G.R. No. 179011 April 15, 2013 Rey Castigador Catedrilla, Petitioner, Mario and Margie LAURON, Respondents
G.R. No. 179011 April 15, 2013 Rey Castigador Catedrilla, Petitioner, Mario and Margie LAURON, Respondents
G.R. No. 179011 April 15, 2013 Rey Castigador Catedrilla, Petitioner, Mario and Margie LAURON, Respondents
Spouses Deloy
Facts:
Respondents are the owners, by way of succession, of a parcel of land consisting of 8,550 square meters
located in Trece Martires City (Trece Martires property). Dionisio, respondents’ predecessor-in-interest,
donated a 680-square meter portion (subject land) of the 8,550 square meter property to the
Communications and Electricity Development Authority (CEDA) for the latter to provide cheap and
affordable electric supply to the province of Cavite. A deed of donation was executed to reflect and
formalize the transfer. Sometime in 1985, CEDA offered for sale to MERALCO, its electric distribution
system, consisting of transformers and accessories, poles and hardware, wires, service drops, and
customer meters and all rights and privileges necessary for providing electrical service in Cavite. This
was embodied in a memorandum of agreement (MOA), signed by the parties. Thereafter, MERALCO
occupied the subject land. MERALCO, through its Assistant Vice President and Head of the Legal
Department, Atty. L.D. Torres (Atty. Torres), wrote a letter to Dionisio requesting the latter’s permission
for the continued use of the subject land as a substation site. The parties were not able to reach any
agreement. Respondents offered to sell the subject land to MERALCO, but their offer was rejected. For
said reason, respondents demanded that MERALCO vacate the subject land. Despite the written
demand, MERALCO did not move out of the subject land. Thus, respondents were constrained to file the
complaint for unlawful detainer.
MTCC rendered the decision dismissing respondents’ complaint for unlawful detainer against MERALCO.
The RTC affirmed the MTCC ruling that the latter had no jurisdiction to interpret contracts involving the
sale of the subject land to MERALCO. The CA set aside the RTC ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not evidence aliunde, such as the letters of Petitioner’s Assistant Vice President and Head of
Legal Department Atty. Torres and Internal Memorandum of Petitioner which purportedly recognized
Respondent’s ownership of the property can prevail over the deed of absolute sale.
HELD:
MERALCO posits that extrinsic evidence, such as the letter request, dated October 11, 1985, and the
Internal Memorandum, dated December 6, 1985, cannot contradict the terms of the deed of sale
between CEDA and MERALCO pursuant to Section 9, Rule 13022 of the Rules of Court.
It is undisputed that on October 11, 1985 or four (4) months after the approval of the MOA and the
corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale, MERALCO, through its Assistant Vice President and Head of the
Legal Department, Atty. Torres, sent a letter to Dionisio seeking his permission for the continued use of
the subject land. Relative thereto, L.G. de la Paz of the Trece Martires Substation of MERALCO sent the
December 16, 1985 Internal Memorandum, addressed to Atty. G.R. Gonzales and Atty. Torres, informing
them of some obstacles in reaching a lease agreement with the Deloys. Evidently, by these two
documents, MERALCO acknowledged that the owners of the subject land were the Deloys. It is clear as
daylight. The first letter was written barely four (4) months after the deed of sale was accomplished. As
observed by the CA, MERALCO never disputed the declarations contained in these letters which were
even marked as its own exhibits. Pursuant to Section 26, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, these
admissions and/or declarations are admissible against MERALCO.
SEC. 26. Admissions of a party — The act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be
given in evidence against him.
In Heirs of Bernardo Ulep v. Ducat, 24 it was written, thus:
. . . Being an admission against interest, the documents are the best evidence which affords the greatest
certainty of the facts in dispute. The rationale for the rule is based on the presumption that no man
would declare anything against himself unless such declaration was true. Thus, it is fair to presume that
the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his fault if it does not.
Guided by the foregoing rules and jurisprudence, the Court holds that the letter and the internal
memorandum presented, offered and properly admitted as part of the evidence on record by MERALCO
itself, constitute an admission against its own interest. Hence, MERALCO should appropriately be bound
by the contents of the documents.
123
FACTS. Wilfredo Rivera and his wife, Loreto Inciong owned two parcels of land in
Lipa City, Batangas , covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-
22290 and T-30557. Loreto died, leaving Wilfredo and their daughters,
Evangeline and Brigida Liza, as her surviving heirs.
On March 29, 1993, Loreto’s heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of her
one-half share of the conjugal estate, adjudicating all the properties in favor
of their two daughters; Wilfredo waived his rights to the properties, with a
reservation of his usufructuary rights during his lifetime. TCT Nos. T-22290 and T-
30557 were cancelled and TCT Nos. T-87494 and T-87495 were issued in place
thereof in the names of Evangeline and Brigida Liza, with an annotation of
Wilfredo’s usufructuary rights. On March 13, 2003, Wilfredo filed with the
MTCC of Lipa City a complaint for forcible entry against the petitioners claiming
that he lawfully possessed and occupied the two (2) parcels of land covered by
TCT Nos. T-87494 and T-87495, with a building used for his furniture business;
that the petitioners took advantage of his hospital confinement by taking
possession and causing the renovation of the building on the property; and that
with the aid of armed men, petitioners barred him from entering the
property in December 2002. ID., ARGUMENT OF THE COMPLAINANT. Wilfredo
voluntarily renounced his usufructuary rights in a petition for cancellation of
usufructuary rights dated March 4, 1996, and that another action between the
same parties is pending with the RTC of Lipa City, Branch 13 (an action for the
annulment of the petition for cancellation of usufructuary rights filed by
Wilfredo).
ID., DEFENSE OF THE RESPONDENT. petitioners mistakenly relied on petitioners’
claim that they occupied the land since 1997; such statements had been
rendered in an interlocutory order, and should not prevail over Evangeline’s
admission in her answer of "Poblacion, Rosario, Batangas” as her residence.
124
FACTS:
The respondent are heirs of Donato Galabo. Donato obtained Lot 722, a portion
of the Arakaki Plantation owned by National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation.
Donato and respondents assumed that their Lot includes Lot. 102 as per survey of
1916 – 1920. When the Board of Liquidators (BOL) took over the administration of
the Arakaki Plantation, it had Lot No. 722 resurveyed. Allegedly, the resurvey did
not include Lot No. 102; thus, when Donato acquired Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-21496 for Lot No. 722,Lot No. 102 was not included. The respondents,
however, continue to posses, occupy and cultivate Lot No. 102.NQFC offered to
buy Lot 102 which Donato declined. Crisostom fenced off the entire Lot 102 and
built hishouse on it. Respondents received a letter from Santos Nantin demanding
that they vacate Lot No. 102.Santos claimed ownership of this lot per the Deed of
Transfer of Rights, which the respondents and their mother allegedly executed in
Santos’ favor. To perfect their title, the respondents applied for free patent over
Lot No. 102.NQFC’s workers with policemen forcibly entered Lot 102 to fence it.
NQFC demanded from Crisostom to remove his house. NQFC, for its part, claimed
that Santos immediately occupied and possessed Lot No.102 after he purchased it
from the respondents in 1972 and declared it under his name for taxation
purposes. Santos was also granted Free Patent over the property by the Bureau of
Lands, and obtained a OCT over it. That the heirs of Santos conveyed Lot No. 102
to NQFC via the Deed of Absolute Sale. NQFC then filed a petition for cancellation
of the respondents’ patent application over Lot No. 102, which the BOL-Manila
granted, on the ground that Donato failed to perfect his title over Lot No. 102
which has long been titled in Santos’ name. Respondent filed a forcible entry suit
against NQFC before the MTCC alleging that: (1) they had been in prior physical
possession of Lot No. 102; and (2) NQFC deprived them of possession through
force, intimidation, strategy, threats and stealth. MTCC relied on the BOL-Manila
Ruling and dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the RTC denied the appeal and
relied on the finding of BOL-Manila as well. RTC also resolved the question of
ownership, as justified under the Rules, explaining that the NQFC’s possession
of Lot No. 102 was anchored on a Deed of Absolute Sale, while that of the
respondents was based merely on the allegation of possession and occupation by
Donato, and not on any title. A petition for review with the CA was filed. CA found
errors in the RTC decision thus it ordered NQFC to vacte the lot. That in a forcible
entry case, only has to prove prior material and physical possession of the
property in litigation and undue deprivation of it by means of force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth. These, the respondents averred in the complaint and
sufficiently proved, thus entitling them to recover possession of Lot No. 102.
Relying on the doctrine of presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty, the CA especially took note of the letters and the Certification which the
BOL sent to the respondents acknowledging Donato as the awardee of Lot No.
102 and the respondents as the actual occupants and possessors. A petition for
review on certiorari was filed with the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not NQFC to support its claim of prior possession can invoke the
principle of tacking of possession, that is, when it bought from Santos, its
possession is, by operation of law, tacked to that of Santos and even earlier, or at
the time Donato acquired Lot No. 102?
HELD:
NQFC’s reliance on this principle is misplaced. True, the law allows a present
possessor to tack his possession to that of his predecessor-in-interest to be
deemed in possession of the property for the period required by law. Possession
in this regard, however, pertains to possession de jure and the tacking is made for
the purpose of completing the time required for acquiring or losing ownership
through prescription. We reiterate – possession in forcible entry suits refers to
nothing more than physical possession, not legal possession.The CA brushed
aside NQFC’s argument on the respondents’ failure to perfect their title over Lot
No. 102.It held that the issue in this case is not of possession de jure, let alone
ownership or title, but of possession de facto. We agree with the CA; the
discussions above are clear on this point. We agree, too, as we have indicated in
passing above, that the issue of ownership can be material and relevant in
resolving the issue of possession. The Rules in fact expressly allow this: Section
16, Rule 70of the Rules of Court provides that the issue of ownership shall be
resolved in deciding the issue of possession if the question of possession is
intertwined with the issue of ownership. But this provision is only an exception
and is allowed only in this limited instance-- to determine the issue of possession
and only if the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership. Save for this instance, evidence of ownership is not at all
material, as in the present case.
125
Facts:
The petitioner owned Pillar Village Subdivision at Las Pias where the respondents allegedly built
their shanties without the petitioners knowledge or consent. Thus, a Complaint for accion
publicianawas filed against the respondents. The respondents denied the material allegations of the
Complaint asserting that its the local government and not the petitioner, which has jurisdiction and
authority over them.RTC dismissed the complaint saying that the land in question is situated on the
sloping area leading down a creek and within the three-meter legal easement and thus, its
considered as public property and part of public dominion under Article 502 of the NewCivil Code.
With this, only the local government of Las Pinas City could institute an action for recovery of
possession or ownership.CA dismissed the case but noted that the proper party to seek recovery of
the property is not the City of Las Pinas but the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG
pursuant to Section 101 of the Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141 otherwise known as the Public
Land Act.
Issues:
2. Who is the property party entitled to institute the case- the OSG or the LGU
HELD:
Petitioner used Article 630 of the Civil Code as it provides the general rule that the owner of the
estate retains the ownership of the portion of the easement established, Article 635 says that all
matters concerning easements established for public or communaluse shall be governed by the
special laws and regulations relating thereto. The applicable special laws are DENR A.O. No. 99
021dated June 11, 1999 which prescribed the guidelines for the implementation of P.D. Nos. 705
and 1067 which was issued for biodiversity preservation, P.D. 1216 and P.D. 1067 or The Water
Code of the Philippines all of which states that such 3 meter allowance is reserved for public use.
Therefore, it cannot be denied that the subject land is public property. In relation to this, the Court
held that respondents have no better right to the property as the petitioners because it is public land.
With regard to the second issue, both the OSG and the local government of Las Pinas City, may file
an action depending on the purpose sought to be achieved. The former shall be responsible in case
of action for reversion under C.A. 141, while the latter may also bring an action to enforce the
relevant provisions of Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992).Under
RA No. 7279, all LGUs are mandated to evict and demolish persons or entities occupying dangerous
areas including riverbanks. It also obliges the LGUS to strictly observe resettlement procedures and
prohibition against new illegal structures in Sections 29 and 30 respectively. Else, there will be
administrative and criminal liability. The Court suggests that petitioner should file an action for
mandamus to compel the local government of Las Pias City to enforce with reasonable dispatch the
eviction of respondents under R.A. 7279.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
126
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs being the naked owners are the ones called upon to
pay the tax for the lands.
HELD:
Pursuant to article 505 of the Civil Code, the tax directly burdens the capital, that is, the real value of
the property and should be paid by the owner (Ong Lengco vs. Monroy, G.R. No. 19411, July 18,
1923). It is contended, however, that under the second paragraph of the aforequoted article, if the
usufructuary should pay the tax, he would be entitled to reimbursement for the amount thereof only
upon the expiration of the usufruct, and the usufruct being still afoot, it is premature for the plaintiffs,
as usufructuaries who advanced the payment of the tax, to bring the action for the recovery of what
they paid. There is, however, no basis for this reasoning. The plaintiffs did not pay the tax. They
objected to this payment. They did not consent to the deduction thereof from their share in the
products, and much less to the application thereof to this payment which they believe they are not
bound to make. In fact they did not make the payment; the naked owners were the ones who made it
without their consent and with money belonging to them as their share of the fruits coming to them in
their capacity as usufructuaries.
The plaintiffs, in claiming the amount of P206.47, do not rely on paragraph 2 of article 505 of the
Civil Code above quoted, for having paid the tax on the lands, but on the first paragraph thereof
because it is their contention that, as usufructuaries, they are not the ones called upon to make this
payment.
128
FACTS:
Marsal & Co., Inc., and Marcelino Florete, Sr. is the present owner of the land
adjoining the Iloilo River up to the adjacent lot where the L. Borres Elem. School is
located. There existed a main canal from the Iloilo River which passes through the
Marsal property and thru a canal that traverses the school property going
towards Lot 2344. Marsal & Co. closed the dike entrance and later on demolished
the portions of the main dike connecting the main canal to the canal running thru
the school grounds. This closure caused flooding in the premises of the school and
its vicinity because the canal serves as outlet of rain or flood water that empties
into the river. This prompted the school and barangay officials to complain to
higher authorities about the closure of the canal. When Florete was about to bury
a pipe in lieu of an open canal, he was prevented from doing so by the district
supervisor, Javellana, thus he instituted a complaint for recovery of damages for
allegedly denying his access to the use of the canal to his property.
The RTC ruled in favor of Javellana thus Florete appealed to the IAC which
reversed the decision thus the case at bar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an easement was established in favor of the school property
RULING: YES
A positive easement of water-right-of-way was constituted on the property of
Florete as the servient estate in favor of the L. Borres Elementary School and the
nearby lands as dominant estates since it has been in continuous use for no less
than 15 years by the school fishpond as well as by the nearby adjacent lands.
As a positive easement, Florete had no right to terminate the use of the canal
without violating Art. 629 of the CC which provides that “The owner of the
servient estate cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the
servitude. Nevertheless if by reason of the place originally assigned or of the
manner established for the use of the easement, the same should become very
inconvenient to the owner of the servient estate, or should prevent him from
making any important works, repairs or improvements thereon, it may be charged
at his expense, provided he offers another place or manner equally convenient
and in such a way that no injury is caused thereby to the owner of the dominant
estate or to those who may have a right to the use of the easement.”
129
G.R. No. 124699. July 31, 2003
NICOLAS VALISNO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FELIPE ADRIANO, defendant-appellee.
In the meantime, plaintiff Valisno rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own
expense because his need for water to irrigate his watermelon fields was
urgent.
He later filed a complaint for damages in the CFI of Nueva Ecija claiming that
he suffered damages when he failed to plant his fields that year (1960) for lack
of irrigation water.
The trial court held that the plaintiff had no right to pass through the
defendant’s land to draw water from the Pampanga River. It pointed out that
under Section 4 of the Irrigation Law, controversies between persons claiming
a right to water from a stream are within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of
Public Works and his decision on the matter is final, unless an appeal is taken
to the proper court within thirty days. The court may not pass upon the
validity of the decision of the Public Works Secretary collaterally.. It dismissed
the complaint and counterclaim.
The Valisno’s MR of the decision was denied by the trial court. The plaintiff
appealed to the CA which certified the case to Us upon the legal question of
whether the provisions of the Irrigation Act (Act No. 2152) or those of the Civil
Code should apply to this case.
The existence of the irrigation canal on defendant’s land for the passage of
water from the Pampanga River to Honorata’s land prior to and at the time of
the sale of Honorata’s land to the plaintiff was equivalent to a title for the
vendee of the land to continue using it as provided in Article 624 of the Civil
Code:
This provision was lifted from Article 122 of the Spanish Law of Waters which
provided:
Article 122. Whenever a tract of irrigated land which previously received its
waters from a single point is divided through inheritance, sale or by virtue of
some other title, between two or more owners, the owners of the higher estates
are under obligation to give free passage to the water as an easement of
conduit for the irrigation of the lower estates, and without right to any
compensation therefore unless otherwise stipulated in the deed of conveyance.
(Art. 122, Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866.)
The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the “conveyance and transfer of
the water rights and improvements” appurtenant to Honorata’s property. By
the terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the vendor Honorata Adriano
Francisco sold, ceded, conveyed and transferred to Dr. Nicolas
Valisno all “rights, title, interest and participations over the parcel of land
above- described, together with [irrigation equipment]” and the water rights
and such other improvements appertaining to the property subject of this sale.
According to the Valisno, the water right was the primary consideration for his
purchase of Honorata’s property, for without it the property would be
unproductive.
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes,
which are appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the
land, although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser’s
easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor’s land
cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third person
As an easement of waters in favor of Valisno has been established, he is
entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful
interference, such as the Felipe’s act of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive
him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.