Ocampo v. Enriquez

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 225973. August 8, 2017.]
SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, TRINIDAD H. REPUNO,

BIENVENIDO LUMBERA BONIFACIO P. ILAGAN, NERI JAVIER
COLMENARES, MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, M.D.,
SAMAHAN NG EX-DETAINEES LABAN SA DETENSYON AT
ARESTO (SELDA), represented by DIONITO CABILLAS,
CARMENCITA M. FLORENTINO, RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO,
FELIX C. DALISAY, and DANILO M. DELA FUENTE , *
petitioners, vs. REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ (in his
capacity as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Reservist and
Retiree Affairs, Armed Forces of the Philippines), The Grave
Services Unit (Philippine Army), and GENERAL RICARDO R.
VISAYA (in his capacity as the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces
of the Philippines), DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN
LORENZANA, and HEIRS OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
represented by his surviving spouse Imelda Romualdez
Marcos, respondents.
RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, SR., RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, JR., RENE

A.C. SAGUISAG III, intervenors.
[G.R. No. 225984. August 8, 2017.]
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, in his personal and official

capacities and as a member of Congress and as the
Honorary Chairperson of the Families of Victims of
Involuntary Disappearance (FIND); FAMILIES OF VICTIMS OF
INVOLUNTARY DISAPPEARANCE (FIND), represented by its
Co-Chairperson, NILDA L. SEVILLA; REP. TEDDY BRAWNER
BAGUILAT, JR.; REP. TOMASITO S. VILLARIN; REP. EDGAR R.
ERICE; and REP. EMMANUEL A. BILLONES , petitioners, vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA; DEFENSE
SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA; AFP CHIEF OF STAFF
LT. GEN. RICARDO R. VISAYA; AFP DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ; and PHILIPPINE
VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE (PVAO) ADMINISTRATOR LT.
GEN. ERNESTO G. CAROLINA (Ret.), respondents.
[G.R. No. 226097. August 8, 2017.]
LORETTA ANN PARGAS-ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO, AIDA

F. SANTOS-MARANAN, JO-ANN Q. MAGLIPON, ZENAIDA S.
MIQUE, FE B. MANGAHAS, MA. CRISTINA P. BAWAGAN, MILA
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com
D. AGUILAR, MINERVA G. GONZALES, MA. CRISTINA V.
RODRIGUEZ, LOUIE G. CRISMO, FRANCISCO E. RODRIGO, JR.,
LIWAYWAY D. ARCE, and ABDULMARI DE LEON IMAO, JR. ,
petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C.
MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA, AFP
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO C.
ENRIQUEZ, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RICARDO R.
VISAYA, and HEIRS OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, represented
by his surviving spouse IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 226116. August 8, 2017.]
HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, JOEL C. LAMANGAN, FRANCIS X.

MANGLAPUS, EDILBERTO C. DE JESUS, BELINDA O.
CUNANAN, CECILIA GUIDOTE ALVAREZ, REX DEGRACIA
LORES, SR., ARNOLD MARIE NOEL, CARLOS MANUEL,
EDMUND S. TAYAO, DANILO P. OLIVARES, NOEL F.
TRINIDAD, JESUS DELA FUENTE, REBECCA M. QUIJANO, FR.
BENIGNO BELTRAN, SVD, ROBERTO S. VERZOLA, AUGUSTO
A. LEGASTO, JR., and JULIA KRISTINA P. LEGASTO ,
petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C.
MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA, AFP
CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RICARDO R. VISAYA, AFP DEPUTY
CHIEF OF STAFF REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ, and
PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE (PVAO) of the DND ,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 226117. August 8, 2017.]
ZAIRA PATRICIA B. BANIAGA, JOHN ARVIN BUENAAGUA,

JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, JUAN ANTONIO RAROGAL
MAGALANG, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE DELFIN N. LORENZANA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF
RICARDO R. VISAYA, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE PHILIPPINE
VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE ERNESTO G. CAROLINA ,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 226120. August 8, 2017.]
ALGAMAR A. LATIPH , petitioner, vs. SECRETARY DELFIN N.

LORENZANA, sued in his capacity as Secretary of National
Defense, LT. GEN. RICARDO R. VISAYA, in his capacity as
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
LT. GEN. ERNESTO G. CAROLINA (ret.), in his capacity as
Administrator, Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) ,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 226294. August 8, 2017.]
LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her capacity as SENATOR OF THE

REPUBLIC and as TAXPAYER , petitioner, vs. HON. SALVADOR
C. MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA,
AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RICARDO R. VISAYA,
UNDERSECRETARY ERNESTO G. CAROLINA, in his capacity
as PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE (PVAO)
ADMINISTRATOR and B/GEN. RESTITUTO L. AGUILAR, in his
capacity as SHRINE CURATOR AND CHIEF, VETERANS
MEMORIAL AND HISTORICAL DIVISION and HEIRS OF
FERDINAND EDRALIN MARCOS, respondents.
[G.R. No. 228186. August 8, 2017.]
SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, TRINIDAD H. REPUNO, BONIFACIO

P. ILAGAN, MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, M.D., SAMAHAN
NG EX-DETAINEES LABAB SA DETENSYON AT ARESTO
(SELDA) represented by ANGELINA BISUNA, CARMENCITA
M. FLORENTINO, RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, FELIX C. DALISAY,
DANILO M. DELA FUENTE, petitioners, vs. REAR ADMIRAL
ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ (in his capacity as the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Reservist and Retiree Affairs, Armed Forces of
the Philippines), The Grave Services Unit (Philippine Army)
and GENERAL RICARDO R. VISAYA (in his capacity as the
Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines), DEFENSE
SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA, and HEIRS OF FERDINAND
E. MARCOS, SR., represented by his surviving spouse
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS and legitimate children IMEE,
IRENE and FERDINAND, JR., respondents.
[G.R. No. 228245. August 8, 2017.]
LORETTA ANN PARGAS-ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO, AIDA

F. SANTOS-MARANAN, JO-ANN Q. MAGLIPON, ZENAIDA S.
MIQUE, FE B. MANGAHAS, MA. CRISTINA P. BAWAGAN, MILA
D. AGUILAR, MINERVA G. GONZALES, MA. CRISTINA V.
RODRIGUEZ, LOUIE G. CRISMO, FRANCISCO E. RODRIGO, JR.,
LIWAYWAY D. ARCE, and ABDULMARI DE LEON IMAO, JR. ,
petitioners, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR
MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA,
REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ (in his capacity as
the Deputy Chief of Staff for reservist and Retiree Affairs,
Armed Forces of the Philippines), GENERAL RICARDO R.
VISAYA (in his capacity as Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of
the Philippines), and HEIRS OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
represented by IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERALTA, J : p
On November 8, 2016, the Court dismissed the petitions challenging

the intended burial of the mortal remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos),
former President of the Republic of the Philippines, at the Libingan ng mga
Bayani (LNMB). As the Filipino public witnessed through the broadcast media
and as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifested 1 based on the
letter sent by the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) of the Department
of National Defense (DND), Marcos was finally laid to rest at the LNMB
around noontime of November 18, 2016, which was ten (10) days after the
promulgation of the judgment and prior to the filing of petitioners' separate
motions for reconsideration. cSEDTC
Now before Us are the following matters for resolution:

1. Motions for reconsideration (MRs) filed by Ocampo et al., 2
Lagman et al., 3 Rosales et al., 4 Latiph, 5 and De Lima; 6
2. Urgent motion or petition for the exhumation of Marcos' remains
at the LNMB filed by Lagman et al.; 7 and
3. Petitions to cite respondents in contempt of court filed by
Ocampo et al. 8 and Rosales et al., 9 which were consolidated 10
with the case and docketed as G.R. No. 228186 and G.R. No.
228245, respectively.
Respondents were ordered to file their Comment to the above-
mentioned pleadings, as to which they complied in due time.
We shall first tackle the procedural issues raised.
Political question doctrine
Petitioners argue that the main issue of the petitions does not deal on
the wisdom of the actions of President Rodrigo R. Duterte (Duterte) and the
public respondents but their violation of the 1987 Constitution (Constitution),
laws, and jurisprudence. They posit that, under its expanded jurisdiction, the
Court has the duty to exercise judicial power to review even those decisions
or exercises of discretion that were formerly considered political questions in
order to determine whether there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of a public officer.
From the records of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a power but also a duty
which cannot be abdicated by the mere invocation of the political question
doctrine. 11 Nonetheless, Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion clarified that
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution was not intended to do away with
"truly political questions," which are beyond judicial review due to the
doctrine of separation of powers. 12 In Francisco, Jr. v. The House of
Representatives, 13 this Court conceded that Section 1 Article VIII does not
define what are "truly political questions" and "those which are not truly
political," and that identification of these two species may be problematic
since there has been no clear standard. In the end, however, We resolved
that, "[i]n our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a
truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question
of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound
to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government
properly acted within such limits." 14
The Court sees no cogent reason to depart from the standard set in
Francisco, Jr. Applying that in this case, We hold that petitioners failed to
demonstrate that the constitutional provisions they invoked delimit the
executive power conferred upon President Duterte. Significantly, AFP
Regulations G 161-375 was issued by order of the DND Secretary, who, as
the alter ego of the President, has supervision and control over the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the PVAO. The Veterans Memorial
Historical Division of the PVAO is tasked to administer, develop and maintain
military shrines such as the LNMB. As held in Our Decision, AFP Regulations
G 161-375 is presumptively valid and has the force and effect of a law and
that, until set aside by the Court, is binding upon executive and
administrative agencies like public respondents, including the President as
the chief executor of the laws.
While the Bill of Rights stands primarily as a limitation not only against
legislative encroachments on individual liberties but also against
presidential intrusions, 15 petitioners failed to show as well that President
Duterte violated the due process and equal protection clauses in issuing a
verbal order to public respondents that authorized Marcos' burial at the
LNMB. To note, if the grant of presidential pardon to one who is totally
undeserving cannot be set aside under the political question doctrine, 16 the
same holds true with respect to the President's power to faithfully execute a
valid and existing AFP regulation governing the LNMB as a national military
cemetery and military shrine.
More so, even if subject to review by the Court, President Duterte did
not gravely abuse his discretion when he allowed Marcos' burial at the LNMB
because it was already shown that the latter is qualified as a Medal of Valor
Awardee, a war veteran, and a retired military personnel, and not
disqualified due to dishonorable separation/revertion/discharge from service
or conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude. If
grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for
that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by
law is for the latter alone to decide. 17
Locus standi
Petitioners claim to have a legal standing to file the petitions because

they have already sustained direct injury as a result of the act being
questioned in this case. With respect to petitioners who are human rights
violation victims (HRVVs) during the martial law period, they contend that
their right to dispute Marcos' burial at the LNMB rests on their right to full
and effective remedy and entitlement to reparation as guaranteed by the
State under the Constitution as well as the domestic and international laws.
In particular, they cite Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10368, arguing that Marcos'
burial at the LNMB distorts the historical bases upon which their rights to
other non-monetary compensation were granted, and is an affront to their
honor and dignity that was restored to them by law. Essentially, petitioners
decry that Marcos' burial at the LNMB results in illegal use of public funds,
re-traumatization, historical revisionism, disregard of their state recognition
as heroes and their rights to effective reparation and to satisfaction.
Petitioners' contentions still fail to persuade.
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. 18 Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when he or
she can demonstrate that (1) he or she has personally suffered some actual
or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
(3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy being sought. 19
Petitioners have not clearly shown the direct injury they suffered or would
suffer on account of the assailed memorandum and directive allowing
Marcos' burial at the LNMB.
Petitioners' view that they sustained or will sustain direct injury is
founded on the wrong premise that Marcos' burial at the LNMB contravenes
the provisions of the Constitution; P.D. No. 105; R.A. Nos. 289, 10066,
10086, 10368; and international laws. However, as the Court fully explained
in the assailed Decision, the historical and legal bases governing the LNMB
unequivocally reveal its nature and purpose as an active military
cemetery/grave site over which President Duterte has certain discretionary
authority, pursuant to his control and commander-in-chief powers, which is
beyond the Court's judicial power to review. SDAaTC
Petitioners cannot also maintain that Marcos' burial at the LNMB serves
no legitimate public purpose and that no valid emulative recognition should
be given him in view of his sins as recognized by law and jurisprudence.
They have not proven that Marcos was actually not qualified and in fact
disqualified under the provisions of AFP Regulations G 161-375. Moreover,
the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10368 cannot be extended to construe
Marcos' burial at the LNMB as a form of reparation for the HRVVs. As We
pointed out, such unwarranted interpretation is tantamount to judicial
legislation, hence, unconstitutional. It is not Marcos' burial at the LNMB that
would result in the "re-traumatization" of HRVVs but the act of requiring
them to recount their harrowing experiences in the course of legal
proceedings instituted by them or their families to seek justice and
reparation for the gross human rights violations.
While the Court has adopted a liberal attitude and recognized the legal
standing of concerned citizens who have invoked a public right allegedly
breached by a governmental act, there must be showing that the issues
raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early. 20
Since the term has no exact definition, the Court has provided the following
instructive guides to determine whether a matter is of transcendental
importance: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the
case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of constitutional or
statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of
the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and
specific interest in the questions being raised. 21 As held in the assailed
Decision and further elucidated below, petitioners are unable to satisfy all
three determinants.
At this point, suffice it to state that given the public character of the
LNMB and the general appropriations for its maintenance and upkeep,
petitioners failed to prove illegal disbursement of public funds by showing
that Marcos is disqualified to be interred at the LNMB under the provisions of
existing Constitution, laws, and regulations. Also, they did not establish that
a special disbursement was ordered for the Marcos burial apart from the
funds appropriated for the interment of those who are similarly situated,
which are sourced from the Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses of
the AFP and are regularly included in the General Appropriations Act. As
aptly noted by the OSG, the Marcos family would shoulder all the expenses
for the burial and that the AFP is even authorized to claim reimbursement for
the costs incurred therefor.
In stressing the alleged transcendental importance of the case,
petitioners made much out of the Court's issuance of Status Quo Ante Order
(SQAO), the conduct of oral arguments, and the mass protest across various
sectors of the Philippine society. They erred. The SQAO was issued so as not
to render moot and academic the petitions filed while the oral arguments
were held in order to enlighten Us on difficult and complicated issues
involved in this case. The concerted actions that transpired were but
manifestations of the people's exercise of freedom of speech and expression
or the right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress
of grievances. The legal requisites for judicial inquiry before a question
involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may
be heard and decided by the Court were not at all dispense with.
Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies
and Hierarchy of Courts
Petitioners claim that the filing of an MR before public respondents and
the Office of the President (OP) would have been an exercise in futility, and
that direct resort to this Court is justified by the following special and
compelling reasons: (1) the very alter egos of President Duterte, if not the
President himself, would rule on the MR; (2) a mere verbal instruction of the
President already put in motion the task of organizing Marcos' burial at the
LNMB; (3) the denial of an appeal to the OP is a forgone conclusion in view of
the President's repeated pronouncements during his election campaign,
after the filing of the petitions, and subsequent to the promulgation of the
Court's Decision, that he would allow Marcos' burial at the LNMB; (4) the
case involves a matter of extreme urgency which is evident from the Court's
issuance of SQAO; (5) whether the President committed grave abuse of
discretion and violated the Constitution and the laws is purely a question of
law; (6) as proven by the clandestine burial of Marcos in coordination with
public respondents, there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to
assail the acts which are patently illegal and made with grave abuse of
discretion; (7) the strong public interest involved as shown by the nationwide
protests; and (8) the case is impressed with public interest and
transcendental issues.
We do not subscribe.
The purpose behind the settled rule that a motion for reconsideration is
a condition sine qua non for the filing of a petition for certiorari is to grant
the court or administrative body which issued the assailed decision,
resolution or order the opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error
attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances
of the case. 22 Even if the challenged issuance of public respondents were
rendered upon the verbal order of President Duterte, it cannot be denied
that the concerned AFP officials still have the power to enforce compliance
with the requirements of AFP Regulations G 161-375, as amended. 23 The
logical and reasonable remedy to question the burial procedures and the
allocation of plots should be with public respondents who issued the
directives.
If the court or administrative body is given an opportunity to correct
itself on an MR, there is no reason then not to extend such basic courtesy to
public respondents since they are subordinates who merely follow the orders
of their Commander-in-Chief. Like the President who is tasked to faithfully
execute the laws of the land, they are also enjoined to obey the laws and are
entitled to the disputable presumption of regularity in the performance of
their official duties. Having been charged to exercise over-all supervision in
the implementation of AFP Regulations G 161-375, public respondents could
correct the interment directive issued should there be any meritorious
ground therefor. The fact that the administrative regulation does not provide
a remedy to question an interment directive does not automatically entitle
petitioners to directly implore this Court considering that it does not prevent
them to appeal or ask for reconsideration based on their claim of right to due
process or an opportunity to be heard on an issue over which they insist to
have a standing to intervene. acEHCD
Likewise, the Court cannot anchor its judgment on news accounts of

President Duterte's statements with regard to the issue of Marcos' burial at
the LNMB. Newspaper articles amount to "hearsay evidence, twice removed"
and are therefore not only inadmissible but without any probative value at
all whether objected to or not, unless offered for a purpose other than
proving the truth of the matter asserted. 24 As it is, the news article is
admissible only as evidence that such publication exists with the tenor of the
news therein stated. 25 The same rules apply to news article published via
the broadcast media or the internet communication. While it may be
asserted that President Duterte's position on the issue is consistent, We
must base Our decision on a formal concrete act, preferably a written order
denying the MR or appeal, so as to avoid being entangled in possibly moot
and academic discourses should he make a volte-face on the issue. Needless
to state, he should be given an opportunity to correct himself, as it is
disputably presumed that he would maintain his solemn oath to faithfully
and conscientiously fulfill his duties as President of the Philippines, preserve
and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and
consecrate himself to the service of the Nation. 26
The fact that the Court was prompted to issue the SQAO does not
make this case extremely urgent to resolve. Instead of issuing a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI), We issued
(and extended) the effectivity of the SQAO in order not to render moot and
academic the issues raised in the petitions. With respect to the alleged
strong public interest on the case as shown by the nationwide protests, the
Court views that such mass actions indicate the controversial nature of the
issue involved. Again, the requisites of judicial review must be satisfied.
There is also no merit in petitioners' contention that the issue of
whether President Duterte and public respondents violated the Constitution
and the laws and/or committed grave abuse of discretion is purely a question
of law that the Court ultimately has to resolve. To reiterate, the issue of
allowing Marcos' burial at the LNMB involves a truly political question which
is within the full discretionary authority and wisdom of President Duterte to
decide. There is no constitutionally imposed limits on the powers or
functions conferred upon him, much less grave abuse of discretion in the
exercise thereof. Similarly, public respondents cannot be faulted for issuing
the interment directive in their official capacities pursuant to the President's
verbal order and to a valid and binding administrative regulation.
Petitioners' direct resort to the Court cannot also be justified by the
ruling in Drilon v. Lim 27 that —
x x x [I]n the exercise of this jurisdiction [to consider the
constitutionality of a law], lower courts are advised to act with the
utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a
declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less
than on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the questioned act is
usually the handiwork of the legislative or the executive departments,
or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming
modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court in the
consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a
thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with concurrence of
the majority of those who participated in its discussion. 28
Such opinion bears no relation to the doctrines on exhaustion of
administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts. Instead, it refers to the
duty of a purposeful hesitation which every court, including Us, is charged
before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was
first carefully studied by the executive and the legislative departments and
determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it
was finally approved. 29
It bears emphasis that the Constitution is clear that judicial power,

which includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, is vested not just in the Supreme Court
but also upon such lower courts established by law. 30 The organic act vests
in Us appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in
all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international
or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance or regulation is in question. 31 This means that the
resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by said lower
courts. 32 Under the law, the proper Regional Trial Court exercises
concurrent jurisdiction over extraordinary remedies such as petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus and equally wields the power to
grant provisional relief/s.
In a case where the constitutionality of an executive order was
challenged, the Court stressed that while lower courts should observe a
becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are
nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted,
subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 33 Besides, even if the case is
one of first impression, the New Civil Code provides that no judge or court
shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the laws. 34 What is missing in the rules may be found in the
general principles of logic, justice and equity. 35 A judge may apply a rule he
sees fit to resolve the issue, as long as the rule chosen is in harmony with
general interest, order, morals and public policy. 36
Despite the patent procedural defects of the petitions, the Court
nevertheless fully discussed the substantive merits of the case and finally
ruled in favor of President Duterte's decision to allow Marcos' burial at the
LNMB.
The substantive issues raised in the MR shall now be discussedin
seriatim.
Mootness of the Case
The OSG argues that Marcos' burial at the LNMB on November 18,
2016 is a supervening event that rendered moot and academic the MRs of
petitioners-movants. Consequently, this Court must refrain from resolving
the issues raised in the MRs for to do so would result in an absurd situation
wherein Marcos' remains would have to be exhumed if the assailed Decision
is overturned. The OSG asserts that petitioners-movants cannot plead for
the exhumation without first complying with Articles 306 to 309 of the New
Civil Code. 37
We disagree.
An issue becomes moot and academic when any declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value such that there is no actual substantial
relief to which petitioners would be entitled and which would be negated by
the dismissal of the claim. 38 On this basis, the Court holds that the MRs filed
by petitioners-movants have not been mooted by Marcos' burial at the
LNMB. There is still a live controversy between the parties. The MRs were not
rendered illusory considering that the execution pending their resolution
may still be voided in the event that We find merit in the contentions of
petitioners-movants. In that sense, a declaration sustaining their motions
and granting their prayer for relief would still be of practical value. SDHTEC
SQAO, Petitions for

Contempt and Motion
for Exhumation
Lagman et al. contend that the right of a party to file a MR is impaired
and that due process is derailed if a decision that is not yet final and
executory is implemented. In this case, the Decision must become final and
executory before the dissolution of the SQAO can take effect. Pending its
finality, the absence of a court order enjoining Marcos' burial at the LNMB is
of no moment because the lifting of the SQAO is contingent upon the finality
of the Decision. Consistent with Tung Ho Steel Enterprises Corporation v.
Ting Guan Trading Corporation , 39 which applied Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 52
of the Rules of Court (Rules), while the reglementary period for filing a MR
has not expired, the Decision and the SQAO as an accessory order must not
be enforced. Accordingly, a premature and void execution of the Decision
can be recalled even motu proprio by this Court.
The assertions lack merit.
While the Court concedes that execution takes place only when
decisions become final and executory, 40 there are cases that may be
executed pending appeal 41 or are immediately executory 42 pursuant to the
provisions of the Rules and the statutes as well as by court order. Yet, the
fact that a decision is immediately executory does not prevent a party from
questioning the decision before a court of law. 43
As regards the SQAO, Tung Ho is inapplicable for having factual and
procedural antecedents that are different from the instant case. Instead, We
should find guidance in Buyco v. Baraquia, 44 which ruled that the lifting of a
WPI due to the dismissal of the complaint is immediately executory even if
the dismissal of the complaint is pending appeal. It was held:
A writ of preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage
of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order,
requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a
particular act or acts. It is merely a provisional remedy, adjunct to the
main case subject to the latter's outcome. It is not a cause of action in
itself. Being an ancillary or auxiliary remedy, it is available during the
pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to
preserve and protect certain rights and interests therein pending
rendition, and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a final judgment
in the case.
The writ is provisional because it constitutes a temporary
measure availed of during the pendency of the action and it is
ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon the
result of the main action.
It is well-settled that the sole object of a preliminary injunction,
whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo
until the merits of the case can be heard . It is usually granted
when it is made to appear that there is a substantial controversy
between the parties and one of them is committing an act or
threatening the immediate commission of an act that will cause
irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before
a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case.
xxx xxx xxx
The present case having been heard and found dismissible as it
was in fact dismissed, the writ of preliminary injunction is deemed
lifted, its purpose as a provisional remedy having been served, the
appeal therefrom notwithstanding.
Unionbank v. Court of Appeals enlightens:
". . . a dismissal, discontinuance or non-suit of an action
in which a restraining order or temporary
injunction has been granted operates as a
dissolution of the restraining order or temporary
injunction," regardless of whether the period for
filing a motion for reconsideration of the order
dismissing the case or appeal therefrom has
expired. The rationale therefor is that even in cases
where an appeal is taken from a judgment
dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does
not suspend the judgment, hence the general rule
applies that a temporary injunction terminates
automatically on the dismissal of the action ." 45
By nature, a SQAO is similar to the provisional remedies of TRO and
WPI. Thus, when the Court dismissed the petitions in Our Decision, the
46
SQAO, in effect, became functus officio; it could not stand independent of
the main proceeding. 47 Such dismissal necessarily carried with it the lifting
of the SQAO issued during the pendency of the action. Being interlocutory
and ancillary in character, the order automatically dissolved upon dismissal
of the main case. 48 The SQAO is effective immediately upon its issuance
and upon its lifting despite the existence of the right to file and the actual
filing of a MR or appeal. 49
Petitioners-movants know for a fact that a SQAO has a definite life
span; that it automatically ceases to have effect upon the expiration of the
period. 50 In this case, the SQAO was initially effective until September 12,
2016. 51 It was extended twice, up to October 18, 2016, 52 and then until
November 8, 2016 53 when the Decision was eventually promulgated. If a
SQAO has no specific time frame, petitioners need not have pleaded for an
extension and this Court need not have reissued separate resolutions
therefor. With the dismissal of the petitions, a court order for the
reinstatement of the SQAO is again necessary. There must be a new
exercise of judicial power. 54 Petitioners-movants were cognizant of this rule.
On November 11, 2016, Lagman et al. filed a "Manifestation" 55 praying "that
the Honorable Supreme Court may consider reissuing the Status [Quo] Ante
Order and/or advising the Respondents not to proceed with the said burial
pending resolution of the motion/s for reconsideration to be interposed
seasonably." On the same day, Ocampo et al. also filed an "Extremely
Urgent Motion" 56 praying, among others, to "[direct] respondents to hold in
abeyance or refrain from executing any plans on the interment of the
remains of Marcos Sr. at the Libingan pending the formal service of the
Decision to petitioners, the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration to be
filed by petitioners, and the finality of the Honorable Court's Decision[.]"
However, We did not act on these pleadings. AScHCD
Finally, based on the title, allegations, and relief being sought, this
consolidated case is one for prohibition; hence, essentially in the nature of
petitions for injunction. Under Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules, 57 judgments
in actions for injunction are immediately executory; it shall be
enforceable after their rendition and shall not be stayed by an
appeal taken therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
With the dismissal of the petitions and the lifting of the SQAO, nothing
stood to hinder respondents from acting on and proceeding with Marcos'
burial at the LNMB prior to the expiration of the period to file a MR and
before its resolution. Considering that there is no fault or punishable acts to
speak of, respondents cannot be held guilty of indirect contempt under
Section 3 (c) and (d), Rule 71 of the Rules. 58 On the same ground, neither is
there any legal justification to order the exhumation of the mortal remains of
Marcos and subject the same to forensic examination to ascertain its
authenticity.
Non-publication of AFP Regulations
Lagman et al. raise a new issue. They propound that AFP Regulations G
161-375 cannot be used as basis to justify Marcos' burial at the LNMB
because, per certification issued by Director Flordeliza C. Vargas-Trinidad, 59
AFP Regulations G 161-371 to 161-375 were not filed with the Office of the
National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the Philippines
Law Complex. This failure is in violation of the mandatory requirement of
Sections 3 (1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Being legally invalid, defective and unenforceable, no rights, privileges and
obligations have accrued therefrom or been vested thereby.
They are mistaken.
Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides:
SECTION 3. Filing. — (1) Every agency 60 shall file with the

University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of
every rule 61 adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of
this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date
shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or
persons.
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent
functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under
pain of disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing
agency and shall be open to public inspection.
SECTION 4. Effectivity. — In addition to other rule-making
requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each
rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as
above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in
the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and
welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement
accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures
to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by
them.
The publication requirement in the ONAR is confined to issuances of
administrative agencies under the Executive Branch of the government. 62
Exempted from this prerequisite are the military establishments in all
matters relating exclusively to Armed Forces personnel. 63 A plain reading of
AFP Regulations G 161-371 to 161-375 reveals that they are internal in
nature as that they were issued merely for the guidance of the concerned
AFP units which are tasked to administer the LNMB. Moreover, in view of the
nature of the LNMB as an active military cemetery, it cannot be said that
AFP Regulations G 161-375 is a regulation which "adversely affect, or
impose a heavy and substantial burden on, the citizenry in a matter that
implicates the very nature of government we have adopted" such that
registration with the ONAR is not only "a matter of administrative
convenience but x x x a dictate of due process." 64
In the exercise of executive power, the President has inherent power to
adopt rules and regulations — a power which is different from a delegated
legislative power that can be exercised only within the prescribed standards
set by law — and to delegate this power to subordinate executive officials. 65
On July 12, 1957, then President Carlos P. Garcia, in the exercise of his
powers of control and to reserve public land, issued Proclamation No. 423.
Pursuant thereto, the AFP Chief of Staff issued AFP Regulations G 161-371 on
February 2, 1960, which was eventually succeeded by AFP Regulations G
161-375. By granting the AFP Chief of Staff the power to administer a
military reservation site then known as Fort Wm Mckinley (now Fort Andres
Bonifacio), part of which is now the LNMB, former President Garcia and the
presidents subsequent to him effectively delegated their rule-making power.
As expressed in said regulations, they were issued "By Order of the
Secretary of National Defense/Defense Minister," who, in turn, is under the
Office of the President.
Assuming that AFP Regulations G 161-375 is invalid for non-compliance
with the publication requirement in the ONAR, its invalidity would still not
result in the denial of Marcos' burial at the LNMB. Since the Administrative
Code of 1987 is prospective in its application, President Duterte may apply
AFP Regulations G 161-373 issued on April 9, 1986 66 as legal basis to justify
the exercise of his presidential prerogative. Under this earlier regulation,
Marcos may be buried at the LNMB because he is a Medal of Valor Awardee,
President and AFP Commander-in-Chief, Minister of National Defense,
Veteran, and Statesman. Moreover, unlike the succeeding regulations, AFP
Regulations G 161-373 contains no provisions on disqualification for
interment.
Compliance with the 1987
Constitution, statutes, and
jurisprudence
Petitioners-movants reiterate that AFP Regulations G 161-375 does not
have the force and effect of law and cannot be a valid source of any right,
obligation or power for violating the Constitution, international and municipal
laws, and foreign and local jurisprudence, which cannot be disregarded as
they are deemed incorporated in administrative regulations.
Again, the Court is not persuaded.
On the 1987 Constitution
Ocampo et al. maintain that Marcos' burial at the LNMB brazenly

violates the Constitution, the basic principles of which are respect for human
rights and dignity and public accountability. Rosales et al. hold that the
spectacle of burying Marcos at the LNMB undermines the recognition of his
crimes and takes away the very historical premises on which so much of our
present constitutional design and order is anchored. And, Latiph expresses
that Marcos was an epitome of anti-democracy, representing oppression and
tyranny which the Constitution rejects.
It is asserted that We ignored the intent expressed by the Filipinos
when they ratified the Constitution, which, among others, orders the AFP to
be the protector of the people (Sec. 3, Art. II); adopts an independent foreign
policy (Sec. 7, Art. II); directs the State to take positive and effective
measures against graft and corruption (Sec. 27, Art. II); restricts the powers
of the President to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and
proclamation of martial law (Sec. 18, Art. VII); expands the power and duty of
the Supreme Court (Sec. 1, Art. VIII); directs that education shall inculcate
patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human
rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical
development of the country (Sec. 3 [2], Art. XIV); requires the State to
strengthen the patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military,
and respect for people's rights in the performance of their duty (Sec. 5 [2],
Art. XVI); creates the Commission on Human Rights (Sec. 17, Art. XIII); and
causes the establishment of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) as well as the enactment of R.A. Nos. 9745, 9851, 10353, and 10368.
AcICHD
Moreover, for Rosales et al., the cases of Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 67
Agabon v. NLRC , 68 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., et al., 69

Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, 70 and Gamboa
v. Finance Secretary Teves, et al. 71 prove that the Constitution has self-
executing provisions. Ocampo et al. add that this Court struck down in
Manila Prince Hotel the argument that some provisions of the Constitution
are not self-executing and requires implementing legislation, and that
provisions claimed to be non self-executing can still be violated if the
questioned act is directly opposite the provisions that require the
government to undertake.
Finally, it is contended that our constitutional tradition has consistently
followed the doctrine that the silence of the Constitution does not mean the
absence of constitutional principles and commands. Rosales et al. cite
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 72 wherein the Court, following the doctrine
of necessary implication, appeared to have recognized the principle of
separation of powers and Our power of judicial review. Also, Ocampo et al.
refer to Egerton v. Earl of Brownlow, 73 wherein an act based on public policy
considerations was allegedly struck down despite the fact that there was no
law or jurisprudence prohibiting it.
The Court need not belabor once more in discussing the points raised
above as most, if not all, of the above submissions were considered and
passed upon in the Decision.
As the OSG correctly counters, reliance on Manila Prince Hotel is
misplaced because the issue there was whether Sec. 10, Art. XII of the
Constitution, a provision which was not invoked in this case, is self-
executing. Petitioners-movants repeatedly failed to demonstrate precisely
how Sections 3, 7, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27 and 28 of Art. II; Sec. 18, Art. VII; Sec. 1,
Art. VIII; Sec. 1, Art. XI; Sec. 3 [2], Art. XIV; Sec. 5 [2], Art. XVI; and Sec. 17,
Art. XIII of the Constitution prohibit Marcos' burial at the LNMB. In fact, even
the Statement 74 dated November 24, 2016, which was issued by some
members of the Constitutional Commission, offers no consolation as
nowhere therefrom could We find any specific constitutional provision/s
violated by the interment of Marcos.
The provisions of the Constitution being invoked in this case are simple
and clear. They are not equivocal as to necessitate resort to extraneous aids
of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and
ascertain the true intent or purpose thereof. 75 Verba legis should prevail
since the presumption is that the words in which the constitutional provisions
are couched express the objective sought to be attained. 76 The authors of
our Constitution were not only the members of the Constitutional
Commission but also all those who participated in its ratification. Since the
ideas and opinions exchanged by a few of its commissioners should not be
presumed to be the opinions of all of them, it is the specific text — and only
that text — which was the result of the deliberations of the Commission that
must be read and construed. 77 As this Court, through Justice Leonen, held in
David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal: 78
In the hierarchy of the means for constitutional interpretation,
inferring meaning from the supposed intent of the framers or
fathoming the original understanding of the individuals who adopted
the basic document is the weakest approach.
These methods leave the greatest room for subjective
interpretation. Moreover, they allow for the greatest errors. The
alleged intent of the framers is not necessarily encompassed or
exhaustively articulated in the records of deliberations. Those that
have been otherwise silent and have not actively engaged in
interpretation and debate may have voted for or against a proposition
for reasons entirely their own and not necessarily in complete
agreement with those articulated by the more vocal. It is even
possible that the beliefs that motivated them were based on entirely
erroneous premises. Fathoming original understanding can also
misrepresent history as it compels a comprehension of actions made
within specific historical episodes through detached, and not
necessarily better-guided, modern lenses.
Moreover, the original intent of the framers of the Constitution
is not always uniform with the original understanding of the People
who ratified it. In Civil Liberties Union:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult
the debates and proceedings of the constitutional
convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of
the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only
when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless
to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is
clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of
value as showing the views of the individual members,
and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they
give us no light as to the views of the large majority who
did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens
whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the
constitution from what appears upon its face." The proper
interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framer's
understanding thereof.
Considering that the Court may not ascribe to the Constitution
meanings and restrictions that would unduly burden the powers of the
President, 79 its plain and unambiguous language with respect to his power
of control as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief should be construed
in sense that will allow its full exercise. It cannot be conveniently claimed
that various provisions of the Constitution, taken together, necessarily imply
the prohibition of Marcos' burial at the LNMB. The silence of the Constitution
cannot be unreasonably stretched to justify such alleged proscription.
On R.A. No. 289
Petitioners Ocampo et al. and Lagman et al. insist that R.A. No. 289 is
applicable in determining the standards on who are entitled to be buried at
the LNMB. As a special law, its provisions prevail over the power to allocate
lands of the public domain granted to the President by the Administrative
Code of 1987. Its salutary objective encompasses all subsequent shrines or
memorials as interment grounds for former Presidents, heroes, and patriots,
regardless of the time it was constituted and its location.
While We agree that R.A. No. 289 is an existing and valid law for not
having been amended or repealed by subsequent ones, it is maintained that
said law and the LNMB are unrelated to each other. Up to now, the Congress
has deemed it wise not to appropriate any funds for the construction of the
National Pantheon or the creation of the Board on National Pantheon.
Significantly, the parcel of land subject matter of Proclamation No. 431,
which was later on revoked by Proclamation No. 42, is different from that
covered by Proclamation No. 208. Even Justice Caguioa's dissent, as to which
Justice Jardeleza concurred, concluded that it is non sequitur to argue the
applicability of R.A. No. 289, or the standards indicated therein, to the LNMB
because the land on which the National Pantheon was to be built refers to a
discrete parcel of land that is totally distinct from the site of the LNMB.
Except for Justice Leonen, the other justices who dissented to the majority
opinion were silent on the matter. TAIaHE
On R.A. No. 10368
The applicability of R.A. No. 10368 was reiterated by petitioners-

movants. Ocampo et al. posit that Marcos' burial at the LNMB is diametrically
opposed and evidently repugnant to the legislative intent and spirit of R.A.
No. 10368, which statutorily declared the policy of the State to recognize the
heroism and sacrifices of all human rights violations victims (HRVVs) during
the Marcos regime. The HRVVs cannot be recognized and their dignity
cannot be restored if the perpetrator is extolled and given honors befitting
that of a hero, tantamount to exonerating him from the abuses of Martial
Law. To recall, Justice Leonen raised the same arguments in his dissent,
stating that Marcos' burial at the LNMB is violative of R.A. No. 10368
because it may be considered as an effort "to conceal abuses during the
Marcos regime" or to "conceal x x x the effects of Martial Law"; that it
undermines the recognition of his complicity.
On their part, Lagman et al. and Rosales et al. assert that aside from
the repealing clause expressly provided for under Sec. 31 of R.A. No. 10368,
the incompatibility between AFP Regulations G 161-375 and said law
satisfies the standard of effecting a repeal by implication. Under the doctrine
of necessary implication, every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is
deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege.
We differ.
The provisions of R.A. No. 10368 are straightforward. The rights of
HRVVs to recognition and reparation have been set and defined under the
law, which grants specific remedies. Glaringly, not one of its provisions could
be construed to justify denying former Pres. Marcos or his family of any
rights which have been vested by law or regulation. R.A. No. 10368
repudiated no commendation or revoked any distinction attained by Marcos
during his lifetime, particularly those which he accomplished outside the
period of September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986. Neither did it nullify any
right or benefit accruing to him because of such achievements. The Court
cannot do more than what the law clearly provides. To stretch its scope is
not only unreasonable but also tantamount to judicial legislation.
Based on the history of the passage of R.A. No. 10368 and the events
that led to or precipitated its enactment, 80 what the legislature actually had
in mind is accurately reflected in the language of the law. As a matter of
fact, in the sponsorship speech of Senator Francis G. Escuero, he expressed
that the "bill seeks to provide reparation and recognition of the survivors and
relatives of the victims of human rights during the regime of former Pres.
Ferdinand Marcos" and that "[i]n order to qualify for compensation under this
Act, the human rights violation must have occurred during the period from
September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986. " 81 In the Senate, Senators
Franklin M. Drilon and Panfilo M. Lacson withdrew their reservation to
interpellate on the measure. 82 Likewise, in the House of Representatives
(House), no member signified an intention to ask any question during the
period of sponsorship and debate, and no committee or individual
amendments were made during the period of amendments. 83 Thus, this
Court is of the view that the statutory omission — the non-inclusion of the
prohibition of Marcos' burial at the LNMB — was both deliberate and
significant. Congress itself did not consider it as part and parcel of reparation
to HRVVs.
Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused
by such an omission, neither could the Court presume otherwise and
supply the details thereof, because a legislative lacuna cannot be
filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of
interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein
situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission
at the time of the enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot
be judicially supplied however after later wisdom may recommend
the inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what
they think should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature
would have supplied if its attention has been called to the omission.
84
Indeed, the Court cannot supply legislative omission. We cannot

engraft upon a law something that has been omitted but is believed as
ought to have been embraced. 85 This Court cannot, under its power of
interpretation, supply the omission even though the omission may have
resulted from inadvertence or because the case in question was not foreseen
or contemplated." 86 If the law is too narrow in scope or has shortcoming, it
is for the Legislature alone to correct it by appropriate enactment,
amendment or even repeal. 87
With regard to the non-monetary reparation to HRVVs under Sec. 5 of
R.A. No. 10368, Rosales et al. argue that the Court's narrow interpretation is
inconsistent with the prevailing jurisprudence and international law for
failure to recognize the all-encompassing concept of the right to an effective
remedy. To them, non-monetary reparation is not limited to a hollow
commitment to provide services from government agencies including public
respondents.
We are not amendable.
It is well established that courts may avail themselves of extrinsic aids
such as the records of the deliberations or the actual proceedings of the
legislative body in order to assist in determining the construction of a statute
of doubtful meaning. Where there is doubt as to what a provision of a statute
means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberation
or discussion on the bill may be adopted. 88 cDHAES
Notably, R.A. No. 10368 is the consolidation of Senate Bill (S.B.) No.
3334 89 and House Bill (H.B.) No. 5990 90 of the 15th Congress. S.B. No.
3334 substituted S.B. Nos. 2615 91 and 3330, 92 which were both referred to
and considered by the Senate Committees on Justice and Human Rights and
Finance. While S.B. No. 3334 did not provide for non-monetary
compensation, 93 H.B. No, 5990 94 afforded such benefit. The Conference
Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of H.B. No. 5990 and S.B. No. 3334
resolved to adopt the provision of the House of Representatives on non-
monetary compensation (appearing as Section 5 of now R.A. No. 10368) but
did not include its definition under H.B. No. 5990. 95 As defined by the
House, it "refers to a non-pecuniary compensation given to a victim of
human rights violation or members of the family to restore the family's honor
and dignity and shall include, but not limited to, psychotherapy, counseling,
medical care, social amelioration and honorific recognition." 96 Hence,
interpretation of the term should be viewed in light of this definition such
that any non-monetary compensation to be granted must be similar in
nature with the enumerated services.
If a statute is plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning or applied according to its express terms, without any attempted
interpretation, and leaving the court no room for any extended ratiocination
or rationalization. 97 When the letter of the law is clear, to seek its spirit
elsewhere is simply to venture vainly, to no practical purpose, upon the
boundless domains of speculations. 98 A strictly literal interpretation of a
statute may be disregarded and the court may consider the spirit and reason
of the statute where a literal meaning would be impossible, render the
provision/s meaningless, car lead to inconvenience, absurdity, contradiction,
injustice or mischievous results, or would defeat the clear purpose of the
lawmakers. 99 Liberality has a place only when, between two positions that
the law can both accommodate, the more expansive or more generous
option is chosen. 100 It has no place where no choice is available at all
because the terms of the law do not at all leave room for discretion. 101
The function of the courts is jus dicere and not jus dare; to interpret
law, and not to make law or give law. 102 Our duty is not to amend the law by
enlarging or abridging the same. 103 This Court should not make or supervise
legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend,
distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is
repugnant to its terms. 104 We cannot interpose our own views as to alter
them. 105 Simply put, the Court must not read into the law what is not there.
106 The letter of the law cannot be disregarded on the pretext of pursuing its
spirit. 107 To do so would be engaging in judicial legislation, which is abjured
by the trias politica principle and in violation of one of the most basic
principles of a republican and democratic government — the separation of
powers. 108
Judicial power covers only the recognition, review or reversal of the
policy crafted by the political departments if and when a case is brought
before it on the ground of illegality, unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion (i.e., blatant abuse of power or capricious exercise thereof). 109
The determination of the wisdom, fairness, soundness, justice, equitableness
or expediency of a statute or what "ought to be" as a matter of policy is
within the realm of and should be addressed to the legislature. 110 If existing
laws are inadequate, the policy-determining branches of the government,
specifically the duly elected representatives who carry the mandate of the
popular will, may be exhorted peacefully by the citizenry to effect positive
changes. 111 True to its constitutional mandate, the Court cannot craft and
tailor statutory provisions in order to accommodate all of situations no
matter how ideal or reasonable the proposal may sound. 112 No matter how
well-meaning, We can only air Our views in the hope that Congress would
take notice. 113
x x x [The] Court should give Congress a chance to perform its
primordial duty of lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt
Congress and usurp its inherent powers of making and enacting laws.
While it may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial
fiat is a dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on
prohibited judicial legislation. 114
Judicial activism should never be allowed to become judicial
exuberance. 115 In this case, no amount of logic or convenience can
convince Us to perform an insertion of a matter that was clearly not included
in R.A. No. 10368 as enacted. Just like his return to the country, Marcos'
burial at the LNMB is a delicate and complex subject with far reaching
implications. No one can deny this as even the Post-EDSA presidents,
including the two Aquino governments, as well as the past Congresses did
not dare, wittingly or unwittingly, to finally put the issue to rest. In view of its
political (and even economic) repercussions, We must leave the task of
enlarging the scope of benefits to the HRVVs to the legislative authority
where it properly belongs and which must be assumed to be just as capable
of compassionate consideration as courts are thought to be. 116
Observance of the IHR Laws
Rosales et al. propound that mere existence of human rights laws,

administrative rules, and judicial issuance in the Philippines is not equivalent
to full compliance with international law standards. It is contended that if the
State is to ensure its commitment to the principles of international human
rights law, HRVVs must be given full satisfaction and guarantees of non-
repetition as defined by Principles 22 and 23 of the Basic Principles and
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law ("Basic Principles and Guidelines"). Similarly,
Ocampo et al. hold that the HRVVs are entitled to restitution, compensation,
rehabilitation, and satisfaction as contemplated in Sections 19 to 22 of the
Basic Principles and Guidelines. Essentially, as the Chief Justice expressed in
her dissent, there must holistic reparation — financial and symbolic.
The Basic Principles and Guidelines and the Updated Set of Principles
for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat
Impunity ("UN Principles on Impunity") are neither a treaty nor have attained
the status of generally accepted principles of international law and/or
international customs. Justice Arturo D. Brion fittingly observed in his
Separate Concurring Opinion that they do not create legally binding
obligations because they are not international agreements but are
considered as "soft law" that cannot be interpreted as constraints on the
exercise of presidential prerogative. Consistent with Pharmaceutical and
Health Care Assoc. of the Phils. v. Health Sec. Duque III , 117 the Basic
Principles and Guidelines and the UN Principles on Impunity are merely
expressions of non-binding norms, principles, and practices that influence
state behavior; therefore, they cannot be validly considered as sources of
international law that is binding upon the Philippines under Art. 38 (1),
Chapter II 118 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. ASEcHI
It is evident from the plain text of the Basic Principles and Guidelines
and the UN Principles on Impunity that they are recommendatory in
character. The Resolution of the General Assembly adopting the Basic
Principles and Guidelines states:
2. Recommends that States take the Basic Principles and
Guidelines into account, promote respect thereof and bring them to
the attention of members of the executive bodies of government, in
particular law enforcement officials and military and security forces,
legislative bodies, the judiciary, victims and their representatives,
human rights defenders and lawyers, the media and the public in
general; (Underscoring ours)
As to the UN Principles on Impunity, the concluding portion of its Preamble

reads:
Pursuant to the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,

the following principles are intended as guidelines to assist States in
developing effective measures for combating impunity. (Underscoring
ours)
Had the Congress intended to incorporate the provisions of the Basic
Principles and Guidelines and the UN Principles on Impunity, which was
already adopted by the United Nations as early as 2005, it could have done
so by expressly mentioning them in the Declaration of Policy under Sec. 2 of
R.A. No. 10368. During the consideration of S.B. No. 3334 and H.B. No. 5990,
petitioners-movants should have petitioned the Commission on Human
Rights to make the necessary recommendations to the Congress or
otherwise directly lobbied to the lawmakers to include the Basic Principles
and Guidelines and the UN Principles on Impunity in the proposed law. They
did not. Nonetheless, they can do so for the enactment of amendatory laws.
While the States have a duty to repair violations of human rights and
international humanitarian law, the modalities of the reparation vary
according to the right violated, the gravity of the violation, the harm done, or
the persons affected. The Basic Principles and Guidelines recognizes that the
different forms of reparation may be awarded depending on the facts of
each case and whenever applicable.
Even if the Basic Principles and Guidelines and the UN Principles on
Impunity are treated as binding international laws, they do not prohibit
Marcos' burial at the LNMB. We already noted in the Decision that they do
not derogate against the right to due process of the alleged human rights
violator. Aside from Art. 14, Part III of the ICCPR, 119 XIII (27) of the Basic
Principles and Guidelines 120 and Principle 9 of the UN Principles on Impunity
121 are clear and unequivocal. Certainly, observance of due process must not
be sacrificed in pursuing the HRVVs' right to full and effective remedy under
the international human rights law. The recognition and protection of a
person's human rights and dignity must not trample upon that of another
who we do not like or those who are perceived to be against us. Justice and
equity demands that there be a balancing of interests in the enforcement of
both. For the Constitution is a law for all classes of men at all times and
there is only one Bill of Rights with the same interpretation for both unloved
and despised persons on one hand and the rest who are not so stigmatized
on the other. 122
Disqualification under the AFP Regulations
Dishonorable Discharge
Rosales et al. assert that "active service," as defined in Sec. 3 of P.D.

No. 1638, contemplates both civilian and military service. Thus, the term
"dishonorable discharge" applies equally to civilians who are guilty of
conduct so reprehensible and tainted with manifest disrespect to the rule of
law. In Marcos' case, he was ousted from the Presidency by the Filipinos and
was forced into dishonorable exile abroad. Lagman et al. posit that Marcos'
burial at the LNMB would completely nullify all that the EDSA People Power
Revolution stands for. It would desecrate the spirit of EDSA as it would
sweep under the rug of impunity the cardinal sins of Marcos against the
Filipinos.
The Court subscribes to the OSG's contention that the two instances of
disqualification under AFP Regulations G 161-375 apply only to military
personnel in "active service." For the purpose of P.D. No. 1638, the definition
of "active service" under Sec. 3 covers the military and civilian service
rendered prior to the date of separation or retirement from the AFP. Once
separated or retired, the military person is no longer considered as in "active
service." In addition, the term dishonorable discharge in AFP Regulations G
161-375 refers to an administrative military process. Petitioners-movants
have not shown that Marcos was dishonorably discharged from military
service under the law or rules prevailing at the time his active service was
terminated or as set forth by any of the grounds and pursuant to the
procedures described in AFP Circular 17, Series of 1987 123 issued on
October 2, 1987.
Moral Turpitude
Ocampo et al., Lagman et al., Rosales et al., and Latiph argue that the
November 8, 2016 Decision distinctly stands out as an aberration that
contradicts and undoes the previous court rulings against Marcos. They
contend that the majority opinion chose to ignore Republic v. Sandiganbayan
(First Division) , 124 Republic v. Sandiganbayan , 125 Marcos, Jr. v. Rep. of the
Phils., 126 Marcos v. Sec. Manglapus, 127 Dizon v. Brig. Gen. Eduardo, 128
Mijares v. Hon. Rañada, 129 PCGG v. Judge Peña, 130 Bisig ng Manggagawa sa
Concrete Aggregates, Inc. v. NLRC , 131 Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 132 In Re:
Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 133 and Hilao v. Estate of Marcos,
134 which characterized the Martial Law as a regime filled with human rights
violations and memorialized Marcos as a dictator who plundered the country.
Rosales et al. opine that it is immaterial that the decisions of this Court and
the foreign tribunals were mere civil in character because all those litigation
involved exhaustive presentation of evidence wherein Marcos and his heirs
were fully heard and have enjoyed due process before courts of competent
jurisdiction. ITAaHc
We disagree.
The cited cases cannot be relied upon to bar Marcos' burial at the
LNMB. Galman v. Sandiganbayan, Marcos v. Sec. Manglapus, Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, Marcos, Jr. v. Rep. of the Phils., PCGG v. Judge Peña , and
Mijares v. Hon. Rañada did not involve the power and authority of the
President to order an interment at the LNMB, while Republic v.
Sandiganbayan (First Division), Republic v. Sandiganbayan, and Marcos, Jr.
v. Rep. of the Phils. pertained to forfeiture cases under R.A. No. 1379, 135
which this Court declared as civil in nature. More importantly, these cases
did not convict Marcos of a crime. The complaints, denunciations, and
charges against him no matter how numerous and compelling do not
amount to conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral
turpitude. Neither mere presence of an offense involving moral turpitude nor
conviction by final judgment of a crime not involving moral turpitude would
suffice. The twin elements of "conviction by final judgment" and "offense
involving moral turpitude" must concur in order to defeat one's entitlement
for burial at the LNMB. The conviction by final judgment referred to is a
criminal conviction rendered by a civil court, not one that is handed down by
a general court martial. The highest quantum of evidence — proof beyond
reasonable doubt, not preponderance of evidence or substantial evidence —
must be satisfied. Rosales et al., therefore, erred in supposing that Marcos
could never be disqualified under AFP Regulations G 161-375 because it
would be absurd that he would appoint a Judge Advocate General to
prosecute him and convene a General Court Martial to convict him.
Rosales et al., Latiph, and De Lima further hold that Sec. 14 (2) Art. III
of the Constitution anent the right of the accused to be presumed innocent
arises only in criminal prosecution. Correspondingly, Marcos cannot avail
such right because he was not charged criminally; he was not under trial;
and would not be sentenced to a penalty where he stood to lose his life or
liberty. Moreover, a claim for violation of due process by a criminal offender
presupposes that the People of the Philippines was afforded a fair
opportunity to arrest and prosecute the accused in a court of competent
jurisdiction. In Marcos' case, the People were unable to criminally prosecute
him because he was ousted from the presidency and died in a foreign land.
Under the principle of territoriality in criminal law, the long arm of the law
could not reach him for lack of jurisdiction over his person.
The arguments are untenable.
Aside from criminal prosecution, the presumption of innocence applies
in the cases of attorney 136 under suspension or disbarment proceedings,
judge 137 and court personnel 138 with pending administrative complaint,
detained person 139 before a military tribunal, and employee 140 in labor
cases.
The right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty is subsumed in
the constitutional right of every person not to be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law. 141 This constitutional mandate
refers to any person, not only to one who has been arrested, detained or
otherwise deprived of liberty, or against whom a complaint or information
was formally filed, or who is undergoing trial, or who is awaiting judgment by
the trial court, or whose judgment of conviction is pending appeal. In Herras
Teehankee v. Rovira , 142 the Court observed that bail is constitutionally
available to all persons, even those against whom no formal charges are
filed. By parity of reasoning, there is no legal or just ground for Us to deny
the constitutional right to be presumed innocent to one who is not even
criminally prosecuted. Similarly, to place such person in a less favored
position than an accused in a criminal case would be, to say the least,
anomalous and absurd. It is illogical, if not inane. If there is a presumption of
innocence in favor of one already formally charged with criminal offense, a
fortiori, this presumption should be indulged in favor of one who is yet to be
charged.
Likewise, it is entirely inaccurate to proclaim that there was no
opportunity to arrest, try, and convict Marcos for his alleged criminal acts.
Petitioners-movants must recall that Marcos v. Sec. Manglapus arose
precisely because the former president intended to return to the Philippines,
but then President Corazon C. Aquino refused on the grounds of national
security and public safety. We sustained the exercise of her executive
power. On hindsight, Marcos could have been prosecuted for his alleged
offenses had he been allowed to come back. As what happened, the Court is
unaware of any criminal case that was commenced against Marcos until his
death.
Rosales et al. are also grossly mistaken to contend that a deceased
person cannot claim any demandable right to due process for it is
exclusively reserved to a person with civil personality. As the assailed
Decision indicated, no less than the Constitution intends that "full respect for
human rights [covers] every stage of a person's development 'from the time
he becomes a person to the time he leaves this earth.'" 143 In fact, in our
system of laws, all criminal liability is totally extinguished by death. 144 This
applies to every Filipino, not just Marcos.
Lagman et al. advance that Marcos must be assessed in his totality as
a person, since he did not err as an ordinary human being. He was a
disgraced President who was deposed by the sovereign people because he
was a dictator, plunderer, and human rights violator; he sinned against the
multitude of Filipinos as the magnitude of his transgressions permeated and
ruined the very core of the Philippines' democratic society and developing
economy; and he was not a noble soldier for faking his wartime exploits and
credentials. Of the same view, Ocampo et al. assert that the record of
Marcos as a soldier cannot be dichotomized and separated from his record
as a President because he is no ordinary soldier and president. As Marcos v.
Sec. Manglapus held, he is "in a class by itself."
The contentions lack merit.
We already pointed out in Our Decision that the NHCP study is limited
to the conclusion that Marcos did not receive the Distinguished Service
Cross, the Silver Medal, and the Order of the Purple Heart, and that the U.S.
Government never recognized the Ang Mga Maharlika and his alleged
leadership of said guerilla unit. It is incomplete as to his entire career. It did
not cover and had no adverse findings with respect to his other
accomplishments as a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a military
personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee. When the Decision
declared that Marcos is "just a human who erred like us," it was never the
intention of the ponente to trivialize or, as petitioners-movants perceive it to
be, forgive and forget what Martial Law has done to the HRVVs and our
nation in general. There was no attempt to erase his accountability for the
alleged human rights violations and the plunder he committed during the
period. What the comparison only meant was to convey the truth that no
human is perfect; that it is in our nature to commit sins and make mistakes.
The Decision did not pass upon the issue of whether Marcos' "errors" were
deliberately or innocently done, extensive or insignificant in scale, or
heinous or meritorious in character.
Moreover, the case of Cudia v. The Superintendent of the
Philippine Military Academy (PMA), 145 which was invoked by
Rosales et al. , is inapplicable. The factual antecedents are different and
the applicable laws are unrelated: Cudia involves the right to due process of
a military cadet who was dismissed from the Philippine Military Academy
(PMA) while this case involves the right to be buried of a military personnel
at the LNMB; Cudia involves the PMA cadet's Honor Code and Honor System
Handbook while this case involves the AFP Regulations G 161-375; and Cudia
involves the exercise of academic freedom by the military academy while
this case involves the exercise of executive power by the President. CHTAIc

Even if Cudia applies, there is actually no conflict. In that case, the
Court affirmed the decision of the PMA, noting that it complied with the due
process requirement of the law. We did not substitute the judgment of the
military; did not impose standards other than what is traditionally and legally
been practiced; and did not enforce a penalty different from what was
imposed by the PMA. On the other hand, this case also involves a military
regulation that We upheld for not being contrary to the prevailing
Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence. This Court affirms the standards as to
who may be buried at the LNMB, which are based on our unique military
traditions and legal milieu, as codified in various AFP Regulations that took
into account existing laws such as C.A. No. 408, P.D. No. 1638, and their
amendments.
Finally, the Court resolves the challenge of Rosales et al. with respect
to Our citation of U.S. rules and regulations on Arlington National Cemetery
(Arlington). First, it must be stressed that We did not heavily rely on the list
provided by the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) as to who are entitled
to be buried at the LNMB. The rules and regulations on Arlington, as found in
the C.F.R., were mentioned because of their apparent similarity with AFP
Regulations G 161-375. They were not the main basis of Our Decision, which
can stand on its own even without such reference. Second , We also did not
forget to cite the very statute that explicitly enumerates those who are
prohibited from interment in Arlington. This is reflected in footnotes 161 and
162 of the Decision. Third, We cannot consider the cases of Timothy Mcveigh
and Russel Wayne Wagner, allegedly U.S. military men who were denied the
right to be buried at the military cemetery. Newspaper or electronic reports
cannot be appreciated be the Court, "not because of any issue as to their
truth, accuracy, or impartiality, but for the simple reason that facts must be
established in accordance with the rules of evidence." 146 And Fourth, the
majority members of the Court did not "insist" the need of a prior proceeding
in accordance with § 553.21 of the C.F.R. before any disqualification under
38 U.S.C. § 2411 can be applied. We merely echoed the U.S. rules with
respect to a person found to have committed a Federal or State capital crime
but who has not been convicted by reason of not being available for trial due
to death or flight to avoid prosecution. We do not imply that exactly the
same U.S. rules should be applied in Marcos' case but only emphasized the
need to guarantee the rights of the accused who enjoys the presumption of
innocence. In this jurisdiction, there has been no identical or similar rules to
apply; hence, this Court cannot direct any compliance. Instead, Our lone
guide is to determine whether, under AFP Regulations G 161-375, Marcos
was dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from service or whether he
was convicted by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude,
Nothing more, nothing less.
MOA between Ramos
and the Marcoses
According to Lagman et al., the 1992 Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA), which was executed between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by then Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III, and the Marcos family,
represented by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, is a valid and enforceable
government contract, it being not contrary to law or public policy, that has
never been impugned. As such, it cannot be amended, revoked or rescinded
by the subsequent President in order to honor a personal campaign promise.
If the sanctity of a private contract is protected by the non-impairment
clause, with more reason is a State contract inviolable. Also, under the MOA,
the Marcos family has irrevocably waived any entitlement of the late
president to be buried at the LNMB. They are in estoppel and are guilty of
laches because they have not instituted any formal demand or action for 24
years since it was signed.
The Court cannot agree.
The decision of former President Fidel V. Ramos in disallowing Marcos'
burial at the LNMB is not etched in stone; it may be modified by succeeding
administrations. If one Congress cannot limit or reduce the plenary
legislative power of succeeding Congresses, 147 so, too, the exercise of
executive power by the past president cannot emasculate that of the
incumbent president. The discretionary act of the former is not binding upon
and cannot tie the hands of the latter, who may alter the same.
In this case, the MOA expressly provides that "any transfer of burial
grounds shall be with prior clearance with the Philippine Government taking
into account socio-political climate." When President Duterte issued his
verbal directive, he effectively gave the required prior government clearance
bearing in mind the current socio-political climate that is different from the
one prevailing at the time of former President Ramos. His factual foundation,
which is based on his presumed wisdom and possession of vital information
as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief, cannot be easily defeated by
petitioners-movants' naked assertions. Certainly, the determination of
whether Marcos' burial at the LNMB will best serve the public interest lies
within the prerogative of the President.
The powers of the Philippine President is not limited only to the specific
powers enumerated in the Constitution, i.e., executive power is more than
the sum of specific powers so enumerated. 148 Thus, he or she should not be
prevented from accomplishing his or her constitutionally and statutorily
assigned functions and discretionary responsibilities in a broad variety of
areas. Presidential prerogative ought not be fettered or embarrassed as the
powers, express or implied, may be impermissibly undermined. If the act is
within the exercise of the President's discretion, it is conclusive; if it is
without authority and against law, it is void. 149 In the absence of
arbitrariness and grave abuse, courts have no power or control over acts
involving the exercise of judgment of the Executive Department. The
ultimate power over alienable and disposable public lands is reposed in the
President of the Philippines. 150 More so, a judicial review should not
interfere with or intrude into a great extent on his needed prerogatives in
conducting military affairs. We have held that the commander-in-chief power
of the President is a wholly different and independent specie of presidential
authority such that, by tradition and jurisprudence, it is not encumbered by
the same degree of restriction as that which may attach to the exercise of
executive control. 151
With the foregoing, it is unnecessary for Us to discuss whether the
Marcos family are in estoppel or guilty of laches .
National reconciliation and forgiveness
As long as it is proven that Marcos' burial at the LNMB is not contrary

to the prevailing Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence, public respondents
need not show exactly how such act would promote the declared policy of
national healing and reconciliation. Regardless of petitioners-movants'
disagreement with it, the rationale for the assailed directives pertains to the
wisdom of an executive action which is not within the ambit of Our judicial
review. As well, the disputed act, just like a law that is being challenged, is
tested not by its supposed or actual result but by its conformity to existing
Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence. Hence, whether or not Marcos' burial
at the LNMB would in fact cause the healing of the nation and reconciliation
of the parties is another matter that is immaterial for purposes of resolving
this case and irrelevant to the application of AFP Regulations G 161-375. It is
presumptuous for petitioners-movants to claim that Marcos' burial at the
LNMB will not bring about genuine national healing and closure. While the
HRVVs may find it hard to accept, it is not improbable that the rest of the
Filipinos may think and feel differently. In either case, the Court cannot
engage in conjectures and surmises. Instead, Our policy is to presume that
the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and
unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. 152 EATCcI
Equally, We cannot pass upon the propositions that Marcos' burial at

the LNMB would cleanse the late President Marcos of his sins or consecrate
his misdeeds (Lagman et al.); or would clear the image of the Marcos family
as they once again attempt to rise into power (Rosales, et al.); or would
politically rehabilitate their already tarnished reputation and give a shot in
the arm to their moribund fanatical followers (Ocampo et al.); or would
vindicate him or exonerate each and every plunderer, thief, murderer,
human rights violator, and torturer in government or justify every immoral
and unlawful act of crooks, trapos, cheaters, and other villains in public
office, giving honor to impunity in public office and to a public life without
moral principles (De Lima). All these allegations are pure and simple
speculations that are devoid of any factual moorings.
Historical revisionism
We concur with Ocampo et al. that this Court was also a victim of
Marcos' authoritarian rule and that it cannot isolate itself from history
because it was and is a part of it. However, as Justice Brion put it, while the
Court is not blind to history, it is not a judge thereof. Accordingly, We should
leave Marcos' legacy to the judgment of history. The assailed Decision aptly
ruled:
Contrary to petitioners' postulation, our nation's history will not
be instantly revised by a single resolve of President Duterte, acting
through the public respondents, to bury Marcos at the LNMB, Whether
petitioners admit it or not, the lessons of Martial Law are already
engraved, albeit in varying degrees, in the hearts and minds of the
present generation of Filipinos. As to the unborn, [We] must [say] that
the preservation and popularization of our history is not the sole
responsibility of the Chief Executive; it is a joint and collective
endeavor of every freedom-loving citizen of this country.
Notably, complementing the statutory powers and functions of
the Human Rights Victims' Claims Board and the HRVV Memorial
Commission in the memorialization of HRVVs, the National Historical
Commission of the Philippines (NHCP), formerly known as the National
Historical Institute (NHI), is mandated to act as the primary
government agency responsible for history and is authorized to
determine all factual matters relating to official Philippine history.
Among others, it is tasked to: (a) conduct and support all kinds of
research relating to Philippine national and local history; (b) develop
educational materials in various media, implement historical
educational activities for the popularization of Philippine history, and
disseminate, information regarding Philippine historical events, dates,
places and personages; and (c) actively engage in the settlement or
resolution of controversies or issues relative to historical personages,
places, dates and events. Under R.A. Nos. 10066 (National Cultural
Heritage Act of 2009) and 10086 (Strengthening Peoples' Nationalism
Through Philippine History Act), the declared State policy is to
conserve, develop, promote, and popularize the nation's historical
and cultural heritage and resources. Towards this end, means shall be
provided to strengthen people's nationalism, love of country, respect
for its heroes and pride for the people's accomplishments by
reinforcing the importance of Philippine national and local history in
daily life with the end in view of raising social consciousness. Utmost
priority shall be given not only with the research on history but also
its popularization. 153
The President of the Philippines has no authority to unilaterally declare
anyone a hero. Also, while it is mandatory for the courts to take judicial
notice of Philippine history, the NHCP has the primary jurisdiction with
respect thereto. 154 It is the principal government agency responsible for
history and has the authority to determine all factual matters relating to
official Philippine history. In its task to actively engage in the settlement or
resolution of controversies or issues relative to historical personages, places,
dates and events, the NHCP Board is empowered to discuss and resolve, with
finality, issues or conflicts on Philippine history. 155 The Court only steps in if
an action is brought before it to determine whether there is grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
NHCP.
Equitable consideration
Rosales et al. contend that the Court should apply equity and extend
equitable protection to the HRVVs because Marcos' burial at the LNMB
causes them irreparable injury as it re-inflicts their trauma and grief while
the Marcos' heirs have not shown any injury that they would sustain by its
denial.
The argument is untenable.
Justice is done according to law. As a rule, equity follows the
law. There may be a moral obligation, often regarded as an equitable
consideration (meaning compassion), but if there is no enforceable
legal duty, the action must fail although the disadvantaged party
deserves commiseration or sympathy.
The choice between what is legally just and what is morally just,
when these two options do not coincide, is explained by Justice
Moreland in Vales vs. Villa, 35 Phil. 769, 788 where he said:
Courts operate not because one person has been
defeated or overcome by another, but because he has
been defeated or overcome illegally. Men may do foolish
things, make ridiculous contracts, use miserable
judgment, and lose money by them — indeed, all they
have in the world; but not for that alone can the law
intervene and restore. There must be, in addition, a
violation of law, the commission of what the law knows as
a n actionable wrong before the courts are authorized to
lay hold of the situation and remedy it. 156
Equity is "justice outside legality," 157 It is applied only in the absence
of and never against statutory law or, as in this case, appropriate AFP
regulations. Courts exercising equity jurisdiction are bound and
circumscribed by law or rules and have no arbitrary discretion to disregard
them. 158 Here, while there is no provision of the Constitution, law, or
jurisprudence expressly allowing or disallowing Marcos' burial at the LNMB,
there is a rule, particularly AFP Regulations G 161-375, that is valid and
existing. It has the force and effect of law because it was duly issued
pursuant to the rule-making power of the President that was delegated to his
subordinate official. Hence, it is the sole authority in determining who may
or may not be buried at the LNMB.
To conclude, let it be emphasized that Supreme Court decisions do not
have to be popular as long as the Constitution and the law are followed. In
pursuit of the ideal "cold neutrality of an impartial judge," every member of
this august body must be guided by what Justice Isagani A. Cruz fittingly
stated in his Dissenting Opinion in Marcos v. Sec. Manglapus, thus: DHITCc
I have no illusion that the stand I am taking will be met with

paeans of praise, considering that Marcos is perhaps the most
detested man in the entire history of our country. But we are not
concerned here with popularity and personalities. As a judge, I am not
swayed by what Justice Cardozo called the "hooting throng" that may
make us see things through the prisms of prejudice. I bear in mind
that when I sit in judgment as a member of this Court, I must cast all
personal feelings aside.
The issue before us must be resolved with total objectivity, on
the basis only of the established facts and the applicable law and not
of wounds that still fester and scars that have not healed. And not
even of fear, for fear is a phantom. That phantom did not rise when
the people stood fast at EDSA — against the threat of total massacre
in defense at last of their freedom. 159
Never has a burial stirred so much emotion, rancor and animosity as
this case, drawing the Court in its vortex. We could only do so much,
however, deciding the issues in a manner within our competence and
otherwise holding back on getting embroiled in politically and emotionally
charged controversies, matters better left for other government officials and
agencies, the people, and history, eventually, to judge.
Ever mindful that the Court cannot and should not be the ultimate
judge of all questions that confront the country, We must ever remain
cognizant of the boundaries of our role as final arbiters on questions of law
in a carefully wrought structure of government. If we are to do our job well,
we must know the limits of our powers and the appropriate yardsticks for our
decision-making authority. Overextending ourselves is more likely to be
counterproductive, eventually compromising our ability to discharge our
responsibilities effectively.
Just like the subject matter of this case, the issues must come to an
end and be interred. A man's place in history is for others to decide, not the
Court's.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration, as well as the
motion/petition to exhume Marcos' remains at the Libingan ng mga Bayani,
are DENIED WITH FINALITY. The petitions for indirect contempt in G.R. No.
228186 and G.R. No. 228245 are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Mendoza,
Perlas-Bernabe, Martires, Tijam and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Sereno, C.J., I reiterate my dissent; please see attached.
Carpio, J., I reiterate my dissent.
Leonen, J., I maintain my dissent in the main case.
Jardeleza, J., I join dissent of J. Caguioa.
Caguioa, J., see separate dissent.
Separate Opinions
SERENO, C.J., dissenting:
On 18 November 2016, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was
interred at the Libingan ng mga Bayani (Libingan) with burial rites and
ceremonies conducted by the Armed Forces of the Philippines. 1
Respondents held the ceremony just 10 days after the Decision of this Court
was released, notwithstanding the fact that the ruling had not yet attained
finality. In his draft Resolution, however, the ponente proposes to take no
action against respondents in connection with their premature
implementation of the Decision. He also recommends the denial of the
Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners.
I maintain my dissent.
I disagreed with the majority ruling issued on 8 November 2016 for
many reasons, as explained in my Dissenting Opinion. My views on most of
the arguments raised by petitioners have already been elucidated in my
discussion therein, and my position has not changed.
It must continuously be emphasized that the absence of an express
prohibition against the burial of former President Marcos should not be
considered the primary determinant of the merits of this case. Our laws and
jurisprudence provide more than sufficient guidance on what must be done
with respect to his burial, and it is the duty of this Court to utilize these texts
to arrive at a conclusion that allows right and justice to prevail.
As extensively explained in my Dissent, our Constitution, 2 statutes,
and jurisprudence clearly denounced the massive plunder and the countless
abuses committed by Marcos and his cronies during his tenure as President.
The legislature and the courts not only condemned him as a thief; they
equally recognized his legal liability for the human rights violations suffered
by innumerable victims while he was in power. 3 Taking all these things into
account, Marcos is clearly not worthy of commendation from the state, and
no public purpose would be served by his interment in the Libingan.
Furthermore, his burial in that cemetery ran counter to the obligations of the
Philippines under international human rights law; in particular, the duty to
combat impunity and hold perpetrators of human rights violations
accountable.
It is thus evident that the President acted with grave abuse of
discretion and in violation of his duty to faithfully execute the laws when he
ordered the burial of Marcos in the Libingan. His act was in direct
contravention of both the policy and the spirit of domestic and international
law, and for the Court to sanction this decision would be to endorse an
egregious act of impunity. It would effectively be allowing the government to
bestow undue honor upon a corrupt public official and perpetrator of human
rights violations. This question is far from being purely political in nature. In
fact, it goes into the very heart of the duty of this Court as the protector of
the Constitution.
I believe that my position on the various issues raised by the parties
has been adequately explained in my dissent from the Decision dated 8
November 2016. Nevertheless, I am compelled to write the present opinion
to record my observations on two crucial questions brought up in the
Motions for Reconsideration: (1) the precipitate burial of Marcos in the
Libingan before the Decision of this Court attained finality; and (2) the
invalidity of AFP Regulations G 161-375 for noncompliance with the
requirement of filing copies thereof with the Office of the National
Administrative Register (ONAR).
Given that the Decision dated 8 November
2016 had not yet attained finality,
respondents had no right to proceed with
the burial of Marcos at the Libingan.
As previously stated, Marcos was interred at the Libingan and accorded
military honors on 18 November 2016, or 10 days after the Decision of this
Court was released. Petitioners objected to the allegedly premature
execution of the Decision citing their unexpired period to seek
reconsideration of the ruling. They argue that the Decision had not attained
finality and therefore could not be executed without impairing their right to
due process. cEaSHC
I find merit in the foregoing arguments.

Respondents had no authority to execute
the Decision pending its finality.
Rule 52, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1997 Rules of Court, provides the
guidelines for the finality and execution of judgments of the Supreme Court:
RULE 52
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Section 1. Period for filing.
A party may file a motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final
resolution within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof, with proof of
service on the adverse party.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Stay of execution.
The pendency of a motion for reconsideration filed on time and
by the proper party shall stay the execution of the judgment or
final resolution sought to be reconsidered unless the court, for
good reasons, shall otherwise direct. (Emphasis supplied)
These provisions apply to all original actions before this Court. 4 In
Perez v. Falcatan, 5 the Court explained:
[U]nder Section 3, Rule 52 ("Section 3") of the Rules of Court "[a]
motion for . . . reconsideration filed [on] time shall stay the final order
. . . sought to be examined." Thus, respondents' timely filing of
their motion for reconsideration of the 3 March 1997 Resolution
prevented that Resolution (and consequently the RTC
Decision) from attaining finality. Indeed, to uphold
petitioner's contention would be to ignore Section 3 and
correspondingly deny respondents their right to seek
reconsideration under Section 1, Rule 52. 6 (Citations omitted
and emphasis supplied)
Indeed, while there are certain judgments that may be executed
immediately or even pending appeal, these remain specific exceptions to the
general rule that a pending motion for reconsideration results in a stay of
execution of the judgment. In Engineering Construction, Inc. v. National
Power Corp., this Court stated:
The point that the Court wishes to emphasize is this: Courts look
with disfavor upon any attempt to execute a judgment which
has not acquired a final character. Section 2, Rule 39, authorizing
the premature execution of judgments, being an exception to the
general rule, must be restrictively construed. It would not be a sound
rule to allow indiscriminately the execution of a money judgment,
even if there is a sufficient bond. "The reasons allowing execution
must constitute superior circumstances demanding urgency which
will outweigh the injury or damages should the losing party secure a
reversal of the judgment." 7 (Emphasis supplied)
I must emphasize that execution pending appeal is discretionary and
may issue only upon good reasons in cases covered by Rule 39, Section 2 of
the Rules of Court. On the other hand, immediate execution is permitted
only in very specific cases as provided by law, 8 the rules, 9 or jurisprudence.
10
A petition for prohibition clearly does not fall within any of the above-
mentioned exceptions. Contrary to the position taken by the ponente, the
fact that the remedy of prohibition is in the nature of an injunction does not
mean that immediate execution is automatically warranted. Following Rule
52, Section 4, the Court must first order the immediate execution of a
decision for good reasons, in order to warrant an exception to the general
rule on the stay of execution. In Florendo v. Paramount Insurance Corp., 11
we declared:
Normally, execution will issue as a matter of right only (a)
when the judgment has become final and executory; (b) when
the judgment debtor has renounced or waived his right of appeal; (c)
when the period for appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been
filed; or (d) when, having been filed, the appeal has been resolved
and the records of the case have been returned to the court of origin.
Execution pending appeal is the exception to the general rule.
As such exception, the court's discretion in allowing it must be strictly
construed and firmly grounded on the existence of good reasons.
"Good reasons," it has been held, consist of compelling
circumstances that justify immediate execution lest the
judgment becomes illusory. The circumstances must be superior,
outweighing the injury or damages that might result should the losing
party secure a reversal of the judgment. Lesser reasons would
make of execution pending appeal, instead of an instrument
of solicitude and justice, a tool of oppression and inequity. 12
(Emphases supplied)
Here, no order for the immediate execution of the Decision dated 8
November 2016 was made. 13 Accordingly, the general principle applies —
the execution of the ruling must be considered deferred until its finality. This
was how it should have been in this case, since there were no "good
reasons" to justify the immediate execution of the ruling. Based on the
records, there was neither allegation nor proof of any urgent need to
proceed with the burial.
The lack of urgency notwithstanding, respondents facilitated the burial
of Marcos at the Libingan prior to the expiration of the 15-day reglementary
period for filing a motion for reconsideration. Their act was clearly in
violation of the Rules of Court, because it amounted to the premature
execution of a judgment that had not yet attained finality.
The expiration of the Status Quo Ante
Order (SQAO) cannot justify the premature
execution of the Decision.
I note that great significance has been given to the fact that the SQAO
had expired on 8 November 2016, the same day the petitions were
dismissed. The expiration of the order was taken to mean that there was
nothing to prevent respondents from proceeding with the burial, even if the
Decision had not yet become final.
I disagree.
The mere expiration of the period specified in the SQAO cannot justify
the premature execution of the Decision. While it may be true that the SQAO
had been lifted, the non-finality of the ruling prohibited the parties from
implementing the judgment by proceeding with the burial. As explained
above, execution may issue only after the decision in any particular case has
become final, unless immediate execution or execution pending appeal is
allowed. To reiterate, no such permission was granted by the Court in this
case. CTIEac
Furthermore, the Court clearly stated the particular reason for the
issuance of the SQAO — to prevent the parties from doing anything that
would render the petitions moot and academic. The Order states in relevant
part:
NOW, THEREFORE, You, Petitioners and Respondents, your
agents, representatives, or persons acting in your place or stead, are
hereby directed to maintain the status quo prior to the
issuance of the assailed Memorandum dated August 7, 2016 of
Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenza, for a period of
twenty (20) days from notice hereof so as not to render moot and
academic the resolution of these consolidated petitions. 14
(Emphases supplied)
In my view, this stated reason was just as important as the period
specified therein, as that reason reflected the purpose behind the directive
of the Court. We wanted to ensure that the dispute was resolved properly —
and thus with finality — without the parties interfering with our exercise of
jurisdiction. By prematurely executing the Decision, respondents failed to
respect the rationale for the ruling.
For the Court to approve the conduct of respondents would be to
support a blatant disregard for the rules. It would allow parties to consider
every decision immediately executory and permit them to render a dispute
moot by means of execution.
Based on the submissions of respondents themselves, that appears to
be their precise intent in this case. After prematurely implementing the
Decision by proceeding with the burial, they came to this Court and argued
that the interment constituted a supervening event that rendered the
Motions for Reconsideration moot and academic. 15 They even insisted that
the exhumation of the body was not a viable remedy should the original
ruling be overturned later on, because that course of action would amount to
disrespect for the dead. 16 These circumstances clearly betrayed the
deplorable attempt of respondents to render these cases moot to their own
advantage. For obvious reasons, the Court should not allow them to distort
the principles of finality and execution in this manner and then to benefit
from their own disregard of the rules.
Noncompliance with the ONAR filing
requirement rendered AFP Regulations G
171-375 invalid and ineffective.
I likewise take a different view as regards the applicability of the ONAR
filing requirement to the AFP Regulations in this case. While the ponente
contends that the requirement does not apply to AFP Regulations G 171-375,
I believe that these regulations are covered by Section 3, Chapter 2, Book VII
of the Administrative Code of 1987. Having failed to comply with that
requirement, that particular issuance must be deemed invalid.
It is argued by the ponente that Section 1, Chapter 1, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987, exempts military establishments from this
requirement in all matters relating exclusively to armed forces personnel.
Since the regulations were supposedly internal in nature, as they were
issued only for the guidance of the AFP units tasked to administer the
Libingan, it is contended that the exemption applies. 17 Furthermore, since
the Libingan is a military cemetery, the regulations allegedly do not affect
the citizenry, and registration in the ONAR cannot be considered a dictate of
due process. 18
I beg to differ.
Section 3, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987,
requires every agency to submit to the ONAR three certified copies of every
rule it adopts. As defined by the Administrative Code, the term "agency"
includes "any department, bureau, office, commission, authority or officer of
the National Government authorized by law or executive order to make
rules, issue licenses, grant rights or privileges, and adjudicate cases." 19 The
AFP is clearly within the scope of this comprehensive definition; accordingly,
it is bound to comply with the ONAR requirement.
It is true that a narrow exception to the foregoing general rule is
provided in Section 1, Chapter 1, Book VII of the same Code, for issuances of
military establishments on "matters relating exclusively to Armed
Forces personnel." 20 AFP Regulations G 161-375, however, does not fall
within the exception.
AFP Regulations G 161-375 does not
pertain exclusively to armed forces
personnel.
It is a basic principle of statutory construction that the words used in a
statute are to be understood in their natural, plain, and ordinary acceptation,
and according to the signification that they have in common use. They are to
be given their ordinary meaning, unless otherwise specifically provided. 21
This interpretation is consistent with the basic precept of verba legis. 22
The word exclusively means "apart from all others," "only," "solely," or
"to the exclusion of all others." 23 Therefore, in order for the exemption
under the Administrative Code to apply, the subject regulations issued by
military establishments must deal with matters that affect only AFP
personnel, to the exclusion of any other group or member of the populace.
Contrary to the position of the ponente that only matters relating
exclusively to personnel of the AFP are implicated in the subject rules, a
plain reading of the regulations reveals that the exception is not applicable
to this case.
Section 3 of AFP Regulations G 161-375 provides:
3. Who are qualified to be interred in the Libingan ng mga Bayani:
The remains of the following deceased persons are qualified and,
therefore, authorized to be interred in the Libingan ng mga
Bayani:
a. Medal of Valor Awardees.
b. Presidents or Commanders-in-chief, AFP.
c. Secretaries of National Defense.
d. Chiefs of Staff, AFP.
e. General/Flag Officers of the AFP.
f. Active and retired military personnel of the AFP, to include
active draftees and trainees who died in line of duty, active
reservists and CAFGU Active Auxiliary (CAA) who died in
combat operations or combat related activities. SaCIDT
g. Former members of the AFP who laterally entered or joined

the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP).
h. Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and
recognized guerillas.
i. Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and
other deceased persons whose interment or reinterment
has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress
or the Secretary of National Defense.
j. Former Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, Dignitaries,
Statesmen, National Artists, widows of former Presidents,
Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff x x x.
It cannot be denied that the preceding enumeration includes persons
who are not members of the armed forces — government dignitaries,
statesmen, national artists, former dignitaries, widows of former Presidents,
secretaries of national defense, chiefs of staff, and even other deceased
persons whose interment or re-interment has been approved by the
Commander-in-Chief, Congress, or the defense secretary. It is therefore clear
that while the regulations are addressed to officials tasked to administer the
Libingan, the subject matter of the issuance is not confined to matters
relating exclusively to AFP personnel. As such, the regulations cannot be
considered exempt from the ONAR requirement.
It must be emphasized that the requirements of publication and filing
of administrative issuances with the ONAR were put in place as safeguards
against abuses on the part of lawmakers and as guarantees to the
constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public
concern; therefore, these requirements call for strict compliance. 24 Here,
petitioners have sufficiently proven that the regulations were never
submitted to the ONAR. 25 Accordingly, these issuances must be deemed
ineffective. 26
The doctrine of prospectivity cannot be
used to circumvent the ONAR filing
requirement under the Administrative
Code.
T h e ponente also advances a novel position regarding the possible
outcome of this case, if we were to assume the invalidity of AFP Regulations
G 161-375 for noncompliance with the ONAR filing requirement. He contends
that even in that scenario, there would still be sufficient justification for the
interment of Marcos at the Libingan, because the President could still apply
AFP Regulations G 161-373 issued on 9 April 1986. 27 The Administrative
Code of 1987 is supposedly not applicable to that earlier issuance, because
the code can only be prospectively applied.
I cannot subscribe to this position.
To begin with, AFP Regulations G 161-373 has already been
superseded by AFP Regulations G 161-374, as clearly specified in the latter's
last paragraph on supersession. 28 In turn, the latter regulations have been
superseded by AFP Regulations G 161-375. Consequently, AFP Regulations G
161-373 cannot be the source of any legal right. It cannot be used as the
basis of the current directives of the President.
Just as important is the flaw in the manner of reasoning employed. The
doctrine of prospectivity cannot be exploited to allow the utilization of past
issuances for the purpose of evading the application of the Administrative
Code. That distorted application of the principle would do nothing but
circumvent the provisions of the law and subvert its very purpose.
As I expressed in my Dissenting Opinion on the Decision dated 8
November 2016, it is the enduring duty of the Court to ensure that right and
justice prevail. In this case, that duty would have meant preventing a
whitewash of the sins of Marcos against the Filipino people. In denying the
Motions for Reconsideration, I believe that the majority has countenanced a
step in the opposite direction.
Nonetheless, the ruling in this case may be taken as an opportunity to
remember the significance of the nation's historical truth. It is a moment to
be reminded that opposing the distortion of our collective memory should go
beyond resisting the burial of a dictator in a cemetery for heroes. The
defense of history, truth, and justice must motivate every Filipino to ensure
that the government fulfills its responsibility to provide an effective remedy
for victims of human rights violations during the Marcos regime. It must also
provide an impetus for citizens to demand justice for the economic plunder
endured by the country during that period.
Based on the information obtained by the Court throughout these
proceedings, the task of obtaining justice for the nation and for the individual
victims of the Martial Law regime is far from complete.
Reports from the Human Rights Victims' Claims Board reveals that
more than 44,000 of the 75,000 applications it has received from victims of
martial law abuses have still not been adjudicated. 29 Needless to state,
these claims should be settled as soon as possible, if the state were to truly
fulfill its acknowledged moral and legal obligation to recognize and/or
provide reparation to victims of human rights abuses during the Marcos
regime. 30
The pending cases against the Marcos family and their cronies must
also be closely scrutinized and monitored. While assets in the form of
corporate shares, 31 paintings, 32 jewelry, 33 and deposits in overseas bank
accounts 34 valued in billions of pesos have been recovered through
litigation or compromise agreements, the PCGG has yet to accomplish its full
mandate. Records submitted to this Court reveal that 118 cases — 51 civil
and 67 criminal suits — filed by the PCGG against the Marcos family and
their cronies remain pending. 35 Evidently, the "herculean task of recovering
the ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the deposed President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his family, relatives, subordinates and close associates" 36 continues
to be a crucial undertaking.
On a final note, I must emphasize the importance of these remaining
tasks. It is imperative for the nation to remember the unfinished duty of the
government to obtain justice for those who suffered under the Marcos
regime. Now more than ever, it is the only way to truly protect our collective
history from the implications of allowing the dictator to be buried at the
Libingan.
WHEREFORE, I maintain my DISSENT from the Decision dated 8
November 2016 and vote to GRANT the Motions for Reconsideration. cHECAS
CAGUIOA, J., dissenting:

When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it
does not assert any superiority over the other departments — it only asserts
the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine the conflicting claims under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them. 1
Anchoring the dismissal of the petitions on the alleged absence of
constitutional limitations on the powers conferred upon the Executive in
determining who are worthy of being interred at the Libingan ng mga Bayani
(LNMB), the Court ruled, in the November 8, 2016 Decision, that,
substantively, President Rodrigo Duterte did not act with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing a verbal order to inter the remains of the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos at the LNMB, considering that the burial is in
accordance with the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence.
I maintain my dissent.
The very provision that codifies this Court's expanded power of judicial
review in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution, is a
direct product of the collective experience of the Filipino people during
martial law under then President Marcos. 2 Inevitably, when the Court is
called upon to discharge its duty 3 to determine whether a branch of
government or any of its officials acted with grave abuse of discretion, the
Court cannot , by any means, divorce the specific text of the Constitution
from its spirit as a post-dictatorship charter. Even in a situation where the
legal basis for the assailed action is itself constitutional, the power of judicial
review vested upon the Court includes the power to declare unconstitutional
the "application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, x x x
instructions, x x x and other regulations." 4
Mindful of this duty, I submit the following observations in addition to
those elucidated in my Dissenting Opinion dated November 8, 2016.
T h e ponencia holds, among others, that Petitioners' view that they
sustained or will sustain direct injury "is founded on the wrong premise that
Marcos' burial at the LNMB contravenes the provisions of the Constitution;
P.D. 105, R.A. Nos. 289, 10066, 10086 and 10368 and international laws," 5
considering that the LNMB is an active military cemetery/grave site over
which the President has certain discretionary authority, pursuant to his
control and commander-in-chief powers, which is beyond the Court's power
of judicial review.
I disagree.
I maintain my position that the directive of President Duterte to bury or
inter the remains of former President Marcos in the LNMB presents a
justiciable, not political, issue. The wisdom of his oral directive is not being
questioned. Rather, the question is whether the issuance of the directive is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction because, among others, it runs counter to the Constitution,
national and international law, public policy on national shrines and national
historic shrines, and jurisprudence.
The Court is not called upon to determine former President Marcos'
rightful place in Philippine history. Rather, it is called upon to determine
whether LNMB, given LNMB's history, nature, purpose and the public policy
behind its establishment, administration and development, should be the
rightful resting place of former President Marcos.
It is beyond question that while it has an active military
cemetery/grave site component, LNMB is foremost a military shrine or
memorial declared as a national shrine. Being a national shrine, it is the
government's duty "to hold and keep x x x [LNMB] as sacred and hallowed
place" 6 pursuant to the policy mandated by Presidential Decree No. (PD)
105 dated January 24, 1973. 7 Also, the administration, maintenance and
development of LNMB must be always in keeping with Proclamation No. 86 8
dated October 27, 1954, which renamed the Republic Memorial Cemetery to
"Libingan ng mga Bayani" (Cemetery of the Heroes), 9 so that LNMB is
"symbolic of the cause for which our soldiers have died, and x x xtruly
express[ive of] the nation's ESTEEM and REVERENCE for her war
dead. " 10 Further, the preservation, protection and conservation of LNMB's
physical, cultural and historical significance and integrity are mandated by
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 10066 11 and R.A. 10086. 12
The very presence in LNMB of the remains of former President Marcos
— a dictator and authoritarian; perpetrator of numerous and gross human
rights abuses involving summary execution, torture, enforced or involuntary
disappearance, arbitrary detention and other atrocities; plunderer of the
Philippine economy with enormous ill-gotten wealth and kleptocrat;
dishonorably separated and evicted President by People Power, dishonorably
discharged Commander-in-Chief; fabricator of allegedly received U.S. medals
and allegedly committed "heroic" actions while being a soldier — is an
affront to LNMB's sacredness and hallowedness as the legally designated and
recognized Philippine heroes' burial site or cemetery. It does not further the
esteem and reverence that LNMB rightly deserves as the memorial in honor
of the heroism, patriotism, gallantry and nationalism of our war dead and
fallen soldiers and military personnel. Its positive cultural and historical
significance and integrity are grossly violated. AHDacC
While we revere our dearly departed, the reverence we accord them is

distinctly different from what we are expected to bestow upon our heroes.
We do not need a definition of who a hero is or ought to be because we know
in our heart and conscience who they really are when the occasion requires
our collective decision. As we revere our dearly departed, we must not
disparage the living and becloud our collective past.
The ponencia further holds that "the beneficial provisions of R.A. 10368
13 "cannot be extended to construe Marcos' burial at the LNMB as a form of
reparation for the [Human Rights Violations Victims] [(]HRVVs[)]," so much
so that the ponencia holds that "[i]t is not the Marcos' burial at the LNMB
that would result in 're-traumatization' of HRVVs but the act of requiring
them to recount their harrowing experiences in the course of legal
proceedings instituted by them or their families to seek justice and
reparation for the gross human rights violations." 14
Once more, this holding is egregious error.
When the Court is called upon to discharge its duty to interpret the
nature and extent of reparations owed to HRVVs as in this case, it must do
so by interpreting domestic law (i.e., R.A. 10368) in accordance with, and
in light of, the very international law obligations underlying, and even
compelling, 15 its passage. It is the solemn duty of this Court to ensure
that laws are interpreted in a manner consistent with the letter,
spirit and intent of the Constitution and the law.
The argument that the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
(U.N. Principles on Reparation) do not in any way bind the Philippines is
extremely erroneous, as it is based on the wrong premise that the HRVVs'
rights flow solely and directly from the U.N. Principles on Reparation. They
do not. Such an isolated reading of HRVVs' rights under international law
fails to consider: first, that the obligation to provide reparation is anchored
upon customary international law itself — and not the U.N. Principles on
Reparation by and of themselves — which, pursuant to Article II, Section 2 16
of the 1987 Constitution, automatically 17 forms part of the law of the land,
and second, that the obligation to provide reparation includes the obligation
to provide full and effective remedy, among which is satisfaction. Thus, the
HRVVs' right to an effective remedy emanates from customary international
law which forms part of the law of the land.
While the U.N. Principles on Reparation in fact do not entail new
international or domestic legal obligations, they however identify
mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the implementation of
existing legal obligations under international human rights law. 18 This is
precisely because the U.N. Principles on Reparation merely compile
international legal obligations already in force, including those embodied
in international treaties. 19
This is supported by the very language of R.A. 10368, categorically
recognizing the Constitutional guarantee of full respect for human rights, 20
the Constitutional prohibition on torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation,
or any other means which vitiate the free will, 21 as well as the mandate to
compensate and rehabilitate victims of torture. 22
I wish to emphasize that R.A. 10368 itself flows from the recognition of
the State's obligation to enact domestic legislation to give effect to the rights
recognized "therein." 23 The word "therein" in Section 2, paragraph 2 of R.A.
10368 refers to various international human rights laws and conventions to
which the Philippines is a State Party ( i.e., International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights [ICCPR] and the Convention Against Torture [CAT] and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR]), which lay down States'
erga omnes obligations concerning the basic rights of human persons. 24
Among the obligations clearly required by international human rights
covenants is the non-derogable right to an effective remedy under Article 2
(3) of the ICCPR. 25 To be clear, without reparation provided to individuals
whose rights have been violated (e.g., those deprived of the right to life, 26
those subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, 27 those
arbitrarily detained, 28 and the desaparecidos) , 29 the obligation to provide
an effective remedy is not discharged.
In any event, adopting the ponencia's resort to verba legis, R.A. 10368
lays to rest any doubt as to the status of the HRVVs' right to an effective
remedy, viz.:
In fact, the right to a remedy is itself guaranteed under existing
human rights treaties and/or customary international law, being
peremptory in character (jus cogens) and as such has been
recognized as non-derogable. 30
To my mind, the obligation to uphold the HRVVs' right to an effective
remedy, and consequently, the right to all forms of reparation, is beyond
question. The only question left to be asked is whether the HRVVs' right to
reparation includes the right not to have the perpetrator of the violations of
the human rights of these victims interred at the LNMB.
Insofar as the extent of reparation is concerned, even under the
pretext of applying the literal meaning of R.A. 10368, it cannot be denied
that the obligation to provide reparation to HRVVs is not limited to monetary
compensation and non-monetary compensation similar to "psychotherapy,
counseling, medical care, social amelioration and honorific recognition," 31
as the ponencia suggests based on House Bill Nos. 54, 97, and 302 and
Senate Bill No. 3330.
Reparation consists of material and symbolic aspects. 32 Inasmuch as
R.A. 10368 provides for mechanisms for monetary compensation, 33 it
likewise transposes into the domestic sphere the international law obligation
to provide non-monetary reparation by recognizing the State's obligation to
"acknowledge the sufferings and damages inflicted upon [HRVVs]." 34 To be
clear, the obligation to provide reparation refers to a range of measures. In
fact, R.A. 10368 is replete with the use of the all-encompassing term
"reparation," evincing the legislative intent to refer to all aspects of the
entire universe of "reparation" accorded to HRVVs under International
Human Rights Laws. IDSEAH
Compensation, as envisioned in Section 4 of R.A. 10368, 35

contemplates economically assessable damage. Section 5, 36 in turn, read
vis-à-vis Section 2, 37 refers to the other aspects of reparation, including
restitution, 38 rehabilitation, 39 satisfaction, 40 and guarantees of non-
repetition. 41 As correctly pointed out by Petitioners, satisfaction, as an
aspect of reparation, requires upholding the imprescriptible right to truth,
public apologies, and judicial sanctions. 42 By allowing the interment of
former President Marcos' remains in no less than the Libingan ng mga Bayani
and adopting a selective interpretation of the term "reparation," the Court
effectively rendered inutile the very laws passed to give due
recognition to the HRVVs' victimhood.
On a final note, as Petitioners correctly pointed out, mere existence of
laws does not, by and of itself, constitute sufficient compliance with the
obligation to provide reparation. For instance, in Bautista de Arellana v.
Colombia, 43 concerning an individual abducted, tortured and killed by
military men dressed as civilians, the United Nations Human Rights
Committee (UNHRC) held that despite the institution of a national
administrative tribunal and the award of damages to the family's victim,
"purely disciplinary and administrative remedies cannot be deemed to
constitute adequate and effective remedies within the meaning of article 2,
paragraph (3) of the [ICCPR]."
All told, the judiciary, as a branch of government, is required 44 to
adopt measures to fulfill its legal obligation to uphold the right to an
effective remedy. 45 Although Article 2, paragraph 2 of the ICCPR allows
States Parties to give effect to the ICCPR rights in accordance with domestic
constitutional processes, the same principle operates so as to prevent States
Parties from invoking provisions of the constitutional law or other aspects of
domestic law to justify a failure to perform or give effect to obligations under
the treaty. 46
To be clear, the actual source of the HRVVs' right to an effective
remedy and to reparation must not be confused with the mechanism by
which those rights are, in practice, enforced and upheld. The right to an
effective remedy and the corollary right to reparation arises from customary
international law as codified in international human rights treaties, while the
means by which those rights are protected are codified in the U.N. Principles
on Reparation.
Petitioners, who are HRVVs, have come to the Court for the
enforcement of their internationally recognized right to effective remedy and
full reparation for the harrowing human rights abuses they and many more
suffered under the Marcos' martial law regime. I cannot, without reneging on
our obligations under international law, and in conscience, allow the
interment of former President Marcos in the LNMB, the perpetrator of the
violations of their human rights, and desecrate its legal status as a sacred
and hallowed national shrine.
WHEREFORE, I maintain my DISSENT from the Decision dated
November 8, 2016 and vote to GRANT the motions for reconsideration.
Footnotes
* Rene A.V. Saguisag, et al. filed a petition for certiorari-in-intervention.
1. Rollo (G.R. No. 225973), pp. 2983-2990.
2. Id. at 3076-3130.
3. Id. at 3015-3067.
4. Id. at 3177-3267.
5. Id. at 3139-3154.
6. Id. at 3165-3174.
7. Id. at 2960-2967.
8. Rollo (G.R. No. 228186), pp. 2-18.
9. Rollo (G.R. No. 228245), pp. 3-14.
10. See Resolution dated November 29, 2016 and December 6, 2016 (Rollo (G.R.
No. 225973), pp. 3138-A-3138-F and Rollo (G.R. No. 228245), pp. 23-26.
11. Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 910 (2003).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 912.

15. See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Abraham F. Sarmiento in Marcos v.
Manglapus, 258-A Phil. 547, 560 (1989).
16. Marcos v. Manglapus , 258 Phil. 479, 506 (1989).
17. Id. at 506-507.
18. Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, supra note 11, at 893.
19. Atty. Lozano, et al. v. Speaker Nograles, 607 Phil. 334, 342 (2009) and
Tolentino v. COMELEC , 465 Phil. 385, 402 (2004).
20. Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 758-759 (2006).
21. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders' Ass'ns, Inc. v. Energy Regulatory
Commission (ERC), et al., 638 Phil. 542, 556-557 (2010).
22. See Commissioner on Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., 695 Phil.
55, 61 (2012).
23. AFP Regulations G 161-375 C-1 dated 18 February 2003 provides.
6. Procedures:
xxx xxx xxx
b. For deceased retired military personnel — The next of kin shall secure the
Death Certificate and shall submit this document to the Adjutant General,
AFP (Attn: C, NRD) who shall examine and process the same and determine if
the deceased is qualified to be interred or reinterred at the LNMB.
c. For deceased veterans and reservists — The next of kin shall secure the
Death Certificate and shall submit this document to the Adjutant General,
AFP (Attn: C, NRD) who shall issue Certificate of Services and/or
authenticated retirement orders of the deceased personnel. Subsequently,
same documents shall be submitted to the DCS personnel for RRA, J10 who
shall process the documents and determine if the deceased is qualified under
par. 3 of the AFPRG and cause the issuance of interment directive. ( Rollo ,
[G.R. No. 225973], Vol. II, p. 1275)
24. Feria v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 412, 423 (2000).
25. Id.
26. 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VII, Section 5.
27. Drilon v. Lim , G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 135.
28. Id. at 140.
29. Id.
30. 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 1.
31. 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 5 (2) (a).
32. Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 232 Phil. 615, 621 (1987).
33. Id.
34. Article 9.
35. Ponce v. NLRC, 503 Phil. 955, 965 (2005).
36. The National Liga ng mga Barangay v. Judge Paredes, 482 Phil. 331, 347
(2004).
37. Art. 306. Every funeral shall be in keeping with the social position of the
deceased.
Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the
deceased. In the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation
shall determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral
shall be decided upon by the person obliged to make arrangements for the
same, after consulting the other members of the family.
Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or
exhumed without the consent of the persons mentioned in Articles 294 and
305.
Art. 309. Any person who shows disrespect to the dead, or wrongfully
interferes with a funeral shall be liable to the family of the deceased for
damages, material and moral.
38. See Spouses Nicolas v. Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association (ARBA) , G.R.
No. 179566, October 19, 2016.
39. G.R. No. 182153, April 7, 2014, 720 SCRA 707.

40. I n PAL Employees Savings & Loan Ass'n, Inc. v. PAL, Inc. (520 Phil. 502, 518-
519 [2006]), We held:
"x x x Distinguishing a 'final' judgment or order from a 'final and executory'
order, the Court in Intramuros Tennis Club, Inc. v. Philippine Tourism
Authority issued the following clarification:
'A 'final' judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more for the court to do in respect thereto — such as an adjudication
on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial,
declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and
which party is in the right, or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on
the ground of res judicata or prescription, for instance. x x x Now, a 'final'
judgment or order in the sense just described becomes 'final and executory'
upon expiration of the period to appeal therefrom where no appeal has been
duly perfected or, an appeal therefrom having been taken, the judgment of
the [appellate] court in turn has become final. It is called a 'final and
executory' judgment because execution at such point issues as a matter of
right." (citations omitted)
41. Sec. 2 Rule 39 provides:
Sec. 2. Discretionary execution .
(a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal. — On motion of
the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the trial court
while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the
original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time of
the filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion, order execution of
a judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period to appeal.
After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending
appeal may be filed in the appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a
special order after due hearing.
(b) Execution of several, separate or partial judgments. — A several separate
or partial judgment may be executed under the same terms and conditions
as execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal.
42. The following are immediately executory:
1. Decisions in actions for injunction, receivership, accounting and support
(Sec. 4, Rule 39; See Gan v. Hon. Reyes , 432 Phil. 105 [2002]; Lim-Lua v.
Lua, 710 Phil. 211 [2013]; and Mabugay-Otamias v. Republic , G.R. No.
189516, June 8, 2016)
2. Decisions in expropriation (Sec. 11, Rule 67; See Diamond Builders
Conglomeration v. Country Bankers Insurance Corp., 564 Phil. 756 [2007]).
3. Decisions in favor of the plaintiff in ejectment cases (Sections 19 and 21,
Rule 70; See Northcastle Properties and Estate Corp. v. Judge Paas , 375 Phil.
564 [1999]; Aznar Brothers Realty Co. v. Court of Appeals , 384 Phil. 95
[2000]; Teresa T. Gonzales La'o & Co., Inc. v. Sheriff Hatab , 386 Phil. 88
[2000]; Limpo v. CA , 389 Phil. 102 [2000]; Lu v. Judge Siapno , 390 Phil. 489
[2000]; Uy v. Hon. Santiago , 391 Phil. 575 [2000]; Jason v. Judge Ygaña , 392
Phil. 24 [2000]; Candido v. Camacho , 424 Phil. 291 [2002]; Torres v. Sicat,
Jr., 438 Phil. 109 [2002]; Nayve v. Court of Appeals , 446 Phil. 473 [2003];
Office of the Court Administrator v. Corpuz, 458 Phil. 571 [2003]; David v.
Rod and Cynthia Navarro , 467 Phil. 108 [2004]; Mina v. Judge Vianzon , 469
Phil. 886 [2004]; Ricafort v. Judge Gonzales , 481 Phil. 148 [2004]; Benedicto
v. Court of Appeals , 510 Phil. 150 [2005]; Bugarin v. Palisoc , 513 Phil. 59
[2005]; Republic of the Phils. (represented by the Phil. Orthopedic Center) v.
Spouses Luriz, 542 Phil. 137 [2007]; City of Naga v. Hon. Asuncion et al., 579
Phil. 781 [2008]; Republic of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al., 638 Phil.
353 [2010]; La Campana Dev't Corp. v. Ledesma, et al. , 643 Phil. 257 [2010];
Calara, et al. v. Francisco et al. , 646 Phil. 122 [2010]; ALPA-PCM, Inc. v.
Bulasao, et al., 684 Phil. 451 [2012]; Vda. de Feliciano v. Rivera , 695 Phil.
441 [2012]; Acbang v. Judge Luczon, Jr., et al. , 724 Phil. 256 [2014]; Atty.
Alconera v. Pallanan , 725 Phil. 1 [2014]; Air Transportation Office (ATO) v.
Court of Appeals (Nineteenth Division), G.R. No. 173616, June 25, 2014, 727
SCRA 196; and Quilo v. Bajao, G.R. No. 186199, September 7, 2016).
4. Judgment of direct contempt (Sec. 2, Rule 71; See Diamond Builders
Conglomeration v. Country Bankers Insurance Corp., 564 Phil. 756 [2007]).
5. Decisions in civil cases before the Regional Trial Court that are governed
by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure (Sec. 21 of the 1991 Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure; See Sps. Jimenez v. Patricia, Inc. , 394 Phil. 877
[2000]).
6. Decisions in Amparo petitions (Lt. Col. Boac, et al. v. Cadapan, et al., 665
Phil. 84 [2011]).
7. Decisions in intra-corporate disputes, except the awards for moral
damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees, if any. (Sec. 4, Rule 1 of
A.M. 01-2-04-SC or the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate
Controversies, as amended; See Atty. Abrenica v. Law Firm of Abrenica,
Tungol & Tibayan , 534 Phil. 34 [2006] and Heirs of Santiago C. Divinagracia
v. Hon. Judge Ruiz, et al., 654 Phil. 340 [2011]).
8. Orders issued by the rehabilitation court (A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC or the
Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation; See Golden Cane
Furniture Manufacturing Corp. v. Steelpro Philippines, Inc. , G.R. No. 198222,
April 4, 2016, 788 SCRA 82.
9. Dismissal Order grounded on the denial of respondents' right to speedy
trial (See Bonsubre, Jr. v. Yerro , G.R. No. 205952, February 11, 2015, 750
SCRA 490).
10. Judgment based on compromise or judicial compromise (See Republic of
the Phils. v. Court of Appeals , 357 Phil. 174 [1998]; AFP Mutual Benefit
Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals , 370 Phil. 150 [1999]; Rosauro v. Judge
Villanueva, Jr., 389 Phil. 699 [2009]; Salvador v. Ortoll , 397 Phil. 731 [2000];
Sps. Magat v. Sps. Delizo , 413 Phil. 24 [2001]; Thermphil, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 421 Phil. 589 [2001]; Manipar v. Sps. Ricafort , 454 Phil. 825 [2003];
Manila International Airport Authority v. ALA Industries Corp. , 467 Phil. 229
[2004]; Sps. Romero v. Tan , 468 Phil. 224 [2004]; Spouses Dela Cruz v. Court
of Appeals, 485 Phil. 168 [2004]; Argana v. Republic of the Philippines , 485
Phil. 565 [2004]; Magbanua v. Uy , 497 Phil. 511 [2005]; Aromin v. Floresca ,
528 Phil. 1165 [2006]; Phil. Journalists, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission , 532 Phil. 531 [2006]; Chong v. Court of Appeals , 554 Phil. 43
[2007]; Diamond Builders Conglomeration v. Country Bankers Insurance
Corp., 564 Phil. 756 [2007]; Republic of the Phils. v. Florendo, et al. , 573 Phil.
112 [2008]; Reyes-Mesugas v. Reyes , 630 Phil. 334 [2010]; Gaisano v. Akol
[Resolution], 667 Phil. 512 [2011]; Rizal, et al. v. Naredo, et al., 684 Phil. 154
[2012]; National Power Corporation v. Sps. Ileto, et al. , 690 Phil. 453 [2012];
Gadrinab v. Salamanca, et al., 736 Phil. 279 [2014]; Metro Manila Shopping
Mecca Corp. v. Toledo [Resolution], G.R. No. 190818, November 10, 2014,
739 SCRA 399; The Plaza, Inc. v. Ayala Land, Inc. , G.R. No. 209537, April 20,
2015, 756 SCRA 350; and Ilaw Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM) Nestle Phils.,
Inc. Chapter v. Nestle Phils., Inc. , G.R. No. 198675, September 23, 2015, 771
SCRA 397).
11. Decisions of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated
employee (Article 223 [3rd paragraph] of the Labor Code, as amended by
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715, and Section 2 of the NLRC Interim Rules
on Appeals under R.A. No. 6715; See International Container Terminal
Services, Inc. v. NLRC , 360 Phil. 527 [1998]; Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
v. NLRC , 365 Phil. 598 [1999]; Roquero v. Philippine Airlines, Inc. , 449 Phil.
437 [2003]; Triad Security & Allied Services, Inc. v. Ortega, Jr. , 517 Phil. 133
[2006]; Composite Enterprises, Inc. v. Caparoso , 556 Phil. 301 [2007];
Torres, Jr., et al. v. NLRC (4th Div.) et al. , 593 Phil. 357 [2008]; Garcia, et al.
v. Phil. Airlines, Inc., et al. , 596 Phil. 510 [2009]; Bank of the Philippine
Islands v. Labor Arbiter Calanza, et al. , 647 Phil. 507 [2010]; Magana v.
Medicard Phils., Inc., et al., 653 Phil. 286 [2010]; Pfizer, Inc., et al. v. Velaso ,
660 Phil. 434 [2011]; 3rd Alert Security and Detective Services, Inc. v. Navia ,
687 Phil. 610 [2012]; Ever Electrical Manufacturing, Inc. v. Macam , G.R. No.
192169 (Notice), June 13, 2013; Wenphil Corp. v. Abing , G.R. No. 207983,
April 7, 2014, 721 SCRA 126; Bergonio, Jr., et al. v. South East Asian Airlines,
et al. , 733 Phil. 347 [2014]; Castro, Jr. v. Ateneo de Naga University , G.R. No.
175293, July 23, 2014, 730 SCRA 422; Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Paz , G.R. No.
192924, November 26, 2014, 743 SCRA 1; Baronda v. Court of Appeals , G.R.
No. 161006, October 14, 2015, 772 SCRA 276; and Manila Doctors College v.
Olores, G.R. No. 225044, October 3, 2016).
12. Reinstatement order of the Voluntary Arbitrator (See Baronda v. Court of
Appeals, supra.)
13. Return-to-work order in case of assumption of jurisdiction by the
Secretary of Labor (See Manila Hotel Employees Ass'n v. Manila Hotel Corp.,
546 Phil. 177 [2007])
14. Decisions of certain government agencies (See Pilipino Telephone Corp.
v. NTC , 457 Phil. 101 [2003]; Zacarias v. National Police Commission , 460
Phil. 555 [2003]; Davao City Water District v. Aranjuez [Resolution], G.R. No.
194192, June 16, 2015; Republic v. Principalia Management and Personnel
Consultants, Inc., G.R. No. 198426, September 2, 2015, 758 SCRA 235; and
Remo v. Bueno, G.R. Nos. 175736 & 175898, April 12, 2016).
15. Penalties imposed in administrative cases ( Dr. Alday v. Judge Cruz, Jr. ,
426 Phil. 385 [2002]).
16. Decisions of the Civil Service Commission under the Administrative Code
of 1987. (See In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A.
Datumanong, in the latter's capacity as Sec. of DPWH, 529 Phil. 619, 626
[2006]).
17. Decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases may either be
unappealable or appealable. Unappealable decisions are final and executory,
and they are as follows: (1) respondent is absolved of the charge; (2) the
penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand; (3) suspension of not more
than one month; and (4) a fine equivalent to one month's salary. Appealable
decisions, on the other hand, are those which fall outside said enumeration,
and may be appealed to the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. An
appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and that such shall
be executed as a matter of course. (Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative
Order No. 17 dated September 15, 2003, as cited in Villaseñor v.
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 202303, June 4, 2014, 725 SCRA 230, 237; See also
Buencamino v. Court of Appeals , 549 Phil. 511 [2007]; Office of the
Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, et al. , 576 Phil. 784 [2008]; Office of the
Ombudsman v. Samaniego , 646 Phil. 445 [2010]; Office of the Ombudsman
v. Court of Appeals, et al. , 655 Phil. 541 [2011]; Facura v. Court of Appeals ,
658 Phil. 554 [2011]; Ganaden, et al. v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., 665
Phil. 261 [2011]; Office of the Ombudsman v. De Leon, 705 Phil. 26 [2013];
Dr. Pia v. Hon. Gervacio, Jr., et al. , 710 Phil. 196 [2013]; Office of the
Ombudsman v. De Chavez, et al. , 713 Phil. 211 [2013]; Gupilan-Aguilar v.
Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 197307, February 26, 2014, 717 SCRA
503; Office of the Ombudsman v. Valencerina , G.R. No. 178343, July 14,
2014, 730 SCRA 12; and Belmonte v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices, G.R. No. 197665, January
13, 2016, 780 SCRA 483.
18. Decisions of Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan (Sections
61, 67 and 68 of the Local Government Code; See Mendoza v. Laxina, Sr. ,
453 Phil. 1013 [2003] and Don v. Lacsa , 556 Phil. 170 [2007]).
19. Decisions of the Office of the President under the Local Government Code
(Sec. 12, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to Sec. 68 of the
Local Government Code; See Gov. Calingin v. Court of Appeals , 478 Phil. 231
[2004]).
20. Decisions of the Supreme Court in disciplinary actions against members
of the Bar (See Bergonia v. Atty. Merrera , 446 Phil. 1 [2003]; Brion, Jr. v.
Brillantes, Jr. , 447 Phil. 347 [2003]; Ramos v. Atty. Pallugna , 484 Phil. 184
[2004]; Mortera v. Atty. Pagatpatan , 499 Phil. 93 [2005]; Lim v. Atty.
Montano, 518 Phil. 361 [2006]; Spouses Tejada v. Atty. Palaña , 557 Phil. 517
[2007]; Pangasinan Electric Cooperative I v. Atty. Montemayor , 559 Phil. 438
[2007]; Fudot v. Cattleya Land, Inc. , 591 Phil. 82 [2008]; Mecaral v. Atty.
Velasquez, 636 Phil. 1 [2010]; A-1 Financial Services, Inc. v. Atty. Valerio ,
636 Phil. 627 [2010]; Atty. Alonso et al. v. Atty. Relamida, Jr. , 640 Phil. 325
[2010]; Yuhico v. Atty. Gutierrez , 650 Phil. 225 [2010]; Nebreja v. Atty.
Reonal [Resolution], 730 Phil. 55 [2014]; Phil. Association of Court Employees
(PACE) v. Alibutdan-Diaz , A.C. No. 10134, November 26, 2014, 742 SCRA
351; Feliciano v. Bautista-Lozada , A.C. No. 7593, March 11, 2015, 752 SCRA
245; Ibana-Andrade v. Paita-Moya , A.C. No. 8313, July 14, 2015, 762 SCRA
571; Japitana v. Parado , A.C. No. 10859 [Formerly CBD Case No. 09-2514],
January 26, 2016, 782 SCRA 34; Floran v. Ediza , A.C. No. 5325, February 9,
2016, 783 SCRA 301; In Re: Ferrer [Resolution], A.C. No. 8037, February 17,
2016, 784 SCRA 118; Vda. de Dominguez v. Agleron, Sr. [Notice], A.C. No.
5359, April 18, 2016; and Quincela, Jr. v. Mijares III [Notice], A.C. No. 11145,
July 26, 2016).
21. Decisions of the Supreme Court in urgent election cases (See Estrella v.
COMELEC, 472 Phil. 328 [2004]; Jainal v. COMELEC , 546 Phil. 614 [2007];
Rivera III v. Commission on Elections , 551 Phil. 37 [2007]; Manzala v.
Commission on Elections, 551 Phil. 28 [2007]; Kabataan Party-List Rep.
Palatino, et al. v. Commission on Elections , 623 Phil. 159 [2009]; Martinez III
v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, et al. , 624 Phil. 50 [2010];
Mayor Tolentino v. COMELEC, et al. , 631 Phil. 568 [2010]; Dela Cruz v.
Commission on Elections, et al., 698 Phil. 548 [2012]; Mayor Abundo, Sr. v.
COMELEC, et al. , 701 Phil. 135 [2013]; Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on
Elections, 707 Phil. 454 [2013]; and Abayon v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, G.R. Nos. 222236 & 223032, May 3, 2016).
22. Decisions of the Supreme Court where there are further proceedings to
be taken and there is a need to finally resolve the case with reasonable
dispatch (See Manotok IV, et al. v. Heirs of Homer L. Barque, 595 Phil. 87
[2008] and Concorde Condominium, Inc. v. Baculio, G.R. No. 203678,
February 17, 2016, 784 SCRA 263).
23. Execution of cases which have dragged on for a number of years (See
Dula v. Dr. Maravilla , 497 Phil. 569 [2005] and De Leon v. Public Estates
Authority, et al., 640 Phil. 594 [2010]).
43. Remo v. Bueno, G.R. Nos. 175736 & 175898, April 12, 2016.
44. 623 Phil. 596 (2009). See also Sps. Arevalo v. Planters Development Bank, et
al., 686 Phil. 236 (2012) and Local Water Utilities Administration Employees
Association for Progress v. Local Water Utilities Administration , G.R. Nos.
206808-09, September 7, 2016.
4 5 . Buyco v. Baraquia , 623 Phil. 596, 600-602 (2009). (Italics, emphasis and
underscoring supplied).
46. "Apart from the provisional remedies expressly recognized and made available
under Rule 56 to Rule 61 of the Rules of Court, the Court has sanctioned only
the issuance of the status quo ante order but only to maintain the last,
actual, peaceable and uncontested state of things that preceded the
controversy. The eminent Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority on
remedial law, has delineated the nature of the status quo ante order, and
distinguished it from the provisional remedy of temporary restraining order,
as follows:
There have been instances when the Supreme Court has issued a status quo
order which, as the very term connotes, is merely intended to maintain the
last, actual, peaceable and uncontested state of things which preceded the
controversy. This was resorted to when the projected proceedings in the case
made the conservation of the status quo desirable or essential, but the
affected party neither sought such relief or the allegations in his pleading did
not sufficiently make out a case for a temporary restraining order. The status
quo order was thus issued motu proprio on equitable considerations. Also,
unlike a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, a status quo
order is more in the nature of a cease and desist order, since it neither
directs the doing or undoing of acts as in the case of prohibitory or
mandatory injunctive relief. The further distinction is provided by the present
amendment in the sense that, unlike the amended rule on restraining orders,
a status quo order does not require the posting of a bond." (See Megaworld
Properties and Holdings, Inc. v. Majestic Finance and Investment Co., Inc. ,
G.R. No. 169694, December 9, 2015 [citations omitted]).
47. See Unionbank of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals, 370 Phil. 837, 845 (1999).
48. See Golez v. Leonidas, 194 Phil. 179, 181 (1981).
49. See Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al., 660
Phil. 271, 285 (2011).
50. See Dojillo v. COMELEC , 528 Phil. 890, 907 (2006).
51. Resolution dated August 23, 2016, rollo (G.R. No. 225973), pp. 317-319.
52. Resolution dated September 7, 2016, id. at 1591-1595.
53. Resolution dated October 18, 2016, id. at 2502-2507.

54. See Santiago v. Vasquez , G.R. Nos. 99289-90, January 27, 1993, 217 SCRA
633, 646.
55. Rollo (G.R. No. 225973), pp. 2931-2935.
56. Id. at 2936-2942, 2996-3002.

57. Sec. 4. Judgments not stayed by appeal. — Judgments in actions for injunction,
receivership, accounting and support, and such other judgments as are now
or may hereafter be declared to be immediately executory, shall be
enforceable after their rendition and shall not be stayed by an appeal taken
therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the trial court. On appeal therefrom,
the appellate court in its discretion may make an order suspending,
modifying, restoring or granting the injunction, receivership, accounting, or
award of support.
The stay of execution shall be upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as
may be considered proper for the security or protection of the rights of the
adverse party.
58. Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. — After a
charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent
to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to
be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts
may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or

proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of
this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct,

or degrade the administration of justice;
xxx xxx xxx
59. Rollo (G.R. No. 225973), pp. 3068-3072.
60. "Agency" includes any department, bureau, office, commission, authority or

officer of the National Government authorized by law or executive order to
make rules, issue licenses, grant rights or privileges, and adjudicate cases;
research institutions with respect to licensing functions; government
corporations with respect to functions regulating private right, privileges,
occupation or business; and officials in the exercise of disciplinary power as
provided by law. (Section 2 [1] Chapter 1 Book VII, [ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
OF 1987]).
61. "Rule" means any agency statement of general applicability that implements or
interprets a law, fixes and describes the procedures in, or practice
requirements of, an agency, including its regulations. The term includes
memoranda or statements concerning the internal administration or
management of an agency not affecting the rights of, or procedure available
to, the public. (Section 2 [2] Chapter 1 Book VII, [ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF
1987]).
62. Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015, 755 SCRA
182, 206.
63. Also not covered by the filing requirement are the Congress, the Judiciary, the
Constitutional Commissions, the Board of Pardons and Parole, and state
universities and colleges. (See Section 1 Chapter 1 Book VII,
[ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987]).
64. See GMA Network, Inc. v. Commission on Elections , G.R. Nos. 205357, 205374,
205592, 205852 & 206360, September 2, 2014, 734 SCRA 88, 153.
6 5 . See Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Antonio T. Carpio in ABAKADA
GURO Party List (formerly AASJS), et al. v. Hon. Purisima, et al. , 584 Phil. 246
(2008).
6 6 . AFP Regulations G 161-373, issued on April 9, 1986, superseded AFP
Regulations G 161-372 issued on July 31, 1973, which, in turn, repealed AFP
Regulations G 161-371 issued on February 2, 1960.
67. 335 Phil. 82 (1997).
68. 485 Phil. 248 (2004).

69. 601 Phil. 245 (2009).
70. 658 Phil. 322 (2011).
71. 668 Phil. 1 (2011).
72. 63 Phil. 139 (1936).
73. 4 HLC 484, [1853] 4 HLC 1, [1853] EngR 885, (1853) 10 ER 359.
74. Signed by Felicitas Aquino-Arroyo, Adolfo S. Azcuna, Florangel Rosario Braid,
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Edmundo G. Garcia, Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon,
Christian S. Monsod, Ricardo J. Romulo, Jaime S.L. Tadeo, and Bernardo M.
Villegas (Rollo [G.R. No. 225973], p. 3268).
75. See Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC , 412 Phil. 308, 338-339
(2001).
76. Id. at 338.

77. See Dissenting Opinion of J. Leonen in Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 732 Phil. 1 (2014).
78. David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016.
79. Spouses Constantino, Jr. v. Hon. Cuisia, 509 Phil. 486, 510 (2005).
80. Refer to the Explanatory Notes of House Bill Nos. 54, 97, 302, 954 and 1693
and Senate Bill Nos. 2615 and 3330 (See People v. Purisima , 176 Phil. 186
[1978]; League of Cities of the Phils., et al. v. COMELEC, et al., 623 Phil. 531
[2009]; and Navarro, et al. v. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al., 663 Phil. 546
[2011]).
81. Senate Journal No. 38, December 3, 2012, p. 1020.
82. Senate Journal No. 41, December 10, 2012, p. 1171.
83. Congressional Record, Vol. 2, No. 44, March 14, 2012, p. 3.

84. Re: Letter of Court of Appeals Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso for Entitlement to
Longevity Pay for His Services as Commission Member III of the National
Labor Relations Commission , A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA, June 16, 2015, 758 SCRA
1, 56.
8 5 . Tañada v. Yulo , 61 Phil. 515, 519 (1935), as cited in Malaloan v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 104879, May 6, 1994, 232 SCRA 249, 259; and Fetalino, et
al. v. Commission on Elections, 700 Phil. 129, 153 (2012).
86. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al. 709 Phil. 478, 496 (2013).
87. See Lacson v Roque, etc., et al., 92 Phil. 456, 464 (1953) and Hebron v. Reyes ,
104 Phil. 175, 215 (1958).
88. De Villa v. Court of Appeals (273 Phil. 89, 96 [1991]), citing Palanca v. City of
Manila (41 Phil. 125 [1920]) and Arenas v. City of San Carlos (82 SCRA 318
[1978]).
89. Entitled "An Act Providing for Reparation and Recognition of the Survivors and
Relatives of the Victims of Violations of Human Rights and Other Related
Violations during the Regime of Former President Ferdinand Marcos,
Documentation of Said Violations, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for
Other Purposes" and co-authored by Sergio R. Osmeña III, Teofisto D.
Guingona III, Francis G. Escudero, and Franklin M. Drilon.
90. Entitled "An Act Providing Compensation to Victims of Human Rights Violations
during the Marcos Regime, Documentation of Said Violations, Appropriating
Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes" and co-sponsored by Lorenzo R.
Tañada III, Edcel C. Lagman, Rene L. Relampagos, Joseph Emilio A. Abaya,
Walden F. Bello, Arlene J. Bag-ao, Teodoro A. Casiño, Neri Javier Colmenares,
Rafael V. Mariano, Luzviminda C. Ilagan, Antonio L. Tinio, Emerenciana A. De
Jesus, and Raymond V. Palatino.
91. Entitled "An Act Providing for Compensation to the Victims of Human Rights
Other Purposes" and introduced by Senator Sergio Osmeña, III.
92. Entitled "An Act Providing for Compensation to the Victims of Human Rights
Other Purposes" and introduced by Senator Teofisto Guingona, III.
93. However, one of the substituted bills, S.B. No. 3330, proposed the inclusion of
non-monetary compensation to HRVVs such as, but not limited to,
psychotherapy, counseling, social amelioration, and honorific recognition.
94. This bill substituted H.B. Nos. 54, 97, 302, 954 and 1693, which were referred
to and considered by the Committees on Human Rights and Appropriations of
the House of Representatives. H.B. No. 54 ("An Act Providing Compensation
to Victims of Human Rights Violations during the Marcos Regime,
Other Purposes") was introduced by Representative Lorenzo R. Tañada III;
H.B. No. 97 ("An Act Providing Compensation to Victims of Human Rights
Violations during the Marcos Regime, Documentation of Said Violations,
Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes ") was introduced by
Representative Edcel C. Lagman; H.B. No. 302 ("An Act Providing
Compensation to Victims of Human Rights Violations during the Marcos
Regime, Documentation of Said Violations, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and
for Other Purposes") was introduced by Representatives Walden F. Bello and
Arlene J. Bag-ao; H.B. No. 954 ("An Act Mandating Compensation to the
9,539 Class Suit Plaintiffs and the 24 Direct Action Plaintiffs Who Filed and
Won the Landmark Human Rights Case against the Estate of Ferdinand
Marcos in the US Federal Court System in Honolulu, Hawaii and Appropriating
Funds Therefor") was introduced by Representatives Teodoro A. Casiño, Neri
Javier Colmenares, Rafael V. Mariano, Luzviminda C. Ilagan, Antonio L. Tinio,
Emerenciana A. De Jesus, and Raymond V. Palatino; and H.B. No. 1693 ("An
Act Mandating Compensation to Victims of Human Rights Violations during
the Marcos Dictatorship from 1972 to 1986 and Appropriating Funds
Therefor") was introduced by Representatives Teodoro A. Casiño, Neri Javier
Colmenares, Rafael V. Mariano, Luzviminda C. Ilagan, Raymond V. Palatino,
Emerenciana A. De Jesus, and Antonio L. Tinio.
95. Senate Journal No. 50, January 28, 2013, pp. 1611-1612.
9 6 . The definition was substantially lifted from H.B. Nos. 54, 97, and 302 and
similar to what was provided in S.B. No. 3330.
97. See People v. Quijada , 328 Phil. 505, 555 (1996) and Barcellano v. Bañas , 673
Phil. 177, 187 (2011).
98. See People v. Quijada, supra; Barcellano v. Bañas, supra , and the dissenting
opinion of Justice Claro M. Recto in Pascual v. Santos , 62 Phil. 148, 160
(1935).
99. Hidalgo, et al. v. Hidalgo, et al., 144 Phil. 312, 323 (1970); People v. Judge
Purisima, supra note 80, at 206; Pobre v. Mendieta , G.R. No. 106677,
106696, July 23, 1993; Matuguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. v. CA , 331
Phil. 795, 818 (1996); Pangandaman v. COMELEC , 377 Phil. 297, 312 (1999);
Thornton v. Thornton , 480 Phil. 224, 233 (2004); Republic of the Phil. v.
Orbecido III, 509 Phil. 108, 115 (2005); Rural Bank of San Miguel, Inc. v.
Monetary Board, 545 Phil. 62, 72 (2007); League of Cities of the Phils., et al.
v. COMELEC, et al. , 623 Phil. 531, 564-565 (2009); and Barcellano v. Bañas ,
supra note 97, at 187.
100. Re: Letter of Court of Appeals Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso for Entitlement to
Longevity Pay for His Services as Commission Member III of the National
Labor Relations Commission, supra note 84, at 52-53.
101. Id. at 53.
1 0 2 . S e e Uson v. Diosomito , 61 Phil. 535 (1935) and Office of the Court
Administrator v. Judge Pascual, 328 Phil. 978, 979 (1996).
103. See Silverio v. Rep. of the Phils. , 562 Phil. 953, 973 (2007) and Kida, et al. v.
Senate of the Philippines, et al., 675 Phil. 316, 372, 383 (2011).
104. Corpuz v. People, 734 Phil. 353, 416 (2014).
105. Bernas v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 85041, August 5, 1993, 225 SCRA 119,
138.
106. Phil. Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Bureau of Internal Revenue , 540 Phil. 142,
165 (2006); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. BPI , 549 Phil. 886, 897
(2007); and Fort Bonifacio Dev't Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
et al. , 617 Phil. 358, 371 (2009).
107. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco Corp. , 581 Phil. 146,
166 (2008).
108. See Mendoza v. People , 675 Phil. 739, 766 (2011) and Kida, et al. v. Senate of
the Philippines, et al., supra note 103.
109. See People v. Reyes , G.R. Nos. 101127-31, August 7, 1992, 212 SCRA 402,
410; Kida, et al. v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., supra note 103, at 368
and Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, et al. , 676
Phil. 518, 603 (2011) citing Justice Renato C. Corona's dissenting opinion in
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, 632 Phil. 32 (2010).
110. See Silverio v. Rep. of the Phils. , 562 Phil. 953, 973 (2007); Re: Entitlement to
Hazard Pay of SC Medical and Dental Clinic Personnel , 592 Phil. 389, 403
(2008); Kida, et al. v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., supra note 103; Giron
v. COMELEC , 702 Phil. 30, 39 (2013); Re: Letter of Court of Appeals Justice
Vicente S.E. Veloso for Entitlement to Longevity Pay for His Services as
Commission Member III of the National Labor Relations Commission , supra
note 84, at 55; and Banco De Oro v. Republic , G.R. No. 198756, August 16,
2016 (Resolution).
111. See the concurring and dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan
in In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Umil v. Ramos , 279 Phil.
266, 317 (1991).
112. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., supra note 86, at 497.
113. Philacor Credit Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 703 Phil. 26, 42
(2013).
114. Corpuz v. People, 734 Phil. 353, 425 (2014).
115. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., supra note 86, at 497.
116. Gonzaga v. The Secretary of Labor, 254 Phil. 528, 545 (1989).
117. 561 Phil. 386 (2007). See also Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC , 632 Phil.
32 (2010).
118. 1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law
such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law.
119. Article 14.
1. All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the
determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and
obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by
law. The press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial for
reasons of morals, public order (order public) or national security in a
democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the parties so
requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in
special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of
justice; but any judgment rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at law shall
be made public except where the interest of juvenile persons otherwise
requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the
guardianship of children.
120. XIII. Rights of others
27. Nothing in this document is to be construed as derogating from
internationally or nationally protected rights of others, in particular the right
of an accused person to benefit from applicable standards of due process.
121. PRINCIPLE 9. GUARANTEES FOR PERSONS IMPLICATED
Before a commission identifies perpetrators in its report, the individuals
concerned shall be entitled to the following guarantees:
(a) The commission must try to corroborate information implicating
individuals before they are named publicly;
(b) The individuals implicated shall be afforded an opportunity to provide a

statement setting forth their version of the facts either at a hearing convened
by the commission while conducting its investigation or through submission
of a document equivalent to a right of reply for inclusion in the commission's
file.
122. See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. in Marcos v. Sec.
Manglapus, 258 Phil. 479, 513-514 (1989).
123. Administrative Discharge Prior to Expiration of Term of Enlistment.
124. G.R. No. 96073, January 23, 1995, 240 SCRA 376.
125. 453 Phil. 1059 (2003).

126. 686 Phil. 980 (2012).
127. 258 Phil. 479 (1989).
128. 242 Phil. 200 (1988).
129. 495 Phil. 372 (2005).
130. 243 Phil. 93 (1988).
131. G.R. No. 105090, September 16, 1993, 226 SCRA 499.
132. 228 Phil. 42 (1986).

133. 910 F. Supp, 1460 (1995).
134. 103 F.3d 762 (1996).
135. AN ACT DECLARING FORFEITURE IN FAVOR OF THE STATE ANY PROPERTY
FOUND TO HAVE BEEN UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED BY ANY PUBLIC OFFICER OR
EMPLOYEE AND PROVIDING FOR THE PROCEEDINGS THEREFOR.
136. Bautista, et al. v. Atty. Ydia, 161 Phil. 511 (1976); Acosta v. Atty. Serrano , 166
Phil. 257 (1977); Uytengsu III v. Atty. Baduel , 514 Phil. 1 (2005); St. Louis
University Laboratory High School (SLU-LHS) Faculty and Staff v. Atty. Dela
Cruz, 531 Phil. 213 (2006); Salmingo v. Atty. Rubica , 553 Phil. 676 (2007);
Aba, et al. v. Attys. De Guzman, Jr., et al. , 678 Phil. 588 (2011); Rodica v.
Atty. Lazaro, et al. , 693 Phil. 174 (2012); Rodica v. Atty. Lazaro, et al. , 706
Phil. 279 (2013); Samonte v. Atty. Abellana , 736 Phil. 718 (2014); Sultan v.
Macabanding, A.C. No. 7919, October 8, 2014, 737 SCRA 530; Jimenez v.
Francisco, A.C. No. 10548, December 10, 2014, 744 SCRA 215; Villamor, Jr. v.
Santos, A.C. No. 9868, April 22, 2015, 757 SCRA 1; Ecraela v. Pangalangan ,
A.C. No. 10676, September 8, 2015; Vda. de Robosa v. Mendoza , A.C. No.
6056, September 9, 2015; Rafanan v. Gambe , A.C. No. 10948 (Notice),
January 18, 2016; Kim Yung Gu v. Rueda , A.C. No. 10964 (Notice), January
20, 2016; Rustia v. Jarder , A.C. No. 10869 (Notice), January 27, 2016; and
Militante v. Batingana , A.C. No. 9199 (Notice), June 1, 2016. See, however,
Cruz v. Jacinto, 385 Phil. 359 (2000).
137. Atty. Geocadin v. Hon. Peña , 195 Phil. 344 (1981); Tan v. Usman , A.M. No.
RTJ-14-2390, August 13, 2014; and Re: Conviction of Judge Angeles, RTC Br.
121, Caloocan City, in Criminal Case No. Q-97-69655 to 56 for Child Abuse,
567 Phil. 189 (2008).
138. Son v. Salvador, et al., 584 Phil. 10 (2008).
139. Go v. Gen. Olivas , 165 Phil. 830 (1976); Romero v. Hon. Ponce Enrile , 166
Phil. 416 (1977); and Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando in Buscayno, et al. v. Military Commissions Nos. 1, 2, 6
& 25, et al., 196 Phil. 41 (1981).
140. Castillo v. Filtex International Corp. , 209 Phil. 728 (1983); Gubac v. National
Labor Relations Commission , 265 Phil. 451 (1990); and Gargoles v. Del
Rosario, G.R. No. 158583, September 10, 2014, 734 SCRA 558.
141. 1987 CONSTITUTION, Sec. 14 (1) Art. III.
142. 75 Phil. 634 (1945). See also Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons , 76 Phil.
756, 766-767 (1946); Concurring and Dissenting of Justice Vicente Abad
Santos in Morales, Jr. v. Minister Enrile, et al. , 206 Phil. 466, 529-530 (1983);
and Separate Opinion of Justice Jose C. Vitug in Gov't of the United States of
America v. Hon. Purganan, 438 Phil. 417, 503 (2002).
143. Vol. IV Record, September 19, 1986, pp. 829-831. See also Bernas, Joaquin G.,
S.J., The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers. 1995. pp. 116-117.
144. REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 89 (1).
145. 754 Phil. 590 (2015).
146. See Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP), et al. v. The Secretary of
Budget and Management, et al., 686 Phil. 357, 374 (2012).
147. City of Davao v. RTC, Branch XII, Davao City, 504 Phil. 543, 558-559 (2005).
148. Marcos v. Sec. Manglapus , 258 Phil. 479, 502 (1989).
149. See U.S. ex rel. Goodrich v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. 284, 314, 15 L. Ed. 102 (1854).
150. Chavez v. National Housing Authority , 557 Phil. 29, 90 (2007).
151. See B/Gen. (Ret.) Gudani v. Lt./Gen. Senga, 530 Phil. 398, 417-418 (2006).
152. See Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 281 Phil. 572, 579 (1991).
153. November 8, 2016 Decision, pp. 28-29 (Citations omitted) (Rollo [G.R. No.
225973), pp. 2617-2618).
154. The Court held in Guy, et al. v. Ignacio (636 Phil. 689, 703-704 [2010]):
x x x In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable,
the court cannot arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy,
the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of
special competence.
Above all else, this Court still upholds the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. As
enunciated in Republic v. Lacap:
The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the
court, he should first avail of all the means afforded him by administrative
processes. The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide
should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without
first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the
same after due deliberation.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the

doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the
administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact.
Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the
corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which are based on sound public
and practical considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are many
accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the
party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is
patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction: (c) where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the
complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make
the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely
legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where
judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and
irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i)
when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto
proceedings x x x (citations omitted).
155. Sections 5 (e) and 7 (h), R.A. No. 10086.
156. Rural Bank of Parañaque, Inc. v. Remolado, et al. , 220 Phil. 95, 98 (1985). See
also Esconde v. Hon. Barlongay, 236 Phil. 644, 654 (1987); Sps. Manzanilla v.
Court of Appeals, 262 Phil. 228, 236 (1990); Sps. Serrano v. Court of Appeals ,
463 Phil. 77, 93 (2003); and Pepsi Cola Products (Phils.) v. Patan, Jr. , 464 Phil.
517, 524 (2004).
157. Sps. Alvendia v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 260 Phil. 265, 278 (1990).
158. See Sps. Alvendia v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 260 Phil. 265, 278 (1990).
159. Marcos v. Sec. Manglapus , 258 Phil. 479, 528 (1989).

SERENO, C.J., dissenting:
1. Manifestation dated 23 November 2016 filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General.
2. Proclamation No. 3, Provisional Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
First Whereas Clause (1986).
3. For a discussion on the statutes and jurisprudence denouncing the economic
plunder and human rights abuses committed by Marcos, his family and
cronies during the Martial Law regime, see my Dissenting Opinion, pp. 20-29,
in Ocampo v. Enriquez , G.R. Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226117,
226120 & 226294, 8 November 2016.
4. Rule 56-A, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Court, provides:
Sec. 2. Rules applicable.
The procedure in original cases for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus , quo
warranto and habeas corpus shall be in accordance with the applicable
provisions of the Constitution, laws, and Rules 46, 48, 49, 51, 52 and this
Rule, subject to the following provisions:
a) All references in said Rules to the Court of Appeals shall be understood to
also apply to the Supreme Court;
b) The portions of said Rules dealing strictly with and specifically intended
for appealed cases in the Court of Appeals shall not be applicable; and
c) Eighteen (18) clearly legible copies of the petition shall be filed, together
with proof of service on all adverse parties.
The proceedings for disciplinary action against members of the judiciary shall
be governed by the laws and Rules prescribed therefor, and those against
attorneys by Rule 139-B, as amended.
5. 508 Phil. 21 (2005).

6. Id. at 31.
7. 246 Phil. 8, 15 (1988).
8. See, for instance, Section 44 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7875, as amended by
R.A. 10606 (2013) on violations of the law requiring payment of fines,
reimbursement of paid claim or denial of payment; section 7 (c) of R.A. 9335
(2005) on termination of personnel of the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the
Bureau of Customs; section 66 of R.A. 8293 (1997) on cancellation of patents;
article 223, R.A. 6715 (1989) on decisions of the Labor Arbiter reinstating an
employee; article 225 (d), P.D. 442, as amended, on decisions of the National
Labor Relations Commission on indirect contempt; Administrative Code of
1987 on decisions of the Civil Service Commission; sections 61, 67 and 68,
R.A. 7160 (1991) on disciplinary actions against elective local officials.
9. See, for instance, Rule 1, Section 3, Financial Liquidation and Suspension of
Payments Rules of Procedure for Insolvent Debtors (A.M. No. 15-04-06-SC, s.
2015) on orders issued under those rules; Section 4, Financial Rehabilitation
Rules of Procedure (A.M. No. 12-12-11-SC, s. 2013) on orders issued under
those rules (Rule 1, Section 4), judgments in an action to implement or
enforce a standstill agreement (Rule 1, Section 16), and any action involving
an out-of-court or informal restructuring/workout agreement or rehabilitation
plan (Rule 4, Section 16); Rule 1, Section 4, Rules of Procedure for
Intellectual Property Rights Cases (A.M. No. 10-3-10-SC, s. 2011), on orders
issued under those rules in connection with actions for violation of
intellectual property rights; Rule 3, Section 5, Rules of Procedure on
Corporate Rehabilitation (A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC, s. 2008) on orders issued
under those rules in relation to petitions for rehabilitation of corporations,
partnerships and associations; Section 5, Rule on DNA Evidence (A.M. No. 06-
11-5-SC, s. 2007) on orders granting the DNA testing; Section 30, Rule on
Violence against Women and Their Children (A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, s. 2004)
on orders issued under those rules in connection with petitions for protection
orders in cases of violence against women and their children under R.A. No.
9262; Section 21, Revised Rule on Summary Procedure (Resolution of the
Court En Banc, 15 October 1991), on judgments issued under the rules,
including ejectment and unlawful detainer; Rule 39, Section 4 on actions for
injunction, receivership, accounting and support; Rule 67, Section 11 on
expropriation cases; Rule 70, Sections 19 and 21 on ejectment cases; Rule
71, Section 2 on judgments for direct contempt.
10. See, for instance, Boac, et al. v. Cadapan, et al., 665 Phil. 84 (2011) on writs of
amparo; Abayon v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal , G.R. Nos.
222236 & 223032, 3 May 2016, on urgent election cases; Malabed v. Asis ,
612 Phil. 336 (2009) and Barcenas v. Alvero , 633 Phil. 25 (2010) on
disciplinary cases against judges and lawyers;
11. 624 Phil. 373 (2010).
12. Id. at 381.
13. The fallo of the Decision dated 8 November 2016 states:
"WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petitions are DISMISSED.
Necessarily, the Status Quo Ante Order is hereby LIFTED."
14. Resolution dated 23 August 2016, p. 8.
15. Consolidated Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General, pp. 92-95.
16. Id. at 93-95.
17. Draft Resolution, pp. 21-22.
18. Id. at 22.
19. Book VII, Chapter 1, Section 2 (1).

20. Sec. 1, Chapter 2, Book VII, provides: "This Book shall be applicable to all
agencies as defined in the next succeeding section, except the Congress, the
Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, military establishments in all
matters relating exclusively to Armed Forces personnel, the Board of Pardons
and Parole, and state universities and colleges."
21. Aquino v. Commission on Elections , 756 Phil. 80 (2015).
22. David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 221538, 20 September 2016.
23. Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition), p. 565.
24. Republic v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp., 574 Phil. 134 (2008).
25. See Certification dated 21 November 2016 issued by the Office of the National
Administrative Register; Annex C of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
petitioners Lagman, et al.
26. Republic v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp., supra note 24.
27. Draft Resolution, p. 22.
28. Paragraph 7 of AFP Regulations G 161-374 states: "Supersession — AFPR G
161-373 dtd 9 Apr 86 is hereby superseded."
29. See Human Rights Claims Board, HRVCB Released the Names of First 4,000
Eligible Claimants, <http://www.hrvclaimsboard.gov.ph/index.php/hrvcb-
released-the-names-of-the-initial-list-of-4-000-eligible-claimants> (visited 16
June 2017).
30. Republic Act 10368 (2013), Section 2.
31. See Yuchengco v. Sandiganbayan , 515 Phil. 1 (2006), on the reconveyance of
111,415 shares of the Philippine Telecommunications Investment
Corporation to the Republic of the Philippines; Republic v. Estate of Hans
Menzi, 512 Phil. 425 (2005), on the forfeiture of the Bulletin Publishing Co.
shares.
32. Imelda Romualdez, et al. v. Republic of the Philippines , G.R. No. 217901, 15
March 2017.
33. See Estate of Marcos v. Republic , G.R. Nos. 213027 & 213253 (Resolution), 18
January 2017, on the forfeiture of jewelry known as the Malacañang
Collection, valued at US$110,055 (low estimate) to USD 153,089 (high
estimate).
3 4 . S e e Marcos, Jr. v. Republic , 686 Phil. 980 (2012), on the forfeiture of the
ARELMA assets worth US$3,369,975.00; Republic v. Sandiganbayan , 453
Phil. 1059 (2003), on the forfeiture of deposits in Swiss Banks valued at USD
658 million.
35. Based on the Overview of PCGG Pending Cases (As of June 2016), Annex A of
the submission of the PCGG to the Court on 2 September 2016, the following
cases remain pending:
Civil (filed before the Sandiganbayan only)

Forfeiture 9
Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and 38
Damages
Other Cases 4
Total Civil Cases 51
Criminal (pending with the OMB, Sandiganbayan
and SC)
Behest Loans 38
Other Cases 29
Total Criminal Cases 67
Total Number of Cases Filed 118
This tabulation does not include civil cases filed in the lower courts and
incidents elevated to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. It also
does not include cases filed against the PCGG.
36. Miguel v. Gordon , 535 Phil. 687, 694 (2006).
CAGUIOA, J., dissenting:
1. Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).
2 . I RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 434, 436. In his sponsorship
speech of Art. VIII, § 1, ¶2, Former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,
Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Constitutional
Commission, stated:
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our
experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents
in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the deposed regime was
marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases against
the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general
set up the defense of political questions and got away with it. As a
consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of habeas
corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of political
detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial
law failed because the government set up the defense of political question.
And the Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority
to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a
proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an
encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged
further violations thereof during the martial law regime. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
[T]he powers of government are generally considered divided into three

branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is
supreme within its own sphere and independent of the others. Because of
that supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is
vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies
and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other words,
the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess
of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a
judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the
courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by
claiming that such matters constitute apolitical question. (Italics supplied).
See also SKARLIT LABASTILLA, DEALING WITH MUTANT JUDICIAL POWER: THE
SUPREME COURT AND ITS POLITICAL JURISDICTION, 84 PLJ 1 (2009).
3. Id.
4. 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 4 (2); see also Bernas, THE 1987
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY, 968
(2009).
5. Resolution, p. 8.
6. P.D. No. 105, Third Whereas Clause.
7. DECLARING NATIONAL SHRINES AS SACRED (HALLOWED) PLACES AND
PROHIBITING DESECRATION THEREOF, January 24, 1973.
8. CHANGING THE "REPUBLIC MEMORIAL CEMETERY" AT FORT WM MCKINLEY,
RIZAL PROVINCES, TO "LIBINGAN NG MGA BAYANI," October 27, 1954.
9. http://corregidorisland.com/bayani/libingan.html.
10. Proc. No. 86, Whereas Clause.
11. NATIONAL CULTURAL HERITAGE ACT OF 2009, approved on March 24, 2010.
12. STRENGTHENING PEOPLE'S NATIONALISM THROUGH PHILIPPINE HISTORY ACT,
approved on May 12, 2010.
13. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REPARATION AND RECOGNITION OF VICTIMS OF
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DURING THE MARCOS REGIME,
DOCUMENTATION OF SAID VIOLATIONS, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, approved on February 25, 2013.
14. Resolution, pp. 8-9.
15. For instance, States have the duty under International Law to translate the
ICCPR human rights guarantees into domestic rights. See S. Joseph, A Rights
Analysis of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1999) 5 Journal of
International Legal Studies 57; see also S. Joseph, M. Castan, The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, Materials, and
Commentary 11 (2013).
16. Sec. 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity with all nations (Underscoring supplied).
17. See Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III,
561 Phil. 386 (2007) (En Banc), citing Minucher v. Court of Appeals , 445 Phil.
250, 269 (2003); see also Mijares v. Ranada, 495 Phil. 372 (2005).
18. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, adopted and proclaimed by
General Assembly resolution 60/147 of 16 December 2005, preamble ¶7.
Emphasis supplied.
19. Theo van Boven, The United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law 5 (2010); Carlos Fernández Romani, International Law of
Victims, 14 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 226 (2010).
20. 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. 2, Sec. 11.

21. Id., Art. 3, Sec. 12.
22. R.A. 10368, Sec. 2 (1).
23. Id., Sec. 2 (2).
24. Id., Sec. 2 (2); Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, Nature of the
General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004). The Human Rights Committee (HRC) is a
treaty-based body of U.N. independent human rights experts, part of whose
mandate is to monitor the implementation of the ICCPR.
25. ICCPR, Art. 2 (3). "Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized
are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative
authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal
system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies
when granted."
26. Id., Art. 6 (1). "Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall
be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life."
2 7 . Id., Art. 7. "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment x x x."
28. Id., Art. 9 (1). "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived
of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure
as are established by law."; see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217 (III), at art. 8 (December 10, 1948),
which provides: "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or
exile."
29. According to the HRC, enforced disappearances inherently constitute torture

and/or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, and the right to be
protected under Article 7 of the ICCPR extends not only to the victim itself,
but to the family of the victim. See: Sarma v. Sri Lanka , ¶ 9.3, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/78/D/950/2000 (July 16, 2003) (providing that "[a]ny act of such
disappearance constitutes a violation of many of the rights enshrined in the
Covenant, including . . . the right not to be subjected to torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment x x x."); Bashasha v. Libya , U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/100/D/1776/2008 (November 2, 2010) at ¶ 7.5 (concluding that "the
anguish and distress caused by the disappearance x x x to his close family"
is a violation of article 7), Human Rights Committee, Views: Mojica v.
Dominican Republic, ¶ 5.7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/449/1991 (Aug. 10, 1994)
(stating that "the disappearance x x x is inseparably linked to treatment that
amounts to a violation" of the right to humane treatment); see also The Right
to a Remedy for Enforced Disappearances in India: A Legal Analysis of
International and Domestic Law Relating to Victims of Enforced
Disappearances, 33 (April 2014).
30. R.A. 10368, Sec. 2 (2).
31. Id., Sec. 5; Resolution, p. 30.
32. Theo van Boven, The United Nations Basic Principles and Guidelines on the
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law 4 (2010).
33. R.A. 10368, Sec. 2; Principle 20, U.N. Principles on Reparation.

34. Id., Sec. 2, par. 2.
35. SEC. 4. Entitlement to Monetary Reparation. — Any HRVV qualified under this
Act shall receive reparation from the State, free of tax, as herein prescribed:
Provided, That for a deceased or involuntary disappeared HRVV, the legal
heirs as provided for in the Civil Code of the Philippines, or such other person
named by the executor or administrator of the deceased or involuntary
disappeared HRVV's estate in that order, shall be entitled to receive such
reparation: Provided, further, That no special power of attorney shall be
recognized in the actual disbursement of the award, and only the victim or
the aforestated successor(s)-in-interest shall be entitled to personally receive
said reparation from the Board, unless the victim involved is shown to be
incapacitated to the satisfaction of the Board: Provided, furthermore, That
the reparation received under this Act shall be without prejudice to the
receipt of any other sum by the HRVV from any other person or entity in any
case involving violations of human rights as defined in this Act.
3 6 . SEC. 5. Nonmonetay Reparation. — The Department of Health (DOH), the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the Department of
Education (DepEd), the Commission on Higher Education (CHED), the
Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), and such
other government agencies shall render the necessary services as
nonmonetary reparation for HRVVs and/or their families, as may be
determined by the Board pursuant to the provisions of this Act. The amount
necessary for this purpose shall be sourced from the budget of the agency
concerned in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
3 7 . "x x x The State hereby acknowledges its moral and legal obligation to
recognize and/or provide reparation to said victims and/or their families for
the deaths, injuries, sufferings, deprivations and damages they suffered
under the Marcos regime."
38. U.N. Principles on Reparation, Principle 19.

39. Id., Principle 20.
43. Communication No. 503/1993, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 55th Sess. ¶2.1-
2.7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/1993 (1995); see also Thomas M. Antkowiak,
Truth as Right and Remedy in International Human Rights Experience, 23
Mich. J. Int'l L. 989 (2002).
4 4 . United Nations, 'General Comment No. 31,' Human Rights Committee,
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (2004) para. 8.
45. ICCPR, Art. 2 (3); CAT, Art. 14.
4 6 . United Nations, 'General Comment No. 31,' Human Rights Committee,
CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 13 (2004) para. 4.

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 225973. August 8, 2017.]

SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, TRINIDAD H. REPUNO,

RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, SR., RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, JR., RENE

[G.R. No. 225984. August 8, 2017.]

REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, in his personal and oﬃcial

[G.R. No. 226097. August 8, 2017.]

LORETTA ANN PARGAS-ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO, AIDA

[G.R. No. 226116. August 8, 2017.]

HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, JOEL C. LAMANGAN, FRANCIS X.

[G.R. No. 226117. August 8, 2017.]

ZAIRA PATRICIA B. BANIAGA, JOHN ARVIN BUENAAGUA,

[G.R. No. 226120. August 8, 2017.]

ALGAMAR A. LATIPH , petitioner, vs. SECRETARY DELFIN N.

[G.R. No. 226294. August 8, 2017.]

LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her capacity as SENATOR OF THE

[G.R. No. 228186. August 8, 2017.]

SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, TRINIDAD H. REPUNO, BONIFACIO

[G.R. No. 228245. August 8, 2017.]

LORETTA ANN PARGAS-ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO, AIDA

On November 8, 2016, the Court dismissed the petitions challenging

Now before Us are the following matters for resolution:

Petitioners claim to have a legal standing to ﬁle the petitions because

Likewise, the Court cannot anchor its judgment on news accounts of

It bears emphasis that the Constitution is clear that judicial power,

SQAO, Petitions for

Non-publication of AFP Regulations

SECTION 3. Filing. — (1) Every agency 60 shall ﬁle with the

Ocampo et al. maintain that Marcos' burial at the LNMB brazenly

Agabon v. NLRC , 68 Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc., et al., 69

On R.A. No. 10368

The applicability of R.A. No. 10368 was reiterated by petitioners-

Indeed, the Court cannot supply legislative omission. We cannot

Rosales et al. propound that mere existence of human rights laws,

As to the UN Principles on Impunity, the concluding portion of its Preamble

Pursuant to the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,

Disqualification under the AFP Regulations

Rosales et al. assert that "active service," as deﬁned in Sec. 3 of P.D.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2021 cdasiaonline.com

National reconciliation and forgiveness

As long as it is proven that Marcos' burial at the LNMB is not contrary

Equally, We cannot pass upon the propositions that Marcos' burial at

I have no illusion that the stand I am taking will be met with

I find merit in the foregoing arguments.

g. Former members of the AFP who laterally entered or joined

CAGUIOA, J., dissenting:

While we revere our dearly departed, the reverence we accord them is

Compensation, as envisioned in Section 4 of R.A. 10368, 35

14. Id. at 912.

39. G.R. No. 182153, April 7, 2014, 720 SCRA 707.

53. Resolution dated October 18, 2016, id. at 2502-2507.

56. Id. at 2936-2942, 2996-3002.

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct,

60. "Agency" includes any department, bureau, oﬃce, commission, authority or

68. 485 Phil. 248 (2004).

76. Id. at 338.

83. Congressional Record, Vol. 2, No. 44, March 14, 2012, p. 3.

(b) The individuals implicated shall be aﬀorded an opportunity to provide a