Civil Procedure Cases - Real Actions
Civil Procedure Cases - Real Actions
Civil Procedure Cases - Real Actions
158121, MAY 6,
2006
FACTS:
Petitioners, heirs of spouses Dorotea and Valeriano Concha, Sr. claim to be the rightful
owners of thelots situated in Cogon, Dipolog City under the Public Land Act. Respondent
siblings Gregorio Lumocso are thepatent holders and registered owners of the subject lots. The
records shows that Valeriano Sr., and hischildren filed a complaint for Reconveyance and/or
Annulment of Title with Damages against SpousesGregorio Lumocso and Bienvenida Guya.
They sought to annul Free Patent and the corresponding OriginalCertificate of Title issued in the
name of “Gregorio Lumocso”.Respondents moved for the dismissal of the respective cases
against them on the same grounds of: (a) lackof jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matters
of the complaints; (b) failure to state causes of action forreconveyance; (c) prescription; and (d)
waiver, abandonment, laches and estoppels. On the issue ofjurisdiction, respondents contended
that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaints pursuant to Section19(2) of BP 129 as
amended by RA 7691, as in each case, the assessed value of the subject lots are less than20k.
Petitioners opposed, contending that the instant case involve actions the subject matters of which
areincapable of pecuniary estimation which, under Section 19(1) as amended by RA 7691 fall
within theexclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC. They also contended that they have two
main causes of action: forreconveyance and for recovery of the value of the trees felled by
respondents. Hence the totality of theclaims must be considered which, if computed, allegedly
fallys within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaints as in each case, the assessed
value of thesubject lots are less than 20k.
HELD:
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the
general class towhich the proceedings in question belong. It is conferred by law and an objection
based on this groundcannot be waived by the parties. To determine whether a court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of acase, it is important to determine the nature of the cause
of action and of the relief sought. The trial courtcorrectly held that the instant cases involve
actions for reconveyance. An action for reconveyance respectsthe decree of registration as
incontrovertible but seeks that transfer of property, which has been wrongfullyor erroneously
registered in other persons’ names, to its rightful and legal owners, or to those who claim tohave
a better right. There is no special ground for an action for reconveyance. It is enough that
theaggrieved party has a legal claim on the property to that of the registered owner and that the
property hasnot yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.Being in the nature of
actions for reconveyance or actions to remove cloud on one’s title, the applicable lawto
determine which court has jurisdiction is Sec 19(2) of BP 129 as amended by RA 7691, viz:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.-- Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
originaljurisdiction: x x x(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein,where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) orfor civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exceptactions for forcible entry into and unlawful
detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction overwhich is conferred upon the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal CircuitTrial Courts; Hence, the MTC clearly
has jurisdiction over the instant cases.Petitioners' contention that this case is one that is incapable
of pecuniary estimation under the exclusiveoriginal jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section
19(1) of B.P. 129 is erroneous. In a number of cases, we have held that actions for
reconveyance44 of or for cancellation of title45 to or toquiet title46 over real property are actions
that fall under the classification of cases that involve "title to, orpossession of, real property, or
any interest therein." The original text of Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 as well as its forerunner,
Section 44(b) of R.A. 296,47 asamended, gave the RTCs (formerly courts of first instance)
exclusive original jurisdiction "[i]n all civilactions which involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, exceptactions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer
of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which isconferred upon Metropolitan Trial
Courts, [MTCs], and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (conferred upon the cityand municipal
courts under R.A. 296, as amended)." Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial effecton
jurisdiction whether a case is one, the subject matter of which was incapable of pecuniary
estimation,under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 or one involving title to property under Section 19(2).
The distinction betweenthe two classes became crucial with the amendment introduced by R.A.
No. 769148 in 1994 which expandedthe exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to
include "all civil actions which involve title to, orpossession of, real property, or any interest
therein where the assessed value of the property orinterest therein does not exceed Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in MetroManila, where such assessed value does
not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusiveof interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs." Thus,under the present law, original jurisdiction
over cases the subject matter of which involves "title to,possession of, real property or any
interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between thefirst and second level
courts, with the assessed value of the real property involved as the benchmark. Thisamendment
was introduced to "unclog the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which would result in the
speedieradministration of justice."Petitioners' contention that the value of the trees cut in the
subject properties constitutes "any interesttherein (in the subject properties)" that should be
computed in addition to the respective assessed values ofthe subject properties is unavailing.
Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, is clear that theRTC shall exercise
jurisdiction "in all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, orany
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
thousandpesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty
thousandpesos (P50,000.00)." It is true that the recovery of the value of the trees cut from the
subject propertiesmay be included in the term "any interest therein." However, the law is
emphatic that in determining whichcourt has jurisdiction, it is only the assessed value of the
realty involved that should be computed.54 In thiscase, there is no dispute that the assessed
values of the subject properties as shown by their taxdeclarations are less than P20,000.00.
Clearly, jurisdiction over the instant cases belongs not to the RTC butto the MTC.
FORTUNE MOTORS, (PHIL), INC. VS. CA, G.R. NO. 76431, OCTOBER 16, 1989
Facts:
On March 1982 to January 1984, private respondent extended various loans to petitioner
amounting to P34.15K secured by a real estate mortgage on petitioner’s building and lot in
Makati. Petitioner was not able to pay. Thus, respondent had the mortgaged property sold at
public auction for P47.8K, respondent being the highest bidder. Certificate of sale was registered
on 24 October 1984. On 21 October 1985, or three days before the expiration of the redemption
period, petitioner filed a complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale in RTC
Manila alleging inter alia that it was premature because the loan was not yet due. Respondent
moved to dismiss on the ground that the venue of the action was improperly laid in Manila for
the property mortgaged is situated in Makati. Petitioner opposed alleging that its action "is a
personal action" and that "the issue is the validity of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings".
On 28 May 1986, RTC Manila denied its motion to dismissal. On 11 June 1986, respondent filed
a petition for certiorari and prohibition in CA. On 30 July 1986, the CA granted the petition
dismissing the complaint without prejudice to its being filed in the proper venue. When
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on 30 October 1986, it filed the present
petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the action for annulment of the real estate mortgage extrajudicial
foreclosure sale is a personal action for venue purposes.
Ruling:
NO. Petition is Denied In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or
as indicated in Sec. 2 (a) of Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to real property, or for
the recovery of possession, or for the partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage
on real property. (Comments on the Rules of Court by Moran, Vol. 1, p. 122) Real actions or
actions affecting title to, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or condemnation
of, or foreclosure of mortgage on real property, must be instituted in the Court of First Instance
of the province where the property or any part thereof lies. (Enriquez v. Macadaeg, 84 Phil.
674,1949; Garchitorena v. Register of Deeds, 101 Phil. 1207, 1957) Personal actions upon the
other hand, may be instituted in the Court of First Instance where the defendant or any of the
defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the
election of the plaintiff (Sec. 1, Rule 4, Revised Rules of Court). A prayer for annulment or
rescission of contract does not operate to efface the true objectives and nature of the action which
is to recover real property. (Inton, et al., v. Quintan, 81 Phil. 97, 1948)
An action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property is a real action. Its prime
objective is to recover said real property. (Gavieres v. Sanchez, 94 Phil. 760,1954) An action to
annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different from an action to annul a private sale
of real property. (Munoz v. Llamas, 87 Phil. 737,1950) While it is true that petitioner does not
directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the property in question, his action for
annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely intertwined with the issue of ownership
of the building which, under the law, is considered immovable property, the recovery of which is
petitioner's primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or
rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime
objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real action.
Respondent Court, therefore, did not err in dismissing the case on the ground of improper venue
(Sec. 2, Rule 4) which was timely raised (Sec. 1, Rule 16). (Punzalan, Jr. v. Vda. de Lacsamana,
121 SCRA 336, [1983]). Thus, as aptly decided by the Court of Appeals in a decision penned by
then Court of Appeals Associate Justice now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Carolina C.
Griño-Aquino, the pertinent portion reads: "Since an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property
results in a conveyance of the title of the property sold to the highest bidder at the sale, an action
to annul the foreclosure sale is necessarily an action affecting the title of the property sold. It is
therefore a real action which should be commenced and tried in the province where the property
or part thereof lies."
SPOUSES VALDEZ VS. CA, G.R. NO. 132424, MAY 2, 2006
Facts: Petitioner spouses filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against respondent spouses
before the MTC.
The complaint alleges that sometime in November 1992, by virtue of a sales contract, petitioner
spouses acquired a residential lot and respondent spouses , without any color of title whatsoever
occupied the said lot by building their house in the same thereby depriving the former rightful
possession thereof.
A formal demand to vacate the premises was sent on July 12, 1994 but it was ignored.
Respondent spouses contend that the complaint failed to state that petitioner had prior physical
possession of the property in dispute and in the alternative, claimed ownership over the land on
the ground that they possess the same for more than thirty years.
The MTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners and ordered respondents to vacate the
property.
On a petition for review, the Court of Appeals reverse and set aside the decision of the RTC on
the ground that petitioners failed to make a case for unlawful detainer because they failed to
show that they had given the private respondents the right to occupy the premises or that they
had tolerated private respondents’ possession of the same, which is a requirement in unlawful
detainer cases. It added that the allegations in the complaint lack jurisdictional elements of
forcible entry which requires an allegation of prior material possession. Hence, MTC has no
jurisdiction over the case.
Issue: WON the allegations of the complaint made out a case for unlawful detainer and MTC has
jurisdiction over the case.
Held: No.
The three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property are:
First, Accion interdictal comprises forcible entry and unlawful detainer. In forcible entry, one is
deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy,
threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied.In
forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is
which party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant
is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.
The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper MTC. Both
actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of
forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer.The issue in said
cases is the right to physical possession.
Second, Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should
be brought in the proper RTC when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an
ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of
title.
Third, Accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also brought in the proper
regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.
Doctrine: Jurisdictional facts establishing a case for ejectment must appear on the face of the
complaint
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of
tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be
recovered.Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful
detainer would be an improper remedy.
It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the cause of action, whether it
is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed
against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter
becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.
To vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that the
complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the class of
cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature.
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to
aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how entry
was affected or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion
publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.
Reason:
In the case at bar, the allegations in petitioner spouses complaint did not contain any averment of
fact that would substantiate their claim that they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the
property by respondents. The complaint contains only bare allegations that “respondents without
any color of title whatsoever occupies the land in question by building their house in the said
land thereby depriving petitioners the possession thereof.” Nothing has been said on how
respondents’ entry was effected or how and when dispossession started.
The failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is
fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for
unlawful detainer, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case.
ESTEBAN VS. SPS. MARCELO, G.R. NO. 197725, JULY 31, 2013
FACTS:
The late Gabriel O. Esteban, substituted by his son, petitioner Mark Anthony Esteban,4
had been in possession of a piece of land located at 702 Tiaga St., Barangka Drive, Mandaluyong
City, since the 1950s.5 In the 1960s, the late Esteban's sister constructed a foundry shop at the
property. In the 1970s, after the foundry operations had proven unproductive, the respondents-
spouses Rodrigo and Carmen Marcelo were allowed to reside therein, for a monthly rental fee of
P50.00. Since March 2001, the respondents-spouses have stopped paying the rental fee (which
by that time amounted to P160.00). On October 31, 2005, the late Esteban, through a lawyer,
sent the respondents-spouses a demand letter requiring them to settle their arrears and to vacate
within five (5) days from receipt thereof.6 For failure to comply with the demand to pay and to
vacate, the late Esteban instituted an unlawful detainer case against the respondents-spouses on
December 6, 2005.
RULING:
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
The one-year prescription period
is counted from the last demand
to pay and vacate
As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, there should first be a demand to pay or to comply
with the terms of the lease and a demand to vacate before unlawful detainer arises. The Revised
Rules of Court clearly so state.20
Since 1947, case law has consistently upheld this rule. "Mere failure to pay rents does not ipso
facto make unlawful tenant's possession of the premises. It is the owner's demand for tenant to
vacate the premises, when the tenant has failed to pay the rents on time, and tenant’s refusal or
failure to vacate, which make unlawful withholding of possession." In 2000, we reiterated this
rule when we declared: "It is therefore clear that before the lessor may institute such action, he
must make a demand upon the lessee to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to
vacate the premises. It is the owner’s demand for the tenant to vacate the premises and the
tenant’s refusal to do so which makes unlawful the withholding of possession. Such refusal
violates the owner’s right of possession giving rise to an action for unlawful detainer."22
Furthermore, in cases where there were more than one demand to pay and vacate, the reckoning
point of one year for filing the unlawful detainer is from the last demand as the lessor may
choose to waive his cause of action and let the defaulting lessee remain in the premises.23
It was an error for the CA to rule that the respondents-spouses could not be ousted because they
were protected by P.D. 1517. This decree, in fact, does not apply to them.
In Sps. Frilles v. Sps. Yambao,24 the Court traced the purpose, development and coverage of
P.D. 1517. The Court declared in this case that the purpose of the law is to protect the rights of
legitimate tenants who have resided for 10 years or more on specific parcels of land situated in
declared Urban Land Reform Zones or Urban Zones, and who have built their homes thereon.
These legitimate tenants have the right not to be dispossessed and to have the right of first refusal
to purchase the property under reasonable terms and conditions to be determined by the
appropriate government agency.25
Subsequent to P.D. 1517, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1893 on
September 11, 1979, declaring the entire Metropolitan Manila area an Urban Land Reform Zone
for purposes of urban land reform. On May 14, 1980, he issued Proclamation No. 1967,
amending Proclamation No. 1893 and identifying 244 sites in Metropolitan Manila as Areas for
Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zones. The Proclamation pointedly stated that:
"the provisions of P.D. Nos. 1517, 1640 and 1642 and of LOI No. 935 shall apply only to the
above-mentioned Areas for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform Zones."
"Thus, a legitimate tenant's right of first refusal to purchase the leased property under P.D. No.
1517 depends on whether the disputed property in Metropolitan Manila is situated in an area
specifically declared to be both an Area for Priority Development and Urban Land Reform
Zone."26
Based on the cited issuances, we find it clear that for P.D. 1517 to apply, the tenants must have
been a legitimate tenant for ten (10) years who have built their homes on the disputed property.
These circumstances do not obtain in the present case as it was not the respondents-spouses who
built their dwelling on the land; it was the late Esteban’s sister who had the foundry shop built in
the 1960s and eventually leased the property to the respondents-spouses in the 1970s. Even
assuming that these two requirements have been complied with, P.D. 1517 still will not apply as
the issue raised in the present petition is not the right of first refusal of the respondents-spouses,
but their non-payment of rental fees and refusal to vacate. In fact, it was their non-payment of
rental fees and refusal to vacate which caused the petitioner’s predecessor to file the action for
unlawful detainer.
Finally, even assuming that the aforementioned circumstances were present, the respondents-
spouses still cannot qualify under P.D. 1517 in the absence of any showing that the subject land
had been declared an area for priority development and urban land reform zone.
The rule on the propriety of resolving issues not raised before the lower courts cannot be raised
on appeal: "points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial
court will not be and ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal. Basic consideration of due process impels this rule."27
We see no merit in the respondents-spouses’ observation that the present petition is irregular
because the other compulsory heirs (or co-owners) have not been impleaded. The present petition
has been properly filed under the express provision of Article 487 of the Civil Code.28
In the recent case of Rey Catigador Catedrilla v. Mario and Margie Lauron,29 we explained that
while all co-owners are real parties in interest in suits to recover properties, anyone of them may
bring an action for the recovery of co-owned properties. Only the co-owner who filed the suit for
the recovery of the co-owned property becomes an indispensable party thereto; the other co-
owners are neither indispensable nor necessary parties.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on
certiorari. The decision dated January 1 7, 2011 and the resolution dated July 15, 20 II of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112609 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
decision dated January 13, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 211, Mandaluyong City, in
Civil Case No. 20270, is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against the respondents spouses Rodrigo
and Carmen Marcelo.
CATEDRILLA VS. LAURON, G.R. NO. 17901, APRIL 15, 2013
CASILANG, SR. VS. CASILANG-DIZON, ET AL., G.R. NO. 180269, FEBRUARY 20,
2013