The Financial Crisis of 2008: What Happened in Simple Terms
The Financial Crisis of 2008: What Happened in Simple Terms
The Financial Crisis of 2008: What Happened in Simple Terms
The financial crisis happened because banks were able to create too much money, too quickly, and used
it to push up house prices and speculate on financial markets.
Most analysts link the current credit crisis to the sub-prime mortgage business, in which US banks give
high-risk loans to people with poor credit histories.
These and other loans, bonds or assets are bundled into portfolios - or Collateralised Debt Obligations
(CDOs) - and sold on to investors globally.
Thousands of people took out loans larger than they could afford in the hopes that they could either flip
the house for profit or refinance later at a lower rate and with more equity in their home – which they
would then leverage to purchase another “investment” house.
A lot of people got rich quickly and people wanted more. Before long, all you needed to buy a house was
a pulse and your word that you could afford the mortgage. Brokers had no reason not to sell you a
home. They made a cut on the sale, then packaged the mortgage with a group of other mortgages and
erased all personal responsibility of the loan. But many of these mortgage backed assets were ticking
time bombs. And they just went off.
- Banks approves loans such as mortgages. Loans were repackaged by investment banks and sold to
other investors
Loans were given to borrowers who effectively had no chance of paying them back. This was done so
because as mortgages are secured to the asset (housing), thus the house could compensate for the
borrower's’ inability to repay
When the housing market crashed in 2008, the CDO's was worth much less than what was expected
This heightened the risk of interbank lending as banks did not know which ones were credit-worthy
The regulators’ most dramatic error was to let Lehman Brothers go bankrupt. This multiplied the panic
in markets. Suddenly, nobody trusted anybody, so nobody would lend. Non-financial companies, unable
to rely on being able to borrow to pay suppliers or workers, froze spending in order to hoard cash,
causing a seizure in the real economy. Ironically, the decision to stand back and allow Lehman to go
bankrupt resulted in more government intervention, not less. To stem the consequent panic, regulators
had to rescue scores of other companies.
But the regulators made mistakes long before the Lehman bankruptcy, most notably by tolerating global
current-account imbalances and the housing bubbles that they helped to inflate.