TASK 1.

1 (Assessment Criteria P1)

Describe the importance of the study of human factor within the
aerospace industry.
To understand the importance of human factor, at first, we have to understand what is human
factor. Human factor is the science of people at work. It is primarily concerned with
understanding human capabilities, and then applying this knowledge to the design of
equipment’s, tools, system and processes of work. Human factors can use input from many
disciplines and is considered a mixture of engineering and psychology. The field of human factor
can be seen to have four main goals: enhancing safety; reducing errors; enhancing comfort; and
increasing productivity. But in aerospace industry or aviation maintenance, it is referred to as
“the study of human capabilities and limitations in the work space. To optimize the relationship
between maintenance personnel and system with a view to improve safety, efficiency and well-
being.

Why it is important?
In the field of aviation industry, it plays an important role. From takeoff to landing, from
maintenance to assembly, there are some parts that cannot be supervised except by humans. In
this field, a single error can lead to a huge disaster. In this modern world, there are still a lot of
issues that depends on humans. Some of them are: (i)Pilots, (ii)Maintenance crew, (iii) Air
Marshals, (iv) Managing crew.
i. Pilots: - The most important and sensitive field in aerospace industry. A single mistake
from the pilots can lead to huge numbers of deaths. The life of the passengers and
reputation of the company depends on them. Fig 1.1 shows an example.

Mismanagement by the pilots of Asian Flight 214 had led to a great destruction.
ii. Maintenance crew: - The maintenance crew have great responsibility on them. The
simple screw or a slight crack can lead to huge destruction. Fig 1.2 shows an example.
 Boeing Airbus 737 Turkish Airlines had crashed down due to a crack in the wings which
lead to a death toll of around 300 people

iii. Air Marshals: - In the runway, the fate of the huge aircrafts and the passengers inside are
in the hands of the air marshals. If he fails to manage traffic adequately, it might lead to
an unwanted accident. Fig 1.3 shows an example.

Southern Airways Flight 932 faced a crash due to the misguidance of the air marshal.
iv. Managing crew: - They are involved in the foods that are served to the luggage’s that are
shifted. This field requires the most men and the human factors takes place because of
more human involvement. See Fig 1.4.
TASK 1.2 (Assessment Criteria P2)
Aloha Airlines Flight 243 was a scheduled Aloha Airlines flight between Hilo and Honolulu in
Hawaii. On April 28, 1988, a Boeing 737-297 serving the flight suffered extensive damage after
an explosive decompression in flight, but was able to land safely at Kahului Airport on Maui.
There was one fatality, flight attendant Clarabelle Lansing, who was ejected from the airplane.
Another 65 passengers and crew were injured. Despite the substantial damage inflicted by the
decompression, and the loss of one cabin crew member, the safe landing of the aircraft
established the incident as a significant event in the history of aviation, with far-reaching effects
on aviation safety policies and procedures. The aircraft involved was the 152nd Boeing 737
airframe. While the airframe had accumulated 35,496 flight hours prior to the accident, those
hours included over 89,680 flight cycles (take-offs and landings), owing to its use on short
flights. The captain of the flight was 44-year-old Robert Schornstheimer, an experienced pilot
with 8,500 flight hours, 6,700 of which were in Boeing 737s. The first officer was 36-year-old
Madeline Tompkins; who also had significant experience flying the 737, having logged 3,500
of her total 8,000 flight hours in that particular Boeing model.
Flight 243 departed from Hilo International Airport at 13:25 HST on April 28, 1988, with six
crew members and 89 passengers on board, bound for Honolulu. Nothing unusual was noted
during the pre-departure inspection of the aircraft. After a routine take-off and ascent, the aircraft
had reached its normal flight altitude of 24,000 feet (7,300 m), when at around 13:48, about 23
nautical miles (43 km; 26 mi) south-southeast of Kahului on the island of Maui, a small section
on the left side of the roof ruptured with a "whooshing" sound. The captain felt the aircraft roll to
the left and right, and the controls went loose; the first officer noticed pieces of grey insulation
floating above the cabin. The cockpit door had broken away and the captain could see "blue sky
where the first-class ceiling had been." The resulting explosive decompression had torn off a
large section of the roof, consisting of the entire top half of the aircraft skin extending from just
behind the cockpit to the fore-wing area, a length of about 18.5 feet (5.6 m). Thirteen minutes
later, the crew performed an emergency landing on Kahului Airport's Runway 2. Upon landing,
the aircraft's emergency evacuation slides were deployed and passengers quickly evacuated from
the aircraft. A total of 65 people were reported injured, eight of them with serious injuries.
Investigation by the United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) concluded
that the accident was caused by metal fatigue exacerbated by crevice corrosion. The aircraft was
damaged beyond repair and was dismantled on site. Additional damage to the airplane included
damaged and dented horizontal stabilizers, both of which had been struck by flying debris. Some
of the metal debris had also struck the aircraft's vertical stabilizer, causing slight damage. The
leading edges of both wings and both engine cowlings had also sustained damage. The human
factor could be held responsible in this accident in the sense that the quality of inspection and
maintenance programs was deficient. As fuselage examinations were scheduled during the night,
this made it more difficult to carry out an adequate inspection of the aircraft's outer skin. The
National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was
the failure of the Aloha Airlines maintenance program to detect the presence of significant
disbonding and fatigue damage which ultimately led to failure of the lap joint at S-10L and the
separation of the fuselage upper lobe. Contributing to the accident were the failure of Aloha
Airlines management to supervise properly its maintenance force; the failure of the FAA to
require Airworthiness Directive 87-21-08 inspection of all the lap joints proposed by Boeing
Alert Service Bulletin SB 737-53A1039; and the lack of a complete terminating action (neither
generated by Boeing nor required by the FAA) after the discovery of early production difficulties
in the B-737 cold bond lap joint which resulted in low bond durability, corrosion, and premature
fatigue cracking. One board member dissented, arguing that the fatigue cracking was clearly the
probable cause, but that Aloha Airlines maintenance should not be singled out because failures
by the FAA, Boeing, and Aloha Airlines Maintenance each were contributing factors to the
disaster.
British Airways Flight 5390 was a flight from Birmingham Airport in England for Málaga
Airport in Spain that suffered explosive decompression, with no loss of life, shortly after take-off
on 10 June 1990. An improperly installed windscreen panel separated from its frame, causing the
plane's captain to be blown partially out of the aircraft. With the captain pinned against the
window frame for twenty minutes, the first officer landed at Southampton Airport.
The County of South Glamorgan was a BAC One-Eleven Series 528FL jet airliner, registered as
G-BJRT. The captain was 42-year-old Tim Lancaster, who had logged 11,050 flight hours,
including 1,075 hours on the BAC One-eleven; the co-pilot was 39-year-old Alastair Atchison,
with 7,500 flight hours, with 1,100 of them on the BAC One-eleven. The aircraft also carried
four cabin crew and 81 passengers. Atchison handled a routine take-off at 08:20 local time
(07:20 UTC) then handed control to Lancaster as the plane continued to climb. Both pilots
released their shoulder harnesses and Lancaster loosened his lap belt. At 08:33 (07:33 UTC) the
plane had climbed through about 17,300 feet (5,300 m) over Didcot, Oxfordshire, and the cabin
crew were preparing for meal service. Flight attendant Nigel Ogden was entering the cockpit
when there was a loud bang and the cabin quickly filled with condensation. The left windscreen
panel, on Lancaster's side of the flight deck, had separated from the forward fuselage; Lancaster
was propelled out of his seat by the rushing air from the decompression and forced head first out
of the flight deck. His knees were caught on the flight controls and his upper torso remained
outside the aircraft, exposed to extreme wind and cold. The autopilot had disengaged, causing
the plane to descend rapidly. The flight deck door was blown inward onto the control console,
blocking the throttle control (causing the aircraft to gain speed as it descended) and papers and
debris blew into the flight deck from the passenger cabin. Ogden rushed to grab Lancaster's belt,
while the other two flight attendants secured loose objects, reassured passengers, and instructed
them to adopt brace positions in anticipation of an emergency landing.

The plane was not equipped with oxygen for everyone on board, so Atchison began a rapid
emergency descent to reach an altitude with sufficient air pressure. He then re-engaged the
autopilot and broadcast a distress call, but he was unable to hear the response from air traffic
control because of wind noise; the difficulty in establishing two-way communication led to a
delay in initiation of emergency procedures. Ogden, still holding on to Lancaster, was by now
developing frostbite and exhaustion, so chief steward John Heward and flight attendant Simon
Rogers took over the task of holding on to the captain. By this time Lancaster had shifted several
inches further outside and his head was repeatedly striking the side of the fuselage. The crew
believed him to be dead, but Atchison told the others to continue holding onto him, out of fear
that letting go of him might cause him to strike the left wing, engine, or horizontal stabiliser,
potentially damaging it. Eventually, Atchison was able to hear the clearance from air traffic
control to make an emergency landing at Southampton Airport. The flight attendants managed to
free Lancaster's ankles from the flight controls while still keeping hold of him. At 08:55 local
time (07:55 UTC), the aircraft landed at Southampton and the passengers disembarked using
boarding steps. Lancaster survived with frostbite, bruising, shock, and fractures to his right
arm, left thumb and right wrist. Ogden dislocated his shoulder and had frostbite on his face, with
damage to one eye. There were no other major injuries.
The human factor in this incident was gravely responsible as investigators found that when
the windscreen was installed 27 hours before the flight, 84 of the bolts used were 0.026 inches
(0.66 mm) too small in diameter (British Standards A211-8C vs A211-8D, which are #8-32 vs
#10-32 by the Unified Thread Standard) and the remaining six were A211-7D, which is the
correct diameter but 0.1 inches (2.5 mm) too short (0.7 inch vs. 0.8 inch). The previous
windscreen had also been fitted using incorrect bolts, which were replaced by the shift
maintenance manager on a like-for-like basis without reference to maintenance documentation,
as the plane was due to depart shortly. The undersized bolts were unable to withstand the air
pressure difference between the cabin and the outside atmosphere during flight. (The windscreen
was not of the "plug" type – fitted from the inside so that cabin pressure helps to hold it in place
– but of the type fitted from the outside so that cabin pressure tends to dislodge it.) Investigators
found that the shift maintenance manager responsible for installing the incorrect bolts had failed
to follow British Airways policies. They recommended that the CAA recognise the need for
aircraft engineering personnel to wear corrective glasses if prescribed. They also faulted the
policies themselves, which should have required testing or verification by another individual for
this critical task. Finally, they found the local Birmingham Airport management responsible for
not directly monitoring the shift maintenance manager's working practices.

TASK 1.3 (Assessment Criteria P7)

Describe the workplace factors that can affect human performance.
In every certain place, the workplace plays an important role. The place should be suitable for
every required situation. The place should have enough light so that small details can be seen.
The place should be quiet and decent. Sound disturbs the human brain and prevents them from
concentrating. The workplace should be clean. Hygiene is very important because in the aviation
industry, hundreds of thousands of people collide or appear in the same place, so hygiene is a
really necessary need. The required instrument should always be provided, cause lack of
important stuffs lacks the quality of work. When there are not enough tools, people use shortcuts
and there starts the decrease of human performance. So for high performance, the work place
should fulfill these.
TASK 1.4 (Assessment Criteria P8)
Identify conditions in the working environment that could lead to
mistakes being made,
There are two main conditions, first is the light and second is sound. The first thing leads to the
phase when an engineer is working in the hanger in the morning with sufficient light, but at the
same time, a person when working at night might not notice various things due to insufficient
light. Slight crack in the frame, small marks in the window, can lead to a huge disaster. The
second point is also a really effective thing to take in concern. An unusual sound can distract the
concentration of the person working. Suppose, if there is a loud sound, the pilot might not notice
the sound of the alarm going out for the low speed or the cracking sound of the turbo engine.