Lesson 1: A Brief History of Ethics (Western Morality)

Ethics is a branch of Philosophy. It attempts to achieve a systematic understanding of the

nature of morality and what it requires of us—of how we ought  to live, and why(Rachels..).
Morality, more specifically,  concerns what we ought to become, how we ought to relate to
others, and how we ought to act. These moral oughts differ from other oughts like  what one
ought to do to fix his laptop, or what he ought to do to improve his academic performance. 
However, if morality is defined in terms of moral oughts, it seems to be a circular or empty
description(Martin 2007). 

The history of ethics has provided many rival theories providing  more focused concepts
of morality. They differ in what to consider as morally significant and put forward claims such
as: morality is a matter of living a life of virtue; morality is matter of seeking pleasure and avoid
pain; morality means living according to reason and of fulfilling our  rational duties to others; 
and morality consists in promoting the happiness of all persons.  

Aristotelean and the the Post-Aristotelian Ethics 

When Greek philosophers considered questions of ethics, they often thought in terms of
morally good character traits or virtues that people should have. Aristotle (384-322 B.C. applies
this approach in his ethics. He begins by emphasizing that for all things that have a function or
activity, the good and the “well” reside in the function. The function of man, he says, is an
activity of the soul which implies a rational principle (or simply—activity of the rational soul.
The function of man, therefore, is a certain kind of life consisting of actions or activities in
accordance with reason. In other words, for Aristotle, following our reason makes us good or
virtuous. We develop desirable traits like courage, temperance, self-respect, and generosity
which enable us to do the right thing in a given situation (Aristotle 1970:18-20). Aristotle’s
ethics does not prescribe absolute and transcendental moral norms for all men. Primarily, he
describes the good life for man as a life characterized by virtuous disposition and activities. In
his account, the good and virtuous man is one who has habituated himself in doing virtuous acts
and has gained a practical wisdom in discerning the right thing to do—the mean between excess
and deficiency—in a given situation. Aristotle’s ethics allows differences in moral judgment
owing to diverse moral situations.

The post-Aristotelian philosophies of the stoics and epicureans express a different view
of normative ethics. The Stoics who have adopted Heraclitus’ view that the world follows a
universal principle, argue that we should live a life in accordance with the logos or principle.
Acceptance of man’s role in life, minimizing desire, prudence, temperance, justice and
brotherly love, are the virtues that men ought to develop (Warner 1958:165-93). The
Epicureans, on the other hand, adopts the atomist view of the world. Believing that even man,
soul, and god are made up of atoms, they prescribe that man should “seek pleasure and avoid
pain” in order to have a good and happy life. They (Warner 1958:144-161) explain that since
man’s existence is due to combinations of atoms, his death is nothing but the separation of
atoms, and hence man must not worry about death or punishments by the gods.

The Rationalist Ethics: Descartes, Leibniz, and Spinoza 

Rene Descartes’s ideas on morality can be found in his analysis of the passions of the
soul, his letter to Princess Elizabeth, and some of his remarks in the Discourse on ethod. He
describes passions as perceptions or thoughts which are not actions of the soul.Passions are
feelings which are received into the soul and not the clear and distinct ideas of the soul.
Descartes also calls them emotions in the sense that they are thoughts that are most prone to
agitate the soul. For him, passions are all good in nature, but they can be misused, and they can
be allowed to grow in excess. Thus, we need to control passions. This, he believes, can be done
indirectly by “the representation of things which are usually united to the passions which we
desire to have and contrary to those which we desire to set aside” (Copleston (1961). This
means that if we want to excite courage and remove fear, it is not sufficient to have the will to
do so, but we must also consider the reasons, the objects, or examples that persuade us that the
peril is not great.

Passions, says Descartes, can bring us to any kind of action only by the intervention of
the desire which they excite. Thus, it is this desire which we need to regulate. This leads us to
the questions when is desire good and when is it bad? Descartes’s view is that desire is good
when it follows true knowledge and bad when it is founded on error. Therefore, he emphasizes
that we should know very clearly and consider with attention the goodness of that which is
desired. Like the stoics, he considers that the first condition for moral choice is to distinguish
what lies within our power from what is not subject to our control. Events of the latter type, he
claims, are ordained by the Providence, and we have to submit to them. After discovering what
lies within our power we must discriminate what is good and what is bad. For Descartes
(Copleston (1961), virtue consists in doing those actions which we have judged to be the best.

In his Discourse on method, Descartes gives the rules for attaining a good life. To have

one’s spirit perfectly content and satisfied, he says, the first rule is to know what one ought to
do and what one ought not to do in all the occurrences in life. The second is to have a firm and
constant resolution to carry out all the dictates of reason without being turned aside by passion
or appetite. And the third is to consider that all the goods that one does not possess are outside
the scope of one’s power, and to accustom oneself not to desire them. Likewise, In his letter to
Princess Elizabeth, Descartes mentions two things required for right moral judgment namely,
knowledge of truth and the habit of assenting to this knowledge. As regards the first
requirement, Descartes prescribes knowledge of God, the nature of the soul, the extent of the
universe, and man’s place in nature. Descartes (Copleston, 1961) emphasizes that one should
consider that he forms part of the great whole, the universe, and, more particularly, of a certain
state, society, and family, and that he ought to prefer the interest of the whole.

Like Descartes, Leibniz devotes his reflection primarily on metaphysical themes such as

the nature of God and the individual substances. Hence as regards ethics, we can only derive
some insights from his views concerning man’s nature, freedom, and God. Leibniz’s view that
man is a substance due to its substantial form, or its soul, leads him to think that the realization
of man’s attributes is consequent to his own nature. This is partly the sense by which Leibniz
speaks of human freedom. But since substantial form exists also in lower animals, other animals
may also be considered free. Leibniz’s notions of man and freedom, as noted by Ross, cannot
explain the special status of human freedom and responsibility. In his analysis of Leibniz’s
philosophy, Ross (1984) concludes that Leibniz is committed to the stoic position that all is
predestined by Providence. This means that Leibniz accepts the stoic prescription: rather than
undergo the stress and frustration of struggling against the inevitable, we should apply our
reason to the task of aligning our perspective with the optimal perspective that God has. In
Leibniz’s Discourse, he explains that God has created the world for the sufficient reason that
this world would be the best of all possible worlds. This world is best because it contains a
maximum of existence—because it is the simplest in structure while the richest in phenomena.
The ethical implication of this view is that since this world is the best, the evil it contains is
minimal and that all things that happen are necessary features of this best world. But Leibniz
does not accept quietism. For him (Beck 1996), man needs to deliberate and do his best for the
general welfare, since we do not know God’s ordinance for this world.
 

The rationalist ethics of Spinoza sees life from the point of view not of a subject whose
problems arise from his individual circumstances, but of a pure and disinterested reasoner, for
whom the human individual is nothing but a mode of God, governed by laws which govern
everything (Scruton 1996). It is from this holistic perspective that Spinoza speaks of a good,
free, and happy life for man. Spinoza’s (Scruton 1996) main moral prescription is that we
should rise above the illusory perspective which sees things sub-specie durationis to the
absolute viewpoint which is God’s. Seeing things, sub-specie durationis refers to the ordinary
way of looking at things. It involves the first level of cognition characterized by imagination
and opinion which give us confused and inadequate ideas. In ethics, it leads to our distinction
between good and evil concepts which according to Spinoza, indicate nothing positive about
things. Moral questions, however, can be objectively posed and answered. This for Spinoza
(Scruton 1996) is possible if we “see through the veil of the passions and understand human
nature as it really is.” The good life is not defined by this or that person’s moral judgments. It
follows from human nature.

The nature of man, according to Spinoza, is to strive and persevere in its being. This
serves as the foundation of a good life for man. Spinoza offers his own definitions of good and
bad based on his view that “Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in
its being.” He (Scruton 1996) says: “By good, I understand that which we certainly know to be
useful to us”; “by bad, however, I understand that which we certainly know will prevent us
from partaking of any good.” This means that insofar as things help man to preserve and
improve his being and increase his power of action, they are good. However if things could only
lead to man’s weakness and miserable condition, then they are bad. The good life therefore is
that which is most useful or favorable to our nature, the bad life is that which is most opposed to
it. The good life is the fulfilment of man’s nature.

More specifically, Spinoza speaks of useful life as a life in accordance with reason.

Thus, when he identifies the primitive passions or affects of joy, and sadness, and all the affects
they imply, he does it with the view of determining which affects are good or in accordance
with reason and which are evil, or contrary to reason. Spinoza (1994) defines “joy as man’s
passage from a lesser to a greater perfection,” and sadness as “man’s passage from a
greater to a lesser perfection”. That joy is a passage to greater perfection means that in
itself joy is not perfection, it is only an affect, which may include cheerfulness, and pleasure,
which accompanies the feeling of having control or power over situations. Likewise, sadness is
also a passage in that it is an affect like melancholy and pain as experienced when one feels
weak and powerless. In relation to his definitions of joy and sadness, Spinoza (1994) enunciates
this proposition: “the knowledge of good and evil is nothing but an affect of joy or sadness
insofar as we are conscious of it.” This, he demonstrates as follows: We call good or evil, what
is useful to, or harmful to, preserving our being, that is, what increases or diminishes, aids or
restrains, our power of acting. Therefore insofar as we perceive that a thing affects us with joy
or sadness, we call it good or evil. And so knowledge of good and evil is nothing but an idea of
joy or sadness which follows from the affect of joy or sadness itself. Reason, according to
Spinoza, demands that everyone loves himself, seeks his own advantage, what is really useful to
him and what leads him to greater perfection (the passage to which is joy). He (1994) identifies
this striving as virtue, “for virtue is nothing but acting from the laws of one’s nature and no one
strives to preserve his being except from the laws of his own nature.” Virtue, however, requires
knowledge, and as Spinoza (1994) claims, “A man cannot be said to absolutely act from
virtue insofar as he is determined to do something because he has inadequate ideas, but
only insofar as he is determined because he understands.” Summing up Spinoza’s moral
view: The problem of living a reasonable, good, and virtuous life ultimately depends on
our knowledge of our nature and of what allows us to attain greater perfection. This leads
us to the need for adequate rather than confused ideas. This requires us to have an active rather
than passive mind, and to see things from a holistic perspective or from God’s perspective. For
Spinoza, the mind is active in of far as it is self-determining. Adequacy of ideas is tantamount
to power, the more one’s ideas are adequate, the more he is independent.

Modern and Contemporary Ethics

In the modern and contemporary times, moral philosophers offer relatively more complex
theories. German philosopher Immanuel Kant objects to both Aristotelian theory of virtue and
the pleasure-seeking theory of the Epicureans. Like Aristotle, Kant believes that reason should
be our guide in moral matters. But he emphasizes that reason supplies us with a fundamental
law of moral duty. Hence, Kant’s (Hoffe 1994) ethics of duty prescribes the categorical
imperative “Act only on that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should
become a universal law.” In opposition to Kant’s deontotological (“deon” means that which is
obligatory) theory, British philosopher John Stuart Mill (1844-1900) revives the pleasure-
seeking theory of Epicurus. Instead of obedience to a duty dictated only by reason, Mill argues
in his Utilitarianism (1861) that a good act is one which promotes the general happiness or
pleasure. The emphasis is on utility or useful consequence of an action.

Ethics and Morals: Study Guide

Process Questions:
1. What is ethics?
2. Is there a distinction between ethics and morality? Where you
able to see the difference between ethics and morality?
3. What are the three categories of ethics? Come out with your
own personal examples and list them down

Especially in everyday language, the distinction between the terms ‘ethics’ and
‘morality’ is not always clear. Even in some philosophical texts both are used
synonymously, while others seem to draw a clear distinction between them.
Historically, the term ‘ethics’ comes from Greek ethos which means the customs,
habits and mores of people. ‘Morality’ is derived from Latin mos, moris which denotes
basically the same; it was introduced by Cicero as an equivalent to the Greek ethos.

For the sake of clarity we assume as a standard definition that morality means the

customs, the special do-s and don't-s that are shared and widely accepted as standard
in a society or community of people — accepted as a basis of life that doesn't have to
be rationally questioned. Ethics on the other hand is the philosophical reflection upon
these rules and ways of living together, the customs and habits of individuals, groups
or mankind as such. This comes close to the conception of Aristotle.

In ancient Greek philosophy the question was to find how to act well and rightly and
what personal/individual qualities are necessary to be able to do this. Ethics therefore
encompasses the whole range of human action including personal preconditions. This
is still true today, but for e.g. Aristotle ethics focused mainly on the pursuit of the ‘good

(life)’, the eudaimonia.
 The aim was to identify and to practically realise ‘the (highest) good’ in life — which
means that you have to evaluate what is ‘good’ as regards content: what life is a good
life and what is not?

As opinions concerning the question what makes a good life differed more and more in
modern times, ethics had and has to face the question how the resulting conflicts of
interests and values could be solved peacefully and justly without taking the part of one
side or the other. And this leads to the question of what is morally right; moral rightness
and ‘good life’ become separate issues. Whereas questions of ‘good life’ are tied to an
evaluation of what is good and are answered in the form of recommendations how to
achieve that goal, norms or principles of moral rightness generate imperatives.

Today it is common to separate ethics into three sub-branches:

1. descriptive ethics
2. metaethics
3. normative ethics

Descriptive ethics aims at empirically and precisely mapping existing morality or

moralities within communities and is therefore linked to the social sciences. Another
aim is to explain the development of existing moralities from a historical perspective.
No normative prescriptions are intended.

Metaethics is a relatively new discipline in the ethical arena and its definition is the
most blurred of all. The Greek meta means after or beyond and indicates that the
object of metaethical studies is morality and ethics itself. The aim is to better
understand the logical, semantic and pragmatic structures of moral and ethical
argumentation as such, their origin and meaning. Other fields of inquiry are e.g.
whether morality exists independently of humans, and the underlying mental basis of
human judgments and conduct.

Normative ethics means the methodological reflection upon morality tackling its

critique and its rationale. Norms and standards for acting and conduct are being set up
or tore down, and argued for or against. When “ethics” is talked about in a common
sense then we are talking about this general normative ethics. When inquiry is directed
towards the principles of moral judgement or the criteria for the ethical analysis of
morality, then we talk about fundamental ethics.

Finally in the realm of normative ethics, there is applied ethics. Here normative theories
are applied to specific, controversial moral issues like animal rights, abortion,
euthanasia etc. − generating the classic so called hyphen-ethics, e.g. bio-ethics,
medical ethics, business-ethics, nano-ethics etc. Inversely, these special issues
constantly challenge theory and demand improvements, changes and specifications.

Alongside hyphen-ethics it is also possible to distinguish between ethics that focuses

on societal and institutional dimensions (social ethics) or on the individuum (individual
ethics). While we consider applied ethics to be a sub-branch of normative ethics, other
moral philosophers treat it as a discipline on the same level as normative ethics,
arguing that it uses normative elements but is independent otherwise.
 In normative ethics there are different theories as to how criteria of moral conduct
should be defined. The three main theories can be sketched as follows:

1. Deontological, i.e. duty theories locate the basis of morality on specific,

foundational principles of duty and obligation. These principles are binding regardless
of the consequences that acting on their basis might bring.
2. Consequentialist theories on the other hand determine the value of an action on
the grounds of a cost-benefit analysis of its consequences. If the positive
consequences outweigh the negative ones then the action is morally proper.
3. Virtue theories focus on a given set of rules like “do not steal” etc. But instead of
defining them merely as obligatory duties, the emphasis lies on the individual to
develop good habits of character based on these rules (and avoid vices). Thus virtue
theory emphasises moral education.

Q: What are “codes of ethics/conduct” or what is “ethical research”? Shouldn‘t that be

called moral?

A: By calling research or a code “ethical”, the authors want to point out that the moral
rules they set up are based on rational deliberation and can be subject to critique.

Q: Looking at the definitions of ethics and morality − what is moral philosophy?

A: It is mostly used as a synonym for ethics. Some, like the French philosopher Jean-
Pierre Dupuy use it differently. For him ‘ethics’ stands for the effort to force everything
into universal harmonized principles while ‘moral philosophy’ endures colliding or
incompatible values or concepts in the discourse.  STEFAN GAMMEL

Read the articles below:

/files/463594/ethics_moralitybwnewfont.pdf

http://philosophy.lander.edu/ethics/types.html