G.R. No.

200877               November 12, 2014 When arraigned, appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to both charges.6 Pre-trial was conducted.
Trial on the merits followed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. The prosecution presented two witnesses, namely: Police Officer 3 Arturo B. Lawas, Jr. (PO3
CHARVE JOHN LAGAHIT, Accused-Appellant. Lawas, Jr.), the arresting officer assigned at Station 4 of the Mabolo Police Station; and
Police Senior Inspector Mutchit Salinas (P/S. Insp. Salinas), Forensic Chemical Officer,
DECISION Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional Crime Laboratory Office 7, Camp Sotero Cabahug,
Gorordo Ave., Cebu City. The testimony,however, of this forensic chemist was later on
dispensed with per agreement of the parties.7
PEREZ, J.:

The prosecution presented its case as follows:

On appeal is the Decision1 dated 17 March 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR
HC. No. 000867 affirming the Decision2 dated 21June2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Cebu City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case Nos. CBU-67096 and CBU-67097 finding herein Based on the reports of some teachers of BarangayLahug Elementary School in Cebu City,
appellant Charve John Lagahit guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 (Illegal and on the information gathered by the trusted informant who is a resident of the place,
Sale of Dangerous Drugs) and 11 (Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II of regarding the illegal sale of dangerous drugs in the area and that the appellant was among
Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of the perpetrators, PO3 Lawas, Jr., being the community cop of Barangay Lahug, Cebu City,
2002." together with two barangay tanod, namely: Celso Nicor (Nicor) and Reuben Laping, was
instructed to closely monitor the said illegal activities. PO3 Lawas, Jr. then conducted
surveillance. As a result, PO3 Lawas, Jr. confirmed that, indeed, the appellant plies his illegal
Two separate Informations,3 both dated 1 September 2003, were filed against appellant for
drug trade in Barangay Lahug, particularly near the stairway of the flyover, which is also in
violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, for allegedly (a) selling 0.49
close proximity to the barangayhall. Worse, most of his clients are the students of the night
gram of marijuana; and (b) being in illegal possession of 0.88 gram of marijuana.
high school of the said barangay.8
The offense involved in CriminalCase No. CBU-67096 for violation of Section 5, Article II of
A week after the surveillance, oron 29 August 2003, at around 8:45 p.m., PO3 Lawas, Jr.
RepublicAct No. 9165, was allegedly committed as follows:
formed a buy-bust team to conduct a buy-bust operation against the appellant. PO3 Lawas,
Jr., the team leader, designated his trusted informant to act as the poseur-buyer while he and
That on or about the 29th day of August, 2003, at about 8:45 P.M., in the City of Cebu, the two barangay tanodwere to serve as back-ups. A ₱20.00 peso bill buy-bust money with
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said [herein appellant], markings "ABL," representing the initials of PO3 Lawas, Jr., was given to the trusted
with deliberate intent, and without authority of law, did then and there sell, deliver or give informant. The buy-bust team agreed to the prearranged signal that the trusted informant will
away to a poseur-buyer: take off his bull cap upon consummation of the sale transaction.Thereafter, the buy-bust team
proceeded to the target area of its buy-bust operation, i.e., near the stairway of the flyover
Four (4) sticks of handrolled marijuanacigarette[s] having a total net weight 0.49 gram that is close to the barangay hall of Barangay Lahug.9

x x x, a dangerous drug/s.4 (Emphasis supplied). At the target area, PO3 Lawas, Jr. and the two barangay tanod positioned themselves on the
oppositeside of the road near the barangay hall. On the other hand, the trusted informant,
On the other hand, the Information pertaining to Criminal Case No. CBU-67097 for violation who is the designated poseurbuyer, immediately approached the appellant upon seeing the
of Section 11, Article II of the same law, reads: latter. The trusted informant handed the ₱20.00 peso bill marked money to the appellant and
the latter, in turn, gave four sticksof handrolled marijuana cigarettes to the former. From his
That on or about the 29th day of August 2003, at about 8:45 P.M., in the City of Cebu, position, PO3 Lawas, Jr. can vividly see the ongoing sale transaction between the trusted
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said [appellant], with informant and the appellant, as there was a lamppost of the Visayan Electric Company
deliberate intent, did then and there have in [his] possession and under [his] control the (VECO) one meter away right below the flyover of Barangay Lahug. Upon the consummation
following: B- Eight (8) sticks of handrolled marijuanacigarette[s] having total net weight of of the sale, the trusted informant executed at once their prearranged signal by taking off his
0.88 gram: a dangerous drug, without being authorized by law.5 (Emphasis supplied). bull cap. Without ado, PO3 Lawas, Jr. and the two barangay tanod crossed the road to
apprehend the appellant. But, before they could do so, another person approached the
appellant and walked with him towards the opposite side of the road. Nonetheless, PO3
Lawas, Jr. and the two barangay tanodfollowed them until they apprehended the appellant. The four hand rolled marijuana sticks in CBU-67096 and the eight rolled marijuanasticks in
Appellant’s companion, on the other hand, managed to escape. After the appellant was CBU-67097 are herebyconfiscated in favor of the government and destroyed pursuant to law.
handcuffed, PO3 Lawas, Jr. recovered from the pocket of the former eight more sticks of
handrolled marijuana cigarettes. The ₱20.00 peso bill marked money and the cash money With cost against the [appellant].14
amounting to ₱90.00, consisting of three pieces₱20.00 peso bills and six pieces ₱5.00 peso
coins, believed to be proceeds of appellant’s illegal activities, were also recovered from the The trial court found that the elements for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of
latter’s possession.10 marijuana were sufficiently established by the evidence of the prosecution beyond reasonable
doubt. The trial court held that appellant’s weak testimony cannotprevail over the straight
The appellant was, thereafter, brought to the barangay hall and was later transferred to the forward, frank, and honest testimony ofPO3 Lawas, Jr., a police officer, who was just doing
Mabolo Police Station. All the seized items remained with PO3 Lawas, Jr. until they reached his duty. In the same manner, the trial court stated that PO3 Lawas, Jr. and the two barangay
the police station. Upon arrival thereat, Barangay Tanod Nicor marked the four sticks of tanod, who participated in the buy-bust operation, were properly performing their duties
handrolled marijuana cigarettes, which were the subjectof the sale transaction, with BBCJLR asthey were not inspired by any improper motive.
08292003. While the other eight sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes, which were
recovered from the possession of the appellant during his arrest, were marked by PO3 On appeal,15 the Court of Appeals, inits Decision dated 17 March 2011, affirmed the guilty
Lawas, Jr. with CJLR-08292003-18. Afterwards, all the marked pieces of evidence, together verdict and the sentence imposed by the trial court.
with a Request for Laboratory Examination of the same, were brought by PO3 Lawas, Jr. to
the PNP Crime Laboratory, where P/S. Insp. Salinas, the forensic chemist, conducted
qualitative examination on the specimens.11 Per Chemistry Report No. D-1561-2003 dated 30 Hence, the instant recourse raising this lone assignment of error:
August 2003, all specimens yielded positive result for the presence of marijuana, a
dangerous drug.12 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE [HEREIN APPELLANT] OF THE
CRIMES CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT
To counter the evidence of the prosecution, the defense presented the lone testimony of the BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.16
appellant, who interposed denial and suggested a frame-up for his exculpation.
Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove the identity of the corpus delictias its
Appellant claimed that on 29 August 2003, at around 8:45 p.m., he was beside the sole witness never testified as to how he was able to recover the four sticks of handrolled
barangayhall of Barangay Lahug waiting for his friend named Roy, a driver of a public utility marijuana cigarettes, which are the corpus delictiof the crime of illegal sale of marijuana from
vehicle, as he would clean the vehicle of the former. However, he was not able to do so as the possession of the poseur-buyer. This failure leaves lingering doubt if indeed the
three men went near him and arrested him for no apparent reason. As he tried to resist the marijuana was sold by the appellant to the poseur-buyer. Appellant posits that the four sticks
arrest, one of the men poked a Magnum .357 at the back of his head. He was then brought to of hand rolled marijuana cigarettes submitted by the prosecution could be objects totally
the barangayhall of BarangayLahug, where the arresting officers told him that they had found different from that which was allegedly, or was not that which was actually seized during the
something, which looks like a cigarette, inside his pocket. He, in turn, told the arresting buy-bust operation. Appellant further argues that there was non-compliance with the
officers that those were not his. Thereafter, he was transferred to the Mabolo Police Station, requirements set forth in Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, i.e., the physical
where he first knew the two charges filed against him.13 inventory and the taking of photographs of the seized items.

After hearing both parties, the trial court rendered a Decision dated 21 June 2007, finding the Appellant also believes that the non-presentation of the police officers who conducted the
appellant guilty of the offenses charged. The dispositive portion of its decision reads: inquest proceedings and marked the seized drugs is fatal to the prosecution’s case as a
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding [herein appellant] CHARVE JOHN crucial link in the chain of custody of the illegal drugs was not established by such omission.
LAGAHIT GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 5, Article II,
[Republic Act No. 9165] and sentences him to LIFE IMPRISONMENT, plus fine in the amount Simply put, the issue for resolution is whether there is sufficient evidence to establish
of Three Hundred Thousand (₱300,000.00) Pesos; and [i]n CBU-67097, the court also finds appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. NO
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 11, Article II,
[Republic Act No. 9165], and sentences him to a penalty of imprisonment of TWELVE (12) This Court rules in the negative.
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY, as minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS, as maximum, plus fine in
the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (₱200,000.00) Pesos. The right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty is guaranteed under
Section 14(2), Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. This fundamental
right of the accused is also embodied under Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
Court,17 which specifically states that "in a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.
acquittal, unless his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute A careful perusal of the records shows that while the identities of the seller and the buyer and
certainty. Only moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction the consummation of the transaction involving the sale of illegal drug on 29 August 2003 have
in an unprejudiced mind." been proven by the prosecution through the testimony of PO3 Lawas, Jr.,this Court,
nonetheless, finds the prosecution evidence to be deficient for failure to adequately show the
Time and again, this Court held that in every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, essential links in the chain of custody, particularly how the four sticks of handrolled marijuana
like marijuana, the following essential elements must be duly established: (1) the identities of cigarettes subject of the saletransaction came into the hands of PO3 Lawas, Jr. from the
the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold trusted informant, who was the designated poseur-buyer.
and the payment for it.18 Similarly, it is essential that the transaction or sale be proved to have
actually taken place coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti, that To note, after the exchange of the buy-bust money and the four sticks of handrolled
is, the actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged.19 marijuanacigarettes between the trusted informant and the appellant, the former gave the
pre-arranged signal to PO3 Lawas, Jr. and the two barangay tanodby taking off his bull cap.
On the other hand, to successfully prosecute a case of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, Immediately, thereafter, PO3 Lawas, Jr. and the two barangay tanod, who were positioned on
the following elements must be established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or the opposite side of the street, moved towards the other side, where the appellant and the
object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession isnot authorized by law; trusted informant were, in order to apprehend the former. But, before they could do so,
and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.20 another person already approached the appellant and walked with him towards the opposite
side of the road. PO3 Lawas, Jr. and the two barangay tanodthen followed them until
The prohibited drug is an integral part of the corpus delictiof the crimes of illegal sale and theyapprehended the appellant and whose companion managed to escape. PO3 Lawas, Jr.
illegal possession of dangerous drugs; proof of its identity, existence, and presentation in handcuffed the appellant and bodily searched him leading to the recovery of the following: (1)
court is crucial. A conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity eight more sticks of handrolled marijuanacigarettes from the latter’s pocket; (2) ₱20.00 peso
of the drug. The identity of the prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart bill marked money; and (3) cash money amounting to ₱90.00, believed to be proceeds ofhis
from showing that the elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that the substance illegal activities. Thereafter, the appellant was brought to the barangay hall and was later
illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit transferred to the Mabolo Police Station. All the seized items remained with PO3 Lawas, Jr.
must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a until they reached the police station. Upon arrival thereat, Barangay Tanod Nicor marked the
guilty verdict.21 The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that four sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes subject of the sale transaction, while the other
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.22 eight sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes recovered from the possession ofthe appellant
during his arrest were marked by PO3 Lawas, Jr. These marked pieces of evidence, together
with a Request for Laboratory Examination of the same, were brought by PO3 Lawas, Jr. to
Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, that implements
the PNP Crime Laboratory.26 The qualitative examination conducted on the specimens
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, defines "chain of custody" as follows:
yielded positive result for marijuana, a dangerous drug.27
"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
From the foregoing set of facts, there was no mention how the four sticks of handrolled
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of
marijuana cigarettes, which were the subject of the sale transaction, came into the hands
each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
ofPO3 Lawas, Jr. from the trusted informant. PO3 Lawas, Jr.’s testimony was lacking as
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody
towhen, where and how the said four sticks of handrolled marijuanacigarettes sold by the
of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary
appellant to the trusted informant were turned over to him by the latter. In the same manner,
custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the
PO3 Lawas,Jr. failed to state that he actually seized the sold four sticks of handrolled
course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.23
marijuanacigarettes. Considering that PO3 Lawas, Jr. was not the poseur-buyer and he was
not even with the poseur buyer during the sale transaction as he was on the opposite side of
In People v. Gatlabayan24 citing People v. Kamad,25 this Court enumerated the links that the the road, the turning over to him by the trusted informant of the four sticks of handrolled
prosecution must establish in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation to be as follows: marijuana cigarettes sold by the appellant was the supposed first link in the chain of custody.
first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to establish the same. This Court cannot overlook this
the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending evidentiary gap as it involves the identification of the sold four sticks of handrolled marijuana
officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal cigarettes. In the absence of the aforesaid link in the chain of custody, doubt arises if, indeed,
the recovered four sticks of handrolled marijuanacigarettes that PO3 Lawas, Jr. brought to the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers/team, shall not render
the barangayhall and then to the Mabolo Police Station; subsequently marked by Barangay void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis supplied).
TanodNicor; later brought to the crime laboratory; and examined by the forensic chemist,
which yielded positive for marijuana, were the same drugs actually sold by the appellant to In the present case, the records are bereft of any indication that would show that the
the trusted informant. prosecution was able to establish the apprehending team’s compliance with the above
procedural safeguards. The records similarly do not contain any physical inventory report or
Given the foregoing circumstances, it is beyond any cavil of doubt that the prosecution photograph of the confiscated items. Even the lone prosecution witness never stated in his
miserably failed to specifically identify the four sticks of handrolled marijuana cigarettes that testimony that he or any member of the buy-bust team had conducted a physical inventory or
were actually sold at the buy-bust as among those that were presented in court. This taken pictures of the items. Although PO3 Lawas, Jr. testified that the seized drugs subject of
evidentiary situation effectively translates to the absence of proof of corpus delicti, and cannot the illegal possession case had been marked, nowhere can it be found that the marking
but lead this Court to conclude that no valid conviction for the crime of illegal sale of thereof was done in the presence of the appellant or any of the above-mentioned third-party
marijuanacan result.28 representatives.1âwphi1

Now, going to the crime of illegal possession of marijuana, there is also no doubt that the While this Court recognizes that non-compliance by the buy-bust team with Section 21 of
prosecution was able to fully satisfy all the elements of the crime. The prosecution, however, Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal as long as there is a justifiable ground therefor, for and as
failed to show that the apprehending team complied with the required procedure for the longas the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
custody and disposition of confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs set forth the apprehending team, these conditions, however, were not met in the present
in Section 21, ArticleII of Republic Act No. 9165. case.30 Despite of all the aforesaid major lapses, the prosecution neither offered any
explanation why the procedure was not followed nor mentioned any justifiable ground for
The procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized and/or surrendered failing to observe the rule. In People v. Ancheta,31 this Court pronounced that when there is
dangerous drugs, among others, is provided under Section 21(a), paragraph 1, ArticleII of gross disregard of the procedural safeguards set forth in Republic Act No. 9165, serious
Republic Act No. 9165, thus: uncertainty is generated as to the identity of the seized items that the prosecution presented
in evidence. Such doubt cannot beremedied by merely invoking the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties for a gross, systematic, or deliberate disregard of the
(a) The apprehending team having initialcustody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
procedural safeguards effectively produces an irregularity in the performance of official
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
duties.32 Also in People v. Ancheta,this Court explained that:
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the Indeed, it is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items that is
inventory and be given a copy thereof. (Emphasis supplied). of utmost importance in determining the admissibility of the evidence presented in court,
especially in cases of buybust operations. That is why Congress saw fit to fashion a detailed
procedure in order to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items
The specific procedures relating to the seizure and custody of drugs have been laid down
would not be compromised. The marking of the seized items was only a piece in a detailed
under the Implementing Rules and Regulations for Republic Act No. 9165, particularly
set of procedural safeguards embodied in [Republic Act No. 9165]. If the arresting officers
Section 21(a), Article II thereof, and it is the prosecution’s burden to adduce evidence that
were unable to comply with the other requirements, they were under obligation to explain why
these procedures have been complied with in proving the elements of the offense. 29 The said
the procedure was not followed and prove that the reason provided a justifiable ground.
Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165
Otherwise, the requisites under the law would merely be fancy ornaments that may or may
reads:
not be disregarded by the arresting officers at their own convenience.33 (Emphasis supplied).
(a) The apprehending team having initialcustody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
In view of the foregoing, serious doubt exists whether the drugs subject of the illegal
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence
possession case presented in court were the same as those recovered from the appellant.
of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
Thus, the prosecution likewise failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
corpus delictiin the crime of illegal possession of marijuana.
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies ofthe
inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, further that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and uncorroborated. This, however, cannot
be used to advance the cause of the prosecution as the evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Joint Decision 1 of the Court of
the defense. Moreover, when the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25983, affirming with modification the decision of the
this case, such that one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Cases Nos. 2750-M-94, 2751-M-
other is compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must 94 and 2807-M-94 for estafa.
acquit.34
As synthesized by the appellate court, the antecedents are as follows:
It is truly distressing how courtsare constrained to make acquittals, dismissals, or reversals by
reason of the inadvertent failure of the arresting officers and the prosecution to establish In September 1994, three separate Criminal Informations charging Joy Lee Recuerdo of
compliance or justify noncompliance with a statutory procedure. It is even more troubling Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code involving 18 worthless
when those cases involve apparently known or long-suspected drug pushers. Congress was bank checks were simultaneously filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan,
clear in its declaration on the eradication of the drug menace plaguing our country. Yet, also the accusatory portions of which read, thus:
firm and stringent is its mandate to observe the legal safeguards provided for under Republic
Act No. 9165. This is the reason why this Court has emphasized countless times that courts A. Six (6) Unitrust Checks
must remain vigilant in their disposition of cases related to dangerous drugs. Also, this Court
has already called on the police, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, and the
prosecution to reinforce and review the conduct of buy-bust operations and the presentation Crim. Case No. 2750-M-94
of evidence.35
"That sometime in the second week of December, 1993, in the municipality of Meycauayan,
All told, the prosecution failed to establish the element of corpus delicti with the prescribed province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
degree of proof required for successful prosecution of both sale and possession of prohibited accused Joy Lee Recuerdo, with intent to gain and by means of deceit, false pretenses and
drugs, thus, no valid conviction for the crimes charged can result. fraudulent manifestations, and pretending to have sufficient funds with the Unitrust, Makati
Commercial Center Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare,
draw, make and issue the following postdated checks, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 March 2011 in CA-
G.R. CEB-CR HC. No. 000867, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant CHARVE
JOHN LAGAHIT is hereby ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt, and is ordered to be Check No Date Amount
immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause.
014355 April 5, 1994 ₱22,000.00
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau or Corrections, Muntinlupa
014356 May 5, 1994 22,000.00
City, for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to
report to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision the action he has taken. 014357 June 5, 1994 22,000.00
Copies shall also be furnished the Director General, Philippine National Police, and the
Director General, Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, for their information. 014358 July 5, 1994 22,000.00

SO ORDERED. 014359 August 5, 1994 22,000.00

014360 September 5, 1994 22,000.00

G.R. No. 168217             June 27, 2006

JOY LEE RECUERDO, Petitioner, with the total amount of P132,000.00 drawn against the said bank, and deliver the said
vs. checks to the complaining witness Yolanda G. Floro as payment for pieces of jewelry she
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. obtained from the said complainant, knowing fully well at the time the checks were issued that
her representations were false for she had no sufficient funds in the said bank, so much that
upon presentment of the said checks with the said bank for encashment, the same were
DECISION dishonored and refused payment for having been drawn against an "Account Closed", and
inspite of repeated demands to deposit with the said bank the amount of P132,000.00, the
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
said accused failed and refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the said Yolanda G. That on or about the 7th day of February, 1994, in the municipality of Meycauayan, province
Floro in the said amount of P132,000.00. of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
Joy Lee Recuerdo, with intent of gain and by means of deceit, false pretenses and fraudulent
Contrary to law." manifestations, and pretending to have sufficient funds with the Prudential Bank, Legaspi
Village Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare, draw, make
and issue the following postdated checks, to wit:
B. Six (6) PCI Bank Checks

Crim. Case No. 2807-M-94 Check No. Date Amount

"That sometime in the second week of December 1993, in the municipality of Meycauayan, 0011783 March 13, 1994 P100,000.00
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said 0011784 April 13, 1994 100,000.00
accused Joy Lee Recuerdo, with intent of gain and by means of deceit, false pretenses and
fraudulent manifestations, and pretending to have sufficient funds with the PCI Bank, Makati- 0011785 May 13, 1994 100,000.00
De La Rosa Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare, draw,
make and issue the following postdated checks, to wit: 0011786 June 13, 1994 100,000.00

0011787 July 13, 1994 100,000.00

Check No. Date Amount
0011788 August 13, 1994 100,000.00
053051982A March 28, 1994 ₱13,000.00

053051983A April 28, 1994 13,000.00 with the total amount of P600,000.00 drawn against the said bank, and deliver the said
checks to the complainant witness Yolanda G. Floro as payment for pieces of jewelry she
053051984A May 28, 1994 13,000.00 obtained from the said complainant, knowing fully well at the time the checks were issued that
her representations were false for she had no sufficient funds in the said bank, so much that
053051985A June 28, 1994 13,000.00 upon presentment of the said checks with the said bank for encashment, the same were
053051986A July 28, 1994 13,000.00 dishonored and refused payment for having been drawn against an "Account Closed", and
inspite of repeated demands to deposit with the said bank the amount of P600,000.00, the
053051987A August 28, 1994 13,000.00 said accused failed and refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the said Yolanda G.
Floro in the said amount of P600,000.00

with the total amount of P78,000.00 drawn against the said bank, and deliver the said checks Contrary to law."
to the complaining witness Yolanda G. Floro as payment for pieces of jewelry she obtained
from the said complainant, knowing fully well at the time the checks were issued that her
Evidence adduced by the Prosecution tend to establish that herein private respondent
representations were false for she had no sufficient funds in the said bank, so much that upon
Yolanda G. Floro is engaged in the business of buying and selling of jewelry since 1985. She
presentment of the said checks with the said bank for encashment, the same were
regularly conducts business at her residence located at No. 51 Interior, Poblacion,
dishonored and refused payment for having been drawn against an "Account Closed", and
Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, though, it was Floro who would personally visit her
inspite of repeated demands to deposit with the said bank the amount of P78,000.00, the said
customers to show and offer them the pieces of jewelry. Herein accused-appellant/petitioner
accused failed and refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the said Yolanda G.
Joy Lee Recuerdo, on the other hand, a dentist by profession, who was introduced to Floro
Floro in the said amount of P78,000.00.
by the latter’s cousin Aimee Aoro in the first week of December 1993, became her customer.
Sometime in the second week of December 1993, at around 7:30 in the evening, Recuerdo
Contrary to law. went to the house of Floro in Meycauayan, Bulacan and purchased from her two pieces of
jewelry, to wit: a 2.19 carat diamond round stone in white gold setting worth P220,000.00
C. Six (6) Prudential Bank Checks pesos, and one piece of loose 1.55 karat marquez diamond with a value of P130,000.00
pesos.
Criminal Case No. 2751-M-94
For the 2.19 carat diamond stone, accused issued and delivered to the complainant then and and delivered to Floro simultaneous to the purchase of the pieces of jewelry, but only several
there ten post-dated checks each in the amount of P22,000.00 drawn against Unitrust days thereafter, when she had already thoroughly examined the jewelry and is fully satisfied
Development Bank, Makati Commercial Center Branch. Only six (6) postdated checks, to wit: of its fine quality (TSN, Joy Lee Recuerdo, January 16, 1996, pp. 3-18).2
Checks Nos. 014356, 014357, 014358, 014359 and 014360 are subject of Criminal Case No.
2750-M-94. For the 1.55 carat marquez loose diamond, accused issued and delivered to On July 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a Joint Decision convicting petitioner Joy Lee
complainant then and there ten (10) postdated checks, each in the amount of P13,000.00 Recuerdo of two counts of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal
drawn against PCI Bank, Makati, Dela Rosa Branch. Six of those checks are subject of Code. The fallo of the decision reads:
Criminal Case No. 2807-M-94, to wit: Checks Nos. 053051983A, 053051984A, 053051985A,
053051986A and 053051987A, subject matter of Crim. Case No. 2751-M-94. WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused JOY LEE RECUERDO GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315, par.
In yet another transaction that transpired in the early evening of February 7, 1994, Recuerdo 2[b] (sic) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences her as follows:
once again proceeded at Floro’s house in Meycauayan, Bulacan and bought another set of
jewelry, this time a pair of diamond earrings worth P768,000.00 pesos. She was given seven 1. In Criminal Case Nos. 2750-M-94 and 2807-M-94, to suffer an indeterminate
(7) postdated checks one for P168,000.00 as downpayment and another six (6) postdated penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prison
checks drawn against Prudential Bank, Legaspi Village, Makati Branch, each for P100,000.00 correccional as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day reclusion temporal as
representing the balance in the aggregate amount of P600,000.00 pesos (Checks Nos. maximum and to pay Yolanda Floro by way of civil indemnity the amount
100783, 01184, 01185, 011786, 011787 and 011788, Record, Criminal Case No. 2750-M-94, of P210,000.00 pesos plus interest from the filing of the information until fully paid;
pp. 138-150) subject matter of Crim. Case No. 2751-M-94. and

Floro deposited the aforementioned checks at Liberty Savings & Loan Association, 2. In Criminal Case No. 2751-M-94, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
Meyc[a]uayan, Bulacan. Upon presentment for encashment by said depositary bank with the imprisonment ranging from six (6) minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
different drawee banks on their respective maturity dates, the six (6) Prudential Bank checks reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay Yolanda Floro by way of civil indemnity
were all dishonored for having been drawn against closed accounts. With her pieces of the amount of P600,000.00 pesos plus interest from the filing of the information until
jewelry still unpaid, Floro, through counsel, made formal demands requiring Requerdo to pay fully paid.
the amounts represented by the dishonored checks (Record, supra, pp. 123, 138, and 151).
Floro’s efforts to obtain payment, though, only proved futile as Requerdo continuously
refused to pay the value of the purchased pieces of jewelry. In both cases, accused shall pay the costs of the suit.

Upon her arraignment on March 1, 1995 in Criminal Case No. 2807-M-94, and on April 4, SO ORDERED.3
1995 in Criminal Case Nos. 2750-M-94 and 2751-M-94, Recuerdo, with the assistance of
counsel, pleaded not guilty. (Record, Criminal Case No. 2807-M-94, p. 40; Criminal Case No. Petitioner appealed the decision to the CA on the following assignment of errors:
2750-M-94, p. 58). Considering the identity of the parties concerned, and the nature of the
transactions from which the charges of Estafa trace its roots, the three criminal cases were I.
consolidated. Joint trial then ensured. Recuerdo, on separate dates, posted three Personal
Bail Bonds to obtain provisional liberty (Record, Criminal Case No. 2750-M-94, p. 21; 2807- The Regional Trial Court erred in finding that the Municipal Trial Court, Meycauayan,
M-94, p. 27; 2751-M-94, p. 17). Bulacan, Branch I did not pass upon the merits of the criminal cases filed against the
petitioner by confining and limiting itself merely to the dispositive portion of the Joint
By way of defense, Recuerdo posited the theory that the trial court of Malolos, Bulacan is Decision dated 28 January 1998 rendered by the latter court, instead of reading the
devoid of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the criminal cases against her, insisting that all the Joint Decision as a whole to get its true meaning and intent.
essential elements of the crime of Estafa involving the bad checks occurred at the City of
Makati, in that, all her business transactions with Floro, to wit; the purchase of the pieces of II.
jewelry and the subsequent issuance of and delivery of the subject bank checks in payment
thereof which eventually bounced, all took place and were executed at her Dental Clinic
The Regional Trial Court erred in affirming the judgment of conviction rendered by
located at the Medical Towers at Suite 306, Herrera corner Ormaza Streets Legaspi Village
the Municipal Trial Court, Meycauayan, Bulacan, Branch II which is in derogation of
Makati City. Furthermore, Recuerdo argued that her act of issuing the dishonored checks
the petitioner’s right against double jeopardy considering that the latter was
does not constitute the offense of Estafa considering that the subject checks were not issued
 previously acquitted of the same criminal cases by the Municipal Trial Court of C. THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN CONJUNCTION WITH
Meycauayan, Bulacan, Branch I. THE ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE WHICH HOLDS THAT WHEN FACED WITH TWO
PROBABILITIES, ONE CONSISTENT WITH GUILT AND THE OTHER WITH INNOCENCE,
III. THE SCALES OF JUSTICE SHOULD TILT IN FAVOR OF INNOCENCE.

The Regional Trial Court erred in finding that all proceedings in the court a quo have D. THE APPLICABLE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT WHICH DIRECTS THAT IN
been made in the presence and with the authority of the public prosecutor, in the face ESTAFA CASES, IT IS OF PRIMORDIAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE PROSECUTION TO
of the undisputed fact that the appeal initiated by the private respondent is fatally PROVE THE EXACT DATE OF THE TRANSACTION AND THE EXACT DATE OF THE
defective because it was filed without the concurrence, permission and authority of ISSUANCE OF THE CHECKS.6
the public prosecutor, in this case, the provincial prosecutor of Bulacan.4
Petitioner avers that she acted in good faith and exerted her utmost efforts to confer with the
Petitioner averred that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged because private complainant to settle her obligations. She points out that she made monthly cash
the crimes were committed in Makati City and not in Malolos, Bulacan where the Informations payments to lessen her civil liability and later on, for convenience, deposited the monthly
were filed. The prosecution failed to prove the essential element of deceit because she drew payments at the private complainant’s bank account with the Bank of the Philippine Islands.
and delivered the postdated checks to the private complainant after the jewelries had been She continued to make payments even during the pendency of the case in the CA, and
delivered. Moreover, she was denied the right to due process. continues to make deposits to private complainant’s bank account.

On August 23, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming with modification the decision of the Petitioner asserts that her efforts to settle her civil obligations to the private complainant
RTC as to the penalty meted on the appellant. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration indicate that she has no intention of duping the latter, as well as the absence of deceit on her
insisting that based on the evidence on record, out of the 17 subject checks, nine were part. That she failed to comply with her obligations by failing to make good the checks as they
honored by the drawee banks. Moreover, she made partial payments of the amounts of the fell due does not suggest deceit, but at best only financial hardship in fulfilling her civil
subject checks while the case was pending in the CA. Contrary to the finding of the trial court obligations. Thus, there is no factual and legal basis to convict her of estafa. Petitioner insists
and the appellate courts that she acted with deceit when she drew and delivered the checks that criminal intent in embezzlement is not based on technical mistakes as to the legal effect
in payment of the pieces of jewelry she purchased from the private complainant, she in fact of a transaction honestly entered into, and there can be no embezzlement if the mind of the
acted in good faith; hence, should be acquitted based on the decision of this Court in People person doing the act is innocent or if there is no wrongful purpose.
v. Ojeda.5 The CA denied the motion on May 20, 2005.
Petitioner further avers that she should be benefited by the Court’s ruling in People v.
Petitioner filed the instant petition contending that: Ojeda,7 considering that the facts therein are parallel if not almost identical to this case, the
only difference being that, in the Ojeda case, the accused-appellant was able to fully settle
her civil obligations. Petitioner points out that she is still paying her obligations to the private
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE CASE CONVICTING THE PETITIONER IN
complainant and further argues that:
A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH –

[i]n Criminal Case No. 2750-M-94, the petitioner issued ten (10) postdated Unitrust
A. THE BENEFICENT RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT ENUNCIATED IN PEOPLE OF
Development Bank checks to the private complainant for the purchase of a 2.19 carat
THE PHILIPPINES V. CORA ABELLA OJEDA (G.R. NOS. 104238-58, JUNE 3, 2004)
diamond stone in white gold setting. Out of the ten (10) checks, four checks were duly funded
WHERE IT HELD THAT A DEBTOR’S OFFER TO ARRANGE A PAYMENT SCHEME WITH
when presented for acceptance and payment. In Criminal Case No. 2807-M-94, the petitioner
HIS CREDITOR AND PAYMENT OF THE OBLIGATION INDICATE GOOD FAITH THAT
issued ten (10) post-dated PCI Bank checks to the private complaint for the purchase of a
SUCCESSFULLY REBUTS THE PRESUMPTION OF DECEIT.
1.55 carat marquez loose diamond. The first four (4) checks were duly funded when
presented for acceptance and payment. In Criminal Case No. 2751-M-94, the petitioner
B. WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT ENUNCIATED IN issued seven (7) post-dated Prudential Bank checks to the private complainant for the
BORROMEO V. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE V. CLORES, ET AL., PEOPLE V. purchase of a pair of diamond earrings. The amount covered by the first check was paid and
BAUTISTA AND PEOPLE V. BENITO GO BIONG, JR. DIRECTING THAT IN CRIMINAL settled. The rest bounced.
CASES, ALL CIRCUMSTANCES AGAINST GUILT AND IN FAVOR OF INNOCENCE MUST
BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.
The petitioner respectfully submits that the act of the petitioner --- OF DULY FUNDING
SOME OF THE POST-DATED CHECKS WHICH SHE ISSUED, SPECIFICALLY THOSE
WHICH BECAME DUE FIRST OR EARLIER – is and should be considered in law as, a The issue of deceit raised by petitioner is a factual issue and must be proved by evidence.
CIRCUMSTANCE INDICATING GOOD FAITH AND ABSENCE OF DECEIT.8 The finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the issuance of petitioner was
tainted with fraud or deceit is a factual finding that binds this Honorable Court (Jose R.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts: Guevarra vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 100894, prom. January 26, 1993).9

In the case of Ojeda, the prosecution failed to prove deceit. Ojeda never assured Chua the In reply, petitioner avers that she is a dentist/orthodontist with a fairly established practice at
checks were funded. Chua knew that the checks were issued to guarantee future payments. the Medical Towers, Ibarra St., Legaspi Village, Makati City. She did not move out of her
Furthermore, Ojeda did not only make arrangements for payment but she fully paid the entire office because she had no intention to renege on her obligations to the private complainant.
amount of the dishonored checks.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
In the instant case, the elements of deceit and damage were established by convincing
evidence. Petitioner Recuerdo issued the subject bank checks as payment for the pieces of Estafa through false pretense or fraudulent act under Paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the
jewelry simultaneous to the transactions, that is, on the very same occasion when the pieces Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, is committed as follows:
of jewelry were bought. The issuance of the check by Recuerdo was the principal inducement
to private complainant to part with the subject jewelries (CA Decision, pp. 12-13). In addition, By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had
petitioner only promised to replace the dishonored checks but she did not settle her no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of
obligations with private complainant. Assuming that there was an offer to settle her the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover
obligations, this will not overturn the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals as to his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or
the presence of deceit. holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima
facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
The guilt of petitioner was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The essential elements of the felony are: (1) a check is postdated or issued in payment of an
The crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code has the obligation contracted at the time it is issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the
following basic elements: check; and (3) damage to the payee thereof.10 It is criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of
a check which is made punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and not the non-payment
Postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted simultaneously at of a debt.11 Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct
the time the check was issued; by false or misleading allegations or by concealment of that which should have been
disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his
legal injury.12 Concealment which the law denotes as fraudulent implies a purpose or design
The postdating or issuance was done when the offender had no funds in the bank, or that his
to hide facts which the other party ought to have.13 The postdating or issuing of a check in
funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check; and
payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank or his funds deposited
therein are not sufficient to cover the amount of the check is a false pretense or a fraudulent
Damage to the payee thereof (Justice Luis B. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Thirteenth act.14
Edition 1993, Book Two, p. 693; People v. Panganiban, 335 SCRA 354).
There is no false pretense or fraudulent act if a postdated check is issued in payment of a
The existence of the foregoing elements of the crime was concretely established by the pre-existing obligation.15 As the Court emphasized in Timbal v. Court of Appeals:16
prosecution through convincing evidence, warranting petitioner’s conviction of the offense of
Estafa.
x x x In order to constitute Estafa under the statutory provisions, the act of postdating or of
issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation;
The trial court found private complainant Floro’s testimony that petitioner issued the subject accordingly, it should be either prior to or simultaneous with the act of fraud. In fine, the
checks as payment for the purchase of pieces of jewelry simultaneous to their transactions to offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party by reason of the
be categorical and credible. There was sufficient evidence established by the prosecution that issuance, whether postdated or not, of the check. It must be shown that the person to whom
the checks were issued by the accused to the complainant in exchange of the pieces of the check is delivered would not have parted with his money or property were it not for the
jewelry given to her on two separate occasions. issuance of the check by the other party.
Estafa is a felony committed by dolo (with malice). For one to be criminally liable for estafa In the present case, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of
under paragraph (2)(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, malice and specific intent to the petitioner of the crime charged. The trial court gave credence and probative weight to the
defraud are required. evidence of the People and disbelieved that proferred by the petitioner.

General criminal intent is an element of all crimes but malice is properly applied only to Petitioner’s insistence of her good faith and her reliance on the ruling of this Court in the
deliberate acts done on purpose and with design. Evil intent must unite with an unlawful act Ojeda case were raised as a mere afterthought in a last ditch effort to secure her acquittal, as
for there to be a felony. A deliberate and unlawful act gives rise to a presumption of malice by these arguments were invoked only in her motion for reconsideration of the CA decision. In
intent. On the other hand, specific intent is a definite and actual purpose to accomplish some Pascual v. Ramos,23 this Court held that if an issue is raised only in the motion for
particular thing. reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, it is as if it was never raised in that court at
all.
The general criminal intent is presumed from the criminal act and in the absence of any
general intent is relied upon as a defense, such absence must be proved by the accused. Petitioner’s defense of good faith is even belied by the evidence of the prosecution and her
Generally, a specific intent is not presumed. Its existence, as a matter of fact, must be proved own evidence. When the postdated checks issued by petitioner were dishonored by the
by the State just as any other essential element. This may be shown, however, by the nature drawee banks and the private complainant made demands for her to pay the amounts of the
of the act, the circumstances under which it was committed, the means employed and the checks, she intransigently refused to pay; she insisted that she issued and delivered the
motive of the accused.17 postdated checks to the private complainant after the subject pieces of jewelry had been
delivered to her. Petitioner never offered to pay the amounts of the checks after she was
The law provides that, in estafa, prima facie evidence of deceit is established upon proof that informed by the private complainant that they had been dishonored by the drawee banks, the
the drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within private complainant thus charged her with estafa before the RTC. It was only during the
three (3) days from receipt of the notice of dishonor for lack or insufficiency of funds. A prima period of January 4, 2005 to June 27, 2005, after the CA promulgated its decision affirming
facie evidence need not be rebutted by a preponderance of evidence, nor by evidence of the decision of the trial court, that petitioner made several payments to the private
greater weight. The evidence of the accused which equalizes the weight of the People’s complainant. While petitioner appended the deposit slips24 to her motion for reconsideration in
evidence or puts the case in equipoise is sufficient. As a result, the People will have to go the CA and her petition in this Court, there is no showing as to which checks they were made
forward with the proof. Should it happen that, at the trial the weight of evidence is equally in payment for. In fine, it was the spectre of a long prison term which jolted petitioner into
balanced or at equilibrium and the presumption operates against the People who has the making remittances to the private complainant, after the CA affirmed the decision of the trial
burden of proof, it cannot prevail.18 court and increased the penalty meted on her, and not because she had acted in good faith in
her transactions with the private complainant. To reiterate, petitioner rejected the demands of
the private complainant to pay the amounts of the dishonored checks.
There can be no estafa if the accused acted in good faith because good faith negates malice
and deceit.19 Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or
statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of While it is true that nine of the 17 postdated checks petitioner issued and delivered to the
malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An private complainant were honored by the drawee banks, such a circumstance is not a
individual’s personal good faith is a concept of his own mind, therefore, may not conclusively justification for her acquittal of the charges relative to the dishonored checks. The
be determined by his protestations alone. It implies honesty of intention and freedom from reimbursement or restitution to the offended party of the sums swindled by the petitioner does
knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. The essence of good not extinguish the criminal liability of the latter. It only extinguishes pro tanto the civil
faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one’s right, ignorance of a superior claim, and liability.25 Moreover, estafa is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the
absence of intention to overreach another.20 In People v. Gulion,21 the Court held that: State on its own motion even though complete reparation had been made for the loss or
damage suffered by the offended party.26 The consent of the private complainant to
petitioner’s payment of her civil liability pendente lite does not entitle the latter to an acquittal.
Good faith is a defense to a charge of Estafa by postdating a check. This may be manifested
Subsequent payments does not obliterate the criminal liability already incurred.27 Criminal
by the accused’s offering to make arrangements with his creditor as to the manner of
liability for estafa is not affected by a compromise between petitioner and the private
payment or, as in the present case, averring that his placing his signature on the questioned
complainant on the former’s civil liability.28
checks was purely a result of his gullibility and inadvertence, with the unfortunate result that
he himself became a victim of the trickery and manipulations of accused-at-large.22
Petitioner cannot find solace in the Court’s ruling in the Ojeda case. The CA correctly refuted
the submission of the petitioner in its decision, thus:
This Court is in full agreement with the position advanced by the Office of the Solicitor prosecute and eventually convict an accused of the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
General that on account of the glaring dissimilarities between the factual backdrop of the paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code has been sufficiently met.29
case of Ojeda, on one hand, and the material facts obtaining in the case at bench, on the
other, the doctrine in the former case may not be applied to benefit accused-appellant. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution
Indeed, even accused-appellant herself was quick to admit that the facts of her case are not of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. No costs.
entirely on all fours with those that obtained in the case of Ojeda. At the outset, emphasis
must be made of the fact that the acquittal of the accused in the Ojeda case was brought SO ORDERED.
about by a combination of reasons not obtaining in the present case. First, the Supreme
Court ruled out the existence of deceit and intent to defraud in the case of Ojeda in view of
the fact that the accused therein performed extraordinary efforts to gradually pay and settle A.M. No. MTJ-08-1698               March 3, 2008
her monetary obligations with the private complainant, and this convinced the High Court that (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 04-1523-MTJ)
the acts of the accused were not tainted with malice, bad faith and criminal intent. Verily, the
accused in the Ojeda case not only made determined and honest arrangements to pay the JAIME RACINES, Complainant,
private complainant, but was likewise able to actually satisfy with completeness the sums she vs.
owed the latter, and this was evidenced by an affidavit of desistance where the private JUDGE JOSE P. MORALLOS and SHERIFF III BENJAMIN CABUSAO, JR., Respondents.
complainant categorically declared that the accused already paid in full her monetary
obligations. The facts in the instant case, however, are totally different. Contrary to the RESOLUTION
contention of accused-appellant, she never made a determined and earnest effort to arrange
and settle with Floro with the end in view of paying her monetary obligations. In truth, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
accused-appellant simply promised to pay Floro the value of the dishonored checks that were
issued in payment for the pieces of jewelry. However, that was all there was to it, and
Complainant Jaime Racines (Racines) was required by the Court in its Resolution dated
lamentably said promise turned out to be an empty one as accused-appellant never made
November 22, 2007 to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court for filing a
good her commitment to pay for the value of the dishonored checks. Accused-appellant never
baseless and unfounded administrative case.
arranged a payment scheme with Floro, and as the facts of the case would disclose she
never made any gradual payment to Floro as shown by the fact that the value of the
dishonored checks remained unpaid, in direct contrast with the facts of the Ojeda case where Racines filed on December 17, 2003, a Complaint against Judge Jose P. Morallos (Judge
the accused was able to pay in full. Suffice it to say that accused-appellant failed to perform Morallos) and Sheriff Benjamin Cabusao, Jr. (Sheriff Cabusao) of the Metropolitan Trial Court
any concrete act to show that she had the intention of paying Floro for the value of the (MTC), Branch 68 of Pasig City, for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment,1 other
purchased pieces of jewelry, in order to somehow rebut the fact duly established by the deceits,2 violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,3 violation of Article 32 of the
prosecution that deceit attended her business dealings with Floro. It must be reiterated that New Civil Code, Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, and the Code of Judicial
We have found that accused-appellant issued the subject bank checks as payment for the Conduct.4 The Court, finding the evaluation of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to
pieces of jewelry simultaneous with her transactions with Floro, and that was, on the very be in accord with law and the facts on record, affirmed its recommendation and dismissed
same occasion when the pieces of jewelry were purchased, first, on the second week of Racines’s complaint in the Resolution dated November 22, 2004. The Court held that there
December 1993, and subsequently, on February 7, 1994. It being clear that the subject bank was nothing in the records to show that Judge Morallos was moved by improper motive when
checks were issued simultaneous with said transactions, it likewise became evident that he rendered the decision in Civil Case No. 9681;5 neither was there anything to show that
deceit attended accused-appellants’ dealings with Floro for the same only goes to show that Sheriff Cabusao used his position to influence the outcome of the decision; and in any event,
the bum checks were issued to Floro in order to induce her to part with the pieces of jewelry the proper recourse was to elevate the case to a higher court for review, and not through an
in favor of accused-appellant. administrative case. The Court, in the said resolution also directed Racines to show cause
within 10 days from receipt thereof, why he should not be held in contempt of court for filing
an utterly baseless and unfounded administrative case.6
In addition to the foregoing, the High Court likewise found in the Ojeda case that the
prosecution miserably failed to adduce evidence to establish that the indispensable element
of notice of dishonor was sent to and was received by the accused therein. In the case at Racines through counsel, Atty. Onofre D. Manalad, filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 7 which
bench, however, it is undisputed that after the dishonor of the subject bank checks Floro, the Court denied with finality in the Resolution dated March 2, 2005 for lack of substantial
through counsel, made repeated formal demands requiring accused-appellant to pay for the argument. The Resolution likewise admonished Racines and his counsel to desist from
value of the bum checks, perforce the notice of dishonor which is required to properly initiating baseless complaints.8
On March 29, 2005, the OCA received an Earnest Motion for Clarification9 filed by Racines discouraging the filing of such cases to protect the orderly administration of justice.19 It
through Atty. Manalad which the Court treated as a second motion for reconsideration in the provides in paragraph 1 thereof that if upon informal preliminary inquiry it is found that the
Resolution dated May 25, 2005. The Court denied the motion for being a prohibited pleading complaint is unfounded, baseless and merely intended to harass respondent, complainant
and directed that no further pleadings or motions shall be entertained in the case.10 may be required to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. And if the
complainant is a lawyer, he may be further required to show cause why he or she should not
On June 19, 2007, Racines by himself, filed a Pagpapaliwanag claiming: He received the be administratively sanctioned as a member of the Bar and as an officer of the
Court’s Resolution dated November 22, 2004 only on March 30, 2007 and he was able to file court.1avvphi1
his explanation only at this time since he had to look for a lawyer who would explain it to him.
The complaint and the other documents which Atty. Manalad prepared were all written in In the present case, Racines, through his lawyer Atty. Manalad filed a case against Judge
English and because he fully trusted Atty. Manalad, he immediately signed the same even Morallos and Sheriff Cabusao, imputing to them corrupt and criminal acts on the mere basis
though Atty. Manalad did not explain it to him. Had Atty. Manalad fully explained the of Judge Morallos’s decision. The complaint stated that Judge Morallos "distorted the facts" in
documents to him, he would not have signed the same, as he had no intention of filing a his "anomalous decision" and committed the crimes of knowingly rendering an unjust
baseless administrative case against respondents. If there was anyone who should be judgment, causing undue injury to Racines, violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
punished, it was Atty. Manalad because he deceived him into filing a baseless administrative Act, and estafa by means of other deceits.20 The complaint also questioned Judge Morallos’s
case.11 integrity, impartiality and professional competence, all on the basis of his decision on the
ejectment favoring the plaintiff therein, Jellicom Manpower and Transport Services owned by
The Court required Atty. Manalad to comment on Racines’s Pagpapaliwanag.12 Sheriff Cabusao, with Racines as defendant. The complaint also claims that Sheriff Cabusao,
Judge Morallos and Gerry Chua, lessor of the property, conspired with one another in
commiting the wrongful acts for which they are liable to pay damages.21
In his Comment, Atty. Manalad avers that Racines is being used by Gerry Chua, lessor of the
Viajeros Market and Chua’s lawyer Atty. Edgardo Galvez against him (Atty. Manalad), since
he is assisting the officers of the Pasig Fruits & Vegetables Vendors Association (PFVVA) in Unfazed by the order of the Court directing Racines to show cause why he should not be held
their cases against Chua. Racines, who was for several years a sergeant-at-arms of the in contempt for filing a baseless complaint, Racines, through Atty. Manalad even filed two
PFVVA, was pirated by Chua to lead a group of goons to harass his co-vendors into giving up motions for reconsideration, reiterating their baseless claims.
their stalls. Atty. Manalad claims that he would not have initiated an action against an
incumbent trial court judge had no grievous correctible error been committed in bad faith at Racines tries to escape liability by saying that Atty. Manald did not explain the contents of the
the expense of truth and justice. He also asserts that the allegations in the complaint against pleadings to him, because if Atty. Manalad did, he would not have signed the same.
Judge Morallos are substantiated by the admission of the parties in their pleadings, and that
he filed the charges against respondents at the instance of Racines who was even crying The Court is not convinced. It is presumed that a person intends the ordinary consequences
when he was pleading before Atty. Manalad for legal assistance.13 of his voluntary act22 and unless the requirements for proper substitution were made, a lawyer
enjoys the presumption of authority given him by his client.23 Racines does not deny that the
The Court finds both Racines and Atty. Manalad guilty of indirect contempt. signatures in the pleadings were his. He also does not claim that he was prevented by Atty.
Manalad from reading the contents thereof. He only said that since he fully trusted Atty.
Persons guilty of any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or Manalad he immediately signed the documents. From the foregoing, it is clear that Racines
degrade the administration of justice may be punished for indirect contempt.14 The Court, in acquiesced and gave his stamp of approval to the pleadings filed in court. Considering
the exercise of its inherent power to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its however that he is not learned in the intricacies of law, the Court finds the penalty of
ministerial officers and of all other persons in any manner connected with a case before it, reprimand with warning to be sufficient in his case.24
may motu proprio initiate proceedings therefor.15
As to Atty. Manalad, the Court finds that a greater penalty is in order. As a member of the bar,
The Court has held that unsubstantiated charges serve no purpose other than to harass he should know better than to file an unfounded administrative complaint.25 He is bound by
judges and cast doubt on the integrity of the entire judiciary.16 The filing of clearly unfounded the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Rule 11.04 thereof states that a lawyer shall not
or malicious complaints seriously affects the efficiency of the members of the judiciary in attribute to a judge motives not supported by the records. Canon 11 also enjoins lawyers to
administering fair, speedy and impartial justice.17 The Court, mindful of the proliferation of observe and maintain the respect due to courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
unfounded or malicious administrative or criminal cases filed by losing litigants and similar conduct by others.26 His claim that he filed the charges against respondent at the
disgruntled lawyers against members of the judiciary, therefore issued A.M. No. 03-10-01- instance of Racines cannot free him from liability. As the Court has pronounced, a client’s
SC18 which took effect on November 4, 2003 with the aim of preventing or at least cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers
must always keep in perspective that since they are administrators of justice, oath-bound 1996 duly signed by the latter. However, on March 20, 1996, petitioner was only able to remit
servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the the amount of P3,300.009 and thereafter, failed to make further remittances and ignored
administration of justice.27 As a lawyer, he is an officer of the court with the duty to uphold its respondent's demands to remit the proceeds or return the goods.10
dignity and authority and not promote distrust in the administration of justice. For violating
Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court finds that a fine of five In her defense, petitioner admitted having previous business dealings with respondent but not
thousand pesos is proper in his case.28 as an agent. She clarified that she was a client who used to buy purchase order cards
(POCs) and gift checks (GCs) from respondent on installment basis and that, during each
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Jaime Racines and Atty. Onofre D. Manalad guilty of Indirect deal, she was made to sign a blank sheet of paper prior to the issuance of POCs and GCs.
Contempt under Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Atty. Onofre D. She further claimed that their last transaction was conducted in 1995, which had long been
Manalad is ordered to pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS within ten (10) days from settled. However, she denied having received P32,000.00 worth of merchandise from
finality of herein Resolution, while Jaime Racines is REPRIMANDED. Both are STERNLY respondent on February 20, 1996.11
WARNED that a repetition of a similar act may warrant a more severe action by this Court.
The RTC Ruling
SO ORDERED.
In a Decision12 dated June 29, 2011, the RTC acquitted petitioner of the charge of estafa but
held her civilly liable to pay respondent the amount of P32,000.00, with interest from the filing
G.R. No. 208113, December 02, 2015 of the Information on March 11, 1999 until fully paid, and to pay the costs.

DOLORES DIAZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND LETICIA S. The RTC found that the prosecution failed to establish any intent on the part of the petitioner
ARCILLA, Respondents. to defraud respondent and, thus, could not be held criminally liable.13 However, it adjudged
petitioner civilly liable "having admitted that she received the [GCs] in the amount of
DECISION P32,000.00." In this relation, it further considered the relationship of respondent and petitioner
as in the nature of a principal-agent which renders the agent civilly liable only for damages
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: which the principal may suffer due to the non-performance of his duty under the agency.14

With the foregoing pronouncement, petitioner elevated the civil aspect of the case before the
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated January
CA on appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 97571.
30, 2013 and the Resolution3 dated July 10, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 97571, which directed petitioner Dolores Diaz (petitioner) to pay respondent Leticia S.
The CA Ruling
Arcilla, (respondent) the amount of P32,000.00, with legal interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum (p.a.) from July 28, 1998 until finality of the decision and thereafter, interest
In a Decision15 dated January 30, 2013, the CA upheld petitioner's civil liability.
at the rate of twelve percent (12%) p.a. on the outstanding balance until full satisfaction.
It ruled that respondent was able to establish by preponderance of evidence her transaction
The Facts
with petitioner, as well as the latter's failure to remit the proceeds of the sale of the
merchandise worth P32,000.00, or to return the same to respondent in case the items were
On March 11, 1999, an Information4 for estafa was filed against petitioner before the Regional
not sold, the fact of which having been substantiated by the acknowledgment receipt dated
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 5 (RTC) for her alleged failure to return or remit the proceeds
February 20, 1996.16 To this, the CA rejected petitioner's attempt to discredit the said receipt
from various merchandise valued at P32,000.00 received by her in trust - i.e., on
which she denied executing on the ground that she was only made to sign blank documents,
consignment basis from respondent.5 During arraignment, petitioner entered a negative plea.
finding that even if petitioner was indeed made to sign such blank documents, such was
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.6
merely a safety precaution employed by respondent in the event the former reneges on her
obligation.17
The prosecution anchored its case on the testimony of respondent who claimed to be a
businesswoman engaged in the business of selling goods/merchandise through agents (one
However, the CA modified the award of interests by reckoning the same from the time of
of whom is petitioner) under the condition that the latter shall turn over the proceeds or return
extrajudicial demand on July 28, 1998.18 Accordingly, it directed petitioner to pay respondent
the unsold items to her a month after they were entrusted. Respondent averred that on
the amount of P32,000.00 with legal interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from July 28, 1998 until
February 20, 1996, she entrusted merchandise consisting of umbrellas and bath towels worth
finality of the decision and thereafter, at the rate of 12% p.a. on the outstanding balance until
P35,300.00 to petitioner7 as evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt8 dated February 20,
full satisfaction. their corresponding values, and assumed the obligation to return the same on March 20,
1996 if not sold.35
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration19 which was denied in a
Resolution20 dated July 10, 2013; hence, this petition. In this relation, it should be pointed out that under Section 3 (d), Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court, the legal presumption is that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. To this,
The Issue Before the Court case law dictates that the natural presumption is that one does not sign a document without
first informing himself of its contents and consequences.36 Further, under Section 3 (p) of the
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA committed reversible same Rule, it is equally presumed that private transactions have been fair and regular.37 This
error in finding petitioner civilly liable to respondent. YES behooves every contracting party to learn and know the contents of a document before he
signs and delivers it.38 The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the
The Court's Ruling need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no
contrary proof is offered, will prevail.39 In this case, petitioner failed to present any evidence to
The petition lacks merit. controvert these presumptions. Also, respondent's possession of the document pertaining to
the obligation strongly buttresses her claim that the same has not been
At the outset, it is noteworthy to mention that the extinction of the penal action does not carry extinguished.40 Preponderance of evidence only requires that evidence be greater or more
with it the extinction of the civil liability where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as convincing than the opposing evidence.41 All things considered, the evidence in this case
only preponderance of evidence, or "greater weight of the credible evidence," is clearly preponderates in respondent's favor.
required.21 Thus, an accused acquitted of estafa may still be held civilly liable where the facts
established by the evidence so warrant,22 as in this case. In fine, the CA's ruling on petitioner's civil liability is hereby sustained. In line, however, with
the amendment introduced by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board in BSP-MB
In upholding the civil liability of petitioner, the CA did not dwell into the purported admission of Circular No. 799,42 series of 2013, there is a need to partially modify the same in that the
petitioner anent her receipt of GCs in the amount of P32,000.00 as found by the RTC. interest accruing from the time of the finality of this Decision should be imposed at the lower
Instead, the CA hinged its ruling23 on the acknowledgment receipt24 dated February 20, 1996, rate of six percent (6%) p.a., and not twelve percent (12%) p.a. as imposed by the CA.
the documentary evidence that respondent had duly identified25 and formally offered26 in the
course of these proceedings. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 30, 2013 and the
Resolution dated July 10, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97571 are
For her part, petitioner denied having entered into the subject transaction with respondent, hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, directing petitioner Dolores Diaz to pay respondent
claiming that she: (a) had not transacted with respondent as to other goods, except Leticia S. Arcilla the amount of P32,000.00 with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
GCs27 and POCs;28 (b) was made to sign two (2) one-half sheets of paper and a trust receipt per annum from July 28, 1998 until full payment.
in blank prior to the issuance of the GCs and POCs,29 and (c) was not able to retrieve the
same after paying her obligation to respondent.30 SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Court agrees with the CA. G.R. No. 173824             August 28, 2008

Petitioner's claim that she was required to sign two (2) one-half sheets of paper and a trust PETER TARAPEN y CHONGOY, petitioner,
receipt in blank31 during her transactions with respondent, which she allegedly failed to vs.
retrieve after paying her obligations,32 is a bare allegation that cannot be given credence. It is PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
well-settled that "[h]e who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is
not evidence."33
DECISION
On the contrary, the CA correctly found that respondent was able to prove by preponderance
of evidence the fact of the transaction, as well as petitioner's failure to remit the proceeds of CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
the sale of the merchandise worth P32,000.00, or to return the same to respondent in case
such merchandise were not sold. This was established through the presentation of the Assailed before Us is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26636, dated
acknowledgment receipt34 dated February 20, 1996, which, as the document's name 31 January 2006, which affirmed with modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
connotes, shows that petitioner acknowledged receipt from respondent of the listed items with
(RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting petitioner Peter Chongoy Tarapen of the crime of The wife of James, Patricia Pangoden, arrived at the BGHMC and saw her husband in the
Homicide. Emergency Room. Dr. Rizal Leo Cala refused to operate on her husband, saying that it was
already hopeless. She then requested for the transfer of her husband to the Saint Louis
On 9 June 2000, petitioner was charged before the RTC of Baguio City with Frustrated University (SLU) Hospital. The request was approved, and her husband was transferred to
Homicide for attacking and assaulting James Lacbao Pangoden.3 The day after, the victim SLU Hospital at 1:30 p.m. James was operated on, and Patricia was told that her husband
died from the injuries he sustained. As a consequence, an amended information was filed on had no more chance to live. She was advised to bring home James; otherwise, they would
13 June 2000 charging petitioner with Homicide allegedly committed as follows: just be spending so much. Patricia brought her husband to his hometown in Namatugan,
Sudipen, La Union, where he expired on 10 June 2000.16
That on or about the 8th day of June, 2000, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent Patricia S. Pangoden testified on the events that happened to her husband from the time he
to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, and assault was bought to the hospital until the time he died. She also testified on the expenses she
JAMES LACBAO PANGODEN, by hitting his head twice with a steel shovel, thereby incurred as a result of the incident.17
inflicting upon the latter: Cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cranio-cerebral injury,
which directly caused his death.4 Molly J. Linglingen and Silmana Linglingen, mother and daughter, and co-vendors of James
at Zandueta St., testified that they saw petitioner get a shovel from the rear of the garbage
The case was raffled to Branch 3. When arraigned on 15 June 2000, petitioner, with the truck, approach James from behind, and hit him with it twice on the head.
assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.5
Virginia Costales recounted the events prior to her seeing James already slumped on the
On 10 October 2000, the pre-trial conference of the case was terminated with the trial court ground. She narrated that when the garbage truck was going down Zandueta St., petitioner
issuing its pre-trial order.6 got off from the truck and guided it. The truck ran over the eggplants she was selling.
Petitioner picked them up and threw them to where James was. James, she said, got angry
because the flowers he was selling were soiled. Petitioner and James exchanged words.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses, namely: (1) Patricia S. Pangoden7; (2)
While the two were exchanging words, she transferred her sack of eggplants to a nearby
Molly J. Linglingen8; (3) Silmana Linglingen9; (4) Virginia Costales10; (5) Dr. Lindo
place. It was then that she heard people shouting. When she turned around, she saw James
Mensalvas11; (6) Dr. Rizal Leo Cala12; and (7) Senior Police Officer (SPO) 2 Juanito Meneses
already slumped on the ground oozing with blood.
II.13

Dr. Lindo Mensalvas and Dr. Rizal Leo Cala, physicians at the SLU Hospital and BGHMC,
The collective testimonies of the witnesses revealed:
respectively, attended to the victim. They respectively issued a medico-legal certificate
containing the injuries sustained by the victim.18
At around 7:00 to 7:30 in the morning of 8 June 2000, a dump truck driven by Jimmy Pugoy
arrived at Zandueta St., Baguio City, to collect garbage. He was accompanied by petitioner
SPO2 Juanito Meneses II, assigned at Police Community Precinct 1, Baguio City, was the
and Edmond Ferrer. The garbage truck came from lower Zandueta St. and proceeded to
investigator to whom the case of petitioner was turned over. At around 10:00 a.m. of 8 June
upper Zandueta St. Upon reaching the Hilltop Market, the truck turned around. During this
2000, the Division Chief of the General Services Office of Baguio City turned the petitioner
time, vendors, including the victim James Pangoden, Molly J. Linglingen, Silmana Linglingen
over to him. SPO2 Meneses disclosed that petitioner admitted to having inflicted injuries on
and Virginia Costales were peddling their wares along said street. Petitioner alighted from the
the victim. The police officer disclosed that he did not notice any injury on Peter’s body or
truck and signaled to the driver to move slowly. Despite guiding the truck, said vehicle ran
face. He added that Peter did not request any medical treatment that morning. He brought
over the eggplants being sold by Virginia Costales. Petitioner picked up the vegetables and
Peter to the BGHMC for possible identification, but the victim was still unconscious. Upon
threw them towards the place where James was. This angered James because the flowers
going back to the police station, he took the statement of the victim’s wife. He likewise
he was selling were soiled. An exchange of words ensued between petitioner and
identified the steel shovel19 allegedly used in killing the victim.
James.14 Petitioner went to the back of the dump truck and got a shovel. He then moved in
front of the truck where James was. While James was facing downwards, petitioner, coming
from behind and holding the shovel with two hands, struck James on the head with the same, The prosecution formally offered Exhibits "A" to "H," inclusive, with sub-markings which the
causing him to fall to the ground in a squatting position. As soon as James raised his head, trial court admitted.20
petitioner hit the former’s head again with the shovel.15 Petitioner then ran away. James was
brought to the Baguio General Hospital & Medical Center (BGHMC) in a taxi. For the defense, the following took the witness stand: (1) Jimmy Pugoy, 21 (2) petitioner Peter
Tarapen,22 (3) Edmond Ferrer,23 and (4) Dr. Maryjane Tipayno.24
The version of the defense as culled from these witnesses is as follows: back of the truck. When the vehicle stopped, Peter alighted and went in front of the vehicle.
Jimmy also went down, taking with him the shovel and the garbage basket. While Peter was
Jimmy Pugoy, petitioner Peter Tarapen and Edmond Ferrer are garbage collectors employed settling some things in front, he placed the garbage inside the basket. After filling up the
by the General Services Office of the City of Baguio. At around 3:00 a.m. of 8 June 2000, basket and before he could load it into the truck, he heard people shouting in front of the
they started collecting garbage. At around 7:00 a.m., they arrived at Zandueta St. Half of said vehicle. As there was a commotion, he proceeded to the front of the vehicle carrying the
street was almost occupied by vendors who were selling various goods. In order to collect shovel he was using. He saw Peter sitting on the ground shaking his head. He went near
garbage piled on said street, the truck driven by Jimmy Pugoy had to go up the street then go Peter, put down the shovel and tried to help him stand up. A person approached and was
down. While going down the street, Pugoy kept on honking the truck’s horn, causing the about to hit Peter, when the latter got hold of the shovel, swung it and hit this person. The
vendors selling near the garbage pile to move away, but some of their goods were left person remained standing. Peter was able to stand and was turning around to leave, but the
behind. Ferrer alighted and started filling up the garbage basket with the use of a shovel. person whom he hit with the shovel was about to follow him in order to punch him. Peter hit
Peter saw a sack of eggplants pinned under the truck being removed by its owner. Peter this person one more time, causing the latter to fall down. Seeing Peter leave, he also left.
helped the old woman carry the sack to the side of the road when, all of a sudden, James
punched him hard on the right ear, causing him to fall and roll down the street. Peter ended Petitioner testified that at the time the incident subject of this case happened, he was in
up sitting on the ground. As he was getting up with his hands raised, James punched him Zandueta St. to collect garbage. He was riding the garbage truck driven by Jimmy Pugoy.
again. Peter protested, saying he did not do anything wrong. James answered: "You people Since the driver was continuously blowing the horn of the vehicle, he went down the truck and
from the government are show-off[s]." Peter, still dizzy while getting up and still with hands saw a sack of eggplants under the vehicle. The owner of the sack of eggplants approached
raised, was kicked by James on the left side of the body. Peter fell on the road and rolled him and asked him to help her. He helped the old woman remove the sack under the truck
anew.25 Feeling very dizzy, Peter tried to pick up something to throw at James to stop him, and carry it to the side of the road. After that, he said someone (James) punched him at the
because he (Peter) thought James would kill him. At this moment, Edmond was coming to the right side of the head, which caused him to fall and sit on the road. As he was getting up with
aid of Peter, who was in front of the truck. Edmond carried with him the shovel he used to his hands raised, James said, "Nalastog kayo nga taga-gobierno," and then punched him for
collect garbage. Edmond tried to help Peter stand. He put down the shovel on the ground. the second time. He was a little dizzy and was again getting up when he was kicked on the
While in a sitting position, Peter was able to get hold of the shovel and swing it, hitting James left side of his body. Feeling very dizzy, he tried to pick up something to throw at James.
who was approaching him and about to strike with a clenched fist. With the help of the shovel, While sitting, he got hold of a shovel which he swung, hitting James. Peter said he got up to
Peter stood up and tried to leave. When James followed Peter, the latter hit him again with run away, but James followed him. It was then that Peter hit him again with the shovel. He
the shovel. Peter saw James boarding a taxi. After feeling a little better, Peter walked to his went to their office and he was accompanied by his supervisor in surrendering to the police.
office and reported the matter to his supervisor. He added that he asked the policemen to bring him to the hospital, because his ear was
aching. It was on 16 July 2000 that he was able to have a medical examination of his ears.
Peter, accompanied by his supervisor, voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities. Per
his request, he was brought to the hospital where he met James’s wife who hit him on the Dr. Maryjane Tipayno, physician at the BGHMC, testified that she performed an audio logic
back. To avoid trouble, he was brought to the City Jail. Upon posting bail, he went to the test on petitioner on 16 June 2000. She found out that petitioner had mild hearing loss on the
hospital for treatment. left ear and severe hearing loss on the right ear.26 She said that the hearing condition of
petitioner could not have been self-inflicted. She explained that the hearing loss in both ears
Jimmy Pugoy testified on what he allegedly saw that fateful morning. He recounted that while could have started years before. She added that it was Dr. Vinluan who interviewed the
he was maneuvering the garbage truck he was driving at Zandueta St., he saw petitioner petitioner, and that it was petitioner who told him that the hearing loss in his right ear was due
Peter Tarapen go down the truck and help an old woman, who was in front of the truck, carry to a blunt trauma.
a sack of eggplants. At that moment, a person (James) went near Peter and suddenly
punched him on the face, causing him to fall and roll down the street. When Peter stood up After formally offering Exhibits "1" and "2" and with the admission thereof by the trial court,
with his hands raised, James punched him again on the face, making the latter fall and roll the defense rested its case.27
again. Peter stood up a second time with his hands up. This time, he said, James delivered a
flying kick, which hit Peter on the stomach. Peter fell and rolled once more. After this, Jimmy As rebuttal witnesses, the prosecution presented Molly Linglingen, who said that petitioner
no longer saw what happened, because the people had gathered, and he parked the truck. was standing up when he hit James twice on the head with a shovel. He explained that
After parking the vehicle, what he saw was a man lying on the ground. He went back to the James was standing with his back turned, when Peter came from behind and hit him.28
office and gave a report.
On 20 June 2002, the trial court convicted petitioner of Homicide in a decision the dispositive
Edmond Ferrer narrated that at around 7:00 a.m. of 8 July 2000, he was with Jimmy Pugoy portion of which reads:
and Peter Tarapen at Zandueta St. collecting garbage. He was with Peter hanging at the
 WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Peter Tarapen GUILTY beyond reasonable actual damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
doubt for the crime of Homicide and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of the sum of P1,960,200.00 representing lost earnings.34
imprisonment at the National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City from Fourteen (14) Years
as Minimum to Twenty (20) Years as Maximum. Peter Tarapen shall also indemnify On 8 March 2006, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 35 on which the Office of the
private complainant Patricia Pangoden the following amounts: One Hundred Ninety Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Comment.36 On 6 July 2006, the Court of Appeals denied
Five Thousand Eighty Pesos and 05/100 (P195,080.05), representing the expenses said motion.37
for hospitalization, funeral and burial; Moral Damages to Patricia Pangoden in the
amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) and Death Indemnity of On 31 August 2006, petitioner, via registered mail, filed a petition for review with this Court,
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), and Loss of Earning Capacity in the amount of seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals.38
Three Million One Hundred Thirty Five Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty Pesos
(P3,680,800.05), plus costs of suit against the accused.29
In our Resolution39 dated 2 October 2006, respondent People of the Philippines, through the
OSG, was required to file its Comment on the petition. After three motions for extension to file
The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Molly J. comment on the petition, which were granted by this Court, the OSG filed its Comment on 5
Linglingen, Silmana Linglingen and Virginia Costales as against the testimonies of defense February 2007.40 On 12 March 2007, petitioner was required to file a Reply to the Comment,
witnesses Jimmy Pugoy, petitioner Peter Tarapen and Edmond Ferrer. The trial court found which he did on 11 December 2007.41
the prosecution’s version of the incident credible. The trial court said Virginia Costales saw
the first part of the incident, which was the heated argument between petitioner and the victim
involving the victim’s soiled goods, while Molly J. Linglingen and Silmana Linglingen On 18 February 2008, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition for review on
witnessed the second part of the incident when petitioner went to the back portion of the certiorari and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda within thirty (30)
garbage truck and got a shovel with which he hit the victim from the back, twice on the head, days from notice. Petitioner and respondent filed their respective memoranda on 2 May 2008
resulting in his death. Having had the opportunity to observe them, it was convinced that they and 10 April 2008.42
were telling the truth vis-à-vis the defense witnesses who were lying, as can be seen from
their hesitant answers and evasive looks when they testified for the petitioner who was a co- Petitioner assails his conviction, arguing that both trial courts:
employee.
I. Erred in giving credence to the prosecution witnesses, despite the grave
The trial court likewise did not appreciate self-defense in favor of petitioner, who struck the inconsistencies in their testimonies and not considering the testimonies of the
unarmed victim from the back, twice on the head. witnesses for the defense showing manifest bias against the accused.

On 8 July 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 30 which the trial court denied on II. Erred in not acquitting the accused when the defense had sufficiently proved the
16 July 2002.31 On 23 July 2002, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.32 In an Order33 dated 29 existence of facts proving that indeed the accused was defending himself from
July 2002, the trial court, finding the notice of appeal to have been seasonably filed, James Pangoden.
forwarded the records of the case to the Court of Appeals.
III. Erred in not acquitting the accused based on reasonable doubt.43
On 31 January 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, affirming with modification
the decision of the trial court convicting petitioner Peter Chongoy Tarapen of the crime of On the first assigned error, petitioner contends that the testimonies of Molly and Silmana
Homicide, the decretal portion reading: Linglingen that there was no prior quarrel or exchange of words between petitioner and
James before the former hit the latter with a shovel, are contrary to human experience,
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision dated June 20, 2002 of because petitioner could not have taken the life of James, whom he did not personally know,
Branch 3 of the Regional trial Court of Baguio City in Criminal Case No. 17792-R for no reason at all.
finding accused-appellant Peter Tarapen y Chongoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of homicide is AFFIRMED with modification. Accused-appellant is This contention is untenable.
sentenced to suffer the penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor, AS MINIMUM, to
fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, AS MAXIMUM, and ordered to pay the A review of the testimonies of both Molly and Silmana Linglingen shows they never said that
heirs of the victim James Lacbao Pangoden the following amounts: P51,549.25 in petitioner and the victim did not have any prior quarrel or exchange of words before Peter hit
James with the shovel. What they said was that they never witnessed any quarrel or
exchange of words between Peter and James. They, however, declared in unison that they The defense attacks the credibility of Virginia Costales by pointing out that her testimony in
saw petitioner get a shovel from the back of the garbage truck and, coming from behind, court, that she did not see petitioner and the victim engage in a fistfight, contradicts her
twice struck James on the head with it. Both Molly and Silmana Linglingen never witnessed declaration in her sworn statement that that two engaged in a fistfight.
the events prior to Peter’s act of getting the shovel. This void was substantially filled up by the
testimony of Virginia Costales, who actually witnessed the altercation between the petitioner Such inconsistency will not discredit her. It is settled that certain discrepancies between
and the victim. Through the testimony of Mrs. Costales, it became clear why petitioner got the declarations made in an affidavit and those made on the witness stand seldom could discredit
shovel, which he used in striking James twice on the head. By combining the testimonies of the declarant. Sworn statements, being taken ex parte,  are almost always incomplete and
the three ladies, a picture of the incident has been wholly painted. The rage that Peter had in often inaccurate for various reasons, sometimes from partial suggestion or for want of
him was brought about by his squabble with James. The defense cannot, therefore, claim that suggestion and inquiries. They are generally inferior to the testimony of the witness given in
Peter took the life of James for no reason at all. open court. Our case law is unequivocal in saying that the testimony of a witness prevails
over an affidavit. In short, affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open-court
Petitioner brands Molly and Silmana Linglingen as biased witnesses, thus, unreliable, declarations; or, more bluntly stated, whenever there is inconsistency between an affidavit
because they were town mates and co-vendors of the victim. The fact that these two and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight. 48 The Court
witnesses were the victim’s town mates and co-vendors did not necessarily make them has consistently ruled that the alleged inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness in
biased witnesses. It is well-settled that the mere relationship of a witness to the victim does open court and his sworn statement before the investigators are not fatal defects that would
not impair the witness’ credibility. On the contrary, a witness’ relationship to a victim of a justify the reversal of a judgment of conviction.49 In this case, when Mrs. Costales was
crime would even make his or her testimony more credible, as it would be unnatural for a confronted with this contradiction, she explained that she never told the police that the
relative, or a friend as in this case, who is interested in vindicating the crime, to accuse petitioner and the victim had a fistfight. What she said was they had a quarrel; that is, they
somebody other than the real culprit.44 A witness is said to be biased when his relation to the faced each other and exchanged words.
cause or to the parties is such that he has an incentive to exaggerate or give false color to his
statements, or to suppress or to pervert the truth, or to state what is false. 45 To warrant The defense tries to destroy the version of Molly and Silmana Linglingen that the victim was
rejection of the testimony of a relative or friend, it must be clearly shown that, independently hit from behind by arguing that same is not corroborated by medical findings. Molly and
of the relationship, the testimony was inherently improbable or defective, or that improper or Silmana Linglingen’s claim that James was hit on the right side of the head was, according to
evil motives had moved the witness to incriminate the accused falsely.46 the defense, negated by the findings of Dr. Mensalvas that James suffered injuries on the
"left frontoparietal and left frontotemporo parietal" areas of his head. The findings of Dr.
The friendship of Molly and Silmana Linglingen with the victim, per se, did not impair their Mensalvas mean that James was facing Peter when hit by the shovel contrary to the
credibility. We, like both lower courts, are convinced that they were telling the truth. Moreover, prosecution’s claim that James was hit by Peter from behind.
the defense failed to show any evidence that prosecution witnesses Molly and Silmana
Linglingen had improper or evil motives to testify falsely against petitioner. This being the We do not agree.
case, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.
The defense relies too much on the findings made by Dr. Lindo Mensalvas and completely
The defense accuses the prosecution witnesses of deliberately suppressing material omits the findings made by Dr. Rizal Leo Cala. It must not be forgotten that the victim was
evidence favorable to the petitioner. It thus argues that it may be safely presumed that such brought to two hospitals where the attending doctors issued separate medico-legal
evidence, having been willfully suppressed, would be adverse if produced. certificates. The medico-legal certificate50 issued by Dr. Cala of the BGHMC was marked Exh.
"D." The one issued by Dr. Mensalvas was marked Exh. "C."
We do not find any suppression of evidence by the prosecution. The defense failed to specify
which evidence was suppressed. It simply made a general statement that the prosecution On the witness stand, Dr. Cala read his findings as follows:
witnesses allegedly did not tell the truth and thus deliberately suppressed material evidence
favorable to the petitioner. The adverse presumption of suppression of evidence is not "Skull Fracture" meaning there is a break in the skull bone, "Linear" which is a
applicable when (1) the suppression is not willful; (2) the evidence suppressed or withheld is straight line fracture, "parietal" area on the right side of the head, then we have
merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; and (4) "Epidural hematoma" it is a blood clot at the right side of the head.51
the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.47 In the case at bar, the prosecution witnesses
who allegedly suppressed material evidence were presented in court and were cross-
examined by the defense counsel. How then can the defense claim there was suppression? When cross-examined, he explained his findings as follows:
The defense counsel was able to question these witnesses, but failed to elicit the answer he
wanted or needed to hear for the exoneration of his client. q Both injuries you found were on the front parietal area?
 a Yes, Sir. This Court believes in the findings made by Dr. Cala as contained in the medico-legal
certificate he issued showing that the victim suffered injuries on the right side of his head,
q Will you please demonstrate to us? consistent with the declarations of prosecution witnesses that the victim was, from behind,
struck with a shovel twice on the right side of the head. We give more weight to this medical
certificate, because the same was issued by a government doctor. By actual practice, only
a (Witness demonstrating by pointing to the right side of his head.)
government physicians, by virtue of their oaths as civil service officials, are competent to
examine persons and issue medical certificates which will be used by the government.54 As
q Doctor, while you were demonstrating, the linear fracture, is it perpendicular to the such, the medical certificate carries the presumption of regularity in the performance of his
head? functions and duties. Moreover, under Section 44, Rule 130,55 Revised Rules of Court, entries
in official records made in the performance of official duty are prima facie evidence of the
a I am sorry but it was injury to the right side of the head, Sir. facts therein stated. Dr. Cala’s findings that the victim sustained injuries on the right side of
his head are, therefore, conclusive in the absence of evidence proving the contrary, as in this
q Only part of the right ear? case. We cannot consider the contents of the medical certificate issued by Dr. Mensalvas
sufficient to controvert the findings of Dr. Cala. As held by this Court, an unverified medical
a Yes, sir. certificate not issued by a government physician is unreliable.56

q If I am facing you, it is on your? Even assuming arguendo that we give more weight to the medical certificate issued by Dr.
Mensalvas, this does not mean that the testimonies of Molly and Silmana Linglingen shall be
disbelieved. It is noted that Dr. Mensalvas testified that the victim sustained a wound on the
a Right, Sir.
right side of his head, possibly caused by a steel shovel.57 Such a finding is consistent with
the claim of Molly and Silmana Linglingen that the victim was hit on the right side of the head.
q Right side on your part. Did you find any injury on the left side? Though there can be inconsistencies of the testimonies of the witnesses with Dr. Mensalvas’s
other findings (i.e., injuries on the left portion of the head) this does not mean that we should
a No, Sir.52 totally doubt and discard the other portions of their testimonies.

From the medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Cala and with his testimony in court, it is clear Well-settled is the rule that the testimony of a witness may be believed in part and disbelieved
that the victim suffered injuries on the right side of his head. Thus, the claim of Molly and in another, depending on the corroborative evidence or the probabilities and improbabilities of
Silmana Linglingen that the victim was struck from behind on the right side of his head is the case. Where a part of the testimony of a witness runs counter to the medical evidence
consistent with the findings of Dr. Cala. submitted, it is within the sound discretion of the court to determine which portions of the
testimony to reject as false and which to consider worthy of belief.58
Dr. Mensalvas, on the other hand, testified that the victim sustained four injuries, three of
which were on the left side of the head and one on the right side. The medical certificate he From the two medical certificates issued, what cannot be doubted is the fact that the victim
issued states that the victim was confined for the following injuries: sustained head injuries, whether on the left or the right, which caused his demise.

1. ACCI; CEREBRAL CONTUSSION We find the testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses more credible and convincing than
those of the defense eyewitnesses. When it comes to credibility, the trial court’s assessment
2. EPIDURAL HEMATOMA, LEFT FRONTOPARIETAL AREA deserves great weight and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or
oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious.
3. SUTURED SCALP LACERATION, RIGHT TEMPOROPARIETAL AREA Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of
testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial
evidence properly.59
4. SCALP CONTUSSION, LEFT FRONTOTEMPORO PARIETAL AREA WITH
UNDERLYING LINEAR FRACTURE OF THE SKULL EXTENDING FROM THE
LEFT FRONTAL TO THE LEFT TEMPORAL BONE.53 The Court of Appeals further affirmed the findings of the RTC. In this regard, it is settled that
when the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are
The question now is: which medical findings should this Court believe?
generally conclusive and binding upon this Court. We find no compelling reason to deviate We agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner failed to clearly and convincingly prove
from their findings. self-defense, whether complete or incomplete.

Petitioner claims that the trial court judge was not able to observe the demeanor of the We confirm the observation of the trial court. A circumspect scrutiny of accused-
prosecution witnesses, because they were looking at the court interpreter when they were appellant’s version of what happened likewise leaves this Court unconvinced that he
testifying. We find this untenable. The trial court judge was emphatic in saying that he had the killed the victim James Pangoden in self-defense.
chance to see the face of the witness while she testified.60
First, accused-appellant’s claim that the victim James Pangoden, suddenly and
On the second and third assigned errors, petitioner admits killing James but invokes self- without provocation, boxed him on his right ear is simply unbelievable. By his own
defense. He claims that the victim was the unlawful aggressor and that he (petitioner) did not account, he (accused-appellant) was at that moment helping a road vendor carry her
provoke the victim. sack of eggplants away from the path of the truck. If this is true, then his testimony
that James Pangoden attacked and boxed him for no reason at all loses credibility.
Article 11, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, provides for the elements and/or Testimonies to be believed must not only come from the mouth of credible witnesses
requisites in order that a plea of self-defense may be validly considered in absolving a person but should by themselves be credible, reasonable, and in accord with human
from criminal liability, viz: experience.

ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. – The following do not incur any criminal liability: Second, it is likewise inconceivable how accused-appellant could have hit the victim
James Pangoden twice in the head while he (accused-appellant) was allegedly in a
sitting position and holding the shovel by the middle part of its shaft. Interestingly
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the
also, while accused-appellant and his witness testified that he was in a "sitting"
following circumstances concur;
position when he hit James Pangoden with the shovel, accused-appellant portrayed a
different account when asked during cross-examination to demonstrate how he hit
First. Unlawful aggression; the victim, viz:

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; Q: Now, how did you hit Pangoden with the shovel, demonstrate it to the Court. All
right you can step down from the witness stand (Witness demonstrating.)
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself. For the record, witness was in a kneeling position when he got the shovel.

Having admitted that he killed James, the burden of evidence that one acted in self-defense A: I was down on the ground, and I was groping (sic) to somebody and I was able to
shifted to petitioner. Like an alibi, self-defense is inherently weak, for it is easy to fabricate. 61 It get hold of the shovel, that was the time I swang (sic) it towards him.
is textbook doctrine that when self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the
accused to show that the killing was justified, and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor.
Q: You have not demonstrated how you hit Pangoden with the shovel?
He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution’s evidence, for, even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after his
open admission of responsibility for the killing. Hence, he must prove the essential requisites For the record, witness is in a kneeling position when he allegedly picked up the
of self-defense as aforementioned.62 shovel holding it in the middle part. With his two hands and swang (sic) it upwards
towards his left.
Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-
defense, whether complete or incomplete.63 Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, For the record, accused held the shovel on the middle part of the shaft, your Honor,
sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or not on the handle.
intimidating attitude.64 There must be actual physical force or a threat to inflict physical injury.
In case of a threat, it must be offensive and positively strong so as to display a real, not Third, it simply goes against the grain of human experience for the victim James
imagined, intent to cause injury.65 Pangoden to persist in his attack against accused-appellant after getting hit in the
head with a steel shovel, considering that he is unarmed and had nothing to match
 accused-appellant’s weapon on hand. That James Pangoden still had the resolution the crime, the imposable penalty, following Article 64(2) of the Revised Penal Code,
and power for a second assault on accused-appellant, after getting hit with a steel is reclusion temporal in its minimum period or within the range of twelve (12) years and one
shovel in the head, flouts ordinary human capacity and nature. In contrast, accused- (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
appellant would claim that he "fell down" and "felt dizzy" after getting boxed on the Law, the maximum penalty to be imposed shall be taken from the minimum period
right side of his head by James Pangoden with his bare fist. of reclusion temporal, while the minimum shall be taken from within the range of the penalty
next lower in degree, which is prision mayor or from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve
Fourth, accused-appellant himself admitted walking away from the crime scene (12) years.
immediately after the incident. As we see it, this actuation on his part is contrary to
his assertion of self-defense. Flight strongly indicates a guilty mind and betrays the The Court of Appeals sentenced petitioner to suffer the penalty of eight (8) years of prision
existence of a guilty conscience, for a righteous individual will not cower in fear and mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. We find this
unabashedly admit the killing at the earliest possible opportunity if he were morally to be in order.
justified in doing so.
With respect to award of damages, the trial court awarded to the heirs of the victim the
Finally, the nature and number of the fatal injuries inflicted upon James Pangoden following amounts: P195,080.05 as actual damages; P300,000.00 as moral
negate accused-appellant’s claim of self-defense. Said victim suffered cerebral damages; P50,000.00 as death indemnity; and P3,135,720.00 for loss of earning capacity.
contusion, epidural hematoma, scalp laceration and skull fracture, which directly
caused his death. If accused-appellant hit the victim just to defend himself, it certainly The Court of Appeals, except for the award of death indemnity, reduced the awards given by
defies reason why he had to aim for the head and do it twice. Indeed, the nature, the trial court as follows: P51,549.25 as actual damages; P50,000.00 as moral damages
number and location of the wounds sustained by the victim belie the assertion of self- and P1,960,200.00 for lost income.
defense since the gravity of said wounds is indicative of a determined effort to kill and
not just to defend. When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil
indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3)
xxxx moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.67

But even assuming arguendo that accused-appellant was able to establish the Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other
element of unlawful aggression, still, this Court will rule out self-defense. than the commission of the crime.68 Under prevailing jurisprudence,69 the award
of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim as civil indemnity is in order.70
It is undisputed that James Pangoden was unarmed while accused-appellant was
armed with a steel shovel. There was no reasonable necessity for accused-appellant As to actual damages, the heirs of the victim are entitled thereto, because said damages
to use a steel shovel to repel the attack of an unarmed man. Moreover, the amounting to P51,549.25 were duly proved by receipts. It is necessary for a party seeking
eyewitnesses’ account of how accused-appellant uncaringly threw the soiled actual damages to produce competent proof or the best evidence obtainable, such as
eggplants towards the direction of James Pangoden’s goods would negate the receipts, to justify an award therefor.71
absence of sufficient provocation on the part of accused-appellant. Thus, the second
and third requisites for self-defense to be successfully invoked, namely, reasonable Moral damages must also be awarded because these are mandatory in cases of murder and
necessity of the means employed to repel the attack and lack of sufficient homicide, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim.72 The award
provocation on the part of the accused, are not present in this case.66 of P50,000.00 as moral damages is in order.

We now go to the imposition of the penalty. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it The award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when
appreciated in favor of the petitioner the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. It no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court. 73 Under Article 2224
was established that a few hours after the incident, petitioner submitted himself to his of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the
supervisors, who, in turn, surrendered him to the police authorities. heirs of the victim suffered pecuniary loss, although the exact amount was not proved.74 In the
case on hand, temperate damages cannot be awarded, because evidence of expenses for
Petitioner is guilty of Homicide for having killed James Pangoden. The penalty for homicide burial and funeral has been presented for which actual damages have been awarded.
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. However, considering that
there is one mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance in the commission of
As regards exemplary damages, Article 2230 of the Civil Code allows the award thereof as
part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.75 There being no aggravating circumstance that accompanied the commission
of the crime, exemplary damages cannot be awarded. TINGA, J.:

The computation of the Court of Appeals with respect to lost earning capacity is correct. At This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks the partial reversal of the 21
the time of his death, the victim was 31 years old. His gross annual income was P120,000.00 February 1996 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals Fifteenth Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 37957
because he was earning P10,000.00 monthly. Living expenses are estimated at 50% of the which modified the 17 April 1995 Decision2 of the Construction Industry Arbitration
gross annual income. Loss of earning capacity is computed by applying the following Commission (CIAC).
formula:76
The case originated from an action for a sum of money filed by Titan-Ikeda Construction and
Net Earning = life expectancy x [Gross – living expenses
Development Corporation (Titan) against Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Corporation
Capacity [2/3(80-age at death)] Annual (50% of GAI)] (Uniwide) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 119, 3 Pasay City arising from
Income (GAI) Uniwide's non-payment of certain claims billed by Titan after completion of three projects
covered by agreements they entered into with each other. Upon Uniwide's motion to
= [2/3(80-31)] x [(GAI) – (50% of GAI)] dismiss/suspend proceedings and Titan's open court manifestation agreeing to the
= 2 (49)     x [P120,000 – P60,000] suspension, Civil Case No. 98-0814 was suspended for it to undergo arbitration. 4 Titan's
   3 complaint was thus re-filed with the CIAC.5 Before the CIAC, Uniwide filed an answer which
was later amended and re-amended, denying the material allegations of the complaint, with
= [98/3] x [P60,000] counterclaims for refund of overpayments, actual and exemplary damages, and attorney's
fees. The agreements between Titan and Uniwide are briefly described below.
= [32.67] x [P60,000]
Net Earning = P1,960,200.00 PROJECT 1.6
Capacity of the
victim The first agreement (Project 1) was a written "Construction Contract" entered into by Titan
and Uniwide sometime in May 1991 whereby Titan undertook to construct Uniwide's
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Warehouse Club and Administration Building in Libis, Quezon City for a fee
CR No. 26636, dated 31 January 2006, is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioner. of P120,936,591.50, payable in monthly progress billings to be certified to by Uniwide's
representative.7 The parties stipulated that the building shall be completed not later than 30
November 1991. As found by the CIAC, the building was eventually finished on 15 February
SO ORDERED.
19928 and turned over to Uniwide.

G.R. No. 126619             December 20, 2006

PROJECT 2.

UNIWIDE SALES REALTY AND RESOURCES CORPORATION, petitioner,

Sometime in July 1992, Titan and Uniwide entered into the second agreement (Project 2)
vs.
whereby the former agreed to construct an additional floor and to renovate the latter's
TITAN-IKEDA CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
warehouse located at the EDSA Central Market Area in Mandaluyong City. There was no
written contract executed between the parties for this project. Construction was allegedly to
be on the basis of drawings and specifications provided by Uniwide's structural engineers.
The parties proceeded on the basis of a cost estimate of P21,301,075.77 inclusive of Titan's
20% mark-up. Titan conceded in its complaint to having received P15,000,000.00 of this
DECISION amount. This project was completed in the latter part of October 1992 and turned over to
Uniwide.

PROJECT 3.9
The parties executed the third agreement (Project 3) in May 1992. In a written "Construction is hereby notified that [Uniwide] Sales Realty and Resources Corporation has
Contract," Titan undertook to construct the Uniwide Sales Department Store Building in assumed responsibility and is held liable for VAT payment on this project. This
Kalookan City for the price of P118,000,000.00 payable in progress billings to be certified to accordingly exempts Claimant Titan-Ikeda Construction and Development
by Uniwide's representative.10 It was stipulated that the project shall be completed not later Corporation from this obligation.
than 28 February 1993. The project was completed and turned over to Uniwide in June 1993.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Honorable Aurora P. Navarette Recina,
Uniwide asserted in its petition that: (a) it overpaid Titan for unauthorized additional works in Presiding Judge, Branch 119, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 94-0814 entitled Titan-
Project 1 and Project 3; (b) it is not liable to pay the Value-Added Tax (VAT) for Project 1; (c) Ikeda Construction Development Corporation, Plaintiff – versus – Uniwide Sales
it is entitled to liquidated damages for the delay incurred in constructing Project 1 and Project Realty and Resources Corporation, Defendant, pending before said court for
3; and (d) it should not have been found liable for deficiencies in the defectively constructed information and proper action.
Project 2.
SO ORDERED."12
An Arbitral Tribunal consisting of a chairman and two members was created in accordance
with the CIAC Rules of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration. It conducted a Uniwide filed a motion for reconsideration of the 17 April 1995 decision which was denied by
preliminary conference with the parties and thereafter issued a Terms of Reference (TOR) the CIAC in its Resolution dated 6 July 1995. Uniwide accordingly filed a petition for review
which was signed by the parties. The tribunal also conducted an ocular inspection, hearings, with the Court of Appeals,13 which rendered the assailed decision on 21 February 1996.
and received the evidence of the parties consisting of affidavits which were subject to cross- Uniwide's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals in its
examination. On 17 April 1995, after the parties submitted their respective memoranda, the assailed Resolution14 dated 30 September 1996.
Arbitral Tribunal promulgated a Decision,11 the decretal portion of which is as follows:
Hence, Uniwide comes to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45. The issues
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: submitted for resolution of this Court are as follows: 15 (1) Whether Uniwide is entitled to a
return of the amount it allegedly paid by mistake to Titan for additional works done on Project
On Project 1 – Libis: 1; (2) Whether Uniwide is liable for the payment of the Value-Added Tax (VAT) on Project 1;
(3) Whether Uniwide is entitled to liquidated damages for Projects 1 and 3; and (4) Whether
[Uniwide] is absolved of any liability for the claims made by [Titan] on this Project. Uniwide is liable for deficiencies in Project 2.

Project 2 – Edsa Central: As a rule, findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally
accorded not only respect, but also finality, especially when affirmed by the Court of
[Uniwide] is absolved of any liability for VAT payment on this project, the same being
Appeals.16 In particular, factual findings of construction arbitrators are final and conclusive
for the account of the [Titan]. On the other hand, [Titan] is absolved of any liability on
and not reviewable by this Court on appeal.17 This rule, however admits of certain exceptions.
the counterclaim for defective construction of this project.

In David v. Construction Industry and Arbitration Commission, 18 we ruled that, as exceptions,
[Uniwide] is held liable for the unpaid balance in the amount of P6,301,075.77 which
factual findings of construction arbitrators may be reviewed by this Court when the petitioner
is ordered to be paid to the [Titan] with 12% interest per annum commencing from 19
proves affirmatively that: (1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue
December 1992 until the date of payment.
means; (2) there was evident partiality or corruption of the arbitrators or of any of them; (3)
the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to
On Project 3 – Kalookan: the controversy; (4) one or more of the arbitrators were disqualified to act as such under
Section nine of Republic Act No. 876 and willfully refrained from disclosing such
[Uniwide] is held liable for the unpaid balance in the amount of P5,158,364.63 which disqualifications or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
is ordered to be paid to the [Titan] with 12% interest per annum commencing from 08 materially prejudiced; or (5) the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
September 1993 until the date of payment. them, that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted to them was
not made.19
[Uniwide] is held liable to pay in full the VAT on this project, in such amount as may
be computed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue to be paid directly thereto. The BIR
Other recognized exceptions are as follows: (1) when there is a very clear showing of grave Art. 1724. The contractor who undertakes to build a structure or any other work for a
abuse of discretion20 resulting in lack or loss of jurisdiction as when a party was deprived of a stipulated price, in conformity with plans and specifications agreed upon with the
fair opportunity to present its position before the Arbitral Tribunal or when an award is landowner, can neither withdraw from the contract nor demand an increase in the
obtained through fraud or the corruption of arbitrators,21 (2) when the findings of the Court of price on account of the higher cost of labor or materials, save when there has been a
Appeals are contrary to those of the CIAC,22 and (3) when a party is deprived of change in the plans and specifications, provided:
administrative due process.23
(1) Such change has been authorized by the proprietor in writing; and
Thus, in Hi-Precision Steel Center, Inc. v. Lim Kim Builders, Inc.,24 we refused to review the
findings of fact of the CIAC for the reason that petitioner was requiring the Court to go over (2) The additional price to be paid to the contractor has been determined in writing by
each individual claim and counterclaim submitted by the parties in the CIAC. A review of the both parties.
CIAC's findings of fact would have had the effect of "setting at naught the basic objective of a
voluntary arbitration and would reduce arbitration to a largely inutile institution." Further, The Court of Appeals did take note of this provision, but deemed it inapplicable to the case at
petitioner therein failed to show any serious error of law amounting to grave abuse of bar because Uniwide had already paid, albeit with unwritten reservations, for the "additional
discretion resulting in lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Arbitral Tribunal, in either the works." The provision would have been operative had Uniwide refused to pay for the costs of
methods employed or the results reached by the Arbitral Tribunal, in disposing of the detailed the "additional works." Instead, the Court of Appeals applied Art. 142327 of the New Civil Code
claims of the respective parties. In Metro Construction, Inc. v. Chatham Properties, Inc.,25 we and characterized Uniwide's payment of the said amount as a voluntary fulfillment of a natural
reviewed the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals because its findings on the issue of obligation. The situation was characterized as being akin to Uniwide being a debtor who paid
whether petitioner therein was in delay were contrary to the findings of the CIAC. Finally, a debt even while it knew that it was not legally compelled to do so. As such debtor, Uniwide
in Megaworld Globus Asia, Inc. v. DSM Construction and Development Corporation, 26 we could no longer demand the refund of the amount already paid.
declined to depart from the findings of the Arbitral Tribunal considering that the computations,
as well as the propriety of the awards, are unquestionably factual issues that have been
discussed by the Arbitral Tribunal and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Uniwide counters that Art. 1724 makes no distinction as to whether payment for the
"additional works" had already been made. It claims that it had made the payments, subject
to reservations, upon the false representation of Titan-Ikeda that the "additional works" were
In the present case, only the first issue presented for resolution of this Court is a question of authorized in writing. Uniwide characterizes the payment as a "mistake," and not a "voluntary"
law while the rest are factual in nature. However, we do not hesitate to inquire into these fulfillment under Art. 1423 of the Civil Code. Hence, it urges the application, instead, of the
factual issues for the reason that the CIAC and the Court of Appeals, in some matters, principle of solutio indebiti  under Arts. 215428 and 215629 of the Civil Code.
differed in their findings.
To be certain, this Court has not been wont to give an expansive construction of Art. 1724,
We now proceed to discuss the issues in seriatim. denying, for example, claims that it applies to constructions made of ship vessels, 30 or that it
can validly deny the claim for payment of professional fees to the architect.31 The present
Payment by Mistake for Project 1 situation though presents a thornier problem. Clearly, Art. 1724 denies, as a matter of right,
payment to the contractor for additional works which were not authorized in writing by the
The first issue refers to the P5,823,481.75 paid by Uniwide for additional works done on proprietor, and the additional price of which was not determined in writing by the parties.
Project 1. Uniwide asserts that Titan was not entitled to be paid this amount because the
additional works were without any written authorization. Yet the distinction pointed out by the Court of Appeals is material. The issue is no longer
centered on the right of the contractor to demand payment for additional works undertaken
It should be noted that the contracts do not contain stipulations on "additional works," because payment, whether mistaken or not, was already made by Uniwide. Thus, it would not
Uniwide's liability for "additional works," and prior approval as a requirement before Titan anymore be incumbent on Titan to establish that it had the right to demand or receive such
could perform "additional works." payment.

Nonetheless, Uniwide cites Article (Art. ) 1724 of the New Civil Code as basis for its claim But, even if the Court accepts Art. 1724 as applicable in this case, such recognition does
that it is not liable to pay for "additional works" it did not authorize or agree upon in writing. not ipso facto accord Uniwide the right to be reimbursed for payments already made, since
The provision states: Art. 1724 does not effect such right of reimbursement. It has to be understood that Art. 1724
does not preclude the payment to the contractor who performs additional works without any
prior written authorization or agreement as to the price for such works if the owner decides
anyway to make such payment. What the provision does preclude is the right of the was already included in the contract price for Project 1. Citing Secs. 99 and 102 of the
contractor to insist upon payment for unauthorized additional works. National Internal Revenue Code, Uniwide asserts that VAT, being an indirect tax, may be
shifted to the buyer by including it in the cash or selling price and it is entirely up to the buyer
Accordingly, Uniwide, as the owner who did pay the contractor for such additional works even to agree or not to agree to absorb the VAT. 34 Thus, Uniwide concludes, if there is no provision
if they had not been authorized in writing, has to establish its own right to reimbursement not in the contract as to who should pay the VAT, it is presumed that it would be the seller.35
under Art. 1724, but under a different provision of law. Uniwide's burden of establishing its
legal right to reimbursement becomes even more crucial in the light of the general The contract for Project 1 is silent on which party should shoulder the VAT while the contract
presumption contained in Section 3(f), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that "money paid by for Project 3 contained a provision to the effect that Uniwide is the party responsible for the
one to another was due to the latter." payment of the VAT.36 Thus, when Uniwide paid the amount of P2,400,000.00 as billed by
Titan for VAT, it assumed that it was the VAT for Project 3. However, the CIAC and the Court
Uniwide undertakes such a task before this Court, citing the provisions on solutio of Appeals found that the same was for Project 1.
indebiti  under Arts. 2154 and 2156 of the Civil Code. However, it is not enough to prove that
the payments made by Uniwide to Titan were "not due" because there was no prior We agree with the conclusions of both the CIAC and the Court of Appeals that the amount
authorization or agreement with respect to additional works. There is a further requirement of P2,400,000.00 was paid by Uniwide as VAT for Project 1. This conclusion was drawn from
that the payment by the debtor was made either through mistake or under a cloud of doubt. In an Order of Payment37 dated 7 October 1992 wherein Titan billed Uniwide the amount
short, for the provisions on solutio indebiti to apply, there has to be evidence establishing the of P2,400,000.00 as "Value Added Tax based on P60,000,000.00 Contract," computed on the
frame of mind of the payor at the time the payment was made.32 basis of 4% of P60,000,000.00. Said document which was approved by the President of
Uniwide expressly indicated that the project involved was the "UNIWIDE SALES
The CIAC refused to acknowledge that the additional works on Project 1 were indeed WAREHOUSE CLUB & ADMIN BLDG." located at "90 E. RODRIGUEZ JR. AVE., LIBIS,
unauthorized by Uniwide. Neither did the Court of Appeals arrive at a contrary determination. Q.C." The reduced base for the computation of the tax, according to the Court of Appeals,
There would thus be some difficulty for this Court to agree with this most basic premise was an indication that the parties agreed to pass the VAT for Project 1 to Uniwide but based
submitted by Uniwide that it did not authorize the additional works on Project 1 undertaken by on a lower contract price. Indeed, the CIAC found as follows:
Titan. Still, Uniwide does cite testimonial evidence from the record alluding to a concession
by employees of Titan that these additional works on Project 1 were either authorized or Without any documentary evidence than Exhibit "H" to show the extent of tax liability
documented.33 assumed by [Uniwide], the Tribunal holds that the parties is [sic] obliged to pay only a
share of the VAT payment up to P60,000,000.00 out of the total contract price
Yet even conceding that the additional works on Project 1 were not authorized or committed of P120,936,591.50. As explained by Jimmy Gow, VAT is paid on labor only for
into writing, the undisputed fact remains that Uniwide paid for these additional works. Thus, to construction contracts since VAT had already been paid on the materials
claim a refund of payments made under the principle of solutio indebiti,  Uniwide must be able purchased. Since labor costs is [sic] proportionately placed at 60%-40% of the
to establish that these payments were made through mistake. Again, this is a factual matter contract price, simplified accounting computes VAT at 4% of the contract
that would have acquired a mantle of invulnerability had it been determined by both the CIAC price. Whatever is the balance for VAT that remains to be paid on Project 1 – Libis
and the Court of Appeals. However, both bodies failed to arrive at such a conclusion. shall remain the obligation of [Titan]. (Emphasis supplied.)38
Moreover, Uniwide is unable to direct our attention to any pertinent part of the record that
would indeed establish that the payments were made by reason of mistake. Liquidated Damages

We note that Uniwide alleged in its petition that the CIAC award in favor of Titan in the On the third issue of liquidated damages, the CIAC rejected such claim while the Court of
amount P5,158,364.63 as the unpaid balance in Project 3 included claims for additional Appeals held that the matter should be left for determination in future proceedings where the
works of P1,087,214.18 for which no written authorization was presented. Unfortunately, this issue has been made clear.
issue was not included in its memorandum as one of the issues submitted for the resolution
of the Court. In rejecting Uniwide's claim for liquidated damages, the CIAC held that there is no legal basis
for passing upon and resolving Uniwide's claim for the following reasons: (1) no claim for
Liability for the Value-Added Tax (VAT) liquidated damages arising from the alleged delay was ever made by Uniwide at any time
before the commencement of Titan's complaint; (2) the claim for liquidated damages was not
The second issue takes us into an inquiry on who, under the law, is liable for the payment of included in the counterclaims stated in Uniwide's answer to Titan's complaint; (3) the claim
the VAT, in the absence of a written stipulation on the matter. Uniwide claims that the VAT
was not formulated as an issue to be resolved by the CIAC in the TOR;39 and (4) no attempt Arbitration has been defined as "an arrangement for taking and abiding by the judgment of
was made to modify the TOR to accommodate the same as an issue to be resolved. selected persons in some disputed matter, instead of carrying it to established tribunals of
justice, and is intended to avoid the formalities, the delay, the expense and vexation of
Uniwide insists that the CIAC should have applied Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of ordinary litigation."43 Voluntary arbitration, on the other hand, involves the reference of a
Court.40 On this matter, the Court of Appeals held that the CIAC is an arbitration body, which dispute to an impartial body, the members of which are chosen by the parties themselves,
is not necessarily bound by the Rules of Court. Also, the Court of Appeals found that the which parties freely consent in advance to abide by the arbitral award issued after
issue has never been made concrete enough to make Titan and the CIAC aware that it will be proceedings where both parties had the opportunity to be heard. The basic objective is to
an issue. In fact, Uniwide only introduced and quantified its claim for liquidated damages in its provide a speedy and inexpensive method of settling disputes by allowing the parties to avoid
Memorandum submitted to the CIAC at the end of the arbitration proceeding. The Court of the formalities, delay, expense and aggravation which commonly accompany ordinary
Appeals also noted that the only evidence on record to prove delay in the construction of litigation, especially litigation which goes through the entire hierarchy of courts. 44 As an
Project 1 is the testimony of Titan's engineer regarding the date of completion of the project arbitration body, the CIAC can only resolve issues brought before it by the parties through the
while the only evidence of delay in the construction of Project 3 is the affidavit of Uniwide's TOR which functions similarly as a pre-trial brief. Thus, if Uniwide's claim for liquidated
President. damages was not raised as an issue in the TOR or in any modified or amended version of it,
the CIAC cannot make a ruling on it. The Rules of Court cannot be used to contravene the
spirit of the CIAC rules, whose policy and objective is to "provide a fair and expeditious
According to Uniwide, the ruling of the Court of Appeals on the issue of liquidated damages
settlement of construction disputes through a non-judicial process which ensures harmonious
goes against the established judicial policy that a court should always strive to settle in one
and friendly relations between or among the parties."45
proceeding the entire controversy leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future
litigations.41 Uniwide claims that the required evidence for an affirmative ruling on its claim is
already on the record. It cites the pertinent provisions of the written contracts which contained Further, a party may not be deprived of due process of law by an amendment of the
deadlines for liquidated damages. Uniwide also noted that the evidence show that Project 1 complaint as provided in Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. In this case, as noted by
was completed either on 15 February 1992, as found by the CIAC, or 12 March 1992, as the Court of Appeals, Uniwide only introduced and quantified its claim for liquidated damages
shown by Titan's own evidence, while Project 3, according to Uniwide's President, was in its memorandum submitted to the CIAC at the end of the arbitration proceeding. Verily,
completed in June 1993. Furthermore, Uniwide asserts, the CIAC should have applied Titan was not given a chance to present evidence to counter Uniwide's claim for liquidated
procedural rules such as Section 5, Rule 10 with more liberality because it was an damages.
administrative tribunal free from the rigid technicalities of regular courts.42
Uniwide alludes to an alleged judicial admission made by Engr. Luzon Tablante wherein he
On this point, the CIAC held: stated that Project 1 was completed on 10 March 1992. It now claims that by virtue of Engr.
Tablante's statement, Titan had admitted that it was in delay. We disagree. The testimony of
Engr. Tablante was offered only to prove that Project 1 was indeed completed. It was not
The Rule of Procedure Governing Construction Arbitration promulgated by the CIAC
offered to prove the fact of delay. It must be remembered that the purpose for which evidence
contains no provision on the application of the Rules of Court to arbitration
is offered must be specified because such evidence may be admissible for several purposes
proceedings, even in a suppletory capacity. Hypothetically admitting that there is
under the doctrine of multiple admissibility, or may be admissible for one purpose and not for
such a provision, suppletory application is made only if it would not contravene a
another, otherwise the adverse party cannot interpose the proper objection. Evidence
specific provision in the arbitration rules and the spirit thereof. The Tribunal holds
submitted for one purpose may not be considered for any other purpose. 46 Furthermore, even
that such importation of the Rules of Court provision on amendment to
assuming, for the sake of argument, that said testimony on the date of completion of Project 1
conform to evidence would contravene the spirit, if not the letter of the CIAC
is admitted, the establishment of the mere fact of delay is not sufficient for the imposition of
rules. This is for the reason that the formulation of the Terms of Reference is done
liquidated damages. It must further be shown that delay was attributable to the contractor if
with the active participation of the parties and their counsel themselves. The TOR is
not otherwise justifiable. Contrarily, Uniwide's belated claim constitutes an admission that the
further required to be signed by all the parties, their respective counsel and all the
delay was justified and implies a waiver of its right to such damages.
members of the Arbitral Tribunal. Unless the issues thus carefully formulated in the
Terms of Reference were expressly showed [sic] to be amended, issues outside
thereof may not be resolved. As already noted in the Decision, "no attempt was ever Project 2: "as-built" plans, overpricing, defective construction
made by the [Uniwide] to modify the TOR in order to accommodate the issues related
to its belated counterclaim" on this issue. (Emphasis supplied.) To determine whether or not Uniwide is liable for the unpaid balance of P6,301,075.77 for
Project 2, we need to resolve four sub-issues, namely: (1) whether or not it was necessary for
Titan to submit "as-built" plans before it can be paid by Uniwide; (2) whether or not there was
overpricing of the project; (3) whether or not the P15,000,000.00 paid by Uniwide to Titan for
Project 2 constitutes full payment; and (4) whether or not Titan can be held liable for defective The Tribunal holds that [Uniwide] has not introduced any evidence to sustain its
construction of Project 2. charge of fraudulent conspiracy. As a matter of fact, [Uniwide]'s own principal
witness, Jimmy Gow, admitted on cross-examination that he does not have any direct
The CIAC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, held Uniwide liable for deficiency relating to evidence to prove his charge of connivance or complicity between the [Titan] and his
Project 2 in the amount of P6,301,075.77. It is nonetheless alleged by Uniwide that Titan own representatives. He only made that conclusion by the process of his own "logical
failed to submit any "as-built" plans for Project 2, such plans allegedly serving as a condition reasoning" arising from his consultation with other contractors who gave him a much
precedent for payment. Uniwide further claims that Titan had substantially overcharged lower estimate for the construction of the Dau Project. There is thus no reason to
Uniwide for Project 2, there being uncontradicted expert testimony that the total cost of invalidate the binding character of Exhibit "2-A" which, it is significant to point out, is
Project 2 did not exceed P7,812,123.60. Furthermore, Uniwide alleged that the works [Uniwide]'s own evidence.49 (Emphasis supplied.)
performed were structurally defective, as evidenced by the structural damage on four
columns as observed on ocular inspection by the CIAC and confirmed by Titan's project Accordingly, deducting the P15,000,000.00 already paid by Uniwide from the total contract
manager. price of P21,301,075.77, the unpaid balance due for Project 2 is P6,301,075.77. This is the
same amount reflected in the Order of Payment prepared by Uniwide's representative, Le
On the necessity of submitting "as-built" plans, this Court rules that the submission of such Consultech, Inc. and signed by no less than four top officers and architects of Le Consultech,
plans is not a pre-requisite for Titan to be paid by Uniwide. The argument that said plans are Inc. endorsing for payment by Uniwide to Titan the amount of P6,301,075.77.50
required by Section 308 of Presidential Decree No. 1098 (National Building Code) and by
Section 2.11 of its Implementing Rules before payment can be made is untenable. The Uniwide asserts that Titan should not have been allowed to recover on Project 2 because the
purpose of the law is "to safeguard life, health, property, and public welfare, consistent with said project was defective and would require repairs in the amount of P800,000.00. It claims
the principles of sound environmental management and control." The submission of these that the CIAC and the Court of Appeals should have applied Nakpil and Sons v. Court of
plans is necessary only in furtherance of the law's purpose by setting minimum standards and Appeals51 and Art. 1723 of the New Civil Code holding a contractor responsible for damages
requirements to control the "location, site, design, quality of materials, construction, use, if the edifice constructed falls within fifteen years from completion on account of defects in the
occupancy, and maintenance" of buildings constructed and not as a requirement for payment construction or the use of materials of inferior quality furnished by him or due to any violation
to the contractor.47 The testimony of Engr. Tablante to the effect that the "as-built" plans are of the terms of the contract.
required before payment can be claimed by Titan is a mere legal conclusion which is not
binding on this Court. On this matter, the CIAC conducted an ocular inspection of the premises on 30 January
1995. What transpired in the said ocular inspection is described thus:
Uniwide claims that, according to one of its consultants, the true price for Project 2 is
only P7,812,123.60. The CIAC and the Court of Appeals, however, found the testimony of On 30 January 1995, an ocular inspection was conducted by the Arbitral Tribunal as
this consultant suspect and ruled that the total contract price for Project 2 is P21,301,075.77. requested by [Uniwide]. Photographs were taken of the alleged construction defects,
The CIAC held: an actual ripping off of the plaster of a certain column to expose the alleged structural
defect that is claimed to have resulted in its being "heavily damaged" was done,
The Cost Estimate for Architectural and Site Development Works for the EDSA clarificatory questions were asked and manifestations on observations were made by
Central, Dau Branch Project (Exhibit "2-A" for [Uniwide] and made as a common the parties and their respective counsels. The entire proceedings were recorded on
exhibit by [Titan] who had it marked at [sic]  its own Exhibit "U"), which was admittedly tape and subsequently transcribed. The photographs and transcript of the ocular
prepared by Fermindoza and Associates, [Uniwide]'s own architects, shows that the inspection form part of the records and considered as evidence.52
amount of P17,750,896.48 was arrived at. Together with the agreed upon mark-up of
20% on said amount, the total project cost was P21,301,075.77. And, according to these evidence, the CIAC concluded as follows:

The Tribunal holds that the foregoing document is binding upon the [Uniwide], it It is likewise the holding of this Tribunal that [Uniwide]'s counterclaim of defective
being the mode agreed upon by which its liability for the project cost was to be construction has not been sufficiently proven. The credibility of Engr. Cruz,
determined.48 (Emphasis supplied.) [Uniwide]'s principal witness on this issue, has been severely impaired. During the
ocular inspection of the premises, he gave such assurance of the soundness of his
Indeed, Uniwide is bound by the amount indicated in the above document. Claims of opinion as an expert that a certain column was heavily damaged judging from the
connivance or fraudulent conspiracy between Titan and Uniwide's representatives which, it is external cracks that was readily apparent x x x
alleged, grossly exaggerated the price may properly be dismissed. As held by the CIAC:
 xxxx WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 21 February 1996 in CA-G.R. SP No. 37957 is hereby AFFIRMED.
On insistence of the Tribunal, the plaster was chipped off and revealed a structurally
sound column x x x SO ORDERED.

Further, it turns out that what was being passed off as a defective construction by G.R. No. 209137               July 1, 2015
[Titan], was in fact an old column, as admitted by Mr. Gow himself x x x
x53 (Emphasis supplied.) EDUARDO CELEDONIO, Petitioner,
vs.
Uniwide had the burden of proving that there was defective construction in Project 2 but it PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
failed to discharge this burden. Even the credibility of its own witness was severely impaired.
Further, it was found that the concrete slab placed by Titan was not attached to the old DECISION
columns where cracks were discovered. The CIAC held that the post-tensioning of the new
concrete slab could not have caused any of the defects manifested by the old columns. We MENDOZA, J.:
are bound by this finding of fact by the CIAC.
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Eduardo
It is worthy to stress our ruling in Hi-Precision Steel Center, Inc. v. Lim Kim Steel Builders, Celedonio (Celedonio) assails the April 8, 2013 Decision1 and the September 17, 2013
Inc.54 which was reiterated in David v. Construction Industry and Arbitration Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 34472, affirming the August 18,
Commission,55 that: 2011 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Malabon City (RTC), in Criminal Case
No. 35668-MN.
x x x Executive Order No. 1008 created an arbitration facility to which the
construction industry in the Philippines can have recourse. The Executive Order The Information,4 dated April 25, 2007, charged Celedonio with the crime of Robbery with
was enacted to encourage the early and expeditious settlement of disputes in Force Upon Things, the accusatory portion of which reads:
the construction industry, a public policy the implementation of which is
necessary and important for the realization of national development goals.
That on or about the 22nd day of April 2007, in the Municipality of Navotas, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
Aware of the objective of voluntary arbitration in the labor field, in the construction with intent to gain and by means of force upon things, and without the consent of the owner,
industry, and in any other area for that matter, the Court will not assist one or the did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the house of the herein
other or even both parties in any effort to subvert or defeat that objective for their complainant by destroying the backdoor of said house, and once inside, take, rob and carry
private purposes. The Court will not review the factual findings of an arbitral tribunal away the following:
upon the artful allegation that such body had "misapprehended facts" and will not
pass upon issues which are, at bottom, issues of fact, no matter how cleverly
disguised they might be as "legal questions." The parties here had recourse to (1) one gold bracelet 24K Php8,000.00
arbitration and chose the arbitrators themselves; they must have had confidence in
such arbitrators. The Court will not, therefore, permit the parties to relitigate before it (3) necklace (1) one 24K and (2) two 18K Php42,000.00
the issues of facts previously presented and argued before the Arbitral Tribunal, save
only where a clear showing is made that, in reaching its factual conclusions, the (2) two digicam Sony player Php22,000.00
Arbitral Tribunal committed an error so egregious and hurtful to one party as to
constitute a grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or loss of jurisdiction. (1) one DVD portable Php5,000.00
Prototypical examples would be factual conclusions of the Tribunal which resulted in
deprivation of one or the other party of a fair opportunity to present its position before
(1) one wrist watch Tagheur Php30,000.00
the Arbitral Tribunal, and an award obtained through fraud or the corruption of
arbitrators. Any other, more relaxed rule would result in setting at naught the basic
objective of a voluntary arbitration and would reduce arbitration to a largely inutile (1) one sun glass Guess Php5,000.00
institution. (Emphasis supplied.)
 (1) one camera Canon Php2,500.00 Guzman (De Guzman)while she was away to attend to the wake of her deceased husband.
No one was left in the house. Marquez, whose house was opposite the house of De Guzman
(1) one Gameboy advance Php5,000.00 and Celedonio, which were adjacent to each other, identified Celedonio as the culprit. Upon
learning of the incident, De Guzman reported it to the police and requested that Celedonio be
investigated for possibly having committed the crime, based on the account of Marquez.
(1) one calculator Php1,500.00

Later, a follow-up operation was conducted by PO1 Rommel Roque (PO1 Roque)and SPO2
(1) one discman Sony Php3,000.00
Adrian Sugui (SPO2 Sugui), accompanied by Marquez. They proceeded to Raja Humabon
St., Navotas, to survey the area for the possible identification and apprehension of the
(2) two pcs. 100.00 US dollar bills suspect. On their way, Marquez pointed to a man on a motorcycle and said, "Sir, siya po si
Eduardo Celedonio." The police immediately flagged down Celedonio. PO1 Roque asked him
(22) twenty two pcs. Php500.00 bills if he was Eduardo Celedonio, but he did not reply and just bowed his head.

(2) two necklace 18K worth Php30,000.00 SPO2 Sugui informed Celedonio of a complaint for robbery against him. Celedonio still
remained silent and just bowed his head. SPO2 Sugui asked him, "Where [were] the stolen
(2) two bracelet worth Php11,500.00 items?" Celedonio then alighted from his motorcycle and opened its compartment where PO1
Roque saw some of the stolen items, as per report of the incident, such as the portable DVD
(2) two gold ring worth Php8,000.00 player and a wristwatch, among others.6

(1) one wedding ring worth 14K worth Php1,500.00 PO1 Roque asked Celedonio if the same were stolen, to which the latter answered, "Iyan
po."7 Thus, Celedonio was arrested and was informed of his constitutional rights. More
itemswere seized from Celedonio at the police station.
(1) one wrist watch swiss military worth Php10,000.00
Version of the Accused
(1) one cellphone NOKIA 8250 worth Php3,000.00
After the prosecution rested its case, Celedonio filed his Demurrer to Evidence (with leave of
(3) three pairs of earrings worth Php15,000.00
court) citing as his ground the alleged illegality of his arrest and the illegal search on his
motorcycle. The RTC denied the demurrer, stating that the question of the legality of
(3) three pcs. of 100.00 US dollars worth Php15,000.00 Celedonio’s arrest had been mooted by his arraignment and his active participation in the trial
of the case. It considered the seizure of the stolen items as legal not only because of
(60) sixty pcs. of Php50.00 bills worth Php3,000.00 Celedonio’s apparent consent to it, but also because the subject items were in a moving
vehicle.8
(100) one hundred pcs. of Php20.00 bills worth Php2,000.00
In his defense, Celedonio claimed that he was at home with his wife, sleeping, at the time of
(15) fifteen pcs. of Php100.00 bills worth Php1,500.00 owned and belonging to the incident. His wife corroborated his statement.
CARMENCITA DE GUZMAN y SERRANO, to the damage and prejudice of the
herein complainant, in the aforementioned amount of Php223,000.00. In its Decision, dated August 18,2011, the RTC found Celedonio guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Robbery with Force Upon Things. The dispositive portion of the RTC
Contrary to law.5 decision9 reads:

Version of the Prosecution WHEREFORE, finding the accused EDUARDO CELEDONIO y MONIS GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for the offense of Robbery with Force Upon Things as defined and
The evidence for the prosecution shows that on the evening of April 21, 2007, a certain penalized under Article 299 (a)2 of the Revised Penal Code, he is therefore sentenced to an
Adriano Marquez (Marquez)witnessed the robbery perpetrated in the house of Carmencita De indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years
and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum. He is also ordered to pay private complainant the
amount of Php105,000.00 which is the worth of what has not been recovered from the loss III
she suffered by reason of the robbery.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING
SO ORDERED.10 THAT THE PROSECUTION WITNESS ADRIANO MARQUEZ WAS ILL-MOTIVATED IN
TESTIFYING AGAINST THE PETITIONER.
The trial court was convinced that the prosecution clearly established that: 1) a robbery had
been committed; 2) it was committed recently; 3) several of the stolen items including cash The petition lacks merit.
were found in Celedonio’s possession; and 4) Celedonio had no valid explanation for his
possession of the stolen goods.11 Jurisprudence tells us that direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix from which a trial
court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules on evidence allow a trial court to
Insisting on his innocence, Celedonio appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. The lack of direct evidence
RTC erred: 1) in convicting him of the crime despite the insufficiency of the circumstantial does not ipso facto bar the finding of guilt against the appellant. As long as the prosecution
evidence; 2) in not finding that the search was illegal, rendering the articles recovered establishes the accused-appellant’s participation in the crime through credible and sufficient
inadmissible; and 3) in not finding that the prosecution witness Marquez was ill-motivated in circumstantial evidence that leads to the inescapable conclusion that he committed the
testifying against him.12 imputed crime, the latter should be convicted.16

The CA, however, affirmed the RTC in toto. It found that the totality of circumstances Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance;
warranted the finding that Celedonio was solely and directly responsible for the crime.13 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.17
In addition, the CA brushed aside Celedonio’s argument that he was illegally arrested and
that the items seized should be excluded as evidence. It stressed that Celedonio was not In this case, the prosecution sufficiently laid down the circumstances that, when taken
arrested when he voluntarily opened the compartment of his motorcycle. He was only brought together, constituted an unbroken chain that led to a reasonable conclusion that Celedonio
to the police for investigation after some of the stolen items were found in his motorcycle was the perpetrator. The CA opined that:
compartment.14 Further, Celedonio’s failure to raise the issue before his arraignment
constituted a waiver on his part to question the legality of his arrest.15 xxx As correctly pointed out by the trial court, these circumstances are: accused was a next
door neighbor of private complainant; he was seen by another neighbor going over the
Celedonio moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied. concrete fence separating their houses and ransacking a room in complainant’s house;
during the time, no one was inside complainant’s house as all of them were at the wake of
Hence, the present petition. private complainant’s recently demised husband; two (2) days after, most of the items
discovered to have been stolen that night were found in the compartment of the accused’s
motorcycle which he was riding on when accosted by the police; the items recovered from
ISSUES
him were identified by the complainant as her stolen property; during the trial accused denied
that the stolen items were found in his possession and claimed that they were "planted" by
I the police investigators to frame him up of the robbery. In short, the accused could not
explain his possession of the recently stolen items found in his sole possession.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING THAT THE PETITIONER’S GUILT WAS PROVEN BASED xxxx
ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
We find the conviction of accused-appellant based on circumstantial evidence factually and
II legally tenable, as the facts from which the aforementioned circumstances arose have been
proved through the positive testimony of Adriano Marquez, PO1 Rommel Roque and
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING Carmencita de Guzman.18
THAT THE SEARCH CONDUCTED ON THE PETITIONER WAS ILLEGAL, RENDERING
THE ARTICLES RECOVERED INADMISSIBLE. The defense does not refute the existence of the commission of robbery. In fact, Celedionio
himself acknowledged that the prosecution’s circumstantial evidence, although weak,
ambiguous and inconclusive, established that 1) a robbery had been committed; 2) it was that it could not destroy whatever credibility Marquez possessed as a witness. The CA, thus,
committed recently; 3) several of the stolen items including cash were found in his posited:
possession; and 4) he had no valid explanation for his possession of the stolen
goods.19 Celedonio, however, still insisted that he cannot be convicted of the crime of robbery xxx It is true that under the Rules of Court, a witness may be impeached by evidence that his
because 1) he was not caught in exclusive possession of the stolen items; 2) the search general reputation for truth, honesty or integrity is bad.1âwphi1 However, a witness cannot be
conducted on him was illegal thereby rendering the seized articles inadmissible; and 3) the impeached by evidence of particular wrongful acts, unless there is a showing of previous
witness Marquez was ill-motivated in testifying against him. conviction by final judgment such that not even the existence of pending information maybe
shown to impeach him.
These arguments, however, do not hold water.
More so, in this case, wherein no information was filed against the witness, but only the mere
First, Celedonio was, in fact, caught in exclusive possession of some of the stolen items say so of the accused on Marquez' alleged involvement in a quarrel with him over a water
when the police officers flagged down his motorcycle during their follow-up operation. He meter. Furthermore, no testimony was presented to show that the reputation of Marquez for
failed to give a reasonable explanation as to his possession of the said items. Section 3(j), truth, honesty or integrity is bad; no evil motive has been established against prosecution
Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a person found in possession of a thing witness Marquez that might prompt him to testify falsely against accused-appellant
taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; Celedonio.22
otherwise, that thing which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, is
owned by him. Alibi and denial were the only defenses of Celedonio. Unless he can strongly support his
claims that the items were "planted" and that it was physically impossible for him to be in De
Celedonio never claimed ownership of the subject items. When the alleged stolen items were Guzman's house other than the mere averment that he was asleep at the time, his defenses
found in his motorcycle compartment which he had control over, the disputable presumption cannot prevail over the strong circumstantial evidence.23
of being the taker of the stolen items arose. He could have overcome the presumption, but he
failed to give a justifiable and logical explanation. Thus, the only plausible scenario that could Having established the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence, the CA did not commit any
be inferred therefrom was that he took the items. reversible error in upholding the RTC. In the absence of any indication that the R TC and the
CA overlooked facts or circumstances that would result in a different ruling in this case, the
Second, no illegal search was made upon Celedonio. When the police officers asked where Court will not disturb their factual findings.24
the stolen items were, they merely made a general inquiry, and not a search, as part of their
follow-up operation. Records did not show that the police officers even had the slightest hint WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
that the stolen items were in Celedonio’s motorcycle compartment. Neither was there any
showing that the police officers frisked Celedonio or rummaged over his motorcycle. There SO ORDERED.
was no showing either of any force or intimidation on the part of the police officers when they
made the inquiry. Celedonio himself voluntarily opened his motorcycle compartment. Worse,
when he was asked if the items were the stolen ones, he actually confirmed it.20 The police
officers, therefore, were left without any recourse but to take him into custody for further
investigation. At that instance, the police officers had probable cause that he could be the
culprit of the robbery. He did not have any explanation as to how he got hold of the items.
Moreover, taking into consideration that the stolen items were in a moving vehicle, the police
had to immediately act on it.

Third, contrary to Celedonio’s argument, Marquez was a credible witness. Jurisprudence also
tells us that where there is no evidence that the witnesses of the prosecution were actuated
by ill motive, it is presumed that they were not so actuated and their testimony is entitled to
full faith and credit.21

In this case, if only to discredit Marquez, Celedonio claimed that they once had a fight over a
water meter. As correctly observed by the CA, however, such allegation was too insignificant