved
was then unfolding. KFOR was
Framework Agreement for Peace in to be a reliable partner of UN and
initially composed of almost 50.000
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Dayton a flexible instrument for any peace
personnel from NATO, Partner and
Peace Accord (DPA), a NATO-led support effort. In fact, NATO, working
non-NATO countries and based on
Implementation Force (IFOR) of with a comprehensive political,
Security Council resolution 1244
60.000 troops was deployed in the civilian and military approach, has
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
country. This Peace enforcement the capabilities, experience, proper
effort was based on Security Council In 2002 at the NATO Ministerial procedures and an integrated
resolution 1031 under Chapter VII of Meeting in Reykjavik, it was agreed: command and control structure to
the UN Charter. deal with any non-Article 5 crises
“To carry out the full range of
management operations (as NATO
In 1996 a 32.000-strong its missions, NATO must be able to
currently defined PSOs).
Stabilization Force (SFOR), was field forces that can move quickly to
subsequently activated in order to wherever they are needed, sustain
deter renewed hostilities and to help operations over distance and time,
create the conditions needed for the and achieve their objectives.”
implementation of the civil aspects of This decision effectively paved the
the DPA. It was based on resolution way for NATO to deploy for the first time
1088 also under Chapter VII of the UN outside of the Euro-Atlantic area, in
Charter. Afghanistan in 2003. An International
Security Assistance Force Michele CAMPANALE
(ISAF) was created based OF-4 (ITA A)
Chief OPS/PLANS
on United Nations Security
NRDC-GR/G ENG
Council Resolutions 1386,
1413 and 1444 to enable
the Transitional Authority
itself and the UN Assistance
Mission in Afghanistan
to operate in the area of
Kabul, and its surroundings
with reasonable security.

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NRDC·GR
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 Ceremonies

NRDC-GR CHANGE OF COMMAND

O n Friday the 12th of March

2021, at the premises of “Pedion
Areos” Camp in Thessaloniki,
Lieutenant General (GRC A)
Dimitrios KOUKKOS handed
over the Command of NRDC-GR,
to Lieutenant General (GRC A)
Anastasios SPANOS.

The ceremony was attended

by the Hellenic Republic Deputy
Minister of National Defence Mr.
Alkiviadis STEFANIS, the Chief
of the Hellenic National Defence
General Staff General (GRC A)
Konstantinos FLOROS and the MOD
General Secretary Mr. Antonios
OIKONOMOU.

Due to the COVID-19 protocols,

the ceremony was attended by
the absolutely minimum military
personnel and without the presence
of guests and media.

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 Visits - Community Relations

ARRC COMMANDER VISIT

O
n Wednesday the 24th
of March 2021, the Allied Rapid
Reaction Corps (ARRC) Commander,
Lieutenant General (GBR A) Sir
Edward SMYTH-OSBOURNE
accompanied by an ARRC delegation,
visited NRDC-GR in Thessaloniki.

The distinguished visitor had

an office call by the NRDC-GR
Commander Lieutenant General
Anastasios SPANOS at the Hellenic C’
Army Corps historical building, where
they had the opportunity to discuss
about issues of common interest.
Afterwards he visited the premises of
NRDC-GR where he received a brief
on the structure, mission and training
activities of the HQ.

He had the chance to visit the

“STEADFAST LEDA 2021” Exercise
Area inside the “Pedion Areos” Camp
where the Phase IIB [Crisis Response
Planning (CRP)] was conducted, with
the participation amongst others of
ARRC Staff members. Finally, he
visited the Thessaloniki War Museum.

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 Visits - Community Relations

LANDCOM COMMANDER VISIT

O n Tuesday the 11th of May

2021, the Allied Land Command
(LANDCOM) Commander Lieutenant
General (USA A) Roger CLOUTIER
accompanied by a LANDCOM
delegation, visited NRDC-GR in
Thessaloniki.

The distinguished visitor had

an office call by the NRDC-GR
Commander Lieutenant General
Anastasios SPANOS at the Hellenic C’
Army Corps historical building, where
they had the opportunity to discuss
about issues of common interest.
Afterwards he visited the premises of
NRDC-GR where he received a brief
on the Multi Corps Land Component
Command (MC LCC) role that NRDC-
GR has till the end of 2023. After
the briefing there was a thorough
and fruitful discussion about the MC
LCC concept. Finally, he visited the
Thessaloniki War Museum.

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NRDC·GR
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 Visits - Community Relations

NRDC-GR OFFICERS’ MEDALS AWARD

O n Tuesday the 20th of April

2021, a number of NRDC-GR Staff
Officers were awarded with Medals
of the Hellenic Republic for their
exceptional service and performance.
NRDC-GR Commander Lieutenant
General Anastasios SPANOS
awarded the medals to the recipients
during a short ceremony that took
place at the HQ premises.

US MILITARY ATTACHÉ VISIT

O n Wednesday the 19th of

May 2021, the United States of
America Army Attaché Colonel (USA
A) Reed ANDERSON accompanied
by his successor, Lt Colonel Nathan
(USA A) MANN visited NRDC-GR in
Thessaloniki.

The two visitors had an office

call by the NRDC-GR Commander
Lieutenant General Anastasios
SPANOS at the Hellenic C’ Army
Corps historical building, where they
had the opportunity to discuss issues
of common interest. Afterwards
they visited the premises of NRDC-
GR where they received a brief on
the structure, mission and training
activities of the HQ.

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NRDC·GR
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 Seminars - Conferences
THE MULTI CORPS LAND COMPONENT COMMAND
(MC LCC) SEMINAR -
DEEP DIVE ON THE NEW NRDC-GR ROLE
and stability in the Central and Eastern
Mediterranean Region, to include the
Balkans. He applauded the efforts
of NRDC-GR, thus far, in fulfilling
that role. The Deputy SACEUR and
other Flag Officers hypothesized and
visualized, through pointed and vivid
dialogue, the role of the MC LCC
in the Major Joint Operations Plus
(MJO+) environment. All functional
areas were represented as the forum
was open to all and non-attributional
NRDC-GR conducted a other organizations within the NATO to ensure candid discussion.
comprehensive study “deep dive” Force Structure (NFS) analyzed, Both events proved NRDC-
seminar on the role of the NRDC-GR via teleconference due to COVID GR as an adaptable organization
as it assumes the mission as a MC 19 restrictions, four main areas: that champions synergy, common
LCC. NRDC-GR assumed the role of operations, planning, communication values and team spirit. The MC LCC
MC LCC in two periods: 15 DEC 2020 and support. The outputs from this milestone events yielded tangible
to 25 JAN 2021; and 3-4 FEB 2021. engagement highlighted the need for results that follow-on Command and
The aim of the two time periods was to emphasis on command relationships, Staff working groups can use to refine
(1) present and discuss the knowledge allocation of critical assets and the processes and products relative to the
acquired during the preparation timelines of delivering force packages NRDC-GR MC LCC responsibility to
period of the Headquarters and (2) at the point of need. contribute to NATO’s readiness and
exploit the conclusions drawn from meet global challenges.
During the 3-4 FEB 2021 time
the respective working groups.
period, 40 distinguished speakers
During the 15 DEC 2020 to 25 and participants from across the NFS
JAN 2021 time period, selected spectrum further defined MC LCC
colleagues from NRDC-GR and requirements and discussed possible
sourcing solutions. The
seminar began with
opening remarks and
challenge from the Chief
of Hellenic Armed Forces Domenico COLELLA
OF-3 (ITA A)
General Staff General COORD SO
Konstantinos Floros. NRDC-GR/G5
He emphasized on the
geographical significance
of maintaining security

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NRDC·GR
erald
 Seminars - Conferences

NRDC-GR INTERNSHIP INDUCTION TRAINING 2021

O
n February 8, 2021,
NRDC-GR, conducted the first
Internship Induction Training for
2021,at its premises, following all the
COVID-19 protocols. The NRDC-GR
Chief of Staff, welcomed the new
members of the NRDC-GR Internship
Program (NIP) and wished them a
fruitful and educational experience,
even under the working restrictions
dictated by the pandemic.
Furthermore, they had the
opportunity to participate in
the preparation of the Exercise
“STEADFAST LEDA 2021”, the
upcoming challenge and main venue
for the HQ as a Multi – Corps Land
Component Command (MC LCC)
HQ.

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NRDC·GR
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 Seminars - Conferences

IKAROS I-21 SEMINAR

O n the 10th and 11th of March

2021, NRDC-GR/Air Operations
Coordination Centre (NRDC-GR/
AOCC) organized and conducted the
“IKAROS I/21” Seminar.
The aim of the seminar was
to familiarize and enhance the
knowledge of NRDC-GR Staff
on matters related to air domain.
The seminar focused on how to
recognize, comprehend and exploit
the challenges for Air Land Integration
(ALI), in the context of NATO Multi-
Corps Land Component Command
(MC-LCC).
The seminar was organized in
close cooperation and coordination
with NRDC-GR Fires and Targeting
and G3 Air Branches. NRDC-ESP
Subject Matter Experts (SME)
provided a briefing via VTC adding
a valuable contribution regarding
the newly developed Tactical Air
Command and Control concept
and ALI for the upcoming exercise
STEADFAST LEDA 21. On the
second day of the seminar a newly
established internal Integrated
Command and Control (ICC)
functional system training took place,
focusing on ICC planers role.
Valuable interaction, exchange
of ideas and proposals between
participants and sharing of
experiences, resulted in a successful
and productive outcome.

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NRDC·GR
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 Seminars - Conferences

STEADFAST LEDA 21 CRISIS RESPONSE PLANNING

F rom Tuesday the 16th until

Friday the 26th of March 2021,
NRDC-GR conducted the Crisis
Response Planning (CRP) at the
premises of “Pedion Areos” Camp
in Thessaloniki, Phase IIB of the
Exercise “STEADFAST LEDA
2021”(STLE21) with the participation
of Staff Officers from other NATO
HQs involved in STLE21 (LANDCOM,
ARRC, NRDC-ESP, JFTC).

On Friday the 19th, the Mission

Analysis Brief (MAB) took place.
The NRDC-GR Commander LtGen
Anastasios SPANOS attended the
event which was shared with the
other HQs via VTC.

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NRDC·GR
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 Seminars - Conferences

OPERATIONAL ORDER DEVELOPMENT

FOR STEADFAST LEDA 21

F rom Monday the 29th of March

until Friday the 16th of April 2021,
NRDC-GR conducted the Operational
Order (OPORD) Development at
the premises of “Pedion Areos”
Camp in Thessaloniki, Phase IIB of
the Exercise “STEADFAST LEDA
2021”(STLE21) with the participation
of Staff Officers from NRDC-ESP.

On Wednesday the 14th, the

OPORD Development and Back Brief
presentations took place. The NRDC-
GR Chief of Staff MGen Konstantinos
GOUNARIS attended the event
which was shared with the other HQs
via VTC.

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NRDC·GR
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 NRDC·GR January - June 2021/Issue 16

Overview erald NRDC-GR HERALD

EDITORIAL BOARD
COMMUNICATION DIVISION/Public Affairs Office (PAO)
Chief PAO
OF-5 (GRC A) Athanasios PAPATHANASIOU EDITORIAL
D.Chief PAO
OF-4 (GRC A) Paschalis KAMPOURIS
PA SO Dear reader,
OF-4 (GRC A) Nikolaos BARMPERIS
Production As the entire world tries to get back to normalcy
OF-1 (GRC A) Georgios THEODOROU
Combat Camera following the COVID-19 pandemic, we get even closer to
OR-7 (GRC A) Konstantinos BALAMPANOS
OR-6 (GRC A) Alexandros ATSKAKANIS a new landmark for NRDC-GR; Exercise “STEADFAST
Communication Information LEDA 2021”. This means following “old” procedures and
Tel.: +30 2310 882452 / IVSN 451-2452 timetables (planning circles, documentation revisions,
email: [email protected], email: [email protected]
www.nrdc.gr Twitter: @NRDC-GR adjusted battle rhythms, etc.) but operating under “new”
Facebook: NATO Rapid Deployeable Corps - Greece conditions (wearing masks, social distancing, etc.). Even
YouTube Channel: www.youtube.com/user/nrdcgreece
so, we are more than confident about our success!
Commander’s Corner
NRDC-GR Commander’s Corner p.01 Probably those inside our organization that were more
affected by the protective measures against the pandemic
Affiliated Units were our interns. They were not able to be physically
• LIVEX “CENTAUR 21” - “DEFENDER EUROPE 21” p.02
• “Vittorio Veneto” Division: present at the HQ premises at the desired rate and they
Realignment to a NATO Headquarters p.08
had to work harder (remotely) to fill the gap. But they
Articles managed this difficult situation well; maybe better than we
• Operations Planning for Retrieving an Occupied Territory
expected! As a “reward” for their efforts and successful
after its Surrounding: Restrictions by the Law of Armed completion of the undertaken projects we host many of
Conflict and International Humanitarian Law p.13
• Big Data and Social Media Analysis: their articles in this issue; more than ever! Please be fair on
Innovative Ideas for NATO p.18 your “evaluation” about their writings; bare in mind that they
• NATO’s Role in Arms Control, Disarmament and
Non-Proliferation: Dealing with Crises in Modern Times p.21 are still young students or graduates. Yet, we feel confident
• Warfare Economics p.26
• An Overall Review of NATO Covid-19 Response p.30 about the future and one of the reasons we are optimistic is
• The Puzzle/Enigma of Strategic Autonomy - EU-NATO
Synergy p.34 the quality of our youth!
• Inclusive Leadership: Managing Diversity in
a Multinational Working Environment p.40
• Historical Logistics Challenges: Enjoy all the interesting articles we host in this issue
The Spanish Road (1567-1659) p.45 and allow us, the Public Affairs Office team to acknowledge
• Logistics and the Gulf War p.51
• NATO’s Role in Peace Support Operations the writers for their contribution. It is more than valuable
(Non Article 5 Crisis Management Operations) p.55
and strengthens the goal of PAO to inform NRDC-GR
Visits - Community Relations Staff, NATO community and the Public about our latest
• NRDC-GR Change of Command p.58 developments and more. Please, bear in mind that the
• ARRC Commander Visit p.59
• LANDCOM Commander Visit p.60 views expressed in the articles are those of the contributing
• NRDC-GR Officers’ Medals Award p.61 writers and do not represent the official opinion of NRDC-
• US Military Attaché Visit p.61
GR or NATO.
Seminars - Conferences
• The Multi Corps Land Component Command (MC LCC) See you in the next one!
Seminar - Deep Dive on the new NRDC-GR Role p.62
• NRDC-GR Internship Induction Training 2021 p.63
• IKAROS I-21 Seminar p.64 Very respectfully,
• STEADFAST LEDA 21 Crisis Response Planning p.65
• Operational Order Development for STEADFAST LEDA 21 p.66
OF-5 (GRC A) Athanasios PAPATHANASIOU
ON THE COVER NRDC-GR Chief Public Affairs Officer
2021 Soldier of the affiliated 71st Airmobile Brigade (GRC A)
Standing ready...

NRDC·GR NRDC·GR
erald Herald
 NRDC-GR HERALD
THE MAGAZINE OF NATO RAPID DEPLOYABLE CORPS-GREECE

January - June 2021 / Issue 16

LIVEX “CENTAUR 21” -

“DEFENDER EUROPE 21”
Italian Division
“Vittorio Veneto”
Inclusive Leadership:
Managing Diversity
Warfare Economics
An Overall Review of
NATO Covid-19 Response