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75112

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 75112 October 16, 1990

FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO, in his capacity as Judge of the
Regional Trial Court,. Branch XIV, Roxas City and the late POTENCIANO KAPUNAN, SR., as substituted by
his heirs, namely: LEONA KAPUNAN TIANGCO, CICERO KAPUNAN, JESUS KAPUNAN, SANTIAGO
KAPUNAN, POTENCIANO KAPUNAN, JR., PAZ KAPUNAN PUBLICO, SUSA KAPUNAN GENUINO and
ERLINDA KAPUNAN TESORO, respondents.

Aquilina B. Brotarlo for petitioner.

Rhodora G. Kapunan for the Substituted Heirs of the late respondent.

FERNAN, C.J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City, Branch 14 in Civil Case
No. V-4222 which found petitioner Filamer Christian Institute and Daniel Funtecha negligent and therefore answerable for the resulting injuries caused to private
respondent Potenciano Kapunan, Sr.

Private respondent Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., an eighty-two-year old retired schoolteacher (now deceased), was
struck by the Pinoy jeep owned by petitioner Filamer and driven by its alleged employee, Funtecha, as Kapunan, Sr.
was walking along Roxas Avenue, Roxas City at 6:30 in the evening of October 20, 1977. As a result of the
accident, Kapunan, Sr. suffered multiple injuries for which he was hospitalized for a total of twenty (20) days.

Evidence showed that at the precise time of the vehicular accident, only one headlight of the jeep was functioning.
Funtecha, who only had a student driver's permit, was driving after having persuaded Allan Masa, the authorized
driver, to turn over the wheels to him. The two fled from the scene after the incident. A tricycle driver brought the
unconscious victim to the hospital.

Thereafter, Kapunan, Sr. instituted a criminal case against Funtecha alone in the City Court of Roxas City for serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Kapunan, Sr. reserved his right to file an independent civil action.
The inferior court found Funtecha guilty as charged and on appeal, his conviction was affirmed by the then Court of
First Instance of Capiz. 2

Pursuant to his reservation, Kapunan, Sr. commenced a civil case for damages 3 before the RTC of Roxas City.
Named defendants in the complaint were petitioner Filamer and Funtecha. Also included was Agustin Masa, the
director and president of Filamer Christian Institute, in his personal capacity in that he personally authorized and
allowed said Daniel Funtecha who was his houseboy at the time of the incident, to drive the vehicle in question
despite his knowledge and awareness that the latter did not have the necessary license or permit to drive said
vehicle. His son, Allan Masa, who was with Funtecha at the time of the accident, was not impleaded as a co-
defendant. 4

On December 14, 1983, the trial court rendered judgment finding not only petitioner Filamer and Funtecha to be at
fault but also Allan Masa, a non-party. Thus:

WHEREFORE, finding the averments in the complaint as supported by preponderance of evidence to be reasonable
and justified, and that defendants Daniel Funtecha, Filamer Christian Institute and Allan Masa are at fault and
negligent of the acts complained of which causes (sic) injury to plaintiff, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants, namely: Daniel Funtecha and Filamer Christian Institute, the employer whose
liability is primary and direct, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the following:
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(1) to pay the sum of TWO THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(P2,950.50) as medical expenses (Exh. "A");

(2) to pay TWO HUNDRED FORTY ONE PESOS (P241.00) as doctor's fee (Exh. "C");

(3) to pay THREE HUNDRED NINETY PESOS (P390.00) as additional expenses incurred for thirty-
nine days at P10.00 a day, for remuneration of plaintiff's helper while recuperating;

(4) to pay FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) as Court litigation expenses;

(5) to pay THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00) as loss of earnings capacity;

(6) to pay TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages;

(7) to pay FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) as attorney's fees;

(8) to pay TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00)as insurance indemnity on the policy contract;

and without prejudice to the right of defendant Filamer Christian Institute to demand from co-defendant
Daniel Funtecha part-time employee and/or Allan Masa a full time employee reimbursement of the
damages paid to herein plaintiff.

The defendant Agustin Masa as director of defendant Filamer Christian Institute has also failed to
exercise the diligence required of a good father of a family in the supervision of his employee Allan
Masa, being his son. However, the court absolved defendant Agustin Masa from any personal liability
with respect to the complaint filed against him in his personal and private capacity, cause he was not in
the vehicle during the alleged incident.

For failure to prove their respective counterclaims filed by the defendant Daniel Funtecha, Dr. Agustin
Masa, and Filamer Christian Institute, as against the herein plaintiff, same are hereby dismissed.

The Zenith Insurance Corporation as third party defendant has failed to prove that there was a policy
violation made by the defendant Filamer Christian Institute which absolves them from liability under the
aforesaid insurance policy. The record shows that the defendant Daniel Funtecha while driving the said
vehicle was having a student drivers license marked Exh. "1" and accompanied by Allan Masa who is
the authorized driver of said vehicle with a professional drivers license as shown by Exh. "3".

This Court finds that defendant Daniel Funtecha while driving the said vehicle is considered as
authorized driver in accordance with the policy in question marked Exh. "2-Masa and FCI".

Finding the averments in the third party complaint filed by defendant Filamer Christian Institute as
supported by preponderance of evidence as shown by their exhibits to be reasonable and justified,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the said defendant and third party plaintiff Filamer Christian
Institute as against third party defendant Zenith Insurance Corporation.

The Zenith Insurance Corporation as third party defendant is hereby ordered to pay in favor of the
defendant and third party plaintiff, Filamer Christian Institute, the following:

(1) to pay TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) as third party liability as provided
in the Zenith Insurance Corporation policy (Exh. "2");

(2) to pay TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00)as moral damages;

(3) to pay FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00) as Court litigation and actual
expenses;

(4) to pay THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00) as attorney's fees;

The defendants Daniel Funtecha, Filamer Christian Institute and third party defendant Zenith Insurance
Corporation are hereby ordered jointly and severally, to pay the costs of the suit. 5

Only petitioner Filamer and third-party defendant Zenith Insurance Corporation appealed the lower court's judgment
to the Court of Appeals and as a consequence, said lower court's decision became final as to Funtecha. For failure
of the insurance firm to pay the docket fees, its appeal was dismissed on September 18, 1984. On December 17,
1985, the Appellate Court rendered the assailed judgment affirming the trial court's decision in toto. 6 Hence the
present recourse by petitioner Filamer.

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It is petitioner Filamer's basic contention that it cannot be held responsible for the tortious act of Funtecha on the
ground that there is no existing employer-employee relationship between them. We agree.

The Civil Code provides:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.

xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that
they observe all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied).

The legal issue in this appeal is whether or not the term "employer" as used in Article 2180 is applicable to petitioner
Filamer with reference to Funtecha.
7
In disclaiming liability, petitioner Filamer has invoked the provisions of the Labor Code, specifically Section 14,
Rule X of Book III which reads:

Sec. 14. Working scholars. — There is no employer-employee relationship between students on the
one hand, and schools, colleges or universities on the other, where students work for the latter in
exchange for the privilege to study free of charge; provided the students are given real opportunity,
including such facilities as may be reasonable, necessary to finish their chosen court under such
arrangement. (Emphasis supplied).

It is manifest that under the just-quoted provision of law, petitioner Filamer cannot be considered as Funtecha's
employer. Funtecha belongs to that special category of students who render service to the school in exchange for
free tuition Funtecha worked for petitioner for two hours daily for five days a week. He was assigned to clean the
school passageways from 4:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. with sufficient time to prepare for his 7:30 a.m. classes. As
admitted by Agustin Masa in open court, Funtecha was not included in the company payroll. 8

The wording of Section 14 is clear and explicit and leaves no room for equivocation. To dismiss the implementing
rule as one which governs only the "personal relationship" between the school and its students and not where there
is already a third person involved, as espoused by private respondents, is to read into the law something that was
not legislated there in the first place. The provision of Section 14 is obviously intended to eliminate an erstwhile gray
area in labor relations and seeks to define in categorical terms the precise status of working scholars in relation to
the learning institutions in which they work for the privilege of a free education.

But even if we were to concede the status of an employee on Funtecha, still the primary responsibility for his
wrongdoing cannot be imputed to petitioner Filamer for the plain reason that at the time of the accident, it has been
satisfactorily shown that Funtecha was not acting within the scope of his supposed employment. His duty was to
sweep the school passages for two hours every morning before his regular classes. Taking the wheels of the Pinoy
jeep from the authorized driver at 6:30 in the evening and then driving the vehicle in a reckless manner resulting in
multiple injuries to a third person were certainly not within the ambit of his assigned tasks. In other words, at the time
of the injury, Funtecha was not engaged in the execution of the janitorial services for which he was employed, but
for some purpose of his own. It is but fair therefore that Funtecha should bear the full brunt of his tortious
negligence. Petitioner Filamer cannot be made liable for the damages he had caused.

Private respondents' attempt to hold petitioner Filamer directly and primarily answerable to the injured party under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code would have prospered had they proceeded against Allan Masa, the authorized driver
of the Pinoy jeep and undisputably an employee of petitioner. It was Allan's irresponsible act of entrusting the
wheels of the vehicle to the inexperienced Funtecha which set into motion the chain of events leading to the
accident resulting in injuries to Kapunan, Sr. But under the present set of circumstances, even if the trial court did
find Allan guilty of negligence, such conclusion would not be binding on Allan. It must be recalled that Allan was
never impleaded in the complaint for damages and should be considered as a stranger as far as the trial court's
judgment is concerned. It is axiomatic that no man shall be affected by a proceeding to which he is a stranger. 9

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WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision under review of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.
The complaint for damages 10 is ordered DISMISSED as against petitioner Filamer Christian Institute for lack of
cause of action. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur but limit my concurrence on the employee-employer relationship to labor law situations.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur but limit my concurrence on the employee-employer relationship to labor law situations.

Footnotes

1 Penned by Associate Justice Desiderio P. Jurado and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose C.
Campos, Jr. and Serafin E. Camilon. Associate Justice Crisolito Pascual did not take part.

2 Annex E of Petition, p. 49. Rollo.

3 Civil Case No. V-4222.

4 Records. pp. 1 and 3.

5 Records, pp, 572-573.

6 Rollo, pp. 177 and 21.

7 Presidential Decree No. 442.

8 Records, p. 569.

9 Church Assistance Program vs. Sibulo, G.R. No. 76552, March 21, 1989.

10 Civil Case No. V-4222.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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