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Documentary Evidence: Original Document Rule and Secondary Evidence

19. CITIBANK, N.A. MASTERCARD vs. EFREN S. TEODORO, G.R. No. 150905, September 23, 2003
DOCTRINE:
 The original copies of the sales invoices are the best evidence to prove the alleged obligation—
photocopies thereof are mere secondary evidence.
 The correct order of proof is as follows— existence, execution, loss, and contents—but this order may
be changed if necessary, at the sound discretion of the court.
 When more than one original copy exists, it must appear that all of them have been lost, destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court before secondary evidence can be given of any one.
 Before secondary evidence may be admitted to prove the contents of original documents, the offeror
must prove the due execution and the subsequent loss or unavailability of the original.
FACTS:
Petitioner Citibank, N.A. Mastercard operates a credit card system through which it extends credit
accommodations to its cardholders for the purchase of goods and services from its member establishments.
Respondent Efren Teodoro was one such cardholder. Teodoro made various purchases through his credit cards.
He was billed for such purchases, for which he tendered various payments.
Citibank claimed that as of January 20, 1995, Teodoro’s obligations stood at P191,693.25, inclusive of interest
and service charges. Citibank demanded payment from Teodoro several times. Teodoro’s refusal to pay
prompted Citibank to file a complaint for collection before the RTC. The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction over the amount involved. The case was then transferred to the MTC.
During the trial, Citibank presented several sales invoices or charge slips, which added up to only P24,388.36.
Although mere photocopies of the originals, the invoices were marked in evidence as Exhibits “F” to “F-4.”
Because all these copies appeared to bear the signatures of Teodoro, the trial court deemed them sufficient
proof of his purchases with the use of the credit card. The MTC ordered Teodoro to pay Citibank the amount of
P24,388.36 plus interest and penalty fee.
The RTC affirmed the MTC decision in toto. The CA reversed the trial courts, ruling that the photocopies of the
sales invoices or charge slips as evidence were insufficient to prove any liability on Teodoro’s part. Hence, this
petition.
Citibank contended that the testimony of its principal witness, Citibank’s assistant manager Mark Hernando,
proves the existence or due execution of the original sales invoices, the loss or unavailability of the original sales
invoices, and Citibank’s diligence and good faith in the search for or attempt to produce the originals.
Teodoro maintained that Citibank failed to prove the due execution of the sales invoices; that Hernando was not
privy to such execution; that Hernando was not the person before whom the application form was signed.
ISSUE:
Whether the photocopies of the sales invoices or charge slips marked during trial as Exhibits “F” to “F-4” are
admissible in evidence.
RULING: NO. The original copies of the sales invoices are the best evidence to prove the alleged obligation.
Photocopies thereof are mere secondary evidence. As such, they are inadmissible because petitioner, as the
offeror, failed to prove any of the exceptions provided under Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as
well as the conditions of their admissibility.
Petitioner failed to prove that the originals had been lost or could not be produced in court after reasonable
diligence and good faith in searching for them. Petitioner failed to show that all three original copies were
unavailable, and that due diligence had been exercised in the search for them.
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The original copies of the sales invoices are the best evidence to prove the alleged obligation. Photocopies
thereof are mere secondary evidence. As such, they are inadmissible because petitioner, as the offeror, failed
to prove any of the exceptions provided under Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as well as the
conditions of their admissibility. Because of the inadmissibility of the photocopies in the absence of the
originals, respondent’s obligation was not established.
Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:
“SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable.—When the original document has been lost or destroyed,
or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents
in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.”
Applying the above Rule to the present case, before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove
the contents of the original sales invoices, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or due
execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its nonproduction in court;
and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be
attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents. At the sound
discretion of the court, this order may be changed if necessary.
In the present case, the existence of the original sales invoices was established by the photocopies and the
testimony of Hernandez. Petitioner, however, failed to prove that the originals had been lost or could not be
produced in court after reasonable diligence and good faith in searching for them.
Indeed, the loss of the originals and reasonable diligence in the search for them were conditions that were not
met, because the sales invoices might have been found by Equitable. Hernandez, testifying that he had
requested the originals from Equitable, failed to show that he had subsequently followed up the request.
Finally, when more than one original copy exists, it must appear that all of them have been lost, destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court before secondary evidence can be given of any one. A photocopy may not be
used without accounting for the other originals.
In the present case, triplicates were produced, although the cardholder signed the sales invoice only once.
During the trial, Hernandez explained that an original copy had gone to respondent, another to the merchant,
and still another to petitioner.
Each of these three copies is regarded as an original in accordance with Section 4 (b) of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. Petitioner failed to show that all three original copies were unavailable, and that due diligence had
been exercised in the search for them.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.

20. WILGEN LOON et al. vs. POWER MASTER, INC.et al., G.R. No. 189404, December 11, 2013
DOCTRINE:
 In labor cases, strict adherence to the technical rules of procedure is not required. Time and again, we
have allowed evidence to be submitted for the first time on appeal with the NLRC in the interest of
substantial justice. Thus, we have consistently supported the rule that labor officials should use all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure, in the interest of due process. However, this liberal policy should still
be subject to rules of reason and fairplay. The liberality of procedural rules is qualified by two
requirements: (1) a party should adequately explain any delay in the submission of evidence; and (2) a
party should sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven. The reason for these requirements
is that the liberal application of the rules before quasi-judicial agencies cannot be used to perpetuate
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injustice and hamper the just resolution of the case. Neither is the rule on liberal construction a license
to disregard the rules of procedure.
 Why the respondents’ photocopied and computerized copies of documentary evidence were not
presented at the earliest opportunity is a serious question that lends credence to the petitioners’ claim
that the respondents fabricated the evidence for purposes of appeal. While we generally admit in
evidence and give probative value to photocopied documents in administrative proceedings,
allegations of forgery and fabrication should prompt the adverse party to present the original
documents for inspection. It was incumbent upon the respondents to present the originals, especially in
this case where the petitioners had submitted their specimen signatures. Instead, the respondents
effectively deprived the petitioners of the opportunity to examine and controvert the alleged spurious
evidence by not adducing the originals. This Court is thus left with no option but to rule that the
respondents’ failure to present the originals raises the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed
would be adverse if produced.
FACTS:
Respondents Power Master, Inc. and Tri-C General Services employed and assigned petitioners as janitors and
leadsmen in various Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) offices in Metro Manila area.
Petitioners filed a complaint for money claims against respondents and their officers which include Spouses
Homer and Carina Alumisin. Petitioners alleged that they were not paid minimum wages, overtime, holiday,
premium, service incentive leave, and thirteenth month pays; that respondents made them sign blank payroll
sheets. Petitioners later amended their complaint, including illegal dismissal as their cause of action, claiming
that they were relieved from service in retaliation for the filing of their original complaint. Mr. Romulo Pacio, Jr.
appeared on behalf of respondents, however, respondents neither filed any position paper nor proffered
pieces of evidence in their defense.
The LA ruled in favor of petitioners, awarding them salary differential, service incentive leave, and thirteenth
month pays. The LA stated that the burden of proving the payment of these money claims rests with the
employer. The LA denied the petitioners’ claims for backwages, overtime, holiday, and premium pays. The LA
held that petitioners failed to show that they rendered overtime work and worked on holidays and rest days
without compensation; that they did not show any notice of termination of employment; or that they were
barred from entering respondents’ premises.
Before the NLRC, respondents claimed they were not personally served with summons and other processes; and
that they paid petitioners minimum wages, incentive leave and thirteenth month pays. As proofs, they attached
photocopied and computerized copies of payroll sheets to their memorandum on appeal. Respondents
claimed that petitioners were validly dismissed for their repeated defiance to their transfer to different
workplaces and their violations of company rules and regulations.
Onto respondents unverified supplemental appeal, they attached photocopied and computerized copies of list
of employees with automated teller machine (ATM) cards. This list also showed the amounts allegedly
deposited in the employees’ ATM cards. They also attached documentary evidence showing that the petitioners
were dismissed for cause and had been accorded due process.
Petitioners filed an urgent manifestation and motion where they asked for the deletion of the supplemental
appeal from the records, claiming that: 1) it was not verified; 2) it was belatedly filed; 3) the attached
documentary evidence bore petitioners’ forged signature. Later, in another urgent manifestation, petitioners
claimed that the payrolls should not be given probative value; that the genuine payrolls bore their signatures,
unlike the respondents’ photocopies.
The NLRC partially ruled in favor of respondents, affirming the LA’s awards of holiday pay and attorney’s fees.
However, it allowed the respondents to submit pieces of evidence for the first time on appeal on the ground
that they had been deprived of due process. The NLRC found that respondents did not actually receive the LA’s
processes.
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The NLRC also vacated the LA’s awards of salary differential, thirteenth month and service incentive leave
pays. In so ruling, it gave weight to the pieces of evidence attached to the memorandum on appeal and the
supplemental appeal.
The NLRC further ruled that the petitioners were lawfully dismissed on grounds of serious misconduct and willful
disobedience. The NLRC denied petitioners’ MR. Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Petitioners insisted the NLRC should not have admitted the respondents’ unverified supplemental appeal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the NLRC should properly give due course to the respondents’ supplemental appeal.
2. Whether the NLRC committed commit grave abuse of discretion in arbitrarily admitting and giving
weight to the respondents’ pieces of evidence for the first time on appeal.
RULING:
1. YES. The CA correctly ruled that the NLRC properly gave due course to the respondents’ supplemental
appeal
Neither the laws nor the rules require the verification of the supplemental appeal. Furthermore, verification is a
formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement. It is mainly intended for the assurance that the matters alleged in the
pleading are true and correct and not of mere speculation. Also, a supplemental appeal is merely an addendum
to the verified memorandum on appeal that was earlier filed in the present case; hence, the requirement for
verification has substantially been complied with.
2. YES. CA grossly erred in ruling that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in arbitrarily
admitting and giving weight to the respondents’ pieces of evidence for the first time on appeal. The
respondents failed to adequately explain their delay in the submission of evidence; and the
respondents failed to sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven.
Why the respondents’ photocopied and computerized copies of documentary evidence were not
presented at the earliest opportunity is a serious question that lends credence to the petitioners’
claim that the respondents fabricated the evidence for purposes of appeal. While we generally admit
in evidence and give probative value to photocopied documents in administrative proceedings,
allegations of forgery and fabrication should prompt the adverse party to present the original
documents for inspection.
In labor cases, strict adherence to the technical rules of procedure is not required. Time and again, we have
allowed evidence to be submitted for the first time on appeal with the NLRC in the interest of substantial justice.
Thus, we have consistently supported the rule that labor officials should use all reasonable means to ascertain
the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, in the
interest of due process.
However, this liberal policy should still be subject to rules of reason and fairplay. The liberality of procedural
rules is qualified by two requirements: (1) a party should adequately explain any delay in the submission of
evidence; and (2) a party should sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven.
Guided by these principles, the CA grossly erred in ruling that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in arbitrarily admitting and giving weight to the respondents’ pieces of evidence for the first time
on appeal.
The respondents failed to adequately explain their delay in the submission of evidence. Notably, the
respondents’ delay was anchored on their assertion that they were oblivious of the proceedings before the LA.
However, the respondents did not dispute the LA’s finding that Mr. Romulo Pacia, Jr. appeared on their behalf.
The respondents failed to sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be proven.
Why the respondents’ photocopied and computerized copies of documentary evidence were not presented at
the earliest opportunity is a serious question that lends credence to the petitioners’ claim that the respondents
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fabricated the evidence for purposes of appeal. While we generally admit in evidence and give probative value
to photocopied documents in administrative proceedings, allegations of forgery and fabrication should
prompt the adverse party to present the original documents for inspection. It was incumbent upon the
respondents to present the originals, especially in this case where the petitioners had submitted their specimen
signatures. Instead, the respondents effectively deprived the petitioners of the opportunity to examine and
controvert the alleged spurious evidence by not adducing the originals. This Court is thus left with no option but
to rule that the respondents’ failure to present the originals raises the presumption that evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced.
It was also gross error for the CA to affirm the NLRC’s proposition that “[i]t is of common knowledge that
there are many people who use at least two or more different signatures.” The NLRC cannot take judicial
notice that many people use at least two signatures, especially in this case where the petitioners themselves
disown the signatures in the respondents’ assailed documentary evidence. The NLRC’s position is unwarranted
and is patently unsupported by the law and jurisprudence.
The petitioners are entitled to backwages.
The petitioners are entitled to salary differential, service incentive, holiday, and thirteenth month pays.
The petitioners are not entitled to overtime and premium pays.
The petitioners are entitled to attorney’s fees.
WHEREFORE, based on these premises, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision dated June 5, 2009, and the
resolution dated August 28, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 95182. This case is REMANDED to the
Labor Arbiter for the sole purpose of computing petitioners’ full backwages xxx.

21. Skunac Corporation vs. Sylianteng, 723 SCRA 625, April 23, 2014
DOCTRINES:
 The best evidence rule applies only when the content of such document is the subject of the inquiry.
 A signed carbon copy or duplicate of a document executed at the same time as the original is known as a
duplicate original and maybe introduced in evidence without accounting for the non-production of the
original.
 The notarization of a private document converts it into a public document. Moreover, a notarized
instrument is admissible in evidence without further proof of its due execution, is conclusive as to the
truthfulness of its contents, and has in its favor the presumption of regularity.
FACTS:
SKUNAC CORPORATION and ALFONSO F. ENRIQUEZ, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO S. SYLIANTENG and CAESAR S.
SYLIANTENG, respondents. 
The subjects of the controversy are two parcels of land located in Pujalte Subdivision situated along Wilson
Street, Greenhills, San Juan City, which are portions of a parcel of land previously registered in the name of Luis
Pujalte.
Respondents Roberto and Caesar Sylianteng based their claim of ownership over the subject lots on a Deed of
Absolute Sale executed in their favor by their mother Emerenciana on June 27, 1983. The Syliantengs alleged
that Emerenciana acquired the lots from Luis Pujalte through a Deed of Sale dated June 20, 1958. The TCT
covering the lot were then issued in the names of the Syliantengs.
Petitioner Skunac Corporation and Alfonso Enriquez claimed that Romeo Pujalte, who was declared by the RTC
of Pasig City in a special proceedings as the sole heir of Luis Pujalte, caused the reconstitution of the Mother
Title resulting to its cancellation and the issuance of a TCT in his favor. Romeo then sold the lots to Skunac and
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Enrique in 1992. TCT for Lot 1 was issued in the name of Skunac, while the TCT for Lot 2 was issued in the name
of Enriquez.
The Syliantengs contend that they have a better right to the lots in question because the transactions conveying
the same to them preceded those claimed by petitioners as source of the latter’s titles. Skunac and Enriquez
maintained that the Syliantengs acquired the lot under questionable circumstances it appearing that there was
no copy of the Deed of Sale between Emerenciana and Luis Pujalte on file with the Office of the Register of
Deeds.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners Skunac and Enriquez, declaring the TCTs in the name of Emerenciana and
the Syliantengs null and void.
The CA granted the Syliantengs’ appeal, declaring the TCTs in the name of Romeo Pujalte, Skunac, and Enriquez
as null and void. Petitioners’ MR was then denied. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners assailed the authenticity and due execution of the deed of sale between Luis and Emerenciana .
Petitioners contend that the Syliangtengs’ presentation of the “duplicate/carbon” original of the Deed of Sale
dated June 20, 1958 is in violation of the best evidence rule under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the Syliantengs’ presentation of the “duplicate/carbon” original of the Deed of Sale between Luis and
Emerenciana is in violation of the best evidence rule.
RULING: NO. The best evidence rule is inapplicable to the present case. The said rule applies only when the
content of such document is the subject of the inquiry. In the instant case, what is being questioned is the
authenticity and due execution of the subject deed of sale. There is no real issue as to its contents. A certified
copy of page 26 of the notarial register of the notary public who notarized the subject deed of sale, which was
issued by the Records Management and Archives Office of Manila, shows that the sale of the subject lots by
Luis to Emerenciana was indeed regularly notarized. The said deed was, in fact, registered as evidenced by
official receipts issued to this effect.
Emerenciana’s acquisition of the subject lots from Luis and her subsequent sale of the same to respondents
are valid and lawful.
For Article 1544 of the Civil Code to apply, the the two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of
the subject matter must each have bought from the very same seller. In the present case, the subject lots were
sold to petitioners and respondents by two different vendors — Emerenciana and Romeo Pujalte (Romeo).
Hence, Article 1544 of the Civil Code is not applicable.
The best evidence rule is inapplicable to the present case. The said rule applies only when the content of such
document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually
executed, or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule
does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible
without need to account for the original. In the instant case, what is being questioned is the authenticity and
due execution of the subject deed of sale. There is no real issue as to its contents.
petitioners do not dispute that the copy of the deed of sale that respondents submitted as part of their evidence
is a duplicate of the original deed of sale dated June 20, 1958. It is settled that a signed carbon copy or
duplicate of a document executed at the same time as the original is known as a duplicate original and maybe
introduced in evidence without accounting for the non-production of the original.
The Rules of Court provides that “[w]hen a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same
time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as originals.”
In addition, evidence of the authenticity and due execution of the subject deed is the fact that it was
notarized. The notarization of a private document converts it into a public document. Moreover, a notarized
instrument is admissible in evidence without further proof of its due execution, is conclusive as to the
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truthfulness of its contents, and has in its favor the presumption of regularity. This presumption is affirmed if it is
beyond dispute that the notarization was regular. To assail the authenticity and due execution of a notarized
document, the evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.
In the present case, petitioners failed to present convincing evidence to prove that the notarization of the
subject deed was irregular as to strip it of its public character. On the contrary, a certified copy of page 26 of the
notarial register of the notary public who notarized the subject deed of sale, which was issued by the Records
Management and Archives Office of Manila, shows that the sale of the subject lots by Luis to Emerenciana
was indeed regularly notarized.
The Court, however, agrees with the CA that the said deed was, in fact, registered as evidenced by official
receipts issued to this effect. Petitioners, again, did not present any evidence to assail the authenticity of these
documents.
Petitioners also question the authenticity of the subject deed of sale (Exhibit “B-1-C”) by arguing that only one
copy of such deed was prepared as only one document number was assigned by the notary to the said deed.
One number is assigned to a deed or contract regardless of the number of copies prepared and notarized.
Each and every copy of such contract is given the same document number. It is, thus, wrong for petitioners to
argue that only one copy of the June 20, 1958 deed of sale was prepared and notarized, because only one
document number appears on the notarial book of the notary public who notarized the said deed. On the
contrary, evidence shows that at least two copies of the subject deed of sale was prepared and notarized —
one was submitted for registration with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and the other was retained by
Emerenciana, which is the copy presented in evidence by respondents.
Petitioners also question the authenticity of and the entries appearing on the copy of the title covering the
subject properties in the name of Luis. However, the Court finds no cogent reason to doubt the authenticity of
the document as well as the entries appearing therein, considering that the parties (herein petitioners and
respondents) stipulated that the machine copy of TCT No. 78865 in the name of Luis, marked as Exhibit “DDD”
for respondents, is a faithful reproduction of the original copy of the said title, including the memorandum of
encumbrances annotated therein.
In the present case, petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to contradict the presumption of regularity
in the performance of the duties of then Acting Register of Deeds of San Juan.
Evidence, however, shows that Romeo never became the owner of the subject properties for two reasons.
First, as shown above, the disputed lots were already sold by Luis during his lifetime. Thus, these parcels of
land no longer formed part of his estate when he died. Hence, Romeo’s sale of the subject lots to petitioners is
invalid as it is settled that any unauthorized disposition of property under administration is null and void and
title does not pass to the purchasers.
Second, even granting that the subject lots formed part of the estate of Luis, it was subsequently proven in a
separate case that Romeo is not his heir. In a criminal case for use of falsified documents filed against Romeo, it
was proven that his claim of heirship is spurious. Indeed, not being an heir of Luis, Romeo never acquired any
right whatsoever over the subject lots, even if he was able to subsequently obtain a title in his name.
In the present case, Romeo filed a Verified Complaint-in-Intervention with the RTC, denying that he sold the
subject lots to petitioners and claiming that the same properties still form part of the estate of Luis.
In the instant case, The Torrens Certificate of Title (TCT No. 5760-R) in the name of Romeo, which was the title
relied upon by petitioners, also contained Entry No. P.E. 4023, quoted above, which essentially informs
petitioners that the lots which they were about to buy and which they in fact bought, were already sold to
Emerenciana. This entry should have alerted petitioners and should have prodded them to conduct further
investigation.
In the instant case, respondents satisfactorily established their claim for moral damages.
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As to exemplary damages, these are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Respondents are also entitled to attorney’s fees, as awarded by the CA, on the strength of the provisions of
Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated August 10, 2012
and February 18, 2013, respectively, in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 92022, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

22. THERESITA DIMAGUILA et al. vs. JOSE and SONIA A. MONTEIRO, G.R. No. 201011, January 27, 2014
DOCTRINES:
 Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made by a party in the course of
the proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and may be contradicted only by showing that
it was made through palpable mistake. The petitioners argue that such admission was the palpable
mistake of their former counsel in his rush to file the answer, a copy of which was not provided to them.
 Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a document is
in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a
certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the
record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody
or the record.
 As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in
official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the
performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a
duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The necessity of this
rule consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official’s attendance as a witness to
testify to the innumerable transactions in the course of his duty. The document’s trustworthiness
consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty.
FACTS:
Respondents Spouses Jose and Sonia Monteiro along with the Noblezas filed a complaint for partition and
damages with the RTC against petitioners Dimaguilas, among others. The complaint alleged that all the parties
were co-owners and prayed for the partition of a residential house and lot located at Gat. Tayaw St., Liliw,
Laguna. Spouses Monteiro anchored their claim on a deed of sale executed in their favor by the heirs of Pedro
Dimaguila.
The Dimaguilas counted that there was no co-ownership; that the subject property then owned by Maria Ignacio
Buenaseda had long been partitioned equally between her two sons Perfecto and Vitaliano Dimaguila through a
deed of extrajudicial partition. The southern-half portion assigned to Perfecto, and the northern-half portion to
Vitaliano. The Dimaguilas claimed that they were the heirs of Vitaliano, and that Spouses Monteiro were neither
heirs of Perfecto or Vitaliano.
Spouses Monteiro later amended their complaint, abandoning the original claim for partition and instead
seeking the recovery of possession of a portion of the subject property occupied by the Dimaguilas and other
defendants, specifically, the portion sold to the couple by the heirs of Pedro.
Spouses Monteiro adopted the Dimaguilas’ admission in their original answer that the subject property had
already been partitioned between Perfecto and Vitaliano, along with the aforesaid division. Spouses Monteiro
further averred that Perfecto was survived by his heirs, among them is Pedro, whose 1/3 share is immediately
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adjacent to the northern-half adjudicated to the Dimaguilas as heirs of Vitaliano. They claimed that Pedro’s
share was sold by his heirs to the Spouses Moteiro through a bilihan ng lahat naming karapatan; and that when
Spouses Monteiro attempted to take possession of said share, they discovered that the subject portion was
being occupied by the Dimaguilas.
In their answer, the Dimaguilas denied the admission in their original answer that it had been actually divided
into southern and northern portions, arguing instead that the extrajudicial partition mentioned only the
division of the subject property “into two and share and share alike.” They argued the existence of a co-
ownership, contrary to their original position.
Sonia Monteiro testified that she was approached by Pedro’s son, Francisco, who showed her a deed of
extrajudicial partition executed by and between Perfecto and Vitaliano. During trial, Sonia’s brother Pedrito
testified that Perfecto was his grandfather who had two properties, one of which was the subject property in
Liliw.
Engineer Baltazar Mesina testified that he was the geodetic engineer hired by Spouses Monteiro, who later
came up with a survey plan.
Crisostomo Arves, an employee from the Office of the Municipal Assessor, presented a certified true copy of the
cadastral map of Liliw and a list of claimants/owners.
Dominga Tolentino, a record officer of the DENR testified that as part of her duties, she certifies and safekeeps
the records of surveyed land, including cadastral maps from the region.
One of the Dimaguilas, Asuncion, the sole witness for the defendants, testified that their first counsel made a
mistake when he alleged in their original answer that the property had already been partitioned into northern
and southern portions between the two brothers, as the original answer had been rushed and they were
never given a copy of it. She claimed that the mistake was only pointed out to her by their new counsel after
their former counsel withdrew due to cancer. She further testified that there was no intention to partition the
“bahay na bato” which stood on the subject property, in order to preserve its historical and sentimental value.
The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro and ordered the Dimaguilas to turn over the possession of the
subject 1/3 portion of the southern-half of the property. The RTC found that although the extrajudicial
partition merely divided the property into two share and share alike, evidence aliunde was appreciated to
show that there was an actual division of the property into south and north between Perfecto and Vitaliano, and
that such partition was observed and honored by their heirs. These pieces of evidence were the cadastral map
of Liliw and a corresponding list of claimants, which showed that the subject property had long been registered
as Lot 876 (northern-half), claimed by Buenaventura Dimaguila (Buenaventura), an heir of Vitaliano, and Lot 877
(southern-half), claimed by Perfecto.
It noted that the Dimaguilas had strongly maintained their theory of partition from 1992 when the complaint
was first filed, and only changed their defense in 2001 when Spouses Monteiro filed their amended complaint.
It keenly observed that it was precisely their admission which propelled Spouses Monteiro to amend their
complaint from one of partition to recovery of possession.
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. The CA found that Spouses Monteiro had established their case by a
preponderance of evidence thru their presentation of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, the cadastral map
and the municipal assessor’s records.
The Dimaguilas argue that their original allegation regarding the partition of the subject property into northern
and southern portions was a mistake of their former counsel, and it was not their intention to partition the
property because to do so would damage the house thereon.
The evidence aliunde considered by the RTC, consisting of the cadastral map and the list of claimants, were
timely objected to during the trial as hearsay and a violation of the best evidence rule.
The Dimaguilas also insisted on their argument, which was raised before the RTC, but not addressed, that the
Bilihan should not have been admitted as evidence for lack of a documentary stamp tax in accordance with the
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NIRC. The CA, however, ruled that if a document which did not bear the required documentary stamp was
presented in evidence, the court should require the proponent to affix the requisite stamp.
The CA denied the Dimaguilas’ MR. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the original allegation regarding the partition of the subject property into northern and
southern portions was a palpable mistake of their former counsel.
2. Whether the evidence aliunde considered by the RTC was hearsay and a violation of the best evidence
rule.
3. Whether the Bilihan should not have been admitted as evidence for lack of a documentary stamp tax.
RULING:
At the outset, it must be pointed out that the petitioners’ assignment of errors calls for the Court to again
evaluate the evidence to determine whether there was a partition of the property and whether the 1/3 portion
of the southern half was sold to the respondent spouses. These clearly entail questions of fact which are
beyond the Court’s ambit of review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, especially considering that the
findings of fact of the RTC were affirmed by the CA. On this ground alone, the present petition must be
denied. Nonetheless, the Court shall delve into these factual issues to finally put this case to rest.
1. NO. The Court notes that this position was adopted by the petitioners only almost eight (8) years after
their original answer was filed, in response to the amended complaint of the respondent spouses. The
petitioners cannot now insist that the very foundation of their original defense was a palpable
mistake.
Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case does not require proof, and may be contradicted only by showing that it was made
through palpable mistake. The petitioners argue that such admission was the palpable mistake of their former
counsel in his rush to file the answer, a copy of which was not provided to them.
This contention is unacceptable. It is a purely self-serving claim unsupported by any iota of evidence. Bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof. Furthermore, the Court notes that this
position was adopted by the petitioners only almost eight (8) years after their original answer was filed, in
response to the amended complaint of the respondent spouses. The petitioners cannot now insist that the
very foundation of their original defense was a palpable mistake.
Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that through estoppel, an admission is rendered conclusive upon the
person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
Considering that an admission does not require proof, the admission of the petitioners would actually be
sufficient to prove the partition even without the documents presented by the respondent spouses. If
anything, the additional evidence they presented only served to corroborate the petitioners’ admission.
2. NO. Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of claimants of the
area covered by the map were presented by two public officers. The cadastral maps and the list of
claimants, as certified true copies of original public records, fall under the exception to the best
evidence rule.
As to the hearsay rule, entries in official records are an exception to the rule.
Anent the best evidence rule, Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself,
except when the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or
is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody
thereof. Section 24 of Rule 132 provides that the record of public documents may be evidenced by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody or the record.
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Certified true copies of the cadastral map of Liliw and the corresponding list of claimants of the area covered
by the map were presented by two public officers. The cadastral maps and the list of claimants, as certified
true copies of original public records, fall under the exception to the best evidence rule.
As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in official
records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the performance
of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The necessity of this rule consists in the
inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the official’s attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable
transactions in the course of his duty. The document’s trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity
of performance of official duty.
The cadastral map and the corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries in official records as they were
prepared by the DENR, as mandated by law. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein.
3.
On January 3, 1996, the petitioners filed a notice of consignation, manifesting that they had attempted to
exercise their right of redemption as co-owners of the 1/3 portion of the southern half of the property under
Article 1623 of the Civil Code by sending and tendering payment of redemption to Spouses Monteiro, which
was, however, returned.
By filing the notice of consignation and tendering their payment for the redemption of the 1/3 portion of the
southern-half of the property, the petitioners, in effect, admitted the existence, due execution and validity of
the Bilihan. Consequently, they are now estopped from questioning its admissiblity in evidence for relying on
such for their right of redemption.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

23. Rafael Ortañez vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 561, January 23, 1997
DOCTRINES:
 Under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an agreement
were reduced to writing, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such
terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof.
 Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, “it cannot serve the purpose
of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at
all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake.”
FACTS:
Private respondents Oscar Inocentes and Asuncion Lllanes Inocentes sold to petitioner Rafael Ortañez two
parcels of registered land in Quezon City for a consideration of P35,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively. The
Inocentes received the payments for the said lots, but failed to deliver the titles to Ortañez. When Ortañez
demanded from them the delivery of the titles, Oscar and Asuncion refused on the ground that the title of the
first lot is in the possession of another person, and Ortañez’s acquisition of the title of the other lot is subject to
certain conditions.
Ortañez sued the Inocentes for specific performance before the RTC. In their answer with counterclaim, the
Inocentes merely alleged the existence of the following oral conditions which were never reflected in the deeds
of sale:
“3.3.2 Title to the other property (TCT No. 243273) remains with the defendants (private respondents)
until plaintiff (petitioner) shows proof that all the following requirements have been met:
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(i) Plaintiff will cause the segregation of his right of way amounting to 398 sq. m.;
(ii) Plaintiff will submit to the defendants the approved plan for the segregation:
(iii) Plaintiff will put up a strong wall between his property and that of defendants’ lot to segregate his
right of way;
(iv) Plaintiff will pay the capital gains tax and all other expenses that may be incurred by reason of
sale. x x x.”
Oscar Inocentes, a former judge, orally testified that the sale was subject to the above conditions, although
such conditions were not incorporated in the deeds of sale. Despite Ortañez’s timely objections on the ground
that the introduction of said oral conditions was barred by the parol evidence rule, the RTC nonetheless,
admitted them and eventually dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the court a quo. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the parol evidence to establish the alleged oral conditions precedent to the contract of sale are
admissible.
RULING: NO. The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. (1) Private respondents’ oral testimony is
not as reliable as written or documentary evidence; (2) The deeds of sale in this case, made no reference to
any pre-conditions or other agreement; (3) The parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary,
contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument, hence, contrary to the rule; (4) Parol evidence does
not fall under the exceptions provided under the Rules; the deeds of sale are clear, without any ambiguity,
mistake or imperfection, much less obscurity or doubt in the terms thereof; and (5) Private respondents did
not expressly plead that the deeds of sale were incomplete or that it did not reflect the intention of the buyer
(petitioner) and the seller (private respondents).
First, private respondents’ oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in
the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary
evidence. Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform
language. Thus, under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of an
agreement were reduced to writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no
evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents thereof. Considering that the written deeds of
sale were the only repository of the truth, whatever is not found in said instruments must have been waived and
abandoned by the parties.
Secondly, to buttress their argument, private respondents rely on the case of Land Settlement Development, Co.
vs. Garcia Plantation where the Court ruled that a condition precedent to a contract may be established by parol
evidence. However, the material facts of that case are different from this case. In the former, the contract
sought to be enforced expressly stated that it is subject to an agreement containing the conditions-precedent
which were proven through parol evidence. Whereas, the deeds of sale in this case, made no reference to any
pre-conditions or other agreement. In fact, the sale is denominated as absolute in its own terms.
Third, the parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a
valid instrument, hence, contrary to the rule.
Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, “it cannot serve the purpose of
incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the
writing unless there has been fraud or mistake.” No such fraud or mistake exists in this case.
Fourth, we disagree with private respondents’ argument that their parol evidence is admissible under the
exceptions provided by the Rules, specifically, the alleged failure of the agreement to express the true intent of
the parties. Such exception obtains only in the following instance:
“[W]here the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention of the
parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument. In such a case, extrinsic evidence of
the subject matter of the contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of the facts and
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circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the contract may be received to enable the court
to make a proper interpretation of the instrument.”
In this case, the deeds of sale are clear, without any ambiguity, mistake or imperfection, much less obscurity
or doubt in the terms thereof.
Fifth, we are not persuaded by private respondents’ contention that they “put in issue by the pleadings” the
failure of the written agreement to express the true intent of the parties. Record shows that private
respondents did not expressly plead that the deeds of sale were incomplete or that it did not reflect the
intention of the buyer (petitioner) and the seller (private respondents). Such issue must be “squarely
presented.” Private respondents merely alleged that the sale was subject to four (4) conditions which they tried
to prove during trial by parol evidence. Obviously, this cannot be done, because they did not plead any of the
exceptions mentioned in the parol evidence rule. Their case is covered by the general rule that the contents of
the writing are the only repository of the terms of the agreement.
One last thing, assuming arguendo that the parol evidence is admissible, it should nonetheless be disbelieved as
no other evidence appears from the record to sustain the existence of the alleged conditions. Not even the
other seller, Asuncion Inocentes, was presented to testify on such conditions.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the records of this case REMANDED to the trial court for
proper disposition in accordance with this ruling.
SO ORDERED.

24. Lapulapu Foundation, Inc. vs. CA et al, 421 SCRA 328, January 29, 2004
DOCTRINE:
Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or
defeat the operation of a valid contract.   While parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of written
contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions
which are not mentioned at all in writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake.   No such allegation had been
made by the petitioners in this case.

FACTS:
Sometime in 1977, Elias Q. Tan, then President of Lapulapu Foundation, Inc., obtained four loans from Allied
Banking Corporation covered by four promissory notes in the amounts of P100,000 each. The Bank was
constrained to file with the RTC of Cebu City, a complaint seeking payment by Tan and the foundation, jointly
and solidarily, of the sum of P493,566.61 representing their loan obligation, In its answer to the complaint, the
Foundation denied incurring indebtedness from the Bank alleging that the loans were obtained by Tan in his
personal capacity, for his own use and benefit and on the strength of the personal information he furnished the
Bank. The Foundation maintained that it never authorized Tan to co-sign in his capacity as its President any
promissory note and that the Bank fully knew that the loans contracted were made in Tan’s personal capacity
and for his own use and that the Foundation never benefited, directly or indirectly, therefrom. According to
Tan, the Bank’s employee required him to affix two signatures on every promissory note, assuring him that the
loan documents would be filled out in accordance with their agreement. However, after he signed and delivered
the loan documents to the Bank, these were filled out in a manner not in accord with their agreement, such that
the Foundation was included as party thereto. Prior to its filing of the complaint, the Bank made no demand on
him. After due trial, the court rendered judgment (1) requiring Tan and the Foundation to pay jointly and
solidarily to the Bank the amount of P493,566.61 as principal obligation for the four promissory notes, of
attorney’s fees in favor of the Bank for being without basis. Tan and the foundation filed the petition for review
on certiorari.
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ISSUE:
WHETHER CA ERRED IN APPLYING THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE AS BASIS FOR ADJUDGING JOINT AND SOLIDARY
LIABILITY ON THE PART OF PETITIONERS ELIAS Q. TAN AND LAPULAPU FOUNDATION?
RULING:
NO. In this case, the promissory notes are the law between the petitioners and the respondent Bank. These
promissory notes contained maturity dates as follows: February 5, 1978, March 28, 1978, April 11, 1978 and
May 5, 1978, respectively. That these notes were to be paid on these dates is clear and explicit. Nowhere was it
stated therein that they would be renewed on a year-to-year basis or "rolled-over" annually until paid from the
proceeds of petitioner Tan’s shares in the Lapulapu Industries Corp. Accordingly, this purported unwritten
agreement could not be made to vary or contradict the terms and conditions in the promissory notes.

Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or
defeat the operation of a valid contract.   While parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of written
contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions
which are not mentioned at all in writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake.   No such allegation had been
made by the petitioners in this case.

Finally, the appellate court did not err in holding the petitioners jointly and solidarily liable as, The petitioner
asserts that it has a personality separate and distinct from that of its President, petitioner Tan, and that it cannot
be held solidarily liable for the loans of the latter.