G.R. No. 150274. August 4, 2006.

IN THE MATTER TO DECLARE IN CONTEMPT OF

COURT HON. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG in the latter’s
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Public Works
and Highways. JIMMIE F. TEL-EQUEN, petitioner.

Contempt; The contempt power, however plenary it may seem,

must be exercised judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-
restraint with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction
and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or
vindication.—The power to declare a person in contempt of court
and in dealing with him accordingly is an inherent power lodged
in courts of justice, to be used as a means to protect and preserve
the dignity of the court, the solemnity of the proceedings therein,
and the administration of justice from callous misbehavior,
offensive personalities, and contumacious refusal to comply with
court orders. This contempt power, however plenary it may seem,
must be exercised judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-
restraint with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction
and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or
vindication. It should not be availed of unless necessary in the
interest of justice.
Same; A conduct, to be contumacious, implies willfulness, bad
faith or with deliberate intent to cause injustice.—After careful
consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, we find
that the issuance of the Memorandum Order by Secretary
Datumanong was not a contumacious conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of
justice. A conduct, to be contumacious, implies willfulness, bad
faith or with deliberate intent to cause injustice, which is not so in
the case at bar. If it were otherwise, petitioner should have been
dismissed immediately after the Administrative Adjudication
Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman rendered its decision on
March 28, 1994. It was only after the Court of Appeals rendered
its decision on March 2, 2000 affirming the dismissal that
Secretary Datumanong issued the memorandum and after
ascertaining that no injunction or restraining order was issued by
the Court.
_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

627

VOL. 497, AUGUST 4, 2006 627

In the Matter to Declare in Content Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong,

Secretary of DPWH

Administrative Law; Judgments; Where the legislature has

seen fit to declare that the decision of the quasi-judicial agency is
immediately final and executory pending appeal, the law expressly
so provides.—At most, it may be considered only an error of
judgment or a result of confusion considering the different rules
regarding execution of decisions pending appeal. Decisions of the
Civil Service Commission under the Administrative Code of 1987
are immediately executory even pending appeal because the
pertinent laws under which the decisions were rendered mandate
them to be so. Thus, “where the legislature has seen fit to declare
that the decision of the quasi-judicial agency is immediately final
and executory pending appeal, the law expressly so provides.”
Otherwise, execution of decisions takes place only when they
become final and executory, like decisions rendered by the Office
of the Ombudsman.
Statutory Construction; It is a principle in statutory
construction that where there are two statutes that apply to a
particular case, that which was specially designed for the said case
must prevail over the other.—Petitioner was charged
administratively before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Accordingly, the provisions of the Ombudsman Act and its Rules
of Procedure should apply in his case. It is a principle in statutory
construction that where there are two statutes that apply to a
particular case, that which was specially designed for the said
case must prevail over the other. In fine, Secretary Datumanong
cannot be held in contempt of court for issuing the Memorandum
Order in the absence of malice or wrongful conduct in issuing it.
The remedy of the petitioner is not to file a petition to cite him in
contempt of court but to elevate the error to the higher court for
review and correction.
Same; As a general rule, the retroactive application of
procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any personal
rights because no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom.—
Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are construed to be
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to
that extent. As a general rule, the retroactive application of
procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any personal
rights because no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom.
In the case at bar, the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman are clearly procedural and no vested right of the
petitioner is violated as he is considered

628

628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In the Matter to Declare in Content Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong,

Secretary of DPWH

preventively suspended while his case is on appeal. Moreover, in

the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such
other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the
suspension or removal. Besides, there is no such thing as a vested
interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office.
Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special
immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to
have any vested right in an office.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Contempt.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Felix T. Diaz, Jr. for petitioner.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner Jimmie F. Tel-Equen, District Engineer of
Mountain Province, DPWH Cordillera Administrative
Region, filed this present petition to cite the former
Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong of the Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH) in contempt of court
for issuing Memorandum Order dated October 5, 2001
dismissing him from the service.
The facts of the case are as follows:
The Ombudsman Task Force on Public Works and
Highways filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an
administrative complaint for dishonesty, falsification of
official documents, grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty,
violation of office rules and regulations, and conduct
prejudicial to the service against petitioner Tel-Equen and
several others, relative to the anomalous payment of
P553,900.00 of the bailey bridge components owned by the
government. The case was docketed as OMB-ADM-0-91-
0430.1
On March 28, 1994, the Administrative Adjudication
Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman found respondents

_______________

1 Antonio v. Villa, G.R. No. 144694, March 28, 2005, 454 SCRA 84, 91.

629

VOL. 497, AUGUST 4, 2006 629

In the Matter to Declare in Content Hon. Simeon A.
Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH

guilty of dishonesty, falsification of public documents,

misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service and ordered their dismissal from the service
with accessory penalties pursuant to Section 23 of Rule
XIV, Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known
as the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.2
After the denial of the motions for reconsideration, three
petitions were filed before this Court which were
consolidated and referred to the Court of Appeals in light of
the ruling in Fabian v. Desierto3 where appeals from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases should be referred to the appellate court under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court.4
On March 2, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed with
modification the decision of the Administrative
Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman
finding petitioner and two co-accused guilty as charged and
dismissed them from the service while the other two
respondents were exonerated from administrative liability
for lack of evidence.5
Petitioner, together with his two co-accused, appealed
from the decision of the Court of Appeals which was
docketed as G.R. No. 144694.6 Meanwhile, while appeal
was still pending, Secretary Datumanong issued the
assailed Memorandum Order,7 which reads:

October 5, 2001
MEMORANDUM TO:
Messrs:
JIMMIE F. TEL-EQUEN
District Engineer

_______________

2 Id., at p. 95.
3 356 Phil. 787, 808; 295 SCRA 470 (1998).
4 Antonio v. Villa, supra at p. 96.
5 Id., at pp. 96-97.
6 Id., at p. 97.
7 Rollo, p. 12.

630

630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In the Matter to Declare in Content Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong,
Secretary of DPWH

RUDY P. ANTONIO
Chief, Construction Section
All of Mountain Province Engineering District
This Department
This is with reference to the Order of the Ombudsman dated
December 11, 1995 in OMB ADM. 0-91-0430 entitled “OMB TASK
FORCE ON DPWH versus JIMMIE F. TEL-EQUEN, ET AL.”
(Annex “A”), affirming the March 28, 1994 Resolution (Annex “B”)
in the same case finding you guilty of having committed acts of
dishonesty, falsification of public documents, misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
recommending that you be DISMISSED from the service together
with its accessory penalties pursuant to Sec. 23, Rule XIV, Book V
of Executive Order No. 292.
The Order was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (Eight
Division) in its Decision (Annex “C”) promulgated on March 02,
2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 50324 entitled “ROMULO H.
MABUNGA, ET AL. versus THE OMBUDSMAND, ET AL.”
Inasmuch as the Order dismissing you from the service is not a
subject of any injunction or restraining order from the Supreme
Court, the same is immediately executory. Wherefore, you are
hereby ordered DROPPED/DISMISSED from the service effective
upon receipt hereof.
                                                                                                    (Sgd.) SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG
                                                                             Secretary

Hence, the instant petition to cite Secretary

Datumanong in contempt of court.
 Petitioner contends that in issuing the Memorandum
Order despite knowledge of the pendency of G.R. No.
144694, Secretary Datumanong committed a contumacious
act, a gross and blatant display of abuse of discretion and
an unlawful interference with the proceedings before the
Court, thereby directly or indirectly impeding, obstructing
and degrading the administration of justice, and pre-
empting the

631

VOL. 497, AUGUST 4, 2006 631

In the Matter to Declare in Content Hon. Simeon A.
Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH

Court’s sole right to make a decision in accord with the

evidence and law.8
Petition lacks merit.
The power to declare a person in contempt of court and
in dealing with him accordingly is an inherent power
lodged in courts of justice, to be used as a means to protect
and preserve the dignity of the court, the solemnity of the
proceedings therein, and the administration of justice from
callous misbehavior, offensive personalities, and
9
contumacious refusal to comply with court orders. This
contempt power, however plenary it may seem, must be
exercised judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-
restraint with the end in view of utilizing the same for
correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not
for retaliation or vindication.10 It should not be availed of
unless necessary in the interest of justice.11
After careful consideration of the facts and
circumstances of the case, we find that the issuance of the
Memorandum Order by Secretary Datumanong was not a
contumacious conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. A
conduct, to be contumacious, implies willfulness, bad faith
or with deliberate intent to cause injustice, which is not so
in the case at bar. If it were otherwise, petitioner should
have been dismissed immediately after the Administrative
Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman
rendered its decision on March 28, 1994. It was only after
the Court of Appeals rendered its decision on March 2,
2000 affirming the dismissal that Secretary Datumanong
issued the memorandum and after ascer-
_______________

8  Id., at p. 6.
9    Office of the Court Administrator v. Paderanga, A.M. No. RTJ-01-
1660, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 21, 34.
10  Rodriguez v. Bonifacio, 398 Phil. 441, 468; 344 SCRA 519, 538
(2000).
11 Quinio v. Court of Appeals, 390 Phil. 852, 861; 335 SCRA 522, 529
(2000).

632

632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In the Matter to Declare in Content Hon. Simeon A.
Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH

taining that no injunction or restraining order was issued

by the Court.
At most, it may be considered only an error of judgment
or a result of confusion considering the different rules
regarding execution of decisions pending appeal.
Decisions of the Civil Service Commission under the
Administrative Code of 198712 are immediately executory
even pending appeal because the pertinent laws13 under
which the decisions were rendered mandate them to be
so.14 Thus,

_______________

12  Section 47(4), Chapter 6, Title I of Book V of Executive Order No.

292 (1987), reads:
Sec. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.—
x x x x
(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory,
and in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent
shall be considered as having been under the preventive suspension
during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal.
13 Section 37(d) of Article IX of P.D. No. 807 (1975), otherwise known
as Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, reads:
Sec. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.—
x x x x
(d) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory,
and in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent
shall be considered as having been under the preventive suspension
during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal.
 And, Section 47 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19-99, otherwise
known as the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(1999), reads:
Section 47. Effect of Filing.—An appeal shall not stop the
decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is
suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as
having been under preventive suspension during the pendency of
the appeal, in the event he wins an appeal.
14 Lapid v. Court of Appeals, 390 Phil. 236, 251; 334 SCRA 738, 752
(2000).

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VOL. 497, AUGUST 4, 2006 633

In the Matter to Declare in Content Hon. Simeon A.
Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH

“where the legislature has seen fit to declare that the

decision of the quasi-judicial agency is immediately final
and executory pending appeal, the law expressly so
provides.”15 Otherwise, execution of decisions takes place
only when they become final and executory, like decisions
rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman.Thus, in Lapid v.
Court of Appeals,16 the Court held:

Petitioner was administratively charged for misconduct under

the provisions of R.A. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989. Section
27 of the said Act provides as follows:
“Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions.—All
provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are
immediately effective and executory.
A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed
within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall
be entertained only on the following grounds:
x x x x x x x x x
Findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman when
supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any
order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public
censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one
month’s salary shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives
or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for
certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written
notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the
 motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.”
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
likewise contain a similar provision. Section 7, Rule III of the said
Rules provides as follows:

_______________

15 Neeland v. Villanueva, Jr., 416 Phil. 580, 592; 364 SCRA 204, 218 (2001).
16 Supra at pp. 246-247, 249; pp. 748-750, 751.

634

634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In the Matter to Declare in Content Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong,
Secretary of DPWH

“Sec. 7. Finality of Decision—where the respondent is

absolved of the charge and in case of conviction where the
penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension
of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one
month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable.
In all other cases, the decision shall become final after the
expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the
respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition
for certiorari, shall have been filed by him as prescribed in
Section 27 of R.A. 6770.”
It is clear from the above provisions that the punishment
imposed upon petitioner, i.e. suspension without pay for one year,
is not among those listed as final and unappealable, hence,
immediately executory. Section 27 states that all provisionary
orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective
and executory; and that any order, directive or decision of the said
Office imposing the penalty of censure or reprimand or
suspension of not more than one month’s salary is final and
unappealable. As such the legal maxim “inclusio[n] unius est
exclusio alterius” finds application. The express mention of the
things included excludes those that are not included. The clear
import of these statements taken together is that all other
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which impose
penalties that are not enumerated in the said Section 27
are not final, unappealable and immediately executory. An
appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the instant
case, will stay the immediate implementation of the
decision. This finds support in the Rules of Procedure issued by
the Ombudsman itself which states that “(I)n all other cases, the
decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days
from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for
reconsideration or petition for certiorari (should now be petition
for review under Rule 43) shall have been filed by him as
prescribed in Section 27 of R.A. 6770.”
x x x x
A judgment becomes “final and executory” by operation of law.
Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act provides that any order,
directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing a
penalty of public censure or reprimand, or suspension of not more
than one month’s salary shall be final and unappealable. In all
other cases, the respondent therein has the right to appeal to the
Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from receipt of the written
notice of the

635

VOL. 497, AUGUST 4, 2006 635

In the Matter to Declare in Content Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong,
Secretary of DPWH

order, directive or decision. In all these other cases therefore, the

judgment imposed therein will become final after the lapse of the
reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or, an
appeal therefrom having been taken, the judgment in the
appellate tribunal becomes final. It is this final judgment which is
then correctly categorized as a “final and executory judgment” in
respect to which execution shall issue as a matter of right. In
other words, the fact that the Ombudsman Act gives
parties the right to appeal from its decisions should
generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending
appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments
as being appealable would be rendered nugatory.
(Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner was charged administratively before the

Office of the Ombudsman. Accordingly, the provisions of
the Ombudsman Act and its Rules of Procedure should
apply in his case. It is a principle in statutory construction
that where there are two statutes that apply to a particular
case, that which was specially designed for the said case
must prevail over the other.17
In fine, Secretary Datumanong cannot be held in
contempt of court for issuing the Memorandum Order in
the absence of malice or wrongful conduct in issuing it. The
remedy of the petitioner is not to file a petition to cite him
in contempt of court but to elevate the error to the higher
court for review and correction.
However, two events supervened since the filing of this
petition that would support its dismissal. First, on March
28, 2005, the Court in G.R. No. 144694 affirmed the
decisions of the Court of Appeals and Administrative
Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman
ordering petitioner dismissed from the service for
dishonesty, falsification of public documents, misconduct,
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Second, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the
Office of the Ombudsman was amended by

_______________

17 Id., at p. 251; p. 254.

636

636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In the Matter to Declare in Content Hon. Simeon A.
Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH

Administrative Order No. 1718 wherein the pertinent

provision on the execution of decisions pending appeal is
now essentially similar to Section 47 of the Uniform Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service and other
related laws, thus:

Rule III
PROCEDURE IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES
Section 7. Finality and execution of decision.—Where the
respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction
where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to
one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and
unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to
the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review under the
requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice
of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being
executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal
and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be
considered as having been under preventive suspension
and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments
that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or
removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly
enforced and properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any
officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of
the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure
shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer.

 
Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are
construed to be applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed
retroactive in that

_______________

18 Signed by Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo on September 15, 2003.

637

VOL. 497, AUGUST 4, 2006 637

In the Matter to Declare in Content Hon. Simeon A.
Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH

sense and to that extent. As a general rule, the retroactive

application of procedural laws cannot be considered
violative of any personal rights because no vested right
may attach to nor arise therefrom.19
In the case at bar, the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman are clearly procedural and no vested right
of the petitioner is violated as he is considered preventively
suspended while his case is on appeal. Moreover, in the
event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and
such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of
the suspension or removal. Besides, there is no such thing
as a vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to
hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide
for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one
can be said to have any vested right in an office.20
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition to
cite former Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong of the
Department of Public Works and Highways in contempt of
court for issuing Memorandum Order dated October 5,
2001 dismissing petitioner Jimmie F. Tel-Equen from the
service is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
 SO ORDERED.

Panganiban (C.J., Chairperson), Austria-Martinez,

Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

Petition dismissed.

Notes.—The reason the Constitutional Commission

adopted the “conviction by final judgment” requirement
was to prevent the President from exercising executive
power in

_______________

19  Calacala v. Republic, G.R. No. 154415, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA
438, 446.
20  Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes v. Court of
Appeals, 348 Phil. 303, 321; 284 SCRA 276, 295 (1998).

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