B.

   Judicial Admissions

1. People v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 108028, July 30, 1996

FACTS: Accused appellant met the private complainants introducing herself as the
general manager  Philippine-Thai.
-The private complainant were promised to work abroad but they were ask to pay
placement and passport fees in the total amount of P22,500.00 per applicant, to be paid
in three installments, to wit: P1,500 on December 14, 1988, P10,000.00 on December
16, 1988, and P11,000.00 on December 22, 1988.
-When the complainants paid, they were issued receipts by the alleged treasurer Liza
Mendoza but after they paid for the entire amount, they were not able to leave abroad.
- The court found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
recruitment committed in large scale

-The appellant argued that  (1) the stipulation of facts was not tantamount to an
admission by the appellant of the fact of non-possession of the requisite authority or
license from the POEA, but was merely an admission that the Chief Licensing Officer of
the POEA, if presented in court, would testify to this fact, and (2) the stipulation of facts
is null and void for being contrary to law and public policy.
-Appellant posits the foregoing arguments to bolster her contention that the stipulation
of facts did not relieve the prosecution of its duty to present evidence to prove all the
elements of the crime charged to the end that the guilt of the accused may be proven
beyond reasonable doubt.

-And she argued further that the admission by the POEA chief licensing officer here
was no judicial admission of the fact of non-possession of a license/authority but rather
a mere admission that the witness, if presented, would testify to such fact. 
ISSUE: 1.whether or not A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and
defense counsel is a jucial admission binding his client?
HELD: YES "judicial admission are frequently those of counsel or of the attorney of
record, who is, for the purpose of the trial, the agent of his client. When such
admissions are made . . . for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some fact, . . . they
bind the client, whether made during, or even after, the trial."

In this case the stipulation of facts proposed during trial by prosecution and admitted by
defense counsel is tantamount to a judicial admission by the appellant of the facts
stipulated on. Controlling, therefore, is Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which
provides that:

An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the

proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may
 be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was made.

2. Whether or not the court is not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents
of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are
pending in the same court?

HELD: Yes as a general rule, but it is subject to exception;

In the absence of objection and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may

properly treat all or any part of the original record of the case filed in its archives as read
into the records of a case pending before it, when with the knowledge of the opposing
party, reference is made to it, by name and number or in some other manner by which it
is sufficiently designated

And even assuming that judicial notice is misplace it will not affect the prosecution
because the case is not base to on the existence of another illegal recruitment case
filed against appellant by a different group of complainants, but on the overwhelming
evidence against her in the instant case.

3. Whether of not denials of the accused may be considered as evidence?

HELD: NO.  denials if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative,
self-serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater
evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters

In this case, she did not merely deny, but likewise raised as an affirmative defense her
appointment as mere nominee-president of Philippine-Thai is a futile attempt at
exculpating herself and is of no consequence whatsoever when weighed against the
positive declarations of witnesses that it was the appellant who executed the acts of
illegal recruitment as complained of.

DECISION Affirmed, she is guilty of illegal recruitment by a large scale.

III.        OBJECT AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE (RULE 130)

4. Daayata, et al v. People, G.R. No. 205745, March 8, 2017

FACTS:  Petitioners Capistrano Daayata (Daayata), Dexter Salisi (Salisi), and Bregido
Malacat, Jr. (Malacat) were charged with frustrated murder.

-they box and struck one Rolando 0. Bahian with a stone and hitting the latter's head
and several parts of his body, thereby inflicting injuries.

-Five (5) witnesses testified for the prosecution: the offended party, Rolando Bahian
(Bahian); Kagawad Leonardo Abalde (Kagawad Abalde) of Barangay San Simon,
Cagayan de Oro City; Barangay Captain Reynaldo Yafiez (Barangay Captain Yafiez);
Dr. Percy H. Arreza (Dr. Arreza) of the Cagayan de Oro City Hospital; and Dr. John
Mata (Dr. Mata), the surgeon who tended to Bahian.

-According to the witness Bahian has altercation with Salisi in a Basketball game
Bahian and Kagawad Abalde made their way to Barangay Captain Yafiez'
house.18 While on their way, they were blocked by petitioners. 19 Daayata hit Bahian on
the left part of his chest. 20 Bahian staggered and fell onto a parked jeep. 21 Salisi then hit
Bahian with a stone on the left side of his forehead, causing Bahian to fall to the
ground.22 While Bahian was lying prostrate on the ground, petitioners boxed and kicked
Bahian.23 Kagawad Abalde tried his best to get Bahian away but to no avail. 24 All he
could do was to shout for help. 25 Daayata then poked a gun at Bahian, Malacat
unsheathed a bolo, and Salisi wielded an iron bar.

RTC decision- find them guilty of frustrated muder.

On appeal the CA affirmed the RTC.

-They filed an MR but was denied and thus they filed this petition for review on certiorari
and insist different version of events.

-People of the phil filed their comment and said that it is improper for this court to re-
evaluate the findings of the lower court.

-Petitiner reply that respondent failed to directly confront the factual issues they had
raised.

ISSUE: whether or not petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt?

HELD:NO.

Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt finds basis not only in the due process clause
of the Constitution, but similarly, in the right of an accused to be "presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved." "Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional presumption of
innocence that lays such burden upon the prosecution." Should the prosecution fail to
discharge its burden, it follows, as a matter of course, that an accused must be
acquitted. As explained in Basilio v. People of the Philippine

In this case the prosecution case was not able to stand on its own merits. There were
doubts on whether challenged the petitioners in vicente’s house, whether complainant
was relentlessly assaulted

It appears that, rather than letting the better part of reason and modesty prevail, Bahian
elected to make good on his threat to eventually just get even with his adversaries.
Along the way, it even appears that he enlisted the aid of Kagawad Abalde, whose
participation in the clash in the morning of December 17, 1995, as the defense
recounted, was not as a pacifier but also as an aggressor. Unfortunately for Bahian, it
appears that his own hubris and lack of fighting prowess not only prolonged his quarrel,
but even brought him potentially fatal physical harm.

5. People v. Guarin, G.R. Nos. 83437-38, July 17, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
WILFREDO GUARIN y REYES, accused-appellant.

FACTS:
The accused Wilfredo Guarin armed with M16 armalite rifle with Serial No. RP 107024
issued to him as a former member of the Mangatarem INP, with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shoot Alicia Reyes, inflicting upon her "gunshot wound — POE — 0.5 x 0.5
cm., 3rd ICS anterior axillary line left.

The defense witnesses states that  saw a man on the road brandishing a bolo at a man
on a motorcycle, but he was unable to specifically identify them or state their names.
Even assuming the same to be true, it cannot be concluded from his bare statement
that the formen was then in the act of committing an unlawful aggression.

The second defense witness, Norma Reyes Casipit, merely declared that she saw
Reyes and appellant on the road, and that she saw Reyes moving towards appellant
while shouting, "I will kill you," and the latter fired shots to the air. Again, granting the
truth of her story, the fact remains that she never testified on the actual shooting since,
according to her, she ran away and went to the house of appellant to inform his wife
about what was supposedly taking place

-He plead not guilty because his argue that it is for self defense.

However the court found him guilty of the crime of Murder and Frustrated Murder,
respectively, beyond reasonable doubt, as charged in the two information.

ISSUE: Whether or not he acted for self defense?

HELD: NO

The factual ambience of the case at bar also readily yields the conclusion
that alevosia attended the commission of the crimes. The evidence establishes that the
victim was suddenly shot by appellant while the former was without any opportunity to
defend himself. Appellant deliberately adopted means to ensure the consummation of
his objective to the extent of availing himself of two automatic and heavy caliber
firearms and rapidly firing at the victim while the latter was in a defenseless state.
On appellant's invocation of self-defense, the Court entertains serious doubts on the
veracity of the testimonies of witnesses Lucio Basa and Norma Reyes Casipit, and
rejects the testimony of appellant for being inherentlincredible. As earlier stated, the
presence of several fatal gunshot wounds on the body of the deceased is physical
evidence which eloquently refutes such defense. 17 If the intention of appellant was
merely to defend himself from the supposed aggression of the deceased who was at the
time of the incident allegedly drunk and holding a bolo, appellant could have easily
repelled that aggression with one or two shots at the legs or non-vital part of the victim's
anatomy. Also, appellant was then riding a motorcycle and armed with an armalite and
a revolver. Evidently, he could have easily evaded the aggression of the deceased by
simply speeding away or, as just stated, by aiming at the legs or feet of the advancing
Orlando Reyes, instead of shooting him nine times in vital areas of his body. All these
are even on the supposition ex hypothesi that the supposed encounter on the road did
actually happen.

THUS, decision affirmed and some modification to the other crim case for less serious
physical injury.

Best Evidence Rule

1.G.R. No. 146586             January 26, 2005

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE and SPORTS, petitioner,

vs.
JULIA DEL ROSARIO, MARIA DEL ROSARIO, PACENCIA DEL ROSARIO, and
HEIRS OF SANTOS DEL ROSARIO,

FACTS:  The respondents Julia Del Rosario, Maria Del Rosario, Pacencia Del Rosario
and the Heirs of Santos Del Rosario ("respondents") filed before the trial court a
complaint for Recovery of Possession against petitioner Department of Education,
Culture and Sports ("DECS").

-The trial court rendered decision in favor of the petitioners dismissing the complaint for
the recovery of Possession.

- The Petitioners presented defense witnesses , Judge Eli Natividad, then a municipal
councilor of Sta. Maria, testified that he was the person who prepared the deed of
donation and later notarized the same, executed and signed before him and in his
presence. Likewise, he affirmed that the municipal board of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, passed
a resolution accepting the deed of donation in favor of the said municipality. Noteworthy
is the rule that a recantation/recollection of witness is a form of secondary evidence to
prove the existence/content of a document. However the document was lost and
beyond recovery.

-On appeal the CA reverse the RTC decision and ordered the defendant to vacate the
place. It ruled the defense was not able to prove the due execution or existence of the
deed of donation and the there was not enough evidence that a diligent search was
made by the petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in its ruling?

HELD: NO.

The best or primary evidence of a donation of real property is an authentic copy of the
deed of donation with all the formalities required by Article 749 of the Civil Code. The
duty to produce the original document arises when the subject of the inquiry are the
contents of the writing in which case there can be no evidence of the contents of the
writing other than the writing itself.

(Article 749 of the Civil Code requires that the donation of real property must be made in
a public instrument.)

A party may prove the donation by other competent or secondary evidence under the
exceptions in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Section 3 reads:

SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry
is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

(b) xxx;

(c) xxx;

(d) xxx.

In relation to this, Section 5 of Rule 130 reads:

SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. – When the original document has
been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part,
may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

In this case DECS did not introduce in evidence the municipal council Resolution
accepting the donation and  inadequate proof that DECS or the Municipality made
a diligent search in the places where the deed of donation may likely be found
and that the search was unsuccessful.

Thus CA decision is affirmed.

Secondary evidence
4Heir of Cardenas v. The Christian and Missionary Alliance Churches of the
Philippines, Inc.,

FACTS: Petitioner Remedios], heir of [Sps. Cardenas], represented by her attorney-in-

fact, [Janet] who is her daugther[4] filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and
Use of Real Property and Damages against [respondents] The Christian and Missionary
Alliance Churches of the Philippines, Inc. (CAMACOP) which is a religious corporation,
Reo Repollo [(Repollo)] and Leocadio Duque, Jr. [(Duque, Jr.)] before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Midsayap, Cotabato.

- It was alleged that CAMACOP illegally occupy the property registered by the
petitioners.

-CAMACOP alleged that they actually bought the said property from certain Pastora.

- However CAMACOP has no copy of the document is available because its counsel,
Atty. Calud, submitted to the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources of the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources (DANR), now Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), all the copies of the Deed of Sale.

- The RTC rendered decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.

-CAMACOP was able to provide sufficient documentary and testimonial evidence that
the subject property was indeed sold to it by Pastora. Hence, the RTC found as a fact
the existence of a sale transaction between CAMACOP and the predecessor-in-interest
of Janet and Remedios, i.e., Pastora.

-On appeal, the CA denied and affirm the RTC decision. It ruled that "failed to overcome
the burden of proving her claim by preponderance of evidence [and found] that the
court a quo did not err in its appreciation of the evidence and in ruling that there was in
fact a sale of the subject property by the late spouses in favor of [CAMACOP.] The
failure of [Janet] to prove her claim makes [the] appeal vulnerable to denial.

ISSUE: Whether or not CAMACOP has a better right to possess the property?

HELD:NO.

As a general rule, a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and

incontrovertible title to the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.

-in this case "the property Lot 90, Psd-37322 covered by TCT No. T-6097 is still
registered in the names of Pastora T. Cardenas and Eustaquio Cardenas.

- "the same lot is still declared for tax purposes in the name of the plaintiffs Pastora
Cardenas and Eustaquio Cardenas.  While Tax Declarations are not conclusive proof
of ownership, at the very least they are proof that the holder has a claim of title over the
property and serve as sufficient basis for inferring possession.
In asserting that the subject property was sold by Pastora to CAMACOP, the latter relies
on the existence of a Deed of Sale purportedly executed in 1962. CAMACOP however
maintains that, since all of the copies of this alleged Deed of Sale had been supposedly
lost, it had to resort to the presentation of secondary evidence to prove the existence of
this Deec of Sale.

According to Section 5, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, when the original
document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon
proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on
his part, may prove its contents by presenting secondary evidence. These secondary
evidence pertain to: (1) a copy of the lost document, (2) by a recital of the contents of
the lost document in some authentic document, or (3) by a testimony of a witnesses, in
the order stated.

While the allegation of CAMACOP that it had lost copies of the Deed of absolute sale it
is quite unbelievable and extraordinary that not even a single copy of the purported
Deed of Sale was retained by CAMACOP or its counsel, considering the grave
importance of such a document.

THUS, instant appeal is granted, the RTC and CA decision is hereby reverse and set
aside.

d.    Authentication and Proof of Documents

·       4Franco v. People, G.R. No. 191185, February 1, 2016

FACTS:  Benjamin Joseph Nakamoto (Nakamoto) went to work out at the Body Shape
Gym  and lost his NOKIA 3660 cell phone where it was alleged that petitioner
Guilberner Franco (Franco) stole it.

- There were 3 witnesses testify that Franco took the cap and cellphone of the
respondents, that he was the only one eho left the gym after it was respondent
announced that the phone was lost and nobody should leave the gym and lastly
the caretaker saw Franco not actually working out but was just walking in the
area.
- The RTC decision finds him guilty beyond reasonable doubt due to positive
testimony of Rosario.
-  The CA affirmed the decision of RTC.

ISSUE:WHETHER OR NOT THE ERRED IN ITS RULING?

HELD: YES.

Circumstantial evidence, Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that the
following requisites must concur:
(l) there must be more than one circumstance to convict;

(2) the facts on which the inference of guilt is based must be proved; and

(3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. With respect to the third requisite, it is essential that the
circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain, which leads one
to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of others,
as the guilty person.

Rosario's testimony definitely cannot fall under the first category of positive
identification. While it may support the conclusion that Franco took a cell phone from
the altar, it does not establish with certainty that what Franco feloniously took, assuming
that he did, was Nakamoto's cell phone. Rosario merely testified that Franco took "a cell
phone."

Ramos, the gym caretaker, also testified that he did not see Franco take
Nakamoto 's cell phone and only assumed that the cell phone on the altar was
Nakamoto's.

 Records show that there were other people in the gym before and after
Nakamoto lost his cell phone. In fact, Nakamoto himself suspected Rosario of
having taken his cell phone

Thus in this case- No other convincing evidence was presented by the

prosecution that would link him to the theft.57 The fact Franco took a cell phone
from· the altar does not necessarily point to the conclusion that it was
Nakamoto's cell phone that he took. In the appreciation of circumstantial
evidence, the rule is that the circumstances must be proved, and not themselves
presumed. The circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility that some
other person has committed the offense charged.

Air Philippines Corp. v. Pennswell, Inc.,

FACTS: respondent Eric Gan opened a current account with petitioner Security Bank
and Trust Company.

-Petitioner alleged that it had an agreement with respondent wherein the latter would
deposit an initial amount in his current account and he could draw checks on said
account provided there were sufficient funds to cover them. 

-under a special arrangement with petitioner’s branch manager then, Mr. Qui,
respondent was allowed to transfer funds from his account to another person’s account
also within the same branch.

-Later on, respondent purportedly incurred an overdraft or negative balance in his

account. As of December 14, 1982, the overdraft balance came up to P153,757.78.
According to petitioner, respondent refused to heed petitioner’s repeated demands for
payment. For the period December 14, 1982 to September 15, 1990, the total obligation
of respondent reached P297,060.01, inclusive of interest.

- This was shown  recorded his transactions in a ledger. Based on this ledger,
respondent allegedly had a negative balance of P153,757.78. This resulted from
transfers of funds from respondent’s current account to another person’s account.
These transfers were made under the authority of Qui.

-petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money against respondent to recover

the P297,060.01 with 12% interest per annum from September 16, 1990 until fully paid

-Respondent denied liability to petitioner for the said amount. He contended that the
alleged overdraft resulted from transactions done without his knowledge and consent.

The trial court dismissed the case.

On appeal, the ca affirmes the RTC.

ISSUE: whether or not erred in not ruling that petitioner has sufficiently proved its cause
of action against respondent; and that the ledger cards and the testimony of Mr. Patricio
Mercado constituted the best evidence of the transactions made by the respondent
relative to his account.

HELD: NO.

Entries in the course of business. – Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions
to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to
know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person
made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the
ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

Under this exception to the hearsay rule, the admission in evidence of entries in
corporate books required the satisfaction of the following conditions:

1. the person who made the entry must be dead, or unable to testify;

2. the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they
refer;

3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;

4. the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a

duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or religious; and

5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty. 15

The ledger entries did not meet the first and third requisites.
-Entries in business records which spring from the duty of other employees to
communicate facts occurring in the ordinary course of business are prima facie
admissible, the duty to communicate being itself a badge of trustworthiness of the
entries, but not when they purport to record what were independent agreements arrived
at by some bank officials and a client.

- In this case, the entries become mere casual or voluntary reports of the official
concerned. To permit the ledgers, prepared by the bank at its own instance, to
substitute the contract as proof of the agreements with third parties, is to set a
dangerous precedent. Business entries are allowed as an exception to the
hearsay rule only under certain conditions specified in Section 43, which must be
scrupulously observed to prevent them from being used as a source of undue
advantage for the party preparing them.

Thus, petitioner did not prove that respondent had incurred a negative balance in
his account. Consequently, there was nothing to show that respondent was
indebted to it in the amount claimed.lavvphil.net

TR

TRADE Secrets

G.R. No. 172835               December 13, 2007

AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
PENNSWELL, INC. Respondent.

FACTS: Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation  is engaged in the business of air

transportation services. On the other hand, respondent Pennswell, Inc. was organized
to engage in the business of manufacturing and selling industrial chemicals, solvents,
and special lubricants.

-Respondent alleged that the petitioner failed to comply with its obligation contracts
thus the former filed a complaint for a sum of money.

- The petitioner alleged that it was defrauded in the amount of ₱592,000.00 by

respondent for its previous sale of four items, covered by Purchase Order No. 6626.
Said items were misrepresented by respondent as belonging to a new line, but were in
truth and in fact, identical with products petitioner had previously purchased from
respondent.

-Petitioner filed a Motion to Compel10 respondent to give a detailed list of the ingredients

and chemical components of the following products, to wit: (a) Contact Grease and
Connector Grease; (b) Thixohtropic Grease and Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating;
and (c) Dry Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound.

-the RTC rendered an Order granting the petitioner’s motion

-Respondent argued that what petitioner endeavored to inquire upon constituted a trade
secret which respondent cannot be forced to divulge. Respondent maintained that its
products are specialized lubricants, and if their components were revealed, its business
competitors may easily imitate and market the same types of products, in violation of its
proprietary rights and to its serious damage and prejudice.

-The RTC gave credence to respondent’s reasoning, and reversed itself.

-petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the
Court of Appeals, which denied the Petition and affirmed the CA decision.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS RULED IN ACCORDANCE WITH

PREVAILING LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT UPHELD THE RULING OF
THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE CHEMICAL COMPONENTS OR INGREDIENTS OF
RESPONDENT’S PRODUCTS ARE TRADE SECRETS OR INDUSTRIAL SECRETS
THAT ARE NOT SUBJECT TO COMPULSORY DISCLOSURE.

HELD: NO.

 trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known only
to its owner and those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it.

What is clear from the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is that the
chemical formulation of respondent’s products is not known to the general public and is
unique only to it. Both courts uniformly ruled that these ingredients are not within the
knowledge of the public.

Since such factual findings are generally not reviewable by this Court, it is not duty-
bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the
proceedings below.47 We need not delve into the factual bases of such findings as
questions of fact are beyond the pale of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Factual findings
of the trial court when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive on
the Supreme Court.

4Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 109172, August 19, 1994

FACTS:
 Trans-Pacific applied for and was granted several financial accommodations amounting
to P1.3M byrespondent Associated Bank. The loans were evidenced and secured by 4
promissory notes, a real estate mortgagecovering three parcels of land and a chattel mo
rtgage over petitioner’s stock and inventories.
 Unable to settle its obligation in full, petitioner requested for, and was granted by the
bank, a restructuring of theremaining indebtedness. To secure the restructured loan, 3
new promissory notes were executed by Trans-Pacific.The mortgaged parcels of land
were substituted by another mortgage covering 2 other parcels of land and a chattel
mortgage on petitioner’s stock inventory. The released parcels of land were then sold
and the proceeds were turnedover to the bank and applied to TIS’ restructured loan.
Subsequently, the bank returned the duplicate original copies
of the 3 promissory notes to Trans-
Pacific with the word “PAID” stamped thereon.
Despite the return of the notes, Associated Bank demanded from Trans-Pacific payment
of the amount ofP492,100.00 representing accrued interest because the promissory
notes were erroneously released. Initially, Trans-Pacific expressed its willingness to pay
the amount demanded by respondent bank but later had a change of heart and instead
initiated an action before the RTC of Makati for specific performance and damages.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the appellate court is correct in holding that the promissory notes which
are copies executed at the same time with the alleged original are not considered
original documents
RULING: No.
 Applying the legal presumption provided by Art. 1271 of the Civil Code, the trial court
ruled that petitioner has fully discharged its obligation by virtue of its possession of
the documents (stamped “PAID”) evidencing its indebtedness.
Respondent court disagreed and held, among others, that the documents found in
possession of Trans-Pacific are
mere duplicates and cannot be the basis of petitioner’s claim that its obligation has been
fully paid. Accordingly, since the promissory notes submitted by petitioner were
duplicates and not the originals, the delivery thereof by respondent bank to the
petitioner does not merit the application of Article 1271 (1st par.) of the Civil Code.
“Art. 12
71. The delivery of a private document evidencing a credit, made voluntarily by the
creditor to the debtor,
implies the renunciation of the action which the former had against the latter.”
 The provision must be construed to mean the original copy of the document evidencing
the credit and not its duplicate. The pronouncement of respondent court is manifestly
groundless. It is undisputed that the documents presented were duplicate originals and
are therefore admissible as evidence. Further, it must be noted that respondent bank
itself did not bother to challenge the authenticity of the duplicate copies submitted by
petitioner. A duplicate copy of the original may be admitted in evidence when
the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered,
and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice, as in the case of respondent
bank. A duplicate copy of the original may be admitted in evidence when the original is
in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails
to produce it after reasonable notice (Sec. 2 [b], Rule 130),as in the case of respondent
bank. The presumption created by the Art. 1271 of the Civil Code is not conclusive but
merely
 prima facie.
If there be no evidence to the contrary, the presumption stands. Conversely, the
presumption loses its legal efficacy in the face ofproof or evidence to the contrary. In the
case before us, we find sufficient justification to overthrow the presumption ofpayment
generated by the delivery of the documents evidencing petitioners indebtedness.It may
not be amiss to add that Article 1271 of the Civil Code raises a presumption, not of
payment, but of therenunciation of the credit where more convincing evidence would be
required than what normally would be called forto prove payment. The rationale
for allowing the presumption of renunciation in the delivery of a
 private instrument
isthat, unlike that of a public instrument, there could be just one copy of the evidence of
credit. Where several originalsare made out of a private document, the intendment of
the law would thus be to refer to the delivery only of theoriginal
original rather than to the original duplicate of which the debtor would normally retain a
copy. It would thus be absurd if Article 1271 were to be applied differently. To determine
the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to compromise, the circumstances of the
case and the intent of the party making the offer should be considered. Thus, if a party
denies the existence of a debt but offers to pay the same for the purpose of buying
peace and avoiding litigation, the offer of settlement is inadmissible. If in the course
thereof, the party making the offer admits the existence of an indebtedness combined
with a proposal to settle the claim amicably, then, the admission is admissible to prove
such indebtedness (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 5, p. 233 [1980 ed.);
Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. VII, p. 325 [1973 ed.] citing McNiel v. Holbrook, 12 Pac.
(US) 84, 9 L.ed. 1009). Indeed, an offer of settlement is an effective admission of a
borrower's loan balance (L.M. Handicraft Manufacturing Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 186
SCRA 640 [1990]). Exactly, this is what petitioner did in the case before us for review.