National Law Institute University, Bhopal

Project Work III Semester (Mid. Semester)

Subject: Constitutional Law
Topic: Doctrine of Arbitrariness with Special Reference to the
Case: E.P. ROYAPPA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ANR.

Submitted to: Submitted by:

Prof. Kuldeep Kaur Rohan D’Cruz
2019BALLB105

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 Acknowledgements

This project has been made possible by the unconditional support of many people. I would
like to acknowledge and extend my heartfelt gratitude to my Constitutional Law Professor,
Mrs. Kuldeep Kaur for guiding me throughout the development of this project into a coherent
whole by providing helpful insights and sharing her brilliant expertise. I would also like to
thank the officials of the NLIU Library, Gyan Mandir, for helping me find the appropriate
research material for this project. I am deeply indebted to our parents, seniors and friends for
all the moral support and encouragement.

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Table of Contents
Acknowledgements....................................................................................................................2
Introduction................................................................................................................................4
Statement of Problem.................................................................................................................5
Research Questions....................................................................................................................5
Aims and Objectives..................................................................................................................5
Research Methodology...............................................................................................................5
Hypothesis..................................................................................................................................5
Literature Review.......................................................................................................................6
Giving meaning to the doctrine..................................................................................................7
Giving Substance to the Doctrine..............................................................................................9
Comparative unreasonableness..............................................................................................9
Non-comparative unreasonableness.....................................................................................10
Partial rejection of the doctrine................................................................................................12
Case Analysis...........................................................................................................................13
Facts.....................................................................................................................................13
Judgement............................................................................................................................14
Decision................................................................................................................................14
Observations.........................................................................................................................15
Conclusion................................................................................................................................16
Bibliography.............................................................................................................................17
Cases....................................................................................................................................17
Books....................................................................................................................................17

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 Introduction

The decision of the Supreme Court divisional bench in Rajbala v. State of Haryana
1
(hereinafter Rajbala) has invigorated the discourse in the prominent Royappa case2 on the
substance and reach of the doctrine of arbitrariness put forth by the constitutional bench of
the apex court. 'Arbitrariness' has been a dispirited doctrine since its creation. While some
lawyers and judges have opposed the term for its inaccurate import and its possible negative
effect on the “equality” test under Article 14, others have been neutral in their approach to
this redevelopment in that they assume it is not at all a new test, but merely a reaffirmation of
the “reasonable classification” or nexus test. The opinion of the above group of jurists is
reflected in the fact that the word 'arbitrary' was not a recent addition to the constitutional
adjudication vocabulary relating to article 14. It was also used in relation to the initial branch
of the “reasonable classification” test, called the intelligible differential, and it was firmly
maintained that the differential could never be “arbitrary, evasive or artificial” in order to
fulfil the “reasonable classification” test referred to in Article 14. It was therefore uncertain
whether the doctrine of arbitrariness was merely a gloss on or converse of the “reasonable
classification” test or was a separate test with its own substance.
The Supreme Court's subsequent judgments tried to give the doctrine more substance by
comparing it with the principle of 'unreasonableness', but it was still uncertain if this
unreasonableness was subject to the 'distributive aspect' of Article 14 or just in the lack of
some comparative unreasonableness could be a ground for constitutional review. The
Supreme Court 's subsequent rulings answered this question and the doctrine was
successfully extended to cases where there was no opportunity for comparative assessment.
In general, the arbitrary examination that was often used as a metaphor and at times as a
specific test used to assess the constitutionality of executive acts or subordinate statutes. In
the lack of a sufficient amount of case laws relating to other types of state intervention, in
particular legislative acts, including primary legislation, questions have been raised over and
over again about the potential application of this rule to primary laws. This was precisely one
of the issues in the Rajbala case prior to the two-judge bench that addresses the issue in the
negative. The legal effect and consequences of the decision merit analysis. However, it
continues to be seen, regardless of Rajbala, what line of procedure the courts should follow in
a 'arbitrariness' analysis within Article 14.

1
(2016) 2 SCC 445.
2
E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 4 SCC 3.

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 Statement of Problem

To research the development and viability of the Doctrine of Arbitrariness in general and
with special reference to the case of E.P. ROYAPPA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ANR.

Research Questions
 How did the doctrine develop?
 How does it affect the cases dealt by the court?
 Is the use of the doctrine viable?

Aims and Objectives

 To elucidate on its evolution

 To understand the meaning and nuances
 To understand the exceptions and its causes
 To provide criticisms regarding grey areas if any
 To discuss landmark cases and see how it helped in shaping the doctrine
 To provide with a conclusion to this analysis

Research Methodology

This doctrine analysis will be done through doctrinal method of data collection and use of
interpretive powers of the author wherever needed.

Hypothesis

Regarding the Doctrine, significant confusion is present as to the validity of the arbitrary test
to review the constitutionality of the statutes. Despite the apparent questionable validity of
such a procedure. The idea of a method of tiered inspection as in the US can also be
discussed or different standards (liberal or strict) can be introduced in an arbitrary review to
inspection primary and secondary legislation.

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 Literature Review

Basu, D.D., Shorter constitution of India

This book is the shorter version of Commentary On the Constitution of India, which was also
written by the same author. Since the formation of constitution in 1956, several changes have
been made to improve and strengthen the laws, reforms, structure of system, etc. This book is
for people who want information about the constitution’s history, features, amendments, and
articles. In this book, readers will also be familiarised with the fundamental rights and
directive principles of state policy. In this book, the constitution is interpreted from the legal
viewpoint. Details about small judiciary systems, like panchayats, municipalities, and
planning commissions, are also included, along with a systematic, article by article
explanation of the constitution.
Jain, M.P., Indian Constitutional Law
A master piece of constitutional law of Republic of India with contemporaneous exposition
of law in an exhaustive way as propounded by Supreme Court both in detail and discreet
manner. Salute to the great Authors and the eminent revising editors. Although the book is
bulky and contains repetitive details nevertheless the language and literature of law is up to
the mark of Supreme Court and the clarity of thoughts and theories it delivers is so simple
that even a layman would easily understand. However, an abridged edition of the book is
more welcome as the wise adage goes by that brevity is the soul wit. The publisher
LexisNexis is praise worthy for bringing this paper back economy edition with best quality
paper, printing and binding. However, if an abridged version of this magnificent Treaties
could be made possible without of course eliminating the points of law propounded on
different precepts but only by eliminating the academic and deliberative details then it would
be more welcome and helpful both to the academia and Bar as well.

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 Giving meaning to the doctrine

The period shortly following the emergency and the notorious case of Habeas Corpus3 saw a
series of extraordinary judicial interventions directed at regaining the Supreme Court's lost
credibility. The Supreme Court of India has tried to turn itself into Supreme Court of India in
its search for majoritarian legitimacy. In this sense, it was not less than a defining event in
Indian constitutional jurisprudence when, in a five-judge bench judgment, Bhagwati J spoke
for the majority, rejected a 'narrow, pedantic or lexicographic' definition of the “equality”
definition contained in Article 14 of the Constitution (which had previously been limited to
the “reasonable classification” test) and thereby held4:
“Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be cribbed
cabined and confined within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of
view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact, equality and arbitrariness are sworn
enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice
of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it that it is unequal both
according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violating of Art. 14.”
This ‘all-embracing scope’ and ‘activist magnitude’ of article 14 was reiterated in the
renowned Maneka Gandhi case5 where Bhagwati J like-minded with the majority in a 6:1
verdict observed: “Article 14 strikes, at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and
equality of treatment.”
Taking the debate forward on the “equality” test within Article 14, Bhagwati J, voicing for a
five-judge bench, accepted that Royappa did nothing else than discuss and brought to
attention the 'vital and dynamic aspect' of equality that had been ‘latent and submerged in the
few simple but pregnant words of article 14’. Article 14 therefore basically constituted an
assurance against 'arbitrariness' and the “reasonable classification” test was thus itself
guided by the 'arbitrariness' doctrine. In this sense,' arbitrariness' was hardly a novel test, but
simply the concept driving the establishment of doctrinal instruments and judicial criteria to
assess the denial of the “right to equality” provided under Article 14 of the Constitution. This
is what was said by the court:6
“It must therefore now be taken to be well settled that what Article 14 strikes at is
arbitrariness because any action that is arbitrary, must necessarily involve negation of
equality. The doctrine of classification which is evolved by the courts is not para-phrase of
Article 14 nor is it the objective and end of that Article. It is merely a judicial formula for
determining whether the legislative or executive action in question is arbitrary and therefore
constituting denial of equality. . .. Wherever therefore there is arbitrariness in State action
whether it be of the legislature or of the executive or of authority under Article 12, Article 14
immediately springs into action and strikes down such State action. In fact, the concept of
reasonableness and non- arbitrariness pervades the entire constitutional scheme and is a
golden thread which runs through the whole of the fabric of the Constitution.”

3
A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shiv Kant Shukla (1976) 2 SCC 521
4
Supra note 2
5
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248.
6
Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722.

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In a similar manner, in his opposing opinion, Bhagwati J in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab7,
indicated:
“It is now settled law as a result of the decision of this Court in Maneka Gandhi’s case
(supra) that Article 14 enacts primarily a guarantee against arbitrariness and inhibits State
action whether legislative or executive, which suffers from the vice of arbitrariness. This
interpretation placed on Article 14 by the Court in Maneka Gandhi’s case has opened up a
new dimension of that article which transcends the classificatory principle. For a long time
in the evolution of the constitutional law of our country, the courts had construed Article 14
to mean only this, namely, that you can classify persons and things for the application of a
law but such classification must be based on intelligible differentia having rational
relationship to the object sought to be achieved by the law. But the court pointed out in
Maneka Gandhi’s case that Article 14 was not to be equated with the principle of
classification. It was primarily a guarantee against arbitrariness in State action and the
doctrine of classification was evolved only as a subsidiary rule for testing or determining
whether a particular State action was arbitrary or not.”

7
(1982) 3 SCC 24

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 Giving Substance to the Doctrine

The judicial novelty with respect to the ‘arbitrariness’ test was tailed by efforts to offer
substance to the novel doctrine. In Maneka Gandhi, Bhagwati J very perceptibly read the
doctrine of reasonableness in article 14. He said: “The principle of reasonableness, which
legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness
pervades article 14 like a brooding omnipresence.”8
In R.D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority9 case, he said accordingly:
“The principle of reasonableness and rationality which is legally as well as philosophically
an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness is protected by Article 14 and it must
characterise every State action, whether it be under authority of law or in exercise of
executive power without making of law.”
More recently, Pasayat J in Sharma Transport v. Government of A.P.10 has observed as
follows:
“The expression ‘arbitrarily’ means: in an unreasonable manner, as fixed or done
capriciously or at pleasure, without adequate determining principle, not founded in the
nature of things, non-rational, not done or acting according to reason or judgment,
depending on the will alone.”

Comparative unreasonableness
It is therefore evident that the concept of 'arbitrariness' is the central issue within Article 14
in any sort of “equality” analysis. Therefore, the doctrine remains at the root of both the
“reasonable classification” test and the 'general unreasonableness' test. Although the
previous reflects comparative unreasonableness, the latter takes into consideration situations
where there is no criterion suitable for comparative assessment.
The forgoing opinion is subscribed by P.K. Tripathi who contends that the arbitrariness
barred by article 14 affects the ‘distributive aspect’ of state action. He has stated thus:11
“The arbitrariness inhibited by Article 14 is the arbitrariness or unreasonableness in
discriminating between one person and another; if there is no discrimination there is no
arbitrariness in the sense of Article 14.”

Through this logic, the arbitrariness assessment seeks only to strengthen the “reasonable
classification test and nothing supplementary. This view finds support from Jagdish Swarup.
While observing his difference with Bhagwati J that a new doctrine of “equality” had been
advocated in the Royappa case, he points out that:12

8
Supra note 5.
9
(1979) 3 SCC 489
10
(2002) 2 SCC 188.
11
P.K. Tripathi, “The Fiasco of Overruling A.K. Gopalan” AIR Journal 6 (1990)
12
Jagdish Swarup, Constitution of India 401 (Modern Law, Allahabad, 2nd edn., 2006).

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“Any order passed independent of a rule, or without adequate determining principle would
be arbitrary. Here the adequate determining principle is the valid classification. Article 14 is
not really a guarantee against arbitrariness.”
The best known or most authoritative view on the point is Ajay Hasia where it has been
observed:13
“If the classification is not reasonable and does not satisfy the two conditions referred to
above [(i) that the classification is founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes
persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group; and (ii) that
differentia has a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the impugned
legislative or executive action], the impugned legislative or executive action would plainly be
arbitrary and the guarantee of equality under Article 14 would be breached.”
Nonetheless, it has been pointed-out that “arbitrariness doctrine’s unique contribution is to
bring non-comparative unreasonableness within the ambit of Article 14.”14

Non-comparative unreasonableness
While the use of the “reasonable classification” doctrine is provisional for any slightly
different treatment between two individuals or two groups of individuals, the doctrine of
arbitrariness is also not handicapped. For any sufficiently significant failure to base an action
for reasonable grounds, it may and has been invoked. The scope of the application of Article
14 has been enormously broadened by this modern approach to constitutional adjudication
concerning Article 14, as there is no need to allege any prejudice in relation to others.
This is clear from the court's observation in A.L. Kalra v. Project and Equipment
Corporation15. In this case, since he had refused to use some funds he had taken from the
firm, the appellant had lost his job and had also refused to repay the same debts within the
specified timeframe. The court annulled the directive partially on the ground that it was
arbitrary and violated Article 14. Desai J. observed:16
“One need not confine the denial of equality to a comparative evaluation between two
persons to arrive at a conclusion of discriminatory treatment. An action per se arbitrary
itself denies equal of protection by law.”
Similarly, the court dismissed the order of the state government in Shrilekha Vidyarthi v.
State of U.P.17 to withdraw all existing district government counsel to name new ones in their
position. Even if the assignments of counsel were contractual, the court ruled that they had to
be regulated by the standards of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness implicit in Article 14
and the principle of the rule of law applicable to any state operation. It's further stated as
follows:18

13
Supra note 6.
14
Tarunabh Khaitan, “Legislative Review under Article 14” in Oxford Handbook of Indian Constitutional Law
4, Forthcoming; Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 29/2015 (2015), available at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2605395 (last visited on Feb. 2, 2015).
15
(1984) 3 SCC 316, 328
16
A.L. Kalra v. Project and Equipment Corporation (1984) 3 SCC 316, 328.
17
(1991) 1 SCC 212
18
Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P. (1991) 1 SCC 212

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“The meaning and true import of arbitrariness is more easily visualized than precisely stated
or defined. The question, whether an impugned act is arbitrary or not, is ultimately to be
answered on the facts and in the circumstances of a given case. An obvious test to apply is to
see whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the impugned act and if so,
does it satisfy the test of reasonableness. Where a mode is prescribed for doing an act and
there is no impediment in following that procedure, performance of the act otherwise and in
a manner which does not disclose any discernible principle which is reasonable, may itself
attract the vice of arbitrariness. Every State action must be informed by reason and it follows
that an act uninformed by reason, is arbitrary. Rule of law contemplates governance by laws
and not by humour, whims or caprices of the men to whom the governance is entrusted for
the time being. It is trite that be you ever so high, the laws are above you'. This is what men
in power must remember, always.”
As for the use of the ‘arbitrariness’ measure in determining upon the constitutionality of
administrative activities, Om Kumar v. Union of India19 is the principal case in point, wherein
it was said:
“Where, an administrative action is challenged as ‘arbitrary’ under Article 14 on the basis
of Royappa (as in cases where punishments in disciplinary cases are challenged), the
question will be whether the administrative order is ‘rational’ or ‘reasonable’ and the test
then is the Wednesbury test. The Courts would then be confined only to a secondary role and
will only have to see whether the administrator has done well in his primary role, whether he
has acted illegally or has omitted relevant factors from consideration or has taken irrelevant
factors into consideration or whether his view is one which no reasonable person could have
taken. If his action does not satisfy these rules, it is to be treated as arbitrary.”

Partial rejection of the doctrine

19
(2001) 2 SCC 386

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While the expression of a seemingly new typical was appreciated by many legal scholars,
who had grieved the insufficiency and inaptness of the “reasonable classification” test when
used in certain cases, the doctrine of arbitrariness was not free of critical lash-out. The most
moving criticism was perhaps by the well-known jurist H.M. Seervai who stated
consequently: “The new doctrine hangs in the air, because it propounds a theory of equality
without reference to the language of Art. 14.”20 He has further said that the novel doctrine
suffers from “fallacy of undistributed middle” in that “whatever violates equality is not
necessarily arbitrary, though arbitrary actions are ordinarily violating of equality”.
Nevertheless, the reliability or otherwise of the opinions against the expression of the ‘new
doctrine’, there is definite amount of imprecision connected to the theory of non-arbitrariness
that has troubled lawyers and scholars alike. It was only a matter of time before the Supreme
Court of India would express its nervousness with this seemingly vague notion especially in
its use in assessment of primary legislation.
In the case of State of A.P. v. McDowel21l, Reddy J on behalf of the bench of the Supreme
Court, laid down that “no enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or
unreasonable. Some or other constitutional infirmity has to be found before invalidating an
Act.”
In Natural Resources Allocation case22, [hereinafter 2G Reference case] the Court had the
chance to further remark on the “doctrinal looseness” of the arbitrariness test. Citing at length
from McDowell, it was emphasized that “A law may not be struck down for being arbitrary
without the pointing out of a constitutional infirmity.”
The final setback to the use of arbitrariness test with respect to a primary legislation was
given by the verdict of the division bench in Rajbala where it was decided:23
“It is clear that courts in this country do not undertake the task of declaring a piece of
legislation unconstitutional on the ground that the legislation is arbitrary since such an
exercise implies a value judgment and courts do not examine the wisdom of legislative
choices unless the legislation is otherwise violative of some specific provision of the
Constitution. To undertake such an examination would amount to virtually importing the
doctrine of substantive due process employed by the American Supreme Court at an earlier
point of time while examining the constitutionality of Indian legislation.”

Case Analysis

E.P. ROYAPPA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ANR.24

20
H.M. Seervai, Constitutional Law of India 438 (Universal, New Delhi, 4th edn., 1991)
21
(1996) 3 SCC 709.
22
Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1.
23
Supra note 1
24
E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. (1974) 4 SCC 3

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Supreme Court judges (5-judge bench):
A.N. Ray C.J.
Palekar J.
Chandrachud J.
P. N. Bhagwati J.
V. R. Krishnaiyer J.
Royappa is a very famous case in which the Article 14 of the Indian Constitution was given a
clarification and the scope of this Article was extended by the judgement. It was for the first
time in Royappa judgement that the Supreme Court laid a rudimentary, new dimension to
Article 14 and it was an assurance against arbitrariness.

Facts

 The petitioner a member of the Indian Administrative service was chosen for the empty
post of Chief Secretary to the seat.
 The Chief Secretary of the State and the First member of the Revenue Board were later
brought to the equivalent category.
 The petitioner was appointed to the post, and was given the same rank and remunerations
as allowed to the Chief Secretary, but he did not join and went on leave of absence. On
the petitioner’s arrival from leave of absence the post of Deputy Chairman was made for
one year in the status of the Chief Secretary and he was sanctioned to that post.
 Later a representation was made arguing that the post of Deputy Secretary in continuance
of the post of Chief Secretary wasn’t permitted for a period longer than a year as it was
against the Indian Administrative Services (Cadre) Rules, 1954.25
 Thus the Government created another provisional post of Officer on Special Duty but the
petitioner did not join it as well.
 Therefore, the post of Deputy Chairman was put an end and a member of the Board of
Revenue was appointed to the post.
So, the petitioner took to the court against the decision of his transfer adhering to the
provisions of the Article 32 of the Constitution, based on the grounds:
1. It was conflicting to the provisions of Indian Administrative Services (Cadre) Rules,
1954 and Indian Administrative Services Pay Rules, 1954.
2. It was against the provisions of Articles 1426 and 1627 of the Constitution as the posts
of Deputy Chairman, Special Planning Commission and Officer on Special Duty were
lesser in rank to that of Chief Secretary.
3. It was made in wrongful use of power.

25
https://dopt.gov.in/sites/default/files/Revised_AIS_Rule_Vol_II_IAS_Rule_01_0.pdf
26
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/367586/
27
https://indiankanoon.org/doc/211089/

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Judgement

 The Supreme Court held that both the posts required a high mental capability and
specialized experience to operate properly and shouldn’t be compared or lowered
against post that the petitioner was earlier chosen for.
 All three posts are equal in status and responsibility.
 No ground for mala fide intention on the government against the petitioner
 The Court through the affidavit evidence established that the Government
acknowledged the suggestions of the petitioner at all times and the petitioner carried
out his duties and implemented care and carefulness during election, as well as the
time of duty.
 No evidence appears any case of bitterness or difference between the Government and
the petitioner and there were no accounts to indicate that the government acted against
the suggestions of the petitioner.
 The Chief Minister cannot be said on the evidence to have committed violent acts or
intimidation; thus the entire affidavit evidence institutes that the petitioner’s
accusations complaining of wrongful intention against the Chief Minister were
unsubstantiated.

Decision

For the reasons the contentions stated in the judgement, the petition was dismissed and both
the parties were made to bear the cost.

Observations

Resoundingly, the bench unanimously dismissed the appeal. Even so, the bench wasn't really
unanimous in its intention to give the dismissal.  Ray C.J. for himself and Palekar J, gave a
decision where, in the current case, they didn't really find it necessary to fix Article 14 and
16.  Bhagwati J., on the hand, for himself, Chandrachud J., and Krishna Iyer J., he gave
another judgement where he not only emphasizes the value of the aforementioned
constitutional rights, but also puts forth an inventive interpretation of these documents. Since
he later reiterated those findings in later decisions and since they form the basis for a new
equal protection precedent in India, it would be fitting to quote in full the related lines as
follows::28
“Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be cribbed
cabined and confined within traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of
view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact, equality and arbitrariness are sworn
enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice
of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it that it is unequal both
according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violates Art. 14, and if it
affects any matter relating to public employment, it is also violating Art. 16.”
28
Supra note 2.

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The court argued that whether certain appointment was by way of substantive approval or in
an office capacity, but in this case, the petitioner was assigned in the office fashion because
he held the office for only a year and according to the rules if a person is assigned in office
capacity, they have very meagre opportunity for promotion, thus the petitioner believed that
in this case, we find that the nature of the "right to equality in arbitrariness" was found by
Justice Bhagwati. The standard definition of arbitrary is not something that is based on logic
or pertinent grounds, and no reasonable person would take an arbitrary decision. It was rather
reasonable to illustrate this feature of Article 14 in the facts of the situation, because the
petitioner's claim could be summarised as a claim of unfair treatment. Consequently, if at the
time the decision was announced, it was not taken as trumpeting a radical deviation from the
conventional definition of equality right, ought not to be shocked about it. Therefore, this
case essentially concerned class laws and "reasonable classification". Article 14 prohibits
class laws, but allows "reasonable classifications". Class law means that, by granting specific
rights on a class of people arbitrarily chosen from a large number of people, it makes an
inappropriate discrimination. According to the petitioner, he was discriminated against, so
this is a breach of Article 14.

Conclusion

Simple violation of Rule 9 Sub Rule 1 of the Indian Administrative Service (Pay) Rules, 1954
does not encompass breach of any fundamental right. Art. 16 embodies the fundamental
guarantee that Arts. 14 as there shall be equality of opportunity for all people in matters
concerning to occupation or nomination to any office under the State. Art. 16 is only an
instance of the use of the concept of equality preserved in Art. 14. In other words, Art. 14 is
the genus while Art 16 is a species, Art. 16 gives effect to the principle of equality in all that
relating to public employment. The basic principle which, consequently, informs both Arts.
14 and 16 is equality and no discrimination. The substance and reach of this equalising
principle is that it is an instituting faith, to use the words of Bose J., "a way of life", and it
must not be subjected to a “narrow, pedantic or lexicographic” approach. Equality is an ever-

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changing concept with many facets and dimensions and it cannot be confined within
traditional and doctrinal limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality is “antithetic to
arbitrariness”.
The above study shows that there is significant confusion as to the validity of the arbitrary
test to review the constitutionality of the statutes. Despite the apparent questionable validity
of such a procedure, it is quite clear that such an exercise is legally permissible in view of the
court decisions made by the Supreme Court 's Constitutional Bench. Thus, the circular
argument runs: all unconstitutional acts of the state (legislative and executive) are contrary to
the concept of equality. Thus, Article 14 would fall foul of all arbitrary state acts. In addition,
Article 13 would attract all state activities that fall foul of Article 14. This is likely to be the
true law condition before a larger-strength statutory bench decides otherwise. Fragmented
judicial initiatives would not produce the desired outcome in violation of judicial discipline.
The suitability of such a reference, however, may be proposed and genuine attempts may be
made to resolve the ambiguity inherent with the doctrine of arbitrariness. The idea of a
method of tiered inspection as in the US can also be discussed or different standards (liberal
or strict) can be introduced in an arbitrary review to inspection primary and secondary
legislation.

Bibliography

Cases
 Rajbala v. State of Haryana
 E.P. ROYAPPA v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ANR.
 A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shiv Kant Shukla
 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India
 Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi
 Bhagwati J in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab
 R.D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority
 Sharma Transport v. Government of A.P

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  A.L. Kalra v. Project and Equipment
 Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P.
 Om Kumar v. Union of India
 A.P. v. McDowel

Books
 Basu, D.D., Shorter constitution of India
 Jain, M.P., Indian Constitutional Law

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