Nagusara Vs NLRC
Nagusara Vs NLRC
Nagusara Vs NLRC
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Respondent Dy failed with the NLRC a “Motion for Reconsideration, Set Aside Decision
and/or Memorandum of Appeal” arguing that: (1) there was no proper service of
summons, (2) there was no employer-employee relationship between him and
petitioners, and (3) petitioners were not entitled to the relief prayed for in the
complaint.[4] On December 27, 1984 , the NLRC set aside the decision and remanded
the case to the Labor Arbiter.[5]
On June 29, 1988, Labor Arbiter Felipe T. Garduque II issued a decision holding that
the termination of petitioners’ services was illegal. It, however, found petitioners’
claim for overtime pay, legal holiday pay and premium pay for holiday and rest day to
be unfounded.[7] The dispositive portion of the decision states:
On appeal, the NLRC set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It dismissed the
complaint on the ground that there was no employer-employee relationship between
petitioners and respondent Dy. It held that respondent Dy was only an indirect
employer of petitioners as they were actually employed by respondent Amurao whom
respondent Dy sub-contracted to provide labor for his construction project. It also
declared that petitioners were not illegally dismissed. [9] The dispositive portion of the
resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, let the decision appealed from be, as it is hereby, SET ASIDE and
another one ENTERED dismissing the instant cases for lack of merit. [10]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the NLRC for lack of
merit.[11]
Petitioners alleged that in 1981, they were hired as carpenters by Dynasty Steel
Works owned by respondent Dy. Dynasty was engaged in the business of making
steel frames, windows, doors and other construction works. It was contracted by
Solmac Marketing to construct its building in Balintawak, Caloocan City.
On November 25, 1982, petitioners went to the Social Security System (SSS) office
to inquire about their benefits under the system. They were informed that they were
not reported as employees either by Dynasty or by respondent Dy. Petitioners filed a
complaint against Dynasty and respondent Dy for violation of SSS laws and
regulations.
On December 20, 1982, petitioners were prohibited from entering the work site at the
Solmac compound. The security guard showed them an order/notice dated December
18, 1982 issued by respondent Dy instructing him not to allow petitioners to enter the
premises as they were already dismissed from work. Petitioners sought the help of
P/Cpl. Alexander Licuan of the Caloocan Police Department. P/Cpl. Licuan
accompanied petitioners to the work site and inquired about the reason for the
prohibition. Respondent Amurao who introduced himself as supervisor told P/Cpl.
Licuan that petitioners’ services were terminated upon the order of respondent Dy.
Respondent Amurao also filed his own comment stating that he and respondent Dy
entered into a sub-contracting agreement whereby he undertook to supply the
manpower for respondent Dy’s construction project at Solmac building. To comply
with his obligation, respondent Amurao engaged the services of about thirty men
which include petitioners. Respondent Amurao stated that he had complete discretion
in the selection, hiring and dismissal of said workers; that he had direct controls and
supervision over the performance of their work; and that any complaint against them
were coursed through him.
Private respondents would like to make it appear that petitioners were employees of
respondent Amurao who was supposedly sub-contracted by respondent Dy to provide
labor for his construction project at Solmac. Such assertion, however, does not
deserve credence because as observed by the Labor Arbiter:
x x x (T)his Office is inclined to believe the claim of complainants that they were
employees of respondent and not Isayas Amurao.
Firstly, the alleged subcontract between respondent (Dy) and Isayas Amurao is
questionable since the same was dated June 8, 1982, and was conformed by (sic)
respondent Lorenzo Dy on June 11, 1982, around eight (8) months after
complainants had started working in September or October, 1981.
Secondly, the sworn statements and testimonies of respondent Lorenzo Dy and his
witness, Isayas Amurao submitted and declared during the hearing of this case
contain full of (sic) inconsistencies affecting their stand. The affidavits of the other
complainants Pozon, Garcia and Lizarondo do not also deserve weight considering the
fact that the same contradict their previous Sinumpaang Salaysay attached to their
position paper.
Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. -- The provisions of written agreement to
the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an
employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at
the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be
performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the
season.
Respondent Dy stated in his comment that petitioners were not dismissed from work.
Petitioners were allegedly caught by the owner of Solmac Marketing having a drinking
spree inside the compound. Hence, respondent Amurao allegedly decided to transfer
petitioners to another project, but petitioners opposed the transfer and filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent Dy.
We are not convinced. Respondent Dy’s allegation is self-serving and not supported
by substantial evidence. In termination cases, the employer has the burden of
proving that there was just cause for the employee’s dismissal. [18] In this case,
respondent Dy merely presented his own affidavit and that of respondent Amurao
stating that petitioners were drinking within the premises by the owner of Solmac.
He did not present any other witness to substantiate the statements contained in the
affidavits. He did not even present as witness the owner of Solmac Marketing who
allegedly caught petitioners drinking inside the compound.
Dismissal is the ultimate penalty that can be meted to an employee. For dismissal to
be legal, it must be based on just cause which must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence.[19] Respondent Dy failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence
to support the legality of petitioners’ dismissal.
As a rule, employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled to backwages and
reinstatement to their former position without loss of seniority rights. There are
instances, however, where reinstatements is no longer viable as where the business
of the employer has closed, or where the relations between the employer and the
employee have been so severely strained that it is not advisable to order
reinstatement, or where the employee decides not to be reinstated. In such events,
the employer will instead be ordered to pay separation pay. [20]
The records shows that Dynasty Steel Works ceased operating in May 1985. [21] The
closure of Dynasty rendered impossible the reinstatement of petitioners. Hence, in
lieu of reinstatement, respondent Dy should pay petitioners their separation pay in
addition to their backwages computed from the time of their separation until the date
of Dynasty’s closure.[22]
All the other money claims of petitioners are dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence
to support the same. We note the finding of Labor Arbiter Garduque:
With respect to the claim of overtime, the same has not been established by clear
and convincing evidence, and not even included in the computation of the then socio
economic staff of this office, and in the first decision dated February 28, 1993.
The remaining claims of legal holiday pay and premium pay for holiday and rest day
cannot also be granted although unrefuted by respondent but from Annex “H” to
complainants’ reply/comment to respondent’s position paper, it discloses that
complainants only worked up to six (6) days in a week. [23]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the assailed resolution and order of the NLRC are SET ASIDE.
Private respondent Lorenzo Dy is hereby ordered to pay petitioners their SEPARATION
PAY and BACKWAGES. No cost.
SO ORDERED.