D.A., et al.

, IN THE

Plaintiffs, CIRCUIT COURT

v. FOR BALTIMORE CITY

LARRY HOGAN, in his official

capacity as GOVERNOR of the
State of Maryland, et al., Case No. 24-C-21-002988

Defendants.

LEONARD HARP, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.
Case No. 24-C-21-002999
GOVERNOR LARRY HOGAN, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

These two actions are not consolidated. The Court heard the requests for a temporary

restraining order by Plaintiffs in both actions together and issues this Memorandum Opinion and

the accompanying Temporary Restraining Order jointly in both actions because of the similar

issues raised and relief sought in both actions.

Plaintiffs in both actions include Maryland residents who currently receive one or more

of several types of expanded or supplemental unemployment benefits made available to the

states by the federal government under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security

(“CARES”) Act and/or the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (“ARPA”). There are six

individual Plaintiffs in D.A., et al. v. Hogan, et al., Case No. 24-C-21-002988. There are also six

individual Plaintiffs in Harp, et al. v. Hogan, et al., Case No. 24-C-21-002999. The Harp
Plaintiffs also seek to represent a class of allegedly similarly situated persons. The Defendants in

both actions are Governor Larry Hogan and Maryland Secretary of Labor Tiffany P. Robinson.

Both actions are now before this Court. Defendants removed the D.A. action to the

United States District Court for the District of Maryland on July 1, 2021. On the same day,

however, Judge Richard D. Bennett granted Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Remand to State

Court and remanded the action to this Court. Because of these rapid procedural events, Judge

Bennett’s Memorandum Order apparently has not yet been received by the Clerk of this Court.

The Court has confirmed that the Memorandum Order has been docketed by the federal court

and is having a copy of that Memorandum Order docketed in this Court to confirm this Court’s

jurisdiction. An earlier action filed in this Court by the Harp Plaintiffs also was removed to

federal court by Defendants. The Harp Plaintiffs chose to dismiss that action, and they then filed

this action.

The Court now addresses the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary

Injunction (Paper No. 3) filed by the D.A. Plaintiffs in Case No. 24-C-21-002988 and the Motion

for Temporary Restraining Order and Emergency Hearing (Paper No. 2) appended by the Harp

Plaintiffs to their Verified Class Action Complaint (Paper No. 1) filed in Case No. 24-C-21-

002999. Defendants have filed oppositions to both motions, and the D.A. Plaintiffs filed a reply

memorandum. The Court conducted a joint hearing in both actions on July 2, 2021 by remote

electronic means using Zoom for Government pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-802. All parties

appeared by counsel. The Court thanks all counsel for their helpful submissions and arguments.

Allegations

As the health threats resulting from accelerating transmission of the novel coronavirus

disrupted economic activity in the United States in March 2020, Congress passed and the

President signed the CARES Act on March 27, 2020. At issue here are three types of enhanced
2
unemployment benefits established and funded by the United States government in the CARES

Act. Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (“PUA”) provides benefits to people who otherwise

would not be eligible for traditional unemployment insurance benefits, including self-employed

individuals and workers who could not work because of a lack of childcare assistance. 15 U.S.C.

§ 9021. Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Compensation (“PEUC”) extended benefits to

workers who exhausted the number of weeks of benefits for which they previously were eligible.

15 U.S.C. § 9025. Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (“FPUC”) provided

supplemental benefits of $600 per week from March 27, 2020 to July 31, 2020. 15 U.S.C.

§ 9023. The ARPA, Pub. L. No. 117-2, then amended the CARES Act to revive this

supplemental benefit at a level of $300 per week from December 27, 2020 through September 6,

2021.

To implement these and other unemployment benefit programs, Maryland entered into an

“Agreement Implementing the Relief for Workers Affected by Coronavirus Act” with the United

States Secretary of Labor. Defs.’ Oppos., Exh. A. On June 1, 2021, Governor Hogan wrote to

U.S. Secretary of Labor Martin J. Walsh to give notice that “the State of Maryland will end its

participation in the unemployment insurance programs listed below, effective at 11:59 p.m. on

July 3, 2021.” Id., Exh. B. Governor Hogan listed for termination the PUA, PEUC, and FPUC

programs, as well as the Mixed Earners Unemployment Compensation (“MEUP”) program.

Plaintiffs do not include claims about the MEUP program. Governor Hogan offered the

following explanation:

Thanks to Marylanders’ resilience and tenacity, our state has seen

a dramatic drop in COVID-19 cases, and we have reached the
milestone set by President Biden of vaccinating 70% of adults.
Businesses large and small across our state are reopening and
hiring workers, but many are facing severe worker shortages.
While we have experienced 12 straight months of job growth in

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 our state, we will not truly recover until our workforce is fully
participating in the economy.

Our administration, in partnership with your agency, will continue

working with Marylanders who need reskilling and retraining to
reach the next stages of their careers. The comprehensive
resources available to our customers through a great variety of
training and apprenticeship programs will continue to serve the
needs of both Maryland businesses and jobseekers.

Id., Exh. B at 2.

Plaintiffs allege that approximately 300,000 Maryland residents currently receive PUA,

PEUC, or FPUC benefits. But for the State’s early termination of its participation in those

programs, those benefits would continue until September 6, 2021. At stake is nine weeks or just

over two months of additional benefits. Plaintiffs allege, and Defendants do not dispute, that

these benefits are funded entirely by the federal government. Although not emphasized by any

party, the Court assumes that the State bears the costs of administering these benefits, at least

once the federal funds are transferred to the State Unemployment Insurance Fund.

The Court will not recite here each individual Plaintiffs’ allegations of her or his

employment struggles during the pandemic or the importance that each Plaintiff attaches to

continuation of these particular programs and the benefits paid through them. All six Plaintiffs

in the D.A. action have provided affidavits to this effect. Some of the Plaintiffs in the Harp

action are in different situations. Several of them complain about their frustrations with

attempting to qualify for unemployment benefits in Maryland during this period. At the hearing,

their counsel stated that on this motion the Harp Plaintiffs are seeking relief only with respect to

the early termination of these enhanced benefit programs.

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 Discussion1

Plaintiffs bear the significant burden of establishing the appropriateness of granting

immediate and preliminary injunctive relief in the form of a temporary restraining order. Just

this week, amendments to Maryland Rule 15-504 took effect that confirm and clarify that an

applicant for a temporary restraining order must show not only the risk of immediate harm

before a full adversary hearing can be held, but also must satisfy consideration of the four

common considerations for any form of preliminary injunctive relief:

(a) Standard for Granting. A temporary restraining order may

be granted only if (1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown
by affidavit or other statement under oath that immediate,
substantial, and irreparable harm will result to the party seeking the
order before a full adversary hearing can be held on the propriety
of a preliminary or final injunction, and (2) the court examines and
makes appropriate findings regarding:

(A) the likelihood that the moving party will succeed on

the merits;

(B) the balance of harm to each party if relief is or is not

granted;

(C) whether the moving party will suffer irreparable injury

unless the order is granted; and

(D) a determination that granting the order is not contrary

to the public interest.

Md. Rule 15-504. The Court will discuss the “immediate, substantial, and irreparable harm”

element that is specific to the procedural moment of a request for temporary restraining order

within the more general discussion of harm and irreparable harm under the second and third

preliminary injunction factors.

1
Because of the time constraints for preparation of this Memorandum Opinion, the Court omits
citations to most case authorities supporting the Discussion. Those citations may be found in the
parties’ helpful memoranda.
5
 1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Perhaps hoping to fit within the pattern of Ehrlich v. Perez, 394 Md. 691 (2006),

Plaintiffs claim that the State’s early termination of unemployment benefits for them draws

impermissible distinctions that result in a violation of their equal protection rights recognized

under Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Plaintiffs do not place themselves in

any demographic category that would establish or even allege a suspect classification leading to

strict or elevated constitutional scrutiny. Indeed, Plaintiffs strain to articulate any categories of

differentiation at all. They advance allegations that about 85% of the approximately 300,000

Marylanders who are receiving unemployment benefits under one of the enhanced programs at

issue are receiving unemployment benefits only under those programs. They suggest that this

creates an irrational distinction. If early termination of the enhanced programs is carried out, this

means that 85% of those affected will then receive no unemployment benefits at all, while 15%

will continue to receive some benefits because they have some residual eligibility for

unemployment benefits under the State’s existing standard program of benefits. According to

Plaintiffs, this is not a rational way to carry out the Governor’s stated goal of encouraging

workers to return to work. Some allegedly will be more encouraged than others.

The Court has difficulty even following the logic of the argument. The classifications

that have been made have been made at a program level. For example, benefits have been

extended to individuals who are or were self-employed even though they previously were not

qualified for unemployment benefits. Or an amount – currently $300 per week – has been added

to whatever benefits a class of eligible or once-eligible workers receive. The Governor’s action

would end benefits for whole classes of recipients at the program level, with no discrimination

within each separate program. If the result is that one person is left with no benefits at all while

another person retains some benefits under a remaining program, the reason is not because the
6
early termination treats similarly situated people differently but because some people have some

remaining residual eligibility under the standard unemployment benefit program. Put another

way, any discrimination or differentiation would result from the eligibility criteria of the

programs themselves. Those distinctions were created when the individual programs were

created and are not the result of the early termination of certain programs. The Court is not

convinced that Plaintiffs have any likelihood of success on the merits of their Article 24 claims.

Plaintiffs also advance a statutory claim centered in Title 8 of the Labor and Employment

Article of the Maryland Code. They start with the very broad legislative findings and purpose

provisions behind the State’s unemployment insurance system. Those provisions identify

“economic insecurity due to unemployment” as a “serious menace” and establish the

unemployment insurance system as a necessary exercise of the State’s police power for “the

public good and the general welfare of the citizens of the State.” Md. Code, Lab. & Empl. § 8-

102(b)(1), (c). These broad statements serve as “a guide to the interpretation and application” of

Title 8. Plaintiffs find their most specific support in § 8-310, which provides:

In the administration of this title, the [Maryland] Secretary [of

Labor] shall cooperate with the United States Secretary of Labor to
the fullest extent that this title allows.

Id. § 8-310(a)(1). Plaintiffs also cite the recognition that federal contributions, including

payment for the enhanced benefits at issue, flow into the State’s Unemployment Insurance Fund.

Id. § 8-403(a)(6). Finally they cite 2021 Md. Laws ch. 49, an emergency enactment during the

pandemic that requires that “the Maryland Department of Labor shall identify all changes in

federal regulations and guidance that would expand access to unemployment benefits or reduce

bureaucratic hurdles to prompt approval of unemployment benefits.” Id. § 3(a).

In the Court’s opinion, Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success depends on Plaintiffs’ ability to

establish a construction of the Maryland statutes that creates a mandate that executive officials
7
seek and obtain all federally funded benefits that are available to the State. In the absence of a

mandate that controls executive discretion, Plaintiffs are left to debate the wisdom of the

Governor’s strategy as a matter of policy. Plaintiffs engage in that debate, suggesting data or

studies to indicate that enhanced unemployment benefits are not in fact a disincentive to workers

leaving the unemployment benefit rolls and returning to work, but it is not the Court’s function

to adjudicate that policy debate. The Governor and the Secretary of Labor are entitled to very

substantial deference in framing public policy and strategy for the State if the statutory

framework leaves them that scope of discretion.

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success in demonstrating

that the “fullest extent” language of § 8-310(a)(1) should be interpreted in this context to

constrain administrative discretion and require the Maryland Labor Secretary to maximize use of

any available federal unemployment benefits. By plain language, the General Assembly meant

cooperation “to the fullest extent that this title allows” to be extensive and comprehensive. In the

same section, the command that the Maryland Secretary “shall cooperate” with the federal

Secretary “to the fullest extent” contrasts with the discretion accorded that she “may afford

reasonable cooperation” with other federal units. Id. § 8-310(b)(1) (emphasis added).

Moreover, mandating cooperation “to the fullest extent that this title allows” carries the

implication that the Maryland Secretary must act whenever an opportunity for cooperation exists

within the bounds of Maryland law. This is not just “the Secretary should be very cooperative

with federal officials.” It requires action as far as Maryland law in this arena will permit.

Defendants argue that the section deals only with administrative cooperation and is

limited by the specific reporting and expenditure requirements in § 8-310(a)(2). But the

structure of the statute belies such a limitation. Sub-subsection 8-310(a)(1), containing the

“fullest extent” command, stands alone as a sentence with a broad and generalized requirement.
8
Sub-section 8-310(a)(2) has its own separate command – “The Secretary shall . . .” – preceding

the three specific administrative actions. But even there, those three actions show breadth of

application. The first two involve reporting to the federal Labor Secretary, but the third item

involves compliance with federal regulations that “govern the expenditure of any money that

may be allotted and paid to the State” for administration. Id. § 8-310(a)(2)(iii). Thus, while all

the items are administrative, they include the administration of federal funding.

In interpreting the specific statute, the Court must consider the clear remedial purpose of

Title 8 more broadly and the strength of the General Assembly’s expression of the importance of

addressing the “serious menace” of “economic insecurity due to unemployment.” Id. § 8-

102(b)(1). The Court also considers the General Assembly’s pandemic-specific interest in

requiring that the Maryland Labor Secretary review federal regulations and guidance to identify

ways to “expand access to unemployment benefits.” 2021 Md. Laws ch. 49 § 3(a).2 That

provision appears aimed at facilitating access through improved administration, but it reinforces

the desirability, expressed by the General Assembly, of seeking all forms of federal assistance.

At this preliminary stage, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood that

they will succeed in establishing that the “fullest extent” provision requires the Secretary of

Labor, without discretion, to draw available benefits from the federal government if providing

them to Maryland residents is consistent with the Maryland unemployment benefit system.

Defendants have not argued that there is anything about the enhanced benefit programs that

violates Maryland law. Plaintiffs therefore have satisfied this element of the temporary

restraining order standard.

2
The Court appreciates the Senate President providing his insights by affidavit about the General
Assembly’s work during the pandemic, but the Court does not regard his affidavit, prepared for
use in litigation, as a source of legislative history for Chapter 49 enacted during the 2021
Session.
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 2. Balance of Harms

The Court must examine the harm that would be experienced by each party with or

without issuance of a temporary restraining order and then compare those relative harms.

The Court will add more below in the discussion of the irreparable nature of the harm

faced by the individual Plaintiffs, but Plaintiffs have shown by very particularized affidavits that

they face significant hardship if their remaining unemployment benefits terminate tomorrow.

Plaintiffs have been strained economically and emotionally by the pandemic. In its global scope

and in the anxiety that almost all people experience over the threat of disease, the impact of the

pandemic has been universal, but the brief stories of these Plaintiffs reminds the Court that the

impact of the pandemic has been cruelly uneven. Some have suffered death or debilitating

illness themselves, in their families, or among their friends. Others have experienced severe

economic hardship from involuntary unemployment or the inability to work because of the need

to take on childcare and elder care responsibilities. As one who has enjoyed the privilege of

continuous, secure employment, the Court is particularly struck by the plight of those who have

had to struggle with irregular or no employment. To their credit, Defendants, along with

officials at every level of government, have devoted themselves to the effort to ameliorate these

problems. The Court has no doubt that Defendants have made and are continuing to make very

difficult decisions in all good faith.

Defendants, as representatives of the State government, stand to experience some harm

from the issuance of a temporary restraining order. As stated, the Court assumes that although

the cost of the enhanced benefits themselves are a federal responsibility, the State will bear

additional costs of administration by continuing the enhanced benefits for a longer period. Those

are the regular costs of government administration, however, and it is notable that there is no

10
contention that any person will get benefits improperly that she or he would not get if these

programs simply are extended to the full time provided under federal law.

Balancing these harms, the balance tips decidedly in favor of issuing a temporary

restraining order. The personal magnitude of the harm associated with losing benefits

particularly for Plaintiffs and other individuals currently receiving them is far greater than any

additional cost that must be borne by the State.

3. Irreparable Harm

The Court considers under this factor two separate aspects of irreparable harm. One

aspect is the more general issue of whether the nature of the harm Plaintiffs will experience

without a temporary restraining order is irreparable in nature such that injunctive relief is

appropriate. The second aspect is more specific to consideration of a temporary restraining

order. Is it necessary to act immediately, without having given Defendants a full opportunity to

respond to the claims and issues, because of the risk of imminent consequences?

More generally, Plaintiffs face the threat of irreparable harm. Although “only” money is

at stake, the potential consequences are irreparable because it is very unlikely that any Plaintiff

would gain payment of lost benefits at some time in the future. If this were a situation in which

Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants had made or were making legally or factually incorrect

eligibility determinations, it might be possible that the errors ultimately could be addressed by a

lump sum award of benefits that were due. Here, however, there is no dispute about Plaintiffs’

eligibility. They allege instead that they will lose benefits because Defendants choose to

terminate access to a federal source of benefits that will continue and which they would receive

absent that early termination decision. If the Court denied injunctive relief and then later

determined that Defendants should not have terminated the programs early, it is extremely

11
unlikely that access to the federal funds that the State abandoned could be restored. This alone

amounts to irreparable harm.

In addition, Plaintiffs have shown in their affidavits with varying degrees of severity that

the immediate loss of benefits, when some of them already are in vulnerable financial condition,

likely will lead to loss of housing, short-term diversion of effort to less valuable employment,

and/or significant emotional consequences. These non-monetary effects would never be

compensated and therefore add to the threat of irreparable harm.

The Court also must consider whether a temporary restraining order is necessary at this

moment. This inquiry focuses on the very short term from today to the point at which the Court

can conduct a full adversary hearing to consider a preliminary injunction. Here, without any

question, immediate relief is appropriate because of the midnight deadline arising from the

timing of the Governor’s termination notice. It may be possible that if the Court waited seven to

ten days and then issued a preliminary injunction following a hearing, the federal government

would allow Maryland to re-enter the enhanced benefit programs, perhaps even with retroactive

funding to eliminate a lapse in benefits. But there is an opportunity now to prevent any lapse and

to avoid the risk that re-entry would not be possible by acting before termination of participation

in the programs actually occurs. This is exactly the type of “immediate, substantial, and

irreparable harm” that Maryland Rule 15-504(a)(1) is designed to prevent.

In this respect, Defendants mistake the assessment of the status quo that is to be

preserved. Defendants argue that Governor Hogan has already acted to terminate Maryland’s

participation in the enhance benefit programs, so the status quo is termination and that

termination should be preserved. In the Court’s view, the proper perspective is to look at the

situation that existed before the challenged action was taken. The status quo today for each

individual Plaintiff is she or he is receiving benefits. The action that Plaintiffs challenge has
12
been announced and put in motion, but the change in the status quo has not yet occurred because

their benefits have not yet ended. Most important, in this particular situation, there is still an

opportunity to preserve that status during a period of further examination of the issues.

Defendants argue that the U.S. Department of Labor has already acknowledged the impending

termination, but Plaintiffs have rebutted that by submission of an email from the same federal

official indicating that there is still time for Maryland to rescind its termination and to remain in

the enhanced benefit programs.

Plaintiffs have satisfied both the general element of irreparable harm and the specific

requirement of immediate harm needed to support issuance of a temporary restraining order.

4. The Public Interest

As stated above, the Court does not doubt Defendants’ good faith in adopting a course of

action that they believe to be in the public interest considered as a whole. Even accepting their

good faith, however, it must also be recognized that continued State participation in the enhanced

benefit programs would both continue to support a very large number of individual Marylanders

and continue to contribute large amounts of money to the State’s recovering economy.

Defendants properly consider Maryland businesses that face a labor shortage, the effects of that

factor on those businesses, and the rippling effects their activity has in the economy. But the

effects on Plaintiffs also ripple throughout the economy. Any random panel of economists

charged with determining which strategy would net a greater benefit to the public at large likely

would produce divergent opinions. The Court concludes at the very least that the benefits of

continuing the enhanced benefit programs for Plaintiffs and thousands of Marylanders like them

are not limited to the private, personal effect on those people. There is a significant public

interest in continuing those benefits, perhaps even a predominant public interest. Because

13
Maryland Rule 15-504(a)(2)(D) requires only that granting a temporary restraining order be “not

contrary to the public interest,” Plaintiffs have clearly satisfied this factor.

Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have satisfied all four of the preliminary

injunctive relief factors and have also shown a threat of “immediate, substantial, irreparable

harm.” Md. Rule 15-504(a)(1). The motions of Plaintiffs in both actions therefore will be

granted, and the Court will issue a separate Temporary Restraining Order.

The judge’s signature appears on the

original document in the court file.
July 3, 2021 _______________________________
10:00 a.m. Judge Lawrence P. Fletcher-Hill
Circuit Court for Baltimore City

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