Knowledge Argument - Nida Rumelin

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Qualia: The Knowledge Argument

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from the Summer 2010 Edition of the First published Tue Sep 3, 2002; substantive revision Mon Nov 23, 2009
Stanford Encyclopedia The knowledge argument aims to establish that conscious experience
involves non-physical properties. It rests on the idea that someone who
of Philosophy has complete physical knowledge about another conscious being might
yet lack knowledge about how it feels to have the experiences of that
being. It is one of the most discussed arguments against physicalism.
1. Remarks About the History of the Underlying Intuition

2. The Basic Idea
Edward N. Zalta Uri Nodelman Colin Allen John Perry
Principal Editor Senior Editor Associate Editor Faculty Sponsor 3. Some Clarifications
Editorial Board 3.1 Two Versions of the Argument
http://plato.stanford.edu/board.html 3.2 Physical and Non-physical
Library of Congress Catalog Data
3.3 Knowing what it is like
ISSN: 1095-5054 4. Objections
4.1 Doubts about the Thought Experiment
Notice: This PDF version was distributed by request to mem-
4.2 Complete Physical Knowledge without Knowledge of all
bers of the Friends of the SEP Society and by courtesy to SEP
content contributors. It is solely for their fair use. Unauthorized the Physical Facts
distribution is prohibited. To learn how to join the Friends of the 4.3 No Propositional Knowledge 1: the Ability Hypothesis
SEP Society and obtain authorized PDF versions of SEP entries, 4.4 Objections Against the Ability Hypothesis
please visit https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/ . 4.5 No Propositional Knowledge 2: the Acquaintance
Hypothesis
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
4.6 The New Knowledge/Old Fact-View
Copyright c 2010 by the publisher
The Metaphysics Research Lab 4.7 Variants of the New Knowledge/Old Fact View
Center for the Study of Language and Information 4.8 Objections Against the New Knowledge/Old Fact View
Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305
5. The Dualist View About the Knowledge Argument
Qualia: The Knowledge Argument
Copyright c 2010 by the author
6. Concluding Remark
Martine Nida-Rümelin Bibliography
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1
Qualia: The Knowledge Argument Martine Nida-Rümelin
compassion and piety, know about what is going on during a

commemoration of the armistice? For the sake of argument, we
1. Historical Remarks assume compete physical (1 or 2) predictability and explainability
of the behavior of humans equipped with vision, a sense of humor,
In the context of his explanation of the difference between mechanistic
and sentiments of piety. The Martian could then predict all
and emergentist theories, C.D. Broad (1925) argues that even if the
responses, including the linguistic utterances of the earthlings in
mechanistic theory of chemistry were true there still would be a property
the situations which involve their visual perceptions, their laughter
of ammonia that a mathematical archangel endowed with unlimited
about jokes, or their (solemn) behavior at the commemoration. But
mathematical skills and “gifted with the further power of perceiving the
ex hypothesi, the Martian would be lacking completely in the sort
microscopic structure of atoms” could not predict, namely its smell:
of imagery and empathy which depends on familiarity (direct
He [the archangel] would know exactly what the microscopic acquaintance) with the kinds of qualia to be imaged or
structure of ammonia must be; but he would be totally unable to empathized. (Feigl 1958, 431)
predict that a substance with this structure must smell as ammonia
T. Nagel (1974) argues that some facts can only be captured ‘from a
does when it gets into the human nose. The utmost that he could
subjective perspective’ and uses his famous example of bats to illustrate
predict on this subject would be that certain changes would take
the point: Even if we knew everything there is to know ‘from an objective
place in the mucous membrane, the olfactory nerves and so on.
perspective’ about a bat's sonar system, certain factual questions
But he could not possibly know that theses changes would be
concerning bats would remain unanswered. We still would not know
accompanied by the appearance of a smell in general or of the
‘what it is like’ to perceive a given object with a bat's sonar system.
peculiar smell of ammonia in particular, unless someone told him
so or he had smelled it for himself. (Broad 1925, 71) As these examples suggest, the idea that complete physical knowledge
isn't sufficient for complete knowledge of phenomenal states has been
Under the title “The Cognitive Role of Acquaintance,” H. Feigl (1958)
around for a while. In many of these cases, the idea is not used to argue
briefly discusses the epistemic limitations of a Martian who studies
directly against physicalism, although such a use is arguably present in
human behavior but does not share human sentiments:
Broad (1925). The current debate was initiated by Jackson (1982) who
The first question I wish to discuss concerns the cognitive ‘plus’, used the idea to develop a more explicit anti-physicalist argument, the
i.e., the alleged advantages of knowledge by acquaintance over knowledge argument.
knowledge by description. We may ask, for example, what does
the seeing person know that the congenitally blind person could 2. The Basic Idea
not know. Or, to take two examples from Eddington, what could a
Frank Jackson (1982) formulates the intuition underlying his Knowledge
someone know about the effects of jokes if he had no sense of
Argument in a much cited passage using his famous example of the
humor? Could a Martian, entirely without sentiments of
neurophysiologist Mary:
compassion and piety, know about what is going on during a
2 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Summer 2010 Edition 3

neurophysiologist Mary: Most authors who discuss the knowledge argument cite the case of Mary,
but Frank Jackson used a further example in his seminal article: the case
Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to of a person, Fred, who sees a color unknown to normal human perceivers.
investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and We might want to know what color Fred experiences when looking at
white television monitor. She specializes in the neurophysiology things that appear to him in that particular way. It seems clear that no
of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the physical information amount of knowledge about what happens in his brain and about how
there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe tomatoes, color information is processed in his visual system will help us to find an
or the sky, and use terms like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on. She answer to that question. In both cases cited by Jackson, an epistemic
discovers, for example, just which wavelength combinations from subject A appears to have no access to particular items of knowledge
the sky stimulate the retina, and exactly how this produces via the about a subject B: A cannot know that B has an experience of a particular
central nervous system the contraction of the vocal chords and quality Q on certain occasions. This particular item of knowledge about B
expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of the is inaccessible to A because A never had experiences of Q herself.
sentence ‘The sky is blue’.… What will happen when Mary is
released from her black and white room or is given a color 3. Some Clarifications
television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems just
obvious that she will learn something about the world and our 3.1 Two Versions of the Argument
visual experience of it. But then is it inescapable that her previous
knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical As Horgan (1984) points out, talk of ‘physical information’ in the context
information. Ergo there is more to have than that, and Physicalism of the knowledge argument is ambiguous between an epistemological and
is false. an ontological reading. “Physical information” may be interpreted (a) in
the sense of what Horgan calls ‘explicit physical information’ (according
The argument contained in this passage may be put like this: to Horgan's proposal a sentence S expresses explicit physical information
about certain processes just in case S belongs to, or follows from, a
(1) Mary has all the physical information concerning human color
theoretically adequate physical account of those processes) or (b) in the
vision before her release.
sense of ‘ontologically physical information’ which is explicated in
(2) But there is some information about human color vision that Horgan, 1984, p. 150 as follows: a sentence S “expresses ontologically
she does not have before her release. physical information about certain processes just in case (i) all entities
referred to or quantified over in S are physical entities, and (ii) all the
Therefore properties and relations expressed by the predicates in S are physical
properties and relations.” Presupposing a distinction along these lines one
(3) Not all information is physical information. may replace ‘to have all explicit physical information about x’ by ‘to have
complete physical knowledge about x’ and one may replace ‘to have all
ontologically physical information about x’ by ‘to know all the physical

ontologically physical information about x’ by ‘to know all the physical mind.
facts about x’. The argument may thus be reformulated in two different
ways: As many have pointed out, the result of the weaker version (3a) does not
imply the result of the stronger version (3b). That a person has incomplete
(V1) The weaker version of the knowledge argument: knowledge about a certain topic does not imply without further
assumptions that there is some specific fact she does not have knowledge
(1a) Mary has complete physical knowledge concerning facts of. The example of knowledge about oneself (de se knowledge) may
about human color vision before her release. illustrate the general point. Let us suppose that John, who is at t in
Amsterdam, does not know that he is now in Amsterdam (if asked about
(2a) But there is some kind of knowledge concerning facts about
his present location he would assert “I am now in Venice”). John's
human color vision that she does not have before her release.
knowledge concerning the present location of people is incomplete. He
Therefore lacks a specific locating piece of de se knowledge. Still, there need not be
any fact concerning the location of people that John does not have
(3a) There is some kind of knowledge concerning facts about knowledge of. It does not follow from the description of the case that
human color vision that is non-physical knowledge. John does not have knowledge of the fact that John is in Amsterdam. John
may well know that John is in Amsterdam but, having forgotten that he is
(V2) The stronger version of the knowledge argument:
himself John, he may fail to conclude that he is now in Amsterdam. If
(1b) Mary knows all the physical facts concerning human color John finally learns that he is in Amsterdam, he does not thereby learn a
vision before her release. new fact—or so many philosophers would insist—he gains new
knowledge of a fact that he already knew in a different way.
(2b) But there are some facts about human color vision that Mary
does not know before her release. If—in analogy to the de se case—some physical facts about color vision
can be known in two different ways,—in a ‘physical way’ (under
Therefore ‘physical concepts’) and in some other, non-physical way (under ‘non-
physical concepts’), then it is possible to acquire new (non-physical)
(3b) There are non-physical facts concerning human color vision. knowledge about a (physical) fact without thereby acquiring knowledge of
a new fact (the very same fact may have been known before under its
The conclusion of the stronger version of the argument (3b) is an
physical conceptualization). Many authors accept the weaker version of
ontological claim that the physicalist must reject. The conclusion of the
the argument but reject the stronger one for the reason just sketched: they
weaker version of the argument is merely an epistemological claim that is
admit that Mary gains new propositional knowledge but deny that she
compatible with denying the existence of non-physical facts. Although
thereby comes to know facts that she did not know before in some other
Jackson's original formulation in terms of information is open to both
way. (These authors accept the first premise of both versions of the
interpretations it is clear that the second stronger version is what he had in
argument and the second premise of the first version as well, but they
mind.

argument and the second premise of the first version as well, but they Consequence C3 There are non-physical facts about human color
deny the second premise of the second version and insist that (2a) does vision.
not imply (2b)). Their position with respect to the knowledge argument
will be called the New Knowledge/Old Fact-View (see Section 4.6 below). Once C1 and C2 are accepted, there is obviously no way to avoid C3
Others deny even the weaker version V1 and claim that Mary does not (which follows logically from the former two). Moreover, is seems hard
gain any new propositional knowledge (no new knowledge about to deny that it is in principle possible to have complete physical
something that is the case, no factual knowledge). Their position will be knowledge about human color vision (or about an appropriately chosen
called the No Propositional Knowledge View (see Sections 4.3 and 4.5 part thereof). If so, premise P1 should be accepted as an appropriate
below). description of a legitimate thought experiment. To avoid the
antimaterialist conclusion C3 the physicalist can (a) object against the
To locate the different points of disagreement it is helpful to formulate the
inference from P1 to C1 (a minority of philosophers have chosen this
stronger version of the argument more explicitly.
strategy, see Section 4.2 below) or he or she can avoid C2 by (b) denying
(V3) Explicit formulation of the knowledge argument premise P2 (this is the strategy chosen by proponents of the No
(stronger version) : Propositional Knowledge View, see Sections 4.3 and 4.5 below) or by (c)
blocking the inference from premise P2 to C2 (this is the strategy chosen
Premise P1 Mary has complete physical knowledge about
by a majority of physicalist philosophers who subscribe to some version
human color vision before her release.
of the New Knowledge/Old Fact View, see Section 4.6 below).
Therefore
3.2 Physical and Non-physical
Consequence C1 Mary knows all the physical facts about human The knowledge argument is often cited as one of those anti-physicalist
color vision before her release. qualia-based arguments that are supposed to justify property dualism. The
Premise P2 There is some (kind of) knowledge concerning above formulation, however, does not explicitly mention non-physical
facts about human color vision that Mary does properties but only non-physical facts. But the relation between the two
not have before her release. claims is obvious. Friends of the knowledge argument will say that the
facts at issue are non-physical because they involve the exemplification of
Therefore (from (P2)): non-physical properties (e.g. of the property of having an experience with
quality Q).
Consequence C2 There are some facts about human color vision
that Mary does not know before her release. In the assumption that Mary has all physical knowledge (first version) or
knows all the physical facts (second version) “physical” is meant in a
Therefore (from (C1) and (C2)): very broad sense that includes knowledge about (or facts concerning) the
functioning of the receptors and neurons involved in color vision

functioning of the receptors and neurons involved in color vision distinguish two steps of epistemic progress that Jackson's Mary takes at
(biological and physiological knowledge/facts) as well as knowledge once. To see the two steps involved one may consider an example used in
about (or facts concerning) the whole network of causal relations between Nida-Rümelin (1996) and (1998): Like Mary, Marianna first (at t1) lives
processes underlying color vision, external stimuli and behavior in a black and white environment. Contrary to Mary (at a later moment
(functional knowledge/ functional facts). “Physical” knowledge in the t2) she gets acquainted with colors by seeing arbitrarily colored objects
broad sense at issue even includes psychological knowledge (e.g. (abstract paintings, red chairs, blue tables, etc. but no yellow bananas, no
knowledge about the result of psychophysical experiments) in so far as pictures of landscapes with a blue sky etc.). Marianna is therefore unable
they can be formulated without use of phenomenal terminology. One to relate the kinds of color experiences she now is acquainted with to
might try to explicate “physical knowledge” in the sense at issue in what she already knew about them at t1. At t2, Marianna may wonder
roughly the following way: physical knowledge includes all knowledge which of four slides (a red, a blue, a green and a yellow slide) appears to
that is expressible in a terminology that does not contain irreducibly her in the color normal people experience when looking at the cloudless
mental terms. It would be natural to define physical facts as those facts sky. At t2 Marianna knows, in a sense, what it is like to have experiences
that can be expressed in this way. But note that this definition of ‘physical of red, blue, etc. But she still lacks the relevant items of knowledge about
facts’ begs the question against an objection that has been raised against what other people experience: there is a clear sense in which she still may
the knowledge argument (see Section 4.2 below). It is certainly not easy not know that the sky appears blue to normal perceivers, she may even
to formulate a precise, adequate and non question-begging account of have the false believe that it appears to normal perceivers like the red
“physical knowledge” and “physical facts” suited for the discussion of the slide appears to her and thus believe, in a sense, that the sky appears red
knowledge argument. It is, however, quite common to assume that our to normal perceivers. Only at t3, when Marianna is finally released and
intuitive understanding of “physical knowledge” in the broad sense at sees the sky, does she gain this item of knowledge. One way to describe
issue is clear enough for the purposes of the debate, though some argue the two steps of epistemic progress is this: At t2, by having color
that talk of “physical facts” needs clarification (see Alter 1998). experiences, Marianna can form new concepts, she now has what has
been called ‘phenomenal concepts’ of kinds of color experiences. By
3.3 Knowing what it is like acquiring these concepts she acquires the capacity to ask new questions,
and to form new (eventually false) hypotheses (e.g. about the appearance
It is common to formulate Mary's new knowledge in terms of Thomas
of the sky to normal perceivers). Only at t3 does she acquire the kind of
Nagel's famous locution of knowing what it's like: Mary does not know
knowledge that the knowledge argument is concerned with (knowledge
(while living in her black-and-white environment) what it is like to see
that involves the application of phenomenal concepts) about experiences
colors and she learns what it is like to see colors only after her release.
of other people.
But this common way to put the point may lead to a confusion of (a) mere
acquaintance with kinds of color experiences by having and remembering Once these two steps are clearly distinguished one may conclude that
them and (b) knowledge about what kind of color experience other Marianna's relevant epistemic progress at t3 (and Mary's relevant progress
subjects have at a given occasion, and it may thereby lead to a failure to after release) is not happily described by talk of knowing what it's like.
distinguish two steps of epistemic progress that Jackson's Mary takes at Rather, or so one may argue, Mary and Marianna acquire a particular kind

Rather, or so one may argue, Mary and Marianna acquire a particular kind existence of such a case does not seem to provide a convincing reply for
of belief that the sky appears blue to normal perceivers, namely the the materialist. But this point (the relevance or irrelevance of visual
phenomenal belief that it appears blue to normal perceivers, where science in this context) has not received much discussion in the literature.
phenomenal belief involves the application of the appropriate phenomenal It has, however, been pointed out (see Graham and Horgan, 2000,
concept. Both may have believed, in a sense (the non-phenomenal sense footnote 4 with its reference to Shepard 1993) that at least presently
that does not require use of phenomenal concepts) that the sky appears available results of color vision science do not exclude a Mary-case. (The
blue to normal perceivers while still in their black-and-white environment psychologist Knut Nordby was a real life case of a color vision specialist
(they may have been told so by their friends). (For the distinction between who was also a complete achromat. See his paper ‘Vision in a Complete
phenomenal and non-phenomenal belief see Nida-Rumelin 1996 and Achromat: A Personal Account’, linked into in the Other Internet
1998). Resources section and Nordby, 2007.)
4. Objections Another doubt about the thought experiment is raised by the claim that a
person who is confined to a monochromatic environment but knows
4.1 Doubts about the Thought Experiment everything physical there is to know about visual color experience would
be able to figure out what colored things look like and thus would e.g. be
Some authors have raised doubts about the thought experiment itself. It is able to imagine the kind of color experience produced in normal
sometimes pointed out, for example, that merely confining Mary to a perceivers when looking at the cloudless sky during the day (see e.g.
monochromatic environment would not prevent her from having color Dennett 1991; Dennett 2007; Churchland 1989; Maloney 1985, 36).
experiences (see Thompson 1995, 264) or that, after release, she would Probably the most common reaction to this is simply to doubt the claim.
not be able to see colors. But the example can be refined to meet these But it is not clear that the claim, if correct, would undermine the
objections. Mary might be monochromatic from birth and changed into a knowledge argument. The opponent would have to show that complete
normal perceiver by some medical procedure. It is sometimes objected physical knowledge necessarily involves the capacity to imagine blue.
that already accepted or future results of visual science are or might be One may doubt that this claim is compatible with the widely accepted
incompatible with the existence of a Mary-case (a person with assumption that physical knowledge can be acquired independently of
monochromatic experience who becomes a normal color perceiver later) one's particular perceptual apparatus. (Arguably a subject whose visual
or that such results might require (to preserve consistence with visual apparatus is not suited for visual experiences at all will not be able to
science) the introduction of so many additional assumptions that the develop the capacity to imagine colors on the basis of physical knowledge
conceivability of the example becomes doubtful. To this one might reply alone, even if this were true for Mary).
that the thought experiment need not be compatible with visual science. If
the case of a person with monochromatic vision who turns into a normal Some have argued that Mary would recognize the colors when first seeing
perceiver really does involve serious difficulties for materialism, then the them on the basis of her complete physical knowledge about color vision
mere fact (if it were one) that our visual apparatus excludes the actual (see Hardin 1992). According to this claim she would think something
existence of such a case does not seem to provide a convincing reply for like “oh, so this is red” when first confronted with a red patch and she

like “oh, so this is red” when first confronted with a red patch and she “everything physical can be expressed or captured in the languages of the
could not be fooled by what Dennett calls ‘the blue banana trick’: when physical sciences.” According to Flanagan Mary's case may refute
shown a blue banana she would know that it has the wrong color (see linguistic physicalism but does not refute metaphysical physicalism. Alter
Dennett 1991). A possible and common response is to simply doubt these (1998) points out that the knowledge argument needs the premise that all
claims. But, in any case, it is not clear that these claims undermine the physical facts can be learned discursively and argues that this assumption
knowledge argument. One may respond along the following lines: If has not been established. It may be argued against this view that it
Mary when first confronted with red were able to conclude that she is becomes hard to understand what it is for a property or a fact to be
now seeing what people call red, she thereby acquires a large set of new physical once we drop the assumption that physical properties and
beliefs about red experiences (that they are produced by roses, such-and- physical facts are just those properties and facts that can be expressed in
such wavelength combinations and so on). On the basis of seeing red she physical terminology.
(a) acquires a new phenomenal concept of red and (b) she forms new
beliefs involving that new concept using her previously acquired physical 4.3 No Propositional Knowledge 1: the Ability Hypothesis
knowledge. But if this description is correct, then her previous knowledge
Two different versions of the No Propositional Knowledge-View have
was incomplete (for a detailed discussion of Dennett's argument involving
been proposed. According to the Ability Hypothesis (most prominently
the blue banana trick see Dale 1995).
defended in Lewis 1983, 1988 and in Nemirow 1980, 1990, 2007), Mary
4.2 Complete Physical Knowledge without Knowledge of all does not acquire any new propositional knowledge after release (no
the Physical Facts knowledge about something that is the case, no factual knowledge), but
only a bundle of abilities (like the ability to imagine, remember and
It may appear obvious that premise P1 (Mary has complete physical recognize colors or color experiences). According to the Acquaintance
knowledge about human color vision) implies C1 (Mary knows all the Hypothesis proposed by Conee (1994), Mary's new knowledge after
physical facts about human color vision). If all physical facts can be release is what he calls “acquaintance knowledge” which is neither
known under some physical conceptualization, then a person who has propositional knowledge nor identical to a bundle of abilities.
complete physical knowledge about a topic knows all the relevant
physical facts. But a few philosophers can be understood as objecting Lewis and Nemirow presuppose that Mary's epistemic progress after
against precisely this apparently unproblematic step. Harman (1990) release consists in the acquisition of knowing what it is like (e.g. to have
argues that Mary does not know all the functional facts concerning human an experience of blue) and they both claim that knowing what it is like is
color vision because she lacks the concept of what it is for an object to be to have certain practical abilities. According to Nemirow “knowing what
red, blue, etc. Flanagan (1992) distinguishes metaphysical physicalism an experience is like is the same as knowing how to imagine having the
from linguistic physicalism. While metaphysical physicalism is the experience” (Nemirow 1990, 495). According to Lewis,
ontological claim that there are no non-physical individuals, properties or
…knowing what it is like is the possession of abilities: abilities to
relations and no non-physical facts, linguistic physicalism says that
recognize, abilities to imagine, abilities to predict one's behavior
“everything physical can be expressed or captured in the languages of the

recognize, abilities to imagine, abilities to predict one's behavior Hypothesis. The Ability hypothesis implies that there is some knowledge
by imaginative experiments. (Lewis 1983, 131). that can only be acquired by having experiences of a particular kind and
that this knowledge is nothing but knowing-how. This of course does not
A few years later he writes: exclude that there also is propositional knowledge that can be acquired by
getting acquainted with kinds of experiences from the first person
The Ability Hypothesis says that knowing what an experience is
perspective. The proponent of the Ability Hypothesis only has to insist
like just is the possession of these abilities to remember, imagine,
that, if there is such propositional knowledge, then it need not be acquired
and recognize. … It isn't knowing-that. It's knowing-how. (Lewis
on that particular basis but is accessible in other ways as well.
1990, 516)
Lewis's main argument for the Ability Hypothesis can be summarized like 4.4 Objections Against the Ability Hypothesis
this. (1) The only alternative to the Ability Hypothesis is what he calls the
It has been argued against Nemirow that the ability to imagine having an
Hypothesis of Phenomenal Information (HPI). (According to the HPI
experience of a particular kind is neither necessary nor sufficient for
knowing what it is like is propositional in the following sense: coming to
knowing what it is like to have that kind of experience. To show that
know what it is like involves the elimination of hitherto open
imaginative abilities are not necessary for knowing what it is like, Conee
possibilities). (2) The HPI is incompatible with physicalism. (3) The
(1994) and Alter (1998) cite the example of a person who has no capacity
Ability Hypothesis is compatible with physicalism and explains
to imagine having color experiences. They claim that despite this defect
everything that may be explained by the HPI. Therefore: The Ability
she would know what it is like to have an experience of e.g. green while
Hypothesis should be preferred.
attentively staring at something that looks green to her. To show that
Note that the Ability Hypothesis is compatible with the view that we do imaginative abilities are not sufficient for knowing what it is like Conee
sometimes acquire propositional knowledge on the basis of getting introduces the following example: A person, Martha, “who is highly
acquainted with a new kind of experience from the first person skilled at visualizing an intermediate shade that she has not experienced
perspective. The following remarks by Levin are hard to deny: between pairs of shades that she has experienced…happens not to have
any familiarity with the shade known as cherry red.” Martha is told that
…it would be perverse to claim that bare experience can provide cherry red is midway between burgundy red and fire red (she has
us only with practical abilities…. By being shown an unfamiliar experienced the latter two shades of red). Given this information and her
color, I acquire information about its similarities and extraordinary capacity, Martha has the ability to imagine cherry red, but
compatibilities with other colors, and its effects on other mental as long as she does not exercise this ability she does not know what it is
states: surely I seem to be acquiring certain facts about color and like to see cherry red. (A similar example is used for the same purpose
the visual experience of it. (Levin 1986, 246) and discussed in more detail by Raymont 1999). Raymont argues that
mnemic, recognitional and imaginative abilities neither separately nor
But, as pointed out by Tye (2000), this does not undermine the Ability conjointly amount to knowing of what it is like to have a particular kind
Hypothesis. The Ability hypothesis implies that there is some knowledge of experience. He first argues that none of these abilities is necessary and

of experience. He first argues that none of these abilities is necessary and concept to her experience at all. In this case, she still does not know what
sufficient for knowing what it is like: (a) Mnemic abilities are not it is like to have red experiences although she has the ability to apply an
necessary, since someone can learn what an experience is like when first indexical concept to her present experience (she has the ability, but, being
having it without already remembering an experience of the relevant kind. distracted, she does not exercise it). Tye concedes that the revised version
(b) Imaginative abilities are not sufficient since someone can have the of the Ability Hypothesis could not, anyway, be used against the
ability to imagine a particular kind of experience without exercising it knowledge argument in the way that was originally intended. The reason
(see the example cited above). (c) To show that recognitional abilities are is that the revised version is compatible with the view that Mary does
not sufficient either, Raymont cites empirical data “in support of the view acquire knowing-that if she is not distracted when first seeing something
that one can have the ability to noninferentially recognize a certain type of red: she learns that this is a red experience (where “this” refers
visual experience without ever having had it, and thus without knowing introspectively to her present experience) and so acquires knowing-that.
what it is like to have it”. But then these three kinds of abilities cannot According to Tye to have indexical knowledge of this kind is sufficient
conjointly amount to knowing what it is like either: if they did, then— but not necessary for knowing what it is like to have a red experience.
contrary to (a)—each of them would have to be a necessary condition for After all, it is impossible to introspectively refer to a red experience
knowing what it is like. without presently having that kind of experience, but Tye wishes to
concede that a person can know what it is like to have a red experience
Gertler (1999) argues that the best candidate for an analysis in the spirit while not presently having a red experience. This reasoning motivates his
of the Ability Hypothesis is to identify knowing what it is like to have an disjunctive account of knowing what it is like: “S knows what it is like to
experience of red with the ability to recognize seeing-red experiences by undergo experience E iff either S now has indexical knowledge-that with
their phenomenal quality and then goes on to attack this candidate: she respect to E obtained via current introspection or S has the Lewis abilities
points out that the ability to recognize seeing-red experiences by their with respect to E” (Tye 2000). Tye thus defends the physicalist view
phenomenal quality can be explained by the fact that I know what it is against the knowledge argument by a combination of the two strategies
like to see red but not vice versa. mentioned above: he applies the New Knowledge/Old Fact-strategy to the
person who knows what it is like to have an experience in the sense of the
Michael Tye (2000) concedes that none of the abilities considered by
first conjunct (the indexical thought at issue is made true by a physical
Lewis is necessary for knowing what it is like and he discusses the
fact) and he applies the No Propositional Knowledge-strategy to the case
following possible revision of the Ability Hypothesis: knowing what it is
of someone who has knowing what it is like in the sense of the second
like to have an experience of red is the ability to apply an indexical
disjunct.
concept to an experience of red (while having it) via introspection. But,
he goes on to argue, this revised version can again be rejected by a Lycan (1996) argues against the Ability Hypothesis and for the view that
counterexample that shows that the ability at issue is not sufficient for Mary acquires new knowledge-that after release by claiming that “S
knowing what it is like: If Mary is distracted and does not attend to her knows what it is like to see blue” means something like “S knows that it
experience when she first sees a red object, then she need not apply any is like Q to see blue” where Q names the phenomenal quality at issue. It
concept to her experience at all. In this case, she still does not know what has been objected by Tye (1995) that the use of the qualia name “Q”

has been objected by Tye (1995) that the use of the qualia name “Q” Q before release, although—before release—she is not acquainted with
within a propositional attitude context creates the well-known problems: Q. (3) After release Mary gets acquainted with Q, but she does not
Replacing “Q” by another name “R” for the same quale may change the acquire any new item of propositional knowledge by getting acquainted
truth value of the belief ascription. A proponent of Lycan's view could with Q (in particular she already knew under what conditions normal
however respond along the following lines: In the case of qualia names perceivers have experiences with the property Q). More recently Michael
within belief contexts it does not matter which name is used to refer to Tye (2009) defends the acquaintance hypothesis as the right answer to the
the quale at issue as long as the belief is meant in the sense of a knowledge argument thereby abondoning his original response (see below
phenomenal belief ascription. “S believes that it is like Q to see blue” 4.7).
means, on the phenomenal reading, that S has the relevant belief about Q
under a phenomenal concept of Q. Under the assumption that it is A friend of the knowledge argument might concede that a person is
impossible to have two different phenomenal concepts of one and the acquainted with Q only if she has or had an experience with property Q
same quale, the objection is met: As long as two qualia names Q and R but he would have to insist that being acquainted with Q in that sense is a
refer to the same quale, replacing Q by R in an ascription of phenomenal necessary condition for being able to know (in the relevant sense) that an
belief cannot change the truth value of the belief ascription. experience has Q. Another kind of criticism of the Acquaintance
Hypothesis is developed in Gertler (1999). She argues that the property
4.5 No Propositional Knowledge 2: The Acquaintance dualist can explain why the most direct way to get familiar with a quale is
Hypothesis by having an experience of the relevant kind while the physicalist does
not have any explanation for this particular feature of qualia.
Earl Conee (1994) proposes another variant of the No Propositional
Knowledge-View. According to Conee acquaintance constitutes a third It is interesting to see that a proposal clearly falling into the category
category of knowledge that is neither reducible to factual knowledge nor “New Knowledge/Old Fact View” is very similar in spirit to the
to knowing-how and he argues that Mary acquires after release only Acquaintance Hypothesis: Bigelow and Pargetter (1990) argue that Mary's
acquaintance knowledge. According to Conee knowing something by progress after release consists in the fact that she now stands in a new
acquaintance “requires the person to be familiar with the known entity in acquaintance relation to color qualia, but their theory about the
the most direct way that it is possible for a person to be aware of that individuation of beliefs implies that she thereby acquires new factual
thing” (Conee 1994, 144). Since “experiencing a quality is the most direct knowledge. Different beliefs, according to Bigelow and Pargetter, can be
way to apprehend a quality” (Conee 1994, 144), Mary gains acquaintance distinguished appropriately only if one takes into consideration the way
with color qualia only after release. According to the view proposed by the subject is acquainted with the individuals and properties her belief is
Conee the physicalist can defend himself against the knowledge argument about (they use the technical term “modes of acquaintance” in that
in the following way: (1) Qualia are physical properties of experiences context).
(and experiences are physical processes). Let Q be such a property. (2)
Mary can know all about Q and she can know that a given experience has 4.6 The New Knowledge/Old Fact View
Q before release, although—before release—she is not acquainted with

Several positive arguments for the view that Mary's new knowledge after phenomenal concept can be fully described in broadly physical
release constitutes propositional knowledge (genuine information) have terms.
been formulated in the literature. Lycan argues, for example, that Mary's
(4) A subject can acquire and possess phenomenal concepts only if
new knowledge goes along with the elimination of epistemic possibilities
it has or has had experiences of the relevant phenomenal kind.
and that her new abilities are best explained by her having new
information (for further arguments see Lycan 1996, 92). Loar (1990) (5) After release Mary gains knowledge about phenomenal
points out that the embedded occurrence of “feels like such and such” in characters under phenomenal concepts.
sentences like “if pains feel like such and such then Q” cannot be
accounted for in a model that treats knowing of what it is like as mere But the facts that make these new items of knowledge true are physical
know-how. McConnell (1994) defends the more radical view that the facts that Mary knew before release under another conceptualization.
acquisition of knowing-how is normally accompanied by the acquisition
of a particular new item of knowing-that. The differences between variants of the New Knowledge/Old Fact View
concern the theoretical (physicalist) account of (a) phenomenal character,
Many philosophers find it hard to deny that Mary gains new factual (b) phenomenal concepts of phenomenal characters and (c) the relation
knowledge after release and for that reason (if they are physicalists) feel between phenomenal characters and the corresponding phenomenal
attracted by the New Knowledge/Old Fact View. Positions that clearly fall concepts. All proponents of the view point out that, according to their
into that category are defended in Horgan 1984, Churchland 1985; Tye proposal, physical concepts and phenomenal concepts are cognitively
1986, 1995; Bigelow and Pargetter 1990; Loar 1990; Lycan 1990, 1995; independent: it is impossible to see a priori that something that falls
Pereboom 1994; Perry 2001; Van Gulick 2005; Byrne 2002; Levin 2007; under a physical concept of a particular phenomenal character also falls
Balog (forthcoming); Papineau 2002, 2007. under the corresponding phenomenal concept of that phenomenal
character. This is why it is possible to have (like Mary) complete physical
The basic ideas common to the New Knowledge/Old Fact View may be knowledge about e.g. phenomenal blueness (you know everything there is
summarized as follows: to know about phenomenal blueness under its physical conceptualization)
without having a phenomenal concept of blueness and without knowing
(1) Phenomenal character, e.g. phenomenal blueness, is a physical
any of these facts under a phenomenal concept of blueness. Some have
property of experiences (but see Lycan 1990 for an exception who
argued that the phenomenal conceptualization is not expressible in
construes qualia as properties of external objects).
language (see Byrne 2002 and Hellie 2005).
(2) To gain knowledge of what it is like to have an experience of a
In general, if a philosopher A claims that the argument of philosopher B
particular phenomenal character requires the acquisition of
does not go through, it is a point in favor of his view if he can provide an
phenomenal concepts of phenomenal character.
error theory, that is if he can explain why the argument may appear
(3) What it is for an organism to acquire and possess a correct in the first place. The New Knowledge/Old Fact View can claim
phenomenal concept can be fully described in broadly physical to have an error theory with respect to the knowledge argument. Given

to have an error theory with respect to the knowledge argument. Given beliefs.
the cognitive independence of physical and phenomenal concepts of
blueness it appears as if we could imagine a situation where everything An example of a more explicit theoretical account of phenomenal
Mary knew before release were fulfilled but not what she came to know character, phenomenal content and their relation can be found in Tye
after release (and this can be taken to imply that she does come to know (1995). He proposes a representationalist account of phenomenal
new facts). But, according to the New Knowledge/Old Fact View this is character. For a state to have phenomenal character is to represent internal
an illusion. There is no such possible situation. What Mary learns after or external physical items in an ‘abstract’ and nonconceptual way that is
release is made true by a physical fact that she already knew before her “appropriately poised for use by the cognitive system” (see Tye 1996,
release. Some versions of the New Knowledge/Old Fact-View will be 137–144). According to Tye, there are two kinds of phenomenal concepts:
briefly described in what follows. indexical concepts (an example is the concept applied when thinking of a
particular shade of red as “this particular hue” while having a red
4.7 Variants of the New Knowledge/Old Fact View experience) and what he calls “predicative phenomenal concepts” that are
based on the capacity to make certain discriminations. Tye wishes to
Horgan (1984) does not provide a developed theoretical account of accommodate the natural intuition that Mary before release cannot fully
phenomenal concepts but is one of the first to formulate the basic understand the nature of phenomenal blueness (she doesn't really know
intuition shared by most or all proponents of the New Knowledge/Old what it is to have a blue experience). One might think that his view is
Fact View: By having experiences of blue, Mary gets acquainted with incompatible with the intuition at issue. Phenomenal blueness, according
phenomenal blueness (which is in fact a physical property of experiences) to his view, has a physical nature and one might expect that physical
“from the experiential perspective,” she gains what he calls “the first natures are fully describable in physical terms and fully understandable
person ostensive perspective on that property” (Horgan 1984, 151): she under a physical conceptualization. But Tye has a surprising response:
now can refer to phenomenal blueness by thinking or saying “that kind of Although phenomenal blueness has a physical nature, a person cannot
property” while having, remembering or imagining a blue experience and fully understand its nature unless she thinks of phenomenal blueness
while attending to its particular quality. She thus has acquired a new under a phenomenal concept.
concept of phenomenal blueness. Using this new concept she can form
new beliefs (and acquire new knowledge) about phenomenal blueness. Another representationalist view about phenomenal character is combined
Formulated in this way, the view may appear similar to Conee's with the New Knowledge/Old Fact View in Lycan (1990) and (1996).
acquaintance account. According to both views, Mary's progress consists Lycan's account of Mary's epistemic progress can be put, roughly, like
primarily in getting acquainted with phenomenal blueness from an inner this: Only after release Mary can form “introspective second order
perspective. But contrary to Conee's thesis, according to the New representations” of her own color experiences. One may think of an
Knowledge/Old Fact View, acquaintance with phenomenal blueness form introspective representation as of “a token in one of the subject's
an experiential perspective enables the subject to form a new concept of languages of thought, his or her Introspectorese”. It has often been said
phenomenal blueness and thereby implies the capacity to acquire new that what Mary learns is in some sense “ineffable”, that it cannot be
beliefs. communicated in public language. Lycan is led to a similar conclusion

communicated in public language. Lycan is led to a similar conclusion case of demonstrative belief (and he proposes an account of Mary's new
within his computational theory. In his view, when Mary finally has an beliefs after release in terms of his theory of token-reflexive thoughts).
experience of blue she “tokens a semantically primitive mental word for After release, when seeing the sky, Mary may think “Oh, so having blue
the type of first-order state being inwardly sensed.” where this word in experiences is like this” where “this” refers to a physical property (the
Mary's language of thought has an “inferential and/or conceptual role” phenomenal character) of her present color experience. She could not
that is “unique to its subject, in that no other subject could deploy a have had a demonstrative belief of this kind before release. But, again, the
functionally similar representation whose designatum was that (the fact that makes the thought true is simply the fact that blue experiences
subject's) very same first-order state-token, ….” And he concludes that have the particular physical property at issue. Therefore, she does not
“the introspective word would certainly not be synonymous with any learn any new fact.
primitive or composite expression of public English,…” (Lycan 1996,
101). Doubts about Perry's proposal have been raised along the following lines.
In normal cases of demonstrative reference the demonstrated object is in
Papineau (1996) distinguishes third person and first person thoughts about some way given to the epistemic subject (when pointing to a table and
experiences. First person thoughts involve the imagination of an referring to it by “this table”, the object may be given as “the next table
experience of the relevant kind. The basic idea may be put like this: left to me”). But what is the way the kind of experience is given to Mary
When Mary is finally released and after some time sufficiently acquainted when she thinks of phenomenal blueness under the demonstrative concept
with color experiences she can ‘reproduce’ blue experiences in her “this kind of experience?” It cannot be the way it feels to have an
imagination. These imaginations of experiences of a particular kind can experience with that property, since this solution, so one may argue,
be used to refer to experiences of the kind at issue and to think about introduces phenomenal characters of phenomenal characters and thus
them. Obviously, Mary could not have first person thoughts about color reintroduces the original problem. Maybe “the kind of experience I am
experiences (she could not use imagined blue experiences in order to refer now having” is the appropriate candidate. But there are problems with
and to think about blue experiences) before she ever had blue this proposal too (see Chalmers 2002). A worry about the demonstrative
experiences. After release, Mary can acquire new beliefs: first person account is that it does not seem to do duty to the way in which the
beliefs about blue experiences. But for every such new first person belief subjective character itself is present to the mind of the thinker when
about a given kind of experience, there will be one of her old third person employing a phenomenal concept of that character. This worry is
beliefs which refers to the same kind of experience and has the same sometimes put in terms of acquaintance: the specific way in which the
factual content. thinker is acquainted with the referent of her thought in using phenomenal
concepts does not seem to be captured by the demonstrative account (see
Perry (2001) argues that Mary's new knowledge after release does not Levine 2007). Several attemps have been made to answer objections of
pose a problem to physicalism any more than indexical thoughts like “I this kind. Balog (forthcoming) and Papineau (2002) argue that the
am a philosopher” or “today is Sunday” (for a defense of this claim see cognitive intimacy to be accounted for is well explained by a quotational
also McMullen, 1985). He treats Mary's new knowledge as a particular theory of phenomenal concepts: in thoughts involving phenomenal
case of demonstrative belief (and he proposes an account of Mary's new concepts token experiences are used in order to refer to the kind those

concepts token experiences are used in order to refer to the kind those way that it does know in some other way, this can be explained by two
tokens belong to. Levine (2007) argues that even these refined theories do modes of presentation: the subject knows the fact under one mode of
not account for the specific intimite way in which the thinker is related to presentation and does not know it under some other mode of presentation.
the referents of phenomenal concepts. Contrary to this Levin (2007) does So, for example, a person may know the fact that Venus is a planet under
not see any need to 'embellish' the original simple demonstrative account. the mode of presentation associated with “the morning star is a planet”
While Balog's current position is an elaborated version of the quotational and fail to know the very same fact under the mode of presentation
account, Papineau has abandoned the quotational theory and argues in associated with “the evening star is a planet.” In this particular case, as in
Papineau (2007) that phenomenal concepts are special cases of perceptual many others, the difference in the mode of presentation involves two
concepts where perceptual concepts do not involve demonstration. different properties that are used to fix the referent. In one mode of
presentation Venus is given as the heavenly body visible late in the
An influential view about phenomenal concepts which answers the morning (or some similar property), whereas in the other mode of
knowledge argument admitting that Mary gains new knowledge but no presentation the object is given as the heavenly body visble early in the
knowledge of new facts is developed in Loar (1990/1997): Phenomenal evening.
concepts are recognitional concepts. To have the phenomenal concept of
blueness is to be able to recognize experiences of blueness while having If the New Knowledge/Old Fact View involves two modes of presentation
them. The recognitional concept of blueness refers directly to its referent of this sort, then it cannot be used to defend physicalism because this kind
(the physical property of blueness) where this means (in Loar's of explanation of the supposed double epistemic access to facts
terminology): there is no other property (no property of that property) concerning phenomenal types would reintroduce non-physical properties
involved in the reference fixing. According to Loar's view the at a higher level: the subject would have to be decribed as referring to the
recognitional concept of phenomenal blueness refers to the physical phenomenal type at issue by some physical property in case it believes the
property phenomenal blueness in virtue of being ‘triggered’ by that relevant fact under its physical mode of presentation and as referring to
property. It has been doubted that 'directness' in Loar's sense provides an that phenomenal type by some non-physical property in case it believes
account for what one might call acquaintance: for the way in which the the relevant fact under its phenomenal mode of presentation.
phenomenal character is present to the mind when a thinker employs
phenomenal concepts (see Levine 2007). White (2007) argues against It has been argued by several authors that the different modes of
Loar that the account cannot explain the a posteriori character of mind- presentation at issue in the case of beliefs about phenomenal states do
brain identity statements in a satisfying manner. involve the introduction of different reference-fixing properties and that
therefore the proposal is unsuccessful. Arguments of that kind are found
4.8. Objections Against the New Knowledge/Old Fact View in Lockwood (1989, chap. 8) and McConnell (1994). White (2007)
develops the objection in detail. Block (2007) gives a detailed answer to
An objection to the New Knowledge/Old Fact View can be made as White (2007) based on a distinction between what he labels cognitive and
follows. In standard cases, if a subject does not know a given fact in one metaphysical modes of presentation. Chalmers (1996, 2002) makes a
way that it does know in some other way, this can be explained by two similar point as White (2007) using his framework of primary and

similar point as White (2007) using his framework of primary and contemporary philosophers who defend a dualist position (for a prominent
secondary intensions. In that framework, primary intensions describe the exception see Chalmers (1996); the knowledge argument is discussed on
way a concept picks out its referent in the actual world and the cognitive pp. 140–146). There are two possible strategies for a dualist to take who
independence of phenomenal and physical concepts is explained by their wishes to defend the knowledge argument. The first is merely defensive
different primary intensions. If one singular fact can be known under a or ‘destructive’ in that it tries to refute the positive theoretical proposals
physical mode of presentation as well as under a phenomenal mode of one by one that have been used by physicalists in their objections against
presentation, then the two items of knowledge involve two concepts (a the knowledge argument. The second is more ‘constructive’ in that it
phenomenal and a physical concept) with different primary intensions and aims at developing an alternative positive dualist account of phenomenal
these different primary intensions correspond to different properties. A concepts, phenomenal properties and their relations such that on that
two-dimensional framework is used in a different manner in Nida- account Mary does learn new and nonphysical facts upon release.
Rümelin (2007) to develop the idea that the nature of phenomenal Examples (or partial examples) for the first strategy may occasionally be
properties is present to the mind of the thinker when using phenomenal found in the literature (compare Warner 1986, Gertler 1999, Raymont
properties—an idea which leads to the result that the new knowlede/ old 1995, 1999 and Connell 1994). Examples for the second are hard to find,
fact view is mistaken. A general argument against the materialist strategy but Chalmers (1996, 2002) and Nida-Rümelin (2007) exemplify the
to answer objection by appeal to a theory about the special status of second strategy. Using his framework of primary and secondary
phenomenal concepts is developed in Chalmers (2007). intensions he develops a positive account of what he calls “pure
phenomenal concepts” that can be described as incorporating the old and
Anyone who wishes to argue in the way just mentioned, that the two natural intuition that in the case of qualia (phenomenal characters) there is
modes of presentation do involve the introduction of two different no distinction between appearance and reality, in other words: qualia
reference-fixing properties, must deal with Loar's proposal (see 4.7). Loar ‘reveal their nature’ in experience.
avoids the problem of two reference fixing properties by his claim that
phenomenal concepts refer directly to their referent. It has been argued The intuitive idea just mentioned has been expressed in different ways.
against Loar that his causal account of how phenomenal concepts manage Some say that qualia ‘have no hidden sides’. Others say that qualia are not
to directly refer to their referent (namely by being triggered by them) natural kind terms in that it is not up to the sciences to tell us what having
cannot appropriately describe the particular cognitive role of phenomenal an experience of a particular kind amounts to (we know what it amounts
concepts (see White 2007 and Connell 1994). to by having them and attending to the quality at issue). It is quite clear
that an account of this intuitive idea has to be one of the ingredients of a
5. The Dualist View About the Knowledge dualist defense of the knowledge argument. Nida-Rümelin (2007)
Argument develops a technical notion of grasping properties which is intended to
serve the purposes of dualists who argue against materialism using the
There has not been much discussion of the knowledge argument from a assumption that in the special case of phenomenal concepts the relation
dualist perspective. This is unsurprising given the small number of that the thinker bears to the property he conceptualizes is more intimate
contemporary philosophers who defend a dualist position (for a prominent than in other cases: the thinker understands what having the property

than in other cases: the thinker understands what having the property (2007). Other possible reactions to the threat of epiphenomenalism for
essentially consists in. This idea can be used to block familiar objections dualism would be either to doubt that a property dualist must embrace
to the knowledge argument in particular those falling into the Old fact/ epiphenomenalism or to develop an account of knowledge about one's
New Knowlegde category. A similar basic idea but formulated within a own phenomenal states that does not imply a causal relation between
different theoretical framework is elaborated in Stephen White (2007). qualia and phenomenal knowledge about qualia (see Chalmers 2002).
According to mainstream opinion the most serious problem for property 6. Concluding Remark
dualism is the danger of being driven into epiphenomenalism. If
phenomenal characters are non-physical properties and if every physical The appropriate evaluation of the knowledge argument remains
event has a physical cause and if we exclude the possibility of controversial. The acceptability of its second premise P2 (Mary lacks
overdetermination (where something is caused by two different causes factual knowledge before release) and of the inferences from P1 (Mary
that are both sufficient), then, arguably, whether or not a state has a has complete physical knowledge before release) to C1 (Mary knows all
particular phenomenal character cannot have any causal relevance. But if the physical facts) and from P2 to C2 (Mary does not know some facts
qualia are causally impotent, how can a person know that she has an before release) depend on quite technical and controversial issues about
experience with a particular phenomenal character? Many take it to be (a) the appropriate theory of property concepts and their relation to the
obvious that a person cannot know that she now has a blue experience properties they express and (b) the appropriate theory of belief content. It
unless her blue experience plays a prominent causal role in the formation is therefore safe to predict that the discussion about the knowledge
of her belief at issue. This particular problem has been formulated as an argument will not come to an end in the near future.
objection against the knowledge argument in Watkins (1989). Until some
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Qualia: The Knowledge Argument

1. Remarks About the History of the Underlying Intuition

compassion and piety, know about what is going on during a

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