Title

[G.R. No. 157957. September 18, 2003.]

CHARITO NAVAROSA, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

HONORABLE DEAN R. TELAN, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 9, Kalibo, Aklan and ROGER M. ESTO, Respondents.

Ponente CARPIO

Doctrine POST ELECTION REMEDIES : Jurisdiction / Rules of Procedure

Facts ● Petitioner Charito Navarosa and respondent Roger M. were candidates for
mayor of Libacao, Aklan in the 14 May 2001 elections.

● On 17 May 2001, the COMELEC Municipal Board of Canvassers of Libacao

proclaimed petitioner Navarosa as the duly elected mayor, with a winning
margin of three (3) votes over respondent Esto.

● Claiming that irregularities marred the canvassing of ballots in several

precincts, respondent Esto filed an election protest in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 9, Kalibo, Aklan ("trial court").

● Petitioner Navarosa, who also claimed that canvassing irregularities

prejudiced her, filed a counter-protest in the same case.

● trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondent Esto. They declared

respondent Esto the elected mayor of Libacao by a margin of 42 votes and
annulled the earlier proclamation of petitioner Navarosa. The trial court
also ordered petitioner Navarosa to pay respondent Esto actual damages
and attorney’s fees.

● Respondent Esto eventually filed with the trial court a motion for execution
of the judgment pending petitioner Navarosa’s appeal.

● Petitioner Navarosa opposed respondent Esto’s motion. Navarosa offered to

file a supersedeas bond to stay execution pending appeal, should the trial
court grant respondent Esto’s motion.

● RTC granted both execution of judgement and superedeas bond since the
grant of execution pending appeal is conditioned upon the presence of the
“good and valid reason”, the stay of execution found in Sec. 3, Rule 391
does not provide for any condition precedent.

● Under this section, therefore, the filing of a supersedeas bond sufficient in

amount is enough to stay the execution granted

● Est0 filed a petition for certiorari with the COMELEC against the Order

● COMELEc: AFFIRMED the trial court’s Order granting execution pending

appeal and NULLIFIED the stay of the execution

● RTC gave substance and meaning to the people’s mandate

 as expressed in the ballot, especially since it has established petitioner

Esto’s right to the office. The trial court cannot indirectly reverse its

substantial finding of “good reasons” by a rule of procedure which

does not strictly apply in election protest cases when it allowed

the

filing of a supersedeas bond

Contentions Petitioner [Navarosa] Respondent

[COMELEC/Esto]
 Contends that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the election protest because of respondent Esto’s
failure to pay the COMELEC filing fee under Rule 35,
Section 9 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
 COMELEC was wrong when it ruled that the trial court
had no power to order the stay of execution

Lower Courts
Appellate Court
Issue 1. Whether public respondent COMELEC EN BANC lacked jurisdiction over
RESPONDENT ESTO’S election protest for non-payment of the mandatory
COMELEC filing fee of p300.00. Yes, they had jurisdiction

2. Whether there were no “good reasons” to execute the decision of the trial
court? Yes, good reasons were present

3. Whether RTC had no power to order the STAY of execution pending appeal in
an election contest, because section 3, rule 39 of ROC does not apply to election
cases? RTC HAD NO POWER
SC Ruling 1. Whether public respondent COMELEC EN BANC lacked jurisdiction over
RESPONDENT ESTO’S election protest for non-payment of the mandatory
COMELEC filing fee of p300.00. Yes, they had jurisdiction

No time did petitioner Navarosa ever raise the issue of respondent Esto’s
incomplete payment of the COMELEC filing fee during the full-blown trial of the
election protest. Petitioner Navarosa actively participated in the proceedings
below by filing her Answer, presenting her evidence, and later, seeking a stay of
execution by filing a supersedeas bond.
Petitioner Navarosa’s conduct estops her from claiming, at such late stage, that
the trial court did not after all acquire jurisdiction over the election protest

To dismiss the election protest and forever foreclose the determination of the true
winner of the election for a mere P200 deficiency in the COMELEC filing fee

Election contests involve public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers
should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to the determination
of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials.

Election contests must be liberally construed.

2. Whether there were no “good reasons” to execute the decision of the trial
court? Yes, good reasons were present

To grant execution pending appeal in election protest cases, the following

requisites must concur:

 there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse
party;

 there must be "good reasons" for the execution pending appeal; and

 the order granting execution pending appeal must state the "good
reasons."

The trial court in the present case, relying on cases, invoked two "good reasons"
to justify its order allowing execution pending appeal.

First, the order will "give substance and meaning to the people’s mandate."
Second, "more than 10 months or nearly 1/3 of the 3-year term" of the office in
question had already lapsed. The COMELEC found these "good reasons" sufficient.

3. Whether RTC had no power to order the STAY of execution pending appeal in
an election contest, because section 3, rule 39 of ROC does not apply to election
cases? RTC HAD NO POWER

The Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) and the other
election laws do not specifically provide for execution pending appeal of judgment
in election cases.

The failure of the extant election laws to reproduce Section 218 of the Election
Code of 1971 does not mean that execution of judgment pending appeal is no
longer available in election cases.

SEC 4. In what cases not applicable. — These Rules shall not apply to election
cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and
other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and convenient.
As to election cases involving regional, provincial, and city officials, which fall
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC, Section 3 of Article IX-C
of the Constitution vests the COMELEC with the authority to promulgate its rules
of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies.

The supersedeas bond, as used under Section 3, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, refers to a bond, either in cash or a surety bond, filed by the
losing party in an ordinary civil action to secure the performance or to satisfy the
judgment appealed from in case it is affirmed on appeal in favor of the prevailing
party.

While the supersedeas bond ensures that the appealed decision if affirmed is
satisfied, in an election protest case, such bond, in the event the appealed case is
affirmed and the execution pending appeal is proven to be meritorious, cannot
adequately answer for the deprivation of a duly elected candidate of his post, and
his constituents of their leader of choice, such deprivation being unquantifiabl e.

As applied to the present case, the supersedeas bond petitioner Navarosa filed
can only answer for that portion of the trial court’s ruling ordering her to pay to
respondent Esto actual damages, attorney’s fees and the cost of the suit.

It cannot secure execution of that portion proclaiming respondent Esto

duly elected mayor of Libacao, Aklan by popular will of the electorate and
authorizing him to assume the office.

This anomalous situation defeats the very purpose for the filing of the
supersedeas bond in the first place.

In sum, the Court holds that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in ordering execution pending appeal of the trial court’s decision.

Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment

amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power
because of passion or personal hostility.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the instant petition.