The Philippine Judges Association, duly rep. by its President, Bernardo P.

Abesamis, Vice
President for Legal Affairs, Mariano M. Umali, Director for Pasig, Makati, and Pasay, Metro
Manila, Alfredo C. Flores, and Chairman of the Committee on Legal Aid, Jesus G. Bersamira,
Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City and Branches 160, 167
and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively: the National Confederation of the Judges
Association of the Philippines composed of the Metropolitan Trial Court Judges Association rep.
by its President, Renato Quilala of the Municipal Trial Circuit Court, Manila; the Municipal
Judges League of the Philippines rep. by its President, Tomas G. Talavera; by themselves and in
behalf of all the Judges of the Regional Trial Court and Shari’a Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts
and Municipal Courts throughout the country v. Hon. Pete Prado, in his capacity as Postmaster
General, and the Philippine Postal Corp.
G.R. No. 105371
November 11, 1993
Cruz, J.

Facts:
Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation
through its Circular No. 92-28 is being assailed as measures which withdraw the franking
privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission
and its Register of Deeds along with certain other government offices. The petitioners are
members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by
the said measures.

Issue:
Whether or not R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional on the grounds that:
(1) Its title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes;
(2) It did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of
the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage;
(3) It is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.

Ruling:
R.A. No. 7354 being unconstitutional on the ground that its title embraces more than one
subject and does not express its purpose is untenable. The Court does not agree that the title of
the challenged act violates the Constitution. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to
the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It
has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject and reasonably covers all the
provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature of the people, then it is
sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general
objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would
actually render legislation impossible. The withdrawal of the franking privilege from some
agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal object of R.A. No. 7354. Thus, by
virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the
title of the said law.
R.A. No. 7354 not passing the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed
copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage was
held unacceptable by the Court. While it is true that a Conference Committee is the mechanism
for compromising differences between the Senate and the House of Representatives, it is not
limited in its jurisdiction to the question. It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee
report on the bill was enrolled with its certification by the Senate President and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives as having been duly passes by both Houses. It was then presented
to and approved by the President. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that
the measure was duly enacted.
The third issue was based on the equal protection clause. The allegation that R.A. No.
7354 is discriminatory was found to have merit. The repealing clause, Section 35, was found to
be discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed
for all persons similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on
substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the
franking privilege.
 Antero M. Sison, Jr. v. Ruben M. Ancheta, Acting Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue;
Tomas Toledo, Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue; Manuel Alba, Minister of
Budget, Francisco Tantuico, Chairman, Commissioner on Audit, and Cesar E.A. Virata, Minister
of Finance
G.R. No. L-59431
July 25, 1984
Fernando, C.J.

Facts:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 135 was enacted. Antero M. Sison, Jr., as a taxpayer alleged that its
provision under Section 1 of it was unduly discriminative against him because it imposes higher
rates upon his income as a professional, it amounts to class legislation, and it transgresses against
the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution as well as the rule requiring
uniformity in taxation.

Issue:
Whether or not B.P. Blg. 135 violates the equal protection and due process clauses and
the rule on uniformity in taxation.

Ruling:
The due process clause may be invoked where a taxing statute is so arbitrary that it finds
no support in the Constitution. It has also been held that where the assailed tax measure is
beyond the jurisdiction of the state, or is not for public purpose, or, in case of a retroactive statute
is so harsh and unreasonable, it is subject to an attack on due process grounds. For equal
protection clause, the applicable standard to avoid the charge that there is a denial of this
constitutional mandate, of whether the assailed act is in the exercise of the police power or the
power of eminent domain, is to demonstrate that the governmental act assailed, far from being
inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the
very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason.
There is a need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to a conclusion that
there was a violation of the equal protection and due process clauses of the Constitution. Absent
such showing, the presumption of validity shall prevail. Equality and uniformity in taxation
means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same
rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for
purposes of taxation. Where the differentiation conforms to the practical dictates of justice and
equity, similar to the standards of equal protection, it is not discriminatory within the meaning of
the clause and is therefore uniform.
 Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, Evangelina S. Labao, in their behalf
and in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges during the school year 1987-
88 and future years who have not taken or successfully hurdled the National Medical Admission
Test (NMAT) v. The Honorable Judge Angelina S. Gutierrez, Presiding Judge of Branch
XXXVII of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region with seat at Manila, the
Honorable Secretary Lourdes Quisumbing, in her capacity as Chairman of the Board of Medical
Education, and the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM)
G.R. No. 78164
July 31, 1987
Feliciano, J.

Facts:
The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year
1987-88. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education and administered
by the Center for Educational Measurement.
The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the
Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing a
requirement of taking and passing the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility
for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from
administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. The trial court denies
said petition and the NMAT was conducted and administered as scheduled.
The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the
selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the
quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based
on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education
after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of
each applicant, together with the other admission requirements as presently called for under
existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of eligibility for
admission into the medical colleges.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2381 or the Medical Act of
1959, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 are unconstitutional.
Ruling:
Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain “State Policies”
which the government is enjoined to pursue and promote. The petitioners in this case have not
seriously undertake to demonstrate to what extent or in what manner the statute and
administrative order they assail collide with State policies embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17.
They have not discharged the burden of proof which lies upon them.
Petitioners have also failed to demonstrate that the statute and regulation they assail class
with the provision of Article XIV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. On the contrary, the Court
noted that the statute and regulation that were being assailed were in fact designed to promote
“quality education” at the level of professional schools. The State is not really enjoined to take
appropriate steps to make quality education “accessible to all who might for any number of
reasons wishes to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make such education
accessible to all who qualify under “fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements.”
The petitioners’ contention that the NMAT prescribed in MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is
an “unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement,” which results in a denial of due process is
also untenable. Petitioners have failed to specify just what factors or features of the NMAT
render it “unfair”, “unreasonable” or “inequitable”. Petitioners’ arguments appear to relate to
utility and wisdom or desirability of the NMAT requirement. But constitutionality is essentially a
question of power or authority.
The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as
a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. Thus, legislation and
administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass
medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental
power which was also similar with the establishment of minimum medical educational
requirements.
The contention that MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 is in conflict with the equal protection
clause of the Constitution was found to have no merit. Different cutoff scores for different school
years may be dictated by differing conditions obtaining during those years.
 Ismael Himagan v. People of the Philippines and Hon. Judge Hilario Mapayo, RTC Branch 11,
Davao City
G.R. No. 113811
October 7, 1994
Kapunan, J.

Facts:
Petitioner, a policeman assigned with the medical company of the Philippine National
Police Regional Headquarters at Camp Catitigan, Davao City, was implicated in the killing of
Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the information for
murder and attempted murder were filed with the RTC, Branch 11 of Davao City, on September
16, 1992, the trial court issued an Order suspending petitioner until the termination of the case on
the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975 (Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990).
On October 11, 1993, petitioner filed a motion to lift order of suspension relying on
Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to
ninety (90) days. Respondent judge denied the motion pointing out that under Section 47 of R.A.
6975, the accused shall be suspended from office until his case is terminated.

Issue:
Whether or not the imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to
Civil Service Law and would be a violation of the right to equal protection of laws.

Ruling:

The Court disagrees with the contention that the imposition of preventive suspension for
over 90 days is contrary to Civil Service Law and a violation of the right to equal protection of
the laws.
The language of the first sentient of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the
PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall last
until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the
case. Petitioner misapplied Sec. 42 of P.D. 807 because it clearly shows that it refers to the
lifting of preventive suspension in pending administrative investigation, not in criminal cases.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of
persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on
preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law
which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them. The imposition of preventive
suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended
policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws. The equal protection clause does
not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.