It is at once evident from these constitutional and statutory modifications that there is a

definite tendency to enhance and invigorate the role of the Commission on Elections as
the independent constitutinal body charged with the safeguarding of free, peaceful and
honest elections. The framers of the new Constitution must be presumed ot have
definite knowledge of what it means to make the decisions, orders and rulings of the
Commission "subject to review by the Supreme Court". And since instead of maintaining
that provision intact, it ordained that the Commission's actuations be instead "brought to
the Supreme Court on certiorari", We cannot insist that there was no intent to change
the nature of the remedy, considering that the limited scope of certiorari, compared to a
review, is well known in remedial law.

Withal, as already stated, the legislative construction of the modified peritinent

constitutional provision is to the effect that the actuations of the Commission are final,
executory and even inappealable. While such construction does not exclude the general
certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court which inheres in it as the final guardian of
the Constitution, particularly, of its imperious due process mandate, it correspondingly
narrows down the scope and extent of the inquiry the Court is supposed to undertake to
what is strictly the office of certiorari as distinguished from review. We are of the
considered opinion that the statutory modifications are consistent with the apparent new
constitional intent. Indeed, it is obvious that to say that actuations of the Commission
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari technically connotes something less
than saying that the same "shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court", when it
comes to the measure of the Court's reviewing authority or prerogative in the premises.

A review includes digging into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment, while
certiorari deals exclusively with grave abuse of discretion, which may not exist even
when the decision is otherwise erroneous. certiorari implies an indifferent disregard of
the law, arbitrariness and caprice, an omission to weight pertinent considerations, a
decision arrived at without rational deliberation. While the effecdts of an error of
judgment may not differ from that of an indiscretion, as a matter of policy, there are
matters taht by their nature ought to be left for final determination to the sound
discretion of certain officers or entities, reserving it to the Supreme Court to insure the
faithful observance of due process only in cases of patent arbitrariness.

Such, to Our mind, is the constitutional scheme relative to the Commission on Elections.
Conceived by the charter as the effective instrument to preserve the sanctity of popular
suffrage, endowed with independence and all the needed concommittant powers, it is
but proper that the Court should accord the greatest measure of presumption of
regularity to

its course of action and choice of means in performing its duties, to the end that it may
achieve its designed place in the democratic fabric of our government. Ideally, its
members should be free from all suspicions of partisan inclinations, but the fact that
actually some of them have had stints in the arena of politics should not, unless the
contrary is shown, serve as basis for denying to its actuations the respect and
consideration that the Constitution contemplates should be accorded to it, in the same
manner that the Supreme Court itself which from time to time may have members
drawn from the political ranks or even from military is at all times deemed insulated from
every degree or form of external pressure and influence as well as improper internal
motivations that could arise from such background or orientation.

We hold, therefore that under the existing constitution and statutory provisions, the
certiorari jurisdiction of the Court over orders, and decisions of the Comelec is not as
broad as it used to be and should be confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process. Accordingly, it is in this light
that We the opposing contentions of the parties in this cases.

THE MANDANGAN CASE

Being more simple in Our view, We shall deal with the petition in G.R. No. L-49717-21
first.

The errors assigned in this petition boil down to two main propositions, namely, (1) that
it was an error of law on the part of respondent Comelec to have applied to the extant
circumstances hereof the ruling of this Court in Diaz vs. Comelec 42 SCRA 426 instead
of that of Bashier vs. Comelec 43 SCRA 238; and (2) that respondent Comelec
exceeded its jurisdiction and denied due process to petitioner Mandangan in extending
its inquiry beyond the election records of "the 878 voting centers examined by the KB
experts and passed upon by the Regional Board of Canvassers" and in excluding from
the canvass the returns showing 90 to 100 % voting, from voting centers where military
operations were by the Army to be going on, to the extent that said voting centers had
to be transferred to the poblaciones the same being by evidence.

Anent the first proposition, it must be made clear that the Diaz and Bashier rulings are
not mutually exclusive of each other, each being an outgrowth of the basic rationale of
statistical improbability laid down in Lagumbay vs. Comelec and , 16 SCRA 175.
Whether they be apply together or separately or which of them be applied depends on
the situation on hand. In the factual milieu of the instant case as found by the Comelec,
We see no cogent reason, and petitioner has not shown any, why returns in voting
centers showing that the votes of the candidate obtaining highest number of votes of the
candidate obtaining the highest number of votes exceeds the highest possible number
of valid votes cast therein should not be deemed as spurious and manufactured just
because the total number of excess votes in said voting centers were not more than 40
%. Surely, this is not the occasion, consider the historical antecedents relative to the
highly questionable manner in which elections have been bad in the past in the
provinces herein involved, of which the Court has judicial notice as attested by its

numerous decisions in cases involving practically every such election, of the Court to
move a whit back from the standards it has enunciated in those decisions.

In regard to the jurisdictional and due process points raised by herein petitioner, it is of
decisive importance to bear in mind that under Section 168 of the Revised Election
Code of 1978, "the Commission (on Elections) shall have direct control and supervision
on over the board of canvassers" and that relatedly, Section 175 of the same Code
provides that it "shall be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies." While
nominally, the procedure of bringing to the Commission objections to the actuations of
boards of canvassers has been quite loosely referred to in certain quarters, even by the
Commission and by this Court, such as in the guidelines of May 23,1978 quoted earlier
in this opinion, as an appeal, the fact of the matter is that the authority of the
Commission in reviewing such actuations does not spring from any appellate jurisdiction
conferred by any specific provision of law, for there is none such provision anywhere in
the Election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and supervision
endowed to it by the above-quoted provisions of Section 168. And in administrative law,
it is a too well settled postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior
body or office having supervision and control over another may do directly what the
latter is supposed to do or ought to have done.

Consequently, anything said in Lucman vs. Dimaporo, 33 SCRA 387, cited by petitioner,
to the contrary notwithstanding, We cannot fault respondent Comelec for its having
extended its inquiry beyond that undertaken by the Board of Canvass On the contrary, it
must be stated that Comelec correctly and commendably asserted its statutory authority
born of its envisaged constitutional duties vis-a-vis the preservation of the purity of
elections and electoral processes and p in doing what petitioner it should not have
done. Incidentally, it cannot be said that Comelec went further than even what Aratuc et
al. have asked, since said complaints had impugned from the outset not only the returns
from the 878 voting centers examined by their experts but all those mentioned in their
complaints in the election cases filed originally with the Comelec enumerated in the
opening statements hereof, hence respondent Comelec had that much field to work on.

The same principle should apply in respect to the ruling of the Commission regarding
the voting centers affected by military operations. It took cognizance of the fact, not
considered by the board of canvass, that said voting centers had been transferred to the
poblaciones. And, if only for purposes of pre-proclamation proceedings, We are
persuaded it did not constitute a denial of due process for the Commission to have
taken into account, without the need or presentation of evidence by the parties, a matter
so publicly notorious as the unsettled situation of peace and order in localities in the
provinces herein involved that their may perhaps be taken judicial notice of, the same
being capable of unquestionable demonstration. (See 1, Rule 129)

In this connection, We may as well perhaps, say here as later that regrettably We
cannot, however, go along with the view, expressed in the dissent of our respected
Chief Justice, that from the fact that some of the voting centers had been

transferred to the poblaciones there is already sufficient basis for Us to rule that the
Commission should have also subjected all the returns from the other voting centers of
the some municipalities, if not provinces, to the same degree of scrutiny as in the
former. The majority of the Court feels that had the Commission done so, it would have
fallen into the error by petitioner Mandangan about denial of due process, for it is
relatively unsafe to draw adverse conclusions as to the exact conditions of peace and
order in those other voting centers without at list some prima facie evidence to rely on
considering that there is no allegation, much less any showing at all that the voting
centers in question are so close to those excluded by the Comelec on as to warrant the
inescapable conclusion that the relevant circumstances by the Comelec as obtaining in
the latter were Identical to those in the former.

Premises considered the petition in G.R. Nos. L-49717-21 is hereby dismiss for lack of
merit.

THE ARATUC ET AL. PETITION

Of the eight errors assigned by herein petitioners earlier adverted to, the seventh and
the sight do not require any extended disquisition. As to the issue of whether the
elections in the voting centers concerned were held on April 7, 1978, the date
designated by law, or earlier, to which the seventh alleged error is addressed, We note
that apparently petitioners are not seriously pressing on it anymore, as evidenced by the
complete absence of any reference thereto during the oral argument of their counsel
and the practically cavalier discussion thereof in the petition. In any event, We are
satisfied from a careful review of the analysis by the Comelec in its resolution now
before Us that it took pains to consider as meticulously as the nature of the evidence
presented by both parties would permit all the contentions of petitioners relative to the
weight that should be given to such evidence. The detailed discussion of said evidence
is contained in not less than nineteen pages (pp. 70-89) of the resolution. In these
premises, We are not prepared to hold that Comelec acted wantonly and arbitrarily in
drawing its conclusions adverse to petitioners' position. If errors there are in any of
those conclusions, they are errors of judgment which are not reviewable in certiorari, so
long as they are founded on substantial evidence.

As to eighth assigned error. the thrust of respondents, comment is that the results in the
voting centers mentioned in this assignment of error had already been canvassed at the
regional canvass center in Cotabato City. Again, We cannot say that in sustaining the
board of canvassers in this regard, Comelec gravely abused its discretion, if only
because in the guidelines set by this Court, what appears to have been referred to is,
rightly or wrongly, the resumption only of the canvass, which does not necessarily
include the setting aside and repetition of the canvass already made in Cotabato City.

The second and fourth assignments of error concern the voting centers the
corresponding voters' record (C.E. Form 1) and record of voting, (C.E. Form 5) of which
have never been brought to Manila because they, wePrReOnoVtIaNvCaEilable The is
not clear as to how many are these voting centers. According to petitioners they are
501, but in the Comelec

resolution in question, the number mentioned is only 408, and this number is directly
challenged in the petition. Under the second assignment, it is contended that the
Comelec gravely abused its discretion in including in the canvass the election returns
from these voting centers and, somewhat alternatively, it is alleged as fourth
assignment that the petitioners motion for the opening of the ballot boxes pertaining to
said voting centers was arbitraly denied by respondent Comelec.