Footnote 312

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

Case Title EDWARD ENDINO (at large) and GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused.
GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused-appellant.
Date February 20, 2001; G.R. No. 133026
Ponente Justice Josue N. Bellosillo
1. Gerry Galgarin alias Toto, accused-appellant.

2. Accused-appellant disowned the confession which he made over TV Patrol

and claimed that it was induced by the threats of the arresting police officers. He
asserted that the videotaped confession was constitutionally infirmed and
inadmissible under the exclusionary rule provided in Sec.12, Art. III, of the
Constitution.

3. Gerry Galgarin and his nephew Edward Endino were accused of slaying
Dennis Aquino, where the former stabbed him several times and the latter shot
him. This was done in the presence of the victim’s girlfriend. Galgarin was
Facts
arrested and interviewed by TV Patrol where he confessed and begged his
nephew to surrender as well. This confession was admitted by the trial court as
evidence for his guilt. Trial court convicted him of the crime of murder.

4. People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee.

5. The Court rejected his contention stating that it was not part of the custodial
investigation, since it was given to newsmen and not to police. It however
cautioned lower court from admitting evidence such as this, since it should be
done only after scrutiny to avoid abuse and legalizing coerced extra-judicial
confessions.
Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting the videotape confession as
Issue
evidence .
No. The trial court did not erred in admitting the videotape confession as
evidence.

The Constitution provides that no torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or

any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section
17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

In the case at bar, the interview and confession does not form part of custodial
Ruling
investigation since it was not given to the police officers but to the media in an
attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. However, because of
the inherent danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting guilt, it is
prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in
further admitting similar confessions. We should never presume that all media
confessions described as voluntary have been given freely. It should be
thoroughly examined and scrutinized.

Therefore, the trial court did not erred in admitting the videotape confession as
evidence.
Footnote 360
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. WONG CHUEN MING,
AU WING CHEUNG, TAN SOI TEE, LIM CHAN FATT, CHIN KOK WEE, CHIN
KIN YONG, YAP BOON AH, CHIN KONG SONG, CHIN KIN FAH, CHAI MIN
Case Title
HUWA, and LIM NYUK SUN, accused.

WONG CHUEN MING and AU WING CHEUNG, accused-appellants.

Date April 12, 1996; G.R. Nos. 112801-11
Ponente Justice Teodoro R. Padilla
1. Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung, accused-appellants.

2. Accused-appellants' contention that they were deprived of their right to

counsel and due process when their previous counsels also represented the
other accused despite "conflicting interests" is not well-taken.

3. Accused-appellants and several others were charged with unlawfully

transporting shabu into the country after thirty (30) boxes containing the
prohibited drug were found among their baggage upon their arrival from Hong
Facts
Kong. They were ordered to sign on the masking tape placed on the said boxes.
They were brought to Camp Crame where they were made to identify the
signatures on the boxes and affix their signatures again.

4. People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee.

5. The trial court conducted a joint and/or consolidated trial of all the cases upon
motion by the prosecution considering that the State had common testimonial
and documentary evidence against all accused.
Whether or not the signatures of the accused on the boxes, as well as on the
Issue
plastic bags containing shabu are admissible in evidence.
No. The signatures of the accused on the boxes, as well as on the plastic bags
containing shabu are not admissible in evidence.

The Constitution provides that any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
Ruling
In the case at bar, by affixing their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and
on the plastic bags, the accused in effect made a tacit admission of the crime
charged for mere possession of shabu is punished by law. These signatures of
accused are tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial confession. They are,
therefore, inadmissible as evidence for any admission of wrong from the
accused in violation of their constitutional rights.

Therefore, the signatures of the accused on the boxes, as well as on the plastic
bags containing shabu are not admissible in evidence.
Footnote 408
SALVADOR P. SOCRATES, petitioner, vs.
Case Title SANDIGANBAYAN, THIRD DIVISION, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Date February 20, 1996; G.R. Nos. 116259-60
Ponente Justice Florenz D. Regalado
1. Salvador P. Socrates, petitioner.

2. Petitioner Salvador P. Socrates assailing the orders and resolution issued by

respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 18027 and 18028, both
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Salvador P. Socrates." In G.R. Nos.
116259-60, petitioner assails the legality of (a) the order dated February 9, 1994
denying petitioner's Amended and Consolidated Motion to Quash the
Informations; 1 (b) the order dated May 24, 1994 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation; 2 and (c) the order dated July 20, 1994
denying the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order of May 24, 1994. On
the other hand, in G.R. Nos. 118896-97, petitioner seeks the annulment of the
Resolution dated December 23, 1994 ordering the preventive suspension of
petitioner as Provincial Governor of Palawan for a period of ninety (90) days,
and to enjoin respondent court from enforcing the same.

3. In G.R. Nos. 116259-60, the validity of the informations filed in Criminal Cases
Nos. 18027-28 is being contested on three grounds, viz.: (1) the respondent
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case on the ground that an inordinate
delay of six (6) years between the conduct of the preliminary investigation and
Facts
the subsequent filing of the informations against petitioner constitutes a violation
of his constitutional rights to a speedy disposition of the case and due process of
law pursuant to the Tatad doctrine; (2) the facts charged do not constitute an
offense; and (3) since the acts charged in the complaints filed before the
Tanodbayan are different from the charges contained in the informations,
another preliminary investigation should have been conducted, in the absence of
which there is a denial of due process.

4. Sandiganbayan, Third Division, and People of the Philippines, respondents.

5. Based on the Resolution dated August 27, 1992 of Special Prosecution

Officer I Wendell Barreras-Sulit (Annex "F-2", ibid.), which affirmed the
Resolution dated February 21, 1992 rendered by Ombudsman Investigator
Ernesto Nocos recommending the filing of appropriate charges against
petitioner, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed on September 16, 1992 with
the respondent Court two (2) Informations against petitioner, docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 18027 and 18028. The first was for violation of Section 3(h)
of Republic Act No. 3019, and the second for violation of Section 3(e) of the
same law.
Whether or not the six-year delay in the termination of the preliminary
Issue investigation is a violation of the petitioner’s right to due process of law or of his
right to speedy disposition of the case.
Ruling No. The six-year delay on the termination of the preliminary investigation is not a
violation of the petitioner’s right to due process of law or of his right to speedy
disposition of the case.

The Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial.

In the case at bar, the constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy disposition of
cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case. The Court said that We have only to reiterate the
declaration made in Tatad to the effect that in the application of the constitutional
guaranty of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also
be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. It is palpably
clear that the application of the Tatad doctrine should not be made to rely solely
on the length of time that has passed but equal concern should likewise be
accorded to the factual ambiance and considerations. It can easily be deduced
from a complete reading of the adjudicatory discourse in Tatad that the three-
year delay was specifically considered vis-a-vis all the facts and circumstances
which obtained therein. A speedy trial is one conducted according to the law of
criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delays. The primordial purpose of this constitutional right is to
prevent the oppression of an accused by delaying criminal prosecution for an
indefinite period of time. In the present case, while there may have been some
delay, it was petitioner himself who brought about the situation of which he now
complains.

Therefore, the six-year delay on the termination of the preliminary investigation

is not a violation of the petitioner’s right to due process of law or of his right to
speedy disposition of the case.
Footnote 456
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
Case Title
DOMINADOR TABION, accused-appellant.
Date October 20, 1999; G.R. No. 132715
Ponente Justice Artemio Panganiban
1. Dominador Tabion, accused-appellant.

2. In his Brief, appellant pleads for acquittal on the anemic argument that the
private complainant instituted the criminal charge, merely because she hated
him so much for his having been a member of the NPA (New People Army).
Without much ado, he submits that the evidence of the prosecution was not
enough to overcome the constitutional presumption of his innocence.

3. Before us for automatic review is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 61 of Bogo, Cebu in Criminal Case No. B-00121, convicting Dominador
Tabion of qualified rape and imposing upon him the supreme penalty of death.
Facts
The case arose from the Information dated October 30, 1996. The Information
charging appellant with rape failed to allege the minority of his daughter-victim.
As a result, he cannot be convicted of qualified rape and sentenced to death,
consistent with the Court's ruling in People v. Ramos 1 that both the age of the
victim and her relationship with the offender must be clearly alleged in the
information.

4. People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee.

5. The appellant may be convicted only of simple, not qualified, rape. Hence, his
penalty should be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Whether or not the death penalty be imposed if the information has alleged and
Issue the evidence has proven both the age of the victim and her relationship to the
offender.
No. The death penalty cannot be imposed if the information did not alleged and
the evidence has not proven both the age of the victim and her relationship to
the offender.

The Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.

In the case at bar, pursuant to the above-mentioned constitutional right of the

accused and the extant jurisprudence on the subject, the court have held that
the death penalty may be imposed only if the information has alleged and the
Ruling
evidence has proven both the age of the victim and her relationship to the
offender. In People v. Perez, the Court ruled that because “the circumstance that
[the victim] was less than eighteen years of age at the time of the rape was
never, in any manner, stated in the Information,” the accused could be convicted
only of simple rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, not death. We said that
it was the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship with the
offender that would have qualified the rape as heinous and thus justified the
imposition of the supreme penalty.

Therefore, the death penalty cannot be imposed if the information did not
alleged and the evidence has not proven both the age of the victim and her
relationship to the offender.
Footnote 504
RAYMOND MICHAEL JACKSON, petitioner, vs.
Case Title HON. FLORITO S. MACALINO, RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ, BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, respondents.
Date November 24, 2003; G.R. No. 139255
Ponente Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.
1. Raymond Michael Jackson, petitioner.

2. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the CID regarding the BOC
deportation order but this was denied. However, petitioner could not be deported
because he filed a petition to lift the summary order of deportation with the CID,
which had not yet been resolved.

3. In 1997, Raymond M. Jackson, an American citizen was charged or violation

of Article 176, RPC1. He was found to be in possession of US passports under
the names of Raymond Michael Jackson and Steven Bernard Bator after a
search conducted in his residence in Angeles City. In1 999, the US Embassy in
Facts Manila issued a certification that the US Passports had been cancelled because
the same were tampered with. CID ordered his arrest for being an undesirable
alien based on the hold departure order of the Makati RTC and the certification
of the US Embassy. Petitioner was arrested and etained at the CID. Jackson
then filed a petition for habeas corpus against the Commissioner of the CID, et
al.

4. Hon. Florito S. Macalino, Rufus B. Rodriguez, Bureau of Immigration, John

Doe and Jane Doe, respondents.

5. The Board of Commissioners (BOC) of the CID ordered the summary

deportation of Jackson.
Whether or not the Commissioner of the CID can issue warrant of arrest. On the
Issue assumption that he can, whether or not such warrants can only be issued to
enforce deportation.
Yes. The Commissioner of the CID can issue warrant of arrest and such warrant
can be issued to enforce deportation.

The Constitution provides that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not
be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety
requires it.

In the case at bar, even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events
may bar his release or discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into is the
legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ
of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by
reason of same supervening events such as the instances mentioned in Section
4, Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Any
such supervening events are the issuance of a judicial process preventing the
discharge of the detained person.
Ruling
As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondents rests
on the petitioner who attaches such restraints. Whether the return sets forth
process where on its face shows good ground for the detention of the petitioner,
it is incumbent on him to allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the
apparent effects of such process.

Moreover, the petitioner, in his motion for reconsideration with the CID, offered
to post a bail bond for his provisional release to enable him to secure the
necessary documents to establish the appropriate grounds for his permanent
stay in the Philippines. By offering to post a bail bond, the petitioner thereby
admitted that he was under the custody of the CID and voluntarily accepted the
jurisdiction of the CID.

Therefore, the Commissioner of the CID can issue warrant of arrest and such
warrant can be issued to enforce deportation.
Footnote 552
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEO ECHEGARAY,
Case Title
Accused-Appellant.
Date September 2, 1997; G.R. No. 117472
Ponente Per Curiam
1. Leo Echegaray, Accused-Appellant.

2. The accused-appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration which focused on

the sinister motive of the victim's grandmother that precipitated the filing of the
alleged false accusation of rape against the accused. This was dismissed.

3. Appellant was convicted of the crime of rape committed against his young
daughter and was meted out the supreme penalty of death.
Facts
4. People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee.

5. The SC rendered a decision in the instant case affirming the conviction of the
accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime
having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act
No. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect,
accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty of death.
Whether or not the reimposition of the death penalty for heinous crimes violates
Issue
the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
No. The reimposition of the death penalty for heinous crimes did not violate the
constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.

Then Constitution provides that excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be
imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
hereafter provides for it.

In the case at bar, the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because the
perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so
Ruling deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects
on the national efforts to lift the masses from abject poverty through organized
governmental strategies based on a disciplined and honest citizenry, and
because they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their
victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to
the safety of individuals and the survival of government, they must be
permanently prevented from doing so.

Therefore, the reimposition of the death penalty for heinous crimes did not
violate the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment.
Footnote 600
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by ROMIE V. BRAGA, Assistant
Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, petitioner, vs. HON. MAGNO B. PABLO, Judge
Case Title of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Third Judicial District, Branch XIII,
ROGELIO CARACE, GODOFREDO CARACE, GIL CASTRENCE, ROGELIO
CARANZA and DAMIAN SENIT, respondents.
Date June 25, 1980; G.R. No. L-37271
Ponente Justice Pacifico P. De Castro
1. People of the Philippines, represented by Romie V. Braga, Assistant
Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, petitioner.

2. On May 3, 1973, the prosecution moved for postponement, and without

objection on the part of the defense, trial was postponed to May 29 and 30,
1973.

3. Before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIII, Alaminos,

Pangasinan, Rogelio Carace, Godofredo Carace, Gil Castrence, Rogelio
Caranza and Damian Senit were charged with Homicide in an information filed
on February 6, 1973, for the killing of Benjamin Atcha (Criminal Case No. 254-
A).

Trial was reset for continuance on June 13 and 22, 1973. On June 13, 1973,
only one witness, Santiago Atcha, was presented for lack of material time, and
on June 22, 1973, Santiago Atcha was cross-examined, after which the
prosecution moved for postponement, and without objection on the part of the
Facts
defense, hearing was reset for July 17, 1973.

On July 17, 1973, for failure of its last witness, Dr. Francisco Q. Duque, to arrive,
the prosecution moved for postponement on the ground that Dr. Duque is a vital
and indispensable witness who would testify on the cause of death of the victim
in this case, Benjamin Atcha.

4. Hon. Magno B. Pablo, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,

Third Judicial District, Branch XIII, Rogelio Carace, Godofredo Carace, Gil
Castrence, Rogelio Caranza And Damian Senit, respondents.

5. The presiding judge, Hon. Magno B. Pablo, denied the motion for
postponement and ordered the prosecution to proceed with the presentation of
its evidence. The prosecuting fiscal asked for reconsideration of the order
denying the motion for postponement, but the judge denied the motion for
reconsideration, prompting the prosecution to file a second motion for
reconsideration in writing, signed by both the fiscal and the private prosecutor.
Whether or not there is double jeopardy where the order of dismissal or acquittal
Issue
was made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Ruling No. There is no double jeopardy where the order of dismissal or acquittal was
made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

The Constitution provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of

punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.

In the case at bar, the order of dismissal, under the circumstances pointed out
above, would amount to an acquittal because evidence had already been
presented by the prosecution. An evaluation of said evidence is thus
indispensably required, where, as in this case, the evidence presented even if
the prosecution’s case is considered submitted at a stage short of the
presentation of its complete evidence, obviously suffices to prove a crime, even
if a lesser one than the offense charged. The dismissal was sought to be justified
upon an invocation of the right to speedy trial. Precisely, the respondent judge,
allegedly, to avoid a violation thereof, denied further postponement. It is
therefore, a palpable error to base the dismissal of the case, as the respondent
judge did, on the ground of the violation of accused’s right to speedy trial. If at
all, the dismissal may be decreed by reason of the failure of the prosecution to
prove the guilt of the accused of any crime under the information, even on the
basis of the evidence presented when its case was deemed submitted on motion
of the defense. The respondent court, however, failed utterly to show this to be
what actually obtained after the hearings held on at least six days, as the order
of the respondent judge acquitting the accused, or dismissing the case, as he
later amended his order, made no mention whatsoever of the evidence
presented.

Therefore, There is no double jeopardy where the order of dismissal or acquittal

was made with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Footnote 593
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
Case Title THE HON. JUDGE PEDRO C. NAVARRO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Pasig, Rizal, Branch II, and JAIME CATUDAY, respondents.
Date March 25, 1975; G.R. No. L-38453-54
Ponente Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez
1. People of the Philippines, petitioner.

2. This is a petition by the State for certiorari to annul the joint decision of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, insofar as it acquits Jaime Catuday of the charge
of light threat. The ground alleged is that the case for light threat was never tried
in the lower court.

3. On March 6, 1968, respondent Catuday was charged in the Municipal Court of

Makati, Rizal, with the crime of light threat allegedly committed against Henry
Dioquino (Criminal Case No. 12846). Almost a year later, or on February 3,
1969, and while the light threat case was still pending, he was charged in the
same court, with a different offense, frustrated theft, allegedly committed against
the Commonwealth Foods, Inc. In two separate decisions rendered on
Facts
September 10, 1969, the Municipal Court convicted him of the two charges. He
appealed both decisions to the Court of First Instance.

4. The Hon. Judge Pedro C. Navarro, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Pasig, Rizal, Branch II, and Jaime Catuday, respondents.

5. Sometime in December 1972, upon retirement of Judge Flores of Branch XI,

respondent District Judge Pedro C. Navarro took over in the two cases. The theft
case was then in the rebuttal stage. On March 20 , 1973, rebuttal evidence
closed, and upon order of the court, the parties filed their respective “offer and
submission of exhibits”, and submitted the theft case for decision. On July 20,
1973, respondent Judge rendered one decision, acquitting Catuday of both
charges for lack of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Whether or not where the State not afforded due process in trial of criminal
Issue cases, the dismissal of the information cannot be proper basis for claim of
double jeopardy.
Yes. Where the State not afforded due process in trial of criminal cases, the
dismissal of the information cannot be proper basis for claim of double jeopardy.

The Constitution provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of

punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.

In the case at bar, the respondent Judge, in rendering his judgment of acquittal
of private respondent Jaime Catuday in Criminal Case No. 20145 for Light
Threat which was never tried in the respondent Judge's court nor in Branch XI of
Ruling the CFI of Rizal, acted with abuse of discretion tantamount to excess or lack of
jurisdiction. The State is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must
be given the opportunity to present its evidence in support of the charge. The
Court has always accorded this right to the prosecution, and where the right had
been denied, had promptly annulled the offending court action. We have
heretofore held that a purely capricious dismissal of an information deprives the
State of fair opportunity to prosecute and convict; it denies the prosecution of its
day in court.

Therefore, where the State not afforded due process in trial of criminal cases,
the dismissal of the information cannot be proper basis for claim of double
jeopardy.