BAKER UNIVERSITY

Redefining Darius

A New Perspective on the Batlle of Gaugamela

John Patchen
 Patchen 1

Abbreviations Ancient Authors

AD- Astronomical Diaries and Related Texts from Babylonia

Arr.- Arrian, Anabasis of Alexander
Curt.- Quintus Curtius Rufus, The History of Alexander
DS.- Diodorus Siculus, The Library of History
Hdt.- Herodotus, The Histories
Just. - Marcus Junianius Just.us, Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus
Plb.- Polybius, The Histories
Plu.- Plutarch, Parallel Lives: Alexander
Xen.- Xenophon, Anabasis
 Patchen 2

“All things together appeared full of terror to Darius, who had already long been in a

state of fear, so that he was the first to turn and flee (Arr., 3.14.).” In light of other ancient texts,

Arrian was wrong. Historians must examine the facts, statements, historical texts, tear apart the

subtleties, reconstruct the events of time, and correctly piece together what occurred. We must

do this with as much clarity as possible, without previously held notions, and without

sentimentalism. Reconstruction of the past should focus on factual evidence, but it is also

scientific. In the absence of absolute evidence, historians must draw conclusions based on the

most likely rational explanation that the evidence and facts present.

The ancient historians who recount Gaugamela present varied accounts of what actually

transpired. We do not even know the actual site of the battle, due to conflicting accounts.1

Curtius and Diodorus present more romanticized accounts; Arrian’s account is decidedly

“Greek,” and scathing in its assessment of Darius. It presents Darius as a poor commander,

lacking in the qualities of a man, and a coward (Arrian, 3.22). Arrian’s assessment in particular

has influenced many modern scholars, who in turn have branded Darius as a coward.2

All of the ancient historian's contributions skew the modern perception of Darius. Yet,

when carefully studied in their totality, along with a passage from the Astronomical Diaries, they

present a stunningly clear picture of the Persian King of Kings. When objectively analyzed and

reconstructed, the facts present a new portrayal of Darius. The evidence shows Darius was a

quick learner as a tactician, bold commander, loyal to his men, and an extremely courageous

individual.

1
Arrian (3.8.7) states that Gaugamela was 600 stades from Arbela, whereas Ptolemy “Geographia” indicates
Gaugamela some 200-320 stades from Arbela (Ptol., VI, i, 5).
2
As superbly pointed out by Badian, 242; the following authors have, at various points in their careers published
highly critical accounts of Darius: Tarn, “Alexander the Great (1948), Lauffer, in Alexander der Große, 2nd ed.,
(1981), and Dandamayev in A Political History of the Achaemenid Empire (1989).
 Patchen 3

Darius’s Historical Background

It is extremely important to understand Darius’s personal background in order to

understand why the traditional accounts of his actions at Gaugamela are so confusing. Darius’s

rise to King of Persia occurred largely because of his bravery and loyalty to the King Artaxerxes

Ochus III most certainly, but also to Persia. For Darius to flee and abandon his troops from the

battle of Gaugamela in fear or out of cowardice at the most pivotal time in Achaemenid history,

indeed the history of Persia to that point, is contrary to what we know about Darius. Darius, in

fact, earned his throne largely because of his courage on the battlefield (DS, 17.6.6, Just.,

10.3.3).

Darius was initially unknown during the reign of the Persian King Artaxerxes III, but was

clearly of Achaemenid lineage.3 When Ochus purged the Achaemenid family because of his fear

of a conspiracy against him, he did not eliminate Darius because Darius was unknown to him.4

Artaxerxes III would later come to know Darius because of his exploit in single-handed combat

against an unnamed Cardussi chief (Just., 10.3.3 and DS, 17.6.6.). For this feat of bravery,

Ochus awarded Darius the satrapy of Armenia.5

Darius’s father was Arsanes and a grandson of Ostanes, who in turn, was a brother to

Artaxerxes II.6 His mother was Sisygambis, Arsanes’ sister, making Darius a member of the

Achaemenid family. In Darius III, Badian argues that Darius may have been protected from

execution based on his adoption of the name Codomannus, a name he embraced some time after

3
E. Badian, “Darius III,” Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, Vol. 100 (2000): 244.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
6
Waldemar Heckel, Who’s Who in the Age of Alexander the Great, ( Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), Kindle
Edition. Location 2391.
 Patchen 4

defeating the Caudisii chief.7 According to Badian, the texts indicate that Darius dropped his

birth name of Artašãtu, shortly after adopting the Codomannus name.8

Darius was then able to establish himself within the Achaemenid inner circle. Badian

points to Darius’s appointment in the King’s postal service as a particularly notable assignment.9

It is in this role that Darius firmly establishes himself as a reliable and loyal member of the

King’s inner circle and he is able to gain the King’s trust. Badian goes as far to note that Darius

was a “friend of the King,” an honor only bestowed to Arses, the King’s son and heir to the

throne.10 Darius clearly established himself as a reliable and loyal member of the King’s inner

circle. Moreover, the King did not sense Darius to be any particular threat to him or any of his

heirs.11

Sometime between 339 and 338 BCE, Darius married Stateria,12 his sister (Arr., 2.11.9,

Plu., 30.3, Just., 11.9.12). Darius had three children—one son Ochus, and two daughters Statira

and Drypetis (Curt., 3.11.24.). Darius also had a unknown wife that he apparently married

sometime in the 350s, while satrap of Armenia, and this relationship may have also produced a

son, Ariobarzanes.13

Artaxerxes III was assassinated by Bagoas, vizier of the royal court (DS, 17.5.3). After

Artaxerxes was murdered, Bagoas placed Arses on the throne and murdered all of his brothers to

isolate him from his family, and make him easier to control (DS, 17.5.4). Arses grew tired of

7
Badian, 246-247
8
Ibid, 247-248.
9
Badian, 250.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
Badian, 250-251, argues that the marriage must have occurred in late 338, after the death of Artaxerxes III, owing
to the treatment of rivals to the throne.
13
Ibid, 251.
 Patchen 5

Bagoas’s control, as well as his actions, and rebelled against him. Bagoas then murdered Arses

in 336, and installed Darius as King of Persia (Ibid.)

Badian theorizes that Bagoas specifically chose Darius to placate the Persian nobles

because of his history of bravery, and also because of his patronage to Ochus—qualities that

separated him from other potential heirs to the throne.14 Diodorus states that Bagoas chose

Darius since he was a member of the royal circle, and was the son of Ostanes, who in turn was

the brother of Artaxerxes II (DS, 17.5.5), a vital link to the Achaemenid Dynasty.

Unlike Darius’s predecessors, Darius would not become victim to another of Bagoas’s

attempts to murder the King of Persia. Darius quickly proceeded to respond to potential threats

to his own reign and quelled plots against him, Bagoas was one of those Darius eliminated as

potential threats. Bagoas had intended to murder Darius, but Darius discovered the plot, and

Bagoas was forced to drink his own poison (DS, 17.5.6).

Darius ascended to the throne 336 BCE, before his ascension, Artaxerxes III had

defeated the Egyptian Pharaoh Nectanebo II in 342 in his conquest of Egypt.15 Nectanebo II fled

to Upper Egypt, where the Nubian King Khababash16 offered him asylum. Khababash is of note

because he led a brief rebellion against Persian occupation, though modern historians debate as

to exactly when Khababash ruled and when his rebellion concluded.

Alan B. Lloyd suggests that Khababash rebelled against the Persians either upon the

death of Artaxerxes III or the death of his son Arses, yet exactly when is remains undetermined.17
14
Ibid.
15
Stanley M. Burstein "Prelude to Alexander: the Reign of Khababash,” in Ancient History Bulletin Vol. 15 (2000),
149-151.
16
Alternative spellings: Khabash, Khabbash, or Chababash. The contemporary view of Khababash is that he was
Nubian.
17
Alan B. Lloyd, “Egypt, 404-332 B.C.” in The Cambridge Ancient History, Second Edition, Vol. VI, The Fourth
Century B.C. (Cambridge: University Press, 1994), 345.
 Patchen 6

The noted German scholar Friedrich Kienitz argues that Khababash could not have rebelled

under Artaxerxes, and attempts to eliminate his son Arses as well.18 Leaving Darius’s reign as

the time of Khababash’s rebellion.19

Further complicating the issue, there are few historical texts about Khababash and his

rebellion. Texts credit Khababash with two regnal years, according to Lloyd, but exactly when

his rebellion ended remains unclear. According to Phiroze Vasunia, Khababash’s reign ended in

335 BCE.20 If his rebellion did, indeed, end during 335, then Khababash’s rebellion ended

during the reign of Darius, not Arses. This is of significance, because it indicates that the

rebellion began under Arses, and that Darius was able to defeat a significant rebellion in Egypt

early in his reign as King of Persia.

Badian dismisses such a notion, since there is no mention of Darius’s success in

suppressing the Egyptian rebellion in any of the Greek texts.21 Badian certainly has a legitimate

point that classical Greek historians would have taken advantage of Darius’s success in Egypt to

strengthen Darius’s stature, thereby making Alexander’s eventual victory over him even more

significant. Badian dismisses the possibility of Darius successfully quelling the rebellion too

quickly, for even he points out that the Greeks had no cites or forces involved in operations in

Egypt.22 The absence of a potential Darius victory in Egypt does not preclude the possibility.

As noted, Lloyd is of the belief that Darius was able to reclaim Egypt early in his career.

Nylander also holds the same opinion,23 joining in Lloyd’s appraisal is noted scholar A.B.
18
Badian, 253 and F. K. Kienitz, Die politische Geschichte Agyptens vom 7. bis zum 4. Jahrhundert vor, (Berlin,
Akadime-Verlung, 1953).
19
Ibid.
20
Phiroze Vasunia, The Gift of the Nile: Hellenizing Egypt from Aeschylus to Alexander, (Berkley: University of
California Press 2001), 266.
21
Badian, 254.
22
Ibid.
23
Carl Nylander, “Darius III,” 148.
 Patchen 7

Bosworth.24 Waldemar Heckel specifically mentions that Darius was initially unable to deal with

Alexander’s invasion of Asia Minor because he was concluding the campaign in Egypt.25 Thus,

it would appear that amongst his published contemporaries, Badian holds a minority opinion.

Darius’s personal history is counter to what the ancient texts would lead one to believe,

especially Arrian’s scathing appraisal of Darius (Arr., 3.22). His history of courage on the

battlefield allowed him to be recognized by Artaxerxes III, honored with the name Codomannus,

and given a satrapy. He must have performed well in the role of satrap, as he appointed to the

King’s postal service.26 He continued to prove his loyalty to the king and to Persia, and

positioned himself firmly within the royal circle.

Through his courage, loyalty, performance of duty, and acceptance in the royal circle,

Darius, without conspiring to do so, placed himself in line for the throne when Arses was

murdered. Upon assuming the throne, Darius quickly eliminated a threat to his own life,

perpetrated by the individual who had murdered his two predecessors. Within a very short

period of ascending to the throne, Darius then proceeded to reconquer Egypt.

The evidence, when evaluated, indicates that Darius was not a coward, nor was he inept.

Indeed, Darius’s personal history shows a man quite capable of adapting to situations very

rapidly. He was a man who learned quickly, had a strong sense of duty, and a very sharp

understanding of the situation and how to respond. His loyalty to Artaxerxes III must have been

unwavering, or he would not have earned the King’s trust. More specifically, he was one to

24
A.B. Bosworth, “Alexander the Great Part I: The events of the reign” in The Cambridge Ancient History, 2nd ed.,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
25
Waldemar Heckel, 2405.
26
Badian, 250. As a satrap, Darius would have control of a sizable military force. Badian hints that Darius may
have worked his way through the king’s postal service to a position of high importance, perhaps even the central
sector in Persepolis (p. 250). This is an interesting observation, as this appointment would have given Darius a
much great knowledge of the whole of the Persian Empire, and its geography.
 Patchen 8

accept challenges, not flee from them, as we see from his victory over the Cadusii chieftain and

his response to Khababash’s rebellion.

The Psychological Impact of Historical Events on Darius

Perhaps the greatest influences on Darius at Gaugamela were the psychological events

that transpired prior to the battle—events which must have weighed heavily upon his mental

state. There were two particular events that were of such significance that their impact on the

battle cannot be overlooked. The first event was the capture by Alexander of Darius’s family,

and the subsequent death of his wife Stateria. The second event, which is perhaps more

significant, is the lunar eclipse of 20 September 331 BCE.

Alexander’s forces captured Darius’s family after Darius retreated from Issus (Arr.,

2.11.3). During his hasty retreat, Alexander was able to capture Stateira, as well as Darius’s son,

daughters, and mother (Ibid). Darius attempted to secure their freedom from Alexander, first by

offering to buy their freedom (Arrian, 2.13.1-3, Curtius, 4.11.1-6, and Just., 11.11-12). Later,

Darius would offer a large part of his kingdom to Alexander in exchange for their release (Curt.,

4.10.18-19, and Just., 11.12).

One of the most important psychological aspects of the captivity of Darius’s family was

the death of his wife Stateira. It is of note that there is little mention of Darius’s first wife in the

ancient texts, yet we know a great deal about Stateira. Stateira’s death in captivity greatly

affected Darius (Curtius, 4.10-18-19, Just., 11.12, and Plutarch 30.1). There are contradictory

accounts as to the exact nature of Stateira’s death. Curtius suggests that she died because of the

stress of travel (Curt., 4.10.18-19). Plutarch indicates that Stateira died in childbirth (Plu., 30.1)

contradicting Curtius, though Plutarch does suggest that Alexander was not the father (Ibid).
 Patchen 9

Aside from the psychological impact of the capture of his family and the loss of his wife

Stateira, the lunar eclipse of 20 September 331 BCE significantly impacted the events of

Gaugamela. It was an ominous foretelling of future events, and the King’s decline. For

Alexander, it foretold of his impending victory. Darius, however, faced the knowledge that he,

and his kingdom, were doomed.

Sachs and Hunger have translated the account of the eclipse: "The 13th (of Ululu),

moonset to sunrise: 8˚... lunar eclipses, in its totality covered, 40th minute of the night [totality?]

[original broken...] Jupiter set; Saturn...during totality, west wind blew, during clearing the east

wind [...] fourth?...; during the eclipse, death and plague." (AD, 179, No. -330, obv. 2-4. ) The

eclipse is confirmed by NASA databases, which indicate the eclipse occurred on 20 September,

331 BCE.27

To understand the eclipse, we must understand the importance of the moon in Babylonian

culture. The moon represented Persia. We know this from Herodotus, who recounts the Magi

explaining the significance of a lunar eclipse to Xerxes (Hdt, 7.37.3). Likewise, the sun

represented the Greeks (Hdt., 7.37.4). The Chaldean Magi indicated the solar eclipse of 480 BCE

would bring Xerxes favor (Ibid). Indeed the prophecy was true as Xerxes was able to subdue

Thessaly with little effort and gained a victory at Thermopylae in August, though not without

hardship.

In turn, the lunar eclipse of 331 BCE would signify an omen of bad luck. Yet, the eclipse

of the moon was not the only significant factor. There were other omens during the eclipse that

27
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. “Catalog of Lunar Eclipses: -399 to 300 (400 BCE-301 BCE).”
Eclipse 04036” -0330 Sep 20, 2006, accessed 3 December 2014. http://eclipse.gsfc.nasa.gov/5MCLEmap/-0399--
0300/LE-0330-09-20T.gif.
 Patchen 10

compounded the situation. The importance of Jupiter and Saturn during the eclipse adds

additional importance to the equation. Both planets had significant meaning to Babylonian

Zoroastrian mythology.

Jupiter signified the Babylonian god Marduk, the god of water, vegetation, but more

importantly judgment and magic. 28 He was also the patron deity of the city of Babylon. Saturn

represented Shamash, the god of the Sun and justice.29 More importantly, Jupiter is a positive

planet, its presence in an eclipse could have avoided the bad omen for Darius.30 The

mythological impact worsened by the presence of Saturn, a negative planet.31 The coup de la

mort for Darius as King of Persia came in the form of two prophecies.

The first prophecy comes from the rules of the Šumma Sîn ina tāmartīsū.32 Since Jupiter

is a positive planet and Saturn a negative, the king is safe. However, one of his noble

representatives will die in his place.33 The presence of Jupiter itself is a sign of good omen,

while the presence of Saturn without Jupiter is a sign of bad omen. During the eclipse of 20

September, Jupiter was set and Saturn was present, magnifying the negative omens.34

Since the eclipse occurred in the month of Ululu, the omens were compounded. Spek

notes the following translation: “ if in Ululu, (an eclipse (of the moon) occurs during the evening

watch): the enemy will inflict a defeat on the land; the enemy will enjoy my possessions.”35

28
Helmer Ringgren, Religions of The Ancient Near East, Translated by John Sturdy,(London: The Westminster
Press, 1974), 66.
29
Ibid.
30
Robartus van der Speck, “Darius III, Alexander the Great and Babylonian Scholarship” in A Persian Perspective:
Essays in Memory of Heleen Sancis-Weerdenburg, Achaemenid History VII, Edited by Wourter Henklelman and
Amelie Kuhrt, (Leiden: Nederlands Instituut vor het Nabije Oost, 2003), 294.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid, 292.
33
Ibid, 294.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid.
 Patchen 11

The second prophecy appears to speak directly of Alexander and Darius, and comes from

the 29th tablet of Enūma Anu Elil. The prophecy speaks of an eclipse on the 13th day of Ululu, it

speaks of westerly winds, the son of the king, and an intruder who becomes king for 8 years, and

who will conquer the enemy army, pursue his enemy and will have great luck.36 The passage

certainly seems to foretell of the events of Gaugamela.

The winds during the eclipse first blew from the west, then shifted to the east. Alexander

defeated Darius at Gaugamela, and pursued him until his death in the summer of the following

year. He became King of the World, when Darius fled to the lands of the east. Darius’s son,

Ochus, a prisoner of Alexander and treated well by him, never did see the Persian throne.

Alexander would rule Persia until June 323, just shy of eight full years, and would conquer much

of the known world, and enjoyed a tremendous amount of success.37

Ancient sources mention the eclipse (Arr., 3.7.6, Curt., 4.10.1-8, Plu., 31.8). Both Arrian

and Curtius make note that Alexander realized the significance of the eclipse omens. Alexander

was an educated man, and understood the importance of knowing all aspects of the enemy and

sacrificed accordingly, to note the fortunes of the eclipse (Arrian, 3.7.6).

The psychological impact of the eclipse among the Persian troops is only compounded by

Darius’s flight at Issus, in which his chariot and personal effects were seized. Upon his chariot

was the emblem of the Fravashi, the representation of the divine mandate of the king’s authority,

but also of this right to rule.38 Thus, by seizing the chariot, and the Fravashi along with it, in the

eyes of the Persians, Alexander had taken Darius’s right to rule.39

36
Ibid.
37
Ibid.
38
See Nylander, Darius III, 149-152, in which he argues that Darius’s retreat from Issus was necessary as the
capture of the Persian King would upset the cosmic balance. Nylander explains how the capture of Darius’s
chariot, armor and staff, with various Zoroastrian symbology was a egregious offense to allow to occur.
39
Ibid.
 Patchen 12

The eclipse, while not of specific significance in Zoroastrian symbology to the average

Persian soldier, still provided significant impact psychologically. As Roy Willis points out in

World Mythology, in many Ancient Near Eastern societies, any eclipse represented a disturbance

of the cosmic balance.40 Thus, the soldiers would naturally be psychologically impacted by the

occurrence of any eclipse, but especially a lunar impact, given the fact that the moon represented

Persia, as explained previously.

From a psychological aspect, the evidence suggests that psychologically, Darius would

have been under emotional duress. His enemy held his family prisoners, and his wife died while

in captivity. This emotional strain was compounded days before the battle by a lunar eclipse that

foretold prophecy of his impending defeat, and end of his dynasty. The evidence gives useful

insight as to Darius’s immediate reactions when the Macedonians were able to breech the Persian

center.

The ancient texts state that Darius fled at Gaugamela (Arr., 3.14, Curt., 4.15.28-32, DS,

17.60.3-4) however, the evidence presents the possibility that Darius’s flight was induced by

psychological factors. The Persian troops, impacted by the cosmological imbalance foretold by

the eclipse, not to mention the knowledge of the fact that Darius had lost the symbols of his

Fravashi, began to flee when the events of the battle turned against the Persians. Darius, in turn,

was forced to flee as the troops nearest him began to flee, leaving him exposed to the oncoming

Macedonian assault.

Darius, The Battle of Issus, and its Effects

40
Roy Willis, World Mythology, (New York: Holt and Company, 1993) 26-27.
 Patchen 13

The Battle of Issus placed the initial stigma on Darius as a poor commander. More

importantly, he fled from the battlefield, and his family taken prisoner. Yet, in the wake of Issus,

the evidence from the ancient sources shows a man with incredible insight. It shows a

commander willing to adapt his tactics and strategy, in not only the sense of his short-term

campaign tactics, but also one who changes his entire strategy for the campaign. The evidence

also shows a commander who quickly learns and institutes changes to correct weaknesses.

With the immense amount of modern scholarship about the importance of Darius’s flight

available, it is pointless to try to offer additional analysis on the matter. Darius fled from the

battle. Arrian states that his flight damaged his reputation (3.1.2) with Mazaeus. It is reasonable

to conclude that Mazaeus was not the only Persian noble who viewed Darius’s flight negatively.

Several factors that contributed to Darius’s defeat at Issus, yet one significant factor was

the restrictive terrain.41 Darius placed his army in this position by aggressive pursuit Alexander

after capturing Issus.42 Darius’s decision to charge with his cavalry in such terrain limited their

effectiveness (Curt., 3.6.1). Two years later at Gaugamela, Darius specifically chose terrain

suited for his cavalry and chariots (Arr., 3.8.7, Curtius, 4.9.9-10).

Issus dramatically influenced the manner in which Darius equipped and deployed his

army at Gaugamela. Darius suffered heavy loss with his cavalry against the Macedonians, as

well as heavy losses with his infantry. The Persians that took the field at Gaugamela were better

equipped to match the Macedonians than those that took the field at Issus. Darius implemented

sweeping changes to his army. So drastic were the changes that they completely altered the

manner in which the Persian army traditionally fought, as well as traditional roles.

41
Cited by Polybius (Plb.,12.17) using Callisthenes as his source, as being fourteen stades, or approximately 1 ½
miles wide.
42
J.F.C. Fuller, The Generalship of Alexander The Great, ( 1960; repr., New York: DaCapo, 1990), 154-155.
 Patchen 14

Darius armed his levied infantry with heavier armor and trained the infantry prior to the

battle. 43 The addition of war elephants and scythed chariots to his army (Arr., 3.8.13) added a

heavy assault force capable of breaching both the heavy Macedonian cavalry and infantry.

Improvements to the cataphract cavalry were designed to bring them to a level comparable to the

Companion Cavalry. 44 All of these changes to his infantry and cavalry, as well as the addition

of heavy assault forces, altered the primary response of defense to the infantry instead of the

cavalry45 This becomes apparent in the manner in which Darius deploys his army at Gaugamela

(Arr., 3.11).

Perhaps the most interesting change that results from Issus is the manner in which Darius

pursues the campaign after the battle. Darius’s operations immediately after Issus focused on

cutting off Alexander’s supply lines, communications, and forcing Alexander’s withdrawal

towards Macedonia.46 The secondary focus is to generate funds to rebuild an army.47 Both of

these short-term changes in strategy are to be expected.

However, Darius’s long-term strategic change is as bold as the changes he made to his

army. Darius’s long-term tactics changed from an aggressive, unsystematic defense of his

empire by means of seeking out Alexander to a deliberate, methodical defense. Darius would no

longer seek out Alexander, instead he would force Alexander to come to him at a location of his

own choice. At Granicus and Issus, the Persians marched to meet Alexander; 48 at Gaugamela, it

would be the Macedonians who would march to meet the Persians.

43
Badian, 258.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
46
A.R. Burn, “Notes on Alexander’s Campaigns,” in The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol.72, 1952, 81-83.
47
Ibid.
48
Matt Waters, Ancient Persia: A Concise History of the Achaemenid Empire, 550-330 BCE, (New York,
Cambridge University Press, 2014), Kindle Edition, 3111-3553.
 Patchen 15

Darius suffered a tremendous defeat at Issus; yet, he was able to learn valuable lessons

from his encounter with Alexander. The evidence shows Darius’s ability to adapt his army and

not only to meet the capabilities of his enemy, but also to enhance his own army’s capabilities.

Darius learned to choose the terrain to allow as much mobility as possible, increasing his

cavalry’s effectiveness. Perhaps most impressive was his change in the way he altered the

manner in which his army traditionally fought, and in doing so, taking a tremendous risk in

changing not only roles within his army, but traditional social roles as well.49 In arming the

levied infantry, he allowed the cavalry to assume a greater offensive role, and the levied infantry

to assume a greater defensive role.

Location of the Battlefield

In Notes on Alexander’s Crossing of the Tigris and the Battle of Arbela, Aurel Stein

describes in very precise detail his interpretation of the most likely site of the battle. He draws

his conclusion based on the following factors: the most probable location of Alexander’s

crossing of the Tigris River, Arrian’s timeline of Alexander’s movements after his crossing;

Arrian, Curtius, and Diodorus’s accounts of Alexander’s movements prior to the battle in

relationship to terrain features, and the author’s accounts of Darius’s movements to the

battlefield site.50

Stein also takes into account his own travels through and his observation of the area.

Stein rejects the Arrian’s description of the battlefield being 600 stades from Arbela, and argues

that Ptolemy’s Geographia offers a more accurate account at 200 or 320 stades.51 Stein

49
Badian, 258.
50
Aurel Stein, “Notes on Alexander’s Crossing of the Tigris and the Battle of Arbela,” The Geographic Journal,
Vol. 100, No. 4 (Oct., 1942): 157-163. http://www.jstor.org/stable1788973 . Accessed November 20, 2014.
51
Ibid, 159.
 Patchen 16

eventually concludes that the battle occurred near present day Kermalais (Karemlesh). He

describes a wide plain extending from Bartella (Bartallah) in the North to Qaraqosh in the South.

The author believes that the area indicated by Stein has a high probability of being the

site of the battle. In terms of terrain, it is most suitable. In terms of logistics, it offers the

greatest ability to support Darius’s army. E.W. Mardsen’s excellent work on establishing an

estimate of Persian cavalry at the battle places the number of Persian cavalry at 34,000.52 The

Persian infantry was probably around 50,000, not including the 10,000 Immortals (Apple

Bearers).53 Stein’s site is ideal, for it sits very near the old caravan road that Stein notes on his

map.54 The site is also very near the Jabal ‘Ain-as Satrah, which is described in the ancient texts.

There are also numerous small villages in the vicinity, which could have been used by Darius as

told by Diodorus. The site is the only one in the region that fits all of the historical descriptions

and offers maneuverability on a large scale.

Darius’s Battle Strategy

Gaugamela was the last “stop” before Alexander reached Babylon proper. A decisive

victory at Gaugamela offered no chance to stop the Macedonians from reaching Babylon. Darius

was wagering the rest of the Persian Empire on the outcome of this one specific battle. It had

taken Darius two years to raise another army capable of challenging Alexander after Issus. For

Darius and the Persian Army, Gaugamela was the last stand (Curt., 4.14).

52
E.W. Marsden, The Campaign of Gaugamela, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964), 19-37.
53
Ibid.
54
Stein, 156.
 Patchen 17

Darius knew well that the outcome of the coming battle would mean either victory or

defeat for Persia (Curt., 4.14.15). Indeed, Darius was wagering the entire Persian Empire on the

outcome (Curt., 4.14.10). By allowing Alexander to advance deep within the Persian Empire to

a battlefield of his own choosing, Darius was making a bold move.

Darius also had an overwhelming number of cavalry and infantry at Gaugamela. Sources

vary as to the exact number of cavalry and infantry he possessed, but modern estimates place the

number at around 35,000 cavalry and approximately 50,000 infantry.55 He had learned much in

his campaign with the Macedonians. He had brought in heavy Greek mercenary infantry to

augment and bolster his own infantry (DS, 17.53.1-2). Darius was willing to wager everything,

but he was hedging his bet with his powerful army.

It is not hard to see Darius’s strategy. His strategy was simple, yet complex. His

cavalry, supported by the newly equipped heavier-armed infantry, which would help delay

Alexander’s own infantry and protect the Persian center, would outflank the Macedonians,

encircling the entire Macedonian army and destroy Alexander along with the entire Macedonian

army. Darius’s primary objective would be to initially destroy Alexander’s one true elite force—

the Companion Cavalry. Once Darius is able to destroy the Companion Cavalry and, hopefully,

Alexander along with it, his remaining cavalry would flank and destroy the remaining, and

hapless Macedonian infantry. The key for the Persians at Gaugmela was the destruction of

Alexander’s heavy cavalry, and the Persian army was prepared specifically for such a task.

Darius did not blunder into Gaugamela as he did Issus. Gaugamela was a well-prepared

and well thought out battle plan from the Persian perspective, matched by an equally well

55
Arrian suggest a force of 40,000 cavalry, while Diodorus notes 200,000. Curtius documents 45,000 cavalry.
Modern historian John Warry places the number of cavalry at 40,000 with 51,000 infantry, Marsden suggests
34,000 cavalry and around 50,000 supporting infantry.
 Patchen 18

thought out Macedonian battle plan. Yet, the lunar eclipse had foretold of the Darius’s

impending defeat. The Babylonian gods had abandoned the Persian king, and he was destined to

fail at Gaugamela.

Secondary Contributing Factors

We must now address factors that played a significant role during the battle. One, in

particular, will change the entire perspective of Darius’s withdrawal from the battlefield, for it is

of such importance that it dramatically alters not only our perception of the battle, and

Alexander’s strategy, but also our perception of Darius’s understanding of how the battle was

unfolding. This factor is a fatal flaw within the command model of the Persian army itself, one

that extends back hundreds of years, and has contributed to several decisive defeats for the

Persian army.

In Alexander’s Targeting of Persian Commanders, the author set forth a historical model

indicating that Alexander understood an inherent flaw in the Persian command model that

existed since the first Greco-Persian Wars.56 Through a detailed examination of key battles at

Plataea and Cunaxa, it was established that the targeting and elimination of the Supreme Persian

commander resulted in the breakdown and the retreat of the entire Persian army. This

phenomenon occurred not once, but consistently upon the death of the supreme commander in

virtually every battle. Furthermore, it was not limited to the supreme commander, but extended

to commanders of great influence among the Persian troops.57

The Persians knew of this flaw, at least as far back as the Battle of Cunaxa, for Cyrus the

Younger deliberately attempted to target his brother Artaxerxes. We know this because

56
John Patchen, “Alexander’s Targeting of Persian Commanders: A Historical Examination,” 2013.
57
Ibid.
 Patchen 19

Xenophon describes Cyrus’s tactic in his Anabasis (Xen., 1.8.12). However, the Persian army

command model remains relatively unchanged up to the Battle of Gaugamela.

Darius assumed the traditional center-of-the-line position at both Issus and Gaugamela, as

per the Persian doctrine (Xen., 1.8.22). This position was significant at both battles, because

Alexander deliberately targeted the Persian center and, at both battles, he is able to drive into the

Persian center. At Issus, he drove Darius to retreat. Again, at Gaugamela, he is able to drive into

the Persian center as well.

We have no evidence to suggest that Darius did not understand the same weakness in the

Persian command model. In fact, the evidence suggests the opposite, that Darius would have

understood the weakness. Darius was a quick learner. We see this in his response to the

rebellion in Egypt, Bagoas’s assassination, , and the way he adapted very quickly after Issus. We

must accept that Darius had it within his means to realize that his army had a crucial flaw that

could have disastrous consequences.

Persian Battle Movements

We must now examine several crucial battlefield movements that the Persians executed at

Gaugamela, which provide much insight not only to the actual plan that Darius had for defeating

Alexander, but also his psychological mindset. In understanding pivotal command decisions, it

is possible to ascertain the intent that Darius had once the left flank collapses and he must make a

decision to withdraw. Consequently, they also indicate possible actions Darius may have made

during his withdrawal as well.

The most pivotal aspect of Gaugamela was the action on the Persian left flank. The

outcome of Gaugamela hinged more on the events that unfolded in this sector of the battlefield
 Patchen 20

than in any other, so we must carefully examine the actions taken by Darius during the battle.

Once Darius did achieve a breach in the center of the Macedonian lines, his forces immediately

pushed deep into the baggage train, instead of attempting to encircle and destroy Alexander and

the Companion Cavalry These factors were decisive in Darius’s defeat.

The Persian Left Flank

Darius began his attack by attempting to outflank Alexander with his Scythian and

Bactrian cavalry (Arr., 3.13). The Macedonians repulsed the first wave of the attack, but upon

the engagement of Bactrian reserves, the forces of the left flank renewed their assault (Ibid). At

this point, Darius was fearful that his scythed chariots would quickly be of no use and ordered

them into battle. Arrian states that the scythed chariots inflicted little harm upon the

Macedonians, (Arr., 3.13 ) while Diodorus states that the scythed chariots did indeed inflict

casualties among the Macedonian center. (DS, 17.58.4).

Darius’s Breech of the Macedonian Lines

As the action on the left flank progressed, the Persian right flank attack proceeded

remarkably well. The Persian infantry with cavalry support had nearly encircled Parmenion (DS,

17.60.5). As a result of the oblique movement that Alexander used to draw the Persian cavalry

on the left flank away to open his own breech, the Persians were able to achieve a breech of their

own, which they quickly exploited. Both Diodorus and Curtius state that Mazaeus sent a large

contingency of cavalry and infantry through this center gap, created between the Macedonian left

and right flanks, to attack the Macedonian baggage train, and free the Persian prisoners

(Curt.,4.15.5, DS, 17.59.5).

 Patchen 21

It was here that Darius lost the Battle of Gaugamela. At a crucial time in the battle,

Darius’s desire to reach the prisoners (more specifically his family) overshadowed the more

pressing tactical situation. The cavalry and infantry sent to attack the baggage train did indeed

reach its objective. However, they would have served a much greater immediate tactical use if

used to encircle crucial left flank.

By presenting Alexander with the threat of encirclement, it is doubtful that Alexander would

have been able to launch his decisive attack into the Persian center. Instead, Alexander would

have been the one forced to withdraw, or perhaps have been destroyed. The destruction of the

Macedonian forces, and Alexander himself, would have resulted in a the release of the Persian

prisoners in the baggage trains. Thus, Alexander, and his encirclement and destruction was a

greater priority to the immediate success of the operation, then freeing the prisoners in the

baggage trains.

Darius’s Actions Post-Withdrawal

At least two sources state that Darius’s withdrawal was impossible to view because dust

obscured the view (Curt., 4.15.32, DS, 17.61.1-2). Curtius and Diodorus are both in concurrence

that Darius withdrew into a cloud of dust, while Arrian and Plutarch mention nothing of the dust

cloud. Curtius and Diodorus certainly make a viable statement, as anyone who has been exposed

to even basic horse ridership knows that horses, even at a trot will create dust. It is here that we

must consider our first historical quandary. How is it possible, from this point forward, to

discern Darius’s actions, or intent if he cannot be seen?

 Patchen 22

It is not entirely clear whether Darius is withdrawing because the tactical situation

demanded it, or if he is retreating in fear. There are conflicting texts from Arrian, Diodorus, and

Curtius that must be analyzed and objectively reviewed. It is in the greater context that the

picture becomes clear. Arrian indicates that Darius fled out of panic (Arr., 3.14), while Curtius

and Diodorus suggest that the tactical situation around Darius offered no other alternative except

withdrawal (Curt., 4.15.28-32, DS, 17.60.3-4).

All of the ancient texts are in concurrence that Darius fled. Arrian’s text indicates that

Darius was the first to turn and flee Arrian’s account is contradicted by Diodorus and Curtius,

who both state that Darius only fled after the troops around him began to flee (Curt., 4.15.28-32,

DS, 17.60.1-5). Both Diodorus and Curtius are clear that the Persian forces began to flee after

they believe that a javelin had slain Darius (Curt., 4.15.28, DS, 17.60.2). However, this was not

the case, as the javelin struck Darius’s chariot driver, killing him instead (Ibid).

The result of the errant javelin was catastrophic nonetheless. The Persians nearest to

Darius, believing their supreme commander had fallen, responded as they had historically they

began to flee. This historically dictated action was the exact reason that Alexander intended to

attack the Persian center. The forces surrounding Darius at this moment—and the very same

forces beginning to flee were among his most elite.

Compounding the issue at Gaugamela is the Astronomical Diaries’s passage that

indicates that Darius’s troops deserted him at some point during the battle. The Diaries context

state, “On the 24th,58 in the morning, the king of the world […] the standard? [….] they fought

58
The 24th of the Month of Ululu, or 1 October.
 Patchen 23

with each other, and a heavy defeat of the troops of [….] the troops of the king deserted him and

[went] to their cities59 (AD, 179, No. 330, obv, 15-17).”

One of the first actions indicative of Darius’s mindset during the withdrawal was his

conviction to die an honorable death. Curtius indicates that Darius initially thought about

standing his ground and fighting, but then decided to withdraw (Curt., 4.15.30). Justin validates

Darius’s initial unwillingness to withdraw. “Darius, when he saw his army repulsed, wished

himself to die, but was compelled by his officers to flee.” (Just., 6.14.3) Darius’s resolve to die

on the battlefield with his troops, or at the least, near his army is not the action of an individual

who is cowardly, but rather the action of an honorable commander—the modern day captain

going down with his ship.

It is also of note that during the withdrawal from the battle that Darius’s commanders

advised him to destroy key bridges over the Lycus River (Great Zab) that would allow

Macedonian forces to pursue him during his withdrawal (Curt., 4.16.8-9, Just. 6.14.4). Darius

refused to allow the destruction of the bridges, which will cut off the remaining Persian forces on

the battlefield from possible escape (Ibid).

Diodorus suggests that Darius circled back behind into villages to reorganize some of his

troops (DS 17.61.1). This contradicts the Arrian account that Darius fled from the battle and

continued to flee the immediate area until he reached Media. Diodorus’s account is consistent

with a king who has already invested a significant amount of time and resources, as well as

completely changed his tactics, for the sole purpose of engineering the defeating a single foe.

This account also provides some insight as to possible strategies that Darius may have

implemented during his withdrawal.

59
Author’s Italics.
 Patchen 24

At the moment of his withdrawal, Darius’s had suffered a key tactical defeat on the

Persian left flank. At the same time, the battle was progressing well for the Persians in other

aspects. The Persians had broken into the Macedonian baggage train, though they eventually

withdrew with heavy casualties (DS, 17.60.8). More importantly, the Persian infantry with

supporting cavalry on the right flank was not only holding the Macedonian infantry at bay, they

were close to achieving an encirclement. Alexander broke off his pursuit of Darius because of

the threat posed by the Persian right flank (Arr., 3.15). If Darius did indeed withdraw to a nearby

village to reorganize his troops, his options were limited.

Darius’s only true course of action, other than a full-fledged retreat, would be to conduct

what military tacticians call in modern terms as a retrograde defense. In a retrograde defense, the

commander trades time for space.60 Specific units are tasked with harassing and delaying the

enemy (time) so that as many the of commander’s forces as possible can withdraw safely

(space), known as delaying actions. Keys to a retrograde defense are: avoiding a decisive

engagement; preparing plans to enhance a rapid, controlled execution; denying the enemy

information on current movements; avoiding surprise with current intelligence; and combining

deception with delaying actions to prevent the enemy from closing in strength.61 While Darius

did not have access to 20th century United States Army military field manuals, the Diodorus

account, and the Astronomical Diaries passage certainly indicates that he attempted to perform a

retrograde defense.

Diodorus states that Darius did not withdraw to the rear with the other barbarians, but

turned in the opposite direction. (17.61.1-2). As noted earlier, part of a retrograde defense

requires deception and delay to prevent the enemy from closing and destroying the bulk of the
60
Department of the Army, FM 3.20: Defensive Operations, (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2002) 8.29-8.31.
61
Ibid.
 Patchen 25

forces withdrawing. By turning in the opposite direction of the main body of retreating forces,

and with only a small force covering him (Curt., 4.16.8), Darius himself became the deception,

placing himself in considerable danger, especially if Alexander had continued to pursue him.

Such a deceptive move could not have been conducted without some form of

communication with his other generals, so Darius would have halted at some point during the

retreat to coordinate this move. Where, exactly, remains a mystery, as the site of the battle

remains unknown. During this short halt, it is entirely plausible that Darius would have sent a

messenger to Mazaeus, the commander of the right flank, in an attempt to save as many of the

right flank forces. This premise is not without historical evidence to support it.

Arrian, Curtius and Diodorus all concur that the Persian right flank attack had progressed

extremely well (Arr., 3.15, Curt., 4.16.1-5, DS, 17.60.5-8). Once again all three sources agree

that the right flank was initially unaware of Darius’s flight from the battlefield (Arr., 3.14, Curt.,

4.16.1-4, DS, 17.60.5). However, Curtius specifically mentions that once “news of the king’s

defeat had reached Mazaues, and he, alarmed at his side’s misfortunes, began to relax his

pressure on the dispirited Macedonians despite his superior strength (4.16.4).” Given the size of

the forces involved, the space that was created by Alexander’s oblique movement that created

the center gap in which Mazaeus sent his forces to attack the baggage train, it is entirely possible

that the “news of the Kings’s defeat” arrived by a messenger sent by Darius, informing Mazaeus

of the withdrawal plan.

The perception that Mazaeus “began to relax his pressure” was actually the beginning of

Mazaeus’s withdrawal. When Pamenion rallied the Thessalian cavalry believing that the

Persians were retreating in panic (Curt., 4.16.5), it became a disorganized withdrawal. Instead of
 Patchen 26

withdrawing to Arbela with the rest of the Persian forces, Mazaeus, already discontent with his

King (Arr., 3.12), crossed the Tigris and returned to Babylon hence the Astrological Diaries

noting that the “the troops of the king deserted him and [went] to their cities. (AD, 179, No. 330,

obv, 15-17.)” Mazaeus’s desertion of Darius, may well have denied the Persian king a sizable

body of troops to mount an additional defence or counter attack.62

The evidence, when examined in its context, presents and entirely new scenario of Darius

at Gaugamela. It cannot be dismissed that Darius fled the battle after the Macedonians breached

the center of the Persian formation. However, the evidence suggests that Darius displayed a

significant amount of courage and tactical awareness once he initially fled the battlefield. It

suggests that he was focused on saving as many of his troops as possible, even risking his own

life as the distraction in the process. Finally, the evidence suggests that Darius attempted to

contact Mazaeus with the right wing, to include his troops in the withdrawal, but they “deserted

him and [went] to their cities. (AD, 179, No. 330, obv, 15-17.”)

Darius’s Fate After Gaugamela

Why was Darius not immediately deposed, and eliminated? The answer becomes clear

when entire events of the battle are examined closely and in depth: Darius must have

distinguished himself during the course of the battle to the extent that he had enough support

among the remaining Persian Army to continue to lead them until Bessus and Narbarzanes could

successfully mount their coup against him.

62
Reference Martin Doughtery, “Pydna” in Battles of the Ancient World (London: Amber Books, 2007) 129; where
Doughtery describes how, in ancient warfare, casualties are initially light until on side is broken, or driven to
retreat—whereupon the disorganized nature of retreat, or having one’s battle line broken results in high casualties.
Based upon this historical reference, it is reasonable to infer that Mazeus’s casualties, up until his withdrawal,
would also have been realitively few, giving Darius a sizable force of troops remaining if Mazeus could have
broken away in an orderly manner.
 Patchen 27

The fact that Darius was not disposed of after Gaugamela bears a great deal of weight.

He was, by all accounts, no longer King of Persia; Alexander had already conquered much of

the Persian Empire. As Badian points, out regicide and coups were not uncommon in

Achaemind History.63 Yet the Persian nobles, most notably Bessus, and Narbarxanes, did not

immediately remove Darius from his throne. In fact, Curtius states that Darius still maintained

the backing of his army after Gaugamela, after calming his troops (Curt., 5.1.7-9).

Even up to the moment that Bessus and Narbarzanes arrested him, Darius had the support

of many of his nobles (Curt., 5.8.6-5.9.1). After Darius’s arrest, the Persian camp was divided as

to the actions of Bessus (Curt., 5.9.14). The Persians had no clear commander, and while

Bessus attempted to win over the remaining Persian army, the unanimous consent of the men

was that the desertion of the King was not acceptable (Curt., 5.9.16).

Darius eventually accepted his fate. The murder of Darius occurred when Alexander and

his forces drew near the Persian forces, startling Bessus and Narbarzanes, who ordered Darius

bound and thrown in an ox cart.64 The Macedonians found Darius, and Alexander was greatly

disappointed, for he wanted to capture Darius.65 Denied the honorable death he desired,

cowardly murdered by his own relative, Darius III, the last of the Achaemenid kings died, and

the Achaemenid dynasty perished with him.66

Summation of the Evidence

63
Badian, 264.
64
Prevas, 69.
65
Ibid.
66
Bessus did assume the title King of Kings of Persia, though modern historians do not recognize Bessus as a
legitimate King of Persia, since Alexander had already conquered much of Persia already. Alexander, who
ordered would capture Bessus and ordered his nose, and ears cut off—a traditional Persian punishment for
regicide. Alexander then had Bessus executed.
 Patchen 28

Thus, a brief summation of the evidence presented suggests the following:

1. Darius’s historical background shows one of courage and loyalty, which is the primary

reason he ascended to the throne.

2. Upon ascension to the throne, Darius quickly suppressed a rebellion in Egypt as well as a

potential assassination attempt.

3. Darius rapidly adjusted to lessons learned from the Battle of Issus, altering his short-term,

long-term strategic plans, tactical awareness, and the manner in which he equipped his

army.

4. Significant psychological factors were present that affected Darius at Gaugamela

5. Darius’s flight at Gaugamela was not a full fledged retreat as has been historically

portrayed, instead the evidence points to Darius’s attempt to withdraw as many of his

troops as he could, using himself as a diversion to provide safety for his own troops.

Conclusion

Gaugamela changed the course of history. The Persian Achaemenid dynasty ended, and

Alexander firmly cemented his legacy by claiming the Persian Empire. However, our

understanding of the battle, and more specifically Darius, his actions, and his legacy, have been

skewed by classical texts that have a decidedly negative account of his ability to command, as

well as his personal character. Within these texts, we find trinkets of evidence that, when

dissected and examined individually and as a whole, begin to offer an entirely different picture of

the Persian king.

In the end, we see a picture of an individual fighting desperately, yet with confidence,

for his family, his empire, and his people. A king and commander unwilling to accept defeat and
 Patchen 29

willing to sacrifice everything, including himself, to achieve victory—or at a minimum save as

many of the lives of his own troops that he committed to battle. He is an individual whom

astrological events had doomed before battle, who continued to fight, believing that Persia would

prevail, even when those around him might not. Even to the end, Darius wished for nothing

more than the chance of regaining his kingdom in battle, or at least the honor of dying in battle

(Curtius, 4.8.13-17). Yet Bessus and his conspirators denied this from the Darius. Darius’s

treatment in death by Alexander exceeded his treatment by many in life.

It is time now that we seriously reconsider the events at Gaugamela, and specifically, our

conceptions of Darius and his actions. In light of the evidence brought forth, it is perhaps the

least we can do as historians to right what may be one of the greatest conceptual wrongs of

Ancient Near Eastern history. Darius was not a coward; he was the exact opposite—brave,

noble, courageous, determined, and willing to fight and die for his men, and for Persia.
 Patchen 30

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