Title Frivaldo v COMELEC, Raul Lee, 257 SCRA 727, June 28, 1996
Ponente Panganiban, J:
Doctrine
Facts On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in
the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R.
Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec praying
that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public
office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the
Philippines", and that his Certificate of Candidacy be canceled. On
May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a
Resolution granting the petition.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted
upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy
continued and he was voted for during the elections held on said
date.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the
election returns and a Certificate of Votes dated May 27, 1995 was
issued showing the following votes obtained by the candidates for
the position of Governor of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060
Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440
Raul R. Lee 53,304
Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925
On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a
(supplemental) petition praying for his proclamation as the duly-
elected Governor of Sorsogon. Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening
of June 30, 1995, Lee was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition,
praying for the annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of
Lee and for his own proclamation.
He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he
took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his
petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the
Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been
granted". As such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of
the Comelec) . . . was released and received by Frivaldo on June
30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal
impediment to the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor . .”
The Comelec First Division held that Lee, "not having garnered the
highest number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed
as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the
highest number of votes,
and . . . having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation
on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
725 . . . (is) qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon.
On December 26, 1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied by the Comelec en banc in its
Resolution promulgated on February 23, 1996. On February 26,
1996, the present petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a
temporary restraining order, this Court issued on February 27,
1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed the parties "to maintain
the status quo prevailing prior to the filing of this petition."
Contentions Frivaldo Raul Lee
The judicially declared
disqualification of
respondent was a
continuing condition and
rendered him ineligible to
run for, to be elected to
and to hold the Office of
Governor;
The alleged repatriation
of respondent was
neither valid nor is the
effect thereof retroactive
as to cure his ineligibility
and qualify him to hold
the Office of Governor;
Lower Courts
Appellate Court
Issue The consolidated issues may be restated as follows: (Related only
to our topic. Did not include jurisdiction issues but I suggest na-
read din full text)
1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it
seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be
proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be
given retroactive effect? If so, from when?
2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of
Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be
elected to or hold office
SC Ruling The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation
The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly requires Philippine
citizenship as a qualification for elective local officials, including
that of provincial governor, thus:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. -- (a) An elective local official
must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered
voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province
or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to
be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election;
and able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of
governor, vice governor or member of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, or
mayor, vice mayor or member of the
sangguniang panlungsod of highly
urbanized cities must be at least
twenty-three (23) years of age on
election day.
x x x x x x x x x
Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this
Court in G.R. No. 104654 and during the oral argument in this
case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of
Congress, but that the bill allowing him to do so "failed to
materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members
of the House of Representatives" due, according to him, to the
"maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case, his attempt
at naturalization was rejected by this Court because of
jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was
overwhelmingly elected governor by the electorate of Sorsogon,
with a margin of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in
1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee.
Twice, he was judicially declared a non-Filipino and thus twice
disqualified from holding and discharging his popular mandate.
Now, he comes to us a third time, with a fresh vote from the
people of Sorsogon and a favorable decision from the Commission
on Elections to boot. Moreover, he now boasts of having
successfully passed through the third and last mode of reacquiring
citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with no less than
the Solicitor General himself, who was the prime opposing counsel
in the previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for co-
respondent Comelec, arguing the validity of his cause.
On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and
the presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not
been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the
proceedings were speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude
that such proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all, the
requirements of repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to
comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome. In fact,
P.D.725 itself requires very little of an applicant, and even the
rules and regulations to implement the said decree were left to the
Special Committee to promulgate. This is not unusual since, unlike
in naturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry into
Philippine political life, in repatriation the applicant is a former
natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his
previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a
natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served his country
and his province prior to his naturalization in the United States -- a
naturalization he insists was made necessary only to escape the
iron clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in
conscience embrace -- and who, after the fall of the dictator and
the re-establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in
returning to his country of birth to offer once more his talent and
services to his people.
Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be
valid, nevertheless it could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of
June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification prescribed by
the Local Government Code "must exist on the date of his election,
if not when the certificate of candidacy is filed," that "both the
Local Government Code and the Constitution require that only
Philippine citizens can run and be elected to public office."
Obviously, however, this was a mere obiter as the only issue in
said case was whether Frivaldo's naturalization was valid or not --
and NOT the effective date thereof. Since the Court held his
naturalization to be invalid, then the issue of when an aspirant for
public office should be a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the
Court. Which question we shall now directly rule on.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local
official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality,
city, or province . . . where he intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect.
* In addition, "candidates for the position of
governor . . . must be at least twenty-three (23)
years of age on election day.
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any
particular date or time when the candidate must possess
citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must consist of at
least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of
election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election
day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding
an elective public office, and the purpose of the citizenship
qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no
person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people
and our country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official
begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his
proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office
to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30,
1995 -- the very day32 the term of office of governor (and other
elective officials) began -- he was therefore already qualified to be
proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the functions and
responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he
was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the
liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to
our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which
such law was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished
from liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the
Local Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE
OFFICIALS", not of candidates. Why then should such qualification
be required at the time of election or at the time of the filing of
the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists?
At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the
retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit Frivaldo considering that said law
was enacted on June 5, 1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino
citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for
repatriation even later, on August 17, 1994?
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that
Frivaldo became an American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only
the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given retroactive effect, but
even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June
30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his
application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is simply
that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the legislative authority
that the law should apply to past events -- i.e., situations and
transactions existing even before the law came into being -- in
order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible
thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally
guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to
be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the
more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective
manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the
passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo
on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect as of
date of his application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in
the law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on
the part of the legislative authority; and there is no showing that
damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious
would result from giving retroactivity to his repatriation. Neither
has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any
contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of
some constitutional guaranty.
Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly,
Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and
whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be
deemed mooted by his repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it
would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be
given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee decides not to
act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial
length of time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as
Frivaldo -- having already renounced his American citizenship --
was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their control. This
should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application
of laws, it is to be presumed that the law-making body intended
right and justice to prevail
The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship
a Continuing Disqualification?
Lee contends that the May 1, 1995 Resolution of the Comelec
Second Division in SPA No. 95-028 as affirmed in toto by
Comelec En Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became final
and executory after five (5) days or on May 17, 1995, no
restraining order having been issued by this Honorable
Court.54 Hence, before Lee "was proclaimed as the elected
governor on June 30, 1995, there was already a final and
executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee adds that this
Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes were legally
"correct") declaring Frivaldo an alien have also become final and
executory way before the 1995 elections, and these "judicial
pronouncements of his political status as an American citizen
absolutely and for all time disqualified (him) from running for, and
holding any public office in the Philippines."
We do not agree.
Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot
govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a
person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his
citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the
purpose. Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration, we held:
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case,
whatever the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to
be threshed out again and again, as the occasion
demands.
