1st Year Logic (English) A1 Logic
1st Year Logic (English) A1 Logic
This is an argument consisting of three sentences of which (1) and (2) are premises
and (3) is the conclusion. In this argument (3) expresses the claim “Logic is not difficult” and
in support of this claim the two other sentences (1) and (2) are advanced as evidences. The
sentences (1) and (2) together provide the justification for accepting the truth expressed
by the sentence (3).
2 + 2 LOGIC, Part-I
Logic is a study of the methods and principles of correct or good arguments. It teaches
us how to construct good arguments and detect mistakes in our arguments. The knowledge of
logic enables us to increase clarity, consistency and cogency of reasoning in our intellectual as
well as everyday life. It also helps us to recognise fallacies or errors in our speech and writings.
The knowledge of the principles of good reasoning helps us to avoid logical errors that otherwise
would creep into our thoughts causing confusions and puzzles. From this we cannot however
claim that a logician or a reasonably good logician cannot commit any logical error. A logician, as
a human being, may commit logical mistake or even argue wrongly. This is quite possible. What
NATURE AND SCOPE OF LOGIC 3
we are claiming is that a person with the knowledge of logic is better equipped to avoid errors
in arguments and argue more efficiently than what he or she would have done without knowledge
of logic. Logical thinking is a skill that can be acquired by the study of logic. Logic promotes
rational thinking, critical attitude and thereby help us to form a scientific world view. Therefore, it
is desirable that one should know the basic principles of good argument. The knowledge of this
would place one in a comparatively better position to understand the situation, evaluate beliefs
and take correct decisions. Logic also teaches us to appreciate the good arguments and criticise
the bad ones advanced by others. Since logic, in general, deals with arguments, let us continue
our analysis of the notion of an argument.
As a student of logic, one should be able to determine whether a passage does or does
not express any argument. So, an enquiry into the distinction between argumentative and non-
argumentative passages will be instructive. Firstly, if in a given passage no statement is connected
with the other then surely the passage is not argumentative. Hence the minimum requirement of
any passage to express an argument or a series of arguments is that the statements should be
connected in such way that they collectively justify or support the truth of a claim. Consider the
following passage.
“The Moon goes round the Earth. All happy men are virtuous. All great scholars are
eccentric.”
Here no statement is connected with the other. Hence it is not an argumentative passage. Arguments
should be distinguished from narrative passages which may consist of loosely connected set of
4 + 2 LOGIC, Part-I
statements. Consider the following passage. Dasarath was the king of Ayodhya. He had three
queens and four sons. Ram was his eldest son. Ram was very kind to everybody. Sita, the
princess of Mithila, was his wife.
Here we have narrated several statements but no claim has been made either explicitly or implicitly
about any one of them on the basis of the rest. Hence, no argument is involved in the above
passage. On the other hand consider the following passage.
All teachers deserve our respect because they are our seniors and our seniors deserve our
respect.
This passage is clearly argumentative. All the sentences are well connected. It is claimed
that all teachers deserve our respect. This is the conclusion of the argument. In support of this
conclusion reasons have been given. The reasons are stated in the two statments: (1) Our seniors
deserve our respect and (2) Teachers are our seniors. These two statements are the premises
which together provide reasons for the conclusion.
Secondly, to identify an argument, we have to identify its premises as well as the conclusion.
Usually in an argument the conclusion is preceded by an expression such as “so”, “hence”,
“thus”, “therefore”, “as a result”, “for this reason”, “It is proved that” etc. We call such expressions
conclusion indicators. A conclusion is a sentence which begins with any of the conclusion indicator
words or phrases. An argument may have also premise indicators. The expressions such as
“since”, “because”, “for”, “as”, “follows from”, “as shown by” etc. are called premise-indicators.
Usually premises of an argument begin with or are preceded by the premise indicator expressions.
For example, if we assert “P because Q” then Q being preceded by a premise indicator signals
that Q is the premise of the argument. The same is the case with conclusion-indicators. Indicator
words do not always signal the presence of an argument. For instance, in the sentence “Sita is
living in Bhubaneswar since her marriage to Ashok” the word “since” indicates a temporal
connection rather than a premise in any argument. In the sentence “Ram resigned from his job
because of his illness” the word ‘because’ indicates a causal connection, not an argument. It
NATURE AND SCOPE OF LOGIC 5
should be further noted that the non-occurance of premise or conclusion indicator ia a passage
does not indicate that the passage is not argumentative. In other words, a passage might be
argumentative even when the indicator words or phrases are absent. To decide the nature of the
passage we have to look at the context of stating the passage.
Thirdly, if a passage consists of just one statement then it does not express an argument.
Because, an argument consists of at least one premise and a conclusion. Usually an argument
consists of a set of statements which are the premises and another statement which is the conclu-
sion. An argument has the following general from:
P ( a set of premises)
Therefore, Q (the conclusion)
Fourthly, there can be passages that are explanatory in nature without being argumentative.
If our interest is to establish the truth of a statement say ‘Q’ on the basis of another statement ‘P’
then “ Q, because P” states an argument. On the contrary, if the truth of “Q” is unproblematic and
we have no intention to justify “Q” on the basis of “P”, then the formulation “Q because P” is an
explanation of why Q occured. Therefore, the difference between an argumentative and explanatory
passage is really dependent on our interest or purpose of stating or using the passage in question.
Let us the examine some proposed definitions of logic. Some logicians define logic as an
art of reasoning. According to this view since logic develops the skill or ability to reason correctly,
it is an art. As an art, logic provides the method and technique for testing the correctness or
incorrectness of arguments. Music, dance, cooking are instances of art. They aim to develop our
skills. In these disciplines practice makes a person more skillful. A student of logic is required to
6 + 2 LOGIC, Part-I
work out the exercises as a part of his or her learning the subject. So logic is an art. Some define
logic as both science and art of reasoning. A science is a systematic study of phenomena which
are within the area of its investigation. It undertakes to formulate the laws or principles which
holds good without exception. Logic is a science as it is a systematic study of the methods and
principles of correct reasoning. Logic also studies and clarifies the different types of fallacies
which are committed in correct reasoning. A distinction can be drawn between positive and
normative sciences. A positive science describes how the facts in its area of investigation actually
behave. It arrives at general laws by the methods of observation and experiment. A normative
science, on the other hand, investigates the norms as standard that should be applied. Logic is
not a positive science since it does not report how people actually reason or argue. Since it deals
with the standardas principles of correct thinking, it is a normative science. The use of the word
‘reasoning’ in the above definitions may be misleading. The term ‘reasoning’, may signify a mental
process or a mental product. In logic, we are not concerned with the actual process of reasoning
rather with arguments which is a product. A thought when expressed in language becomes an
argument. Thus, the statement that logic is an art and at the same time science of reasoning gives
important insights into the nature of logic but as a definition, it is not very accurate.
Some logicians claim that logic is the science of laws of thought. But such a view is not
correct because all reasoning involves thinking but all thinking cannot be called reasoning. Logic
deals with correct reasoning and not with all types of thinking. There are many mental proceses
such as remembering, imagining, day-dreaming etc. which can be instances of thinking without
involving any reasoning. Psychology studies all these phenomena, but logic deals only with reasoning.
Further logic does not discover any descriptive laws but it formulates the principles of correct
reasoning. We can sum up by stating that logic helps one to improve upon the quality of reasoning.
It provides technique to strengthen and polish the skill of reasoning. It aims at providing a solid
foundation by which one can distinguish between correct and incorrect reasoning.
might create confusion in your mind. You may wonder, does an argument consist of sentences or
of propositions? There should not be any confusion on this point. The sentences, which figure in
arguments, express propositions. Strictly speaking propositions are the constituents of arguments.
One should, however, be clear about the distincton between sentence and proposition.
Firstly, all sentences do not express propositions. Only declarative or indicative sentences
express propositions. Questions, (viz., How old are you?, “What is your father?”, ‘Are you a
student?)’, commands (‘Go there’, ‘Get out’, ‘Take whatever available’) and exclamation (viz,
Oh! What a book!’) are sentences but they do not express any proposition. Such sentences do
not have any truth value as they do not assert or deny anything. Secondly, a sentence is a linguistic
entity belonging to a specific language, whereas propositions are logical entities having no specific
allegiance to any particular language. Of course, to express a proposition we always need a
sentence but a proposition is different from a sentence. Two or more sentences belonging to the
same or to different languages may express the same proposition. For example, “Rama killed
Ravana” and “Ravana was killed by Rama” are two different sentences in English but both
express the same proposition. Because, the state of affair described by the first sentence is the
same as that of the second senence. So far as the proposition is concerned these two sentences
express the same proposition. Similarly, the sentence “Ram killed Ravan” can be translated into
any other language like Odia, Hindi or Sanskrit, and the corresponding sentences in these languages
would express the same proposition. Thirdly, the same sentence may express different proposition
uttered at different times and in different places. For example, the sentence “The present Prime
Minister of India is a bachelor” uttered in the year 1994 would express a false propositon whereas
the same sentence uttered in the year 2002 would express a true proposition. In other words, the
state of affair expressed by the two utterances of the same sentence at different times are different.
Even if the sentence is the same, the propositions expressed by the sentence at difference times
would be different. Thus propositions are distinct from sentences.
Logic as a system of reasoning aims at characterising this relation. On the basis of the nature of
this relational tie we can broadly distinguish between two kinds of arguments viz., deductive and
inductive.
In deductive arguments, the premises conclusively justify or support the conclusion. The
truth claim expressed by the conclusion is fully supported by the truth claim expressed by the
premises. In other words, in case of deductive arguments the truth of the premises absolutely
ensures the truth of conclusion. In this sense we call a correct deductive argument demonstrative.
If the premises are true, the conclusion must necessarily be true. This means that in a correct
deductive argument the premises and conclusion are so related that it is impossible for the premises
to be true and the conclusion to be false. Consider the following example,
Here it is impossible that premises are true and conclusion is false. This is a valid deductive
arguement in which the premises provide conclusive grounds for the truth of the conclusion. In an
inductive argument the premises do not absolutely or conclusively ensure the truth of the conclusion.
If the premises of an inductive argument are all true and the reasoning is good then it is reasonable
to believe in the truth of the conclusion. But here we cannot be absolutely sure of the truth of the
conclusion. For example, consider the following argument.
(1) Ram is mortal
(2) Hari is mortal
(3) Sita is mortal
(4) .....................
(5) ....................
Therefore, all men are mortal.
This is an inductive argument. Here even if all the premises are true and the reasoning is
good yet the truth of the conclusion cannot be asserted conclusively or with certainty. Because,
NATURE AND SCOPE OF LOGIC 9
even if all the premises are observed to be true and nothing contrary has been observed so far,
yet the conclusion being a general proposition cannot be observed to be true as it includes future
and unobserved cases. Therefore, the conclusion of an inductive argument is always prone to
revision. Hence an inductive argument may be evaluated as better or worse according to the
degree of support or backing given to the conclusion by the premises.
Inductive arguments are of great importance for establishing scientific laws and propositions
expressing empirical conjectures about the world. Most of our beliefs are based on induction.
They cannot be justified by deductive arguments as such cases are empirical generalisations
based on uncontradicted experience. For example, we believe that eating rice nourishes us whereas
taking arsenic will be poisonous. These beliefs are established by inductive method.
Let us examine some of the misunderstandings usually associated with the distinction
between inductive and deduction. It is claimed that induction is a process from particular to
general, whereas deduction is a process from general to particular. This is illustrated in the following
example.
All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
Here the conclusion is a particular proposition and one of the the premises, precisely the
major premise, is a general proposition. Of course the reasoning involved in the above argument
is correct. This is an instance of valid deductive argument . Therefore, it has been said that
deduction is a process from general to particular. This is not always true. Because there are valid
deductive arguments whose premises are all general propositions and the conclusion is also a
general proposition. Consider the following example :
All men are mortal.
All kings are men.
Therefore, all kings are mortal.
10 + 2 LOGIC, Part-I
Similarly, there are valid deductive arguments whose premises as well as the conclusion
are all particular propositions. Consider the following arguments:
Likewise, we may have a good inductive arguments that may have particular propositions
for its premises as well as for its conclusion. This is illustrated in the following inductive argument.
During the last ten years maximum temperature in summer in Rourkela has
exceeded 400 C., so this year also it will exceed 400 C.
The above examples make it clear that it is not correct to characterise deduction as a
process from general to particular and induction as a process from particular to general. The
fundamental difference between induction and deduction lies on the nature of the relation between
premises and the conclusion. In case of deduction, the premises conclusively support the conclusion
in the sense that no additional information (or premise) is relevant (i.e. it cannot increase or
decrease the validity of a deductive argument). Validity never admits of degree. On the other
NATURE AND SCOPE OF LOGIC 11
hand, the relation between premises and the conclusion in an inductive argument admits of degrees.
Even in the best inductive argument premises render the conclusion highly probable. The premises
of a good inductive argument never conclusively support the conclusion in the sense that it is
possible to discover some additional facts concerning the world that may upset the truth claim
made by the conclusion of a well-established inductive argument. Thus, only deductive arguments
can be characterised as valid or invalid. Inductive arguments are either strong or weak depending
upon the amount of support the premises provide to the conclusion.
We know that probability is the essence of any inductive argument i.e. the conclusion of
an inductive argument is probable. Note that mere presence of the word “probability”, “probable”
etc. in the conclusion never ensures that the argument in question is inductive. Because, there are
deductive arguments about the probabilities themselves. Hence we may conclude that an argument
is deductive if and only if the conclusion conclusively follows from or is completely determined by
its premises, whereas in case of induction, the conclusion is claimed to follow from its premises
only with probability.
(i) Two arguments may share the same form or structure yet differ in content. Consider
the following examples:
12 + 2 LOGIC, Part-I
Example 1 :
All men are mortal.
All kings are men.
Therefore, all kings are mortal.
Example 2 :
All mammals have lungs.
All rabbits are mammals.
Therefore, all rabbits have lungs.
Clearly the content or the subject matter of these two arguments are different. Example
1 is about men, mortality and kings and example 2 is about mammals, lungs and rabbits, Thus
there are arguments with the same structure having different subject matters. On the other hand,
(ii) The content may be same but the form or structure of the argument may be different. To
show this, let us consider these examples.
Example 3 :
No heroes are cowards.
All soldiers are heroes.
Therefore, no soldiers are cowards.
NATURE AND SCOPE OF LOGIC 13
Example 4 :
No cowards are heroes.
All soldiers are heroes.
Therefore, no soldiers are cowards.
The content of these two arguments is the same since both are about heroes, cowards
and soldiers. But these two arguments have different structures that may be exhibited as follows:
No P M
All S M
No S P
Clearly the structure of the arguments stated in examples 3 and 4 are different though
their content remains the same. Thus, we can notice that content and form are really different and
14 + 2 LOGIC, Part-I
independent of each other. Now we may end this section by taking note of the fact that logic
deals with the form or the structure, not with the content of an argument.
The above remarks on deductive validity shows the connection between validity of an
argument and the truth or falsity of its premises and conclusion. But the connection is not a simple
one. Of the eight possible combinations of truth or falsity of premises and the conclusion and
validity or invalidity of arguments, only one is completely ruled out. The only thing that cannot
happen is that the premises are all true, the conclusion is false and the argument is deductively
valid.
Given below are the other seven combinations of true and false premises and conclusion
with example.
(i) There are valid arguments whose premises as well as the conclusion are all true.
NATURE AND SCOPE OF LOGIC 15
T T Valid
Invalid
T F xxx
Invalid
F T Valid
Invalid
F F Valid
Invalid
The above examples show that invalid arguments allow for all possible combinations of
true or false premises and true or false conclusion. We cited examples of valid arguments with
false conclusion as well as invalid arguments with true conclusions. Thus, it can be noticed that
the truth or falsity of the conclusion does not by itself determine the validity or invalidity of the
argument. So also the validity of an argument does not by itself guarantee the truth of its conclusion.
We also noticed that valid arguments may have only three out of the four possible truth
contributions. A valid argument cannot have true premises and a false conclusion. In other words,
if an argument is valid and its premises are true, then we can be sure that the conclusion is true.
Here both the premises are false but the argument is valid. Hence, it is also an unsound
argument. Thus mere validity of an argument does not make the argument sound, because there
are valid arguments that are not sound. To say that an argument is unsound amounts to the claim
that the argument is either invalid or some of its premises are false. Thus the soundness of an
argument implies validity as well as the truth of all its premises. But the unsoundness of an argument
does not imply invalidity, because there are unsound arguments that are valid.
At this stage the following question may be asked. Why logicians should not confine their
attention only to sound arguments? The answer is, we cannot study only sound arguments though
it is interesting. Because, to know an argument to be sound we must know that all its premises
are true. But knowing the truth of the premises is not always possible. Further, we are often
involved in arguments whose premises are not known to be true. For example, when a scientist
verifies a scientific hypothesis or even a theory, he or she very often deduces consequences from
the hypothesis or the theory in question and compares these consequences with the data and if
18 + 2 LOGIC, Part-I
the result tallies then the hypothesis or the theory is verified to be true. Here the investigator does
not know the truth of the hypothesis or the theory prior to the process of testing. If the truth of the
theory or the hypothesis was known to the scientist prior to the verification, the verification
would be pointless. So, to confine our attention to sound arguments only would be self-defeating.
But this does not make sound arguments logically uninteresting. Because, if by some means, we
know that an argument is sound then we may infer the truth of its conclusion.
“Man is a man” and so on. It does not assert anything about the nature of x, it does not tell us
whether x in question is white or heavy or soft. It does not tell us about any particular character
of the world. It gives us a very useful instruction concerning the use of concepts occurring in an
argument. It tells us that in any good argument or in any process of good reasoning, every
concept occurring in it must be used in the same sense thoughout the argument. In other words,
the meaning of concepts occurring in an argument should remain constant throughout the argument.
This law can also be taken as an instruction for assigning truth-values to propositional variables in
classical logic. In this sense, it states that distinct occurrences of the same propositional variable
always receive the same truth value throughout the argument. In propositional sense it states that
every proposition implies itself. Symbolically the law states that for any proposition P, (P P)
holds. (Read ‘P P’ as ‘if P then P’.) This means that if a proposition is used in an argument to
state something, then whenever this proposition occurs in the argument it is used to state that thing.
It states that the same proposition should not state different things in the same argument. One
cannot accept and reject a given proposition at the same breath in any given argument. If we accept
and reject a proposition P at the same time in an argument then the very use of P becomes pointless.
Hence, for any discourse or argument to be possible, we have to accept the law of identity.
The fundamental nature of the law of identity can be understood in the following way.
For example, if we deny this law i.e. if we deny x is x then it implies that there is a denial. Hence
by use of the law of identity we have denial is a denial. It is of the form d is d, where d stands for
‘denial’. Thus the law of identity is back. The very denial of this law implies its presence. Therefore,
without presupposing this law we can not even state or assert anything. For any discourse or
argument to be possible we have to accept the law of identity. In this sense, it is a fundamental or
basic principle of logic.
not possess that property at the same time. Aristole says, “the same cannot belong and not
belong together to the same under same respect”. For example let A stand for “to be honest” and
B stand for “not to be honest”. Then A and B will never belong to the same thing. In other words,
it is not possible to assert and deny the same. In its propositional formulation, it asserts that two
contradictory statements are not true together. It also suggests that no proposition is both true
and false. Symbolically, the law of contradication is represented by the formula (p · p) where
p stands for any proposition (Read (p · p) as ‘not both p and not p’). This law, like the law of
identity, also suggests the method of assigning truth values to propositions. It says that while
assigning truth values to the propositions, we should not assign both truth and falsehood to the
same proposition. This law is one of the minimum conditions of any good argument. It says that
if something is a table, then it is not the case that it is not a table. A thing cannot both be a table
and not a table at the same time. Any arguments violating this law would be inconsistent and
thereby becomes pointless as it would claim nothing. When we say that a good argument must
conform to this law, it implies that it should be consistent.
logically true. Since they are all tautologies, they are equivalent to each other. For that matter they
are all equivalent to any of the tautologies. But logicians consider these laws as having a very
special status. They are basic or fundamental principles to which any good or correct argument
must conform. Further, these laws cannot be proved. Because, to prove them amounts to
constructing valid arguments in which each such law must occur as conclusion. Since any valid
argument, in general, must conform to these laws, the proofs of such law (if any) as a form of
valid argument must also conform to these three laws. This means the proof of these laws would
involve the fallacy of pititio principii (i.e. the fallacy of assuming what we wish to prove). Thus we
may say that these laws are presuppositions of any good argument. Furhter, the fundamental
nature of these laws can be seen in relation to the construction of truth tables. These laws provide
us the necessary instructions for assigning truth values to the propositions in classical logic. Each
proposition is assigned the value T or F ( in accord with the law of excluded middle) but not both
(in accord with the law of contradiction) and distinct occurrences of the same variable always
receive the same truth value through out the expression (in accord with the law of identify). So
these laws are fundamental, self evident and unavoidable for providing consistent arguments in
any field of human knowledge.
********
22 + 2 LOGIC, Part-I
SUMMARY
Since logic is a systematic study of methods and principles of correct reasoning and it
teaches us the technique of testing the correctness of arguments, it can be viewed both as a
science and an art.
There are three fundamental laws of logic. These are (1) the law of identity, (2) the law of
contradiction, and (3) the law of excluded middle. These are basic principles of correct thinking
which are presupposed in any logical thinking.
**********
NATURE AND SCOPE OF LOGIC 23
MODEL QUESTIONS
Objective -type
I. Point out in each case whether it is true or false.
1) Logic is the study of methods for evaluating arguments.
2) If a valid argument has only false premises, then it must have a false conclusion.
3) Every valid argument with a false conclusion has at least one false premise.
4) Some arguments are true.
5) Every sound argument is valid.
6) Every invalid argument is unsound.
7) A sound argument can have a false conclusion
8) If an argument is valid and has only true premises, then its conclusion must be true.
9) If all the premises of an argument are true, then it is sound.
10) Every valid argument with a true conclusion is sound.
11) Every valid argument has a true conclusion.
12) If the premises of a valid argument are false, then its conclusion is also false.
13) Every unsound argument is invalid.
14) If an argument has one false premise, then it is unsound.
15) If all the premises of a valid argument are true, then its conclusion is also true.
16) Some arguments are false.
17) Deductive logic is concerned with tests for validity and invalidity of arguments.
18) If a deductive argument has all true premises and a false conclusion, then it is invalid.
19) Every valid argument has true premises and only true premises.
20) If an argument is invalid, then it must have true premises and a false conclusion.
24 + 2 LOGIC, Part-I
6. Which one of the following correctly expresses the difference between deduc-
tive and inductive arguments?
a) In an inductive argument, the premises provide some support for the conclusion, but a
deductive argument, if it is valid, provides conclusive support for the conclusion.
b) Inductive arguments reason from the general to the particular, while deductive arguments
reason from the particular to the general.
c) Deductive arguments reason from the general to the particular, while inductive arguments
reason from the particular to the general.
d) Deductive arguments consist of true propositions, while inductive arguments consist of
only false proposition.
7. If the purpose of a passage is to account for some proposition, then the passage
is probably:
a) attempting to define key terms.
b) an argument.
c) going to fail, since there is no way to account for most propositions.
d) an explanation.
8. In correct reasoning:
a) all the propositions are true.
b) the conclusion supports the premises.
c) the conclusion is never false.
d) the premises support the conclusion.
10. If the premises and the conclusion of an argument are all true, then
a. the argument must be valid.
b. the argument must be sound.
c. the argument must be valid and sound.
d. none of the above
III. Match the descriptions given in the right with the words given in the left.
Essay-type questions:
1. What is an argument? Point out the distinction between deductive and inductive arguments.
2. Explain the nature of Logic.
3. Distinguish between:
(a) truth and validity
(b) sentence and proposition
(c) valid and invalid arguments
(d) arguments and explanations
4. State and explain the fundamental principles of logic.
5. What are the principles of logic? Explain.
***
28 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
CHAPTER - 2
LOGIC AND LANGUAGE
The first sentence reports that having feather is a feature of birds. The second sentence
reports that birds do not have some essential qualities found in mammals. In either case it pro-
vides information about the world. Both affirmation and denial about things in the world are
examples of descriptive use of language. The following are some more examples of language
functioning descriptively.
1. Crows are black.
2. Puri is not the capital of Orissa
3. A spider has eight legs.
4. Logic is the study of correct reasoning.
5. The 15th of August is Indian Independence Day.
All these above statements happen to be true statements. However, it should be noted
that not only true sentences are instances of informative use of language, but also false sentences
are instances of informative use of language. “A spider has six legs” is a false statement since
spiders in fact have eight legs. Yet the statement “A spider has six legs”, even though false, is
nonetheless an example of descriptive use of language.
When language functions informatively we can sensibly ask whether what is asserted is
true or false. In other words, the question “Is it true?” can be meaningfully asked of all such
instances. When language is used to affirm or deny any proposition, its function is informative.
Language used to present arguments serves informative function. All descriptions of things, events,
and their properties and relations consist of informative discourse. The language of science is a
clear instance of descriptive use of language.
1. Jai Hind!
2. Cheers!
3. It is disgusting!
4. It is too bad!
5. It is wonderful!
6. Let us win this game!
In appropriate contexts all these can count as instances of language functioning emotively.
In all these above examples language is functioning directively. Anyone who utters any of
these sentences, in a typical situation, is directing someone to do something or to respond in an
appropriate manner. In all instances of language functioning directively, we can meaningfully ask
the question “Should I respond?” You will notice that directive discourse, like emotive discourse,
is neither true nor false. But directive discourse, specially the imperative statements, can figure in
LOGIC AND LANGUAGE 31
some arguments. A command such as “Close the window”, or an advice such as “You should
wear helmet while riding scooter” is either obeyed or disobeyed, but it is neither true nor false.
Though commands, advices, and requests are neither true nor false, these can be reasonable or
unreasonable, proper or improper. These characterisations of imperative statements are somewhat
analogous to characterisation of informative statements as true or false. Moreover, imperative
statements often imply or presuppose the truth of some propositions. If I request you to close the
window, my request presupposes the truth of the proposition that the window is open. Since
reasons can be cited for or against imperative statements, such statements do occur in imperative
arguments. We are not going to discuss the logic of imperatives in this book. In our study of logic
we shall restrict our discussion to arguments that are stated in the language that functions
informatively.
The study of logic is concerned with language that functions informatively. So it is important
to distinguish language that is informative from language that serves other functions. There is,
however, no mechanical method for distinguishing informative use of language from language that
serves other functions. Grammatical structure of a sentence often provides a clue to its function,
but there is no necessary connection between function and grammatical form. We can determine
whether the language in a particular context is functioning informatively or not by asking “Is this
instance of language being used to make an assertion that is either true or false?” If the answer is
“yes” then it is an instance of informative use of language.
It should be noted that language, in particular contexts, very often functions in more than
one way. One and the same sentence might have more than one function. For effective
communication language is often used deliberately to serve multiple functions. Language used to
serve expressive function might contain some relevant information. So also language that is primarily
informative may make use of other functions as well. Most discourses in our ordinary
communication contain elements from all the three uses of language enumerated above. In logic
we restrict our attention to those cases where our discourse is at least partly informative or
descriptive.
32 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
An argument consists of declarative sentences. We have also noted that the declarative
sentences express propositions. As a sentence consists of words, so also a proposition consists
of terms. As words are the constituent of sentences, so also terms are the constituent of
propositions. Consider, for example, the proposition: “Crows are black”. It consists of a subject
term “crows” and a predicate term “black” joined together by a copula “are”. Similarly, the
proposition “All men are mortal” has a subject term “man” and predicate term “mortal”. A
categorical proposition expresses a relation between a subject term and a predicate term.
A term consists of one or many words. For example, in the proposition “All scientists
who are famous are sincere and hardworking persons”, the subject term is “scientists who are
famous” and the predicate term is “sincere and hardworking persons”. Here a group of words
together constitute the subject term. The predicate term too consists of several words in this
example. The terms in this proposition are many-worded terms.
A term constitutes a unit of meaning in the proposition. It expresses a single idea. The
terms in a categorical proposition can be best understood as being about classes and individuals.
A term signifies either a class of individuals or an individual. For example, in the proposition
“Man is mortal” it is asserted that the class “man” is included in the class of “mortals”. Here both
the terms are class terms and they can be said to be expressing general ideas. The proposition
“Asok is mortal” states that an individual (Asok) belongs to the class of mortals. Here “Asok”
expresses a singular idea.
category of words. These are called syncategorematic words. Words like ‘hurray!’ and ‘oh!’
cannot be used to signify a term either independently or in conjunction with other words. These
are acategorematic words. It should be noted that unless a word is used in a proposition, its
nature cannot be determined. Looking to its use in a proposition, it can be determined as
categorematic, syncategorematic or acetogorematic. For the same word can be used
differently.
iii) How intelligent ! he showed his talent in the competition. (here intelligent is used
acetogorematically)
Thus looking to the use of a term in a proposition, the nature of the term can be determined.
Usually words used as noun, pronoun and adjective are categorematic, and words used as
verb, adverb, adjective, preposition and conjuction are syncategorematic and word used as
interjection are acategorematic.
(a) Denotation :
A general term applies to several things. In one sense of ‘meaning’, the things to which a
general term applies constitute its meaning. This is meaning in the sense of reference. The things
to which a general term applies are called the denotation of the term. This sense of ‘meaning’ is
called the denotative, or referential meaning of the term.
Let us elucidate the idea of denotational meaning with an example. Consider the term
‘month’. The term ‘month’ applies to January, February, March, April, etc. to all the twelve
months. The term ‘month’ applies equally in the same sense to all these months. When we say
that a month has less than 32 days, part of what we mean is that January has less than 32 days,
February has less than 32 days and so on. Thus the months January, February, March, etc.
constitute the denotation of the term ‘month’. The denotation of ‘boat’ is the set of all boats, the
denotation of ‘dog’ is the set of all dogs, and the denatotion of ‘chair’ is the set of all chairs that
are (or ever have been or ever will be) in the world. The collection of all the objects, individuals
or events to which a term applies constitutes the denotation of the term. The denotation of a
term is the collection of individual things to which the term correctly applies.
One might think that since in course of time old things are destroyed and new things are
created, denotation of a term does not always remain constant. For example, one might reason
that since people die and babies are born, denotation of ‘human beings’ would decrease with
every death and increase with every birth. But this view is based on a mistake. The denotation of
the term ‘human’ consists of all human beings – living, dead, and the unborn. So, particular
deaths and births do not change the denotation of ‘human beings’.
consist of its sub-classes like ‘logic books’, ‘physics books’, ‘story books’ etc. Hence extension
of a term consist of classes and denotation of a term consists of individual members.
It can be noticed that a term lacking denotation may still have extension. For example,
the term ‘unicorn’ lacks denotation since there are no such animals in the world, but it still can
have extension in the form of having sub-classes such as ‘white unicorns’, ‘black unicorns’,
‘brown unicorns’ and so on. Similarly, terms like proper names lack extension but have denotation.
(c) Connotation :
A general term signifies some properties or qualities on the basis of which we know how
to apply the term correctly. All the objects denoted by a given term share some common and
essential attributes. Connotation of a term consists of these common and essential qualities. By
‘common quality’ we mean the quality shared in common by all the members. By ‘essential
quality’ we mean those qualities without which the term will not apply to something. On the basis
of these common and essential attributes we are able to decide whether the term applies to a
given object or not. In other words, the set of features shared by all and only those things to
which a term applies is called the connotation of that term. The connotation of the term ‘triangle’
consists of those attributes common to all triangles and found only in triangles. ‘Triangle’ means a
plane figure bound by three straight lines. ‘A plane figure bound by three straight lines’ constitutes
the connotation of ‘triangle’. The connotation of a term is the set of all and only those
properties that a thing must possess for that term to apply to it. The word intension is
also used as synonym of connotation.
The word ‘connotation’ is ambiguous. It has multiple senses. There are at least three
different senses in which words intension and connotation have been used. These are called
subjective, objective, and conventional connotation of a term. ‘Subjective connotation’ of a
term is the set of attributes the user associates with that term. It is the set of all the attributes the
user believes to be true of the objects denoted by the term. Subjective connotation is psychological
in character. It varies from individual to individual and from context to context. It may also vary
from time to time for the same person. So, subjective interpretations cannot provide any reliable
36 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
By ‘objective connotation’ we mean the list of all the properties found in the individuals
belonging to the concept. But many of these properties may not be essential for the application of
the concept. Let us, for the sake of argument, suppose that all human beings have two legs. Then
‘being biped’ will be a part of the objective connotation of ‘human beings’. But this does not
make it an essential property of human beings. If someone loses a leg in an accident, he or she
does not cease to be human. Moreover, there are also other biped creatures, e.g. birds, apart
from human beings. There is another problem with the idea of objective connotation. Since
objective connotation will include all the features common to the objects denoted by the term, it
would not be humanly possible to know all of these. Human beings are not omniscient. If meaning
is identified with objective connotation, then we shall have to concede that one never knows the
complete meaning of the terms one is using. So, objective connotation cannot be the public
meaning of a term.
(1) Connotation of a term determines its denotation, but denotation of a term does not
uniquely determine its connotation. One may know the connotation of a term without
knowing its denotation. For instance, even though there are no unicorns in the world,
people know the meaning of the word “unicorn” in the sense of knowing its connotation.
‘Unicorn’ means ‘a horse like animal with one long horn on its forehead’. So, one who
knows this, knows the connotation of the term, although no one has ever come across
LOGIC AND LANGUAGE 37
any unicorn in the world. Further, two terms having different connotations may have the
same denotation. For example, consider the two terms ‘equilateral triangle’ and
‘equiangular triangle’. The term ‘equilateral triangle’ means a plane figure enclosed by
three straight lines of equal length. The term ‘equiangular triangle’ means a plane figure
enclosed by three straight lines that intersect each other to form equal angles. Notice that
these two terms have different connotative meaning but both denote exactly the same set
of figures. So, connotation of a term determines its denotation. In other words, the
connotation of a term provides us a set of criteria for deciding whether an object falls
within the extension of that term. For example, when we come across an animal in a zoo,
we decide whether or not it belongs to the class of leopards by seeing whether or not it
has the relevant features of a leopard.
(2) Connotation and denotation vary inversely. When connotation increases denotation
decreases, and when denotation increases connotation decreases. Some logicians call it
the law of inverse variation. Consider the following sequence of terms:
1. ‘animal’,
2. ‘aquatic animal’, and
3. ‘aquatic animal with fins’.
These terms have been arranged in the order of increasing connotation. The connotation
of ‘aquatic animal’ is greater than that of ‘animal’. Aquatic animals have all the qualities common
and essential for something to be an animal and in addition to those properties they have the
property of living in water. Similarly, the connotation of ‘aquatic animal with fins’ is greater than
that of ‘aquatic animal’, since aquatic animals with fins have all the properties of aquatic animals
plus the property of having fins. So you can see that the three terms are in the order of increasing
connotation. You will also notice that these terms are in the order of decreasing denotation. The
total number of aquatic animals is less than that of animals, and the total number of aquatic
animals with fins is less than that of aquatic animals. Thus when we arranged the terms in an order
of increasing connotation, the terms also automatically got arranged in an order of decreasing
denotation.
38 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
Similar relation of inverse variation can also be noticed if we arrange terms in an order of
decreasing connotation.
1. ‘aquatic animal with fins’
2. ‘aquatic animal’
3. ‘animal’
There are, however, some exceptions to this relation of inverse variation. In some cases
an increase in connotation does not result in the decrease in denotation. We observed earlier that
the two terms having different connotation might have the same denotation. We cited the case of
the two terms ‘equilateral triangle’ and ‘equiangular triangle’ to illustrate that point. The same
example can be cited to illustrate an exception to the ‘law of inverse variation’. Although the term
‘equilateral and equiangular triangle’ has greater connotation than that of the term ‘equilateral
triangle’, there is no variation in the denotation of these terms. This illustrates the point that
increase in connotation is not always accompanied by decrease in denotation.
of ‘human being’. Similarly, if we decrease the connotation of ‘human beings’ by taking out the
property ‘rationality’ from it we get a new term ‘animal’ with greater extension, since the term
‘animal’ contains more subclasses than that of ‘human beings’. In the above examples we notice
that increase in connotation leads to decrease in extension and decrease in connotation leads to
increase in extension. Analogously we can notice that increase or decrease in extension will also
lead to corresponding decrease or increase in connotation.
***
40 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
SUMMARY
Ordinary language has a variety of functions which can be broadly classified into
descriptive, emotive and directive uses of language. Logic is concerned with language that
functions descriptively or informatively. Grammatical form of a sentence is not a sure guide
to its function. Language is very often used to serve multiple functions.
As words are the constituents of sentences, terms are the constituents of propositions.
Terms are expressed by one word or many words. A term signifies an individual a property
or a class of individuals.
General terms have both denotation and connotation. Denotation of a term consists
of the things to which the term applies. Connotation of a term consists of the set of common
and essential attributes shared by the objects denoted by the term. The denotation of a term
is determined by its connotation, but connotation is not determined by its denotation.
Generally, denotation and connotation of terms vary inversely when the terms are arranged
in accordance with their subordination. Increase or decrease in connotation of a term results
in another term with a corresponding decrease or increase in denotation. So also, increase
or decrease in denotation results in corresponding decrease or increase in connotation. A
similar relation of inverse variation can also be noticed between extension and connotation
of terms.
******
LOGIC AND LANGUAGE 41
MODEL QUESTIONS
Objective type
I. Fill in the blanks by selecting the appropriate word from the options given in the
bracket.
1. When someone asserts or denies a fact, it is an instance of ____________ use of language.
(informative, expressive, directive)
2. “Please close the door.” This sentence illustrates the ___________ use of language.
(informative, expressive, directive)
3. The set of attributes shared by all and only those objects to which the term refers to is
called the ____________ of that term. (extension, connotation, denotation)
4. Terms having different connotation may have the same _________. (denotation, meaning,
intension)
5. When a question is posed in order to request an answer, it is a case of _______ discourse.
(descriptive, expressive, directive)
6. The _________ use of language includes both correct and incorrect information.
(descriptive, expressive, directive)
7. The __________ connotation of a word for a speaker is the set of all attributes the
speaker believes to be possessed by objects denoted by that word. (objective, subjective,
conventional)
8. The __________ connotation of a word is the total set of characteristics shared by all
objects denoted by that word. (objective, subjective, conventional)
9. The __________ of a term increases when attributes are added to it. (extension,
connotation, denotation)
10. The class term “unicorn” has no _____________. (extension, connotation, denotation)
II. Point out in each case whether the statement is true or false.
1. The extension of a term refers to its subclasses.
2. The connotation of “town” includes Aska, Burla, Chowdwar, and Dhenkanal.
3. The term “sky flower” has connotation but no denotation.
42 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
***
CHAPTER - 3
DEFINITION AND MEANING
Words in ordinary language are not only ambiguous, they are also often excessively
vague. An expression is vague, if borderline cases for its application occur. In other words, an
44 + 2 LOGIC, Part-I
Disputes arising out of either ambiguity or vagueness of words are verbal disputes. A
verbal dispute can be avoided by stating the sense in which the key words are used. Once the
parties to the dispute make clear the sense in which they are using the terms they will realise that
their disagreement is on the meaning of their terms and the parties in the dispute might not be
opposed to one another. A verbal dispute would disappear once the parties involved in the
dispute distinguish between different meanings of the important terms and agree on the meaning
of these terms. We can save a lot of time, sharpen our reasoning ability, and communicate with
each other more effectively if we watch for disagreements about the meaning of words and try to
resolve them whenever we can.
But all disputes are not verbal disputes. Some disputes are genuine disputes in which
there is some genuine disagreement between parties. Genuine or non-verbal disputes can be of
two kinds. Such disputes involve either disagreement in attitude or disagreement in belief.
Disagreement in attitude arises when two persons or parties express different feelings or attitudes
towards the same situation. For example, some people like eggs and some others do not like
eggs. Those who like eggs would say that eggs are delicious, but those who do not like would
disagree and say that eggs do not have good taste. Here they are expressing their disagreement
in their attitude towards eggs. If two persons give different answer to the question whether eggs
are good tasting or not, then the fact is that one of them likes its taste and the other does not like
the taste. No verbal dispute is involved here, since both the persons agree on the meaning of the
words by means of which they convey their respective feelings. This is a case a genuine
disagreement in the sense that they have different feelings towards the same situation.
DEFINITION AND MEANING 45
There is an important type of dispute in which parties to the disputes disagree on what
they believe to be true. These are factual disputes. People engaged in a factual dispute often
agree on the meaning of the words by means of which they convey their respective positions, but
they disagree over the truth of some specific proposition. Suppose one person asserts that a
spider has eight legs and another person disagrees and claims that spiders have six legs. Further
investigation of the matter will settle their dispute in support of the claim that spiders have eight
legs, because spiders in fact have eight legs. There are, however, some factual disputes which are
difficult to settle because we are not in a position to verify the facts, but in such cases we can say
what would settle the issue.
3.2 Definitions :
A definition states the meaning of a term. Since meaning of an expression is explained by
its definition, definitions provide a useful method of preventing or eliminating differences in the
use of languages. In other words, definitions are essential for preventing ambiguity. We observed
earlier that verbal disputes often arise due to use of ambiguous and excessively vague words and
phrases. Such disputes can be avoided if we agree on the definition of the key terms in our
arguments. Definitions thus help us in correcting mistakes in our reasoning by eliminating ambiguity.
The term to be defined is called the definiendum. The word or words used to state the
meaning of the term defined is called the definiens. In other words, the term sought to be defined
is the definiendum and the expression supplying the definition is the definiens. Consider the definition
of ‘triangle’.
In this definition the term ‘triangle’ is the definiedum and ‘a plane figure enclosed by
three straight lines’ is the definiens. The definiedum and the definiens are said to have the same
meaning. Both are claimed to be synonymous expressions and therefore one can be substituted
for the other without any loss of meaning.
be used it is called stipulative definition. A reportive definition of a term reports the way in
which the term is already used. It tells us how a term is actually used by the native speakers of the
language. Such a definition reports the conventional meaning of a term. It reports the long-
established usage of a term. Reportive definitions can be true or false, depending upon the accuracy
with which it captures the actual usage of the term. Reportive definitions help to eliminate ambiguity.
Reportive definitions also help us to increase our vocabulary by learning the meaning of new
symbols by the help of symbols we already understand. Most dictionary definitions are examples
of reportive definitions. ‘A triangle is a plane figure enclosed by three straight lines’ is a reportive
definition. So also the definition of ‘unicorn’ as ‘a horse-like animal having a single straight horn
projecting from its forehead’ is a reportive definition.
connotation respectively. Keeping the distinction between denotation and connotation in mind,
we can now proceed to discuss the two ways a general term can be defined.
a. It is not always possible to name all the objects denoted by a word or expression.
General terms refer to infinite number of things. Terms like ‘numbers’ and ‘instants of
time’ refer to infinite series. Even terms such as ‘chairs’ and tables’ denote not only
chairs and tables now existing all over the world but also those which existed in the past
and those which would exist in the future. Even when an expression refers to a finite set
of things (such as ‘the colleges of Odisha in the year 2003’) it is either cumbersome or
inconvenient to name all of the things to which the expression refers in order to elucidate
the meaning of the expression.
b. Further, most terms do not have names for each and every individual they include within
their denotation. For example, all the individual tables that constitute the denotation of
the term ‘table’ do not have names. To provide a verbal denotative definition of ‘table’
would require providing a list containing the names of all the individual tables. This is an
48 + 2 LOGIC, Part-I
c. In view of these difficulties, one might suggest that although denotative definition by
complete enumeration is not possible, one may try instead to provide a denotative definition
by offering a few examples. In practice, we generally follow this procedure to elucidate
the meaning a term. This is a very useful method in practice. Citing of examples often
assist us to understand the meaning of a term. But the important question is: Can we
provide the definition of a term by this method?
d. There are some terms for which denotative definition is entirely impossible. The term
‘unicorn’ has an accepted meaning in our language. ‘Unicorns are fictitious’ and ‘There
are no unicorns in the world’ are meaningful statements. Thus we do use it to make
meaningful statements. Since there are no unicorns in the world, the term lacks any
denotation . So although the word ‘unicorn’ is meaningful we cannot indicate its meaning
by this method.
An ostensive definition is
(a) denotative, because the meaning is given by the set of individuals, objects, or events to
which the term or expression can be correctly applied;
(b) non-verbal, because the denotation of the term or expression is indicated non-linguisti-
cally (e.g., by pointing or displaying);
(c) explicit, because the meaning of the term or expression is given entirely by, and nothing
else but, the objects picked out by the act of ostension.
While ostensive definitions are often useful, they do not always work. Since ostensive
definitions are denotative definitions, they share the limitations characteristic of denotative
definitions. There are several other limitations of ostensive definitions as well. Firstly, while explaining
the meaning of a term to someone by pointing to it, the person’s attention might get directed to
the wrong object. Secondly, even if you succeed in identifying the right object by pointing to it,
there remains the possibility that some special feature of the thing will mistakenly get identified in
place of the thing itself. Thirdly, the objects to be ostensively defined are not always available.
For instance, you cannot ostensively define ‘ocean’ while in Koraput. Fourthly, the technique of
ostensive definition is not suitable for abstract terms such as numbers, the gross national product,
or the average worker.
In support of ostensive definitions it can be pointed out that there are cases where
denotative definition is the only way we can explain the meaning of a term. In any language there
are some words we first learn by pointing at examples to which the term applies. Sensation
words refer to relevant sense experiences. There is no other way to make their meaning clear.
definiendum, and the expression that states the definition is called the definiens. Thus, in the
above example, ‘triangle’ is the definiendum, while ‘a plane figure enclosed by three straight
lines’ is the definiens. The definiens and the definiendum are synonymous expressions and both
have the same meaning.
An effective and popular method of providing connotative definitions for general terms is
by stating their genus and differentia. Classical logicians have developed this method in great
detail. The basic procedure involved in providing this kind of definition is as follows: we begin by
identifying a wider class (the genus) of which the term is a subclass (species); then we specify the
distinctive features (the differentia) that set the members of this subclass apart from all the other
things belonging to other subclasses within that wider class. Our definition of ‘triangle’ stated
above followed this procedure. We first identified the wider class “enclosed plane figure” as the
genus to which all triangles belong and then we specified “bounded by three straight lines” as the
differentia that distinguishes the subclass triangles from other closed plane figures like circles,
rectangles, pentagons etc. Similarly, the term ‘human being’ can be defined as ‘rational animal’
by this method. Human beings belong to a wider class of animals, but are different from other
animals by virtue of their rationality. The term ‘animal’ is the genus of the term ‘human’ and
‘rational’ is the differentia that distinguishes members of the human species from the members of
other coordinate species belonging to the genus ‘animal’. It can be noticed that the terms ‘genus’
and ‘species’ are relative terms. A term can be a genus in relation to its subclasses, but a species
in relation to another wider class. Thus the class of animals is a genus relative to its subclass
humans, but it is a species in relation to the larger class of living things that includes plants as well.
This method of defining terms by stating their genus and differentia has certain limitations.
Words signifying elementary qualities like ‘red’, ‘blue’ etc. cannot be defined by this genus and
differentia method, because these qualities cannot be analysed further into anything simpler. The
sensed qualities like ‘red’ and ‘blue’ are identified in our experience and the difference among
these qualities is also learnt in experience. Since we do not normally know how to express the
difference one shade of colour from another, we cannot define these terms by this genus-differentia
method. There are unique particulars like ‘space’ and ‘time’ which cannot be brought under any
DEFINITION AND MEANING 51
class. So, definition by genus and differentia is not possible in such cases. Further, a universal
class which constitutes the highest class cannot be defined by this method. A universal class
which is all inclusive would be the summum genus or the highest genus. Terms connoting universal
attributes like ‘being’, ‘existent’ etc. and words standing for ultimate metaphysical categories like
‘substance’, attribute, etc. cannot be defined by this method, since these are supposed to designate
highest classes and therefore cannot be brought under any higher class.
There are five rules by means of which we can evaluate the success of connotative
definitions by genus and differentia:
1. A definition should state the entire connotation of the term, neither less nor more.
The entire connotation of the term is given by stating the genus and the differntia of the
term. If more than the logical connotation is stated, it becomes over complete definition.
If less than the entire connotation is stated, it becomes an incomplete definition. For
example, the definition of human beings as language-speaking rational animals states
more than the connotation. If we define human beings as rational, it would be a case of
incomplete definition. Thus when definition states more than the exact connotation there
arises the fallacy of overcomplete definition and when definition states less than the entire
connotation there arises the fallacy of incomplete definition.
Further, the connotation of a term consists of the essential attributes of the class.
The definition should focus on essential features shared by all and only the members of
the class. The things to which a term applies may share many distinctive properties. But
all these properties do not indicate the true nature of the term. The definition of “human
beings” as “featherless bipeds” is not a good definition even if it picks out the right
individuals. Simply by stating a property (that follows from the connotion) or stating an
accidental quality of the definiendum definition does not become sound. By stating an
additional quality above the connotation (the additional quality may be a property or an
accident) the definition becomes overcomplete. If simply a property or an accidental
52 + 2 LOGIC, Part-I
quality is stated without the connotation the definition becomes in complete. Over complete
or incomplete definition is fallacious in nature.
2. The denotation of the definiendum and the definiens should be identical. This rule
states that the definition of a term should capture the correct denotation of the term. A
good definition will apply exactly to the same things as the term being defined, no more
and no less. When this rule is violated we have a fallacy of either too broad or too
narrow definition. For instance, the definition of “bird” as “warm-blooded animal” will
be too broad, since it would include not only birds but also horses, cattle and dogs as
well. On the other hand, the definition of “bird” as “feathered egg-laying animal” will be
too narrow, since it would exclude male birds. So a good connotative definition must be
satisfied by all and only those things that are included in the denotation of the term they
define.
3. A definition should not be circular. A definition is circular if the definiendum turns up
in the definiens. A circular definition uses the term being defined as part of its own
definition. Since the purpose of a definition is to explain the meaning of a term or to make
its meaning clear, this purpose is defeated if the term is included in the definition. Someone
who does not understand the term will not be benefited by such a definition. “A cordless
phone is a telephone that has no cord”, “Man is human”, “Circles are circular in shape”
are examples of circular definition.
4. A definition should not be expressed in ambiguous, obscure, or figurative language.
While defining a term one should avoid figurative and obscure language. The aim of
definition is to explain the meaning of a term to someone who is unfamiliar with its proper
application. So the use of ambiguous, obscure, or figurative language will not help such
a person learn how to apply the term. Thus, “happiness is a warm puppy” is a good
poetic metaphor, but as a definition it will be useless. So too ambiguous definition, figurative
definition and obscure definition are fallacious. Scince is knowledge (ambiguous definition).
Childhood is the morning of life(figurative definition). Student is a perpendicular homo
sapion with neck-tie (obscure definition).
5. A definition should not be negative where it can be affirmative. A definition should
DEFINITION AND MEANING 53
state what a term means rather than what it does not mean. A good definition should use
positive designations whenever it is possible to do so. The difficulty with negative definition
is that there are too many things a term does not signify. For example, a table is not a
chair, not a sofa, not a bed, not a house and so on and so forth. Similarly defining
“triangle” as “a figure which is not a circle” is a negative definition. It is not possible to
explain the application of a term by identifying some of the things to which it does not
apply. In a few instances, however, this may be the only way to go. A proper definition of
the mathematical term “infinite” might well be negative. Terms having negative content,
such as ‘blind’ or ‘opaque’, are to be defined negatively. But in ordinary circumstances,
it is advisable to offer positive definitions.
SUMMARY
Disputes are of two types – verbal and genuine. Genuine disputes arise when there is a
disagreement in belief or disagreement in attitude. Disagreements in belief arise when parties in a
dispute have conflicting judgments about the same fact; disagreements in attitude arise when
parties in a dispute express different feelings or attitudes towards the same fact. Verbal disputes
are not due to any genuine disagreement but are due to the use of ambiguous or excessively
vague words. Such disputes can be avoided if one takes care to distinguish between the different
meanings of the key words and specify the sense in which one is using the words. Defining the
key terms in an argument is a very effective method of avoiding verbal disputes.
A definition states the meaning of a term. The word or phrase we seek to define is called
the definiendum and the group of words used to state the meaning is called the definiens. A
definition is either reportive or stipulative. A reportive definition of a term reports the meaning the
term already has, so it can be either correct or incorrect. A stipulative definition deliberately
assigns a new meaning to the term. It is a proposal or suggestion and not a report. So it is neither
true nor false. Corresponding to the two different kinds of meaning (denotation and connotation)
of terms, there can be denotative and connotative definitions of terms. Denotative definitions can
be either verbal or non-verbal (ostensive). There are several limitations of these different forms
of denotative definitions. A connotative definition of a general term states the common and essential
attributes shared by all members of the class. Definition by stating the genus and differentia is an
effective and popular method of providing connotative definition of a general term. In this form of
54 + 2 LOGIC, Part-I
definition we first name the genus or higher class of which the term defined is a species or
subclass, and then we name the differentia that distinguishes the members of that species from
members of all other species coming under that genus. There are five rules for connotative definition
or definition by differentia.
1. A definition should state the common and essential attributes of the class. That is it must
state the entire connotation of the term, neither more nor less.
2. A definition must capture the entire denotation of the term. It should be neither too broad
nor too narrow.
3. A definition must not be circular.
4. A definition should not be expressed in ambiguous, obscure, or figurative language.
5. A definition should not be negative where it can be affirmative.
***
MODEL QUESTIONS
1. A disagreement in attitude is a
a. verbal disagreement
b. disagreement in fact
c. genuine disagreement
d. fake disagreement
a. disagreement in attitude
b. agreement in attitude
c. verbal disagreement
d. verbal agreement
DEFINITION AND MEANING 55
3. “Human beings are rational animals.” In this definition the term “human beings”
is the
a. species.
b. difference.
c. definiendum
d. genus.
4. A mother holds her baby’s hand and pronounces the word “hand” in order to
teach the baby what the word “hand” means. This is an example of
a. ostensive definition.
b. connotative definition.
c. stipulative definition.
d. verbal definition.
5. “Living things” means plants and animals. This is an attempt to define “living
things” by citing its
a. extension.
b. synonym.
c. genus and difference.
d. none of the above.
6. “The term ‘months having less than 31 days’ refers to February, April, June,
September and November.” This is an instance of
a. circular definition.
b. connotative definition.
c. denotative definition.
d. explanation
7. A group of words used to define another word or phrase is called the
a. definiens.
b. definiendum.
c. genus
d. species
56 + 2 LOGIC, Part-I
3. Distinguish between denotative and connotative definitions. Explain the different forms
of denotative definitions.
4. State and explain the rules of definition by genus and differentia. Point out the limitations
of this kind of definitions.
5. What is an ostensive definition? Point out its usefulness and limitations.
6. Evaluate the following as definitions by genus and differentia.
***
CHAPTER- 4
CATEGORICAL PROPOSITION
convey any meaning. By rearranging the words in the above expression we can obtain the
expression such as “Ram is going” or “Is Ram going ?” These are grammatically correct sentences.
Grammatically, sentences are of different types namely, assertive or declarative sentence (e.g.
“The rose is red”); imperative sentence (e.g. “Do not tell a lie”); interrogative sentence (e.g. Has
the servant come back ?); optative sentence (e.g. “May you be happy”) and exclamatory sentence
(e.g. “What a beautiful scenery is this !”). A logician is not interested in all these types of sentences
because all these, except the declarative sentence, are not used to assert or deny anything.
Logicians are interested only in declarative sentences as they express propositions that are either
true or false. Intuitively we may say that what a declarative sentence states or expresses is a
proposition.
term refers to what we are talking about the subject. Diagrammatically, the subject, predicate
and copula of the given proposition “Crows are black” can be viewed as follows.
Though the proposition contains three elements (subject, predicate and copula) yet all
declarative sentences in our everyday use of language may not exhibit all these three elements.
For example, “Ram eats” expresses a proposition, where all these above three elements are not
explicitly stated. Hence we have to convert the proposition “Ram eats” in such a way (like
“Rama is a person who eats”) so that all these three items are specified explicitly. For this purpose,
it is convenient to identify the copula first. Then we can say what precedes the copula is the
subject term and what succeeds the copula is the predicate term. Thus it is necessary to reflect
on the nature of copula.
Of course, the copula of a proposition, being different from the subject as well as the
predicate, is expressed by the verb of the sentence. Thus, the verb takes the burden of expressing
the notion of copula. But in general, it cannot be said that the copula is just the verb of the
sentence. Because, there are sentences where the same word acts both as a verb as well as the
predicate. For example, consider the proposition ‘Ram eats’. Here ‘Ram’ is the subject but the
predicate of this sentence has merged with the copula in such a way that we cannot identify the
copula of the proposition. Thus, we have to be clear about the form of the verb expressing the
copula. On the other hand, if we allow the merger of the copula with the predicate, i.e. if we say
62 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
the word ‘eats’ in the proposition “Ram eats” is both the predicate and also the copula then we
are actually assigning a function to the copula for which it is not capable of. The verbs such as
‘laugh’, ‘walk’, ‘eat’, ‘drink’, ‘run’ etc describe some activity of the subject and thereby convey
some information about the subject. For this reason such verbs satisfy the definition of predicate
(predicate gives the information about the subject) but they cannot act as a copula. Because the
only function of the copula is to express the relation between subject and predicate, it should not
convey any information regarding the subject. So, the idea of merging the copula with the predicate
is inconsistent with the role of copula in a proposition. Thus, it is necessary to separate the copula
from the predicate and at the same time, the copula should be capable of expressing the relation
between subject and predicate in a proposition. To achieve this purpose, the verb ‘to be’ alone
is capable. Therefore, the copula of a proposition must be expressed by the verb ‘to be’. Further,
there can be questions with respect to the tense of the copula. What would be the tense of the
copula? Regarding this, it may be said that the copula must be always in present tense because of
the following reason. As we know, the copula unites (or expresses the relation between) subject
and predicate. The copula, being the particle to express a relation between subject and predicate
term in a proposition, must be in the present tense. Otherwise, it is impossible to assert the
existence of a relation between subject and predicate. Because, for any subject term ‘S’ and any
predicate term ‘P’, if S was P (i.e. assuming the copula in past tense), one has to presuppose that
‘S’ and ‘P’ were related in past but at present the relation between them may be absent. Hence,
the copula cannot be in past tense. By use of an analogous reasoning, it can also be shown that
copula cannot be in future tense. So, the copula must be in present tense, otherwise the assertion
or denial of a relation would be impossible. Thus, the copula of a proposition admits the present
tense of the verb ‘to be’.
As to the second question (should the sign of denial be attach to the copula?) our answer
would be “yes”. The sign of negation will be a part of the copula. The reasons for this are as
follows. Given any proposition, either the predicate is affirmed of the subject (as in case of “Ram
is honest”) or it is denied of the subject (as in case of “Ram is not honest”). The former yields an
affirmative proposition, whereas the latter yields a negative proposition. In case of a negative
CATEGORICAL PROPOSITION 63
proposition our problem is to decide whether we should attach the sign of negation to the copula
or to the predicate. For example, how are we to form the negation of the proposition ‘Ram is
honest’? Should we say “Ram is not honest” or “Ram is not-honest”? If we say the particle ‘not’
should be attached to the predicate and not to the copula then we are presupposing that copula
must always be in affirmative. This means there can’t be any negative relation possible between
the subject and predicate. In other words, there cannot be any negative proposition to be found
in our language. This implies that all propositions are affirmative. This is clearly false. Hence, by
attaching the sign of negation to the copula, we are accepting the existence of negative relation.
Further, copula only being a particle for expressing the relation between subject and predicate
term of a proposition, should express both affirmative and negative relation. For this, the sign of
negation should be attached to the copula. Moreover, if we allow that the sign of negation to be
attached to the predicate and not to the copula then we are really allowing the predicate to
express the negative relation for which predicates are unfit.
From these considerations we follow the convention that the copula will admit only present
tense of the verb ‘to be’ and the sign of negation will be attached to the copula and not to the
predicate. Hence, the form of the copula would be either ‘am’ or ‘am not’, ‘is’ or ‘is not’, or
‘are’ or ‘are not’ and nothing else.
4.3 Classifications of Propositions :
We have already discussed the notion of proposition as a relation between subject and
predicate terms. Now we may proceed to discuss the classification of propositions. Propositions
may be classified into various classes according to different principles, such as the principles of
composition, relation, quality, quantity, modality, significance etc. But for our purpose it suffices
to consider the classification of propositions according to relation, significance, quality, quantity
and both quality and quantity.
(a) Classification of propositions according to relation : According to relation,
propositions are of two types namely (i) categorical and (ii) conditional. This distinction depends
on the nature of the relation between subject and predicate of the proposition. A proposition is
64 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
called categorical if the relation between subject and predicate of the propostition is either
affirmed or denied without any condition or restriction. In other words, a categorical proposition
is one in which the predicate is either affirmed or denied of the subject unconditionally. For
example, “All men are mortal”, “Some men are rich”, “Gopal is the author of many books” are
propositions in which the predicate is affirmed of the subject without any condition. So, they are
all categorical propositions. Similarly, “No man is perfect”, Some men are not rich”, “Gopal is
not the son of Ram” are propositions in which the predicate is denied of the subject without any
condition. Hence, they too are categorical propositions.
On the other hand, in case of conditional propositions, the relation between subject and
pedicate holds conditionally. It is of three types, namely (i) Hypothetical, (ii) Alternative and (iii)
Disjunctive. A hypothetical proposition is a conditional proposition, having the form “if P then Q”,
where “P” and “Q” stand for any propositions. In this case, the “if-clause” and “then-clause” of
the proposition are respectively called antecedent and consequent. The antecedent (or the if-
clause) always states the condition for asserting the consequent (or the then-clause), For example,
“I shall go if he comes”, here “he comes” is the antecedent and ‘I shall go’ is the consequent of
the above proposition. Moreover, since “my going” depends on “his coming”, “I shall go if he
comes” is a hypothetical proposition. The same is the case with the propositions “I shall not go to
the college if it is raining”. Here “my not going to the college” depends on “raining”. So “it is
raining” is the antecedent and “I shall not go to the college” is the consequent.
“Black cats are black” are examples of analytic proposition. The truth of such a proposition
depends on the meaning of the subject, predicate and copula present in the proposition.
Thus, to accept or reject such a proposition we don’t have to see how the things really are
in the world but only to know the meaning of the words and terms prsent in it. Thus to know
the truth of “All bachelors are unmarried”, we don’t have to look at the world to see whether
a bachelor is unmarried or not. If we know the meaning of terms (‘all’, ‘bachelor’, and
“unmarried”) and the copula (is) then we would be in a position to ascertain its truth.
On the contrary, a proposition is called synthetic (or real) if and only if its truth or
falsehood depends on facts. In case of synthetic proposition the subject and predicate terms
are non-equivalent in meaning. In such a case, the predicate states something new about the
subject in the sense that the predicate is not contained either implicitly or explicitly in the
subject. To know the truth of synthetic proposition say “It is raining”, “The grass is green”,
“All men are mortal”, we have to look at the world to see how the things really are. Without
looking at the world, we cannot either reject or accept the truth of a synthetic proposition.
An analytic proposition is necessarily true as it is independent of facts. The opposite
or negation of an analytical proposition is necessarily false as it is self-contradictory.
On the contrary a sythetic proposition is true or false as a matter of fact. The opposite
of a synthetic proposition is also a synthetic proposition. It may be false but never self-
contradictory.
(c) Classification of propositions according to quality : According to quality,
a proposition is either affirmative or negative. A proposition is called affirmative if and
only if the predicate is affirmed of the subject. For example, in the proposition “Ram is a
boy”, the predicate ‘a boy’ is affirmed of the subject “Ram”. A proposition is called
negative if and only if the predicate is denied of the subject. For example, in the proposition
“Ram is not rich” the predicate ‘rich’ is denied of the subject. In case of affirmative
proposition, the copula is affirmative whereas in negative propositions the copula carries
CATEGORICAL PROPOSITION 67
the sign of negation. But in case of universal negative propositions, the sign of negation is not
attached to the copula but to the subject. For example in “No man is perfect’ or ‘No S is P’,
the sign of negation is attached to the subject of the proposition. However, this is mere a
convention of English language. Note that the quality of the hypothetical proposition depends
on the quality of the consequent. For example, the negation of “If he comes, I shall go’
would be ‘If he comes, I shall not go’. Similarly the negation of ‘if A is B then C is D’ would
be ‘if A is B then C is not D. Briefly, we may say that if the consequent of a hypothetical
proposition is negative (or affirmative), the hypothetical proposition in question is negative (or
affirmative). To repeat, the quality of a hypothetical proposition depends on the quality of the
consequent.
examples of universal proposition where as “Some men are rich”, “Some men are not rich” are
examples of particular propositions.
Note that the classification of propositions that we have introduced so far is mutually
exclusive and taken it jointly are exhaustive. For example, the division of proposition according
to quality is either affirmative or negative. This division is mutually exclusive because it is impossible
to find a proposition, which is both affirmative as well as negative. In other words, if a proposition
is affirmative then it cannot be negative and vice versa. Similarly, this division is also exhaustive,
which means that there is no proposition which is neither affirmative nor negative. These two
conditions jointly say that any proposition must have exactly one quality i.e. either it is affirmative
or negative. The same is the case with other divisions of propositions like division according to
relation and division according to quantity.
According to quality
Proposition
Affirmative Negative
According to quantity
Proposition
Universal Particular
CATEGORICAL PROPOSITION 69
Proposition
Universal Particular
“Some men are rich” and “Some men are not rich” are examples of I and O-propositions
respectively. In the case of former the predicate term ‘rich’ is affirmed of a part of the denotation
of the subject, whereas in case of the latter the predicate term is denied of the part of the denotation
of subject. Hence, the former is particular affirmative and the latter is particular negative. The
structures of I and O-propositions respectively are “Some S is P” and ‘Some S is not P’, where
‘S’ and ‘P’ stand for subject and predicate terms. For our convenience we may summarise
above discussion in the following table.
Particular Negative O-proposition Some S is not P Some men are not rich.
Note that for Aristotle these four types of categorical propositions (such as A,E,I and O-
propositions) are called logical propositions because they exhibit two essential or unavoidable
features namely quality and quantity.
Further, a categorical proposition in which logicians are interested exhibits its logical
constituents explicitly. It states its quantity, quality, subject and predicate in an explicit manner.
These four constituents in a categorical proposition should be written in the following order.
quantifier, subject term, copula (exhibitting the quality of the proposition) and predicate term.
The cateogircal proposition where all these constituents are specified is called a logical
proposition. The general schema or the skeleton of a logical proposition is as follows :
Words such as “all” “none” and ‘some’ are quantifiers which express universality and
particularity. Here we may note that quantifiers are attached only to the subject of a categorical
proposition. Moreover, A, E, I and O-propositions are recognised as the most basic for Aristotle
CATEGORICAL PROPOSITION 71
because for him any proposition in our ordinary language may be reduced to either of these
above four forms without any change of meaning. Thus, our next section is devoted to deal with
the method of reduction of propositions into their logical or standard form.
Here the first item is the ‘quantifier’ (or more precisely the words expressing the quantity
of the proposition). It is attached to the subject term only. The second item in any logical
proposition is the subject term. The predicate term, that expresses something about the subject,
comes after the copula. The copula is placed in between the subject and predicate term.
Further, the quality of the proposition is expressed in and through the copula. The copula and
the predicate term are respectively the third and fourth logical elements of a categorical
proposition. Thus, a categorical proposition which is in standard form must exhibit explicitly
the subject, the predicate, the copula, its quality and quanitity. Let us call a categorical proposition
regular if it is in its standard form, otherwise it is called irregular. In our ordinary language most
of the categorical propositions are irregular in nature. Even though there are irregular categorical
propositions they can be put in their regular form. It should be noted that while reducing an
irregular categorical proposition into its standard form, we should pay enough attention to the
meaning of the proposition so that the reduced proposition is equivalent in meaning to its
irregular counterpart.
Before describing the method of reduction of irregular propositions into their regular
forms, it is profitable to understand the reasons for irregularity of a categorical proposition.
The irregularity of any categorical proposition may be due to one or more of these following
factors.
72 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
(i) The copula is not explicity stated, rather it is mixed with the main verb which forms the
part of the predicate
(ii) Though the logical ingredients of a categorical proposition are present in the sentence yet
are not arranged in their proper logical order.
(iii) The quantity of a categorical proposition is not expressed by a proper word like ‘all’,
‘no’ (or none), ‘some’ or it does not contain any word to indicate the quantity of the
proposition.
(iv) All exclusive, exceptive and interrogative propositions are clearly irregular.
(v) The quality of the proposition is not specified by attaching the sign of negation to the
copula.
Keeping these factors in mind, let us describe systematically the method of reduction of an
irregular categorical proposition into its standard form (or into a regular proposition). Below we
describe the method of reduction.
In our ordinary use of language, very often the copula, is not explicitly or separately
expressed but is mixed with the main verb. The main verb in such a case, forms the part
of the predicate. The moment copula is identified, the other items of a logical proposition
are brought out in a usual manner. We know that the copula of any logical proposition
must be in present tense of the verb “to be” with or without the sign of negation. Now let
us consider an example of an irregular proposition, where the copula is not explicitly
stated. “All sincere students deserve success”. This is an irregular proposition, as the
copula is clearly mixed with the main verb of the proposition. The method of reducing
such irregular sentences into regular ones is as follows. The subject and the quantifier of
the irregular proposition should remain as they are, while the rest of the proposition may
be converted to a class forming property (i.e. term) which would be our logical predicate.
CATEGORICAL PROPOSITION 73
In our above example ‘All’ is the quantifier attached to the subject ‘sincere students’.
We should not touch the quantifier nor the subject term of the proposition, they should
remain where they are. On the other hand, the rest of the proposition ‘deserve success’
should be converted into a class forming property ‘success deserving’. This should be
our logical predicate. Then we link the subject term with the predicate term with a standard
copula. Thus,
II. Irregular propositions where the usual logical ingredients are all present but are
not arranged in their logical order.
Consider the following examples of irregular propositions. “All is well that ends
well” and “Ladies are all affectionate.” In these cases, first we have to locate the subject
term and then rearrange the words occurring in the proposition to obtain the regular
categorical proposition. Such reductions are usually quite straightfoward. Thus we reduce
the above two examples as given below.
“All things that end well are things that are well.” A - proposition
III Statements in which the quantity is not expressed by proper quantity words. Some
propositions do not contain word like ‘All’, ‘No’, ‘Some’ or contain no words to
indicate the quantity. We reduce such a type of irregular proposition into its logical form
as explained below.
Here we have to consider two sub-cases : sub-case (i) where there is indication of
quantity but no proper quantity words like ‘All’, ‘No’, or ‘Some’ are used and Sub-case
(ii) where the irregular proposition contains no word to indicate its quantity.
Sub-case (i) : Affirmative sentences that begin with words like ‘every’, ‘any’, ‘each’ are
to be treated as A-propositions, where such words are to be replaced by the word “all”
and rest of the proposition remains as it is or may be modified as necessary. The followings
are some of the examples of this type.
A negative sentence that begins with a word like ‘every’, ‘any’, ‘each’, or ‘all’ is to be
treated as an O-proposition. Any such proposition may be reduced to its logical form as
shown below.
“Sentences with singular term or definite singular term without the sign of negation are to
be treated as A-proposition. For example, “Ram is mortal.”, “The oldest university of
Orissa is in Bhubaneswar.” are A-propositions.
Here the predicate is affirmed of the whole of the subject term. On the other hand,
sentences with singular term or definite singular term with the a sign of negation are to be
treated as E-propositions. For example, “Ram is not a student” and “The tallest student
of the class is not a singer” are to be treated as E-propositions. These are cases where
the predicate is denied of the whole of the subject term.
IV “Sentences beginning with the words like ‘no’, ‘never’, ‘none’ are to be treated as
E-propositions. The following sentence is an example of this type.
V Affirmative sentences with words, like ‘a few’, ‘certain’, ‘most’, ‘many’ are to be
treated as I-propositions, while negative sentences with these words are to be treated
as O-propositions. Since the word ‘few’ has a negative sense, an affirmative sentence
beginning with the word ‘few’ is negative in quality. A negative sentence beginning with
the word ‘few’ is affirmative in quality because it involves a double negation that amounts
to affirmation. The following are examples of above type.
VI Any statement whose subject is qualified with words like ‘only’, ‘alone’, ‘none
but’, or ‘no one else but’ is called an exclusive proposition. This is so called because
the term qualified by any such word applies exclusively to the other term. In such cases
the quantity of the proposition is not explicitly stated. The propositions beginning with
words like ‘only’, ‘alone’, ‘none but’ etc are to be reduced to their logical form by the
following procedure. First interchange the subject and the predicate, and then replace
the words like ‘only’, ‘alone’ etc with ‘all’. For example,
VII Propositions in which the predicate is affirmed or denied of the whole subject with
some exception is called an exceptive proposition. An exceptive proposition may be
CATEGORICAL PROPOSITION 77
VIII. There are impersonal propositions where the quantity is not specified. Consider for
example, “It is cold”, “It is ten O’clock”. In such cases propositions in question are to be reduced
to A-proposition because the subject in each of these cases is a definite description.
There are some propositions where the quantity is not specified. In such cases we have
to examine the context of its use to decide the quantity. For example, consider following sentences
(1) “Dogs are carnivorous”, (2) “Men are mortal”, (3) “Students are present.” In first two
examples, the quantity has to be universal but in the third case, it is particular. Thus, their reduction
into logical form are as follows.
“Dogs are carnivorous.” Irregular proposition.
“All dogs are carnivorous.” A - proposition.
This is so because we know that “being carnivorous’ is true of all dogs.
78 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
Here ‘being mortal’ is generally true of men. But in the proposition “Students are present”,
we mean to assert that some students are present”. So the proposition “Men are mortal” is
reduced to “All men are mortal” But in the example “Students are present”, ‘being present’ is not
generally true of all students. So the proposition “Students are present” is reduced to “Some
students are present” which is an I-proposition. Thus the context of use of a proposition determines
the nature of the proposition.
IX Problematic propositions are particular in meaning. For example “The poor may be
happy” should be treated as a particular proposition, because what such a proposition
asserts is that it is sometimes true and sometimes false. Thus, “The poor may be happy”
is reduced to “Some poor people are happy”, which is an I-proposition
X Similarly, there are propositions where the quantity is not specified but their
predicates are qualified by the words like ‘hardly’, ‘scarcely’, ‘seldom’. Such
propositions should be treated as particular negative. For example, “Businessmen are
seldom honest”, is an irregular proposition. It is reduced to “Some businessmen are not
honest”. If such a proposition contains the sign of negation, that these proposition is to
be treated as an I-proposition. For example, “Businessmen are not seldom honest.” is to
be reduced to “Some businessmen are honest”, which is an I - proposition. This is so
because it involves a double negation which is equivalent to affirmation.
We have already discussed that there are four types of propositions, namely (i) Universal
affirmative (or A-proposition) (ii) Universal negative (or E-proposition), (iii) Particular affirmative
CATEGORICAL PROPOSITION 79
(or I-proposition) and (iv) Particular negative (or O-proposition). Only these types of propositions
can occur in any logical argument. Of course, each proposition, in addition to quantifier and
copula, must have a subject term and a predicate term. Now we wish to explain a crucial notion
viz. ‘distribution of terms’ in a logical proposition, that plays an important role in developing rules
for deductive arguments.
In categorical proposition, terms designate classes of objects. In other words, the subject
and predicate terms in a categorical proposition designate classes of objects, and the categorical
proposition may be regarded as about these classes. For example, the proposition “All men are
mortal” is about the class of men and the class of mortal beings. More over, it is about all men
since we are talking about all the members of the class designated by the term, ‘men’. On the
other hand, in asserting the proposition “All men are mortal”, we are not asserting or talking
about all the members of the class designated by the predicate term ‘mortal’. Hence, only a part
of the class of objects designated by the term ‘mortal’ is being considered. So, in any categorical
proposition we may refer to either all or some members of a class designated by a term. To
express this insight, Aristotle introduces a technical term called ‘distribution’. A term is said to be
distributed in a proposition if and only if it refers to the whole of the class designated by the term.
Otherwise, the term is called undistributed. If a term refers to a part of the class designated by the
term, it is called undistributed. Alternatively, we may say that if a term refers to the entire denotation
of a term (or refers to all the members of the class designated by the term) either affirmatively or
negatively, then the term in question is distributed. On the other hand, if only a part of a denotation
is being referred to by the term then it is called undistributed.
Let us examine which term is distributed in which type of proposition. As we know, there
are four types of categorical proposition namely A, E, I and O-propositions. For convenience,
let us state the logical form or the structure along with a concrete example of each of the four
types of proposition in a tabular form.
80 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
E No S is P No man is perfect
Here the variables S and P are called term variables (i.e. the terms are only to be
substituted for S and P). More precisely, ‘S’ and ‘P’ stand for subject and predicate terms
respectively.
A-Proposition (All S is P)
E-Proposition ( No S is P)
whole of P negatively. Hence, both S and P in an E-proposition are distributed. Thus, both the
subject and the predicate terms of an E-proposition are distributed.
I-Proposition (Some S is P)
Now we may summarise our above discussion on distribution in a tabular from as given
below.
Distribution of Terms
From this table we may note the following facts with respect to distribution of terms in
standard categorical proposition.
(i) In universal proposition, the subject term is distributed whereas in particular proposition
subject term is undistributed.
(ii). In negative proposition the predicate term is distributed while in an affirmative proposition
the predicate term remains undistributed.
(i) Independence
Let P and Q be any two propositions such that neither the truth or falsity of P implies the
truth or falsity of Q nor the truth or falsity of Q implies the truth or falsity of P. Then P and Q are
called independent. The relation in this case is called independence. For example, “All men are
mortal’ and “All horses are animal” are clearly independent propositions as any one of them does
not imply the other. From the truth or falsity of one, the truth or falsity of the other cannot be
inferred. We may note that in a valid deductive argument the conclusion cannot be independent
of the premise or premises.
(ii) Equivalence
Two propositions. P and Q are equivalent when they are so related that if P is true
then Q is true and if Q is true then P is true; and if P is false, Q is false and if Q is false the P
is false.If P and Q are equivalent propositions then it is impossible for P to be true and Q to
be false or Q to be true and P to be false. For example, “No men are perfect” and “No
perfect beings are men” are clearly equivalent to each other. The relation is called the relation
of equivalence.
CATEGORICAL PROPOSITION 83
(iii) Contradictory
Two propositions are contradictorily related if the truth of one implies the falsity of the
other and the falsity of one implies the truth of the other. In other words, P and Q are contradictorily
related if and only if (i) the truth of P imlies the falsity of Q and conversely and (ii) the falsity of P
implies the truth of Q and conversely. Thus two contradictorily related propositions can neither
be true together nor they can be false together. For example, “He is alive” and “He is not alive.”
are contradictorily related. A proposition and its negation are contradictorily related.”All Indians
are poor”.and “Some Indians are not poor”. are contradictory to each other. So too “No teacher
is rich”. and “Some teachers are rich”. are contradictory to each other.
(iv) Contrary relation (or contrariety)
Two propositions are contrarily related if the truth of one implies the falsity of the other
but the falsity of one does not imply the truth of the other. Here both the propositions can be
simultaneously false but they cannot be simultaneously true. ‘All S is P’ and ‘No S is P’ are
contraries. Thus A and E-propositions with the same subject and same predicate are contrarily
related. Here from the falsity of one we cannot derive the truth or falsity of the other.
(v) Sub-contrary relation (or Sub-Contrariety)
Two propositions are sub-contrarily related if and only if the falsity of any one of them
imlies the truth of the other but not conversely. Here both the propositions can be true together
but they cannot be simultaneously false. For example, “Some men are rich” and “Some men are
not rich” can be simultaneously true but they cannot be simultaneously false. The falsity of one
implies the truth of the other. Note that in case of contrary relation the truth of any one of the
propositions implies the falsity of the other where as in case of sub-contrartry relation the falsity
of any one of the propositions implies the truth of the other. Further, for any proposition P and Q
if P is contrarily related to Q then from the falisty of P or Q nothing can be infered with respect to
the truth or falsity of the other.
(vi) Superalternation
Two propositions P and Q may be related in such a manner, that if P is true then Q is true
but P is false then Q remains undecided. Then this relation is called super-alternation and P is
84 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
superaltern to Q. This relation holds between A and I proposition and E and O proposition with
the same subject and same predicate.
(vii) Subalternation
Two propositions P and Q may be related in such a manner that if Q is false then P is
false, but if Q is true then P remains undecided. This relation is called subalternation. Here Q is
called subaltern to P. This relation holds between I and A proposition and also between O and E
proposition with the same subject and same predicate. Here I-proposition is called subaltern to
A-proposition and similarly, O-proposition in the subaltern to E-proposition.
To obtain all types of oppositions, let us draw a square representing all the four types of
propositions namely A, E, I and O. This is called the square of opposition of propositions.
Contrary
“All S is P” A E “No S is P”
Co
ntr
Sub - alternation
Sub - alternation
ad es
ic
ct ori
di t
n tra orie
Co s
I O
“Some S is P” Sub-contrary “Some S is not P”
Here, our representation of propositions by use of a square is such that the upper two
tips of the square represent the two universal propositions ‘A’ and ‘E’, while two lower tips of
the square represent the two particular propositions ‘I’ and ‘O’. Further, two affirmative
propositions would be on one side of the square (in the present case they occupy the left side of
the square) and other two negative propositions are on the right side of square. As it is shown by
use of the square, there can be four types of oppositions of propositions namely (I) Contradictory,
(ii) Contrary, (iii) Sub contrary and sub alternation. Let us discuss each of these.
i) Contradictory Opposition
This kind of opposition obtains between two propositions having the same subject and
same predicate but differing both in quality as well as in quantity. Thus, the pair, A and O are
contradictorily related. Similarly, E and I are also contradictraily related. Note that A and O-
propositions and so also E and I propositions are different from each other with respect to both
quality and quantity. A and O-propositions are qualitatively different because A-proposition is
affirmative and O-proposition is negative. They are also quantitatively different as A-proposition
is universal and O-proposition is particular. Hence, if one is true then the other must be false and
also coversely. This means that they cannot be true together nor false together. For example, “All
judges are lawyers” and “Some judges are not lawyers” cannot both be true together and they
cannot be false together. If one is true then the other must be false and vice versa. Thus we derive
the following logical principle from the denial of an A-proposition. The denial of an A-proposition
yields an O-proposition with the same subject and predicate. For example. “It is false that all S
is P” will be equivalent to “Some S is not P”. Similarly, the denial of an O-proposition yields an
A-proposition. For example, “It is false that some S is not P” will be equivalent to “All S is P”.
Similar remarks can also be made with regard to the relation between E and I propositions
having the same subject and predicate which are also contradictorily related.
Contrary opposition is a kind of opposition that holds between two universal propositions
86 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
having the same subject and same predicate but differing only in quality. Thus, A and E-
propositions are contrarily related. Here, the truth of A-proposition implies the falsity of E-
proposition and the truth of an E-proposition imlies the falsity of an A-proposition. But from
the falsity of either one, nothing about the other can be inferred. The truth of either one implies
the falsity of the other. This means in case of contrary opposition, both cannot be true together
but can be false together. For example, “All poets are emotional” and “No poets are emotional”
are contrarily related. Beacuse the truth of “No poets are emotional” implies the falsity of “All
poets are emotional” i.e. the truth of either one implies the falsity of the other. But, if one is
false, the truth value of the other remains undecided. Thus we have the logical principle namely
“the truth of A-proposition implies the falsity of E-proposition but not vice versa, and similarly
the truth of E-proposition implies the falsity of A-proposition but not vice versa. (of course in
both the cases the subject and the predicate remains the same).Thus we see that A and E-
propositions are contraries that can be false together but they cannot be true together.
Sub-Contrary Opposition
Sub-Alternation Opposition
holds between a universal proposition and its corresponding particular proposition. This opposition
obtains between A and I-propositions as well as between E and O-propositions. In other words,
the opposition between a universal proposition and its corresponding particular proposition is
called sub-alternation. Technically speaking the universal proposition is called super-altern and
the corresponding particular proposition is called subaltern. In this case, we say that (I) from the
truth of super-altern, the truth of subaltern follows but not vice versa. Hence, the logical principle
with respect to subalternation is (i) the truth of A-proposition implies the truth of I-proposition but
not vice versa and (ii) Similarly the truth of E-proposition implies the truth of O-proposition but not
vice-versa.
88 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
SUMMARY
A categorical proposition expresses a relationship between two categories or classes
of things. It consists of a subject term and a predicate term joined together by a copula.
According to quantity a categorical proposition is either universal or particular. According
to quality a categorical proposition is either affirmative or negative. By combining these two
principles of division we have a four fold classification of categorical propositions. These
are universal affirmative (All S is P), universal negative (No S is P), particular affirmative
(Some S is P), and particular negative (Some S is not P). These four types of propositions
are named as A, E, I, and O respectively.
A term is either distributed or not distributed in a proposition. When we refer to all
the members of the class designated by a term, the term is said to be distributed. When we
say a term is undistributed, we mean that we are referring to some of the members of the
class designated by that term. Distribution of a subject term depends on quantity. The subject
term of a universal proposition is always distributed and the subject term of a particular
proposition is always undistributed. Distribution of a predicate term depends on quality. The
predicate term of an affirmative proposition is undistributed. The predicate term of a negative
proposition is always distributed.
Two propositions having the same subject and predicate terms may differ from each
other in quantity or in quality or in both. This differing relation between propositions, having the
same subject and predicate, is called the opposition of propositions. There are five kinds of
oppositions. These are contradictory, contrary, subcontrary, subaltern and superaltern relations.
These relations are represented by a diagram, called the “Square of Opposition”. Certain important
truth relations hold between propositions having any of the relations of opposition.
Modern logicians point out that only particular propositions I and O have existential
import. It has been argued that universal propositions A and E have no existential import. The
consequence of denying existential import to universal proposition is that the traditional square of
opposition of proposition cannot in general hold good.
The four types of categorical proposition A, E, I and O can be diagrammatically
represented by drawing overlapping circles inside a rectangle by shading or putting ‘X’ in
appropriate regions within the circles.
CATEGORICAL PROPOSITION 89
MODEL QUESTIONS
I. Answer the questions by choosing the option you think to be most appropriate.
1. “No officer who takes bribe is a respectable person.” This is a
a) universal affirmative proposition.
b) particular affirmative proposition.
c) universal negative proposition.
d) particular negative proposition.
2. “Some teachers are honest.” The quality of this proposition is
a) Negative.
b) Affirmative.
c) Particular.
d) Universal.
3. “Some students are hard working.” The quantity of this proposition is
a) Negative.
b) Affirmative.
c) Particular.
d) Universal.
4. “All teachers of logic are teachers of philosophy.” In this proposition
a) the subject term is distributed
b) the predicate term is distributed
c) both the subject and predicate are distributed.
d) neither the subject term nor the predicate term is distributed.
5. “No motorcycles are cheap vehicles” and “Some motorcycles are cheap
vehicles.” These two propositions are
a) subcontraries.
b) contradictories.
c) contraries.
d) none of the above.
90 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
7. The two propositions “Some motorcycles are expensive” and “Some motorcycles
are not expensive” are
a) contraries.
b) subcontraries.
c) equivalent.
d) contradictory.
VI. (a) Given that A is true, what can be logically inferred regarding the truth or falsehood of its
corresponding E, I, and O propositions?
(b) Given that A is false, what can be logically inferred regarding the truth or falsehood of its
corresponding E, I, and O propositions?
(c) Given that E is true, what can be logically inferred regarding the truth or falsehood of its
corresponding A, I, and O propositions?
(d) Given that E is false, what can be logically inferred regarding the truth or falsehood of its
corresponding A, I, and O propositions?
(e) Given that I is true, what can be logically inferred regarding the truth or falsehood of its
corresponding A, E, and O propositions?
(f) Given that I is false, what can be logically inferred regarding the truth or falsehood of its
corresponding A, E, and O propositions?
(g) Given that O is true, what can be logically inferred regarding the truth or falsehood of its
corresponding A, E, and I propositions?
(h) Given that O is false, what can be logically inferred regarding the truth or falsehood of its
corresponding A, E, and I propositions?
Essay type questions :
1. Explain with examples the different parts of a categorical proposition.
2. Explain the four-fold classification of categorical propositions according to the mixed
principle of quantity and quality.
3. What is meant by distribution of terms? Explain when terms are distributed in a proposition.
4. Explain with diagram the meaning of the traditional Square of Opposition.
5. What is meant by opposition of propositions? Explain and illustrate different kinds of
94 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
opposition of propositions.
6. What is existential import? Do all propositions have existential import? Explain.
7. What is Venn diagram ? Explain how the different forms of categorical proposition can
be represented in Venn diagrams.
***
CHAPTER -5
NATURE, PROCEDURE AND PROBLEM OF INDUCTION
Man is inquisitive. He wants to understand the world around him. Man’s reflection on
life, nature and society has resulted in formation of ideas. This rational endeavour has indeed
helped for the growth of knowledge. This process is going on from the early phase of human
civilization to our age of technological sophistication. The knowledge that man acquires in an
age is handed down to the posterity. That becomes possible because man is capable to commu-
nicate through language. That is why what was composed thousands years back are even avail-
able to us now and we are able to read and understand the mind of the people living in that
remote past. Thus man’s rational capacity and the ability to speak language have helped him to
develop knowledge on very many fields.
Man is bestowed with sense organs and the intellectual capacity to comprehend the
environment around him. By sense experience man learns many things about the physical world.
By perceiving things, events and processes and mentally comprehending them he develops
systematic body of knowledge which is called science. Science is a systematic body of classified
empirical knowledge. Physics, chemistry, astronomy etc. are different branches of natural science.
As nature is vast and unlimited there are different specializations in the field of natural science.
Each branch of natural science studies and explores some invariant laws that operate in a particular
area of nature. Physics, for example, explores the fundamental relationships between matter and
energy, chemistry is concerned with the composition of substances and their reactions with one
96 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
another, astronomy studies the nature, position and motion of heavenly bodies, so on and so
forth. Of course there are many areas of natural science which are complementary to each other.
There is no watertight compartment between different areas of natural science, rather they
collectively make a system.
Man, too, we know, is a social being. Human society has passed through various
evolutionary changes. It has become stable in the long process of historical development. Man
has also become interested to study his society in a systematic way. Consequent upon this study
there are different branches of social science. Economics, political science, sociology etc. are
branches of social science trying to interpret and explain the different social aspects of human life
and behaviour. As there are different areas of social interaction, social sciences study them making
mutual specializations.
Natural science and social science constitute the realm of physical science. Unlike physical
science there is another branch of knowledge, which covers different areas of mathematics.
Mathematics is a formal science in which theorems are necessarily brought out from the axioms,
which are considered as self-evident. The relation between an axiom and its theorem or theorems
is only implication or necessitation at an abstract level. That is, the structural character of formal
science, say mathematics, is that of axiomatic deductive. Algebra, geometry, calculus etc. are
some of the major branches of mathematics.
All these areas of knowledge- physical science and formal science- are founded on
some methodological device. In each sphere of science some process of reasoning is applied to
obtain accurate knowledge. Our knowledge in these spheres- whether obtained directly, indirectly
or inferentially- assumes some process of reasoning. That is, any systematic or methodological
knowledge is bound to adopt some definite procedure and employ some reasoning. The process,
procedure or reasoning applied in a system of study ordinarily does not come within that system
to be investigated. There is another area to consider and examine the different procedures or
reasoning that is applied to have specialized knowledge of science. A physical scientist applies
some reasoning, methodology and procedure to build up his system or reach some generalizations.
NATURE, PROCEDURE AND PROBLEM OF INDUCTION 97
But he is not theoretically concerned with the methodology that he applies. This can be explained
by an analogical example. A common man communicates his ideas or feelings through the language
he has learnt. He makes intelligible communication by following the conventional rules of a language
that he has learnt. A lay man or even an illiterate person finds no difficulty to make intelligible
communication by following certain rules of grammar. For any intelligible linguistic communication
presupposes some rules of grammer. A linguist or grammarian, on the other hand, studies the
rules of grammar of a language at a theoretical plane which a common man presupposes or
applies in practice without being theoretically conscious of them. Somebody may be using some
rules without being conscious of them but they can be explained at a theoretical level. Similarly
the methodology or procedure that is used in different areas of science is not analytically elucidated
by the scientist. He has a practical understanding or implicit mastery of the procedure that is
necessary for his system of knowledge to be formulated. But such procedures and the process of
reasoning are analyzed and explained theoretically by a logician. A logician is not interested in
making empirical generalization nor does he investigate the cause of a phenomenon. Such enterprise
is carried out by a scientist dealing with empirical phenomena. But a logician on the other hand
investigates the valid forms of reasoning and the theoretical procedure underlying any valid
generalization. While exploring the valid forms of reasoning at a theoretical plane logic also studies
the auxiliary processes connected with reasoning. Logic, therefore, can be taken as a reflective
enquiry or in philosophical terms a second order activity. Its procedure is analytical or conceptual
but not empirical.
Not only in intellectual pursuit but even in practical life we draw conclusion and usually
make inference. Drawing conclusion, making inference, formulating arguments etc. are normal
rational activities of a person. In the morning after getting up if one finds the ground is wet, he
infers rain at night. On the road if we see a crowd and a vehicle lying we imagine an accident.
After seeing two bodies with some facial resemblance one assumes that they are brothers. In
such numerous occasions we very often make inference in practical life. But whether an inference
is sound, appropriate or not requires understanding of the rules of valid reasoning.
98 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
Thus, logic is primarily concerned with the valid forms of reasoning. It lays bare the
fundamental principles underlying the valid forms of arguments. In any branch of knowledge or
even in the practical commerce of life we make inference and present argument. We draw
conclusion on the basis of some evidence. When a conclusion is drawn form some evidence
there is an inference. An inference is a mental process and its manifestation in language is called
an argument. In other words when an inference is expressed in language it is called argument.
Logic as a system of study deals primarily with criteria for the evaluation of arguments with a
view to determining the conditions of their validity.
Classical logic centres round two areas such as Deductive Logic and Inductive Logic.
Deductive logic received a systematic elaboration in Aristotle (384-322 BC). Inductive logic on
the other hand had a late theoretical emergence. Although there were some scattered ideas about
induction in the writings of some ancient and medieval writers, Francis Bacon (1561-1626) gave
a systematic presentation of inductive logic. After Bacon there are a number of great thinkers
who have made significant contribution to inductive logic. Before going to discuss the nature,
problem and procedure of induction, a brief discussion on deductive logic i.e. the nature of
deduction will throw insight to understand the perspectives of induction and the nature of logic as
well.
NATURE OF DEDUCTION :
The structure of deductive arguments reveals that there is a necessary implication between
the premises and the conclusion. The conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. So the
reasoning here is conclusive. Further the conclusion cannot have more generality than the premises.
What is already assumed in the premise can only be brought out in the conclusion. As there is a
relation of formal entailment between the premise and the conclusion the conclusion cannot go
beyond the premise. Let us take two examples to explain it:
1. All teachers are literate.
Some literate people are teachers.
NATURE, PROCEDURE AND PROBLEM OF INDUCTION 99
The first argument comes under immediate inference and the second one under mediate
inference i.e. syllogism. In each case the conclusion necessarily follows from the respective premise
or premises. To accept the premise and deny the conclusion would land us in contradiction.
Further the conclusion in a deductive argument will always have equal or less generality than the
premise or premises from which it is derived. Again one important characteristic of deductive
reasoning is that the conclusion cannot have any novelty. It cannot give any new information that
is not inherent in the premise. Thus in a valid deductive argument the conclusion can never extend
our knowledge beyond the content of the premise. It only brings out or makes explicit what is
implicitly inherent in the premise.
In a valid deductive argument since the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises,
if the premises are true as a matter of fact, the conclusion must also be true. A false conclusion
cannot follow from true premises in a valid argument. But if the premises are false, the conclusion
will be false even if the argument is valid. Let us take an example-
All men are immortal.
All philosophers are men.
All philosophers are immortal.
Here no consistency is violated since the premises do necessarily imply the conclusion. It
is an argument in form of Barbara of the first figure. But here the conclusion is false as a matter of
fact. The falsity of the conclusion is due to the fact that the premise “All men are immortal” is false
as a matter of fact. So a conclusion can be false even in a valid argument if the premise is false.
Similarly in other cases the premises and the conclusion may be true. But the argument
may be invalid. Consider this example:-
All men are mortal.
All students are mortal.
100 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
In this argument the premises as well as the conclusion are ture as a matter of fact, but the
argument is invalid. It is invalid because the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the
premises for it involves the fallacy of undistributed middle. Thus truth and validity are different
concepts. A proposition is true or false depending upon the situation it describes. If it tallies with
the actual state of affairs, it is true otherwise it is not. But on the other hand an argument is valid
or invalid. An argument is valid if its conclusion is being justified by the premises. Validity, there-
fore, is a rule guiding concept. If some rules of reasoning are satisfied with regard to an argument
then the argument is valid. For there is complete justification or consistency between the pre-
mises and the conclusion. In an invalid argument the premises do not justify the conclusion. But it
should be noted that once an argument is valid and the premises are true the conclusion must be
true and can never be otherwise.
From this analysis it appears that in case of deductive reasoning the thrust is on formal
consistency. Logic is primarily concerned with the forms of valid arguments. Logic has explored
different forms of valid argumentation. Once a valid form is made explicit any subject matter filled
into it will make the argument a valid one. Since the content of the argument may be anything a
logician is not interested what the subject matter of an argument is. But on the contrary he is very
much concerned with the form of the argument. For example, consider these two instances:-
a. No P is M
All S is M
No S is P
b. If P, then Q
Not Q
Not P
NATURE, PROCEDURE AND PROBLEM OF INDUCTION 101
In the first example, (a), S, P and M stand for terms of a proposition and in (b), P and Q
stand for propositions. In (a) whatever term will be substituted uniformly in place of S, P and M,
will result in a valid argument. So too in (b) any proposition substituted in place of P and Q will
make a real valid argument. For these are valid forms of arguments. Once the forms of valid
argument are ascertained, any real argument can be symbolized into its formal structure. If the
formal structure is in accordance with valid reasoning, then the argument, irrespective of its
subject matter, will be treated as valid. Logic, therefore, is very much concerned with the forms
of validity like mathematics. Deductive logic and mathematics are thus considered as formal
sciences. A formal science has universal application. The procedure or reasoning in formal science
is based on self-consistency. In mathematics, particularly in Euclid’s geometry, the deductive
procedure is evident. From a limited axioms hundreds of theorems are brought out by applying
the deductive procedure. Great logicians and mathematicians have presented frameworks to
show that from a very limited axioms with the help of a few definitions and rules of syntax any
tautology, which is a necessarily true expression, can be derived. All these show that deductive
logic is primarily concerned with the forms of valid reasoning.
NATURE OF INDUCTION :
There are regularities in nature and discovery of them advances human knowledge. From
our varied experience when we notice some regularity and have explanation for it we make
generalisation. For example we find living beings die, birds lay eggs, iron rusts, water flows
downward, cats catch mice, matter gravitates etc. There are also irregularities in nature. We find
some boys are intelligent but some are not, some mangoes are sweet but some are not, some
birds sing but some do not, good harvest does not follow every year, etc. But science seeks
exceptionless regularities of nature. These are like invariable generalisations. Generalisations are
most significant in the sphere of human knowledge. For they are the very basis of all positive
sciences. Not only in science in our practical life generalisations are very much helpful without
which we cannot regulate our life.
102 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
When a generalisation is made it comes within the scope of induction. Inductive logic
examines the conditions for appropriate generalisation. Theoretically it explains the basis and
structure of a sound generalisation. By formulating the criteria for valid generalisation it distinguishes
sound generaalisation from the illicit ones.
Since every physical science makes empirical generalisation, a question may very well
be raised regarding the basis of such generalisation. It is found that our observation is the basis of
generalisation. From our experience we find that birds are not mammals but lay eggs. On the
basis of this regular experience we make the generalisation that all birds are non-mammals.
On the other hand we observe from nature that cows, dogs, cats - all quadruped animals -
are mammals. In case of such animals the female animal gives birth to babies and feeds them with
milk from her body. Here the premises are based on verifiable or observable instances and are
true. On the basis of particular experiences a generalization is made. Thus in induction there is
generalisation on the basis of actual observation of facts.
veracity of these generalisations. Thus in induction the conclusion is a real inference as on the
basis of our observation we pass to a general truth of similar cases. Here there is a leap and every
genuine form of induction carries a leap. A leap is a jump from the observed instances to
unobserved cases, from some to all or from known cases to unknown cases of unlimited totality.
This process of jumping from some to all, from limited cases to a generalised theory is said to be
the “inductive leap”. This characteristic of having a leap is an essential feature of inductive reasoning.
An inductive inference is worth the name by virtue of its having the inductive leap.
Any generalisation extends our knowledge, therefore induction has novelty. What we
observe and finally what we infer are factually significant. And what is factually significant must
have novelty. For it widens our knowledge and extends our information about the physical world.
Inductions are also very much essential for practical purpose of life. By induction we imagine the
104 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
Thus inductions are very useful from the scientific as well as practical point of view. There-
fore there must be a theoretical study to formulate rules and fix up some criteria for valid generalisation.
That is what is done in inductive logic. Inductive logic provides a criteriological basis to study the
different procedures of induction and examine the reasonableness of inductive generalisation.
We notice that deduction and induction are the two distinct processes of reasoning. Each
process of reasoning has its own distinctive features. The deductive process provides the theoretical
basis to know how arguments are valid or invalid. The inductive process formulates the basis for
generalsation and guards against illegitimate ones. For any wrong derivation or hasty generalisation
is a logical commission that makes thinking opaque. Deduction and induction as processes of
reasoning help know the rules and procedures of their respective mode and thus guard against
fallacious inferences. Now let us discuss their interrelationship, i.e. their similarities and differences.
When a conclusion necessarily follows from the premises and there is a relation of
implication between the premises and the conclusion, the reasoning is deductive. On the other
hand when the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises but is supported by
them the reasoning is inductive. That is, in case of induction even if all the accompanying evidences,
the premises, are true, there is no certainty that the conclusion will be true. But in deduction if the
argument is valid and the premises are true, the conclusion must be true.
From the above consideration it appears that induction and deduction are two forms of
reasoning. They are two different processes of inference. For deriving a conclusion from premises
these two processes are applied in different spheres. While mathematical discourses use the
deductive procedure all physical sciences mostly apply the inductive procedure. Since both of
them are the process of reasoning they do help to build up systems of knowledge. There is no
system of knowledge that can do away with any process of reasoning. Any intellectual pursuit or
106 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
system of thought takes the help of some form of reasoning to establish its conclusions. Induction
and deduction are the two most significant processes of reasoning which have been explored in
logic.
There are some deep-seated confusions with regard to the relation between induction
and deduction. We should guard these confusions to have a clear perception of their exact
relation or role. For the confusions not only mar their relation but also blur the role of induction or
deduction.
There is a view that one is prior to the other. John Stewart Mill, for example, takes
induction as prior to deduction. According to him in a deductive argument one premise must be
a general proposition. But to get a general or universal proposition we have to take the help of
induction. That is the general proposition of a deductive argument is obtained by induction, so
induction has priority over deduction. Contrary to Mill’s view Jevon holds that deduction is prior
to induction. For in induction though the conclusion is a general proposition it is suggested as an
insight on the basis of some observation. That is the general proposition is like a hypothesis which
we imagine on the experience of particular facts. The hypothesis to be accepted needs to be
verified deductively. Without verifying a hypothesis in a deductive manner it cannot be accepted
as a proper inductive generalisation. That is induction requires prior deduction for verification of
the hypothesis. Thus according to Jevon deduction is prior to induction.
But this way of expressing their relation is misleading as well as confusing. As they are
two processes of reasoning they are mutually dependent. As they are inferential procedures they
have some close link. But it is not correct to maintain that induction supplies a premise to deduction.
Deduction makes an assumption and brings out the conclusion that necessarily follows from it.
Deduction has nothing to account for the material truth of the conclusion or of the premise. So it
is not to be accepted that induction supplies a premise to deduction.
Similarly the view that deduction is prior to induction is not correct.At the stage of verification
for the confirmation of a hypothesis deduction is made. Deduction aims at formal consistency of an
NATURE, PROCEDURE AND PROBLEM OF INDUCTION 107
Again some deductive logicians consider deduction to be more fundamental than induction
whereas some inductive logicians treat induction to be more fundamental than deduction. Those
who accept the fundamentality of deduction hold that all arguments- including inductive ones-
are deductive in nature. Even inductive arguments can be expressed in deductive form. To say
“all dogs are mammals” is to make an inductive generalisation on the basis of observation of
facts. But deductive logicians like Aldrich and Whatley try to reduce the above inductive argument
to a form of deductive argument like-
The dogs observed and the dogs not observed are mammals.
But the idea of “all dogs” include the dogs that are either observed or not observed.
But this way of reducing an inductive argument to a form of deduction is wrong for what
is brought out as a proof in the conclusion is first presupposed in the premise. What is aimed to
be proved is at first assumed to be true. To assert that the dogs we have observed and the dogs
we have not observed are mammals is to make an inductive generalisation. That can be done
only if induction is accepted as a valid form of inference. Thus this attempt to reduce induction to
a form of deduction is not justified.
Similarly some inductive logicians like J.S. Mill and Bain accept the fundamentality of
induction over deduction. All arguments, they hold, are basically inductive for either they are
from particular facts to other particular facts or from particular cases to a general case. Further
for them deduction consists as a stage in every scientific generalisation. That is deduction only
applies a generalisation obtained by induction in individual cases. For the proof of an induction,
they maintain, deduction is required to apply a generalisation to some individual cases. The
generalisation “ all men are mortal” can be ascertained by applying it to individual persons. That
108 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
is deduction comes within the system of induction and therefore has a secondary importance.
But such a view is also not acceptable . It is not correct to say that all arguments are
primarily inductive nor is it a fact that induction includes deduction. Rather induction and deduction
are two fundamental and independent processes of reasoning having different spheres of application.
Deductive reasoning aims at formal certainty or consistency whereas inductive reasoning aims at
a true generalisation. Formal consistency has absolute certainty but no novelty, whereas a
generalisation has novelty but no absolute certainty. So these two forms of reasoning are distinct
from each other and it is not correct to reduce one to the other.
There are also misleading descriptions about deduction and induction. Some logicians
describe induction to be an ascending process and deduction as a descending process. Aristotle
held that induction is an ascending process for passing from particular cases to a general conclusion.
Bacon too takes deduction as a descending process for passing from a general case to particular
cases. Similar such expressions are used to characterise them or their relation. Sometimes it is
held that induction moves upwards whereas deduction proceeds downwards. Some again describe
them as reverse processes. For in deduction we proceed from general to particular but in induction
we proceed from particular to general . These descriptions are misleading as they are expressed
in ambiguous ways. Such descriptions in stead of making their characteristics clear rather blur
their essential nature.
as belonging to the same class. The generalisation in induction covers unlimited cases because of
its essential similarity with the observed instances. Thus similarity is the basis of both, and their
difference is only with respect to their starting points which is a superficial or marginal one.
Consequently deduction starts from a general premise and draws particular cases from it. Induction
on the other hand starts from the particular facts and establishes a general proposition. Thus
while deduction applies or interprets the law to the individual cases induction interprets the observed
instances by help of generalised principle or law. On the basis of this it is also maintained that
induction proceeds from facts to ideas and deduction proceeds in the reverse direction that is
from ideas to facts.
But this type of elucidation to marginalise their difference sometimes blurs their real
distinction. Even the real significance of induction or deduction as a process of reasoning is also
overshadowed by it. For instance it is not correct to say that induction always proceeds from
particular to the general. At the higher stage of inductive generalistion facts are not interpreted by
laws rather laws are brought under some higher law as is the case in non-instantial hypotheses.
We shall discuss this when we explain the idea of secondary induction. Similarly it is not correct
to say that deduction proceeds from idea to fact. For in deductive reasoning facts qua facts have
nothing to do with inference. It is very formalistic in its very approach. To assume a generalised
truth and to find out what it entails is the very task of a deductive inference. But in induction to
relate the observed facts to some empirical law or the laws to some higher law or theory is the
purpose of this inference. So deduction and induction are two significant modes of reasoning and
their difference should not be belittled in metaphorical or ambiguous elucidations.
The above discussion shows that induction as a process of reasoning mostly infers a
universal conclusion from particular instances based on observation of facts. We have already
mentioned that inductive logic acquired a systematic expression with Francis Bacon. Later logicians
also contributed significantly to it and discussed many allied and auxiliary topic associated with it.
Particularly systematic study on philosophy of science largely contributed to the sphere of inductive
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logic. In comparison with Deductive Logic Inductive Logic has a short history. But in spite of that
it has made a headway and has become a consistent system for a theoretical study.
Though the term ‘induction’ at present has acquired a difinite connotation it was not used
in a unitary sense in the past. Logicians and philosophers used the term in different meanings.
Aristotle first introduced the concept. In his use of the term, induction connotes two different
meanings. Scholastic logicians of the medieval period used induction in the Aristotlean sense and
as such did not make any new contribution over and above Aristotle. Bacon and Mill employed
the term to stand for some inferential procedure. They have made significant contribution in their
discussion on induction and its allied topics. Modern logicians and philosophers of science have embarked
upon induction and have thrown valuable insights. Thus in the course of the long period of reflection and
discussion induction has now acquired a definite connotation and a conceptual boundary.
Aristotle, as mentioned above, used induction for the first time. From his use two meanings
follow. In the first meaning, induction denotes a general principle that seems to be involved in a
particular case. That is induction is a process to establish a universal relation in any event that is
perceived. After perceiving two tables one of rectangular size and one of circular size we form
the general proposition that a circle is necessarily distinct from a rectangle. That is ‘induction’
used in this sense simply denotes a relation on the basis of perception.
Aristotle also used induction in a second sense. In this sense induction is the establishment
of a universal proposition on the basis of observation of all the instances covered by it. Here the
supposed universal proposition has a limited number of which each one has been separatrly
verified. Thus after exhaustive enumeration of all the cases there can be a summary of the facts
observed in form of a universal proposition. Statements like “all the planets of the sun have
gravitational power”, “all continents are inhabited by living beings” etc. are examples of induction.
Here the subject has limited number, each of which can separately be perceived. This notion of
induction of Aristotle has been characterised by later logicians as perfect induction or induction
by complete enumeration.
NATURE, PROCEDURE AND PROBLEM OF INDUCTION 111
Logicians in the medieval period did not make any new contribution to the idea of induction.
They used induction in the sense of complete enumeration as done by Aristotle in his second
sense. They thus used induction in the sense of enumeration. In this context there is reference to
the idea of perfect induction or imperfect induction. If all the instances or particulars coming
under the universal proposition are separately verified for making an induction, it is called perfect
induction. But the establishment of a universal proposition on observation of some instances is
called imperfect induction.
Then it was Francis Bacon(1561-1621) who made some significant contribution to the
idea of induction. He used induction in the sense of establishing a form or essence of the natural
things. By essence or form Bacon meant the invariable laws of nature. According to him by
induction the regularities or the invariable laws of Nature can be discovered. He maintained that
through observation and understanding of nature general laws can be arrived at. He emphasised
not to overlook the negative instances, if any, before making a generalisation. He also explained
the steps to be adhered to in the process of making a generalisation.
After Bacon, the next important name in the development of inductive logic is that of J.S.
Mill(1806-1873). Mill analysed the experimental methods. These methods are the methodological
procedures of induction that enable to explore that cause of any specified phenomenon. He also
emphasised on true generalisation. According to Mill a generalisation means asserting the fact
that what is true of some instances of a class under certain conditions is also true of all the
members of the class. That is what is true at certain times will be true at all times under similar
circumstances. Mill further holds that scientific induction is the best or ideal form of induction.
For scientific induction is founded on the veracity of a causal relation. If induction will be based
on uncontradictoriness of our experience i.e.on the basis of mere enumeration of facts, its result
would be only probable. But according to Mill scientific induction is founded on the basis of a
causal connection. A causal relation between two phenomena can be proved by the use of any of
the five experimental methods that he explored. Mill’s view is that the generalisation of the scientific
induction will be certain as a causal relation is proved there. Any induction founded on causal
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Most of these ideas have contributed to the development of the inductive system though
they have been largely modified or changed by modern logicians. There is a great deal of
advancement upon Aristotle’s view or of Bacon’s form. Induction is no more understood in the
sense of exhaustive enumeration nor is it restricted to the discovery of form as Aristotle and
Bacon hold respectively. Similarly Mill’s view of proving a causal connection has not been
accepted. Mill’s view that scientific induction is absolutely certain has been criticised. Modern
logicians hold that absolute certainty is not warranted in matters of empirical truth. Inductive
generalisations are not certain in the way mathematical or analytical expressions are certain.
What is true as a matter of fact can never have the certainty that is there in case of an analytic or
verbal proposition. An inductive generalisaion might have high degree of probability but cannot
have formal certainty.
Thus some of the views or ideas have been changed in the light of new insights or explorations.
That shows man’s intellectual creativity. Thus though most of the ideas of Aristotle, Bacon and Mill
have undergone modification, they are considered as great pioneers of Inductive Logic.
There are theories and laws in every branch of science. Every theory in physical science
is a generalisation. By observing events and processes theories are formulated for their explanation.
Observation of regularities in Nature also prompts to make generalisation. Generalisations like
water freezes at zero degree temperature, water expands when freezes, water splits into hydrogen
and oxygen etc. also require explanation by some theories or laws. Whether it is a theory or law,
it is basically a generalisation. Every significant generalisation in science possesses explanatory
power. All genralisations are obtained by induction. Looking at all the generalisations and their
explanatory power a distinction has been made between primary induction and secondary
induction. A primary induction is in the form- “ All the observed A’s are B’s; therefore all A’s are
B’s. That is on the basis of observation of a limited number of cases a generalisation is made
about all the cases. Here the conclusion is a general real proposition. In case of secondary
NATURE, PROCEDURE AND PROBLEM OF INDUCTION 113
induction certain theories are formulated but not on the basis of observation of particular facts.
Here there is systematisation of the theories by help of a higher theory. That is secondary induction
aims at explaining theories by systematising the existing theories or laws.
Let us analyse them in some detail and bring out their characteristics.
PRIMARY INDUCTION :
a). Primary induction depends upon observation of facts. At first a number of cases are
observed either from nature or under controlled conditions to establish a general proposition.
We observe instances of birds laying eggs, whales as mammals, iron wires conducting electricity
etc. On the basis of our experience of facts we make generalisition that “ all birds lay egg and are
not mammals”, “all whales are mammals” or “ iron is a conductor or electricity” etc. To reach
these genreralisations we have to depend on actual observation or experiment of facts.
b). The conclusion in primary induction is a general real proposition. A general proposition
covers cases of unlimited generality. The subject here denotes a class having innumerable number
of individuals. It represents a whole class. To say “all men are mortal” or “no cow is a biped” is
to refer to a class with unlimited individuals. Further a real proposition is one in which the predicate
gives some new information about the subject. Hence a real proposition is either true or false as
a matter of fact. But in a verbal proposition the predicate simply repeats either a part of the
meaning or the whole meaning of the subject. A bachelor is unmarried, a triangle is a three sided
plane figure, two and two equals four etc. are all verbal propositions .A verbal proposition is
necessarily true and its opposite is necessarily false and self contradictory. But the opposite of a
real proposition is a real proposition. The opposite of a real proposition may be false but never
self-contradictory. Thus a real proposition is completely different from a verbal proposition. The
conclusion in primary induction is always a real proposition.
c). Primary induction involves an inductive leap. When we say “All A’s are B’s” it indicates
that every A is B always and everywhere. Since the conclusion is a general real proposition of
unrestricted totality there is a genuine inference here. For we observe some cases of A being B
114 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
and on the basis of this experience when we assert that ‘all A’s are B’s’, it involves a leap. It is an
inference since we draw a conclusion on the basis of some observed facts. When we pass from
some cases to all cases, from present experience to a general theory it is said to be the inductive
leap. To pass from some to all, from observed to unobserved, from known to unknown is not
possible by any deduction, rather the reasoning here is inductive. So it is known as inductive
leap.
d). Primary induction is based upon resemblance of facts. Resemblance or similarity is the
very basis of an inductive inference. When we observe some instances for a generalisation, they
belong to a category or class. The unobserved individuals belong to the same class of observed
individuals. This jump from the known to the unknown covering a class of unlimited individuals is
on the basis of structural or fundamental similarity between the observed individuals and the
unobserved ones. Since we observe some whales to be mammals we generalise that all whales
are mammals for whales constitute a biological class having fundamental resemblance. So on the
basis of resemblance a generalisation is made. This is the very basis of induction according to
Mill. He maintains, “Induction, then is that operation of the mind, by which we infer that what we
know to be true in a particular case or cases will be true in all cases which resemble the former in
certain assignable respects.”
e). The conclusion established by induction is probable. In primary induction the conclusion
involves a leap. The very presence of an inductive leap renders the conclusion to be probable.
Since the conclusion here is a real proposition having factual import, it cannot be logically certain.
To say all men are moral or no bird is a mammal is to make an assertion of fact. Here even
though not a single contrary evidence is ever known and even if such generalisations are founded
on well-established theories of science, still they are not to be taken as anaytically true. The
degree of probability may be very high, but it is not logically certain. There cannot be logical
certainty in case of synthetic propositions, which describe empirical facts. Only an analytic or
verbal proposition can assume logical certainty. But a real proposition by definition lacks logical
certainty for its opposite is also a possibility in the empirical world. Since the conclusion established
NATURE, PROCEDURE AND PROBLEM OF INDUCTION 115
by primary induction is a real proposition it enjoys novelty but not logical certainty. It has novelty
for it is factually informative or descriptive. Where there lies novelty, there cannot have logical
certainty.
SECONDARY INDUCTION :
In some advanced sciences there is attempt to build some higher theories to systematize
the generalisations. No observation of facts is made for this. When a higher theory is imagined for
enhancing the explanatory power of some theories it is a case of secondary induction. For here
there is no observation of facts unlike that of primary induction to think of a hypothesis. The
hypothesis imagined in secondary induction will provide possible explanatory models to some
existing theories or laws of science. Since the hypothesis here has nothing to do with the cases of
factual instance, it is called non-instantial hypothesis. It is done in developed sciences. Thus when
there is induction of a non-instantial hypothesis to provide explanations to the theories of science,
it is called secondary induction. It is different from primary induction for unlike the latter it is not
making an induction on the basis of observation of facts. But the induction here aims at systematizing
the theories of science by some higher theory. Let us see what are the important characteristics of
secondary induction.
of evidences is also not that easy in non-instantial hypotheses for there is no instance exemplifying
it. So the method of deduction is applied here. From the non-instantial hypothesis laws of lower
or the lowest variety are drawn by help of deduction. They are tested by tallying them with facts.
This test is done under varying circumstances to provide a possible basis for the acceptance or
rejection of a non-instantial hypothesis.
d. The conclusion is probable in nature. All inductions, whether primary or secondary, are
probable. Since induction makes generalisition which ultimately relates to facts it cannot
possess logical certainty. A generalised theory or law admits innumerable instances which
can never be exhaustively verified. So all inductions are probable though the degree of
probability differs.
When a single contrary evidence is found or some discripancy is observed with regard to
any generalised theory or law it arouses suspicion and leads to imagine some new hypothesis.
Any theory or law, therefore, is subject to change or modification as there is no limit to scientific
discovery or innovation. Thus any hypothesis, whether instantial or non-instantial, is probable in
nature and that is an accompanying characteristic of any empirical generalisition.
Thus the distinction between primary induction and secondary induction throws insight
to describe the nature of induction. The descriptions of induction as given by Aristotle, scholastic
logicians, Bacon, Mill etc. are inadequate. That is because their descriptions do not cover all
aspects of the concept as it is understood in recent time. At present it is maintained that inductive
logic is basically concerned with the procedure and methodology of all sciences. It also discusses
other allied and auxulary issues associated with the procedure of science. An empirical science
aims at discovering exceptionless regularities- called theories or laws- and the systematization of
the laws by a coherent system or order. That is done by the help of the procedure of induction.
So let us turn to the issue of the procedure of induction.
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The different stages of inductive procedure are(i) observation of facts (ii) formation of
hypothesis, (iii) generalisation and (iv) verification. Let us explain these a little elaborately.
(i) Observation :
a. Definition- The observer first makes his point clear what he is gong to observe for his
purpose in a situation. Since nature appears very much complex and at times very baffling
the observer makes his selection of the phenomena that he will take note of for his work.
NATURE, PROCEDURE AND PROBLEM OF INDUCTION 119
This clarity and definiteness with which one begins his observation is called definition.
b. Analysis- The second step in observation is analysis of the situation. Since nature presents
complex situations, the observer simplifies it . He resolves a complex situation into its
constituent conditions. Then the observer selects those phenomena necessary for his
purpose and avoids other accidental factors. That is after breaking up a complex situation
the relevant conditions are picked up for the investigation. Since an event consists of
different conditions, or irrelevant factors selecting the relevant matters for study or
explanation is very important.
Thus all the above steps are considered important to undertake systematic observation
for an objective study of some circumstance. Francis Bacon lays great emphasis on observation.
instances is considered seriously to be the cause. Since nature is very complex it requires great
insight to imagine what might be the cause of a phenomenon. To find out the real explanation of
a phenomenon, we consider some possible situation. That is on the basis of our observation we
fix upon one condition to a possible explanation of the phenomenon. That is considered as a
hypothesis. To explain an event what seems to be the most probable explanation in the context is
provisionally admitted. This provisional supposition is put to test under varying circumstances in
a regulated way. In the process of test either the hypothesis is accepted or rejected on the basis
of its agreement or disagreement with the fact respectively. That is if further observation confirms
the hypothesis by supportive evidence then the hypothesis is corroborated. If it does not
corroborate the facts, then the hypothesis is rejected and a fresh one may be thought of. The
process goes on till a satisfactory explanation of the event or events is found out.
iii) Generalisation :
Mill has attached great importance to generalisation for he thinks that induction becomes
complete at the stage of generalisation. He maintains that the experimental methods conclusively
NATURE, PROCEDURE AND PROBLEM OF INDUCTION 121
establish a causal relation so the methods help for a generalisation. But inductive generalisations
can never have absolute certainty but can have high degree of probability. For the possibility of a
generalisation being false in face of new facts cannot be ruled out. But generalisation constitutes
one of the stages of inductive procedure.
iv. Verification :
When the hypothesis is generalised it requires verification to ascertain that the general
proposition is true under all similar circumstances. The verification of a general proposition makes
it a law. Verification means confirmation by appealing to facts. This is done either directly or
indirectly. Direct verification is done either by observation or by experiment. Indirect verification
is done either by deduction or by accumulation of evidences. In case of indirect verification
conclusions are drawn from the hypothesis and compared with real situations. Or else facts are
collected or accumulated and compared with the deductions from the hypothesis. Verification of
a general proposition involves some deduction. For here particular conclusions are drawn from
general proposition and compared with facts. When there is more and more confirmation of it,
there is more and more acceptance of the hypothesis. That is, adequate objective tests add to
the confirmation of the generalisation.
Jevon attaches great importance to verification in inductive procedure. For him it is the
most essential requirement to ascertain an induction because the facts must be in conformity with
the generalisation. Since it is done by deduction, Jevon, as already stated above, has attached
more fundamentally to deduction.
Apart from these well-defined stages of inductive procedure philosophy of science gives
importance to the idea of a system which can be taken as the next stage of inductive procedure.
That is in advanced branches of science any empirical generalisation must be in agreement with
the system of prevalent laws. All the generalisations must be making a coherent system and any
new discovery must be placed in the system in order of its generality. The idea of non-instantial
hypothesis of finding out higher and higher theories to explain different theories and laws-which
are also generalisations- is gradually becoming more important in advanced branches of science.
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The idea is that the empirical laws which explain the facts are not a loose bundle but again
grouped under a few higher laws, theories or principles. In this way they make a coherent system
in which the mutual interrelations of different generalisations do agree with facts and the advanced
theories. Thus the inductive procedure aims at establishing a system and order. While the knowledge
of facts is established by different generalisations or laws, the laws themselves constitute a unifying
system by higher generalisations.
Thus any systematic scientific explanation or induction passes through the above stages
which constitute the procedure of induction.
Thus a generalisation ranges over unobserved, unlimited and infinite number of cases.
Our experience, however wide it may be, cannot exhaust all the cases covered by such a
proposition. Hence an induction consists of a leap. An inductive leap means a jump from some to
all, from observed cases to unobserved cases, from the knowledge of a limited instances to the
knowledge of all. But how is this jump justified? What is the basis for accepting the proposition
NATURE, PROCEDURE AND PROBLEM OF INDUCTION 123
“All A’s are B’s” always and everywhere on the basis of our experience of some A’s are B’s? This
is the problem of induction.
Different attempts have been made by logicians to find out solution to this problems right
from Aristotle. Aristole tried to solve this problem of induction unsuccessfully by deduction.
Aristotle who was the founder of the deductive procedure applied the deductive method in
finding out a solution to the problem of generalisation. For example, Aristotle justifies an induction
by deduction-
Gandhi, Sankar, Buddha, Russell, Kant, Plato etc. are mortal.
Gandhi, Sankar, Buddha, Russell, Kant, Plato etc are all human beings.
All human beings are mortal.
This attempt to draw a conclusion covering a generalisation is not sound. The premise,
“Gandhi, Sankar, Buddha…… etc. are mortal” is not at all exhaustive for we cannot examine all
human beings. While the conclusion is about all the members of a class, the premises are about
some individuals. In a valid syllogistic argument we cannot draw a conclusion covering all members
of a class from the observation of some members of that class. From “Some A’s are B’s” it is not
possible to deduce. “All A’s are B’s. The very attempt to infer a conclusion with unrestricted
totality from the premises of a limited number in a deductive manner is unsound. So by deduction
we cannot arrive at a generalisation from particular instances. Therefore the leap remains, and
since it is a problem of induction, this cannot be solved by any deductive procedure. Thus Aristotle’s
attempt at a solution is not sound.
J. S. Mill holds that the solution to the problem of induction lies on our acceptance of two
very fundamental laws called the law of causation and the law of uniformity of nature.
So far the law of causation is concerned it assumes that every event has a cause. Mill
accepts the law of causation as a universal principle that can be the basis for inductive generalisation.
The law of uniformity of Nature assumes that nature is governed by uniform laws. In other words
nature functions in the same manner under similar circumstances. That is the way we have observed
things in the past will also continue to happen in the future. Since Mill holds that the problem of
124 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
induction can be solved by these two laws if a causal relation is established between two phenomena
in respect of some essential point, even one or two instances will be sufficient for a generalisation.
But unless a causal relation is ascertained hundreds of cases will not provide a basis for making
a generalisation. So according to Mill the law of uniformity of nature and the law of causation
form the basis to solve the problem of induction.
But Mill’s assumption that causal relation is absolutely certain which can be proved by
experimental methods is misleading. First of all the experimental methods-that will be discussed
in a laler chapter- do not conclusively prove a causal relation. Causal relation is an empirical
relation but not a relation of necessity or implication. Further all inductive generalisations are not
about a causal relation. In some areas of knowledge a causal relation is required but in other
areas no causal explanation is sought for generalisations. That is scientific explanation or induction
is not to be restricted to a causal explanation. Science makes generalisation on different grounds.
On the basis of statistical records, resemblance or analogical similarities generalisations are made.
When a generalisation is made it may be a hypothesis that needs gradual confirmation by deduction
and observation. Thus Mill’s analogy to solve the problem of indication has not received universal
acceptance.
In logic our purpose is to see how far a generalisation is dependable. Logicians fix up
standard to assess the veracity of generalisation. Right generalisations are distinguished from
illicit or unfounded generalisations. What sort of evidences can provide a sufficient basis for a
generalisation and what sort of evidences are irrelevant to a generalisation need to be distinguished.
Since inductive generalisations are propositions with factual import, they cannot be conclusively
established or proved. Rather they carry degree of probability with them. Thus the problem of
induction can be tackled at a pragmatic level. We go on discovering the secrets of nature, its
exceptionalness regularities more and more by help of the inductive procedure. That means
the regularities of nature can be discovered by the inductive procedure as that constitutes
the very objective of science. So whatever generalisations are made following the inductive
procedure account for scientific explanation. That constitutes the rule-of-the scientific-game
and its procedure.
NATURE, PROCEDURE AND PROBLEM OF INDUCTION 125
SUMMARY
PROBLEM OF INDUCTION :
MODEL QUESTIONS
GROUP – A
Objective Questions :
1. Answer the following :-
i. What is the first step in inductive procedure?
ii. What is the last step in inductive procedure?
iii. Who holds the view that hypothesis is an important step in inductive procedure?
iv. According to whom induction is complete only after verification?
v. Is it correct to say that induction is prior to deduction?
vi. Is deduction the only fundamental process of reasoning?
vii. What are the principles upon which Mill attempts to solve the problem of induction?
viii. Point out one of the basic differences between deduction and induction.
ix. Give an example of a general real proposition.
x. Is it correct to say that deduction is a descending process and induction is an ascending
process?
xi. What is meant by analysis?
xii. Give an example of an illicit generalisation.
2. Fill in the blanks :-
i. Induction establishes the ________ truth of a general real proposition.
ii. According to ________ induction is complete at the stage of generalisation.
iii. According to _________ induction is complete only after verification.
iv. Induction is a process of generalisation from _________ instances.
v. Elimination of irrelevant factors is possible only after ________.
vi. The principle of causation states that for every ________ there is a cause.
vii. The principle of uniformity of Nature states that ________ behaves uniformly.
viii. Observation is ____________ perception.
128 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
GROUP – B
Short type questions :
1. Answer the following :-
i. What is inductive leap?
ii. What is the problem of induction?
iii. Explain what you mean by secondary induction?
iv. What is primary induction?
v. What is generalisation?
vi. Name the different stages of inductive procedure.
vii. Point out some important differences between deduction and induction.
viii. What is an axiom?
ix. What is the law of causation?
x. Are induction and deduction complementary processes?
GROUP – C
Long type Questions :
1. Discuss the relation between deduction and induction as two processes of reasoning. Is
any process fundamental than the other?
2. The evidence for a valid deductive conclusion is always complete but that is not so in
case of an inductive conclusion- why it is so, explain.
3. What is primary induction? Distinguish it from secondary induction.
4. Explain with example the different steps involved in inductive procedure.
5. What is the problem of induction? How does Mill attempt to solve it? Discuss.
***
CHAPTER -6
INDUCTION AND PROBABLE INFERENCE
Introduction :-
In the preceding chapter we discussed the nature and procedure of induction. We find
that deduction and induction are two independent modes of inference. In deductive argument,
the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. The premises demonstrate the truth of the
conclusion as they imply it. On the other hand induction deals with those inferences which derive
universal conclusions from instantial premises. Hence inductive arguments are not to be classified
as valid or invalid which is a characteristic feature of deductive arguments. But inductive arguments
are characterised as probable, and there are degrees of probability. Again it should be noted that
inductive logic does not formulate arguments, but studies the nature of inductive arguments with
a view to laying bare the structure and procedure of generalisations.
Further it was noticed that the basis of primary induction is observation of particular
instances. That is by observation or experiment of facts we are able to make inductive
generalisations. Thus observation and experiment provide the material basis of induction. Again
inductive leap is a very important feature of induction. Without inductive leap no inference can be
characterised as truly inductive. Therefore having an inductive leap is considered as an essential
feature of inductive generalisation. Further, because of the leap involved in induction an inductive
argument is considered probable. Since all inductions are about propositions relating to matters-
of-fact such propositions lack analytical certainly. Any such proposition is contingently true and
its opposite is also a possibility. So probability is another important characteristic of an inductive
generalisation. Thus having been based on observation of facts, having an inductive leap and
130 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
having been about the world of facts and thereby being probable are the significant characteristics
of induction proper. In absence of any of these characteristics no inference can be considered as
induction proper. Hence any process of inference can be characterised as inductive if its conclusion
is based on observation of instances, possesses an inductive leap, i.e. passes from some to all or
observed to unobserved and is a real proposition which is only contingently true. There are three
such kinds of inference and they are scientific induction, unscientific induction and analogy.
There are some simulating forms which give the appearance of being induction but are
not inductions at all. Any inference that does not possess the essential features of induction is not
an induction. In some of the text books induction by complete enumeration, parity of reasoning
and colligation of facts are named as induction-improperly-so-called. But since they are not to
be classed as inductions calling them as induction is misleading. In induction by complete
enumeration the conclusion does not possess any inductive leap for it is established after exhaustive
enumeration. The conclusion here is a universal proposition based on observation of all facts
connected with this induction. After individually verifying all the cases and subsuming them under
one proposition a universal proposition is formed. So perfect induction by complete enumeration
is more of a deductive argument than an inductive argument. To make assertions like ‘every
month of English calendar has less than thirty two days’, ‘every planet rotates round the sun’,
‘each student in a particular class knows English’ etc. are examples of this type of induction.
Similarly in parity of reasoning the conclusion is a mathematical assertion deductively drawn from
some theories or axiom. Here it is taken that what-ever reasoning holds in a single case the same
reasoning will apply in every other similar case. For example, after proving that the interior angles
of a triangle are equal to two right tangles we generalise that the same reasoning will apply in case
of every other triangle. So there is a generalisaion that the interior angles of every triangle will
make two right angles. But such an inference is not at all inductive for it is not based on any
observation of facts. Since it is not based on any observation of facts, the conclusion reached
here is not a real proposition. The conclusion is a mathematical proposition which is necessarily
true. So most of the important charcteristics of induction are lacking in induction by parity of
INDUCTION AND PROBABLE INFERENCE 131
reasoning. Similarly in colligation of facts a set of observed phenomena is brought under a notion
or a class name. After going round a building one forms the idea that it is an educational institute.
In this form of reasoning new concepts are formed by binding together many observed facts. But
no inductive leap is involved in this process of thinking. Thus induction by complete enumeration,
parity of reasoning and colligation of facts are not considered as induction and therefore are not
discussed in this chapter which deals with induction as a form of inference. Since they are only
processes simulating inductions they will be dealt with a little elaboration in the chapter discussing
Inductive Fallacies. Hence we shall discuss three basic forms of induction such as scientific
induction, induction by simple enumeration or unscientific induction and analogy.
Scientific induction is defined as the process of inferring the material truth of a general
real proposition from the actual observation of particular instances of facts and phenomena in
reliance on the law of uniformity of nature and law of causation.
1. Frog a is cold-blooded
Frog b is cold-blooded
Frog c is cold-blooded
S1,S2, S3 . . . are P.
CHARACTERISTICS :
A general proposition is about the whole class of unlimited particular cases. In other
words the predicate of a general proposition states something about the entire class of the sub-
ject term. A proposition, such as, ‘all metals, when heated, expand’, or ‘all vipors are poisonous’
is about unlimited and indefinite number of individuals of the class metal or the class vipor as the
case may be.
Scientific induction does not aim at establishing particular propositions like ‘some birds
are black’ or ‘many people are bald’. Unrestricted generality is the hallmark of scientific induction.
But many propositions which appear to be general are not really general. For example,
the proposition, ‘all the districts of Orissa have colleges’, is apparently general because of its
form but really it is not general as it establishes the truth of a proposition whose scope is of a
limited whole. These propositions are the conclusion of, what is called, perfect induction. Scientific
induction must be distinguished from perfect induction.
Scientific induction establishes a general proposition which is real but not verbal. A real
proposition is distinguished from a verbal proposition. A real proposition is informative and synthetic
INDUCTION AND PROBABLE INFERENCE 133
in the sense that its predicate says something new about the subject. But in a verbal proposition
the predicate states the meaning or synonym of the subject term. It gives no new information. The
predicate states the connotation or part of the connotation of the subject term. For example, all
brothers are male’ or ‘all mothers are women’, are verbal propositions. A connotative definition
states a verbal proposition in order to give the meaning of a term. In other words the predicate
states the meaning of all subject term in a verbal proposition. In a general real proposition like
‘All dogs are mammals’ the predicate gives some new information.
ii) The data on which scientific induction is founded are facts of experience. To establish a
general real proposition one must begin by observing particular instances. By observing the
particular cases of death of persons we infer the general real proposition, ‘All men are mortal’.
Observation can be performed by means of experiment and also by the help of instru-
ments such as telescope, microscope and other sophisticated apparatus.
iii) There must be an inductive leap in scientific induction. As we start from the ‘known’ facts
of observation to reach a conclusion about the ‘unknown’ we make a jump or take a leap.
The inductive leap is a passage from the observed to the unobserved, from some to all
(particular to general ) and from the known to the unknown. We observe some instances of
frogs to be cold blooded and conclude that all frogs are cold blooded. The conclusion not only
asserts about the observed cases of frogs but also about all the frogs of past, present and future
which are not observed nor are they accessible for observation. Inductive leap, according to
Mill and Bain, is the most important characteristic of any induction proper. No induction is possible
without inductive leap. Perfect induction is no induction because it has no inductive leap.
iv) The conclusion of induction is more general than the premises. Thus the conclusion of an
induction goes beyond the premises to say something by taking a leap. This is the reason why the
conclusion of induction is always probable. In a deduction the conclusion necessarily follows
from the premises so it gives formal certainty. But the conclusion of induction has only probability
but no certainty.
134 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
v) Law of causation and the law of uniformity of nature are considered to be the formal
grounds of induction. Scientific induction relies on the two laws as its basis. Inductive leap is
justified because of the law of causation and the law of uniformity of nature. The law of
causation is the characteristic which distinguishes scientific induction from induction per
simple enumeration.
Law of universal causation states that everything or event has a cause. Law of
uniformity of nature states that nature behaves uniformily. According to this law the same
cause always produces the same effect under similar conditions. Thus the law of uniformity
of nature, according to Mill, is the basis of induction which justifies the leap from the observed
to the unobserved. The law of uniformity of nature is the ground of all inductions whereas
law of causation as a ground of induction is an additional speciality in case of scientific
induction.
For example, ‘All cases of leprosy are cured by M.D.T’, is a conclusion of scientific
induction which is based on the known causal connection between leprosy and M.D.T. The
conclusion about all cases of leprosy is justified because of the causal connection.
VALUE :
However, scientific induction is considered by Mill and Bain to be the best form of
INDUCTION AND PROBABLE INFERENCE 135
Mill’s view of scientific induction is mostly restricted to finding the causal connection. It
comes under primary induction. As far as the present day scientific thinking is concerned application
of inductive inference procedures to collected data (premises) does not give us scientific
knowledge rather the method of inventing hypotheses. By testing them we arrive at scientific
knowledge. According to C.G. Hempel, “ scientific hypotheses and theories are not derived from
observed facts, but invented in order to account for them”. Mill’s notion of ‘induction’, in a wider
sense, can be used appropriately in case of secondary induction as well.
This inference states that in our experience something has been perceived to possess
some characteristic. Never have we come across a single contrary instance. Because of the
uncontradictoriness of our experience we generalise that all the members of that class possess
that particular characteristic. For example, we have found that all the crows are black. We never
have come across any non-black crow nor we knew from any other source about a non-black
crow. On the basis of such uniformity and uncontradicted experience we come to the general
conclusion that “All crows are black”
Example :
Crow A is black
Crow B is black
Crow C is black
No non-black crow is experienced so far.
136 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
CHARACTERISTICS :
ii) Like scientific induction we have the premises of unscientific induction from experience
of particular instances. The probability of the conclusion of unscientific induction increases
depending upon the number of instances observed under varying circumstances. Thus
induction by simple enumeration, as its name suggests, makes its conclusion more probable
if more number of positive instances are counted or enumerated for observation.
iii) Like scientific induction there is an inductive leap in unscientific induction.We pass from the
known to the unknown, from observed to the unobserved and from particular to general, i.e. some to
all.
INDUCTION AND PROBABLE INFERENCE 137
(iv) Unscientific induction relies on the law of uniformity of nature like scientific induction. But
unlike scientific induction it does not rely on the law of causation. We see some uniformity when
we mark that all crows are black. We do not know if there is any causal reltion between the
colour of the crow with its other essential properties.
VALUE :
We are unaware of any causal relation in case of unscientific induction. In this respect
probability of the conclusion of this induction is less than that of the conclusion of scientific
induction which is based on causal law.
Logicians, like Bacon, hold that induction by simple enumeration is merely collecting
number of instances which is no better than a childish affair. It is the layman’s induction. Ordinary
people cannot have critical and analytical mind. It may, sometimes, be a complicated procedure
to have proper observation of fact. So a common man depends on induction by simple
enumeration to arrive at a conclusion. However the common man’s popular induction may be,
some times, a hasty generalisation without careful examination or scrutiny of the instances
experienced. Such generalisations have no probability. But in some other occasions a generalisation
has a greater degree of probability. But in general the degree of probability is low in case of
induction by simple enumeration due to the risk of a negative(contrary) instance in future. The
risk of such a contrary instance ruins the generalisation completely.
It is to be pointed out that the value of induction by simple enumeration is not insignificant
in science. It is considered as a beginning stage of scientific induction. As the generalisation is
based on uniformity or resemblances of instances it helps us to formulate the hypothesis and thus
is the starting point of induction proper.
To sum up, it may be noted that the conclusions of scientific induction and induction by
simple enumeration are not different in kind as considered traditionally. The difference is only in
degree as both the conclusions are only probable. Hence it is not proper to conclude that scientific
induction gives certainty because of its basis of causal law and the conclusion of induction by
138 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
simple enumeration gives only probability. As all scientific inductions are not based on casual law
and all inductions by simple enumeration are not hasty generalisations their conclusions are more
or less probable depending on the circumstance. The conclusions are only different in degree but
not in kind so far as their probability is concerned.
6.3 ANALOGY :
The word analogy has been used differently. Logicians use it in different meanings in the
context of arguments. Besides its frequent use in arguments it has also literary usage in metaphor
and simile by the creative writers to create a vivid impression in the mind of the reader. The
literary use of analogy aims at some explanation where something unfamiliar is made easier through a
comparison with something familiar with which it has resemblance or similarity. Look at this example
Science is built up with facts as a house is built with stones. But a collection of facts is no
more a science than a heap of stones is a house.
This is a literal expression in which science is compared with house and facts with stones.
Thus analogy is used both in literary description or in argument. Even sometimes it is difficult to
distinguish between a literary use and argumentative use. But we shall not deal with this issue here
but see its use in logic.
The argument by analogy has been used right from Aristotle. Aristotle used analogy in the
sense of equality of ratios. For example, 3 :6 : :5 :10. Here the relation between 3 and 6 is
analogous to the relation between 5 and 10. Whitely defines analogy as resemblance of ratios or
relations. Whately’s point can be understood by this example :
A is related to B as C is related to D
From the relation of A and B, P follows
From the relation of C and D P must follow
Carveth Read defines analogy as a kind of probable proof based on imperfect similarity
i.e. between the data of comparison and the subject of our inference. Many other logicians like
Welton, Mill, Bain, Lotze have discussed analogy in the argumentative sense in their own way
INDUCTION AND PROBABLE INFERENCE 139
with slight individual variation. All the writers agree on some basic points. That is analogy is a
probable inferential process in which two or more things are similar in some respect and one of
those things has a further characteristic and from this a conclusion is inferred that other thing also
has that characteristic. Precisely analogy is a kind of probable inference from one particular to
another based on their resemblance.
It should be mentioned that not every analogical argument needs exactly two things or
exactly two or three characteristics. Number and characteristics may vary on which things are
similar. The point is not with regard to the numerical differences of number of particulars or number
of characteristics. But the general structure used in all analogical arguments is the same. That structure
is the defining feature of all analogical inferences. Thus analogy can be defined like this :
“every analogical inference passes from the similarity or resemblance of two or more
things in one or more respects to the resemblance of those things in some further respect”.
Let us take some examples, symbolic and concrete, to illustrate this point
a, b, c, d have the property P,Q and R
a, b, c have the property S
d has the property S
In this example a, b, c and d, the individual things, which resemble each other as having
the common properties of P, Q and R. It is further observed that a, b and c have the property S.
It is not known whether d has the property S or not. But on the basis of its similarity with a, b and
c possessing the property S, it is inferred that d has the property S.
Concrete example –
Orissa, Bihar and Madya Pradesh are the states of India having sizeable tribal popula-
tion. One study reveals that the rate of literacy of tribal women in Orissa and Bihar is within 1 to
2 per cent. So it is reasonable to infer that the rate of literacy of tribal women in Madhya Pradesh
would be within 1 to 2 percent.
140 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
Thomas Reid’s famous example is invariably quoted by writers in different revised forms.
According to his original quotation:-
“ we may observe a very great similitude between this earth which we inhabit and the
other planents, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus and Mercury. They all revolve round the sun as the
earth does, although at different distances and in different periods.
“They borrow all their light from the sun as the earth does. Several of them are known to
revolve around their axis like the earth and by that means must have a like succession of day and
night. Some of them have moons, that serve to give them light in the absence of the sun, as our
moon does to us. They are all, in their motions, subject to the same law of gravitation, as the earth
is . From all this similitude, it is not unreasonable to think that those planets may, like our earth, be
the habitations of various orders of living creatures. There is some probability in this conclusion
from analogy.”
Not only in logical arguments in our day today inferences we frequently take the help of
analogy. I infer that my new cycle will ride well for my previous cycle which I bought from the
same shop and with same brand gave me good ride in the past. When my attention is drawn to a
new picture of Dilip Kumar I infer that I shall enjoy seeing it as I have seen his films in the past and
have enjoyed them. Those inferences which we mostly use in everyday life are basically analogi-
cal in nature.
Analogy has all the basic characteristics of induction. It is based on observation of facts.
It collects its premises from experience. On the basic of our experience, this inference is made.
But here the conclusion is not a general real proposition unlike that of other forms of induction,
but a particular real proposition. Though the conclusion is a particular proposition, a general
proposition can implicity be included in it. In the above example I bring all pictures of Dilip
Kumar, all cycles of a company under a class to which they belong. Similarly the earth, saturn,
jupiter, mars etc. are brought under the class “all planets”. But in analogy since we pass from one
specific property to another specific property of the same particular or from one specific particular
INDUCTION AND PROBABLE INFERENCE 141
Like other process of induction analogy has a leap. The inferred property has not been
observed, so there is a passage from the known to the unknown. In scientific or unscientific
induction the leap is with regard to the numerical number of individuals as there we pass from
some to all having one property. But the leap in analogy is in respect of the property. Here we
pass from one particular case having some properties to the same particular having more properties.
Here there is an assumption that properties found together are connected. When we observe
some properties in one or some cases, we think that they will be present in other similar cases
also. So even if we have not observed a property in one individual we infer it on the basis that
property is found in the particular with which that individual has some similarities. If the diffetrent
planets have a number of properties in common and the earth is inhabited by living beings, then it
is inferred that other planets might be inhabited also.
Analogy has the characteristic of being probable like other forms of inductive argument.
The conclusion in scientific induction, unscientific induction or analogy is neither certain nor
demonstratively valid. Their conclusions are probable in nature. Probability is a matter of degree.
The degree of probability may be high or low depending upon the real situation. In case of some
analogical arguments the conclusion is highly probable. Where the conclusion is having higher
probability it is called a good analogy and where the degree of probability is less, it is called a bad
analogy.
The three characteristics that induction is based on observation of facts, that it involves
an inductive leap and that it is probable in nature are found in all forms of induction proper. But in
case of scientific induction the generalisation is supposed to be based on an assumed causal
connection. According to some text book writers there is no causal relation in analogical induction.
While scientific induction is based on a causal relation, analogy lacks any causal relation. But
recent writers do not accept this view. They hold that some analogical arguments might be based
on causal connection too. Irving M.Copi and Carl Cohen hold that in analogy “one attribute or
circumstance is relevant to another for purpose of analogical argument, if the first affects the
142 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
second, that is, if it has a causal or determining effect on that other. The factor of relevance is to
be explained in terms of causality. In an argument by analogy the relevant analogies are those that
deal with causally related attributes of circumstances. Copi and Cohen hold that analogical
arguments may be probable whether they go from cause to effect or from effect to cause. They
are even probable when the attribute in the premise is neither cause nor effect of the conclusion’s
attribute, provided that they are effects of the same cause. Thus from the presence of some
symptoms of a given disease, a doctor can predict other symptoms-not that either symptom is
the cause of the other, but because they are jointly caused by one and the same infection”.
So all analogical inferences are not completely free from a causal connection. In some
form of analogical argument a causal connection may provide the basis for inference.
particular proposition. But the significant point is that in both the ground of inference is resemblance.
In unscientific induction a,b,c… who belong to a class are observed to have the property p.
d,e,f…. are very much similar to a,b,c… as they all belong to a class. So we infer that d,e,f…which
are not observed must have the property p. We find observed crows are black and assume that
the unobserved crows are also black because the unobserved crows are very much similar to the
observed crows. So the ground of inference or of the generalisation in induction per simple
enumeration is this resemblance or similarity. In analogy resemblance or similarity is the very
basis of drawing a conclusion. But in spite of these important similarities between induction per
simple enumeration and analogy certain striking differences are noticed between them. In the
former the evidence for generalilsation is extensive. After observing a large number of instances
without a single exception the generalisation is made. So in induction per simple enumeration the
extent and number of our observation play the important basis for our generalisation. Therefore
in this form of induction the numerical strength of the evidences is of vital importance. But in case
of analogical argument the number of instances is not important for there can be an inference
even with two things only. In analogy the importance of the resemblance of the properties and
their relevance for the conclusion is most warranted. So the emphasis is on the similarity of the
properties and their relevance. In other words while in induction per complete enumeration the
evidence for the inference is extensive and quantitative in analogy the evidence for the inference
is intensive and qualitative. For in the former we go by the number of instances but in the latter we
consider the importance and relevance of the qualities on which things are similar.
Our discussion shows that analogical arguments are not deductively valid. As they are
about facts, they are probable in nature. Some analogical arguments are cogent and have a high
degree of probability whereas some others are useless and have no importance at all. So there
must be some criteria by which the value of an analogy can be assessed. Let us discuss the
criteria devised by logicians for the determination of the strength of analogical arguments.
To assess the value of an analogy the number and importance of the points of resemblance
144 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
between the particulars are given due weightage. Sometimes the number of instances counts
important to add to the probability of the conclusion. Suppose I gave a shirt-cloth to a tailor.
Even though he had taken the measurement the shirt did not fit me well. On further occasions
other friends also patronise with similar experience that their shirts were not tailored properly to
fit them by the same tailor. A number of instances helps draw the conclusion that the tailor does
not stitch properly for good fitting. Thus a single instance may not be sufficient to lend support to
the conclusion but if a number of instances are there they add to the degree of probability. Of
course there is no mathematical ratio between the number of instances and the conclusion. The
degree of probability of analogical arguments would be more on the modesty of the conclusion.
If my motor-cycle shows less oil consumption and gives high mileage I infer that my friend’s
motor-cycle which is of the same model and brand would be giving the same mileage.
Further the strength of the analogical inference will be more if the things compared are
similar on important and relevant points. Things must resemble on essential points and not on
superficial points. A doctor’s inference that a will be relieved of his pain by a particular drug as
the same drug has relieved the pain of b,c and d having somewhat similar symptoms is a reasonable
analogical argument. Because there is similarity in their symptoms and the drug has worked in
case of b,c and d, it will be reasonable to think that it will work on a. But suppose p,q and r
belong to a particular locality, speak the same language and have the same number of children. It
is found that they suffer from stomach-trouble. It will be silly to infer that s who also belongs to
the same locality, speak the same language and have the same number of children is having
stomach trouble. This argument by analogy is very weak for the points of similarity cited are quite
irrelevant to the matter with which the inference is concerned. But in case of the former example
the similarities are quite relevant to the conclusion. Thus the strength of the analogy will be more
when the points of similarity will be relevant to the conclusion.
From the above illustration it follows that if the points of difference or dissimilarity in
analogical argument will be more in number and importance the strength of the analogy will be
less. If two things are similar on unimportant or irrelevant points and the point to be inferred has
INDUCTION AND PROBABLE INFERENCE 145
no useful link with their similarities the probability of the conclusion will be very weak. Suppose
two persons belong to the same age group, village, caste and religion. If one is a poet it cannot be
inferred that the other person is also a poet. For the conclusion of being a poet has no relevant
link with the points of similarity.
Similarly the value of an analogical inference will be less if the unknown sphere between
the things compared is larger than their known region. Sometimes our information is inadequate
or we are ignorant when we compare two particulars. If we are not sure what are the similarities
or dissimilarities between the things then also our conclusion can have less probability. That is if
the number and importance of the unknown points will be more then the probability of the con-
clusion will be weak.
Thus the value of an analogical argument depends on the important points of resem-
blance between the instance in the premise and that of the conclusion. It is not on how many
points the phenomena are similar or dissimilar, but their relevance with the point to be inferred in
an analogy is important. The importance of similarity between the instance in the premise and that
of the conclusion adds to the probability of the conclusion whereas more disimilarities or the
unknown points between the instance mentioned in the premise and the conclusion weaken it and
reduce the probability of the conclusion. Some logicians express the value of analogical argument
mathematically by means of a fraction in the following manner-
In a fraction if the numerator increases, its value increases and if the denominator increases
the value of the fraction decreases. Similarly the value of a particular analogical argument is more
if the known points of resemblance, the numerator, will be more. That makes the analogical
argument more probable. But if the denominator is more, then the value of the argument will be
less i.e. the probability will be weak.
But the value of analogy cannot be decided with accurate precision unlike that of a
146 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
mathematical fraction. For while a mathematical fraction is constant, the fraction in the analogy is
quite uncertain and even vague. Because in the analogy the unknown points always remain uncertain
and vague. If some points are unknown, their exact nature and number cannot be determined.
However the value of an analogy mostly depends on the connection between the points
of resemblance and the inferred similarity. If the points of resemblance have some determining
effect and that is what is inferred in the conclusion, then the value of the analogy would be more.
We find that the analogical arguments are probable and not demonstratively valid. The
probability of an analogical argument is determined empirically. Observation and experiment
determine the merit of an analogical argument. Evaluation renders an analogy as good or bad.
A good analogy means where there is higher degree of probability. In such cases there is a
close link or determining relation between the data of comparison and the subject of inference.
But a bad analogy is a false one for there is no relevant link between the data of comparison
and the matter to be inferred. So a bad analogy is very weak. Because in a bad analogy there
is resemblance on irrelevant points between the instances of the premise and the conclusion.
Some examples will suffice to make the points clear.
1. My neighbour has covered a layer of straw over the roof of his building and that has
reduced the temperature of the rooms of his building.
So I infer that if straw will be covered over the roof of my house, then the room tempera-
ture of my house will decrease.
2. I find that my pet dog barks at people who come to my house for the first time as they are
stranger to the dog.
So I infer that if I visit somebody’s house and he has a dog, it will bark at me as I am a
stranger to the dog.
These are examples of good analogy as in each case the conclusion is cogent with the
premise.
INDUCTION AND PROBABLE INFERENCE 147
3. In a cricket series when India played with England in each of the two matches it had
rained heavily. So it is forecast that it will rain in the third match between India and
England to be played after a week.
4. Plants are like human beings for they have growth, decay and death. Human beinigs are
intelligent so plants have intelligence.
The above two examples are bad analogies. In the third example the basis of the
forecast is two instances of rain during the match between India and England. So from this
accidental phenomenon if an inference is made that that will also happen in future there is no
cogency between the data of the information and the conclusion. So too in the fourth example
human beings and plants are compared to have some similarities. But intelligence of plants
does not follow from the points of similarities between plants and human beings.
6.4 PROBABILITY :
frequencies of the supportive evidences. From this it appears that the probability is not an intrinsic
or inherent feature of a proposition. It is something extraneous to the proposition. It is because
the same proposition might have different degrees of probability depending upon the confirming
support or evidence. The relevance of the evidence given in support of a proposition may be
different also. The relevance is not the same in all cases. Further the probability of an inductive
inference is supposed to be measured by the frequency of the supporting fact. The numerical
strength of probability of a conclusion is the adequate evidence for the proposition.
CALCULUS OF PROBABILITY :
Most of the branches of science practically employ the calculus of probability in their
studies. The concept of probability is also familiar in mathematics and logic. But propositions of
science dealing with matters of fact are different from the propositions of mathematics. So no
purely mathematical system can decide the degree of probabilities of assertions of fact. Thus
mathematical probability is different from probability used in science. In mathematics the theory
of probability is limited to the idea of necessary inference. The idea of mathematical probability
connotes the condition of equiprobability of events. The probability of a tossed coin showing
head is fifty per cent since a coin has only two sides, such as head and tail. That is when a coin is
tossed, either the head or the tail must face upward.
Similarly once the components of a complex event is known the calculus of probability
can be determined. The purpose of the calculus is to decide from a complex event the probability
of the events comprising it. From a set of alternative possibilities mathematical probability determines
the possible consequence of the assumption.
By help of a mathematical ratio the idea of probability is explained. When we are sure
that some event will definitely occur its probability is I, and when we are sure of its non-occurrence
its probability is O and when our belief is in between the certainty of its occurrence and its non-
occurrence the probability is some fraction intermediate between I and O. Further the idea of
probability is also linked with the principle of insufficient reason or indifference. That means in a
INDUCTION AND PROBABLE INFERENCE 149
complex situation of several alternatives, if there is no known reason to accept one rather than
another then each of these alternatives has an equal probability. If there is induction, alternatives
are equally probable.
Further probability cannot be taken as a measure of belief. For the belief of people about
something may remarkably differ. So belief does not always correspond with the state of facts.
Hence probability cannot be estimated on the basis of belief. If large number of people believe in
something that does not constitute the ground for the belief to be accepted. The belief in astro-
logical prediction or in the existence of ghost by a majority of people cannot be the ground to
accept astrology as a science or ghost as a reality.
When calculating the probability of complex events, all possible alternatives are
also taken into consideration. The probability of the alternative occurrence of two events
is the sum of separate probabilities. Suppose two events cannot occur jointly. In a game
of dice 1 and 2 cannot occur together. Since there are six possible values, the probability
for each value is 1/6 . So the probability of either 1 or 2 occurring alternatively would be
1 1 1
.
6 6 3
Similarly the probability of the joint occurrence of two independent events is the
product of the probability of each of them. If a and b are two separate events, R(a) the
probability of the first and R(b) the probability of the second, then the probability of their
joint occurrence is R(a) X R(b). Suppose in a winter season a foggy morning occurs in an
average of once in four days, and rain occurs once in seven days, their separate probabilities
1 1
are and respectively in a week. So the probability of their joint occurrence is
4 7
1 1 1
4 7 28
150 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
TYPES OF PROBABILITY :
The reasonableness of belief thory of probability holds that between two positions one is
worthy of acceptance if it is more reasonable to accept it on the basis of available evidence. Out
of two statements compared with a common body of evidences one may be more rational than
the other. The theory of evolution is more probable a doctrine than the theory of creation. For the
former is more rational and reasonable to be believed. Similarly when modern physics and
astronomy had not developed like today and the geocentric theory was the accepted hypothesis
the heliocentric theory made a break though in 16th century. The heliocentric theory was found
to be more reasonable than the geo-centric one because it could explain more facts than the later.
Sometimes when the numerical value of probability is not known or the evidences at
INDUCTION AND PROBABLE INFERENCE 151
hand are too inadequate we are guided by sheer guess or vague impressions. The evidence at
hand may be very complex and thereby baffling. That reduces the probability of a claim. At times
the statistical enumerations can make extravagant claims. Even unscrupulous people deliberately
give false figures with a purpose. These negative points reduce probability to chance or chance
coincidence. Probability can be linked with chance though there is important difference between
them.
We have already noticed that the theories or laws established in science are basically
generalisations. Further the theories or generalisations in every branch of science mutually support
one another and make a coherent system. But in the early state of development of sciences the
generalisations were considered as somewhat isolated. Even today there are some areas of
science-particularly the social sciences- in which generalisations are somewhat isolated from
each other and do not constitute a coherent system. Where the theories or laws are mutually
supporting they are highly probable forms of generalisaions. But where they are relatively isolated,
there the idea of fair sample is very important because on the basis of these instantial
representations, generalisations are made. We have already discussed that an inductive
generalisation is made on the basis of observation of particular instances. The instances which
are observed or verified constitute only a limited or small part of the conclusion which is a
proposition of unlimited totality. The more instances covered or verified add to the probability of
the conclusion. The problem of inductive leap has been dealt with in the first chapter. Here we
shall embark upon on a specific issue of the role of “fair sample” in induction.
This problem presented by Mill is a problem in philosophy of logic but to find an answer
to it is not that difficult or impossible. When a universal proposition is inferred on the basis of our
experience of facts, it requires gradual confirmation. Confirmation is made by objectively verifying
fair samples. A fair sample must be a representative of the class having all the defining properties
with which the class is generally associated. For the observed instance is the representative of all
possible instances. Thus any one instance is as good as another. If we find through an experiment
the atomic number and weight of silver, then we can comfortably generalise the atomic number
and weight of silver. And any object that answers to the definition of silver is supposed to possess
the same atomic number and weight like the examined instances. In such case the probability will
be too high. Similarly if it is found that frogs collected from different sources are cold-blooded,
we become pretty sure that all frogs are cold-blooded because the examined instances are fair
samples of all possible instances. In other words the unobserved instances have the same
homogeneity with the observed instances. As all frogs make a homogeneous class, so it is not
necessary to observe each frog to establish the conclusion. For the verified instances are the fair
samples. They represent the whole class. In this example the observed instance is as good as the
unobserved or unknown instances. If different instances do not differ in their defining or
representative nature, they matter as one instance. Because the members of the class form one
homogeneous kind, so to examine a few cases as fair samples will be the basis for generalisation.
In some advanced sciences theories or laws established by inductive generalisation mutually
support one another and form a coherently organised system of propositions. In some areas a
generalisition is not only based on verifying instances of fair samples, but also support some far-
reaching results of the system. That means in science each generalisition is not an isolated theory
of its kind, rather part of a comprehensive system where theories mutually support each other.
For an isolated theory cannot stand firm by itself. Rather as part of a unifying system it supports
each generalisation to stand on a firm basis and as such helps the system as well. Thus the
probability of an advanced theory is not influenced by further verifying instances but by the
supporting theories of the system. But if there is a contrary hypothesis which can systematise the
154 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
facts or the prevailing theories in a superior way that poses doubt to the veracity of the prevailing
theory in question. So the probability of a theory is influenced by another hypothesis if it has more
systematising and explanatory power.
The above mentioned arguments are said to be deductive due to the reason that the
conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. The conclusion is certainly true if the premises
are true.
Example A :
INDUCTION AND PROBABLE INFERENCE 155
Mr. X is corrupt.
Example B :
These syllogistic arguments are inductive in the sense that no conclusion necessarily follows.
Here even if the premises are true the conclusion is only probable. This argument states that if the
premises are true the conclusion is likely to be true. In other words the conclusion is always
probable.
In a statistical syllogistic argument (or a statistical syllogism) one of the premises is a statistical
generalisation like the above examples. The other premise is a particular one in the sense that it
uniquely denotes one individual. Thus the form of the statistical syllogism is
Example A :
Premise 1 – x% of K’s are L’s.
Premise 2 – a is a K.
a is an L.
To give a concrete example-
Example B :
80% of students are sincere.
Rabi is a student.
Rabi is sincere.
In the above examples the subject in the first premise (K, student ) is called the
reference class. This is the class of things or persons to which a characteristic is attributed.
The attributed characteristic or property is called the attributive class (L, sincere in the
above examples). The subject in the second premise refers to the individual object(person,
place, thing etc.) In the above example the individual is a , Rabi(in the two examples
respectively). Thus in the above example, the reference class is the class of students, the
attributive class is the class of sincere beings and the individual person is Rabi.
It is important to note that the class denoted by K(students) in the first premise includes
the individual (Rabi) mentioned in the second premise. This is to say that the individual ‘a’ (Rabi)
in the second premise belongs to the class ‘K’ (students) of the first premise.
INDUCTION AND PROBABLE INFERENCE 157
The class denoted by L(sincere beings) in the first premise is the characteristic or prop-
erty attributed to the individual in the conclusion.
Thus, the statistical syllogism is an argument based on the principle that what is generally,
but not universally, true or false of a class is also, in a like manner, true or false a particular
instance.
When we say 100% of ‘K’s’ are ‘L’s’ it expresses a universal general proposition like
‘All K’s are L’ s. The conclusion derived from this premise with the help of the second premise,
which is a particular proposition, is certainly true.
In case of statistical syllogism the reference class of the statistical generalisation is not
100%. Hence the strength of the statistical syllogism is judged by the closeness of the members
of reference class to 100% having the characteristic of the members of the attributive class. For
example, the statistical syllogism,
Sidhartha is a man,.
Sidhartha is a theist.
Maya is a girl.
Maya is vegetarian.
Similarly if the reference class is closer to 0% having the characteristic mentioned in the
attributive class of the statistical generalisation, then the individual(in the second premise) is very
less likely to possess the property of the members of the attributive class. For example,
Sidhartha is a politician.
We may mark that his statistical syllogism is stronger than the example given below-
Rahul is a man.
Rahul is bald.
A statistical syllogism may not always have as its first premise of the form x% of K’s are
L’s. In the first premise there may not be given any specific percentage of the reference class. In
many cases the words like some, most, almost all, many, usually, few, very few, a few etc. are used
to quantify the reference class. It is also not the fact that the argument is always in the present tense.
Look to the following example:
Example A : Most K’s are L’s.
X is a k.
X is an L.
Example B :
Usually senior students do better than the juniors in games.
Lata is a senior student and Maya is a junior student.
Lata will (probably) do better than maya in games.
Example C :
Few birds are bright coloured.
Sparrows are birds.
Sparrows are not bright coloured.
Sometimes a fallacy occurs in statistical syllogism. The syllogism is fallacious when all
INDUCTION AND PROBABLE INFERENCE 159
available relevant evidences are not taken into consideration in the first premise. This is called the
fallacy of incomplete evidence.
The fallacy of incomplete evidence is committed if and only if some available relevant
informations which would reduce the probability of the conclusion are ignored.
For example :
Most intellectuals are not politicians.
The finance minister of India is an intellectual.
The finance minister of India is not a politician.
The above statistical syllogism commits the fallacy of incomplete evidence by ignoring
the relevant information that almost all of the finance ministers of India are intellectuals.
Let us consider another example:
Most of the Oriyas are poor.
The District Magistrate of Cuttack is an Oriya.
The District Magistrate of Cuttack is poor.
Here the fallacy of incomplete evidence occurs by ignoring the fact that the job of district
magistrate is a highly paid job.
Thus by taking note of the available relevant evidences the degree of probability can be
assessed. But by ignoring the available evidences the above fallacy will be commited.
*******
160 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
SUMMARY
INDUCTION :
Induction is based on observation of facts and is about the world of facts. It has an
inductive leap and it is probable in nature. There are three basic forms of induction such as
scientific induction, induction per simple enumeration(or unscientific induction) and analogy.
SCIENTIFIC INDUCTION :
It is probable in nature.
ANALOGY :
Analogy is a kind of probable inference from one particular to another particular based
on their resemblance. Its main characteristics are
a) It is based on observation of facts
b) It has inductive leap
c) It is probable
INDUCTION AND PROBABLE INFERENCE 161
The strength of an analogy depends on the number and importance of the points of
resemblance of the particulars.
PROBABILITY :
FAIR SAMPLE :
A fair sample is the representative individual of a homogeneous class having all the defining
characteristics of that class. So any one instance is as good as another belonging to the same class.
STATISTICAL SYLLOGISM :
In a statistical syllogism the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises. It
is inductive rather than deductive
One premise here is a statistical generalisation. The conclusion is probable. The prob-
ability of the conclusion depends upon the strength of the attributive class.
162 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
MODEL QUESTIONS
GROUP - A
Objective Questions :
1. Answer the followiong :
a) How many kinds of induction proper are there ?
b) Name the different kinds of processes simulating induction.
c) Which induction is the best form of induction ?
d) Define unscientific induction
e) What is the important characteristics that unscientific induction lacks ?
f) Give an example of a good analogy.
g) Give an example of a bad analogy.
h) What are the different theories of probability?
i) Give an example of inductive syllogism?
j) What is the nature of the premises in a statistical syllogism?
k) What is a fair sample?
2. Name the process of reasoning involved to make each of the following
statements :
a) Where there is smoke, there is fire.
b) All lions are carnivorous.
c) Plants must have life as they grow and die.
d) Radhakrishnan is a vegetarian as most of the South Indians are vegetarians.
3. Fill in the blanks :
a) Inductive leap is an important characteristic in all forms of induction ———.
b) Leap means a—————— from some to all.
c) Analogy is based on ——————.
d) ——— induction is an induction par excellence.
e) Unscientific induction is otherwise called induction per simple ———.
f) In a fair sample the members of a class form one ________ kind.
g) In a statistical syllogism the subject is called __________ class.
INDUCTION AND PROBABLE INFERENCE 163
GROUP - B
Short type Questions :
1. Explain the following
a) What is an inductive leap ?
b) What is inductive per simple enumeration ?
c) Illustrate a bad analogy?
d) What does the strength of an analogy mean ?
e) What are the forms of reasoning that establish a general proposition in the conclusion ?
f) What is calculus of probability?
g) Can probability be estimated on the basis of belief.
h) How is the problem of induction related with the question of fair sample?
i) Why is a theory in science not an isolated generalisation.
j) What does the strength of a statistical syllogism mean?
GROUP - C
***
164 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
CHAPTER -7
FORMAL GROUNDS OF INDUCTION
Introduction :-
Man is not always satisfied with particular facts like this piece of iron rusts when exposed
to oxygen, or in the falling of a particular stone to the ground, or in the death of a particular man
etc. He is eager to generalise. He wants to arrive at a general proposition on the basis of some
particular facts that he has actually observed. Thus after observing a few cases of falling of stones
when thrown upward, rusting of iron when exposed to air etc. he is tempted to generalise. He
arrives at general propositions like all material bodies fall to the ground when thrown upward,
iron rusts when exposed to oxygen, etc. But this is not to say that all the generalisations that he
makes are genuine and acceptable scientifically. Generalisations like ‘all mangoes are sweet’, ‘all
men are honest’, ‘all cows are white’ are not genuine ones for the reason that in such cases there
is every chance of meeting some contrary experiences. We may find some mangoes which are
not sweet, some cows which are not white etc. So these generalisations are not acceptable. Thus
there are generalisations, like the former ones, where we never come across any contrary instance.
Even the possibility of getting one is also very remote. Such generalisations are highly probable
or almost certain. These generalisations of unrestricted totality are strongly supported by two
laws or principles namely, the law of uniformity of nature and the law of causation.
The law of uniformity of nature holds that the same cause will produce the same effect
under similar circumstances while the law of causation states that every event has a cause. On the
basis of the law of causation a causal connection is established between two events and then a
generalisation is made on the ground of uniformity of nature. Both the laws are somewhat
indispensable for inductive generalisation. In other words without their supports inductive
generalisations will be very weak. They justify our leap from some cases to all cases, from
known cases to unknown cases etc. That is why the law of causation and the law of uniformmity
FORMAL GROUNDS OF INDUCTION 165
of nature are called the formal grounds of induction. But it should be mentioned that inductive
arguments are not at all formally valid. Formal validity is a typical characteristic of deductive
inference.
The law of uniformity of nature is one of the two formal grounds of induction. It is,
according to Mill, a fundamental principle of knowledge. This law has been variously described.
It is said -nature behaves in the same way under similar conditions, nature is uniform, in nature
there are parallel cases, the future is like the present, nature repeats itself, the future resembles
the past, nature is governed by laws, the same cause will produce the same effect, etc. For
example, timber is found to float on the surface of water in the past. So we infer that it shall
continue to float in water in future also in similar conditions. Similarly since water has quenched
our thirst in the past, it shall continue to do so in the future under similar circumstances. Again if
quinine has cured malarial fever in the past, it shall have the same effect in the future under similar
circumstances. In other words if something is true of some members of a class, it will be true of
all members of the class under similar conditions. In short, nature is law binding and it is uniform.
Violation of law of nature is not known. It is empirically impossible. For nature never acts irregularly.
It should be pointed out here that the law of uniformity of nature never denies variety in
nature. On the other hand it admits of infinite varieties of phenomena in nature. But due to the
presence of infinite varieties of phenomena in nature some wrongly hold that nature is not always
uniform. On the other hand it is full of surprises. It is thus said, “In many ways nature seems not
to be uniform, there is a great variety in sizes, shapes, colours and all other properties of things”.
166 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
In like manner Mill says, “Nobody believes that the succession of rain and fine weather will be
the same in every future year as in the present. Nobody expects to have the same dreams
repeated every might”. And such arguments fail to disprove the uniformity of nature. Despite
varieties nature certainly remains uniform. For what the law of uniformity of nature asserts is that
all varieties of nature are subject to uniform laws. Each one of them depends on certain cause
and when this particular cause recurs it also reappears. Thus for example if the cause which was
responsible for creating a total solar eclipse in the past is repeated, then total solar eclipse will
also recur. In the same way if the cause which was responsible for creating headache in a person
in the past is repeated today, then the person will again suffer from headache. So all the infinite
varieties of phenomena in nature are subject to their respective laws. Nothing in nature is accidental
or groundless. Nature admits of no lawlessness. Instead law reigns supreme in nature. There is
rule of law everywhere in nature.
One can assume from the above that there is not one uniformity or law governing the
entire nature. For diverse events are systematised under different departments. Different
departments of nature act uniformity in accordance with their respective laws. That is to say
corresponding to different departments of nature there are different departments of science to
study or investigate their respective subject matter as per certain laws. These laws are uniformly
operating in different departments of nature. Thus for example the heavenly bodies like stars and
planets are governed by the laws of astronomy; matter, energy and physical events are governed
by the laws of physics; human beings act in accordance with the laws of psychology etc. Likewise
plants are governed by the laws of botany, elements, atoms etc. are governed by the laws of
chemistry and so on. In each department definite laws or uniformities are operating and so it is
maintained that there is not one uniformity but corresponding to different spheres of nature there
are several uniformities or laws. Bain, therefore, holds “the course of the world is not a uniformity
but uniformities”.
But such a view is not tenable on the ground that even though there are many uniformities
or laws governing the different departments of nature yet there is an underlying unity among them
because nature as a whole behaves uniformly. The different spheres of nature are but parts of
one system. In this sense it is still better to call it unity of nature. Mill who is an empiricist believes
FORMAL GROUNDS OF INDUCTION 167
that we establish the general law of uniformity of nature after observing or experiencing particular
cases of uniformities. From our experience we know that timber floats in water, water quenches
our thirst, water flows downward and since we never come across a single exception to contradict
our above experiences we are led to believe that nature as a whole is uniform.
PARADOX OF INDUCTION:
The law of uniformity of nature is a formal ground of induction according to Mill and
others. It is the foundation or the basis of all inductive generalisations. Unless we believe this
principle we cannot pass from some to all, known to unknown, from past to present and then to
distant and unknown future. In other words the law justifies or guarantees the leap from particular
cases to a general law. Neither can we generalise nor can our generalisation be proper unless we
believe that nature will behave in the same way under similar circumstances. This law, therefore,
is the very basis or ground of induction.
But quite contrary to this above view Mill also held that the law of uniformity of nature is
the result of induction. Even he called it the result of induction per simple enumeration. Induction
is justified by the law of uniformity of nature. But the law of uniformity of nature itself is the result
of induction per simple enumeration. In other words from experience we gather cases of particular
uniformities like fire always accompanies smoke, water flows downwards, magnets attract iron
and so on. Since we do not come across any contrary experience we are gradually led to believe
that everywhere in nature things behave in uniform manner, or nature, as a whole, is uniform. This
uncontradicted experience of ours gathered year after year forms the very basis of our understanding
of nature. In short, according to Mill the law of uniformity of nature is the result of induction per
simple enumeration. This is the manner in which the law of uniformity of nature is established as
the ground of induction.
So for Mill what is the ground or foundation of induction is also the result of induction.
This is known as the paradox of induction. But Mill’s paradox of induction is subject to criticism
for the following reasons-
First, Mill’s argument involves the fallacy of petitio principii because he argues in a circu-
lar way. He says that the principle of uniformity of nature is the ultimate basis; the major premise
168 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
of all inductive genrealisations and again he says that this principle is the result or conclusion of
induction. But can the uniformity of nature be the major premise and conclusion at the same time?
If it is the ground or very basis of induction it cannot be its result at the same time. Mill is trying to
prove uniformity of nature by induction and again he is trying to prove induction by uniformity of
nature. This is like proving A by B and B by A. But this is not tenable for he is arguing in a circular
manner. He assumes the law and again tries to prove it.
Secondly according to Mill the conclusion of induction per simple enumeration has lesser
degree of probability. If the principle of uniformity of nature be the result of induction per simple
enumeration it will have less probability too. In that case it cannot be the basis of all inductions.
But in scientific induction the conclusion has a higher degree of probability. What is less probable
cannot be the basis of what is highly probable. Thus uniformity of nature cannot be reduced to a
form of induction per simple enumeration. Since it is the basis of all inductions, it itself cannot be
reduced to a form of induction. Certainty can be the basis of probability, but probability cannot
form the basis of certainty.
Mill, as an empiricist, accepts the law of uniformity of nature as an empirically derived
assumption. His problem is that he takes induction, particularly scientific induction, as absolutely
certain. An absolutely certain generalisation cannot be founded on an empirically derived
assumption, that too which is a product of induction per simple enumeration. So he tries to make
the law of uniformity of nature as the major premise of all inductions and draws generalisations
from it to make induction as absolutely certain. He seeks logical or formal certainty in case of
induction. That means to provide analytical or formal certainty to scientific induction he seeks
justfication for the law of uniformity of nature on the basis of experience of facts. That leads him
to fall to the problem of paradox of induction.
But any generalisation, even scientific generalisation, cannot enjoy formal certainty for
inductions are about facts of the world. Any proposition that enjoys formal or analytical certainty
cannot have factual significance. Any factually significant assertion cannot enjoy logical, formal or
analytical certainty. To mix formal certainty with factual certainty is a conceptual confusion.
Further in case of factual certainty there are also differences. The statement that at present
FORMAL GROUNDS OF INDUCTION 169
there are thirty districts in the state of Odisha is a particular proposition whose truth can be
conclusively ascertained by verification. In case of particular propositions, its truth or falsity can
be ascertained by verification with the help of observation or experiment of facts. But a general
proposition like all material bodies gravitate, no crow is a mammal etc. is a generalisation with
unlimited numbers. Such propositions can have probability but not certainty. Since we have
verified such cases under numerous and varied situations we accept them beyond doubt as
uniform occurrences. But such generalisations cannot enjoy formal or analytical certainty, for no
factually siginificant proposition possesses it.
Mill’s confusion of two stands leaves him in a paradoxical position. But a paradox is an
absurd position somewhat self-contradictory or self-defeating. Mill as an empiricist tries to find
justification for the law of uniformity of nature and has taken experience as its basis. He, therefore,
infers it like an induction. On the other hand he ascribes analytical certainty to induction thereby
making the law of uniformity of nature as the major premise of all inductions. For if it would be the
ultimate major premise of all inductions, generalisations thereby can be absolutely certain. So he
falls to a perplexing position by making the law of uniformity of nature as the basis of induction and
the law as a product of induction. But in fact no paradox would be there once it is understood that
inductive generalisations are factually true and cannot, unlike analytical propositions, enjoy absolute
certainty.
Thus it is absurd to accept the law of uniformity of nature as the ground of all inductions
and again make itself a result of induction. But this paradox can easily be avoided. For if the law
of uniformity of nature be taken as the ground of all inductions, the empiricist position that the law
of uniformity of nature is the result of an inductive procedure should be given up. And if the law
will be taken as a result of induction per simple enumeration, then the idea that it is the ultimate
ground of all inductions should be abandoned.
It has been pointed out earlier that the law of uniformity of nature and the law of causation
constitute the formal ground of induction. Mill says that a principle of unimormity of nature is the
formal ground of all inductions. For the leap from the known to the unknown, some to all is made
170 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
possible by the presupposition of the law of uniformity of nature. In case of scientific induction
both the principles of causation and uniformity of nature form the formal ground of indcution. By
means of law of causation a causal connection is first established between two events. But to
generalise or extend this result further under the impression that the same cause will produce the
same effect under similar circumstances we must seek the help of the principle of uniformity of
nature. Law of causation is the discovery of a causal relationship between two events, states,
processes or phenomena. But in order to arrive at a general proposition we need the help of the
law of uniformity of nature. Thus for instance while to ascertain a causal connection between
gravitation and falling of a particular stone to ground we need the law of uniformity of nature to
establish the general proposition “all material bodies fall to the ground because of gravitation”.
In the conclusion it can be said that whereas the law of uniformity of nature is the ground of
all forms of induction to bridge the gap of inductive leap the law of causation forms the basis of
scientific induction. But both the laws constitute the formal ground of induction.
SUMMARY
Uniformity of Nature :
According to Mill the law of uniformity of nature is a formal ground of induction. It
maintains that the same cause will produce the same effect under similar circumstances.
It also means nature behaves uniformly under similar circumstances.
There are different spheres of nature and each sphere is governed by uniform laws or
regularities. The different laws or regularities constitute one system that we call nature. So nature
is unity in diversity.
When Mill reduces uniformity of nature to a form of induction there arises a paradox.
Once the ground of induction is reduced to a form of induction, there will arise the fallacy of
petitio prinicipii and other difficulties.
***
FORMAL GROUNDS OF INDUCTION 171
MODEL QUESTION
GROUP – A
Objective Questions
1.a. What are the formal grounds of induction?
b. State the law of uniformity of nature.
2. Fill in the blanks :
a. Law of uniformity of nature is ________ ground of induction. (formal, informal, material)
b. Law of causation is _______ ground of induction. (experimental, formal, material)
c. _________ is justified by the Law of unifromity of nature.
(analogy, inductiveleap, unscientific induction)
d. _________ holds the opinion that “the course of the world is not an uniformity but
uniformities. (Mili, Bain, Read)
3. Distinguish between :
Uniformity of nature and unity of nature.
Factual certainty and analytical certainty.
4. Write short answers :
a. What is the paradox of induction?
b. What is variety in nature?
5. Questions for long answers :
a. Discuss what is meant by the law of uniformity of nature.
b. What is paradox of induction? How can this paradox be solved?
***
172 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
CHAPTER-8
LAW OF CAUSATION
Introduction :-
The word “cause” is used in every day life as well as in science. The laymen uses the idea
of cause to have an immediate answer to some problem. For him what makes a thing occur is the
cause and what is made to occur due to something is the effect. When there is some event or
action, man wants to known the doer or the agent of that action. Sometimes he also seeks an
explanation about how something has happened. To know the agent or the process of an action
is considered to know its cause. In science it is somewhat a fundamental axiom that everything
that occurs in nature does not just occur. Whatever occurs in nature, occurs only under some
condition. To find out the cause of a phenomenon is to know the conditions that lead to its
occurrence.
Either in Science or in common sense, the law of causation states that every event has a
cause. The occurrence of everything is due to or on account of a cause. Whatever happens has
a cause. In the words of Mill “Every phenomenon which has a beginning must have a cause”.
Bain in the like manner says, “Every event that happens is definitely connected with some prior
event, which happening, it happens and which failing, it fails”. It means whatever phenomenon
happens is definitely connected with some prior event. The presence of this prior event causes
the occurrence or happening of the phenomenon and its absence to its non-occurrence. The
presence of some prior event is indispensable for the occurrence of a new phenomenon because
there cannot be any beginning out of nothing. “Ex nihilo nihil fit” which means nothing comes out
of nothing. Bain therefore rightly observes “no change arises out of vacuity or stillness”
LAW OF CAUSATION 173
The idea of cause has been construed differently by different philosophers. There is also
a popular as well as a scientific view of causation. The popular view of cause in many cases is
partial and sometimes even superstitious. Causation is also an important concept in scientific
explanation. The scientific view of cause as it was held in the past has undergone revision in
modern science. Keeping all these facts in view we shall discuss some commonly accepted
characteristics of causation.
i) Causal relation holds between pair of events on the basis of our experience. Causal
connection is discovered empirically. A causal relation is that a given phenomenon is uniformly
and invariably attended by another phenomenon. We experience, either through observation or
through experiment, regular association of one kind of phenomena with another kind of circum-
stance. On the basis of this observation we establish a causal connection between pairs of
phenomena.
We find that fire is invariably associated with smoke or water freezes and solidfies when
temperature becomes zero degree or less. This characteristic behaviour of phenomena gives the
idea of a causal relation between pairs of events. Since we uniformly observe fire to be associated
with smoke we take fire to be the cause of smoke. In case of a causal connection when we
observe one phenomenon, we expect to find the other. When we observe smoke we expect fire
to be there.
ii) Cause always precedes the effect. Causal relation between two phenomenon is a temporal
relation. There is invariable succession between two events which are causally connected. Even
there can be simultaneous causation. But under no circumstance the effect can precede the cause
nor can the cause follow the effect. Sometimes there can be co-effects of a single cause also.
iii) Cause and effect are relative concepts. A phenomenon can be the cause in relation to its
invariably following event, the effect, and the effect in relation to its invariably preceding
phenomenon, the cause. Flood can be the effect of excessive continuous rain. Thus in this example
174 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
continuous rain is the cause and flood is the effect. But flood can be the cause of crop failure. If
there is failure of crops due to flood, then flood can be taken as its cause. Hence there is no
phenomenon which is an absolute cause.
iv) Cause can be taken as the necessary and sufficient condition for the occurrence of the
effect. But the word “cause” is sometimes used either in the sense of necessary condition or sufficient
condition. So it is useful to know the difference between the two concepts. A necessary condition
is the circumstance in absence of which the effect cannot occur.A sufficient condition is a circumstance
in whose presence the effect must take place. For example, oxygen is a necessary condition for the
occurrence of combustion, for without it combustion cannot take place. But it is not a sufficient
condition for oxygen may be present without combustion occurring. Failure of heart is a sufficient
condition for the death of a person. For if someone’s heart stops functioning then that is sufficient
for the death of the person.
v) Causation is an empirical relation but not a logical implication. If it is said that there is a
causal connection between two events C1 and C2, say, for example, between mosquito-bite and
malaria it does not mean that C2 necessarily follows from C1. Rather their relation is discovered
after a lot of scientific investigation. So causal connection between two events is inductively
established on the basis of experience, either by observation or experiment. Hence causal relation
is a posteriori but not a priori. After repeated observation of the invariant association between
two phenomena and after discovering their characteristic connection, a causal relation between
them is established. So the effect does not logically follow from the cause but empirically and
inductively associated with the cause.
vi) Causal connection is not a relation between two isolated events, but there is generality in
such a relation. Two events to be causally connected means they are generally and uniformly
connected. That means each occurrence of an event being produced from a cause is a simple
instance of a causal law which is a general principle. That general principle holds that such
circumstances always follow from such phenomenon.
If I put my finger on fire and get hot-sensation it is not a single case of this sort. But it is
LAW OF CAUSATION 175
an instance of the causal connection that fire, when touched, gives hot sensation. That means
there is a general causal relation between fire and hot sensation. It signifies that this relation is an
invariant one for it will happen at any time, at any place and to any person. This generality
between two events as cause and effect is the result of the law of uniformity of nature.
Aristotle viewed cause from a wider perspective. A cause for Aristotle is not simple but
compound in nature consisting mainly of four factors. Besides, such factors are not interdependent
in the production of the effect. On the other hand each of the four factors has the legitimacy to be
treated as a cause by itself. So Aristotle virtually believes in four kinds of causes, namely I)
material cause ii) formal cause iii) efficient cause, and iv) final cause.
Material cause of a thing is the matter or the substance out of which the effect is produced.
Thus for example, cement, sand, bricks etc. constitute the material cause of a building. The
building is constructed out of these materials. So sand, cement, brick etc. form the material cause
of the building.
Formal cause of an effect means the new shape or the form that is given on the substance
for the production of an object or effect. Clay is materially necessary for creating a utensil, say a
pot, a statue or a brick. So it is on this clay that the form of a pot, or of a statue or of a brick is
imposed. So the form of the statue is formal cause for without it the clay would have remained as
clay only.
Efficient cause is the skill or the energy necessary for producing the effect. The cement,
bricks etc. cannot take the form of a building. It is the skill or the brain of the architect that has
created a Konark or a building. The agent who applies the form to the material is the efficient
cause. In making a gold-ring, the maker is the efficient cause, the form of the ring is the formal
cause, gold is the material cause.
The final cause of a thing is the very purpose for which the change is brought in. The
purpose behind the production of the effect is the final cause of the thing. The very idea or
176 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
purpose for which the entire project has been taken in is considered to be the final cause. The
purpose behind the making of a gold-ring is to wear it in a finger. This purpose is the final cause.
It is to be noted in this regard that the formal and the material causes are intrinsic in nature
as they are very much present in the constitution of the thing in question. But the eficient and the
final causes are extrinsic in nature as they are external to the concerned thing.
The cause is not something very simple to be known. Rather it is so complex that it
requires a lot of investigation to be known. It may be analysed into several condition. It is considered
by some as the sum total of all conditions. Conditions are classed as positive and negative. Thus
the positive conditions and the negative conditions taken together constitute the idea of cause.
Accordingly a positive condition is one that cannot be omitted and a negative condition is one
that cannot be introduced for the occurrence of the effect. In short positive conditions must be
present and negative conditions must be absent if the effect is to be produced. Negatively speaking
the effect cannot be produced if the positive conditions are absent and the negative conditions
are present. For example if a man fell down from the top of a tree and later on died the positive
conditions for his death would be the height from which he fell, the nature of the ground on which
he fell, the parts of the body that dashed against the ground, the stroke he received etc. Similarly
the negative conditions would be some support on the ground, immediate medical help, resistance
of the person to sustain a stroke etc. Like wise if a student secures the first position in HSC
examination the positive conditions are his preparations, intelligence, clarity, favorable questions,
proper valuation etc. whereas the negative conditions are erratic valuation, bad health at the time
of examination, too much of mental tension etc.
A positive condition is thus a necessary factor of a cause. There may be different factors
as well. Science treats all the necessary conditions and their invariability for the occurrence of the
effect. Effect too also consists of conditions. So a set of invariable conditions called the cause
gives rise to succession of other conditions called the effect.
LAW OF CAUSATION 177
In science all conditions which are necessary and sufficient are listed in the idea of a
cause. Scientifically the relation between cause and condition is analogous to the relation be-
tween the whole and the parts. Conditions taken together constitute the cause. Cause stands for
the whole and conditions are its different components. In order that the effect will be produced
all the positive conditions work to give rise to the effect. Mill too says “the cause is the sum total
of all conditions, positive and negative taken together.
It is to be mentioned in this connection that it is not possible to know all the negative
conditions. That is why a negative condition is described as the absence of all preventing circum-
stances. Those circumstances that prevent the occurrence of the effect are the negative condi-
tions. In a circumstance the number of the negative conditions may far exceed the positive con-
ditions. As they are too many it is not that easy to list all of them. But if in presence of the positive
conditions the effect does not occur, then the preventing circumstance that stands on the way is
investigated. Science takes note of the preventing factors and treats them as negative conditions.
But a common man does not distinguish between the necessary conditions and the pre-
venting conditions. Sometimes an important condition or a striking factor is regarded as the
whole cause. Even at times a negative condition is considered as the cause of a phenomenon
overlooking the positive conditions. These are considerations of a popular mind. But in scientific
analysis all conditions are explained to give a vivid description of what the cause of a phenom-
enon or of a class of phenomena is.
We have already mentioned in this chapter the idea of necessary condition and sufficient
condition in the context of concept of cause. Sometimes “cause” is used in the sense of necessary
condition and sometimes in the sense of sufficient condition. But these ideas - necessary condition
and sufficient condition--are different from each other though both are conditions for the occurrence
of an event. A necessary condition for the occurrence of an event is a circumstance in whose
absence the event cannot occur. While investigating the cause of a disease if a particular germ is
178 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
detected, the germ is taken as the necessary condition, for in its absence the disease cannot
occur. For admission into a +2 college passing of HSC examination or its equivalent examination
is a necessary condition for without it one is not eligible for admission into a college. But a
sufficient condition for the occurrence of an event is a circumstance in whose presence the event
must occur. If an event has several necessary conditions they must be included in the sufficient
condition. In the above example passing of HSC examination is a necessary condition for admission
in to a college but securing the requisite mark on merit selection is a sufficient condition for
admission. But sufficient condition is regarded as the combination of all necessary conditions.
Further when an effect is present and the cause is to be inferred or investigated, there the
necessary condition is sought for. But when the effect is to be inferred from the cause, the
sufficient condition is sought. That means cause is identified with either necessary condition or
sufficient condition depending upon the context.
In s causal sequence there are several events connected like a chain. In such a case a
proximate cause can be distinguished from a remote cause. Suppose in a causal series A causes
B, B causes C, C causes D. Here D is the direct effect of C, but it is the result of all the preceding
events such as A,B and C. In this example C is the proximate cause of D whereas A and B are
the remote causes of D. If there is deforestation, it creates ecological imbalance. From ecological
imbalance the atmospheric temperature increases. That results in melting of ice shelf in south pole
of Antarctica. This increases water level in the oceans and sea. Consequently low level land
areas will be submerged in water. Thus the immediate preceding cause of an event is its proximate
cause whereas the other causes in the causal sequence are the remote causes.
Mill takes cause as the sum total of conditions, positive and negative taken together. Bain
falls in line with Mill when he defines cause as the entire aggregate of conditions or circumstances
requisite to the effect. Carveth Read attempts to give a scientific account of causation by bringing
LAW OF CAUSATION 179
out its qualitative and quantitative aspects. According to him qualitatively cause is “the immediate,
unconditional, invariable antecedent of the effect” and quantitatively cause is “equal to the effect”.
Let us first discuss the qualitative marks of cause as pointed out above.
i) Cause and effect are relative terms. No one should be under the impression that cause
and effect are two distinct water-tight compartments. That is to say it is a mistake to believe that
there is a group of phenomena which are causes and another group which are effects. On the
other hand cause and effect are relative terms in as much as one and the same event may be a
cause in relation to its effect and also be an effect in relation to its cause. Thus for example while
rain is the cause of wet-ground, it is also the effect of monsoon cloud.
ii) The given phenomenon is an event in time. It is a matter of common experience that
things change constantly. Changes in nature occur ceaselessly. Without such changes the problem
of causation will not arise. It is inherent in man to ask for the cause of such changes. Man seeks
to know the cause behind the various phenomena that take place in nature. When some phenomena
occur, the existing order of things changes. Man’s intellectual need is to ask for the cause of such
changes.
iii) The cause is an antecedent of the effect. Causal relation is a temporal relation. That
means causation involves succession in time. Cause always precedes the effect and the effect
always follows the cause. Cause is, therefore, the antecedent of the effect. Mosquito bite precedes
malarial fever. So malarial fever is the effect and mosquito bite is the cause which precedes the
former.
But this view that cause is the antecedent of effect is objected by some logicians. For
they hold that cause and effect are relative ideas. An event cannot be called a cause by itself
unless it is associated with another event called the effect. That means if cause is an antecedent
and effect is a consequent how can causation be applied to them as one is existing and the
other is non-existing at a particular time. So they treat cause and effect as simultaneous events.
180 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
But again if two event take place simultaneously it is arbitrary to choose one of them as cause
and the other as effect.
It is to be remembered that although cause and effect are quite distinct in nature, their
distinctness is marked by a line similar to mathematical lines which just exist in our mind but not
in reality. That is to say nature is one continuous process, so no sharp line of demarcation is there
between cause and effect according to Mellone. According to him nature is a continuous process
and what we call cause or effect is nothing but different factors. So it is not that easy to mark off
one from the other.
iv) The cause is an invariable antecedent. Cause no doubt is an antecedent but each and
every antecedent is not to be taken as cause. Cause is an invariable antecedent. Antecedent can
be variable or invariable. Variable antecedents cannot be treated to be cause because they
sometimes precede the effect and sometimes do not. Hooting of an owl might be there prior to
the death of a great man. But it is not to be considered as the cause. For there are several
instances of death without prior hooting of the owl. Likewise appearance of a comet in the sky is
sometimes blindly believed to be the cause of death of some great men. But this too is not the
cause of death of a great man. For many other great men have died in the past even though no
comet was seen in the sky. In other words hooting of the owl and appearance of comet are
variable antecedents and they have no characteristic relation with the death of a man. A variable
antecedent is not the cause of an event. Invariable antecedents are those that invariably precede
their respective effects. So invariable antecedents are alone fit enough to be called causes. For
instance heart failure is the invariable antecedent of the consequent, death, because it always
precedes death.
Thus only invariable antecedent of a phenomenon can be entitled to be the cause. But to
take any antecedent to be the cause will lead to the fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc. This
fallacy literally means after this, therefore because of this. Before the death of a great leader,
there may be many antecedent phenomena like hooting of an owl, appearance of a comet,
LAW OF CAUSATION 181
cyclone in some part etc., but they are not the causes. If any and every antecedent of a phenom-
enon is taken as the cause there arises the fallacy of post hoc ergo popter hoc. Because they are
not invariable antecedents. On the other hand the cause is an invariable antecedent, because
without such an antecedent the effect does not occur.
v) The cause is the unconditional antecedent. All causes are invariable antecedents but not
vice versa. Cause is not only the invariable but also the unconditional antecedent. For if cause
were only invariable antecedent that would land us in the embarrassing position of saying day is
the cause of night or for that matter night is the cause of day. For day invariably precedes night
and night too invariably precedes day. But none of them can be called the cause of the other. The
reason is that day cannot independently cause night nor can night independently cause day. For
each of them to produce the other depends on a number of conditions like rotation of the earth
round the sun, light of the sun, position of the earth etc. So here the invariable relation of day and
night is conditional or dependent on a number of extraneous conditions as mentioned above. So
none of them can be the cause of the other, on the other hand both are coeffects. But the cause
without depending on any other extraneous condition must be able to produce the effect single-
handedly. In short it must be the sole sufficient agent to produce the effect. In other words the
cause must not only be invariable but also the unconditional antecedent. Bain therefore very
appropriately suggests that cause is the “sole sufficing circumstance whose presence makes the
effect and whose obsence arrests it”. To Mill an unconditional antecedent is that group of conditions
which without any further condition helps the event in question to occur.
vi) The cause is the immediate antecedent. The immediacy of the cause follows from its
unconditionality. Failing to produce the effect single handedly if the cause depends on some other
factor for the occurrence of the effect, it will be dependent on that factor and hence cannot be
unconditional. So the cause has to be the immediate antecedent and there must not be any
intervening factor behind it and its effect. Thus for example when a bullet is fired, the wall col-
lapsed and the man standing behind it is killed. Here firing of the bullet is the remote cause but
collapse of the wall is the proximate cause of the death of the man. For had the wall not collapsed
182 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
he would not have died despite the firing of the bullet. In a situation if A causes B, B causes C and
C causes D, then C is the immediate cause or the proximate cause of D whereas A or B is the
remote cause of D. Thus the cause is the immediate antecedent but not the remote antecedent.
The immediate antecedent is the proximate cause that immediately gives rise to the effect. But a
remote cause gives rise to the effect in a remote way.
According to Carveth Read so far as matter and energy are concerned there is a
quantitative equality or agreement between the cause and the affect. In other words quantitatively
matter and energy in the cause are equal to it in the effect. This is obvious for the reason that the
effect is not altogether a new product. Instead it is only transformation of the cause. This quantitative
equivalence of the cause and effect is based on the laws of conservation of matter and conservation
of energy.
The law of conservation of matter states that the total quantity of matter in the world
neither increases nor decreases, it remains constant or unchanged. The form of matter only
changes but not its quantity. For example the weight of water produced is exactly equal with the
weight of oxygen and hydrogen used for the purpose. Likewise the weight of the iron used is
found to be exactly identical with the weight of the utensil which is manufactured out of it. So in
both the cases there is quantitative equality of matter between the cause and the effect it has
produced. It is to be borne in mind that in the process of transformation of the cause into the
effect no quantity is lost. It remains unchanged, the form of course changes. Oxygen and hydro-
gen are gaseous in nature but the effect they produce, i.e. water, is liquid.
The law of conservation of energy likewise states that the total quantity of energy in the
world remains the same always. It neither increases nor decreases. What changes is the form of
the energy only but not its quantity. One form of energy may change into another form without
affecting its original quantity. In other words there is quantitative equality in regard to energy
between cause and effect. Thus, for example, when a moving vehicle stops, we say that the
motion in it is lost. But actually it is never so. No energy is actually lost. Here motion is not lost.
LAW OF CAUSATION 183
On the other hand the form of motion is converted to heat without affecting the original quantity.
Likewise we all are in possession of potential energy. But when we start doing our work the
potential energy is converted into kinetic energy. It is also a fact that the kinetic energy thus spent
is exactly equal in amount to the original potential energy we had, before we started the work. So
the form of energy only changes from potential to kinetic but in the process of transformation of
cause to effect the quantitative equivalence of the energy remains unchanged or unaffected.
Read has defined cause as quantitatively equal to the effect. The effect, actually speaking,
is nothing but the cause transformed. The matter or the energy which disappears as cause reappears
as effect and in the process of appearance and disappearance the quantitative equivalence of
both matter and energy and for that matter cause and effect remains the same. It neither increases
nor decreases. That is why cause is said to be quantitatively equal to the effect.
Thus, the cause of an event is qualitatively the invariable, unconditional and immediate
antecedent and quantitatively equal to the effect.
A common man is not reflective to inquire the cause of a phenomenon. Common people
are superstitious in their beliefs. When they seek to know the cause of a phenomenon they do not
take a scientific view of causation. A scientific view of causation is most dependable whereas
popular view of causation is unreliable and even vague at times. In explaining natural phenomena
sometimes common people attribute some supernatural cause. But science does not accept any
supernatural agency or explanation. There is nothing called supernatural in scientific framework.
For anything that occurs in nature is a natural phenomenon and every natural phenomenon can
have only some natural cause whether we know it or not. To discover or explain the cause of a
phenomenon in a scientific way is to add to human knowledge or information. Thus to explain
phenomena in a scientific way is the need of man’s intellectual quest. So it is better to guard
against the popular view of causation. Now let us explain some popular views of causation and
see how these explanations are incomplete and partial.
184 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
We have already discussed in this chapter that the idea of cause is extremely complex. It
is not that easy to locate the cause of a phenomenon; for what we call a cause involves many
factors or conditions. We have also discussed how cause is the sum total of conditions. There are
positive as well as negative conditions. For various reasons sometimes only one condition or at
times even a negative condition is chosen from the set of conditions and is given the status of a
cause. That is popularly done in absence of a reflective mind.
Often the last condition which appeared just before the occurrence of the effect is
considered to be the cause. In a football match who at last scored the lone goal for the victory of
the team, is considered to be the cause of the victory. Left to himself he could not have scored the
goal. It is because the entire team of players joined together he could score the goal. Thus he is
just a condition like all other players.
Similarly sometime a negative condition is selected and elevated to the rank of a cause.
For example, the cause of death of a snake-bitten patient is attributed to the absence of a doctor.
Again often the condition which looks very conspicuous is treated to be the whole cause. Thus
for example, suppose a man slips his foot while climbing a ladder and is ultimately killed, The
slipping is said to be the sole cause for his death. But actually slipping of the foot is just one of the
several conditions which jointly led to the death of the man. Sometimes an unnecessary or wholly
unconnected factor is chosen as the cause. Thus for instance, the failure of a student in the
examination is attributed to calling him from behind when he was setting out of his house for the
examination. Likewise hooting of an owl is considered to be the cause of death of the head of the
family. These antecedents have nothing to do with the effects. We have already discussed that
taking any antecedent to be the cause ends in the fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc. Sometimes
a supernatural agency is brought in to explain the cause of a phenomenon. Many gullible people
believe that godmen can bring out things from thin air. Astrologers ascribe the position of stars
and planets to be the cause of the important events of a person’s life. But these are all popular
ways of thinking of a cause of a phenomenon in absence of reflective mind. The popular way of
treatment of cause is thus wholly unsatisfactory. It is not only incomplete but unsound as well.
LAW OF CAUSATION 185
In the context of cause sometimes a distinction is made between the agent and the pa-
tient. Agent is that which acts and the patient is that which is acted upon. Anything that acts is the
agent and the thing that is acted upon is the patient. Injection given to a person is the agent and
the human organism upon which it acts or has its action is said to be the patient.
But such a distinction is scientifically unsound because it is based on the supposition that
the agent being the source of energy is active and the patient is passive or devoid of any energy.
But things that are apparently passive are really the store house of potential energy. This potential
energy is as much responsible for the production of the effect as the agent which manifests kinetic
energy. In other words in the above example both the injection and human organism are equally
responsible for any effect to occur. The agent and the patient are important conditions and they
together constitute the cause for any effect to take place. The patient is not passive but also has
an essential role in the concept of the cause. So the distinction is scientifically unsound. Mill,
therefore, rightly observes, “the distinction between agent and patient is merely verbal, patients
are always agents”
Moving power is the force which impels or incites the action. Collocation is arrangement
of circumstances for the production of the effect. For example when a battery is affixed to the
machine of a watch all the parts start functioning. Here the battery is called the moving power as
it forces the parts to perform their respective functions, while the machine where parts are
systematically arranged is the collocation. The effect i.e. the functioning of the watch as a whole
is jointly produced by the moving power and the collocation. But neither the moving power(battery)
nor the collocation(the machine of the watch) can produce the effect single handedly. Both are
necessary for the required purpose i.e. showing time.
But popularly speaking moving power alone is considered to be the cause. But this is
unscientific. For scientifically speaking both moving power and collocation are necessary factors
of the cause.
186 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
Plurality of causes is not based on scientific view of causation, rather it is based on the
popular view. Plurality of causes is a common sense opinion for it means that a given effect or
phenomenon may have been the result of alternative causes. In other words it states that one and
the same effect can be produced by different causes on different occasions. According to Mill
the same cause will always produce the same effect but not vice versa. In other words the same
effect does not always follow from the same cause. It may be caused by alternative causes.
Carveth Read maintains “ the same event may be due at different times to different antecedents”.
Thus for example, light may be due to the sun, the moon, electricity or any other form of light.
Death is caused by road accident, disease, suicide, starvation, or any of the hundreds of other
circumstances that are capable of causing it. A crop failure may be attributed to any of the causes
like flood, excessive rainfall, drought, attack of insects etc.
This view that there can be alternative causes of an effect conflicts with the idea that the
cause is an invariable antecedent. If the cause is interpreted in the sense of being the invariable
and unconditional antecedent or as the necessary and sufficient condition of the effect, then how
to account for the doctrine of plurality of causes? If the scientific view of cause holds that every
effect has a unique cause, then how does plurality of causes appear to be a doctrine? Of course
the cause is not simple, but something extremely complex consisting of many conditions. But in
spite of that there is only one such complex cause uniquely associated with an effect in question.
This runs quite contrary to the doctrine of plurality of causes. In the light of the scientific view of
causation the doctrine of plurality of causes has been criticised by logicians.
i) As the cause is taken specifically the falsity of the doctrine of plurality of causes can be
noticed if the effect too is taken specifically. This way of finding fault with the doctrine of plurality
of causes is called “specializing the effect”.
It is a fact that the effect death is caused by disease in one case, by accident in another
case and by starvation in yet another case and so on. But it is equally also true that death caused
by accident is different from death caused by disease, and death caused by disease is also
LAW OF CAUSATION 187
different from death caused by starvation. Death due to accident does not produce the same
features as death due to starvation. So death in all cases is not identical, it rather differs from case
to case. In other words a specific type of death is produced in each case. There are alternative
causes of death because there are different kinds of effect of death. If like the cause the effect too
would be taken in its entirety there would not have been plurality of causes. On the other hand
corresponding to a specific cause there would be a specific effect. In the given example the type
of death due to accident can be produced by accident alone and never by disease or starvation.
ii) The falsity of the doctrine of plurality of causes can also be detected if like the effect the
cause is taken generically. This way of proving its falsity is known as generalizing the cause.
While viewing the effect generically we should have also taken a general account of the
cause. In brief if the effect was generalised the cause ought to have been genralised also. In that
case many causes would not have been responsible for one and the same effect. In stead one
definite cause will give rise to one specific effect. Thus for example when we generalise the
different causes of death it will be noticed that the common or general character namely “failure
of the vital functions” of human organism is the lone cause for the effect death.
The doctrine of plurality of causes arises due to divergent treatment meted out to cause
and effect. So the defect can be rectified, as above, either by generalizing or by specializing both
the cause and the effect.
Thus the doctrine of plurality of causes is thoroughly unsound from the scientific point of
view. But the doctrine is a common sense opinion widely believed by an unreflective mind.
However the doctrine of plurality of causes cannot be rejected on a priori basis. Rather the
doctrine that every cause is the invariable antecedent is the result of empirical findings. That every
effect is associated with a unique cause is known empirically, so the apparent plurality disappears
when the effect is precisely and specifically mentioned. That establises the hypothesis that every
phenomenon or effect has a unique and invariable single cause but not plurality of causes.
188 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
But conjunction of causes should not be mistaken for plurality of causes. For while
in conjunction of causes several causes combine or act together to produce a single effect,
in plurality of causes several causes act separately or independently to produce a single effect. To
speak it out symbolically, in plurality of causes c1 or c2 or c3 produces the effect e while in
conjunction of causes c1+c2+c3 produce the effect e.
There are two kinds of intermixture of effects, namely (I) homogeneous intermixture of
effects and (ii) heterogeneous or heteropathic intermixture of effects.
In homogeneous intermixture of effects the joint effect is of the same kind or nature with
separate effects. When switched on an electric bulb gives light. Again if one more bulb is lighted
in the same room no doubt together they will provide more light. But nevertheless it is light only.
So light is not only the joint effect of two bulbs operating together, it is also the effect of two
separate bulbs operating individually.
is water. Here the nature of the joint effect that is water is different from the separate causes i.e.
oxygen and hydrogen. In other words while water is liquid oxygen and hydrogen are gases.
Likewise we take different types of food and the joint effect of all these is blood, bone, vitality
etc. But blood and bone are of different in nature from the food we have taken i.e. rice, milk,
vegetable, fish etc. In other words the characteristics of rice, milk etc are not found in blood, bone,
vitality etc.
It is to be noted that in some cases the cause and effect are mutually convertible. But that
is not a universal phenomenon. In the above example we get water from oxygen and hydrogen,
so also we get oxygen and hydrogen from water experimentally. Such mutual convertibility of
cause and effect is called transformation. But in other cases such convertibility of cause and
effect is ruled out for neither can food be converted to blood and bone nor vice versa. The idea
of intermixture and of convertibility is mostly illustrated in some area of science like chemistry,
physiology etc.
The relation of functional dependence has been introduced by the modern scientists for
calculating the exact relation between two phenomena. Particularly in well developed empirical
sciences laws are formulated which give exact result in context of the quantitative characteristic
of the cause. The notion of function is familiar in mathematics. For example if we say y = x+1, y
happens to be a function of x for the value of y is definitely determined when x takes a determinate
value. So in science attempts are made to formulate laws for exactly determining the functional
relation of the characteristcs covering a cause and its exact effect. Einstein’s formula E = mc2
categorically states the mass-energy relationship. On the otherhand the proposition “water boils
when heated” is not an exact contention to explain the relation of water and heat. But if it is held
that water boils at 1000 C it is expressed in more exact terms. That means some of the empirical
laws are calculated in mathmatical terms because of their preciseness and exactness. That is
what is called the relation of functional dependence.
***
LAW OF CAUSATION 191
SUMMARY
LAW OF CAUSATION :
Every event has a cause, that is every phenomenon which has a beginning has a cause.
The important characteristics of a cause are :
(i) cause and effect are relative concepts;
(ii) causal relation holds between a pair of events;
(iii) cause can be taken as the necessary and sufficient condition for the occurrence of the
effect;
(iv) causal relation is an empirical relation, but not a logical implication;
(v) causal connection is not a relation between two isolated events, but there is generality in
such a connection.
Aristotle considered cause as a compound concept and distinguished four kinds of causes.
They are material cause, formal cause, efficient cause and final cause.
CAUSE AND CONDITION :
Cause is considered as the sum total of conditions, positive and negative. For the
occurrence of the effect positive conditions must be present and negative condition must be
absent. A negative condition is the preventing circumstance.
A necessary condition is the circumstance in the absence of which the event cannot
occur. A sufficient condition is the circumstance in the presence of which the event must occur.
In a causal sequence there are several events connected like a chain. The immediate
preceding condition of an event is called its proximate cause and the remote conditions in the
sequence are called the remote cause.
QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE MARK OF CAUSATION :
Qualitatively cause is the invariable, unconditional and immediate antecedent of the
effect and quantitatively equal to the effect. This is called the scientific view of causation which is
distinguished from the popular view.
192 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
MODEL QUESTIONS
GROUP - A
Objective Questions :
1. Answer the following :-
i) What is the quantitative mark of a cause ?
ii) What is the positive condition of a cause ?
iii) What does negative condition of a cause mean ?
iv) Give an example of plurality of causes
v) Define Cause
vi) Give an example of homogenous intermixture of effects
vii) What is an agent ?
LAW OF CAUSATION 193
GROUP - B
Short-type Questions :
1. Distinguish between the following :-
i) Cause and condition
ii) Positive condition and negative condition
iii) Remote cause and proximate cause
iv) Necessary condition and sufficient condition
194 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
GROUP - C
Long-type Questions :
1. Explain the different qualitative marks of causation.
5. State and explain the meaning of conjunction of causes and intermixture of effects. Illustrate
its different kinds with examples.
***
CHAPTER-9
MATERIAL GROUNDS OF INDUCTION
Introduction :-
Induction is usually defined as the establishment of the material truth of a general real
proposition. Hence purely formal grounds cannot be enough for the establishment of the inductive
conclusions. The material truth is assured by material grounds. For the material truth the particular
instances are taken into consideration through observations or experiments. Thus observation
and experiment are the material grounds of induction. In order to arrive at a conclusion like “All
crows are black”, it is very much required to observe the colour of some particular instances of
crows. Similarly, in order to arrive at a generalised conclusion like “Water is composed of hydrogen
and oxygen”, one has to check its composition through the experiment of the electro-chemical
analysis of water. It has been said that each premise of the inductive reasoning stands for one
particular instance, that is expressed by the help of one true proposition. Those true propositions
become the basis for the conclusion. Those true propositions are usually obtained through
observation or experiment . In this way observation and experiment supply the materials of
inductive reasoning.
9.1 OBSERVATION :
Every moment we are exposed to some kind of events or occurrences. If we try to frame
some definite opinion about the events we come across, we have to observe the instances keenly.
The random observation of instances won’t help for any clear understanding of the phenomena
of nature. In the words of Jevon, “To observe is merely to notice events and changes which are
produced in the ordinary course of nature, without being able, or at least attempting to control or
vary those changes”. In this way, observations performed with a definite purpose are different
196 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
‘Observation’ has been derived from the Greek words ‘ob’ and ‘servare’. The above
two words stand for the meanings ‘to keep’ and ‘before the mind’ respectively. The knowledge
derived by placing something before the mind leads to observational knowledge. Usually the
perceptual knowledge is considered as the observational knowledge. But in respect of the inductive
reasoning ‘observation’ has been defined as regulated perception with a definite purpose. It
shows that three factors are involved in the case of an observation. There must be some object
to be observed, the sense organs to observe the object and the mind to become aware of it. This
process is repeated for several times in order to arrive at a conclusion.
CHARACTERISTICS :
A vast nature is present before us. Every moment we come across some event
of nature. When similar type of events are observed in repeated manner, one feels to find
out an explanation with regard to the functioning of nature. That helps us to distinguish
the random or casual perception from regulated perception.
ii. Observation should be systematic and selective. Observation excludes the cases of careless
and stray perceptions. It should be systematic and selective. When the purpose of
observation is decided we select those instances, which have got relevance with the
purpose. Suppose we want to observe the colour of the crows. Then out of the different
types of birds we select only crows to observe. Hence perception should not be careless
or a casual one. The aim of perceptions is to establish some generalised truths. A general
MATERIAL GROUNDS OF INDUCTION 197
truth cannot be derived from stray or casual perception. The perception should be
systematic and selective.
iii. Observation should be impartial and free from any bias.It means that the observation
should be strictly objective. Sometimes in order to establish a definite conclusion we
overlook certain instances, which are not favourable to the conclusion. For example,
when a sales representative demonstrates the utilities of a particular product he only
shows us some of the suitable utilities of it. He overlooks those instances, which are not
favourable for the purpose of demonstration. This is an example of biased observation.
Such types of biased observation should be avoided. Observations should be objective.
Similarly, observation should be neutral. If the neutrality is not maintained it may lead to
fallacious observations. For example, while evaluating the answer scripts if the examiner
thinks that he is evaluating the scripts of brilliant students then the mistakes present in the
answer script may be overlooked.
iv. Joyce has pointed out that very often observations are not free from subjective influ-
ences. There can be three types of subjective influences of the observer, namely, intellec-
tual, physical and moral.
a) The intellectual condition refers to the interest and sincerity of the observer for knowing.
If there is no desire to know something then careful and objective observation may
not take place. Because of this condition we make a distinction between intentional
observation and baseless observations. A sound mind of the observer helps in satisfying
this condition.
b) The sense organs of the observer should not be defective. In such cases the
observations will lead to fallacious observations. Moreover, our sense organs have
limited ability of perceiving the things. The germs are not visible to naked eyes. Many
198 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
stars and planets are not visible to us. A colour blind man cannot observe colours
perfectly. In such cases if the proper instruments are not used erroneous observations
take place. Hence the physical condition should be satisfied for true and unbiased
observations.
c) The third condition is moral one. It is obvious that for impartial observation there
should not be any dogma or bias. Thus for impartial observation the observer should
be free from impositions or any influences. Unless one is having a free and impartial
mind his observation may not be objective, real and accurate.
v. Observation is the active process of knowing the truth. Knowledge through observation
is always active. The involvement of sense organs makes it active. Of course, the
experiments are more active as compared to observations. But observations are not
passive.
vi. Observations should be simple.Simple and direct observations help in knowing the
uncontroversial truths. Since the aim of observation is to obtain right knowledge and to
establish the material truth of a general proposition it should be simple and direct.
In order to have successful observation some conditions need to be fulfilled, failing which
it may lead to fallacious observations. The conditions may be either objective or subjective. It is
very much clear that we use our sense organs for observations. But our sense organs have some
limitations. By the help of eyes we can see many things. But there are also very minute objects,
which are not visible to us through our normal vision. For example the bacterias, germs, etc. are
not visible to our naked eyes. Here the objective conditions are not satisfied for the successful
vision of minute particles. Similarly, we hear sound when it is up to a particular limit. If the sound
is beyond that limit or lower to the audible range, then we cannot hear it through our ears. For
that some instruments may help in satisfying the objective conditions of the observation. The
presence of sufficient light for the observation of perceptual objects is an objective condition.
MATERIAL GROUNDS OF INDUCTION 199
It is quite obvious that for successful observations the objective conditions need to be satisfied.
But some logicians points out that satisfying this condition is not enough. Joyce points out that
there is also the need of satisfying the subjective conditions to have a successful observation.
And he points out three such conditions, namely, intellectual, physical and moral.
INTELLECTUAL CONDITIONS :
This condition refers to the intensity of the desire of the observer in order to have the
observation. Unless the observer is serious about the purpose of observation, the observation
may not be up to the mark. Thus the observer must have the desire to know about something for
which he has to undertake some observations. This desire to know is considered as the intellectual
condition of observation.
PHYSICAL CONDITION :
This condition refers to the sound reception capacity of the observer. The observer gets
the observational knowledge through his sense organs and mind. Unless the sense organs are
non-defective and the mind is sound one cannot expect correct observational knowledge. Say,
for example, an insane person’s observation is not taken as a standard observation. The visual
report of a person who has poor eyesight cannot be taken to be acceptable. Thus in order to
have clear observation the observer should have a sound mind and sound sense organs, i.e. he
must be physically sound.
MORAL CONDITION :
It refers to the impartiality of the observer. Jevon says, “It is not easy to find persons who
can with perfect fairness register facts both for and against their own peculiar views”. That means
very often people are influenced by their own judgments about the facts of observation and lose
impartiality of observations. For example, while going to evaluate the answer scripts if it is kept
in the mind of the examiner that he is evaluating answer scripts of his own students then impartial
observation may not be possible. The imposition of own ideas upon the observed facts leads to
faulty observations. That will lack impartiality Hence observer should be free from all kinds of
200 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
Besides all these subjective conditions, it is also quite important that there should be
favourable natural condition for the observation.
FALLACIES OF OBSERVATION :
The possibility of error in the process of observation cannot be ruled out. Erroneous
observation leads to fallacious induction. Fallacies in observation vitiates the purpose of inductive
procedure. It is necessary to know the fallacies of observation so as to remain careful not to
commit them.
The fallacies of observation are mainly of two types, namely negative and positive. The
negative fallacy is the result of non-observation and the positive fallacy is the result of mal-
observation.
NON-OBSERVATION :
The fallacy of non-observation occurs when what should have been observed is over-
looked. They are also of two types, non-observation of essential circumstances (partial non-
observation) and non-observation of instances (complete non-observation). They are very
common in our day today life. Let us illustrate them:-
a) Non- observation of essential instances:- The instance which is important for the
purpose of investigation if overlooked, while making the observation, then it leads to
the fallacy of non-observation of essential instances.
For example, suppose a person actually suffers from malarial fever. While examining if
the doctor overlooks malarial symptoms and takes it as some other fever, it becomes a case of
non-observation of essential instances. This fallacy can be avoided if extreme care is taken at the
time of investigation.
There are also cases where the part of the object is visible but not the whole. The
invisible part might include some essential evidences. When we observe the moon, it is visible
MATERIAL GROUNDS OF INDUCTION 201
partly. It is a case of partial non-observation. One can use instruments and repeat the observa-
tion for a number of times to improve the knowledge of partial observations.
B. NON-OBSERVATION OF INSTANCES :
Just like partial non-observations, there may be also cases of complete non-observations.
The germs are not visible to the naked eye. We see a glass of water and decide that it is pure and
worth drinking. It is because of the fact that the presence of the germs is not observed at all. It is
a case of complete non-observation.
MAL OBSERVATION :
There are cases of observation where the actual object is observed as something else.
These are the cases of positively wrong observations. For example, sometimes a mirage is perceived
as water or a straight rod is perceived as bent one when half immersed in water. Similarly the
parallel train lines appear to be meeting at a point is also a case of fallacious observation. Such
types of positively wrong observation are known as mal observation. Mal observations are
categorised into two types, namely, individual mal-observation and universal mal-observation.
a) Individual mal-observation :-
b) Universal mal-observation :-
There are certain cases of illusions and hallucinations which are universally found with
every one. Every one is liable to commit that mistake under similar circumstances. Whoever
stands at one end of a train line the parallel lines appear to be merged at certain point. Here
careful observation will not help in overcoming such wrong perception. Because it is possible for
every one to commit this fallacy it is called universal mal-observation. Incase of universal mal-
observations undue assumptions are wrongly inferred. The most popular example of universal
mal-observation is the case of sunrise and sunset. We think that we observe sunrise and sunset,
whereas scientifically considering there is neither sunrise nor sunset.
9.2 EXPERIMENTS :
We find water as a part of the natural phenomena. Scientists have experimented with
water and have found it to be the combination of hydrogen and oxygen at a particular ratio. This
view or the conclusion of the scientists has been accepted as a general truth on the ground of
experiments. Any one can verify this truth under the agreement of certain conditions. The verification
can be done for any number of times also. Thus the experiments help us in arriving at an acceptable
truth and the experiments are always within our control.
NATURAL EXPERIMENTS :
Sometimes nature creates a special circumstance for our observation of some event, It is
called natural experiment. Where nature makes the arrangements for the production of a definite
effect, Jevon calls it natural experiment. For example, before the invention of rockets or the
satelites it was not possible to know the shape of the earth. But special circumstances of nature
like eclipses, have helped to know the shape of the earth through its shadow. This knowledge
regarding the shape of the earth could be possible through special circumstances of nature i.e.
eclipses. Such type of cases is considered to be natural experiments by Jevon.
Strictly considering such types of cases need not be named as experiments. Because
adequate justification cannot be given to consider those to be experiments. Experiments are
arranged ones. Nature cannot be treated as an arranger. So it is not proper to consider them as
experiments.
There are certain points of similarities and dissimilarities between observation and
experiment.
SIMILARITIES :
a) Both of them are material grounds of inductive inference.
b) Both of them aim at explaining certain facts and provide us knowledge about the facts.
204 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
c) There is the involvement of physical, moral and intellectual conditions in both the cases of
observation and experiment. For impartiality one should be physically, intellectually sound
and morally unbiased.
d) Both are the case of observations. The experiments are also observed.
DISSIMILARITIES :
a) Observation is defined as the regulated perception of events or phenomena of nature.
Experiment is defined as the artificial reproduction of events under the arranged conditions.
Thus, the former is the perception of natural events and the later is the perception of
artifically reproduced events.
Bain explains it as: observation is finding a fact, experiment is making one.
b) For observation one has to depend upon nature. The events of nature are not in our
control. The observer is a passive onlooker.
But in case of experiment we interrogate nature This view is maintained by Bacon. In
case of experiment we are actively involved to reach at a definite answer in respect of
certain querries about the nature.
c) The knowledge obtained through observation is comparatively less certain than the knowl-
edge obtained through experiment.
d) Modification is not possible in case of observation. A modified observation is treated as
a fresh observation or another piece of observation.
But modifications are allowed in case of experiment in order to become sure about the
findings of observation.
ESTIMATE :
The considerations that observation is strictly passive and experiment is strictly active,
or that observation is strictly natural and experiment is strictly artificial, are definitely misleading.
Observation cannot be strictly passive nor can it be completely natural. In observation the
event is presented by nature under natural circumstances. So it is more natural a process than
MATERIAL GROUNDS OF INDUCTION 205
There are certain cases where observation is the only mode of acquiring
knowledge. It is not possible to artificially reproduce the stars, the heavenly bodies in the
laboratory and make experiments on them. The knowledge about such distant objects
like stars, comets, etc. or the effect of some unusual circumstances like earth quake, war
etc. is known through observations only. In this sense the observation has wider scope of
application and it is universally applicable.
2. One can pass from cause to effect and effect to cause in observation :
It is the most important limitation of experiment that the sequence of the events
cannot be done in the reverse order. The causal event has to be applied first then the
effect is to be observed. ‘Heat expands material bodies’ can only be verified through the
experiments where heat is to be applied first. So in case of experiments we only pass
from cause to effect, but in observation either way is possible.
It means that observation is a preparatory way for experiment. Whatever may be the
experiment it is to be observed first. Newton observed the fall of the apple first and then
proved the gravitational force through experiments. It shows that observation precedes
experiment but experiment does not precede observation.
206 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
1. The experiments are performed under the control of the performer. Hence the problem
of waiting for the occurrence of the event in nature does not arise is case of experiments.
If some one wants to study monsoon, then he has to wait till the time of monsoon to
come. The object of observation is very often in the control of the nature.But in case of
experiment, the object of observation is under the control of observer. The observer can
arrange the situation to study the phenomenon under controlled condition. Here he is not
under the mercy of nature. So the advantage of the experiment is that here waiting for the
nature is not required.
2. The change, modiification and repeatition are possible in case of experiments as per the
requirement. The performer of the experiment is the master of the situation. The experiment
is always within his control. He can repeat or modify it as per his need. But such type of
addition or alteration of conditions is not possible in case of observations. In experiment
one can isolate or vary a phenomenon in a complex situation for his study. From experience
it is known that combustion of something is possible when it is in open air, without air it
does not burn. But air is the mixture of different gases. Which gas helps for combustion
cannot be known by observation. But by experiment one can separately apply nitrogen,
carbon, oxygen etc. to confirm which gas helps for combustion. By experiment it is
found that oxygen is the gas that helps fire to burn.
4. One important advantage of experiment is that it helps to study the situation with coolness
MATERIAL GROUNDS OF INDUCTION 207
of mind and patience. In observation we are in a hurry to study something when it occurs
lest it may disappear. When we observe a comet or an earthquake we must be alert at
that moment since it will last for a short duration. But this problem is not there in experiment
as it is in our control. We can prolong an experiment as long as we want it but this
opportunity is not there in case of observation.
5. Exactness of a study can be ascertained only in experiment but that is not possible in
case of observation. Since there is scope for repetition and varying of the situation,
accuracy of a result is possible in experiment. An agricultural scientist studies the impact
of a chemical fertiliser on some seed in different varying circumstances. A pathologist
studies the effectiveness of different anti-biotics by making culture of urine or blood. The
accuracy of a study can be achieved by experiment but not by observation.
***
208 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
SUMMARY
MATERIAL GROUNDS OF INDUCTION :
Observation and experiment are considered as the two material grounds of induction.
Observation is the regulated perception of phenomena under natural conditions. In order to have
satisfactory observational knowledge the physical, intellectual and moral conditions are to be
observed carefully. Further it is also necessary to remain careful not to commit the fallacy of
observations. The fallacy may occur when something is wrongly observed as something else, or
due to non-observation of instances or essesntial circumstances. The former fallacy is called mal-
observation and the latter fallacy is called non-observation.
Experiment is the artificial reproduction of event under pre-arranged conditions. In ex-
periment the instances can be repeated. Here we can have the advantage of applying quantitative
changes.
Observation and experiment do not differ in kind but only in degree. Each of them has
some relative advantage over the other.
MODEL QUESTIONS
OBSERVATION AND EXPERIMENT
GROUP – A
Objective Questions :
1. Answer the following :-
a. What are the material grounds of induction?
b. Give an example of experimental observation.
c. What is simple observation?
d. Is observation possible without experiment?
e. Give an example of mal-observation.
f. What is experiment?
g. State one of the advantages of observation over experiment.
h. State one of the advantages of experiment over observation.
i. Name two different fallacies of observation.
j. What is natural experiment?
2. Fill in the blanks :-
a. Experiment is a _________ ground of induction.
MATERIAL GROUNDS OF INDUCTION 209
GROUP – C
Long-type Questions :
1. What is observation? Explain its nature and characteristics.
2. What is experiment? Distinguish it from observation.
3. Observation and experiment do not differ in kind but in degree---explain.
4. Discuss the relative advantages of observation over experiment.
5. Discuss the relative advantages of experiment over observation.
6. Why is observation the material ground of induction? Discuss its fallacies.
***
210 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
CHAPTER - 10
HYPOTHESIS
Mill defines hypothesis as “any supposition which we make either without actual evidence
or on evidence avowedly insufficient in order to endeavour to deduce from it conclusions in accordance
with facts which are known to be real under the idea that if the conclusions to which the hypothesis
leads, are known truths, the hypothesis itself either must be, or at least is likely to be true.”
Let us take one example to explain it. Suppose one day at a particular time when we
arrive at the station to board the train, we do not find the heavy crowd on the platform which
normally should have been there during the time of the departure of the train. It puzzles us. We try
to know the reason. Here a possible explanation comes to the mind that perhaps there is rail-
strike somewhere for which the trains are cancelled. Or may be there is some derailment for
which the schedule has been changed. Such explanations are different attempts to remove the
puzzlement. After inquiry or verification we can be sure of the reason.
Modern logicians prefer the term ‘ explanation’ in place of ‘hypothesis’. Logicians, Copi
and Cohen, have given the definition of an explanation in the following manner: “An explanation
is a group of statements or a story from which the thing to be explained can logically be inferred
and whose acceptance removes or diminishes its problematic or puzzling character”.
The explanations may be concerning scientific truths or may be concerning the facts of
every day life. Accordingly there are two types of explanations, namely, scientific and unscientific.
CHARACTERISTICS OF HYPOTHESIS
iv) Through hypothesis facts are organized in a systematic manner. The aim of hypothesis is
to reach at the real explanation and to remove the puzzlement concerning the event. It is
possible through systematization of involved facts. In this way very often hypothesis is
framed to explain a law.
Since E is not due to h1, h2 or h3 E is due to h4. This logical form is applicable if the number of
causes of a hypothesis is fixed.
Different logicians have classified hypothesis in different ways. We shall discuss some
important classifications here :-
1. READ’S CLASSIFICATIONS:
When a hypothesis is framed with a supposition that a being or some agent is responsible
for the occurrence of the event, it is considered as the hypothesis concerning agent. In
case of a theft, the supposition is concerning persons committing the theft. Hence, those
suppositions are hypothesis concerning agent.
In respect of certain facts, the agent is known or the circumstances involved are known,
but the method or process involved in it is not known. If presuppositions are framed for
this unknown process, then it becomes a hypothesis concerning law. Because the method
does not refer to one particular instance, it is concerned with a type or category for
which the verified hypothesis leads to a law.
2. WELTON’S CLASSIFICATION:
a) Hypothesis of Cause:
Welton does not differentiate between hypothesis concerning agent and collocation. He
puts both the categories in one type and considers it as hypothesis concerning cause.
Any hypothesis that explains the cause of a phenomenon is a hypothesis concerning
cause. In case of events of nature, the agent and the circumstance fall in one group,
214 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
b) Hypothesis of Law :
3. Stebbing’s Classification:
a) Explanatory Hypothesis:
b) Descriptive Hypothesis:
c) Analogical Hypothesis:
Scientists could notice a great deal of resemblance between the planets Earth
and Mars in respect of temperature, atmosphere, etc. On that basis a hypothesis could
be framed that since living beings are there in earth there may be living beings in mars.
This category of hypothesis is considered to be analogical hypothesis. Stebbing defines
it as : by an analogical hypothesis we mean a hypothesis that what is true of one set of
phenomena may be true of another set owing to the fact that the two sets have in common
certain formal properties.
a. Working Hypolthes:
investigator does not wait for a reasonable hypothesis. He starts investigation with some
supposition. That may provide some clue to ascertain the cause. This is described as
working hypothesis.
b) Adhoc-hypothesis:
If any difficulty is found in respect of an existing law or an accepted truth, the law is
challenged immediately. First of all a hypothesis is framed to find out the cause of the
difficulty. The hypothesis that is framed to solve the problem involved in case of a law, is
known as adhoc-hypothesis. An adhoc hypothesis remains adhoc till it is either confirmed
or rejected. For example, the path of Uranus was decided as per the law of gravitation.
Later on some deviations were marked. In course of finding out the cause of deviation it
was supposed that the deviation might be due to the presence of some other planet. In
fact Bourvord discovered the planet Neptune through this method.
c) Non-instantial Hypothesis:
A hypothesis is a probable supposition. But any wild guess should not be treated as
hypothesis. A hypothesis should possess a higher degree of probability. Newton makes a remark
on certain hypotheses by saying “hypothesis non-fingo”. It stands for the expression “I do not
form hypothesis”. It signifies that unless the degree of probability is high, there is no meaning to
HYPOTHESIS 217
take any stray supposition to be a hypothesis. It shows that if a hypothesis lacks the higher
degree of probability, it is not considered as a legitimate hypothesis. For this reason logicians
have suggested some broad conditions for considering a hypothesis to be legitimate.
ii) The hypothesis should be adequate. A hypothesis is required when there is demand of
explanation in respect of some problematic event. If the hypothesis is not adequate it cannot
explain the event correctly. In order to become adequate the hypothesis should be framed after
taking all the connected known truths into account. For example, in case of a theft without
considering any other fact if some one says that the servant is the thief then it is not adequate. In
a complex situation the possible reasons thought of may be quite insufficient or quite irrelevant to
explain the fact. If we say that a political leader is responsible for our social evils here it is not
clear in what way he is responsible for the effect. If we say that the city plan is responsible for the
social evils here it becomes an irrelevant conjecture. So the hypothesis should be adequate in the
sense that there must be adequate basis of framing the hypothesis and the basis is the capability
of explaining the facts(effects).
iii) The hypothesis should be verifiable. Since it is only a provisional supposition the verifiable
aspect of the hypothesis is very important. No hypothesis can be accepted either as the cause or
as a law unless it is verified. The verification may be done in various ways. The hypothesis is
compared with other established truths or facts. Or certain conclusions are deduced from the
hypothesis and the coherence of the new conclusion with other established facts is examined.
Verification helps in reaching higher degrees of probability by gradual confirmation of the hypothesis.
Without verification a hypothesis has no place in scientific procedure and is useless.
218 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
The hypothesis should not be framed going against the established laws of nature, unless
there is the need of an adhoc hypothesis. There are certain laws of facts which are normally
unchallengable in nature. For example, every object is extended is an accepted truth. Similarly,
like begets like, living beings are mortal, a heavy object does not hang in the air because of the
force of gravitation etc. are the exceptionless regularities of nature. They are so to say the laws of
the natural world. Any supposition, that violates any such accepted truths becomes itself
unacceptable. It does not mean that no law of science or the law of society can not be challenged.
But it is suggested that unless there is sufficient ground, a hypothesis should not be framed going
against the established truths.
v) A hypothesis should be based on vera causa or real cause. This point suggests that one
should be careful against superstitions while framing hypothesis. In this regard the remark of
Newton is quite significant that “only real causes are to be admitted in explanation of phenomena”.
This remark was made to guard against blind beliefs while investigating the cause. For example,
sometimes it was thought that the drought occurs due to some supernatural power; or diarrhoea
is due to the anger of the village goddess; etc. These suppositions are no doubt unrealistic. So, it
is suggested that hypothesis should be realistic or based on vera causa.
vi) A hypothesis should have the power of prediction. A hypothesis should explain not only
the present event, but also be capable to explain future events of the same type as well. Then only
the veracity of the hypothesis can be accepted. After knowing the cause of solar or lunar eclipse
the scientists can make accurate prediction when the next eclipse will occur. On the basis of the
predictive power, a hypothesis is accepted as a legitimate one.
vii) A hypothesis should be simple. A simple hypothesis does not involve too much of
assumptions. When there are two incompatible hypotheses, the one that is comparatively simpler
is accepted. In respect of the path of the planets two hypotheses, namely, the Ptolemic and the
Copernican, were offered. Further observations confirmed the hypothesis of Copernicus to be
HYPOTHESIS 219
simpler than that of Ptolemy. So it was accepted. Hence, a hypothesis should be simple.
The entire procedure of induction lacks formal proof and is unable to provide conclusive
or absolutely certain conclusion. There can be higher degree of probolilty of the conclusion if it
coheres with more and more established facts. Time to time new genralisations are established
and accepted. A generalistion is suggested like a hypothesis so there is the need of verification for
the confirmation of the hypothesis. Thus, verifiability is the important criterion of a legitimate
hypothesis. It is also the most important condition for the proof of the hypothesis.
VERIFICATION OF HYPOTHESIS:
The verification of hypothesis is usually done in two ways, i.e, directly and indirectly. The
direct verification takes place through observations or experiments. The indirect method of
verification constitutes deduction and comparison with the established laws. The second one is
none the less a deductive method because whether the newly formed hypothesis is consistent
with other established laws or not is to be tested. When a hypothesis gradually gets confirmation
from subsequent facts then it is accepted as proved. This method is considered as proving through
accumulation of consistent facts.
DIRECT VERIFICATION :
Where direct verification is possible it takes place either through observation or through
experiment. The verification through experiment is more dependable than the verification through
observations. Because the verification of a hypothesis should take place in as many cases as
possible, otherwise, the chance of being falsified cannot be ruled out. For example, a generalisation
like ‘Swans are white’ if verified at various places in India is not sufficient. In Australia black
swans are seen. It shows that observational hypothesis is more vulnerable than experimental
ones.
220 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
INDIRECT VERIFICATION:
In case of indirect verification the conclusions possible from the supposed cause are
verified on the basis of the knowledge of the facts of experience. If the conclusions are found to
be true, then the hypothesis is considered to be verified.
In order to prove the supposition that mercury level rises in a barometer due to atmo-
spheric pressure Torricelli went to a mountain top and verified it directly. But Galileo proved the
pressure of atmosphere indirectly from the observed facts that two objects with different weight
would reach the ground at the same time when dropped from a height.
ADEQUACY
It has already been said that a hypothesis should be adequate. Adequacy is one essential
requirement for indirect verification.
is done referring to some vital mark or finger post. Bacon considers a crucial instance to serve
like a finger post. A crucial instance, Jevon holds, not only helps in selecting the right one, it also
helps in rejecting the irrelevant hypotheses. Crucial instances may be found by simple observations
or experiments.
The theory of ‘aberration of light’ was found to be the crucial instance to justify the
Copernican hypothesis in respect of the movement of planets.
CONSILIENCE OF INDUCTION
Certain special occurrences are seen in case of the verification of certain hypotheses
which are known as consilience of induction. In these cases the hypothesis besides explaining the
facts of the concerned hypothesis also explains certain other facts, which were not known.
Newton’s law of gravitation besides explaining the gravitational force involved in the
falling of hanging bodies also explained the cause of formation of the tides in the sea.
PREDICTION
A hypothesis is proved on the strength of its power of prediction. It has been said that
every scientific hypothesis should have the power of prediction. These predictions are not mere
guess works. The hypothesis accepts the possibility of certain future facts, which are considered
as its predictability. In that case one has to wait till the occurrence of the facts to be verified. An
astronomer may propose a hypothesis regarding the appearance of a comet in future. In order to
verity it one has to wait till that period. Whewell considers that a hypothesis is often proved by its
power of prediction.
In order to be verified the hypothesis should be simple. A simple hypothesis has the
advantage of being proved easily and established easily.
222 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
SUMMARY
MODEL QUESTIONS
GROUP- A
Objective Questions :
1. Answer the following :-
i) What is meant by a hypothesis?
ii) State a condition of a legitimate hypothesis.
iii) Give an example of non-instantial hypothesis.
iv) What is an absurd hypothesis?
v) What is the meaning of vera cause?
vi) Give an example of an ad hoc hypothesis.
vii) Name stebbing’s classification of hypothesis.
viii) What is a theory?
2. Fill in the blanks:
i) Hypothesis is a _______ supposition. (provisional)
ii) When a hypothesis is verified, it becomes either a ______ or a ______ . (Law, Cause)
iii) Hypothesis should not ordinarily ______ with established theories of scienc. (in conflict)
iv) Hypothesis may be directly verified by _____ and _____. (directly, indirectly)
v) When a crucial instance is obtained by experiment, it is called _____.
(experimentum crusis)
vi) Power of prediction is a _______ of hypothesis. (Strength)
vii) _____ says that an hypothesis must have a predictive power. (Whewell)
viii) _____ said, “Hypothetic non fingo”. (Newton)
ix) ______ is considered as vera causa. (Real Cause)
x) _________ hypothesis is framed to explain the discrepancies noticed in case of law or
theory. (Ad-hoc)
224 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
GROUP-B
Short–type Questions :
1. Write notes on the following.
i) Explanatory hypothesis.
ii) Descriptive hypothesis.
iii) Analogical hypothesis.
iv) Working hypothesis.
v) Adhoc hypothesis.
vi) Non-instantial hypothesis.
vii) Legitimate hypothesis.
2. Answers the following:-
i) What is hypothesis concerning collocation?
ii) What is crucial instance?
iii) What is vera causa?
iv) What is hypothesis concerning law?
v) What is hypothesis concerning agent?
vi) What is representative fiction?
vii) What is conscilience of indcution?
3. Explain with example:-
i) Self-contradictory hypothesis
ii) Unverifiable hypothesis
iii) Fictitious or absurd hypothesis.
GROUP -C
Long-type Questions
1. Define hypothesis and discuss its importance in induction.
2. State and explain the conditions of a legitimate hypothesis.
3. How is a hypothesis proved ? Discuss
4. How are hypothesis, theory, law and fact related? Explain.
***
246 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
SUMMARY
Goutam Buddha is the founder of Buddhism. Buddhist teaching was mainly found in
Tripitakas. There are three Tripittakas: Vinaya Pittaka, Sutta Pittaka and Abhidamma
Pittaka. Buddha's teaching is mainly concerned with human suffering and his goal is to attain
human freedom. His teaching is mainly contained in four noble truth., eight fold paths & dependent
origination. The four noble truths are: The life in the world is full of sorrow and suffering (dukha).
There is a cause of suffering (dukha samudaya). There is a cessation of suffering (dukha nirodha)
and there is a way leading to the cessation of suffering (dukha nirodha marga). Theory of
dependent origination is based on the second and the third noble truth. Pratityasamutpada or the
theory of dependent origination tells us that being troubled by the worldly sufferings, man finds its
cause and ultimately we reach at the root cause of all sufferings. Knowledge is the only means of
getting nirvana. Ignorance is bondage and knowledge is liberation.
MODEL QUESTION
Out of the twelve links, the first two are related to past life, the last three are related
to future life and the rest are present life. These links shows that we are suffering due to
our ignorance of this bhava chakra or the dharma chakra. Our ignorance is the cause of
rebirth and suffering. That is why Buddha says that he who sees dependent origination
sees the dharma and he who sees dharma sees pratityasamutpada. This understanding of
dependent origination is the key to nirvana. The theory of dependent origination is the
central teaching of Buddha. Other teachings can be deduced from it. Other teaching like
theory of karma is one of the corollaries of the theory of dependent origination. Karma is
mainly blessed on the causal principles of "As you so, so shall you reap." Rebirth is depending on
the theory of karma. Theory of momentariness or ksanabhangavada is also another corollary
of dependent origination because everything is momentary, dependent and conditional. So, nothing
is permanent. So also the so-called soul is not permanent according to Buddha. The individual
soul is ultimately not permanent but relative, it is ultimately false. Nothing is permanent neither
body nor mind. The soul is nothing but a series of becoming. Everything is conditional, dependent,
relative pratityasamutpada.
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 243
origination. The second noble truth expresses the cause of suffering. The third noble truth expresses
the fundamentals of pratityasamutpada. Buddha tries to find out the cause of suffering and how
the cause of suffering will be ceased. Thus, that leads a way to the cessation of suffering i.e. the
fourth Noble truth. The theory of pratityasamutpada is nothing but a theory of causation.
According to Goutam Buddha, every event has a cause. Without a cause no event can occur.
The causal formula is that depending on the cause, the effect arises. The effect always depends
on the cause. The suffering of old age, misery, diseases etc. are due to the birth. So if we will not
take birth, then there will be no suffering. So, birth is the cause of suffering. In this connection,
Buddha has given an example of a flame in an oil lamp. The flame is dependent upon the oil and
the wick. When the oil and the wick are present, the flame in the lamp is present. If either of them
is absent, the flame ceases to be present. Similarly, if we stop rebirth, then we will not suffer. Birth
is not the final cause of suffering. We take birth because of our willingness to be born, our
willingness is due to our clinging to the objects of the world. This clinging towards objects is due
to our craving or desire for enjoyment of objects. This enjoyment is due to sense experience.
Sense experience is there because of our sense-object contact. This sense object contact is due
to our sense organs. We have sense organs because we are psycho-physical organism having
body and mind. As we have body and mind we have some initial consciousness of our embryo of
the past life. This impression is due to our ignorance. Hence ignorance is the root cause of
suffering.
This chain of casual series is called causal wheel or bhava chakra or jaramarana
chakra. This twelve links cover the past, present and future life. These twelve links are:
1. Ignorance (Avidya).
2. Impression (Samskara)
3. Initial Consciousness of embryo (Vijnana)
4. Psychophysical organism (Namarupa)
242 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
Dukha Nirodha or cessation of suffering follows from the second noble truth that when
cause of suffering i.e. ignorance is removed, the effect i.e. suffering is removed. So, in order to
remove suffering or misery from earthly life, Buddha invented a way to get rid of suffering. That
is the fourth noble truth.
The fourth noble truth is a way leading to this cessation of suffering (Dukha nirodha
marg pratipad). According to Goutam Buddha, too much of attachment towards worldly
objects is very much painful. But a man cannot live without worldly objects. It is very
difficult on the part of human being to be detached from these worldly objects and become
a sanyasi. It is very difficult on the part of human beings to give away all worldly objects
and become sanyasi. Neither too much materialistic nor too much spiritualistic is possible.
So, Buddh suggests a third or the middle path to get nirvana. He recommended eight fold
paths for attainment of nirvana. It is for all sections of the people irrespective of cast,
colour, creed and sex. One can grow into the state of perfection if he follows the eight fold
path i.e. samyak vak (right speech), samyak akrmanta (right action), samyak smruti (right
mindfulness), samyak jiva (right livelihood), samyak vakyama (right effort), samyak
samadhi (right concentration) samyak drusti (right view) and samyak sankalpa (right
understanding). These are the moral teachings which show the right path for making a human
being morally perfect.
Buddha's first noble truth states, a fundamental feature of all suffering. It is stated by
Buddha that: "Birth is a suffering, old age is suffering, sickness is suffering, death is suffering, to be
separated from the loved one is a suffering, to be united with unloved is a suffering, not to obtain
what one desires is suffering, in short the fivefold clinging to the Earth is suffering." So, for him,
the cycle of birth and death is nothing but suffering. The cycle goes on unless one escapes from
it by attaining enlightenment, the state of Nirvana.
The second Noble Truth is that there is a cause of suffering (Dukha Samudaya). From
this second Noble Truth his three fundamental theories are derived. The three fundamental ideas
of early Buddhist metaphysics are the theory of Partityasamutpada, the theory of
Ksanabhangavada or the theory of momentariness and the theory of Anantmavada or the theory
of no soul. The theory of dependent origination (pratityasamutpada) explains that the phenomena
in the world are related to a causal flux. Everything is conditional, relative and limited. So, suffering
must have a cause. It must be dependent on some condition Since everything is conditional,
cause being present, the effect arises and the absence of the cause the effect remains absent. The
cause of suffering is ignorance. Suffering stops at the dawn of knowledge.
240 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
11.3 BUDDHISM
Goutam Buddha is the founder of Buddhism. He was born in a Royal family during sixth
century B.C and had a son named Rahul. In spite of all pleasures and comforts of royal life and
a loving family he left home to find out the causes of human suffering. Three incidents like the sight
of a sick man, a tottering old man and a sanyasi made him pensive. He strove to find a solution
to the problem of worldly worries & sufferings. He took the help of many religious teachers and
preceptors but could not find the ultimate truth. Finally, he meditated under the banyan tree at
Bodhgaya to get enlightenment. Prince Siddhartha became the enlightened Buddha. After getting
true knowledge he decided to share it with the World through his followers.
Buddha’s teaching was oral. After his demise several attempts were made to codify his
teachings. The teachings of Buddha were mainly contained in Tripitakas. It is otherwise known
as three baskets of knowledge. These three Tripitakas are Vinaya Pittaka, Sutta Pittaka and
Abhidamma Pittaka. Vinaya Pittaka contains the rules for his monks, Sutta Pittaka contains
the principal theories or dialogues and the Abhidhamma Pittaka contains the Philosophical theories
of Buddha.
Buddha was a rebel against priestly culture. He was a believer in the theory of Karma.
He was not a metaphysician believing in the existence of soul. On the other hand he believes in
rebirth. The theory of Karma, rebirth and efficiency of knowledge were the instrument for
attainment of salvation or mukti. The central teaching of Buddha is that it is possible to end
suffering. One who is free from suffering attains nirvana or salvation. Buddha is deeply concerned
with human suffering and his only goal is human freedom. So his sound teaching is that a
knowledgeable man instead of wasting his time in idle enquiry about soul, world, God etc. should
concentrate on overcoming human suffering and attaining the goal of nirvana. So he remains
silent about all metaphysical questions. He rather prefers to show the way to the practical problems
of eradicating suffering. The main philosophy of Buddha is contained in four Noble Truths and
Eight Noble Paths. The four Noble Truths are:
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 239
MODEL QUESTIONS
SUMMARY
Jainism belongs to the heterodox (nastika) schools of Indian Philosophy. The word ‘Jaina’
in derived from the word ‘jina’ which means the conqueror. ‘Conqueror’ refers to the liberated
who has conqured all passions. Vardhaman who is known as Mahaveer was the last and most
influential tirthankar.
Jainism does not believe in a supreme God but accepts ‘soul’ and ‘matter’. Jainism has
epistemological (Jnana mimamsa), metaphysical (Tattva Mimamisa) and ethical (neeti mimamsa)
aspects.
Syadvada is jaina theory of knowledge. Knowledge is relative in the sense that one can
know from a particular aspect or point of view.
‘Syad’ means ‘may be’ or ‘some how’. Syadvada is known as ‘saptabhangi naya’ which
means seven forms of relative knowledge. They are (1) syadasti (may be a thing is real) (2)
syadnasti (May be a thing is unreal (3) syadastica nasti ca (May be a thing in both real and unreal
(4) Syadavktayam (May be a thing is indescribable) (5) Syadasti ca a vaktavyam (May be a
thing is real and indescribable) (6) Syadnasti ca avaktavyam (May be a thing is not real and
indescribable) (7) syadasti ca nastica avaktavyam (May be a thing real, unreal and indescribable).
Jainism is not to be understood as a kind of scepticism. It says that our judgements are relative
and conditional but not uncertain and doubtful.
Jaina anekanta vada and syadvada are catholic in nature as they accept that the contrary
views of Buddhism and Brahminism are acceptable as they are only from different perspectives.
236 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
2) Syad nasti (May be a thing is unreal) It means some how a thing does not exist.
For example “May be a table does not exist”. The table does not exist in other
matter, in other time, or in other form. It is not there as a pen or a chair or
whatever is not a table.
3) Syad astica nasti ca (May be a thing is both real and unreal. It means a thing exists
and does not exist depending on different points of views. So it is not a contradiction.
The table exists as a table but does not exist as any thing which is not a table.
5) Syad asti ca avaktavyam (May be a thing is real and indescribable). The object
exists from one stand point but from all points of view or from all aspects it can not
be describable.
6) Syad nasti ca avaktavyam (May be a thing is not real and indescribable). A thing is
relatively or from a Particular stand point said to be unreal and indescribable.
7) Syad asti ca nastica avaktavyam (May be a thing is real, unreal and indescribable.
relativity of judgement. For example when we make a perceptual judgement like ‘This is a tree’
we may be mistaken. But if we say, ‘May be this is a tree” we can not be mistaken. So, according
to jainism we should prefix ‘may be’ when we make judgements about objects. The judgement
that ‘This is a tree’ is relative in the sense that in one aspect this in a tree. But there can be
innumerable aspects from which the tree can be looked at and be judged. In this context the
jainas give the example of the story of ‘six blind men and the elephant’. Each of the blind men
touched a part of the elephant and described about the elephant as a whole. The man who
touched the ear said, the elephant is like a country made fan, the man who touched the tail said it
is like a rope, the man who touched the trunk said it is like a huge snake, the man who touched
the side of the animal said it is like a wall and so an. The blind men were in conflict with each other
due the fact that each of them has mistaken a part of the elephant to be the elephant as a whole.
So our judgements are only partially and conditionally true because the judgements are made
from a particular point of view and a particular aspect.
Saptabhangi Naya
Syadvada is known as sapta bhingi naya. According to jainas there are seven forms of
relative judgements. Naya means the judgement which in a proposition about knowledge of
object. Jainas prefix syad (‘may be’ or ‘some how’) before every judgement as the following.
1) Syatasti (May be a thing is real). This means, “a thing exists relatively or from a
particular point of view.” For example, the judgement that ‘May be a table exists”
means the table does not exist absolutely. The table which we can know has
innumerable characters (gunas). We can know the table of a particular shape, size,
colour in a particular space and time. So “the table exists” is partially and conditionally
known to be true from one aspect and under some conditions.
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 233
11.2 JAINISM
Jainism like Buddhism does not accept the authority of the vedas. It does not believe in
a supreme God. But unlike Buddhism it accepts the permanent entities like ‘soul’ and ‘matter’.
Jainism has three important aspects. They are epistemology (theory of knowledge) which is
called ‘jnana mimansa’, metaphysics, which is or ‘Neetisastra’ called ‘tatva mimamsa and ethics.
Jaina theory of knowledge is relativistic and its theory of reality (metaphysis) is plurastic realism.
As a whole jaina philosophy is relativistic and realistic pluralism. Jaina theory of knowledge is
called anekantavada and its theory of reality is called syadvada. Syadvada and Anekanta vada
are two important and mutually reciprocal doctrines of Jainism.
11.2.1 Syadvada
Syadvada is known as Jaina theory of knowledge. The word ‘syat’ in sanskrit means
‘may be’, ‘probable or ‘perhaps’. According to Jainism our knowledge is relative. Our
knowledge of an object is always from a particular point of view and from a particular aspect.
We can not know an object as a whole. Our knowledge is conditional, partial and limited.
Knowledge is expressed in propositions or judgments. So Syadvada is called the theory of
232 +2 LOGIC, Part-I
SUMMARY
All most all the systems of Indian Philosophy except the Carvakas share some common
characteristic. Development of Indian philosophical thought in different stages and phases is
marked by dialogues in the form of arguments. It is philosophy of life which is of greater concern
for Indian thinkers than more intellectual curiosity. Philosophy should aim at promotings an individual
to realise purusarthas (the supreme ends of life). All the schools of thought emphasise sorrow and
suffering misery and ignorance as evils. The ultimate aim of human life is liberation, freedom
(mukti) or moksa. Moksa can be attained here and now like the state of jeevan mukti or a
stitapragna. Moksa is also a state of enlightenment where ignorance is completely destroyed.
All most all the schools beleive in Karmavada and rebirth as a Universal moral order. All
systems recognise the fundamental spirituality of human being. Pessimission in Indian Philosophy
is optimistic and pragmatic.
MODEL QUESTIONS
is characterised by self-denial and total renunciation of personal interest. The obligation of the
individual also goes beyond society and extended to the senescent world. The spirit of Indian
moral Philosophy is devotion to duties rather than assertion of rights. Thus an ascetic life of
renunciation is the means for the attainment of moksa.
Indian Philosophical out look towards life and existence appears to be pessimistic and
negative. This is due to the fact that Indian Philosophical systems emphasise the negative sides of
human life. It points out the evils like misery, sorrow, suffering egoism and greed in human life.
But this pessimism is only initial, it is not final. This pessimism is a spring board for higher optimism
and pragmatism. Indian philosophy, unlike western philosophy, does not start with wonder and
intellectual curiosity rather than the problems of real life. It is concerned with these problems of
practical life and makes an attempt to solve these problems. It does not conclude that life is a
tragedy. It tries to overcome the evil of sorrow and sufferings. The Upanisad declares,
“anandadhyeba khalu imani bhutani jayante, anandena, jatani jecbanti, anandam prayantyaabhi
sanghishanti.” This means this world is originated from bliss, sustained by bliss and dissolved in
bliss. Man has the power to over come ignorance, darkness and bondage. The main concern of
Indian thinkers, is sat-chit-ananda. ‘Sat’ means ‘existence’, ‘chit’ means ‘consciousness’ and
‘ananda’ means ‘bliss’ which is characterised by knowledge, wisdom and freedom. The famous
verse exemplifies the inner optimism of Indian thought. The verse is “asato ma sat gamaya,
tamaso ma jyotirgamaya and mrutoma amrutogamaya.” This means let me go from false hood to
truth, from darknes to light and from mortality to immortality.
Buddha finds out four noble truths. Firstly he admits the truth that there is suffering in
human life. Sceondly he points out the truth that there is a cause of suffering. Thirdly he assures
that there is a cessation of suffering. Fourthly he shows the truth that there is a way to stop
suffering. These four truth claims of Buddha promises hope and optimism.
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 229
Moksa or liberation is considered as the ultimate goal of life by all most all schools of
Indian Philosophy. Libration is called ‘niravan’ in Buddhism, ‘Kaivalya’ in Samkhya and Yoga
Philosophy, apabarga in Nyaya Vaisasika philosophy and moksa or mukti in all classical
philosophical literature like Vedanta. According to Max Muller, “Philosophy was recommended
in India, not for the sake of knowledge, but for the highest purpose that man can strive after in this
life. *Liberation is the ultimate purusaratha. It (moksa) is the highest value (paramapurusatha).
‘Moksa’ and ‘Dharma’ or ‘righteousness’ are higher values and ‘Artha’ and ‘Kama’ are lower
values. It is freedom (mukti) from Physical and moral evil in life. The evil is bondage and sufferings.
‘Bondage’ is commonly understood as the cycle of birth-death and rebirth which leads to human
misery and suffering. So ‘mukti’ means freedom from this cyclical process of worldly life (Samsara).
Ignorance is the root cause of all evil and sufferings of man which is due to his attachment. So
knowledge of reality (tattvajnana) is the state of moksa. Though the concept of moksa and
attainment of moksa varies from system to system yet all most all the systems agree that knowledge
of reality (tattvajnana) can remove ignorance and misery. According to Advita Vedanta Philosophy
moksa is a state of ultimate bliss. It is wrongly understood that one can attain moksa after death.
On the contrary most of the Indian Philosophical schools teach that it can be attained here and in
this life. This is described as ‘jeevan-mukti’. So Indian Philosophy is not other worldly in the
sense that it seeks happiness, bliss and moksa in an hypothetical imaginary world beyond this life
and this world. The state of stithaprajna in Geeta and Jevan Mukti in Vedanta are the states of
enlightenment of an individual. Except carvaka all other schools believe in moksa.
optimism in Indian Philosophical out look towards life. It is to be noted that the idea of rta was
subsequently transformed into the idea of karmavada in Indian moral Philosophy, ‘apurva’ in
Purba mimamsa and the idea of ‘adrista’ in Nyaya Philosophy.
Actions (Karmas) are classified on the basis of the accurrence of their respective results
or consquences. Karmas are broadly classified as ‘anarabdha’ karma and ‘Prarabhda’ karmas.
Anarabdha karmas are those karmas which have not yet produced their results. These karmas
are of two kinds. They are either accumulated karmas of this life (Kriyamana or sanciyamana
karma) or accumulated from past lives (sancita karma). On the other hand the prarabdha karmas
are those actions (karmas) which have started giving fruits in this life. The law of karma can be
described as a law of conservation of moral values. In Indian Philosophical literature (except the
carvakas) we find both the ‘Law of Karma’ and ‘rebirth’ as most fundamental principles which
have influenced all the schools of thought and ordinary people.
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 227
It is difficult to find out the characteristics of Indian Philosophy as a whole due to the
diversity of its development. Indian thought is characterised by an argumentative tradition. The
dialogue between the orthodox and heterodox schools as well as the dialogue between the
different schools within the same systems are quite evident. All the schools have their original and
independent views which were developed by way of critical appreciation of each others thought.
In this tradition a Philosopher has to follow three points while presenting his view. Firstly, he has
to state and give an exposition of the earlier view (purvapaksa). Secondly he states the criticism
or refutation (Khandana) of the earliers view. Thirdly he gives his concluding view (Uttarpaksa or
Siddhanta).
Indian Philosophy is known to be the most ancient so far the early vedas and upanisads
are concerned. Prof. Hiriyana distinguishes between two phases of Indian Philosophy. The Vadic
period and the classical or Sanskrit period. Most of the works of the vedic period are considered
as revealed. They are either ritualistic (Karmakanda) or speculative (Jnana) in character. The
ritualistic aspect was highlighted by Mimamsa where as the Vedanta or Upanisads emphasised
the speculative aspects. Vedanta is the final part of Veda. Indian Philosophical systems are broadly
classified in to two kinds of schools. They are the orthodox (astika) and the heterodox (nastika)
schools. The schools which accept (or did not reject) the authority of the vedas are called astika
schools, like the Mimamsa, Vedanta, Samkhya, Yoga, Nyaya and Vaisesika. On the other hand
the schools which do not accept the authority of the Vedas are called nastikas or heterodox
schools of Philosophy. They are the Carvakas, Budha and Jaina schools of thought. The
classification of different orthodox and heterodox systems in Indian Philosophy can be easily
understood from the following table.
Indian Philosophy
CHAPTER - 11
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
INTRODUCTION :
The term ‘Indian Philosophy’ means different philosophical systems and traditions
originated in the soil of India. By ‘Indian Philosophy’ some thinkers mean ‘Hindu
Philosophy’. This is true if by Hindu we mean the inhabitant of a geographical territory
(the bank of river Sindhu). But this is not true if by ‘Hindu’ we mean the adherents of a
particular religious faith. Indian Philosophy is called ‘darshana’. The word ‘darshana’ is
derived from the Sanskrit word ‘dris’ which means to see. Darshana is that by which it is
seen, known, understood and ultimate wisdom is realised. By ‘darshana’ we mean tattva
darshana vision of truth’ or intuitive vision. We generally translate ‘darshana’ as ‘Philosophy’
due to a great deal of resemblance between the two. But the word Philosophy is derived
from the Greek word ‘Philos’ and ‘Sophia’ which mean ‘Love’ and ‘Wisdom’ respectively.
Philosophy means love of wisdom or knowledge. In Western tradition Philosophy is
considered as an art of wondering and it begins with intellectual curiosity.
The term ‘darshana’ can be better understood in the context of Nyaya darshana. The
Nayayikas use the word ‘anveeksikee’ to mean arrival at truth by logical means of investigation.
Darshana is to be understood as a means of extraordinary knowledge in the sense that it designates
Jnana, Prajna, Vidya and Paravidya.