FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-40500. February 27, 1976.]

FAUSTO AUMAN, LIBRADO AUMAN, JORGE AUMAN, GREGORIO AUMAN,

ERNESTO AUMAN, VICENTA AUMAN, CONCEPCION A. LUMAPAS, and
CARLOS AUMAN , petitioners, vs. HON. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, Judge,
Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch V (Ormoc Branch) GERONIMO
C. CAPAHI, ENCARNACION CORTES , respondents.

Amado G. Olis for the petitioners.

Cristobal S. Mendiola for the private respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Defendants resisted plaintiffs' complaint for an easement of right-of-way on the

grounds that plaintiffs' lands had an outlet to the public highway other than through
defendants' lands; that the proposed right-of-way is the longest, most circuitous and
burdensome; and that it is possible to construct a road right-of-way involving only
twelve meters in length (instead of the 245 meters proposed by plaintiffs) which could
start from plaintiff's lot through defendants' adjoining lot, with an exit to a public road.
The trial court in its order setting the case for pre-trial, required both parties to a
list of witnesses and documents supporting their action or defense, their memoranda
to support their respective contentions and affidavit of their witnesses.
The defendants, herein petitioners, complied with the order earlier than the
plaintiffs. Shortly, plaintiffs also complied partially, with a request to submit the
affidavits of witnesses later.
Without the a davits of plaintiffs' witnesses having been submitted to complete
the documents required of them in the pre-trial settling order and even without any
motion for summary judgment, the trial court entered a summary judgment adverse to
the defendants, failing therein to resolve certain issues raised by them in their answer.
Upon petition to review the Supreme Court held that the trial court gravely
abused its discretion in entering the impugned summary judgment, defendants having
been denied the procedural right accorded them by section 3, Rule 34 of the Rules of
Court.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENTS; SUMMARY JUDGMENT, NATURE AND

REQUISITES. — A summary judgment is one granted by the court, upon motion by any
of the parties, for the prompt and expeditious settlement of the case, after both parties
have pleaded, the motion to be supported by a davits, depositions, or other
documents, after notice thereof had been served upon the adverse party, who in turn
may oppose the motion with supporting a davits and other documents, and after
hearing, it appears that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, except as to
the amount of damages, and that the movant or the moving party is entitled to a
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 judgment as a matter of law.
2. ID.; D.; ID.; RULE 34 REQUISITES SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS FROM PARTY
IN WHOSE FAVOR JUDGMENT IS RENDERED. — A summary judgment rendered by a
trial court violates the basic rule (Rule 34), where no motion for a summary judgment
with supporting a davits and/or depositions was ever led by the party in whose favor
the judgment was rendered, and served on adverse party.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, PURPOSE. — The
purpose of a motion for summary judgment is to enable that trial court to determine
whether or not a bona fide issue exists between the parties, and if none , for the court to
render a summary judgment as prayed for. This the court can do only after proper
notice to the adverse party who has to be served with copy of the motion for summary
judgment with its supporting a davits at least ten days before the speci ed date of
the hearing of the motions (Sec. 3, Rule 34). The adverse party is given by the Rules
su cient time to prepare and submit on the date of the hearing his show that he has a
real and valid defense which raises a genuine issue of fact proper for trial.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; HEARING IS INDISPENSABLE WHERE GENUINE ISSUES OF
FACT ARE RAISED. — The trial court's statement in its pre-trial order that the parties
shall submit their memoranda, together with their exhibits and a davits of witnesses,
in support of their respective contentions, and that thereafter the case shall be
submitted for a judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment under Sec. 3, Rule 20
of the Rules of Court should the court nd that acts and facts exist to warrant such
judgment, does not constitute substantial compliance with the Rule and does not
prelude the necessity of hearing the parties on the propriety of the summary judgment.
A hearing is an invariable prerequisite, as its essence, is to inquire into the existence of
genuine controversy, especially where there is lack of the necessary documents such
as a davits and/or depositions of the witnesses of the plaintiffs, or even admissions
of the defendants, and all that plaintiffs submitted at the pre-trial was a list of their
exhibits and witnesses without presenting the a davits of the latter to form a basis for
a summary judgment in their favor.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Where the answer of the defendants as well as the
a davits of their witnesses raise genuine issues that could be resolved only after an
appreciation of the evidence of the parties, it is grave abuse of discretion for the trial
court to render a summary judgment without resolving said issues, or worse still,
decide them without receiving evidence on the matter.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Where the complaint for an easement of
right-of-way was resisted by defendants on the ground that: rst, plaintiffs' lands had
an outlet to the public highway other than through defendants' lands; second, the
proposed right-of-way is the longest, most circuitous and burdensome; and third, it is
possible to construct a road right-of-way involving only 12 meters in length (instead of
the 246 proposed by plaintiffs) through defendants' adjoining lot, with an exit to a
public road; so that there arises genuine issues of fact that could be resolved only on
the basis of the evidence of the parties, namely: (1) did the lands of plaintiffs have
adequate outlet to the public highway; (2) was the proposed road only possible exit;
and (3) was it the least prejudicial to the owners of the servient estate; HELD: It is error
for the trial court to enter a summary judgment against defendants granting the
proposed right-of-way, xing the amount of rental to be paid by plaintiff, and even
allowing the latter to buy the potion of the land to be used as the road right-of-way.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT'S AUTHORITY AND FUNCTION. — Sec. 3, Rule 34 of the
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 Rules of Court does not invest the court with jurisdiction summarily to try the factual
issues on deposition and a davits, but gives the court limited authority to enter
summary judgment only if it clearly appears that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact. Upon a motion for summary judgment the Court's sole function is to
determine whether there is an issue of fact to be tried, and all doubts as to the
existence of an issue of fact must be resolved against the moving party.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUMMARY JUDGMENT IMPROPER WHEN GENUINE ISSUES OF
FACT EXIST. — A summary judgment can only be rendered where no questions of fact
are at issue, or the material allegations of the pleadings are not disputed. It is error for
a trial court to grant a motion for summary judgment where the case is controversial.
Thus, the Supreme Court will annul and set aside a summary judgment declaring the
plaintiff owner of a litigated property and ordering defendant to vacate the same, where
it appears from defendant's pleadings and a davits opposing a motion for summary
judgment that genuine issues of fact exist which make a trial indispensable and a
summary judgment improper.
9. JUSTICE, ADMINISTRATION OF; PROCEDURE; SHORTCUTS AVOIDED. —
The demands of a fair, impartial, and wise administration of justice call for a faithful
adherence to legal precepts on procedure which ensure to litigants the opportunity to
present their evidence and secure a ruling on all issues presented in their respective
pleadings. Short-cuts in judicial processes are to be avoided where they impede rather
than promote a judicious dispensation of justice.

DECISION

MUÑOZ PALMA , J : p

Did respondent Judge, Hon. Numeriano G. Estenzo, of the Court of First Instance
of Leyte, Branch V, err and gravely abuse his discretion when he rendered a Summary
Judgment in Civil Case No. 1395-0 on February 25, 1975, favor of private respondents
herein and against petitioners, and issued the order dated Branch 24, 1975, denying the
latter's motion for reconsideration of said judgment? 1
On January 14, 1975, spouses Geronimo and Encarnacion Capahi who are now
the private respondents led a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Leyte
(Ormoc Branch) against Fausto Auman and others, now petitioners, for an easement of
right-of-way and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 1395-0), substantially alleging
that spouses Capahi are the lessees of ve parcels of land (Lots Nos. 6703-B-1, 6701,
6708, 6707 and 6705 with an approximate area of 11.9311 hectares more or less),
located in Barrio R. M. Tan, Ormoc City, belonging to one Eulogio Simon, while Fausto
Auman and his co-defendants are the co-owners of four parcels (Lots Nos. 6696, 6700,
6702 and 6603-part) also located in the same barrio; that the lots leased to spouses
Capahi have no adequate outlet to a public highway except the lands of the Aumans,
hence, the necessity for an easement of right-of-way, as shown in the sketch plan
attached to the complaint, limited to the necessary passage of the vehicles of the
Capahis and the transportation of their sugarcane through the servient estate to the
public highway and to the sugar mills. 2
Petitioners, as defendants, answered the complaint speci cally denying the
material allegations thereof and setting up in turn the following special and a rmative
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 defenses:
"8. That no easement of whatever kind exists on the land of
defendants in favor of either Eulogio Simon or plaintiffs, and none could be
declared by this Honorable Court;

"9. That no easement of right of way has been provided for and
included in the alleged contract of lease;

"10. That plaintiffs have not asked Eulogio Simon, the owner of the
lands, to demand from defendants and other adjoining owners right of way in
favor of Simon's lands;
"11. That the complaint has failed to establish that plaintiffs have
complied with the pre-conditions for the grant of the easement of right of way
xed by Articles 649 and 650 of the new Civil Code, namely, (a) that the leased
lands are surrounded by other immovables and have no adequate outlet to a
public highway, (b) that proper indemnity for the value of the lands to be occupied
and the amount of the damage caused to the said lands and their improvements
has been pre-paid, (c) that the isolation was not due to plaintiffs' own acts, and
(d) that the right-of-way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the defendants'
lands and that the distance from Simon's lands to the public highway is the
shortest;
"12. That the easement claimed is not compulsory;

"13. That plaintiffs have no cause of action against defendants, nor

the complaint has stated any;

"14. That plaintiffs own sketch, Annex B, unmistakably shows that the
right-of-way demanded is the most prejudicial, most onerous, and most
burdensome imposition upon defendants' lands causing defendants the
maximum inconvenience, and covers the longest and most circuitous route from
Simon's lands to the public highway." (pp. 36-37, rollo)

In an Order dated February 5, 1975, the case was set for a pre-trial for February
17, 1975, and parties were ordered to submit on said date the following: prLL

(a) a list of witnesses and documents supporting their action or

defense;

(b) affidavits of the witnesses to serve as direct examination; and

(c) their respective memoranda in support of the parties' respective
contentions.

The Order also warned that any party who failed to submit on said date and time, a list
of witnesses with a davits as aforesaid or documents, which a davits or documents
should be attached to said list would be non-suited or defaulted as the case may be, for
failure to prosecute his claims or defenses. 3
On February 17, a copy of their reply dated February 14, 1975, was furnished by
respondents-spouses to petitioners together with a new sketch plan of the lands
involved with the explanation that the new sketch showed the Pagsanga-an river which
traversed the lands leased by respondents-spouses. The same reply also contained an
answer to the counterclaim. 4
On the same date, February 17, a list of exhibits and of the witnesses was
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 submitted by private respondents to the trial court, in partial compliance with the order
of February 5. 5 On their part, petitioners herein submitted their Memorandum dated
February 15, 1975, giving the names of their witnesses and the substance of their
testimonies, together with a davits of said witnesses, and a brief statement as to why
the right-of-way should not be granted. 6
When the case was called for pre-trial, the petitioners were ready to proceed but
the private respondents were not as they did not have the required a davits of their
witnesses, and upon their request the Judge reset the case for February 26, 1975 for
the submission of said a davits. On February 24, 1975, petitioners' counsel received a
telegraphic notice from the trial court that the case had to be reset for February 25
since the original date of February 26 had been declared a special public holiday. 7
On February 25, 1975, petitioners however led by registered mail a "Motion to
Admit Amended Answer" to which was attached the Amended Answer dated February
24, 1975. Petitioners alleged in their motion that since the reply of private respondents
presented a sketch different from that attached to the complaint and in order that the
issues would be dealt with squarely, it was necessary and expedient that the answer of
petitioners be amended accordingly without altering the theory of their defense. 8
Petitioners' counsel also wired the Clerk of Court asking that the Motion to Admit
Amended Answer be set for hearing on March 6 instead of May 6 as stated in the
motion. 9
On March 5, a wire was received by petitioners from Judge Estenzo to the effect
that the Motion to Admit Amended Answer had become moot and academic because a
Summary Judgment had been rendered by him. 1 0 On March 7, petitioners' counsel
received a copy of the Summary Judgment dated February 25, 1975, with the following
dispositive portion: LibLex

"WHEREFORE, summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the

plaintiffs and against the defendants ordering the latter to open a road right-of-
way on Lots 6696, 6700, 6703 of the Ormoc Cadastre, necessary for sugarcane
trucks to pass, upon plaintiffs' payment to the defendants of a rental at the rate
of P400.00 per hectare of sugar harvest, or of the amount at the rate of P4,000.00
per hectare as a sale of what maybe used as road right of way, with the plaintiffs
obligation of maintaining the road right of way after such payment, for both the
plaintiffs and the defendants to use said road right of way as indicated in Annex
'B-1', without pronouncement as to costs." (p. 79, rollo)

Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the foregoing summary judgment

principally on the ground that it was prematurely rendered and prayed that their
amended answer be admitted and the case set for pre-trial and trial. 1 1 The Motion for
Reconsideration was denied in an Order dated March 24, 1975. 1 2 Hence, this appeal on
certiorari.
We find merit in this petition.
Rule 34 of the Rules of Court covers summary judgments and sets down the
procedure to be taken in order that a summary judgment may be issued by a trial court.
Brie y stated, a summary judgment is one granted by the court, upon motion by
any of the parties, for the prompt and expeditious settlement of the case, after both
parties have pleaded, the motion to be supported by a davits, depositions, or other
documents, after notice thereof had been served upon the adverse party, who in turn
may oppose the motion with supporting a davits and other documents and, after
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 hearing, it appears that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, except as to
the amount of damages, and that the movant or the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. 1 3
The summary judgment rendered by respondent Judge Estenzo was in violation
of the foregoing basic rule.
1. There was no motion for a summary judgment with supporting a davits
and/or depositions that was ever led by respondents Capahi and served on
petitioners herein.
As enumerated and reproduced in the summary judgment itself, all that
respondent Judge had before him on February 25, 1975, the date when the judgment
was rendered, were the following: complaint for easement of right-of-way; answer of
the defendants; Order dated February 25, 1975, setting the case for pre-trial and trial
and requiring the parties to submit their respective list of witnesses and corresponding
a davits, documentary evidence, etc.; list of exhibits of plaintiffs Capahi and the
latter's witnesses; and defendants' Memorandum containing a list of witnesses and
their respective affidavits.
Respondents Capahi did not submit on or before February 25, 1975, the
a davits or depositions of their witnesses as they now claim in their memorandum
led before this Court on September 10, 1975, for had they done so, those documents
would have been mentioned and reproduced in the summary judgment as was done
with the a davits of petitioners' witnesses. We believe, therefore, petitioners'
contention that respondent Judge rendered his summary judgment without any
supporting documents from respondents Capahi in whose favor the judgment was
rendered.
The purpose of a motion for Summary judgment 1 4 is to enable the trial court to
determine whether or not a bona de issue exists between the parties, and if none, for
the court to render a summary judgment as prayed for This the court can do only after
proper notice to the adverse party who has to be served with a copy of the motion for
summary judgment with its supporting a davits at least ten days before the speci ed
date of the hearing of the motion (Sec. 3, Rule 34). The adverse or opposing party is
given by the Rules su cient time to prepare and submit on the date of the hearing his
own counter-a davits, depositions, or other documents to show that it has a real and
valid defense which raises a genuine issue of fact proper for trial. (id.) prcd

Quite obviously, petitioners herein were denied the right accorded them by
Section 3, Rule 34, and respondent Judge rendered judgment against them without
proper hearing.
Private respondents assert, however, that there was substantial compliance with
the Rules when the trial court included in its Order of February 5, 1975, setting the case
for pre-trial, the following statement:
"Both parties are granted until February 17, 1975, at 7:30 A.M. to submit
their respective memorandum in support of their respective contentions in their
pleadings as may be supported by the a davits of their witnesses and exhibits,
at which time the incident will be heard and thereafter submitted for a judgment
on the pleadings or a summary judgment pursuant to Section 3, Rule 20 of the
Revised Rules of Court should this Court nd that acts and facts exist which
would warrant such judgment." (p. 41, rollo)

The above statement of the court a quo did not preclude the necessity of hearing
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 the parties on the propriety of a summary judgment. A hearing was an invariable
prerequisite, as its essence was to inquire into the existence of a genuine controversy,
especially since in the instant case there was lack of the necessary documents such as
a davits and/or depositions of the witnesses of the plaintiffs, now respondents,
Capahi, or even admissions of the defendants, now petitioners. As adverted to earlier,
all that respondent Capahi submitted at the pre-trial was a list of their exhibits, and
witnesses, but that no a davits of the latter were presented to form a basis for a
summary judgment in their favor.
Strangely enough, as petitioners now maintain notwithstanding the fact that they
were the very ones who had presented a davits of their witnesses showing the
presence of real issues of fact which needed to be tried, the summary judgment
rendered by respondent Judge was adverse to them.
2. The answer of petitioners herein as defendants in the court below as well
as the a davits of their witnesses submitted on February 17, 1975, raised genuine
issues which could be resolved only after an appreciation of the evidence of the parties.
Petitioners resisted the complaint for an easement of right-of-way over their
lands on various grounds: rst, that the lands of Capahi had an outlet to the public
highway other than through the lands of the Aumans, that is, to the east where a road
built by plaintiff's older brother is being used to transport sugar cane, second, that the
proposed road right-of-way which measures 5 meters wide and 246 meters long is the
longest, most circuitous and burdensome, as it passes through all the four lots of
Fausto Auman, although it is possible to construct a road right-of-way through only one
of the lots, lot No. 6703, which would be the shortest and nearest exit to the public
road, and third, the right-of-way could start from Capahi's lot 6705 which adjoins
Auman's lot 6703 where the R.M. Tan road ends, thereby involving only a portion of 12
meters. (Joint a davit of Fausto Auman, Defendant's Memorandum, Amended Answer,
pp. 49-50, 57, rollo)
To substantiate the merits of their defense, petitioners invoked Article 649 of the
Civil Code which expressly provides that the owner, or any person who by virtue of a
real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other
immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a public
highway, is entitled to demand a right-of-way through the neighboring estates, after
payment of the proper indemnity, and Article 650 which states that the easement of a
right-of-way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and
insofar as not in con ict with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to
a public highway may be the shortest.
Among the issues of fact therefore which were to be resolved and could be
resolved by the trial court only on the basis of the evidence of the parties, were: (1) did
the lands of Capahi have adequate outlet to the public highway; (2) was the proposed
road the only possible exit; and (3) was it the least prejudicial to the owners of the
servient estate? LexLib

Without resolving these issues, or worse still, deciding them without receiving
evidence on the matter, respondent Judge pronounced judgment against petitioners
granting the proposed right-of-way, xing the amount of P400.00 as rental to be paid
by Capahi, and even allowing the latter to buy the portion of land to be used as the road
right-of-way at P4,000.00 a hectare.
Undoubtedly, respondent Judge is misguided in his concept of a summary
judgment.
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 It is settled that Rule 34 of the Rules of Court
". . . does not vest in the court jurisdiction summarily to try the issues on
depositions and a davits, but gives the court limited authority to enter summary
judgment only if it clearly appears that there is no genuine issue of material fact.
Upon a motion for summary judgment the Court's sole function is to determine
whether there is an issue of fact to be tried, and all doubts as to the existence of
an issued of fact must be resolved against the moving party. On a motion for
summary judgment the court is not authorized to decide an issued of fact, but is
to determine whether the pleadings and record before the court create an issue of
fact to be tried. In others words, the rule (Rule 34, Sec. 3) does not invest the court
with jurisdiction summarily to try the factual issues on a davits, but authorizes
summary judgment only if it clearly appears that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact." (Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court. Vol. 1, p. 600, 2nd
Ed. (Emphasis Ours)

Judge Estenzo's reference to the case of Taleon vs. Secretary of Public Works, L-
24281, May 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 69, as his authority (p. 83, rollo) is untenable. In Taleon a
summary judgment was rendered by the trial court and upheld by this Court for only
purely questions of law were involved which did not require a full trial. Thus this Court
held:
"Appellants' contentions are without merits. First of all, a full trial was not
needed. The issues raised before the court a quo were all purely legal and thus
could be resolved on the basis of the pleadings and memoranda led and the
administrative records sent up to it. No necessity was there for further reception
of evidence." (20 SCRA 73)

What should have guided respondent Judge is, among others, Ibañez vs. North
Negros Sugar Co, Inc., et al., L-6790, March 28, 1955, where this Court emphasized the
rule that a summary judgment can only be rendered where there are no questions of
fact at issue, or where the material allegations of the pleadings are not disputed, and
that it is error for a trial court to grant a motion for summary judgment in spite of the
controversial nature of the case involved. Likewise in Gatchalian vs. Pavilin, et al., L-
17619. October 31, 1962, 6 SCRA 509. this Court annulled and set aside a summary
judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Isabela in its civil case No. 385
which declared plaintiff-appellee, Francisca Gatchalian, owner of the property under
litigation and ordered defendant-appellants to vacate the same, the Court nding that
from the pleadings and a davits submitted by the defendants in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment, there were genuine issues of fact which made a trial
indispensable and a summary judgment improper. In Agcanas vs. Nagum, L-20707,
March 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 298, 299, this Court, with Justice Claudio Teehankee as the
writer of the Opinion, reiterated once again "the established precept that trial courts
have but limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only in cases
where there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact." 1 5
In closing, it may be well to restate what this writer said for the Court in
Constantino vs. Hon. Estenzo, et al., L-40403, July 31, 1975: cdll

". . . The demands of a fair, impartial, and wise administration of justice

call for a faithful adherence to legal precepts on procedure which ensure to
litigants the opportunity to present their evidence and secure a ruling on all the
issues presented in their respective pleadings. 'Shortcuts' in judicial processes are
to be avoided where they impede rather than promote a judicious dispensation of
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 justice." (65 SCRA 675, 679)

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, We hereby set aside the summary judgment in
Civil Case No. 1395-0 dated February 25, 1975, as well as the order of respondent court
dated March 24, 1975, and order respondent Judge to admit the amended answer of
petitioners herein in the aforesaid case, to set the case for pre-trial, and a trial on the
merits, pursuant to law. With costs against private respondents.
So Ordered.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Esguerra and Martin, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. In its Resolution dated July 23, 1975, the Court resolved to treat this Petition as a special
civil action, to consider respondents' Comment as their Answer and to decide the same
upon submission by the parties of their memoranda. (p. 136, rollo)
2. Complaint, pp. 27-34, rollo.

3. pp. 40-41, ibid.

4. pp. 42-44, ibid.
5. pp. 45-46, ibid.
6. pp. 47-51, ibid.

7. p. 52, ibid.
8. pp. 53-62, ibid.
9. pp. 64-65, ibid.
10. p. 66, ibid.
11. pp. 80-89, ibid.

12. p. 97, ibid.

13. Rule 34, Sections 1, 2, 3, Rules of Court; Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court 1970
Edition, Vol. II, pp. 175-176.
14. Section 1, Rule 34, Rules of Court. Summary judgment for claimant. — A party seeking
to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief
may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
(Emphasis Ours)
Section 2, Rule 34, Rules of Court Summary judgment for defending party. — A
party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory
relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits for a summary
judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. (Emphasis Ours)
15. See also Philippine National Bank vs. Puruganan, et al., L-25472, Jan. 31, 1968, 22
SCRA 468; and Consing vs. Jamandre, L-27674, May 12, 1975, First Division, 64 SCRA 1.

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