Lanot v.

COMELEC
G.R. No. 164858

November 16, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioners Henry Lanot et. Al, filed a petition for disqualification under Sections 68 and 80 of the
Ombinibus Election Code against Eusebio before the COMELEC stating that the latter engaged
in an election campaign in various forms on various occasions outside of the designated
campaign period, such as

(a) Addressing a large group of people during a medical mission sponsored by the Pasig
City Government.
(b) Uttering defamatory statements against Lanot;
(c) Causing the publication of a press release predicting his victory;
(d) Installing billboards, streamers, posters, and stickers printed with his surname across
Pasig City;
(e) Distributing shoes to schoolchildren in Pasig public schools to induce their parents to
vote for him.

Eusebio won the election and any other complaints was dismissed by the COMELEC.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a pre-campaign offense committed by eusebio.

RULING:

There is no dispute that Eusebio’s act of election campaigning or partisan political activities
were committed outside of the campaign period. The only question is whether Eusebio, who
filed his certificate of candidacy on Dec 29, 2003, was a candidate when he committed those
acts before the start of the campaign period on March 24, 2004. Under Sec 11 of RA 8436,
Eusebio became a candidate for purposes of Sec 80 of the Omnibus Election Code, only on
March 23, 2004, the last day for filing certificate of candidacy. Applying the facts - as found by
Director Ladra and affirmed by the COMELEC first division – to SEC 11 of RA 8436, Eusebio
clearly did not violate SEC 80 of the Omnibus Election Code which requires the existence of a
“candidate”, one who has filed his certificate of candidacy, during the commission of the
questioned acts.
Chavez v COMELEC

G.R. No. 162777

August 31, 2007

FACTS:

Francisco Chavez ran for the position of Senator in the 2004 elections, representing the political
alliance of PROMDI, REPORMAand Aksyon Demokratiko. Prior to such filing, he entered into
private contracts with 96°North (clothing company), Konka International Plastics Manufacturing
Corp, and G-Box. In line with these contracts, his face was the subject of endorsement
billboards posted by these different companies (three billboards in Balintawak, one more
billboard at Roxas Boulevard for G-Box,a gaming and amusement corporation).

COMELEC issued Resolution 6520, and Section 32 provides that: “All propaganda

materials such as posters, streamers, stickers or paintings on walls and other materials showing
the picture, image, or name of a person, and all advertisements on print, in radio or on television
showing the image or mentioning the name of a person, who subsequent to the placement or
display thereof becomes a candidate for public office shall be immediately removed by said
candidate and radio station, print media or television station within 3 days after the effectivity of
these implementing rules; otherwise, he and said radio station, print media or television station
shall be presumed to have conducted premature campaigning

in violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.” COMELEC ordered him to have the
billboards removed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was violation of SEC 80 of the Omibus Election Code.

RULING:

Yes. Petitioner cannot claim that the subject billboards are purely product endorsements and do
not announce nor solicit any support for his candidacy. Under the Omnibus Election Code,
"election campaign" or "partisan political activity" is defined as an act designed to promote the
election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office. Activities included
under this definition are: (5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or
against a candidate.
It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to endorse certain
products, he acted as a private individual and had all the right to lend his name and image to
these products. However, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for Senator, the billboards
featuring his name and image assumed partisan political character because the same indirectly
promoted his candidacy. Therefore, the COMELEC was acting well within its scope of powers
when it required petitioner to discontinue the display of the subject billboards. If the subject
billboards were to be allowed, candidates for public office whose name and image are used to
advertise commercial products would have more opportunity to make themselves known to the
electorate, to the disadvantage of other candidates who do not have the same chance of
lending their faces and names to endorse popular commercial products as image models.
Similarly, an individual intending to run for public office within the next few months, could pay
private corporations to use him as their image model with the intention of familiarizing the public
with his name and image even before the start of the campaign period. This, without a doubt,
would be a circumvention of the rule against premature campaigning:

Sec. 80. Election campaign or partisan political activity outside campaign period. – It shall be
unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any party, or association of
persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except during the
campaign period.

Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities,
media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation
shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections.

Under the abovementioned Constitutional provision, the COMELEC is expressly authorized to

supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all media communication or information to
ensure equal opportunity, time, and space. All these are aimed at the holding of free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
ROSE MARIE DOROMAL v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R No. 181809, February 17, 2010

Facts:

Petitioner Doromal and respondent Biron were the vice mayoralty candidates for the
Municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo in the May 14, 2007 elections. During the canvassing of votes,
Biron objected to the inclusion of 25 election returns. Biron claimed that there were
discrepancies in the number of votes. In view thereof, the Municipal Board of Canvassers
(MBC) deferred the canvassing of the said returns. MBC later found that there was no
tampering on the number of votes for Doromal in the copy of the election return for the MBC.
Biron appealed to the COMELEC.
COMELEC issued a Resolution partially granting Biron’s appeal. It ordered the exclusion
of only 11 contested election returns while at the same time ordered the inclusion of the
remaining 14 election returns in the canvassing of votes. Commissioner Sarmiento dissented
and reasoned that the missing taras did not, by themselves, conclusively establish that the
subject returns were altered or tampered. Also, the affidavits of Biron’s poll watchers should not
have been given weight for being self-serving. In his view, the proper recourse was not to
exclude the subject returns but to order the correction of manifest errors so that the number of
votes in figures and words would conform to the number of taras in the subject returns.

Issue: Whether or not the Certificate of Votes did not comply with Section 17 of RA 6646.

Held:

YES. The Supreme Court held that the certificates of votes are inadmissible to prove
tampering, alteration or falsification for failure to comply with Sections 16 and 17 of RA 6646. In
excluding three of the 11 subject returns, the COMELEC erroneously relied on the alleged
glaring dissimilarity between the votes stated in the said returns and those stated in the
certificates of votes.

The certificates of votes from some precincts were defective, for they do NOT contain (1)
the thumb-marks of the members of the BEI, (2) the total number of voters who voted in the
precinct, and (3) the time of the issuance of the certificates. Biron failed to comply with the
requirements set by Section 16 and 17 of RA 6646, which provides that:

Sec. 16. Certificates of Votes. - After the counting of the votes cast in the precinct and
announcement of the results of the election, and before leaving the polling place, the board of
election inspectors shall issue a certificate of votes upon request of the duly accredited
watchers. The certificate shall contain the number of votes obtained by each candidate written
in words and figures, the number of the precinct, the name of the city or municipality and
province, the total number of voters who voted in the precinct and the date and time issued, and
shall be signed and thumbmarked by each member of the board.
Sec. 17. Certificate of Votes as Evidence. - The provisions of Sections 235 and 236 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 notwithstanding, the certificate of votes shall be admissible in evidence to
prove tampering, alteration, falsification or any anomaly committed in the election returns
concerned, when duly authenticated by testimonial or documentary evidence presented to the
board of canvassers by at least two members of the board of election inspectors who issued the
certificate: Provided, That failure to present any certificate of votes shall not be a bar to the
presentation of other evidence to impugn the authenticity of the election returns.

While the above-quoted provision authorizes the COMELEC to make use of the
certificate of votes to prove tampering, alteration, falsification or any anomaly committed in the
election returns, this presupposes that the certificate of votes was accomplished in accordance
with Section 16. This should have provided an added reason for the COMELEC to refuse the
admission of said certificates had the COMELEC carefully examined the certificates of votes
appearing in the records of this case.
MAYOR EMMANUEL MALIKSI v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R No. 203302, April 11, 2013

Facts:
During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed
Saquilayan the winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who
garnered the second highest number of votes, brought an election protest in the RTC alleging
that there were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts. RTC held a
revision of the votes and declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding
Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan
appealed to the COMELEC.
In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC, without giving notice to the parties, decided to
recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot images from the CF cards.
Thus, it issued an order dated March 28, 2012 requiring Saquilayan to deposit the amount
necessary to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot images.
COMELEC then nullified the RTC’s decision and declared Saquilayan as the duly elected
Mayor. Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had been denied his right to
due process because he had not been notified of the decryption proceedings. He argued that
the resort to the printouts of the ballot images, which were secondary evidence, had been
unwarranted because there was no proof that the integrity of the paper ballots had not been
preserved.

Issue: Whether or not the conduct of recount by COMELEC is proper.

Held:
YES. The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded as
the equivalents of the original official ballots themselves. The printouts thereof are the functional
equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of
revision of votes in an electoral protest. But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts,
the COMELEC, and the Electoral Tribunals to quickly and unilaterally resort to the printouts of
the picture images of the ballots in the proceedings had before them without notice to the
parties. The rules for the revision of ballots adopted for their respective proceedings still
consider the official ballots to be the primary or best evidence of the voters’ will.
All the foregoing rules on revision of ballots in accordance with stipulate that the printing
of the picture images of the ballots may be resorted to only after the proper Revision/Recount
Committee has first determined that the integrity of the ballots and the ballot boxes was not
preserved. The foregoing rules further require that the decryption of the images stored in the CF
cards and the printing of the decrypted images take place during the revision or recount
proceedings with due notice to and representation of the parties.

Section 6, Rule 10 (Conduct of Revision) of the 2010 Rules of Procedure for Municipal Election
Contests, which governs the proceedings in the Regional Trial Courts exercising original
jurisdiction over election protests, provides that "in the event that the revision committee
determines that the integrity of the ballots and the ballot box have not been preserved, as when
proof of tampering or substitution exists, it shall proceed to instruct the printing of the picture
image of the ballots stored in the data storage device for the precinct. The court shall provide a
non-partisan technical person who shall conduct the necessary authentication process to
ensure that the data or image stored is genuine and not a substitute. Only after this
determination can the printed picture image be used for the recount."

Maliksi was not immediately made aware of that crucial finding because the  COMELEC
First Division did not even issue any written resolution stating its reasons for ordering the
printing of the picture images. Without the written order, Maliksi was deprived of the chance to
seek any reconsideration or even to assail the irregularly-held recount through a seasonable
petition for certiorari in this Court. In that context, he had no real opportunity to assail the
conduct of the recount proceedings. The service of the COMELEC orders requiring Saquilayan
to post and augment the cash deposits for the printing of the picture images did not sufficiently
give Maliksi notice of the COMELEC's decision to print the picture images. The said orders did
not meet the requirements of due process because they did not specifically inform Maliksi that
the ballots had been found to be tampered. The responsibility and the obligation to lay down the
factual bases and to inform Maliksi as the party to be potentially prejudiced thereby firmly rested
on the shoulders of the COMELEC.
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R No. 172131, APRIL 2, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner Chato and respondent Unico were among the candidates for the lone
congressional district of Camarines Norte during the May 10, 2004 clections.
In her petition filed with the COMELEC, petitioner Chato alleged that during the canvassing of
the election returns before the MBC, her counsel raised several objections and pointed to
manifest errors or obvious discrepancies in the election returns from various precincts. MBC
gave her 1 day or until 6:00 p.m. of May 13, 2004, to prove her allegations. However, before the
expiration of the period granted and without notice to petitioner Chato or her counsel, the MBC
concluded the canvassing of votes and hastily forwarded the results of its canvass to the
Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) of Camarines Norte.
PBC then proclaimed respondent Unico as representative-elect of the lone
congressional district of Camarines Norte. Chato complained before the COMELEC alleging
that with all the manifest errors and obvious discrepancies appearing on the face of the election
returns, it could not be said that the canvassing of votes in Labo reflected the true and correct
number of votes that she received in the said municipality. COMELEC ordered the suspension
of the effects of the proclamation of respondent Unico. Soonafter, it lifted the said order on the
ground that respondent Unico’s proclamation and taking of oath of office had not only divested
the Commission of any jurisdiction to pass upon his election, returns, and qualifications, but also
automatically conferred jurisdiction to another electoral tribunal.
Subsequently, COMELEC dismissed Chato's petition for lack of merit. It stated
preliminarily that the MBC is precluded from entertaining pre-proclamation controversies on
matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody, and appreciation of the
election returns or certificates of canvass involving the positions of President, Vice-President,
Senators, and Members of the House of Representatives and Party-List. The COMELEC (First
Division) found that the relief sought by petitioner Chato was actually for the re-counting of
votes, not merely correction of manifest errors in the election returns. COMELEC claimed that
the resolution of the matters raised by petitioner Chato, e.g., correction of the votes garnered by
the candidates and reflected in the election returns, would require the opening of the ballots.
This could only be done in an election protest considering that petitioner Chato likewise alleged
fraud, substitution, and vote padding. COMELEC also held that the MBC or PBC had no
discretion on matters pertaining to the proclamation of the winning candidates because they
were simply performing a ministerial function. Chato filed for a motion for reconsideration which
COMELEC denied through a resolution, ruling that the Commission already lost jurisdiction over
the case in view of the fact that respondent Unico had already taken his oath as a Member of
the Thirteenth (13th) Congress.
 
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it promulgated said
resolution.

Held:
 NO. In accordance with Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, the Senate and the
House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
In Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections, the Court held that the Senate and the House of
Representatives now have their respective Electoral Tribunals which are the "sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members,"
thereby divesting the Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973 Constitution
over election cases pertaining to the election of the Members of the Batasang Pambansa
(Congress) With respect to the House of Representatives, it is the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over contests relative to
the election, returns and qualifications of its members. The use of the word "sole" in Section 17,
Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 of the Omnibus Election Code underscores the
exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals’ jurisdiction over election contests relating to its members.
In effect, the Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives,
the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.  In the present case, it is not
disputed that respondent Unico has already been proclaimed and taken his oath of office as a
Member of the House of Representatives. Hence, the COMELEC correctly ruled that it had
already lost jurisdiction over petitioner Chato’s petition. The issues raised by petitioner Chato
essentially relate to the canvassing of returns and alleged invalidity of respondent Unico’s
proclamation. These are matters that are best addressed to the sound judgment and discretion
of the HRET.
GABRIEL GARDUCE BASARTE v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R No. 169413, MAY 9, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner Basarte and private respondent Jarito were candidates for Municipal Mayor of
Silvino Lobos, Northern Samar in the May 10, 2004 elections. Basarte was the Lakas-CMD
Party mayoralty candidate while Jarito was the candidate of the Liberal Party. Basarte, through
his authorized representative Atty. Anselmo S. Alvañiz IV, registered his objection to the
inclusion of Election Return No. 04101444 of Precinct No. 17A, Barangay Cagda-o on the
grounds that the election return is obviously tampered and the taras, words and figures
contained therein for all local positions have been altered and the second page for the local
positions is missing. The lacking page was supposed to contain spaces for the continuation of
the 7 other candidates for Provincial Board Member. Hence, names of the candidates and their
corresponding votes were missing.
MBC denied the petition. On appeal, COMELEC, penned by Commissioner Resurreccion Borra,
also affirmed MBC ruling.
COMELEC held that the Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct No.
17A has testified before the respondent MBC that they cannot be faulted on the alleged missing
page because there was no such second page existing in the copies of the election returns
when they received the same. With this explanation, and in the absence of any competent
evidence to the contrary, COMELEC held that the conduct of the BEIs of Precinct No. 17A
should be accorded the presumption of regularity in the performance of its official duties.
Basarte filed a motion for reconsideration. COMELEC en banc, in a resolution also penned by
Commissioner Borra, denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration

Issue: Whether or not the acts of the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct No. 17A can be
afforded with the presumption of regularity.

Held:

NO. The uncorroborated explanation of the BEI Chairman of Precinct No. 17A, which
was readily accepted by COMELEC was unaccounted for.
Moreover, the prevailing rule that as long as the returns appear to be authentic and duly
accomplished on their face, the Board of Canvassers cannot look beyond or behind them to
verify allegations of irregularities in the casting or the counting of the votes presupposes that the
returns "appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their face." This principle does not
apply in cases like the one at bar where there is a prima facie showing that the return is not
genuine, several entries having been omitted in the assailed return.
COMELEC's contention that its conclusion was based on its examination of the original
second copy (the COMELEC copy) of the election return is unavailing as what is being assailed
is the copy of the election return that was used in the canvass - the original first copy (the MBC
copy). Under Section 235 of the Omnibus Election Code, the other original copies of the
assailed election return may be resorted to when the assailed election return appears to be
tampered with, altered, or falsified.
In the instant case, the COMELEC resorted to the original second copy despite its ruling that the
questioned election return (the MBC copy) was genuine and authentic on its face.
The merit of petitioner's arguments notwithstanding, Section 243 (d) of the Omnibus Election
Code requires that for a pre-proclamation controversy to prosper, it must be shown that the
election return sought to be annulled would materially affect the results of the election.
In the instant case, it is not clear whether the election return of will materially affect the
results of the mayoral contest. Basarte failed to submit convincing evidence to show that he
would indeed win the election if the contested election return was excluded from the
computation. The petition is DENIED.
PIMENTEL v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 178413             March 13, 2008

Facts:

The Petition stemmed from the 14 May 2007 national elections for 12 senatorial posts. At the
time of filing of the Petition, around two months after the said elections, the 11 candidates with
the highest number of votes had already been officially proclaimed and had taken their oaths of
office as Senators. With other candidates conceding, the only remaining contenders for the
twelfth and final senatorial post were Pimentel and private respondent Juan Miguel F. Zubiri
(Zubiri). Public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc, acting as the
National Board of Canvassers (NBC), continued to conduct canvass proceedings so as to
determine the twelfth and last Senator-elect in the 14 May 2007 elections.

Pimentel assailed the proceedings before the NBC and its constituted Special Provincial Board
of Canvassers for Maguindanao (SPBOC-Maguindanao) in which the Provincial and Municipal
Certificates of Canvass (PCOC and MCOCs) from the province of Maguindanao were
respectively canvassed. The SPBOC-Maguindanao was created because the canvass
proceedings held before the original Provincial Board of Canvassers for Maguindanao (PBOC-
Maguindanao)

Task Force Maguindanao, headed by COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. and
Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer, retrieved and collected 21 MCOCs from the municipalities of
Maguindanao, mostly copy 2, or the copy intended to be posted on the wall. Due to the
consistent denial by the SPBOC-Maguindanao of the repeated and persistent motions made by
Pimentel’s counsel to propound questions to PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-
Maguindanao regarding the due execution and authenticity of the Maguindanao MCOCs,
Pimentel’s counsel manifested her continuing objection to the canvassing of the said MCOCs.

On 29 June 2007, the SPBOC-Maguindanao submitted to the NBC the second PCOC for
Maguindanao. In the proceedings before the NBC, Pimentel’s counsel reiterated her request to
propound questions to PES Bedol and the Chairpersons of the MBOCs-Maguindanao and the
SPBOC-Maguindanao. The NBC, however, refused to grant her request. Pimentel’s counsel
thereafter moved for the exclusion of the second Maguindanao PCOC from the canvass.

Pimentel averred that said canvass proceedings were conducted by the NBC and SPBOC-
Maguindanao in violation of his constitutional rights to substantive and procedural due process
and equal protection of the laws, and in obvious partiality to Zubiri
In the meantime, without any TRO and/or Status Quo Ante Order from the Court, the canvass
proceedings before the NBC continued, and by 14 July 2007, Zubiri (with 11,004,099 votes) and
Pimentel (with 10,984,807 votes) were respectively ranked as the twelfth and thirteenth
Senatorial candidates with the highest number of votes in the 14 May 2007 elections.

After a close scrutiny of the allegations, arguments, and evidence presented by all the parties
before this Court, this Court rules to dismiss the present Petition.

Issue: WON the case of Pimentel is an exception to the prohibition on pre-proclamation in

cases of Senators.

Ruling: No.

The SC did not recognize the pre-proclamation case of Pimentel, which could have prospered if
he met the requirement of law, because SPBOC-Maguindanao is not Congress nor COMELEC
en banc acting as the NBC, specifically charged by Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9369, with the duty to determine the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass submitted to it.

In elections for President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of

Representatives, the general rule still is that pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or certificates of
canvass are still prohibited. As with other general rules, there are recognized exceptions to the
prohibition, namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2) questions affecting the composition or
proceedings of the board of canvassers; and (3) determination of the authenticity and due
execution of certificates of canvass as provided in Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7166, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9369. And, in this case, the exception applies only to Congress or
the COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC, and not to local boards of canvassers who must still
be deemed covered by the prohibition on pre-proclamation controversies.
THEMISTOCLES A. SAÑO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 182221               February 3, 2010

Facts:

Saño argued to suspende and annul a proclamation validly made due to, among others, that the
election returns were (1) obviously manufactured; (2) tampered or falsified; [3]that there was
massive fraud; and [4] illegal proceedings. In support thereto, petitioner attached the affidavits
of his two (2) supporters, who attested that they saw open ballot boxes from Precinct Nos. 49A,
31A, and 58A

COMELEC issued its Resolution dated October 3, 2007 upholding the proclamation of Que, to
wit:

x x x A re-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the

proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any
registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the
Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236 of the Omnibus
Election Code in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of
election returns. On the other hand, Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code enumerates the
issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:

1. Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;

2. The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be
tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic
copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code;

3. The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they
are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and

4. When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the
results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate.

It is likewise settled that the above enumeration of the grounds that [many] be properly raised in
a pre-proclamation controversy is restrictive and exclusive.

Petitioner insists that all five contested ERs were written by only one person, and these ERs
were surreptitiously presented before the MBOC. Thus, he argues that the issues raised before
the MBOC, namely, that the contested ERs were tampered with and/or falsified, obviously
manufactured, and subject of massive fraud, are pre-proclamation controversies as defined in
Section 241 of the Omnibus Election Code and fall within the contemplation of Section 243(b) of
said Code. As such, the contested ERs should have been excluded from the canvass.
Consequently, the MBOC’s proclamation of Que violated Section 39 of Commonwealth Act No.
7859 and Section 20 of RA 7166.

On the other hand, Que argues that the allegations raised by petitioner on the contested ERs
are not proper in a pre-proclamation controversy; that petitioner failed to substantiate his claim
that the contested ERs were obviously manufactured, tampered with, or falsified; and that
petitioner failed to follow the strict and mandatory procedure under Section 20 of RA 7166 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 8969 for manifesting an appeal.

Issue: Whether or not contested ERs are proper in a pre-proclamation controversy.

Ruling:

A pre-proclamation controversy, as defined in BP Blg. 881, otherwise known as the OEC of the
Philippines, is: Any question pertaining to or affecting the proceeding of the BOC which may be
raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before
the board or directly with COMELEC, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and
236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appearance of the election
returns. A pre-proclamation controversy is summary in character. It is the policy of the law that
pre-proclamation controversies be promptly decided, so as not to delay canvass and
proclamation. The BOC will not look into allegations of irregularity that are not apparent on the
face of ERs that appear otherwise authentic and duly accomplished. Section 20 of R.A. No.
7166 lays down the procedure to be followed when election returns are contested before the
BOC. Compliance with this procedure is mandatory to permit the BOC to resolve the objections
as quickly as possible.
SABDULLAH T. MACABAGO  vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JAMAEL M.
SALACOP
G.R. No. 152163             November 18, 2002
Case Digest by: Mary Fe M. Tago-on

FACTS: On May 22, 2001, petitioner Sabdullah T. Macabago was proclaimed as the winning
candidate for the position of Municipal Mayor of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur. On June 1, 2001,
Salacop filed a petition with the COMELEC against petitioner and the proclaimed Vice-Mayor
and Municipal Councilors, as well as the members of the Municipal Board of Canvassers to
annul the elections and the proclamation of candidates.He alleged that there was a massive
substitution of voters, rampant and pervasive irregularities in voting procedures and a failure of
the BEI to comply with Sections 28 and 29 of Comelec Resolution No. 3743 and Section 193 of
the Omnibus Election Code, thus rendering the election process in certain precincts a sham and
a mockery and the proclamation of the winning candidates a nullity. In his answer, Macabago
denied the truth of the material allegations in the petition and averred that it raised a pre-
proclamation controversy. He further alleged that the grounds relied upon by private respondent
would be proper in an election protest but not in a pre-proclamation controversy. The
COMELEC En Banc took cognizance of the petition and issued an order directing the Election
Officer to bring and produce before the COMELEC Office in Manila the original VRRs of the
questioned precincts for technical examination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or committed a grave abuse of
its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the petition of
private respondent and in issuing the assailed Order.

RULING: Yes. The petition before the COMELEC does not pose a pre-proclamation
controversy as defined in Article XX, Section 241 of Republic Act No. 7166, thus:

"SEC. 241. Definition. – A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or

affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or
by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with
the Commission." Pre-proclamation controversies are properly limited to challenges directed
against the Board of Canvassers and proceedings before said Board relating to particular
election returns to which private respondent should have made specific verbal objections
subsequently reduced to writing. The proceedings are summary in nature; thus, the reception of
evidence aliunde, e.g. the original copies of the VRRs, is proscribed. In fine, in pre-proclamation
proceedings, the COMELEC is not to look beyond or behind election returns which are on their
face regular and authentic returns.  In his petition with the COMELEC, Salacop alleged that
fraud and irregularities allegedly perpetrated by unscrupulous individuals who substituted for the
registered voters and voted for the latter in the subject precincts, in conspiracy with the Board of
Election Inspectors, or abetted by the members thereof, attended the electoral process in the
subject precincts. The fraud and the irregularities catalogued by private respondent required the
reception of evidence aliunde. As stated earlier, such grounds are not proper bases for a pre-
proclamation controversy but are appropriate for a regular election contest within the original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Neither is Salacop’s petition before the COMELEC one
for declaration of a failure of elections in Saguiran, Lanao del Sur. He alleged that the elections
ensued in the subject precincts and that petitioner herein emerged as the winner and was in fact
proclaimed as such by the Board of Election Inspectors.

In sum then, the grounds alleged by Salacop in his petition before the COMELEC are those for
a regular election protest and are not proper in a pre-proclamation controversy; nor is such
petition one for annulment of the elections or for a declaration of failure of elections in the
municipality of Saguiran, Lanao del Sur. The COMELEC should have ordered the dismissal of
the petition instead of issuing the assailed order. The COMELEC thus committed a grave abuse
of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the same.
FRANCISCO D. OCAMPO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF
CANVASSERS OF STA. RITA, PAMPANGA and ARTHUR L. SALALILA
G.R. No. 136282           February 15, 2000
Case Digest by: Mary Fe M. Tago-on

FACTS: Francisco D. Ocampo and Arthur L. Salalila were candidates for Mayor in the
Municipality of Sta. Rita, Province of Pampanga during the May 11, 1998 elections. During the
canvassing of the election returns, petitioner moved for the exclusion of the election returns in 8
precincts from Barangay Basilia considering that the turnout of votes was allegedly lopsided
against his favor. The grounds for the exclusion of the election returns in the aforementioned
precincts were: i.e: (1) that the same were obviously manufactured; (2) they were defective for
they contained no data on the number of registered votes in the precinct, actual number of votes
cast and the number of valid votes cast; and (3) other alleged discrepancies in the data on votes
cast and total number of registered voters and excess ballots. Finding the contested election
returns to be genuine and authentic and without merit, the MBC ruled to order the inclusion in
the canvass of the contested election returns. On May 16, 1998, petitioner went to see the
Chairman of the MBC at his office to file his Notice of Appeal. Since the latter was not present,
petitioner instead filed said notice with Board Members Nelia Salvador and Diosdado L. Amio
who, however, refused to accept the same in line with the Board's earlier ruling not to receive
anymore the Notice of Appeal. On May 18, 1998, petitioner went to the COMELEC and filed a
formal appeal. The Commission (Second Division) resolves to GIVE DUE COURSE to the
appeal and the eight (8) contested election returns were ordered excluded but the
COMELEC en banc reversed the findings of the COMELEC Second Division.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion in
reversing the findings of the COMELEC Second Division.

RULING: No. It must be borne in mind that the findings of facts of administrative bodies charged
with their specific field of expertise, are afforded great weight by the courts, and in the absence
of substantial showing that such findings are made from an erroneous estimation of the
evidence presented, they are conclusive, and in the interest of stability of the governmental
structure, should not be disturbed.  In order to allay any suspicion of gravely abusing its
discretion, the COMELEC made a careful examination of the contested election returns. "To
check and double check" if it were true that the contested election returns were tampered with,
altered or falsified, the COMELEC en banc examined two separate copies of the election
returns: (1) the copy for the Municipal Board of Canvassers and (2) the COMELEC copy.
It merely sustained the findings and rulings of the MBC who, at the first instance, found the
contested election returns to be genuine and authentic and the objections to be without merit.
Moreover, the COMELEC en banc did not meet any opposition or dissent from any of the
Commissioners who have rendered the resolution reversing the decision of the MBC. This only
goes to show that there was a painstaking review and examination of the returns by the
COMELEC en banc which does not warrant a different conclusion from this Court.

That the election returns were obviously manufactured must be evident from the face of said
documents. In the absence of a strong evidence establishing spuriousness of the returns, the
basic rule that the election returns shall be accorded prima facie status as bona fide reports of
the results of the count of the votes for canvassing and proclamation purposes must perforce
prevail. The COMELEC en banc did not find any signs of alterations or tampering on the
election returns nor did the petitioner present any hard evidence of such irregularity. Anent the
objection as to the omitted data in the election returns, a close reading of Section 234 of the
Omnibus Election Code shows that nothing in said provision provides for the exclusion of the
election returns. Moreover, such omitted data are merely formal defects and not so material as
to affect the votes the candidates obtained in the election. For as long as the election returns
which on their face appear regular and wanting of any physical signs of tampering, alteration or
other similar vice, such election returns cannot just be unjustifiably excluded.
ARTHUR V. VELAYO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ERNESTO NATIVIDAD
G.R. No. 135613             March 9, 2000
Case Digest by: Mary Fe M. Tago-on

FACTS: Petitioner Arthur V. Velayo and private respondent Ernesto Natividad were among the
candidates for mayor of Gapan, Nueva Ecija in the May 11, 1998 elections. On May 12, 1998,
the canvass of election returns started and Navidad orally sought the exclusion of Election
Returns from two precincts (Precinct 6A and Precinct 103) on the ground that they are
incomplete and contain material defects and do not contain the thumbmarks of official
watchers.  The Board denied the objections and continued with the canvass. Natividad filed
three (3) more cases before the COMELEC (2nd Division) without giving notice of appeal to
Velayo. All his petitions were denied by the COMELEC en banc. Natividad then filed a motion
for Reconsideration contending that the order of dismissal is contrary to law and the evidence.
Again, Velayo was not given a copy of the motion. COMELEC en banc ruled in favor of
Natividad and annulled the proclamation of Velayo. The latter then claimed that he was denied
due process because he was not furnished any notice of the pre-proclamation proceedings
against him from beginning to end. All that he received from the COMELEC was its en banc
resolution annulling his proclamation. The Solicitor General agreed with Velayo and opined that
the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it issued the impugned resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it excluded
votes cast for the certain election returns, without notice and hearing consistent with due
process.

RULING: Yes. Respondent COMELEC failed to be faithful to section 3 of Rule 27 of the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that "all pre-proclamation controversies shall be
heard summarily after due notice . . ." The records will show that petitioner was not furnished
any notice of the pre-proclamation proceedings against him from beginning to end. Natividad did
not give petitioner copies of his notices of appeal from the rulings of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers. Nor was petitioner given copies of private respondent's petitions and motions filed
with the COMELEC. Even the COMELEC's Second Division failed to notify petitioner about the
promulgation of its Order which dismissed the pre-proclamation cases against him for being
moot and academic. He was not also given a copy of Natividad’s Motion for Reconsideration
against said Order. All that Velayo received from the COMELEC was its en banc resolution
annulling his proclamation.

Further, the Court agrees with the Solicitor General that pre and post proclamation proceedings
should be resolved summarily but not ex parte. It is true that RA No. 7166 provides for summary
proceedings in pre-proclamation cases and does not require a trial type hearing. But although
the proceedings are summary, the adverse party nevertheless must at the very least be notified
so that he can be apprised of the nature and purpose of the proceeding.  In the case at bar, all
the proceedings were conducted by the respondent COMELEC without the participation of the
petitioner. Worse, respondent Natividad was allowed to file various motions without the
knowledge of the petitioner. Plainly, these ex parte proceedings offend fundamental fairness
and are null and void. Republic Act No. 7166 introduced several electoral reforms and some of
them relate to the disposition of pre-proclamation controversies. Among others, it provides that
pre-proclamation controversies on election returns or certificates of canvass must be disposed
of summarily by the COMELEC on the basis of the records and evidence adduced in the Board
of Canvassers. In the case at bar, it does not clearly appear that the COMELEC annulled the
proclamation of Velayo on the basis of the official records and evidence adduced by the parties
before the Board of Canvassers. The records contain the contested election returns, the
objections of the aggrieved party, the opposition of the prevailing party, the evidence of the
parties, and the rulings of the Board of Canvassers. R.A. No. 7166 explicitly provides that it is
only on the basis of these official records that the COMELEC can decide the pre-proclamation
controversy in a summary manner. Without the official records, the respondent COMELEC
cannot validly decide a pre-proclamation controversy.
WENCESLAO RANCAP LAGUMBAY vs. COMELEC and CESAR CLIMACO
G.R. No. L-25444             January 31, 1966
Case Digest by: Mary Fe M. Tago-on

FACTS : This petition prays for revision of an order of the Commission on Elections declining to
reject the returns of certain precincts of some municipalities in Mindanao. The Constitution
provides for review by this Court of the rulings of the said Commission.

The matter being urgent, and having reached the conclusion that the returns of certain
questioned precincts were "obviously manufactured" within the meaning of pertinent
jurisprudence, particularly Mitchell v. Stevens,1 we issued on December 24, 1965, a short
resolution upholding the Commission's power and duty to reject the returns of about fifty
precincts. It appearing therein that — contrary to all statistical probabilities — in the first set, in
each precinct the number of registered voters equaled the number of ballots and the number of
votes reportedly cast and tallied for each and every candidate of the Liberal Party, the party in
power; whereas, all the candidates of the Nacionalista Party got exactly zero; and in the second
set, — again contrary to all statistical probabilities — all the reported votes were for candidates
of the Liberal Party, all of whom were credited with exactly the same number of votes in each
precinct, ranging from 240 in one precinct to 650 in another precinct; whereas, all the
candidates of the Nacionalista Party were given exactly zero in all said precincts.

ISSUE: Whether or not fraud is committed in the election.

HELD: The same ratio decidendi applies to the situation in the precincts herein mentioned.
These returns were obviously false or fabricated — prima facie. Let us take for example,
precinct No. 3 of Andong, Lanao del Sur. There were 648 registered voters. According to such
return all the eight candidates of the Liberal Party got 648 each,3 and the eight Nacionalista
candidates got exactly zero. We hold such return to be evidently fraudulent or false because of
the inherent improbability of such a result — against statistical probabilities — specially because
at least one vote should have been received by the Nacionalista candidates, i.e., the vote of the
Nacionalista inspector. It is, of course, "possible" that such inspector did not like his party's
senatorial line-up; but it is not probable that he disliked all of such candidates, and it is not likely
that he favored all the eight candidates of the Liberal Party. Therefore, most probably, he was
made to sign an obviously false return, or else he betrayed his party, in which case, the election
therein — if any — was no more than a barefaced fraud and a brazen contempt of the popular
polls.

The court agrees that frauds in the holding of the election should be handled — and finally
settled — by the corresponding courts or electoral tribunals. That is the general rule, where
testimonial or documentary evidence, is necessary; but where the fraud is so palpable from the
return itself (res ipsa loquitur — the thing speaks for itself), there is no reason to accept it and
give it prima facie value.

At any rate, fraud or no fraud, the verdict in these fifty precincts may ultimately be ascertained
before the Senate Electoral Tribunal. All we hold now, is that the returns show "prima facie" that
they do not reflect true and valid reports of regular voting. The contrary may be shown by
candidate Climaco — in the corresponding election protest. The Court then denies the motion to
reconsider its resolution of December 24, 1965, as well as the petition for a re-hearing.
G.R. No. 107854 July 16, 1993

DATU SUKARNO S. SAMAD, petitioner,

vs.
COMELEC AND BAI UNGGIE ABDULA, respondents.

G.R. No. 108642 July 16, 1993

DATU SUKARNO S. SAMAD, petitioner,

vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ANTONIO CARPIO AND BAI UNGGIE
ABDULA, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner Sukarno S. Samad (‘Samad’) and private respondent Bai Unggie Abdula (‘Abdula)
were among the candidates for the position of Mayor in the Municipality of Kabuntalan,
Maguindanao in the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992.

Both were proclaimed as the mayor – elect by two different canvassing boards: Abdula was
declared mayor-elect by the board of canvassers headed by one Abas A. Saga (‘Saga’) on May
28, 1992 while Samad was declared mayor – elect by another board of canvassers headed by
one Mucado M. Pagayao (‘Pagayao’).Both filed separate petitions against one another.

Samad filed SPA 92-314 on June 1, 1992, seeking for the nullification of the proclamation made
in favor of Abdula and the calling of a special election in three precincts.

On the other hand, Abdula filed SPC 92-421 on August 14, 1992, praying that the proclamation
of Samad be nullified and that he be enjoined from assuming as mayor of Kabuntalan.

Subsequently, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2489 declaring the termination of all pre-
proclamation cases except for 86 cases named in the list annexed thereto. SPA 92-314 was not
included in the list. (Note: SPC-92-421 had not yet been filed at that time.)

On July 2, 1992, the Samad filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cotabato City an action
against the private respondent for quo warranto and prohibition with preliminary injunction which
was eventually decided, ordering Abdula to cease and desist from exercising the powers and
functions of the mayor of Kabuntalan and enjoining all officials and entities to respect the
proclamation of petitioner Samad.

Abdula, filed a petition in the Court of Appeals questioning the validity of the order issued by the
RTC.

The COMELEC First Division, after finding that both the conflicting certificates of canvass and
proclamation prepared by the Saga and Pagayao boards of canvassers were defective, denied
the consolidated petitions and directed the Office of the Executive Director to constitute a
Special Board of Canvassers for the purpose of verifying which of the two sets of statements of
votes upon which the two different proclamation documents were based was genuine, without
prejudice to the resolution of the prayer for special elections in Kabuntalan.

The denial of the consolidated petitions prompted Samad to file a petition to which the Court
issued a temporary restraining order commanding the COMELEC to cease and desist from
implementing the questioned resolutions.
Issue:

Whether or not the present controversy is still within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC or
if such was already vested in the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City upon the filing of
the petition for quo warranto.

Ruling:

The present controversy is still within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.

Under Section 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2489, it was provided:

xxx

4) All pending petitions for disqualification, failure of elections or analogous cases, not
being pre-proclamation controversies and, therefore, not governed by Sections 17, 18,
19, 20, 21 and particularly, by the second paragraph of Sec. 16, Republic Act No. 7166,
shall remain active cases, the proceedings to continue beyond June 30, 1992, until the
issues therein are finally resolved by the Commission; xxx

Since SPA 92-314 was not only for the annulment of Abdula's proclamation but also for the
holding of special elections in three precincts. It therefore fell under Section 4 of the COMELEC
resolution.

The Court also provided that as a general rule, the filing of an election protest or a petition
for quo warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy,  or
amounts to the abandonment of one earlier filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the
authority to inquire into and pass upon the title of the protestee or the validity of his
proclamation.

The reason is that once the competent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of an election protest or
a petition for quo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be decided in the case itself
and not in another proceeding.

However, the general rule admits of exceptions:

Exceptions to the General Rule Application in the case at bar

(1.) the board of canvassers was The proclamation of Abdula by the

improperly constituted; Saga Board of Canvassers was illegally
constituted. The Election Supervisor of
Maguindanao denied having approved
the designation of Saga to take over the
canvassing of votes

(2.) quo warranto was not the proper Because both the Samad and Abdula
remedy; claimed to have assumed the office of
the mayor of Kabuntalan. In a quo
warranto proceeding, the petitioner is
not occupying the position in dispute.
Moreover, under the Omnibus Election
Code, quo warranto is proper only for
 the purpose of questioning the election
of a candidate on the ground of
disloyalty or ineligibility. Neither of these
grounds was invoked by Samad.

(3.) what was filed was not really a The petitions filed by Samad in the
petition for quo warranto or an COMELEC and the RTC were directed
election protest but a petition to at the illegality of the composition of the
annul a proclamation;  Saga board of canvassers and of the
proclamation of Abdulla.

(4.) the filing of a quo N/A

warranto petition or an election
protest was expressly made without
prejudice to the pre-proclamation
controversy or was made ad
cautelam; 

(5.) the proclamation was null and The proclamation of Abdulla was
void. declared null and void.

All the exceptions except the fourth are applicable in the case at bar.

Finally, the jurisdiction as to the prayer of calling special elections in the three precincts is also
cognizable by the COMELEC under Section 6 (Failure of Election) of the Omnibus Election
Code and Section 4 (Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections) under Republic
Act No. 7166.

Therefore, the COMELEC retained jurisdiction over SPA 92-314 and SPC 92-421.

G.R. No. L-30058               March 28, 1969

LUIS G. DE CASTRO, petitioner,
vs.
JULIAN G. GINETE and UBALDO Y. ARCANGEL Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Sorsogon, 10th Judicial District, Branch I, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner Luis G. De Castro (‘De Castro’) and private respondent Julian G. Ginete (‘Ginete’)
were candidates for the office of municipal mayor of the Municipality of Bulan, province of
Sorsogon which eventually proclaimed De Castro as the winner with a margin of 12 votes over
Ginete.

Ginete filed a motion of protest against the election on the ground of frauds and irregularities
committed in the conduct of the election.

Revision proceedings was then conducted, subjecting ballots from 20 precincts for which where
protested by Ginete.

De Castro filed a motion to dismiss the protest on the ground of estoppel. He alleged that the
following acts and utterances of Ginete had estopped the latter from questioning De Castro’s
election:
(a) A letter was written and sent by Ginete to De Castro on January 1, 1968, addressing the
latter as Mayor and congratulating him of having been elected as Mayor.
(b) Ginete, who was at that time the outgoing municipal mayor, delivered a speech during
the inauguration ceremony of De Castro, which speech contained a declaration that De
Castro has been proclaimed with a majority vote and that the people of the Municipality
of Bulan should cooperate with De Castro’s administration.

Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Julian Ginete is estopped from filing an election protest due to his acts and/or
utterances which constitute a declaration or acceptance that it was De Castro who really have
won the election for municipal mayor of Municipality of Bulan.

Ruling:

NO, the act and utterances of Ginete did not estopped him from protesting the election of De
Castro. As held by the Court, there is no showing that Ginete had admitted that De Castro had
won in an election that was clean and honest, or free from irregularities. Ginete, as a law-
abiding citizen, had to abide by the proclamation of the board of canvassers. Ginete having
recognized De Castro as the winner in virtue of the proclamation by the board of canvassers did
not preclude him from questioning the validity of De Castro's election in the manner prescribed
by law, if he had grounds to show that the election of De Castro was brought about through the
commission of frauds and other election irregularities.

The Court also laid down the following elements of estoppel by conduct:
(1) that there must have been a representation or concealment of material facts;
(2) that the representation must have been made with knowledge of the faculty
 (3) that the party to whom it was made must have been ignorant of the truth of the matter;
and
(4.) that it must have been made with intention that the other party would act upon it

The elements of estoppel by conduct are not present in the case at bar.

For one, it cannot be said that Ginete through his acts and declarations made representations of
fact regarding De Castro's election which were not known to the latter. Ginete simply made a
formal recognition of the fact that De Castro had been proclaimed winner by the municipal board
of canvassers of Bulan, and congratulated him which was done only after the board of
canvassers had proclaimed De Castro winner. It cannot be said that De Castro came to know
about his having won the election because Ginete told him so. Ginete did not mislead De Castro
to the belief that he had won the election

Also, it cannot be said that De Castro was led to act in assuming the office as mayor because
Ginete had made representation to him that he (De Castro) had won the election. De Castro
assumed office as mayor by operation of law, because he was proclaimed elected by the
municipal board of canvassers in accordance with law. Ginete, by his acts and/or utterances,
had not induced De Castro to believe that his election was unquestionable. Ginete is not the
one called upon to declare the election of De Castro valid, and so, De Castro cannot claim that
he was induced to believe that he was elected and he assumed office as mayor simply on the
basis of Ginete's act and utterances.

Further, Ginete never made any statement that he would not question the election of De Castro.
The election case, or the election protest, that Ginete brought against De Castro did not arise
out of any act or declaration of Ginete but on the ground of fraud and irregularities allegedly
committed before De Castro’s proclamation.

Finally, the Court held that the purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the
candidate proclaimed elected by the board of canvassers is really the lawful choice of the
electorate. What is sought in an election protest is the correction of the canvass of the votes,
which is the basis of the proclamation of the winning candidate.  4 An election contest involves a
public office in which the public has an interest. Certainly, the act of a losing candidate of
recognizing the one who is proclaimed the winner should not bar the losing candidate from
questioning the validity of the election of the winner in the manner provided by law.

Hence petition is dismissed.

G.R. No. 168253             March 16, 2007

MAYOR NOEL E. ROSAL, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Second Division, and MICHAEL VICTOR
IMPERIAL, Respondents.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 172741             March 16, 2007

MAYOR NOEL E. ROSAL, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MICHAEL VICTOR IMPERIAL, Respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner Noel E. Rosal (‘Rosal’) and private respondent Michael Victor Imperial (‘Imperial’)
were candidates for mayor of Legaspi City in the May 10, 2004 elections to which the former
was proclaimed mayor-elected.

Imperial initially filed a petition to annul the proclamation assailing the canvassing of election
returns in 520 precincts. The same petition was superseded when Imperial subsequently filed
an election protest with the COMELEC contesting the results of the election in all 520 precincts
on the grounds of miscounting, misreading and misappreciation of votes, substitute voting,
disenfranchisement of voters, substitution and padding of votes, and other alleged irregularities.

The Second Division of the COMELEC to which the case was raffled to directed the collection of
the ballot boxes from the contested precincts and their delivery to the Comelec. Before the
revision proceeding, Imperial filed a manifestation apprising the Second Division of the fact that
of the 520 ballot boxes retrieved for delivery to the Comelec, 95 had no plastic seals, 346 had
broken plastic seals and only 79 remained intact with whole plastic seals and padlocks. The
revision proceeding of the subject ballots commenced and eventually concluded with a report
indicating a reduction in Rosal’s vote count from 44,792 votes to 39,752 and an increase in that
of Imperial’s votes from 22,474 to 39,184 votes. Rosal the filed a "motion for technical
examination of contested ballots" on the ground that thousands of ballots revised by the revision
committees were actually spurious ballots that had been stuffed inside the ballot boxes
sometime after the counting of votes but before the revision proceedings. The same motion was
denied by the COMELEC Second Division.

The case then was set for hearing. Upon presentation of evidence, petitioner Rosal presented
witnesses whose testimonies would allegedly prove that a significant number of the revised
ballots were not the same ballots that had been read and counted by the Board of Election
Inspectors (BEI) during the election.

In an order dated April 25, 2005, the Second Division ruled that the testimonies of said
witnesses were "unnecessary" inasmuch as the Comelec had the authority and wherewithal to
determine by itself the ballots’ authenticity and, for that reason, denied the motion and directed
petitioner to file forthwith his formal offer of evidence.

Rosal now filed this petition complaining, that the Second Division denied him due process by
effectively depriving him of a reasonable opportunity to substantiate with competent evidence
his contention that the revised ballots were not the same ballots cast and counted during the
elections, meaning, the revised ballots were planted inside the ballot boxes after the counting of
votes (in place of the genuine ones) pursuant to a fraudulent scheme to manufacture grounds
for a successful election protest.

Issue:

Whether or not the COMELEC Second Division properly conducted the revision proceedings
despite spurious and the impaired condition of the subject ballots as alleged by petitioner Rosal.

Ruling:

No. It will be recalled that before the revision proceedings, the COMELEC Second Division was
informed of the ballot boxes’ impaired condition, that out of the 520 ballot boxes, 95 had no
plastic seals, 346 had broken plastic seals and only 79 remained intact with whole plastic seals
and padlocks. Despite such information, it still brushed aside Rosal’s contention that he was the
victim of an ingenious post-election fraud involving infiltration of the ballot boxes and the clever
switching of ballots actually cast with invalid ones to ensure his defeat in the election protest.

The Court held that the Second Division adopted a manifestly unreasonable procedure, one
totally unfit to address the single most vital threshold question in an election protest, namely,
whether the ballots found in the ballot boxes during the revision proceedings were the same
ballots that were cast and counted in the elections.

In a protest, the protestant ordinarily prays that the official count as reflected in the election
returns be set aside in favor of a revision and recount of the ballots, the results of which should
be made to prevail over those reflected in the returns pursuant to the doctrine that "in an
election contest where what is involved is the number of votes of each candidate, the best and
most conclusive evidence are the ballots themselves.

However, it should never be forgotten, though, that the superior status of the ballots as evidence
of how the electorate voted presupposes that these were the very same ballots actually cast
and counted in the elections. Thus, it has been held that before the ballots found in a box can
be used to set aside the returns, the court (or the Comelec as the case may be) must be sure
that it has before it the same ballots deposited by the voters.

The Court cited various cases with applicable doctrines:

(1) the ballots cannot be used to overturn the official count as reflected in the election returns
unless it is first shown affirmatively that the ballots have been preserved with a care which
precludes the opportunity of tampering and all suspicion of change, abstraction or substitution;

(2) the burden of proving that the integrity of the ballots has been preserved in such a manner is
on the protestant;

(3) where a mode of preserving the ballots is enjoined by law, proof must be made of such
substantial compliance with the requirements of that mode as would provide assurance that the
ballots have been kept inviolate notwithstanding slight deviations from the precise mode of
achieving that end;

(4) it is only when the protestant has shown substantial compliance with the provisions of law on
the preservation of ballots that the burden of proving actual tampering or the likelihood thereof
shifts to the protestee and

(5) only if it appears to the satisfaction of the court or Comelec that the integrity of the ballots
has been preserved should it adopt the result as shown by the recount and not as reflected in
the election returns.
Our election laws are not lacking in provisions for the safekeeping and preservation of the
ballots. Among these laws are Sections 160, 217, 219 and 220 of the Omnibus Election Code
which clearly say that the mode of preserving the ballots is for these to be stored safely in
sealed and padlocked ballot boxes which, once closed, shall remain unopened unless otherwise
ordered by the Comelec in cases allowed by law.

If such substantial compliance of the safety measures is shown as would preclude a reasonable
opportunity of tampering with the ballot boxes’ contents, the burden shifts to the protestee to
prove that actual tampering took place. If the protestee fails to discharge this burden, the court
or the Comelec, as the case may be, may proceed on the assumption that the ballots have
retained their integrity and still constitute the best evidence of the election results. However,
where a ballot box is found in such a condition as would raise a reasonable suspicion that
unauthorized persons could have gained unlawful access to its contents, no evidentiary value
can be given to the ballots in it and the official count reflected in the election return must be
upheld as the better and more reliable account of how and for whom the electorate voted.

The procedure adopted by the Second Division was a complete inverse of the one outlined
above and was contrary to reason. There was complete arbitrariness on its part.

First, there was no indication at all that it ever considered the condition of the ballot boxes at the
time they were delivered to the Comelec for revision despite having been informed of the
ballots’ condition. Now even its own Rules of Procedure on election protests requires the
revision committee to "make a report or statement of the condition in which the ballot boxes and
their contents were found upon the opening of the same" (Section 6 Rule 10 of AM. No. 07-4-
15-SC)

Second, it placed the burden of proving actual tampering of the ballots to petitioner Rosal,
notwithstanding Imperial’s previous manifestation that most of the ballot boxes bore "overt signs
of tampering and only 79 ballot boxes were found intact.

Third, instead of diligently examining whether the ballot boxes were preserved with such care as
to preclude any reasonable opportunity for tampering with their contents, the Second Division
made the probative value of the revised ballots dependent solely on whether spurious ballots
were found among them. It failed to recognize that, in view of reports that the ballot boxes had
been tampered with and allegations that their contents had been switched with genuine but
invalid ballots, the question of whether the revised ballots could be relied on as the same ones
cast and counted during the elections could not obviously be settled by an examination of the
ballots themselves. Clearly, the time when these were deposited in the ballot boxes, a detail of
utmost importance, could not possibly have been determined by that means.

Hence petition was granted. The Comelec must first ascertain, after due hearing, whether it has
before it the same ballots cast and counted in the elections. For this purpose, it must determine:

(1) which ballot boxes sufficiently retained their integrity as to justify the conclusion that the
ballots contained therein could be relied on as better evidence than the election returns and

(2) which ballot boxes were in such a condition as would afford a reasonable opportunity for
unauthorized persons to gain unlawful access to their contents. In the latter case, the ballots
must be held to have lost all probative value and cannot be used to set aside the official
count reflected in the election returns.

G.R. No. 204828               December 3, 2013

JAIME C. REGIO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONNIE C. CO, Respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner Jaime C. Regio (‘Regio’) and private respondent Ronnie C. Co (‘Co’) were candidates
for the position of Punong Barangay which elected Regio as the winner with 478 votes versus
the 336 votes garnered by Co.

Subsequently, Co filed an election protest on the following grounds:

(1.) his supporters were not permitted to vote;

(2.) existence of ‘flying voters’;
(3.) ignorance of the rules on appreciation of ballots which resulted in misreading,
miscounting and misappreciation of ballots;
(4.) Regio committed vote buying
(5.) Regio engaged in distribution of sample ballots inside the polling centers during the day
of the elections

The trial court allowed the revision of ballots. Per report of the revision committee, there was a
substantial changed in the total number of votes garnered by both parties in that, Co now
earned the highest number of votes which is 321 votes versus the 232 votes for Reigo.

Regio claimed that the results of the revision are products of post-elections operations, as the
ballots were tampered with, switched, and altered drastically to change the results of the
elections. He also presented witnesses who all testified that there were no instances of electoral
fraud, irregularities, and anomalies during the day of the elections.

Despite the results of the revision of ballots, the trial court dismissed the protest of Co’s protest
and declared Regio as the duly-elected punong barangay ruling Co’s failure to sufficiently show
that the integrity of the contested ballots had been preserved. It then cited Section 6 Rule 13 of
A.M 07-4-15-SC which provides the presumption that election returns are genuine, and that the
data and information supplied by the board of election inspectors are true and correct.

Co filed an appeal which was dismissed by the COMELEC First Division because of Co’s failure
to show that the integrity of the ballots in question was in fact preserved. Co moved for
reconsideration which was then granted by the COMELEC En Banc, declaring Co as the duly
elected barangay. It also found that the ballots subjected to revision were genuine. Hence this
petition filed by Regio.

Issue:

Whether or not the COMELEC En Banc is correct in ruling that private respondent Co had
successfully discharged the burden of proving the integrity of ballots subjected to revision.

Ruling:

NO. The COMELEC En Banc ignored the rules on evidence in election protest cases. The Court
applied the following standards or doctrines to be observed in an election contest filed on the
ground of irregularities in the appreciation and counting of ballots which was laid down by the
Court in the case of Rosal v. COMELEC and Imperial:
 (1) The ballots cannot be used to overturn the official count as reflected in the election
returns unless it is first shown affirmatively that the ballots have been preserved with a
care which precludes the opportunity of tampering and suspicion of change, abstraction
or substitution;

(2) The burden of proving that the integrity of the ballots has been preserved in such a
manner is on the protestant;

(3) Where a mode of preserving the ballots is enjoined by law, proof must be made of such
substantial compliance with the requirements of that mode as would provide assurance
that the ballots have been kept inviolate notwithstanding slight deviations from the
precise mode of achieving that end;

(4) It is only when the protestant has shown substantial compliance with the provisions of
law on the preservation of ballots that the burden of proving actual tampering or
likelihood thereof shifts to the protestee; and

(5) Only if it appears to the satisfaction of the court of COMELEC that the integrity of the
ballots has been preserved should it adopt the result as shown by the recount and not as
reflected in the election returns. In the same case, the Court referred to various
provisions in the Omnibus Election Code providing for the safe-keeping and preservation
of the ballots, more specifically Secs. 160, 217, 219, and 220 of the Code.

The Rosal Doctrine was promulgated precisely to honor the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions. Primacy is given to the official results of the canvassing, even
in cases where there is a discrepancy between such results and the results of the revision
proceedings. It is only when the protestant has successfully discharged the burden of proving
that the re-counted ballots are the very same ones counted during the revision proceedings, will
the court or the Commission, as the case may be, even consider the revision results. Even then,
the results of the revision will not automatically be given more weight over the official
canvassing results or the election returns. What happens in the event of discrepancy between
the revision results and the election returns is that the burden of proof shifts to the protestee to
provide evidence of actual tampering of the ballots, or at least a likelihood of tampering. It is
only when the court or the COMELEC is fully satisfied that the ballots have been well preserved,
and that there had been no tampering of the ballots, that it will accord credibility to the results of
the revision.

Applying the Rosal Doctrine in the case at bar, the Court held that Private respondent Co has
not successfully proved that the ballots counted during the revision proceedings are the same
ballots cast and counted during the day of the elections. He did not present any testimonial
evidence to prove that the ballots had been preserved. He mainly relied on the report of the
revision committee. There was no independent, direct or indirect, evidence to prove the
preservation of the ballots and other election paraphernalia. That led to the conclusion that Co
failed to discharge his burden under the Rosal doctrine. With no independent evidence to speak
of, he cannot simply rely on the report of the revision committee, and from there conclude that
the report itself is proof of the preservation of the ballots. What he needs to provide is evidence
independent of the revision proceedings. Without any such evidence, the Court or the
COMELEC, as the case may be, will be constrained to honor the presumption established in
A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, that the data and information supplied by the members of the Boards of
Election Inspectors in the accountable forms are true and correct. Hence, petition was granted.
Ronald Allan Poe vs Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

P. E.T. CASE No.002

Facts:

In the 2004 Presidential Elections, Gloria Macapagal -Arroyo was declared and
proclaimed president, respondent, being the second placer refused to concede defeat and filed
an electoral protest.

In December of 2004, protestant died of cardio-pulmonary arrest secondary to cerebral

infarction. His wife, herein movant, filed a manifestation with urgent motion/petition to intervene
as a substitute for deceased protestant.

Movant claims that because of the untimely demise of her husband, and in the
representation not only for her husband, but more so because of the paramount interest of the
Filipino people, for her to continue and substitute for her late husband in the election protest
initiated by him to ascertain the true and genuine will of the electorate.

Respondent asserts that the widow of a deceased candidate is not the proper party to
replace the deceased protestant since a public office is personal and not a property that passes
on to the heirs. That the widow has no legal right to substitute for her husband in an election
protest, since no such right survives the husband, considering that the right to file an election
protest is personal and non-transmissible.

ISSUE:

May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the
latter’s protest case.

HELD: NO.

The fundamental rule applicable is RULE 14, PET RULES:

Rule 14. Election Protest- only the registered candidate for President or Vice-President
of the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the
election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition
with the clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within 30 days after the proclamation of the
winner.

By these express provisions, the rule in effect determined the real parties in interest
concerning an on-going election contest. It envisioned a scenario where, if the declared winner
had not been truly voted upon by the electorate, the candidate who received that 2 nd and 3rd
number of votes would be the legitimate beneficiary in a successful election contest.

Given the circumstances of the case, the Court concludes that protestant’s widow is not
a real party in interest to the election protest.

On the other hand, on Intervention, Rule 19 (1) of the ROC is applicable, in the absence
of such rule in the PET Rules. In such intervention, the interest which allows a person to
intervene in a suit must be in a matter of litigation, and of such direct and immediate character
that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the effect of the judgment.
 In this protest, Mrs. Poe will not immediately and directly benefit from the outcome
should it be determined that the declared president did not truly get the highest number of votes.

Luis Malaluan vs COMELEC and Evangelista

GR.NO.120193

FACTS:

Petitioner and respondent Evangelista were both mayoralty candidates in the

Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato. In May 1992 elections. Private respondent was
proclaimed winner by the municipal board of canvassers. Petitioner filed an election protest and
was declared the winner by the RTC, private respondent filed an appeal of the court’s decision
to the COMELEC.

Petitioner filed a motion for an execution pending appeal, which the court granted upon
posting of bond, by virtue of which, petitioner assumed the office of the mayor, and exercise the
powers and functions of said office.

Such exercise was not for long’ as COMELEC ordered petitioner to vacate the
office,declared respondent to be the duly elected mayor, which was affirmed by COMELEC en
banc.

COMELEC also found that the that the order granting to be defective because of alleged
non-compliance that there be a good and special reason to justify the execution pending appeal.

ISSUE:

W/N COMELEC erred in finding that the issuance of execution pending appeal was
defective.

HELD: YES.

Sec.2, Rule 39, of the ROC, allows RTC to order executions pending appeal upon good
reasons stated in a special order. It is not disputed that petitioner posted a bond, as required
under the ROC.

Capping the combination of circumstances which impel the grant of immediate execution
is the undeniably urgency involved in the political situation in the Municipality of Kidapawan,
North Cotabato. The appeal before the COMELEC would undoubtedly cause political vacuum in
said municipality to persist, and so the trial court reasonably perceived execution pending
appeal to be warranted and justified. At any rate, the bond posted by the petitioner could cover
any damages suffered by any aggrieved party. It is true that mere posting of a bond is not
enough reason to justify execution pending appeal, but the nexus of circumstances
aforementioned considered together and in relation to one another, is the dominant
consideration for the execution pending appeal.

Lucy Torres-Gomez vs Codilla and HRET

Gr.No.195191
FACTS:

Richard Gomez (husband of herein petitioner) and private respondent filed their
respective COC for representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.

Juntilla, a registered voter, filed a verified petition for disqualification of Gomez, on the
ground that the latter lack the residency requirement for a member of House of Representative.

COMELEC granted Juntilla’s petition and ultimately disqualified Gomez, the latter filed
MR but was denied. Gomez filed a manifestation with COMELEC en banc, alleging without
necessary admitting the allegations of Juntilla, that he was accepting the aforementioned
resolution, in order to enable his substitute to facilitate the filling of necessary documents for
substitution. Later on, herein petitioner filed her COC.

Juntilla assailed the validity of the proposed substitution, however, the COMELEC law
department allowed petitioner as a substitute candidate for her husband. Pending MR of the
assailed decision, petitioner won in the election against herein respondent.

Respondent filed a motion to suspend proclamation, however, Petitioner was

nevertheless proclaimed the winning candidate for the congressional seat.

Accordingly, respondent filed an election protest with HRET, claiming that the denial of
the COC of GOMEZ rendered the latter a non- candidate, who therefore could not have been
validly substituted, as there was no candidacy to speak of.

Petitioner seeks dismissal of the petition, on the ground that protestant raises an issue on
her qualification as a member of the House of Representatives, and not the number of votes
cast. Her qualification is allegedly not a proper ground for an election protest, in which the
issues should be the appreciation of ballots and the correctness and number of votes of each
candidate.

ISSUE:

W/N HRET erred when it allowed the protestant to raise issues on qualification of a
candidate in an election protest.

HELD: NO

It bears stressing that HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. This exclusive
jurisdiction includes the power to determine whether it has the authority to hear and determine
the controversy presented, and the right to decide whether there exists that state of facts that
confers jurisdiction, as well as all other matters arising from the case legitimately before it.

Further, no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to HRET. An election protest

proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the defeated
and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities. Its
purpose is to determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes
cast and is entitled to hold the office.

Respondent’s issues raised in his election protest are proper for such a petition, and
within the jurisdiction of HRET.
MICHAEL L. SAN MIGUEL, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
CHRISTOPHER V. AGUILAR, Respondents.

GR No. 188240 December 23, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner Michael San Miguel and private respondent Christopher Aguilar vied in the
2007 elections for the position of Punong Barangay of Barangay Marcelo Green in Parañaque
City which declared San Miguel as the winner.

After San Miguel’s proclamation, Aguilar filed an election protest before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Parañaque City which, after recount and revision of ballots from the contested
precincts, ruled that Aguilar actually garnered more votes compared to San Miguel and
accordingly annulled latter’s proclamation by May 9, 2008. San Miguel appealed the case to the
Comelec.

Three days after the promulgation of the trial court's Decision, Aguilar filed an Urgent
Motion for Execution Pending Appeal (Urgent Motion) which was received by petitioner on May
13, 2008 with notice of a May 14, 2008 hearing. The trial court calendared the hearing,
however, on May 19, 2008, and eventually denied the Urgent Motion by Order of May 22, 2008.
This prompted Aguilar to elevate the matter on certiorari to the Comelec which reversed the trial
court's Order and declared Protestant him as the duly elected Punong Barangay of Marcelo
Green, Parañaque City and annulled the proclamation and oath-taking of Protestee-MICHAEL
L. SAN MIGUEL.

The trial court explained that it could no longer order execution since the rule which
allows the issuance of a special order only within the five-day period to appeal which, at that
time, had already expired.

San Miguel posits that the Rules of Procedure expressly provide that the special order
should be issued before the expiration of the five-day period to file a notice of appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Trial Court may still thereafter resolve a motion for execution pending
appeal and in effect affirming the application of Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in
Election Contests.

RULING:

Supreme Court held that the usage of the word "may," the language of the subject
provision denotes that it is merely directory, and not mandatory, for the trial court to issue the
special order before the expiration of the period to appeal.

Therefore, the trial court may still thereafter resolve a motion for execution pending
appeal, provided: (i) the motion is filed within the five-day reglementary period; and (ii) the
special order is issued prior to the transmittal of the records to the Comelec.
 In the present case, the Urgent Motion was filed well within the reglementary period.
Indeed, in one case, the Court construed a similarly phrased provision to mean that the ruling on
the motion for execution may issue after the period of appeal, as long as the motion for
execution pending appeal was filed before the expiration of the time to appeal.

Keeping in mind that "hurried justice is not always authentic

justice," the permissive nature of the rule allows the trial court to apply the same insofar as it is
practicable, albeit the rigid compliance therewith is not altogether impossible.

It also appears that the prevailing party need not check first if the losing
party actually appealed the case before the prevailing party could file a motion for
execution pendente lite. The setting of the same period of five days for the filing of a motion for
execution pending appeal, similar to that for a notice of appeal, allows the trial court to
expediently rule on this incident, along with the notice of appeal, before transmitting the records
to the Comelec, during which the trial court shall have already lost jurisdiction to resolve
pending incidents.

As interpreted by the Court in Pecson v. Commission on Elections, the same elements

of possession of the records and non-lapse of the appeal period are necessary for the trial
court's exercise of its residual jurisdiction to issue a special order. In the present case, the
Comelec correctly found that the trial court gravely abused its discretion when it motu
proprio reset the hearing of the Urgent Motion from May 14, 2008 to May 19, 2008, and used
such circumstance in denying the grant of a special order on the ground that it had lost its
jurisdiction with the lapse of the five-day period.

DIEGO T. LIM, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

GR No. 171952 March 8, 2007

FACTS:
 Diego T. Lim, petitioner, and Francisco C. Adalim, private respondent, were candidates
for mayor in Taft, Eastern Samar during the 2004 national and local elections. Lim was
proclaimed as the duly elected mayor with a lead of 45 votes.

Adalim then filed with the Regional Trial Court an election protest against Lim alleging
that irregularities attended the canvassing of ballots in 35 precincts within the municipality.

Lim filed a motion to dismiss the election protest on the ground that Adalim failed to pay
the exact amount of docket and other legal fees, but the motion was denied. His motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.

Lim filed with the COMELEC petition for prohibition and injunction praying that the trial
court be enjoined from hearing the election protest but the petition was later on dismissed by
COMELEC.

Upon Adalim’s motion, the parties were directed by the court to proceed with the hearing
of the case. Subsequently, respondent Judge promulgated her Decision in the election protest
declaring Adalim as the winning candidate in the mayoralty race. Thereupon, Lim filed a notice
of appeal. For his part, private respondent filed a motion for execution pending appeal. 

The trial court issued a Special Order granting private respondent's motion for execution
pending appeal. On the same date, the sheriff implemented the writ of execution. Immediately,
Lim filed with the COMELEC Second Division a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order or Status Quo Order, alleging that the
trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting Adalim's motion for execution pending
appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued a Special
Order granting Adalim’s motion for execution pending appeal.

RULING:

Supreme Court held that Lim’s contention is bereft of merit.

Before granting an execution pending appeal in election cases, the following requisites
must concur: (1) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party;
(2) there must be "good reasons" for the execution pending appeal; and (3) the order granting
execution pending appeal must state the good reasons.

In Fermo v. Comelec, the Supreme Court held that the paramount consideration for a
valid exercise of discretion to allow execution pending appeal is the existence of good reasons
which must be stated in a special order. The following constitute good reasons and a
combination of two or more of these will suffice to grant execution pending appeal: (1) public
interest involved or will of the electorate; (2) the shortness of the remaining term of the
contested office; and (3) the length of time that the election contest has been pending.

As correctly found by the trial court, the grant of the execution pending appeal is justified
considering the presence of these good reasons: the public interest or will of the electorate that
their chosen Mayor should immediately sit as Mayor and govern them, as the one being found
to be the true winner in the mayoralty race, as well as the shortness of the remaining term of the
contested office (more than one-third of the very short term of office of three (3) years has
already expired or lapsed).

LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO, Petitioner, vs. HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO R.

BELMONTE, JR., Respondent

GR No. 211140 January 12, 2012

FACTS:

One Joseph Socorro Tan (Tan), a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of
Torrijos, Marinduque, filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to deny due
course or cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of Regina O. Reyes as candidate for the
position of Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque. In his
petition, Tan alleged that Reyes made several material misrepresentations in her COC.

On March 27, 2013, the COMELEC First Division resolved to grant the petition; hence,
Reyes's COC was accordingly cancelled. But while said motion was pending resolution, the
synchronized local and national elections were held on May 13, 2013. The day after, or on May
14, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the resolution of the COMELEC First Division.

On May 18, 2013, despite its receipt of the May 14, 2013 COMELEC Resolution, the
Marinduque Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed Reyes as the winner of the
May 13, 2013 elections for the position of Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque.

Velasco filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam and Petition for Quo Warranto Ad

Cautelam  against Reyes in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality regarding the cancellation of Reyes’

COC.

Hon. Belmonte administered the oath of office of Reyes and thereafter Reyes assumed
office and started discharging the functions of a Member of the House of Representatives.

Subsequently, the May 18, 2013 proclamation of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO

REYES is declared NULL and VOID by the COMELEC En banc and without any legal force and
effect. Petitioner LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO is proclaimed the winning candidate for
the position of representative in the House of Representatives for the province of Marinduque.

Velasco alleges that despite all the letters and requests to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and
Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap, they refused to recognize him as the duly elected Representative of
the Lone District of Marinduque. Likewise, in the face of numerous written demands for
Reyes to vacate the position and office of the Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque,
she continues to discharge the duties of said position.

Hence, the instant Petition for Mandamus with prayer for issuance of a temporary

restraining order and/or injunction.

Velasco asserts that both respondents Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap
are unlawfully neglecting the performance of their alleged ministerial duties; thus, illegally
excluding him (Velasco) from the enjoyment of his right as the duly elected Representative of
the Lone District of Marinduque.
Reyes contends on the other hand that the petition is actually one for quo warranto and
not mandamus given that it essentially seeks a declaration that she usurped the subject office;
and the installation of Velasco in her place by Speaker Belmonte, Jr. when the latter administers
his oath of office and enters his name in the Roll of Members.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition is one for quo warranto and not petition for mandamus.

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that after a painstaking evaluation of the allegations in this
petition, it is readily apparent that this special civil action is really one for mandamus and not
a quo warranto case, contrary to the asseverations of Reyes.
 A petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use
or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not
well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. Where the action is filed by a
private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position; otherwise,
respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.
To be sure, what is prayed for herein is merely the enforcement of clear legal duties and
not to try disputed title. That the respondents make it appear so will not convert this petition to
one for quo warranto.

Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that any person may file
a verified petition for mandamus "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."

The difference between a ministerial and discretionary act has long been established. A
purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts,
in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or
the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law
imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty
shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only
when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON. ROSALIO G. DE LA ROSA,

Respondent.

GR No. 104654 June 6, 1994

FACTS:

Juan G. Frivaldo filed a petition for naturalization to be re-admitted as a citizen of the

Philippines. The respondent Judge, Judge Dela Rosa, set the petition for hearing on March 16,
1992, and directed the publication of the said order and petition taking in consideration the
publication requirements - Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation, for three
consecutive weeks, the last publication of which should be at least six months before the said
date of hearing. The order further required the posting of a copy thereof and the petition in a
conspicuous place in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Manila.
Frivaldo filed a "Motion to Set Hearing Ahead of Schedule," where he manifested his intention to
run for public office in the May 1992 elections. He alleged that the deadline for filing the
certificate of candidacy was March 15, one day before the scheduled hearing. He asked that the
hearing set on March 16 be cancelled and be moved to January 24. The motion was granted.

After the hearing, the court granted his petition and re-admitted as a citizen of the
Republic of the Philippines and on the same day, Frivaldo was allowed to take his oath of
allegiance before respondent Judge. However, One Quitero Hermo alleged that the proceedings
were tainted with jurisdictional defects, and prayed for a new trial to conform with the
requirements of the Naturalization Law.

Frivaldo was proclaimed winner on 1992 election for Governor. Raul Lee, who was also
a candidate for the same position, filed a petition with the COMELEC to annul the proclamation
of Frivaldo as Governor-elect of the Province of Sorsogon. The petition states the following
grounds: (1) that the proceedings and composition of the Provincial Board of Canvassers were
not in accordance with law; (2) that private respondent is an alien, whose grant of Philippine
citizenship is being questioned by the State in a separate case; and (3) that private respondent
is not a duly registered voter.

COMELEC issued the questioned en banc resolution which dismissed the petition for
having been filed out of time. Lee argues that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it ignored the fundamental issue of private respondent’s disqualification in the
guise of technicality.

The COMELEC concedes that private respondent has not yet reacquired his Filipino
citizenship because the decision granting him the same is not yet final and executory. However,
it submits that the issue of disqualification of a candidate is not among the grounds allowed in a
pre-proclamation controversy. Moreover, the said petition was filed out of time.

The COMELEC contends that the preparation for the elections occupied much of its
time, thus its failure to immediately resolve the disqualification case. It argues that under
Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, it is excused from deciding a
disqualification case within the period provided by law for reasons beyond its control. It also
assumed that the same action was subsequently abandoned by petitioner when he filed before
it a petition for quo warranto which sought private respondent’s disqualification because of his
American citizenship.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Frivalo is disqualified to be proclaimed as Governor on grounds of lack of

Filipino Citizenship.

HELD:

On the issue of citizenship, the Supreme Court held that trial court never acquired
jurisdiction to hear the petition for naturalization of private respondent. The proceedings
conducted, the decision rendered and the oath of allegiance taken therein, are null and void for
failure to comply with the publication and posting requirements under the Revised Naturalization
Law.
 The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following irregularities: (1) the
hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without a publication of
the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself; (2) the petition was heard within
six months from the last publication of the petition; (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of
allegiance before the finality of the judgment; and (4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance
without observing the two-year waiting period.

In the aspect of disqualification, the Supreme Court held that the petition is one for quo
warranto. In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Supreme Court held that a petition
for quo warranto, questioning the respondent’s title and seeking to prevent him from holding
office as Governor for alienage, is not covered by the ten-day period for appeal prescribed in
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. Furthermore, the Supreme Court explained that
"qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at
the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire tenure;
once any of the required qualification is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged."

Frivaldo’s argument, that to unseat him will frustrate the will of the electorate, is
untenable. Both the Local Government Code and the Constitution require that only Filipino
citizens can run and be elected to public office. We can only surmise that the electorate, at the
time they voted for private respondent, was of the mistaken belief that he had legally reacquired
Filipino citizenship.

Frivaldo is declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from
continuing to serve as GOVERNOR of the Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to VACATE his
office and to SURRENDER the same to the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once
this decision becomes final and executory.

G.R. No. 181613               November 25, 2009

ROSALINDA A. PENERA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR T. ANDANAR, Respondents.

FACTS:

Penera and private respondent Edgar T. Andanar were mayoralty candidates in Sta. Monica
during the 14 May 2007 elections. On 2 April 2007, Andanar filed before the Office of the
Regional Election Director, Caraga Region (Region XIII), a Petition for Disqualification against
Penera, as well as the candidates for Vice-Mayor and Sangguniang Bayan who belonged to her
political party, for unlawfully engaging in election campaigning and partisan political activity prior
to the commencement of the campaign period.

Rosalinda A. Penera’s filed a motion for reconsideration of this Court’s Decision of 11

September 2009.The assailed Decision dismissed Penera’s petition and affirmed the Resolution
dated 30 July 2008 of the COMELEC En Banc as well as the Resolution dated 24 July 2007 of
the COMELEC Second Division. The Decision disqualified Penera from running for the office of
Mayor in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte and declared that the Vice-Mayor should succeed
Penera.

ISSUE:

W/N Penera is guilty of premature campaigning

RULING:
No to both. Under the assailed September 11, 2009 Decision, a candidate may already be liable
for premature campaigning after the filing of the certificate of candidacy but even before the
start of the campaign period. Thus, such person can be disqualified for premature campaigning
for acts done before the start of the campaign period. In short, the Decision considers a person
who files a certificate of candidacy already “candidate” even before the start of the campaign
period.

Now the Court holds that the assailed Decision is contrary to the clear intent and letter of the
law. In Lanot v. COMELEC,it held that a person who files a certificate of candidacy is not a
candidate until the start of the campaign period. Lanot was decided on the ground that one who
files a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the start of the campaign period.

Congress elevated the Lanot doctrine into a statute by specifically inserting it as the second
sentence of the third paragraph of the amended Section 15 of RA 8436. In RA 9369, Congress
inserted the word “only” so that the first proviso now reads:

x x x Provided, that, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only
upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period x x x.
Thus, Congress not only reiterated but also strengthened its mandatory directive that election
offenses can be committed by a candidate “only” upon the start of the campaign period. This
clearly means that before the start of the campaign period, such election offenses cannot be so
committed.

In layman’s language, this means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts
done during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight — any election
offense that may be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be committed
before the start of the campaign period. In ruling that Penera is liable for premature
campaigning for partisan political acts before the start of the campaigning, the assailed Decision
ignores the clear and express provision of the law.

G.R. No. 169865             July 21, 2006

VIRGINIO VILLAMOR, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and AMYTIS* DE DIOS-BATAO, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Virginio Villamor was proclaimed as Mayor of Carmen, Cebu, by the Municipal Board
of Canvassers (MBC) in the elections held on May 10, 2004 over his opponent, respondent
Amytis De Dios-Batao. Respondent filed a petition to annul the proclamation of petitioner
alleging as grounds the illegal composition of the MBC and its proceedings.
Subsequently, respondent filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court
However, the trial court dismissed the election protest for lack of jurisdiction because it was filed
one-day late.The Petition To Declare Null And Void Proclamation dated 17 May 2004 filed by
petitioners Amythis De Dios Batao, et al., is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
W/N the trial court prematurely admitted respondent's election protest pending a pre-
proclamation controversy.

RULING:
As a general rule, the proper remedy after the proclamation of the winning candidate for the
position contested would be to file a regular election protest or a petition for quo warranto. The
filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a
pre-proclamation controversy or amounts to the abandonment of one earlier filed, thus depriving
the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass upon the title of the protestee or the
validity of his proclamation.
The reason is that once the competent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of an election protest or
a petition for quo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be decided in the case itself
and not in another proceeding. This procedure will prevent confusion and conflict of authority.
In the case at bar, respondent's petition to annul the proclamation rested mainly on the alleged
illegal composition of the municipal board of canvassers and its proceedings which is an issue
that may be properly raised in a pre-proclamation controversy
Although Sec. 17 of R.A. 7166 and Sec. 5 par. (a)(1) of Rule 27 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure also allow filing of a petition directly with respondent COMELEC when the issue
involves the illegal composition of the Board, Sec. 5, par. (b), of the same Rule requires that it
must be filed immediately when the Board begins to act as such, or at the time of the
appointment of the member whose capacity to sit as such is objected to if it comes after the
canvassing of the Board, or immediately at the point where the proceedings are or begin to be
illegal.
In the instant case, respondent's petition to annul petitioner's proclamation based on the alleged
illegal composition of the board of canvassers is a pre-proclamation controversy which should
have been filed prior to petitioner's proclamation. However, respondent filed the petition on May
17, 2004 only or four days after petitioner's proclamation. As such, the filing of the petition to
annul the proclamation of petitioner did not suspend the running of the reglementary period
within which to file an election protest and inevitably, it did not suspend the latter's period to file
an Answer with Counter Protest. Accordingly, the subsequent filing of the election protest on
May 24, 2004 by respondent amounted to the abandonment of the pre-proclamation
controversy earlier filed.

G.R. No. 151914 July 31, 2002

TEODULO M. COQUILLA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MR. NEIL M. ALVAREZ, respondents.

FACTS:
Petitioner Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar.
He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he joined the United States Navy. He was
subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen. From 1970 to 1973, petitioner thrice visited the
Philippines while on leave from the U.S. Navy. Otherwise, even after his retirement from the
U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in the United States.

On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate,
although he continued making several trips to the United States, the last of which took place on
July 6, 2000 and lasted until August 5, 2000. Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation
under R.A. No. 81715 to the Special Committee on Naturalization. His application was approved
on November 7, 2000, and, on November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the
Philippines. Petitioner was issued Certificate of Repatriation No. 000737 on November 10, 2000
and Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate No. 115123 on November 13, 2000.

On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern
Samar. His application was approved by the Election Registration Board on January 12, 2001.
On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a
resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for “two (2) years.”

His opponent sought the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that
the latter had made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by stating that he
had been a resident of Oras for two years when in truth he had resided therein for only about six
months since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

ISSUE:

W/N Coquilla can be considered to have resided in Oras, Eastern Samar for more than one (1)
year.

RULING:

No. The term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to
“dwelling” or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place where a
party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).”

Coquilla lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S.
Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine
citizenship, he was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our
immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien. Until his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on November 10, 2000, petitioner did not reacquire his
legal residence in this country

G.R. No. 193261               April 24, 2012

MEYNARDO SABILI, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORENCIO LIBREA, Respondents.
FACTS:

COMELEC denied Sabili’s Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of Lipa due to failure
to comply with the one year residency requirement. When petitioner filed his COC
for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he had been a
resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months.

However, it is undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during the 2007
elections, he and his family were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay
(Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas. Respondent Florencio Librea (private
respondent) filed a "Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for
Disqualification

Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had already
been a resident of Lipa City for two years and eight months prior to the scheduled
10 May 2010 local elections.In its Resolution dated 26 January 2010, the
COMELEC Second Division granted the Petition of private respondent, declared
petitioner as disqualified from seeking the mayoralty post in Lipa City, and canceled
his Certificate of Candidacy for his not being a resident of Lipa City and for his
failure to meet the statutory one-year residency requirement under the law.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 26 January 2010 Resolution of the

COMELEC, during the pendency of which the 10 May 2010 local elections were
held. The next day, he was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Lipa City after
garnering the highest number of votes cast for the said position. He accordingly
filed a Manifestation with the COMELEC en banc to reflect this fact. In its
Resolution dated 17 August 2010, the COMELEC en banc denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner.

Hence, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition (Petition for Certiorari with
Extremely Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order and for the
Conduct of a Special Raffle of this Case) under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, seeking the annulment of the 26 January 2010 and 17 August2010
Resolutions of the COMELEC.

ISSUE:

W/N the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Sabili failed to prove
compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials

RULING:

In the case at bar, there are real and substantial reasons for petitioner to establish Sta. Rosa as
his domicile of choice and abandon his domicile of origin and/or any other previous domicile. To
begin with, petitioner and his wife have owned and operated businesses in Sta. Rosa since
2003. Their children have attended schools in Sta. Rosa at least since 2005.

Although ownership of property should never be considered a requirement for any candidacy,
petitioner had sufficiently confirmed his intention to permanently reside in Sta. Rosa by
purchasing residential properties in that city even prior to the May 2007 election, as evidenced
by certificates of title issued in the name of petitioner and his wife

In all, petitioner had adequately shown that his transfer of residence to Sta. Rosa was bona fide
and was not merely for complying with the residency requirement under election laws.
In the clear absence of the most important element in the establishment of a domicile—animus
manendi—it is of no use to discuss the consequence of testimonies as to his bodily presence in
the locality. As stated, all the requisites for a valid change of domicile or residence is necessary
for election law purposes. In the absence of even just one element, the presumption is in favor
of the maintenance and continuity of the domicile of origin. Hence, in this case, petitioner is
presumed to still be a resident of San Juan, Batangas and disqualified from taking the mayoralty
position in Lipa City, Batangas.

QUO WARRANTO

Angelia v. COMELEC
G.R No. 135468

FACTS:
 Petitioner Dioscoro O. Angelia and private respondent Florentino R. Tan were
candidates for the position of member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Abuyog, Leyte in the
elections held on May 11, 1998.

Only eight (8) were declared duly elected members of the Sangguniang Bayan. Tan,
who received a total of 7,761 votes — four votes less than those obtained by Angelia — ranked
ninth among the candidates.

Tan filed a petition for quo warranto with the Regional Trial Court, Abuyog, Leyte against
Angelia, alleging that, he actually received a total of 7,771 votes, while Angelia actually
garnered 7,760 votes.

However, Tan filed a motion to withdraw his petition. Subsequently, he filed a petition for
annulment of proclamation of Angelia with the COMELEC.

In the decision, the Commission En Banc hereby annuls the proclamation of Angelia and
thereafter proclaim the winning candidate/s for Municipal Kagawad based on the corrected
results.

Angelia filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that Tan had engaged in forum-
shopping because, after filing a petition for quo warranto with the Regional Trial Court, Abuyog,
Leyte, private respondent filed the present petition for annulment of proclamation with the
COMELEC.

ISSUE:
Whether the petition for quo warranto if Angelia was the proper remedy

DECISION:
This contention is bereft of merit.

Under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code, the grounds for a petition for quo
warranto are ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines of the respondent.

While the filing of a petition for quo warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-
proclamation controversy, this principle admits of several exceptions, such as when such
petition is not the proper remedy.

Since in the present case, private respondent alleged the existence of manifest errors in
the preparation of election returns, clearly, the proper remedy is not a petition for quo
warranto but a petition for annulment of proclamation.

Filipinas Engineering v. Ferrer

G.R No. L-31455

FACTS:
In preparation for the national elections of November 11, 1969, then respondent
Commissioners of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued an invitation to bid for the
manufacture and delivery of 11,000 units of voting booths.

Among the seventeen who submitted their proposals, the Committee recommended that
Filipinos Engineering and Machine Shop, (Filipinas for short) be awarded the contract to
manufacture and supply the voting booths, but that an "ocular inspection be made by all
members of the Commission of all the samples before the final award be made."

After an ocular inspection of all the samples submitted was conducted by the COMELEC
Commissioners, and after the Commissioners noted that Acme Steel Manufacturing Company,
(Acme for short) submitted the lowest bid, the COMELEC issued a Resolution awarding the
contract (for voting booths) to Acme.

Thus, Filipinas filed an Injunction with a writ of preliminary injunction with the then Court
of First Instance of Manila against herein public respondents COMELEC Commissioners,
chairman and members of the Comelec Bidding Committee, and private respondent Acme.

ISSUE:
Whether the lower court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a suit involving an order of
the COMELEC dealing with an award of contract arising from its invitation to bid

DECISION:
The Court are far from convince that an order of the COMELEC awarding a contract to a
private party, as a result of its choice among various proposals submitted in response to its
invitation to bid comes within the purview of a "final order" which is exclusively and directly
appealable to this court on certiorari.

What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC
reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions
or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise
of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.

Since the COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued
pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative
functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a
"final order" reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court.

Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by the COMELEC from

said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order.
Any question arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial
courts.

COMELEC and HRET JURISDICTION

Jalosjos Jr., v. COMELEC

G.R No. 192474

FACTS:
 Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr., petitioner, while serving as Tampilisan Mayor, bought a
residential house and lot in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay and renovated
and furnished the same. In September 2008 he began occupying the house.

After eight months or on May 6, 2009 Jalosjos applied with the Election Registration
Board (ERB) of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, for the transfer of his voter’s registration record to
Barangay Veterans Village.

On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position
of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 10, 2010 National
Elections.

This prompted Erasmo to file a petition to deny due course to or cancel his COC before
the COMELEC, claiming that Jalosjos made material misrepresentations in that COC when he
indicated in it that he resided in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

The COMELEC, on June 3, 2010 the En Banc held that Jalosjos did not satisfy the
residency requirement since, by continuing to hold the position of Mayor of Tampilisan,
Zamboanga Del Norte, he should be deemed not to have transferred his residence from that
place to Barangay Veterans Village in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

ISSUE:
Whether it is the COMELEC or HRET who has jurisdiction over the case at bar

DECISION:
It is the HRET who has jurisdiction over the case at bar.

The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC

of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed
Representative in favor of the HRET.

Here, the fact is that on election day of 2010 the COMELEC En Banc had as yet to
resolve Erasmo’s appeal from the Second Division’s dismissal of the disqualification case
against Jalosjos. There then existed no final judgment deleting Jalosjos’ name from the list of
candidates for the congressional seat he sought.

Therefore, with the fact of his proclamation and assumption of office, any issue
regarding his qualification for the same, like his alleged lack of the required residence, was
solely for the HRET to consider and decide.

Reyes v. COMELEC
G.R No. 207264

FACTS:
Respondent, Joseph Socorro Tan, a registered voter and resident of the Municipality of
Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or
to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner on the ground that it contained
material misrepresentations. These, however, was all denied by Petitioner, Regina Ongsiako
Reyes.

The COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution cancelling petitioner’s COC. Also, the
COMELEC En Banc, promulgated a Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
for lack of merit.

Four days thereafter or on 18 May 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13 May
2013 Elections.
 On 5 June 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the 14
May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc final and executory, considering that more than
twenty-one (21) days have elapsed from the date of promulgation with no order issued by this
Court restraining its execution.

On same day, petitioner took her oath of office before Feliciano R. Belmonte Jr.,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Petitioner has yet to assume office, the term of which officially starts at noon of 30 June
2013.

ISSUE:
Whether Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is a duly
proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of
the House of Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque.

DECISION:
The COMELEC retains jurisdiction.

The HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s
qualifications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is
duly filed with said tribunal.

The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a
Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:

Section 17, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution, the House of Representative

Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election returns and qualification of the members of House of
Representative.

In numerous cases, it was ruled that, the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a
candidate who is not a member of the House of Representatives and that the Court has
invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications
ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.

Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of

Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet assumed office. To repeat what has
earlier been said, the term of office of a Member of the House of Representatives begins
only "at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." 

Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction.

2. Whether petitioner had complied with the Oath of Office requirement

In her attempt to comply with the second requirement, petitioner attached a purported
Oath Of Office taken before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5 June 2013. However, this is not
the oath of office which confers membership to the House of Representatives.

Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of Representatives provides:

 Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members. – Members shall take their oath or
affirmation either collectively or individually before the Speaker in open session.

Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of the oath it must be made (1)
before the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in open session.

Here, although she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it
was made during plenary or in open session.

Thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed complied with.