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Process bus interoperability under IEC 61869-9 + differential protection (87L)

scheme with one conventional end

Conference Paper · August 2018

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 Process bus interoperability under IEC 61869-9 + differential protection (87L)
scheme with one conventional end
P. ALBI, J.C. SÁNCHEZ, C. RODRÍGUEZ, A. FERNÁNDEZ, D. RAMOS, A.
CABALLERO1, J. ROMÁN2, J. CÁRDENAS3, A. SÁNCHEZ4, J.M. PARRA5, R.
VÉLEZ6
1 Red Eléctrica de España, S.A.U., 2 Siemens, 3 General Electric, 4 Arteche, 5 Omicron, 6
Ingeteam
Spain
SUMMARY
In October 2014, the Spanish TSO started a project for proving interoperability under IEC 61869-9
standard (at this time prIEC 61869-9). The idea was protecting a long overhead line with a differential
scheme (87 L) with one end under process bus approach and the other end with conventional IT and
protection relays terminals.
For implementing the project, it was chosen the 220 kV Mudarra-Montearenas overhead line, with a
high tripping ratio due to wide range of reasons: long transmission line (+160 km), seasonal nesting,
and regular lightning strokes.
The installation phase ended during 2016 with the standard just officially issued.
The project configuration defines the Montearenas substation as the NCIT end, with protection relay
terminals based on IEC 61869-9 and synchronized by a 1 PPS signal. For time stamping in protection
relays records, an additional IRIG-B signal is provided. The other end, Mudarra substation, is mainly
focused on conventional measures. The line kept its tripping responsibility on the former protection
system, what will be used to compare the new solution with the TSO typical one, and it will allow
certain freedom grades to test the new solutions without affecting the line availability.
The architecture scheme in order to fulfil a wide range of possible configurations and tests (including
GOOSE message in both ends) is as follows:

The paper includes explanations about some engineering, commissioning & testing experience.

1
Shifting from former IEC 61850-9-2-LE to IEC 61869-9 represented a challenge for the project. There
are some hints including those aspects that implied more difficulty.
It summarizes the operation of the system also, since it achieved its functionality in 2016, and there is
some valuable experience based on the results of 14-line tripping events, maintenance tasks,
configurations upgrading, etc. The experience of maintenance personnel in charge of operating and
maintaining the facility, has been added to help in the understanding on what happens when
implementing proven laboratory solutions in the field with the same expectations than the present
solution.
Finally, it is included a set of conclusions based on the up to now experience.

KEYWORDS
Process Bus, IEC 61850, IEC 61869-9, Non-Conventional Instrument Transformers (NCIT),
differential protection (87L), Stand Alone Merging Unit (SAMU), Merging Unit (MU),
interoperability, process bus recorder, utility experience.

1.- PROJECT DESCRIPTION

1.1 General
In October 2014, the Spanish TSO started a process to find several IED manufacturers to prove
process bus interoperability under IEC 61869-9 standard. At this time, the standard was in IEC at
CDV stage (committee draft for vote), and when the project achieved its operational stage in 2016, the
standard was recently issued.
A set of NCIT, SAMU, protection relays, Digital recorder manufacturers joined to the project to check
how can be implemented a line differential protection function (87L) with only one end substation
running under SV´s measures.
For checking the expected future solutions in a partial, but not total, digitalization of grid substations it
was crucial designing only one end to support the IEC 61869-9 interoperability.
On the other hand, the differential protection scheme choice supports the TSO preference for ensuring
a correct fault clearing in an expected low short-circuit currents scenario, due to a high degree of
renewable generation penetration for covering the future electricity demand.
It was selected the Over-Head Line (OHL) 220 kV between the substations of Montearenas
(Ponferrada, León) and La Mudarra (Mudarra, Valladolid) in Spain, 163 km long, with an historical
high fault ratio due to a wide range of reasons: long transmission line, seasonal nesting and regular
lightning strokes.
The end of Montearenas substation was fitted with the following main equipment, considering this end
as the “digital substation end”:
-NCITs for current (optic) and voltage (pure voltage -divider), with a Merging Unit (MU).
-Stand Alone Merging Unit (SAMU), that acquires current and voltages from a derivation of
the conventional instrument transformers already installed.
-Line protection relay terminal from manufacturer A, working with SV from either MU or
SAMU.

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 -Line protection relay terminal from manufacturer B, working with SV from either MU or
SAMU.
-Recorder, with capabilities of monitoring and registering not only SV under 61869-9, but also
wiring signals from secondaries of conventional instrument transformers and digital tripping orders,
with its own GPS signal, providing itself PTP synchronization, for better time accuracy.
The end of Mudarra substation was fitted with the following equipment, considering this end as the
“existing/conventional” substation, in a hypothetical future digital deployment.
- Line protection relay terminal from manufacturer A, working with SV from its own SAMU,
digitalizing existing analogic current and voltages.
-Line protection relay terminal from manufacturer B, working directly with existing analogic
current and voltages
In both substations, the existing clock system with a GPS antenna has been adapted to provide not
only the current IRIG-B signal but also 1 PPS signal compliant with the requirements established in
IEC 61869-9 (6.904.3).

1.2 NCIT: technology in current and voltage IT

The actual solution for the NCIT, and its application on current transformer, uses the Faraday
Effect to measure the current flowing in the line.

Figure 1.- NCIT architecture in Montearenas substation

An accurate temperature measurement is needed for compensating temperature differences

between the NCIT and the merging unit (MU).
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 The advantages found with respect to conventional CTs are:
a) They are compact and light.
b) Easy to install, due to their light weight and the use of long, thin and flexible optical fiber to
the sensor. Immune to electromagnetic emissions, because it consists of optical components.
c) Wide measurement range, due to no magnetic saturation.
d) Improved safety, due to the avoidance of the risk of explosion because of oil inflammation
e) Improved footprint (together with CVT)
The voltage instrument transformers are a pure voltage divider, that feeds the M.U. with a low voltage
value (0-200 V), integrating the M.U. both signals (analogic and digitally calculated form light beam)
providing a time consistent SV message under IEC 61869-9.
The avoidance of electromagnetic part of CVT, provides more simplicity and lowers the risk of
failure. On the other hand, the very high impedance of the signal provided, increased also the safety of
the instrument transformer.

Figure 2.- Schematics of Schematics of high impedance secondary of the non-conventional

voltage transformer
1.3 IEC 61869-9 implementation
The former SV reference standard (IEC 61850-9-2 LE), evolved inside the IEC TC 38 Instrument
transformer, to provide a digital interface for instrument transformers based on IEC 61850. The final
result was the edition 1 of IEC 61869-9 that includes backward compatibility for the UCA
International Group Implementation Guideline for Digital interface to Instrument Transformers Using
IEC 61850-9-2, i.e., IEC 61850-9-2 LE.
The project considered that future process bus architectures will follow IEC 61869-9 for SV´s
implementation.
It was chosen a sample rate of 4800, with 2 ASDUs per frame, what was considered preferred rate for
general measuring and protective applications in the standard, regardless of the power system
frequency, i.e., variant F4800S2I4U4. The intention is checking the interoperability between different
manufacturers of NCIT+MU, SAMU and protection relays, in the expected more widely adopted
variant in the future.
As it has been mentioned above, 1 PPS was chosen for synchronization due to practical reasons when
the project started. PTP solution (IEC 61588:2009) will be considered for future stages, since it is
declared as preferred synchronization method in IEC 61869-9.

4
1.4 Recorder device
Tools in an IEC 61850 environment have to deal with the replacement of physical signals (Binary I/O,
signals from instrument transformers) with GOOSE and Sampled Measured Values transmitted over
Ethernet networks. It is therefore necessary to define clearly where in this hierarchy of abstraction is
the tool’s desired operating environment.
The recorder integrated in Montearenas substation operates mostly in the two upper layers of this
hierarchy; it allows live supervision and triggered recording of the signals transmitted by GOOSE and
SMS, as well as of physical signals connected to its front panel inputs. In this role, it is just a
subscriber to the services, like any other device in the digital substation. However, it provides detailed
inspection of the Real Time Services, both in the timing and in the content of the packages for
performance checking of the SV´s message. During system set-up and adjustment, the device checks
for lost packets, timing errors, changes in quality bits, re-synchronizations, etc. And during normal
operation, the recorder compares the signals from the different Merging Units with the substation’s
analog values from CTs and VTs. In this way, both the quality of the service’s implementation and the
quality and accuracy of the device as a CT or VT (magnitude and phase errors, noise, THD, etc.) are
verified.

2.- FROM THE LABORATORY TO THE FIELD: DIFFERENCES WITH THE PRESENT
PRACTICE AND NEW PARADIGMS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT
2.1 General
The project proposed a goal of assessing the real impact in the TSO processes and practices and in
their technological partners when bringing the process bus solution under IEC 61869-9 from the
laboratory to real facility. Therefore, some issues that implies a wide perspective of the topic are
detailed:
2.2 Engineering at TSO
The process bus engineering implies additional requirements for the installation of digital equipment
in the switchyard, withstanding severe weather and EMC conditions. Special attention has to be paid
to the substation specific weather conditions expected and for the EMC conditions at which outdoor
cabinets will be exposed. It will impact in the lifetime of the equipment, but also in the cost/benefit of
the solution.
Regarding protection and control, IEC 61850 represents a digital transformation in the present solution
used for the last decades. It has been considered three challenges to be taken into account when
implementing a process bus solution in the engineering phase:
a) Stablishing the digital solution includes defining the data network for IEC 61850 data, traffic
management and fault tolerance analysis, whether using or not VLAN for traffic control. The
following decisions were made in these regards:
-It has decided to segment network traffic by VLAN definition for the IEC 61850 services.
- The protection and control devices are required to have 2 different interfaces (ports
implemented, one for SV and the other for Goose services and IEC 61850-8-1 reports.
- Services IEC 61850 without fault tolerance to single fail in the IED 61850 data network.
-IEC 61850 network sharing for IEC 61869-9 and IEC 61850-8-1 services.

5
b) Engineering documentation have to deal with the “new information” that comes from the digital
interface of the process bus implementation, to represent the new architecture. This new information
has to be merged in a consistent way with the present documentation in .dwg format, considering that
the software tools are managing IEC 61850 solution.
For this project, the documentation keeps .dwg format, compatible with the present electrical
information representation. It has been added some additional pages, including information for each
IEDs in its own dedicated pages, comprising:
-Information received/published by IEC 61869-9.
-Information received/published by IEC 61850-1 GOOSE.
-Datasets of information.
-Additional architecture drawing defining IED 61850 data network and another
synchronization network drawing has been included.
c) Field equipment synchronization. It´s needed to provide a very precise synchronization signal over
the field devices, what allows these devices a very accurate reference of the beginning of each second.
The substation GPS provides IRIG-B and 1 PPS signals not only in an optical way but also in an
electrical way when required by the equipment. It is expected, that PTP 1588 will use the same data
network than IEC 61850, and the solution will be simpler.

2.3 Product engineering. SV publishers:

The main differences between the IEC61850-9-2 LE (and the new standard IEC61869-9 are related
with the preferred sample rates. Those modifications from the guideline to the standard imply changes
in the SAMUs and MUs’ processing to adapt the sampling, recalculate new antialiasing and
decimation filters, adapt the frame to allocate the recommended number of ASDUs. And all those
changes impact in the processing delay time.
2.4 Product engineering – Protection relays
The following hints were identified as challenges in the engineering of protection relays for the
project:

a) Feeder Current information processing at the digital substations. The IED at the digital
substation subscribes to the IEC 61869-9 sampled values (SVs) published by a Stand Alone
Merging Unit (SAMU), therefore it must ensure that the current magnitudes and angles
processed in the line differential algorithm have the required accuracy and are sampled at the
appropriate rate. Furthermore, the IED must manage lost SVs as well as avoid tripping in the
event of a false current differential appearing due to a communications / HW failure in the
substation's process bus.

b) Feeder Current Synchronization. In a line differential protection scheme, it is paramount that

feeder current samples at both ends would be perfectly synchronized in order for the line
differential algorithm to determine the existence of a fault within the protected zone. In
conventional line differential schemes there are a number of time propagation related factors
to be considered (channel asymmetry, jitter, channel noise, channel delay, recovery time, etc.)
for a correct time alignment of the samples. In digital substations the IED must also consider

6
 SV propagation time through the process bus LAN for a correct performance of the
differential protection scheme.

c) Network architecture. The network architecture applied in the project is a single star topology,
which was applied to establish communication between the MU/SAMU and the line
protections, having, therefore, a point to multipoint process bus architecture between the
MU/SAMU and the Line Protections.

d) GOOSE messages. In addition to the SVs, with the help of the standard IEC 61850-8-1,
GOOSE (Generic Object-Oriented Substation Event) messages were implemented, to start the
fault record by the trip of one of the protection functions configured in the line protections or
to inform to the recorder.

2.5 Commissioning & testing

Along the installation phase, some aspects were checked to test the right operation of the line
protection. The aspects that were checked along the tests to put in service the protection system were
as follows:

- Loss of the PPS signal at the MU/SAMU.

- Switch-off of the MU/SAMU.
- Switch-off and on of the MU/SAMU.
- Loss of the communication link between the MU/SAMU and the line protections.

Under these circumstances, the protection system was stable. Furthermore, it was checked that the line
differential protection was in blocking mode for any of the previous circumstances.
Conventional line differential testing involves testing IEDs located in two or mode substations which
are separated by a distance which can vary between a few and hundreds of Km, therefore protection
engineers are required at both ends with GPS synched test sets to perform point to point tests.

In order to check the “digital secondaries” for the correct operation, this project used the recorder that
provides a comparison with the conventional analogic signals (previously checked and in service
without problems).

2.6 Operation and difficulties. Tripping and results.

Up to now, the experience based on the 16 months since the commissioning is that there have been 14
faults in the line and the mixed line differential protection scheme has detected the faults in all of the
cases (100% success rate), for both protection relay manufacturers and architectures, having had
operational times with good accuracy.
The protection system has not miss operated in this period, therefore it is assumed that SV publishing
meets the required accuracy and availability; “lost” SVs are correctly dealt with by the IEDs.
Taking one of the faults as a summary and example to show the behavior of the line protections, next
it is shown the fault records of the line protection scheme 1 under a one-phase to ground fault (L3-E
fault) on 14th of January 2017:

7
 Trigger
14/01/2017
4:22:25.586

K1:MPI3p1:I A/ A

0.0

-0.5

-1.0
-0.075 -0.050 -0.025 0.000 0.025 0.050 0.075
t/s

K1:MPI3p1:I B/ A
1.0

0.0

-1.0

-0.075 -0.050 -0.025 0.000 0.025 0.050 0.075

t/s

K1:MPI3p1:I C/ A
2.5

0.0

-2.5

-5.0

-0.075 -0.050 -0.025 0.000 0.025 0.050 0.075

t/s

K1:MPV3p1:V A/ V
50

-50

-100
-0.075 -0.050 -0.025 0.000 0.025 0.050 0.075
t/s

K1:MPV3p1:V B/ V
50

-50

-100
-0.075 -0.050 -0.025 0.000 0.025 0.050 0.075
t/s

K1:MPV3p1:V C/ V
50

-50

-100
-0.075 -0.050 -0.025 0.000 0.025 0.050 0.075
t/s

Ln1:87L:I-DIFF:Pickup:phs A

Ln1:87L:I-DIFF:Pickup:phs B

Ln1:87L:I-DIFF:Pickup:phs C

Ln1:87L:I-DIFF:Operate
:general
Ln1:87L:I-DIFF fast:Pickup
:phs A
Ln1:87L:I-DIFF fast:Pickup
:phs B
Ln1:87L:I-DIFF fast:Pickup
:phs C
Ln1:87L:I-DIFF fast:Operate
:general
Ln1:87L:Remote trip.:Operate
:general
-0.075 -0.050 -0.025 0.000 0.025 0.050 0.075
t/s

Figure 3. Fault Record of IED1 Mudarra under L3-E internal fault

3.- CONCLUSIONS
3.1 Protection relays operation

The differential protection scheme can be accomplished successfully without digitalizing both ends,
and therefore it is expected that future grid digitalization could be deployed step by step.
On the other hand, some practical issues have been arisen. These problems recommend increasing the
attention on them, to solve some problems before considering the future solution equivalent to the
present one.
Based on this pilot project we have considered the following topics for making a comparison with the
present solution, that has proved their robustness and functionality for many years:

8
3.2 Synchronization
Synchronization differences with IEC 61850-9-2 LE has implied some problems when migrating to
IEC 61869-9 with 1 PPS synchronization. Attention has to be paid to the correct implementation of
new requirements regarding SmpSync values in IEC 61869-9. PTP future implementation could solve
most of the problems, regarding the different physical media and connectors needed in the project.
In general, it has been concluded that the implementation of process bus solutions for protection
purposes introduces a new dependency for the correct protection relay performance. The new
architecture is fully dependant on the synchronization signal because the loss of global area clock
(GPS signal) implies the loss of differential protection function, since the protection relay goes to
blocking state after few seconds.
Redundancy on the global time signal (Galileo, Glonass) or high precision clocks utility owned might
be considered.
3.3 Engineering, operation and maintenance in the utility side
The knowledge for implementing the solution and for solving failures during operation is not widely
spread. Even in the manufacturer side, only few very skilful personnel are prepared for solving some
kinds of incidents. There is a gap to be filled in this sense.
Processes that currently are easy to perform when checking and maintaining ITs, control and
protection devices, require now new training on communications and in new applications focused on
process bus. Synchronization topics requires also more understanding and training all over the
organization. The training activity in the utility side will become more and more necessary.
New hardware and software tools are needed and other ones become useless (injection equipment,
testing cables…). Placing the electronic devices in outdoors cabinets in the switchyard, next to the
switchgear, may lead to very difficult maintenance task. Extreme weather conditions, electromagnetic
coupling in laptops ports and cables makes longer these tasks, in areas with more electric risk. Some
additional measures have to be taken to decrease this inconvenience.
The high integration ratio of optical ports and wiring ports in the equipment, decreases the present
ergonomics level at the control cabinets.
There is no standard fiber optic connectors. Many different type of connectors depending on the
standard referred: ST connectors recommended in 61850-9-2 LE, but also allowed MT-RJ in the same
standard. Duplex LC connector recommended in IEC 61869-9. There is no standard connector in the
market for process bus implementation, that makes difficult having spares and testing FO cables for
commissioning and maintenance tasks.
3.4 Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity company´s policies must consider the process bus devices and functionalities, and the
consequences of affecting their functionalities when improving the cybersecurity.
Due to the fact that the process bus solution could be more sensitive to cyberattacks, the complexity
for accessing process bus devices will be increased due to the fact that the continuous upgrading of
antiviruses and cybersecurity applications could lead to blocking the normal performance of software
tools.
It is considered necessary a set of stable hardware and software tools, that will not need regular
upgrading. Only problems about the cybersecurity found in process bus specific applications should
lead to this tool upgrading.

9
 Any mistake in considering the consequences in process bus applications in a cybersecurity policy
change could lead to a lack of accessing and maintaining the “instrument transformer secondaries” that
feed metering, protection and control devices in the future substations.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] IEC 61969-9: 2016 Instrument transformers - Part 9: Digital interface for instrument
transformers
[2] IEC 61850-9-2 LE Implementation guideline for digital interface to instrument Transformers
using IEC 61850-9-2
[3] Kiyoshi KUROSAWA, Kazuomi SHIRAKAWA, Takehiko KIKUCHI: “Development of
Optical Fiber Current Sensors and Their Applications”. 2005 IEEE/PES Transmission and
Distribution Conference & Exhibition: Asia and Pacific; Dalian, China
[4] F.J. Martin, E. Villarreal, J. Figuera, J. Rodriguez, P. Jimenez, J. Cardenas, M. Boucherit, G.
Mikhael, J. Roman, A. Jahr, “Optical current measurement transmission over long distances and
its application for fault discrimination in hybrid (overhead-line + underground cable)
transmission links”. CIGRE 2017.
[5] J. Castellanos, I. Ojanguren, I. Garces, R. Hunt, J. Cardenas, M. Zamalloa, J. Garcia, A.
Gallastegui, M. Yubero, E. Otaola, “IEC61850 9-2 Process Bus: Application in a real
multivendor substation”. CIGRE 2010)

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