ANSWER KEY DPC ONLINE EXAM June 2020

Question Answer Keys Marks

No.
 When cause of action for the suit arose. 1
1(a). Shalini gives possession of the site on
23.02.2014 even though she was required to
give possession on 23.01.2014 as per the Joint
Development Agreement. Therefore it would be
difficult for her to contend that time of 6 months
should be calculated from the date of the
agreement. It would have to be 6 months from
the date of possession being given (which would
also be a “reasonable period of time” under
section 46 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872)
Accordingly, it can be said that the defendant
M/s Dhiraj Realtors was required to complete
the construction of the six-storeyed building and
obtain BBMP clearance by 23.08.2014.
Necessary averment must be incorporated in the
Plaint.

 Limitation: If cause of action arose on 23-08- 1

2014, the suit ought to have been filed within 3
years thereafter by virtue of Article 54 of the
Limitation Act, 1963. However, since there is a
written acknowledgement by the Defendant
No. 1 of the liability vide letter dated 28-02-
2020, it can be said that under section 18 a fresh
period accrues from the said date. Hence, the
suit filed within 3 years from 28-02-2020 in
April 2020 is within time (necessary averment
to that effect under Order 7 Rule 6 should be
made)

 Prayer: Plaintiff seeks the following:

a) Specific Performance of J.D.A. dated 1
23.01.2014 whereby the defendant is directed
to complete the construction of the suit schedule
property namely the remaining 2 floors and
hand over vacant possession of 6 apartments
after paying the plaintiff towards Rs. 7 per
flat for 18 flats retained by the Defendant No.
1;
b) Damages for delay in the completion of the
construction (Rs. 1 lakh per month from 23-08-
 2014 till date of suit) and future damages during
the pendency of the suit;
c) Costs and such other reliefs as the Hon’ble Court
deems fit and proper.

 List of Documents : Would include letter dated 1

07-01-2020 having an admission that Dhiraj
was away from India when the contract was
required to be performed and is thus
responsible for the delay; letter dated 28-02-
2020 carrying an assurance that extends the
limitation period; letters in September 2016,
2019 and 2020 between the parties; internet
and paper clippings regarding frauds by
Dhiraj; the JDA dated 23-01-2014; notice
issued prior to suit as per clause 3(m);
documents to show damages.

 Condition precedent to be averred: Under Order 1

6 Rule 6 the Plaintiff would need to aver that
due notice has been given prior to the suit as per
clause 3(m).

 Valuation and Court Fees Paid: Valuation for the 1

purposes of territorial jurisdiction : the subject-
matter of the suit is immovable property as
described, out of which Plaintiff is seeking
possession of 6 apartments valued at (say) Rs. 9
lakhs per apartment = 54 lakhs. Plus Rs. 126
lakhs due to her for the 18 flats. Plus Rs. 1 lakh
per month from 23-08-2014 till April 2020 = Rs
68 lakhs. Total= 248 lakhs. Court fees: A sum of
Rs. 3,31,125/- is paid on the Plaint as court fees
under section 40(e) [suit for specific
performance] read with section 21 [suit for
money], section 6 [multifarious suits] and
Article 1(xvi) of Schedule 1 of the Karnataka
Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958.

 Material averments : JDA executed on 23-01- 2

2014 on the terms set out; when possession
given and when project to be completed; status
of the project; letters exchanged; that Plaintiff
ready and willing (section 16 SRA, 1963)
  Format : Including title, parties, schedule. 1
1(b). ISSUES 2
(a) Whether the plaintiff proves that she was ready
and willing to perform her part of the contract
as per J.D.A. dated 23.01.2014? (assuming that
the JDA dated 23-01-2014 is undisputed)
(b) Whether Plaintiff proves that the Defendant No.
1 committed breach of the JDA dated 23-01-
2014?
(c) Whether Plaintiff is entitled for specific
performance as per the provisions of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963?
(d) Whether Plaintiff further proves that she has
suffered damages as claimed by her and is
entitled to the same?
(e) Whether Defendant No. 1 establishes that
Plaintiff’s delay resulted in jeopardizing the
project in question and that delay was thus
justified?
(f) Whether the suit is within time?
(g) Whether the court fees paid are sufficient?
(h) What order ?

2. Material Averments 1.5

 That the defendants 1 to 3 vide their article
published in Times Newspaper edition dated
28.12.2019 made the following false statement
: “OFFICER MAKES MONEY DURING PANDEMIC:
Smt. Ameya Ratanlal, IAS Officer currently
Deputy Commissioner, Mumbai, has illegally
made money by awarding contracts for Civil
Supplies during COVID 19 Pandemic without
calling for public tender”
 The said statement has been made maliciously
against the plaintiff in order to malign her
reputation as a consequence of which, the
plaintiff has lost her reputation in the
governmental circles and was consequently
transferred to Bengaluru unceremoniously by
Order of the CM dated 25-12-2019.
 The plaintiff’s career has been irretrievably
affected on account of the false and malicious
statements made against her. Her chances of
promotion have been blighted. The plaintiff is
seeking damages to the tune of Rs. 25 lakhs for
 defamation.

ARGUMENTS
 The Plaintiff has convincingly and clearly 1.5
proved that the statement made against her by
the Defendants was false- this is apparent from
Exhibits P2 to P19 showing her Service
Records- that indicate that no complaint has
been received against her at the relevant point
in time.
 Per contra, the evidence of DW1 (editor of
Times Newspaper) is riddled with
contradictions- in para 2 of chief he says
someone told him about the corruption
committed by the Plaintiff whilst in para of cross
he admits that no person has given information
to him about the corruption.
 Further, by virtue of the landmark judgment in
State of Kerala vs John Janardhan, 2011(9)
SCC 234, it is well-established that newspaper
are not excluded by the law of defamation and
they may well be sued if they make false
statements. Hence, the contention of the
Defendants that newspapers cannot be sued
for defamation is unacceptable.

3. Since the Promissory Note was payable on or before 2

06.03.2017 and Ziya failed to repay the loan by the said
date, the cause of action arose on 06.03.2017. Under
Article 31 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act,
1963 period of limitation prescribed is 3 years from
the date when the promissory note is due to be paid.
Hence, period of limitation is expired on 06.03.2020.
The fact that from 25.03.2020 to 08.06.2020, courts in
Karnataka were closed due to COVID 19 pandemic is
irrelevant since only if the courts were closed at the
time when period of limitation expired the plaintiff
would get the advantage of section 4 of the Limitation
Act,1963.
4. Under Order 41 Rule 22 of the CPC 1908, a Cross 2
Objector is expressly entitled to raise objections against
the findings in the judgment whereas the appellant can
only question the decree as per the bare wording of
section 96. Further, the cross-objector can file his
 objections within one month from the date of
service of notice fixing the date for hearing of appeal
even though limitation for preferring an appeal from
the decree is calculated from the date of the decree.
Thus, he has an advantage even in terms of limitation.

5. The Supreme Court in the following cases appears to 2

have diluted the rigour of section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963. (Any one of these cases with facts and ratio
clearly enumerated.) Ramlal Motilal and Chhotelal
vs. Reva Coal Fields reported in AIR 62 SC 361,
Mohan Bigrama Chela vs. Financial Commissioner
1977 (4) SCC 69, and Collector, Land Acquisition
Anant Nagar vs. Master Katiji 1987 (2) SCC 109.
6. GROUNDS FOR DHIRUBHAI 4

 That the petitioner could not have been

implicated for the more serious offence
under section 306 of IPC and at best, he could
have been implicated only under section 27 of
the Drugs & Cosmetics Act, 1945, which is a
much smaller offence. There is no evidence or
material to indicate that petitioner had any clue
or knowledge of the mental state of the victim-
in fact, Petitioner’s assistant Mr Shyamprakash
gave the medicine mechanically. Thus, the
alleged offence is not a serious one.
 That the Petitioner is innocent and has not
committed any offence. There is nothing on
record to show that Petitioner knew about the
mental state of the victim. In fact, the
Petitioner’s assistant gave the drugs only after
verification of the prescription given by the
victim. Indeed, there is an entry in the Record
Book of the Pharmacy noting the doctor and
prescription date.
 That the facts and circumstances are such that
Petitioner would not abscond and would be
available for assisting in the investigation. The
petitioner is a law-abiding citizen and has never
been convicted for any offence. He has been
running a Pharmacy in Nagarbhavi,
Bengaluru for the past 15 years. He is
residing at Nagarbhavi with his wife and
children for the past 25 years and has strong
 roots in society. He is not likely to abscond or
tamper with the prosecution evidence.
 The petitioner had initially filed bail petition
before JMFC Nagrbhavi in Crl Misc No.
43/2020 which was erroneously rejected
vide order dated 20.05.2020 on the sole ground
that petitioner had given medicine across the
counter without prescription. However, the
learned judge has ignored the entries made in
the Record Book of the Pharmacy that show that
drugs were supplied only on prescription.
 The petitioner is now under detention since
22.04.2020 i.e., for the past one-and-a-half
months and is suffering serious hardship.
 The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in various
decisions that bail is the rule and that jail is
the exception and as such, the petitioner
deserves to be enlarged on bail.
7. The defendants can prefer an appeal against the order 2
passed to the Hon’ble High Court under Order 39 Rule
1 r/w Order 43 Rule 1(r) r/w section 106 of CPC.

8. SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS OF LAW 2

a) Did not the court below act perversely in

ignoring Ex. P8 which is the report of the Court
Commissioner as well as the evidence of the
Court Commissioner (CW2) which categorically
establishes the Plaintiff’s title to the property?
b) Did not the court below act perversely in
relying upon the alleged Release Deed dated
30-04-2012 set up by the defendant to establish
his title, when the same was unregistered and
not marked in evidence?
c) Is not the finding recorded by the court below
that Plaintiff is not in possession perverse since
Exhibits P1 to P5 are revenue records showing
the possession of the Plaintiff and Defendant did
not lead any rebuttal evidence on this issue?

9. GROUNDS FOR SHOLAY ENTERPRISES

4
(a) That the Licensing Authority viz., the Deputy
Commissioner, has acted arbitrarily in
rejecting the application for license filed by the
 petitioner and thereby violated his
fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles
19 (freedom of business, trade and
profession), 14 (equality and non-
arbitrariness) and 21(right to life which
includes right to decent standard of living) of
the Constitution of India.

(b) That the petitioner was not given an

opportunity of being heard and thereby the
principle of audi alteram partem was
violated. It is a well-established principle of
administrative law that before an administrative
authority takes any decision that affects the
rights of citizens, they should be heard in the
matter.

(c) That the Deputy Commissioner has acted

arbitrarily and contrary to the Rules in
entertaining the objections by a rival cinema
operator. Such a procedure is not
contemplated under the Cinema Regulations
Rules 2014. Rules 35 and 36 do not permit any
objections to be filed.

(d) That the Deputy Commissioner has acted

arbitrarily in refusing license on the ground that
Petitioner has exhibited indecent films when
such a ground of refusal is not available as
per the Rules concerned. In any event, the
objections and the FIR are malicious. The FIR
has been filed by Punith Poori – who is none
other than the brother of Amit Poori- and thus
show obvious mala fides. The Deputy
Commissioner ought not to have given any
importance to the FIR in the circumstances.

(e) That the Deputy Commissioner has acted

contrary to law by passing an order dated
20.06.2019 even though he was required to
pass an order within 15 days of the
application under Rule 36 of the Rules.

10. Parties : John represented by his G.P.A. holder Mrs. 1

Mary Ann, vide GPA dated 03-05-2020 (hereinafter
 called the “vendor”) and Janardhan (hereinafter called
the “vendee”.

Schedule and correct boundaries: On the North: 1

Government Multi-Storeyed Complex (earlier an open
field).

Valid title : Permission of the Deputy Commissioner 1

not to alienate granted land and the discharge of
housing loan by John.

Time for performance and date of agreement: 1

Vendor required to execute registered sale deed upon
being paid balance consideration within 6 months from
the date of registration of the agreement (date of
agreement and registration being different).

Other averments:
 Previous title-holders 2
 Consideration
 Possesssion
 Time of essence
 Self-acquired property (own earnings)

Stamp Duty paid : Under section 3 of the Karnataka

Stamp Act, 1957 read with Article 5 (e)(i) “possession 2
delivered with agreement” and Article 20 (i) [@8% of
the market value] = 8% of 70 lakhs = Rs. 5.6 lakhs.

Format 1

11.  In civil matters persons can approach the 3

Supreme Court under Articles 132 (certificate
appeal where High Court certifies that the case
involves a substantial question of law as to the
interpretation of the constitution); under
Article 133 (if High Court certifies that the case
involves a substantial question of law of general
importance and that the said question needs to
be decided by the Supreme Court); and under
Article 136 (Special Leave Petitions).
 Sections 109, 112 and 107 to 108 and Order
45 of the Code relate to appeals to the Supreme
Court on the civil side. The Supreme Court Rules
 made under Article 145 that override the
provisions of the Code in case of inconsistency.
The procedure is laid out in Order 45 for
certificate appeals. Application needs to be made
by petition stating the grounds of appeal and
praying for a certificate (Rule 3). Thereupon
notice shall be served on the opposite side (Rule
3). Upon grant of certificate, the High Court shall
require security for costs from the applicant,
require deposit of amount for preparing and
transmitting the paper-book, declare the appeal
admitted, transmit the record to the Supreme
Court and furnish copies of the paper-book to
the parties. Rules 7 and 8. The High Court may
also stay the execution of the decree (Rule 13).
 In criminal matters persons can approach the
Supreme Court under Articles 132 (certificate
appeal where High Court certifies that the case
involves a substantial question of law as to the
interpretation of the constitution); Article 134
(appellate jurisdiction in criminal matters where
High Court grants a certificate; or has on appeal
reversed an order of acquittal and imposed
death sentence or has withdrawn any case from
a subordinate court and convicted the accused
and sentenced him to death); or under Article
136 (Special Leave Petition).
 In addition, under Article 134(2) Parliament
may by law confer on the Supreme Court to hear
appeals from the High Court in criminal
proceedings (pursuant to which the Supreme
Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate
Jurisdiction) Act, 1970 has been enacted
whereby an appeal lies if the High Court has
withdrawn or reversed a case on appeal and
imposed a sentence of not less than 10 years.
 On the constitutional side, in addition to Article
132 (involving substantial question of law as to
the interpretation of the constitution), you of
course have writ petitions under Article 32 to
protect and safeguard fundamental rights.

 Whereas on the civil and criminal sides, the

court acts as an appellate court, on the
constitutional side, it acts as the court of first 1
 instance and exercises original jurisdiction.

 Whilst civil and criminal matters involve civil 1

rights and rights of actors within the criminal
justice system, in constitutional matters under
article 32, fundamental rights are involved,
which are generally thought of as being of a
higher importance. Thus, under Article 32, you
can only approach the court if your fundamental
rights are infringed.
 Rules relating to filing and procedure are
generally more rigid in the case of regular
criminal and civil appeals whereas they are
often relaxed in the case of writs even though
the filing procedure for all types of cases is
prescribed under the Supreme Court Rules.

12. (a)LIST OF DATES AND EVENTS 4

30-01-1958 The parties are referred to as per

their designations in the trial court.
The Plaintiff and Defendants Nos. 1
to 3 constituted a HUF governed by
Mitakshara law. The Defendant No.
1 is the kartha of the HUF and the
father of Plaintiff and Defendants 2
and 3. Defendant No. 2 and plaintiff
are brothers whilst Defendant No. 3 is
the sister.

The Defendant No. 1 acquired the

suit schedule property vide a
registered partition deed between
himself and his brothers on 30-01-
1958. Thus, the property is not the
self-acquired property of the kartha
but joint family property of the HUF.

2007 The Plaintiff and Defendants were all

residing together until
misunderstandings arose between
them and Plaintiff was denied his
share in the coparcenary property.
Thus, Plaintiff was constrained to
institute OS No. 38/2007 against
 Defendants 1 and 2 seeking
partition and separate possession
of his 1/3rd share.
2007 The defendants 1 and 2 filed a
common written statement and
falsely contended that the suit
schedule property was the self-
acquired property of defendant
No.1, acquired vide a sale deed
dated 09-08-1998 out of his own
funds.

2008 Defendant No. 3 got herself

impleaded, being the sister of the
Plaintiff, on the erroneous
assumption that she was also a
coparcener and had rights over the
suit schedule property.
2008 to 2013 In the course of the trial, the Plaintiff
led cogent and convincing evidence to
establish his case whereas the
Defendants 1 and 2 failed miserably
in establishing that the property was
self-acquired.
20-08-2013 The trial court rightly decreed the
suit categorically holding that the
suit schedule property was HUF
property and that the coparceners
had rights in the same and
negativing the contention of the
Defendants that the property was
self-acquired.

However, whilst decreeing the suit

in favour of the Plaintiff, the trial
court has erroneously awarded
only 1/4th share instead of 1/3rd on
the erroneous assumption that
Defendant No. 3 is also a
coparcener.
2013 The Defendants 1 and 2 preferred
an appeal against the judgment
and decree of the trial court
holding that the suit property was
HUF property in R.F.A. 465/2013 to
 the High Court.

Challenging the same judgment

and decree of the trial court
awarding 1/4th share instead of
1/3rd, the plaintiff preferred an
appeal R.F.A. No. 816/2013 to the
Hon’ble High Court.

12-09-2019 The two appeals were heard and

disposed of together by the
Hon’ble High Court acting under
section 96 CPC, vide the impugned
judgment and decree dated 12-09-
2019.

The Hon’ble High Court has rightly

dismissed RFA 465/2013 by
affirming that the suit schedule
property is HUF property.

However, the Hon’ble High Court

has erroneously also dismissed
RFA No. 816/2013 filed by the
Plaintiff without appreciating that
by law, Defendant No. 3 has no
right over the property in
question.
09-06-2020 Hence, this Special Leave Petition.

(b) CAUSE TITLE

IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 1
(ORDER 16 RULE 3(1)(a)
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION
(Under Article 136 of the Constitution of India)
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION CIVIL NO……OF 2020
WITH PRAYER FOR INTERIM RELIEF

BETWEEN
IN RFA NO. 816/2013
BETWEEN STATUS IN STATUS
HIGH BEFORE
 COURT THIS
HON’BLE
COURT
Sri Narendra Gupta Appellant Petitioner
AND
1. Sri Lalchand Respondent Respondent
Gupta No. 1 No. 1
2. Sri Rajkumar Respondent Respondent
Gupta No. 2 No. 2
3. Smt. Sangeetha Respondent Respondent
Gopal No. 3 No. 3

(c) PARA NO. 1 1

The Petitioner above-named respectfully submits this
SLP against the Final Judgment and Decree dated 12-
09-2019 passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka
Bangalore Bench, Banglore, in RFA NO. 816/2013
whereby the appeal filed by the Petitioner has been
dismissed.

(d) QUESTIONS OF LAW

3
(e) Did not courts below err in awarding 1/4th share
to the sister Defendant No. 3 when she was
admittedly born before the 2005 amendment
to the Hindu Succession Act,1956?

(f) Could she have been given the benefit of the

2005 Amendment to section 6 when the section
specifically mentions that it is a right acquired
by birth, and did not the court below
misinterpret section 6 as amended?

(g) Did not the court below err in failing to give

effect to the mandatory requirement of Order
41 Rule 33 of CPC by framing questions for
consideration and answering the same, which
is a mandatory procedure to be followed in a
first appeal ?

13. Crux of the difference: An appeal is generally 2

understood to the judicial examination of a decision of
an inferior court by a higher court. A review is a
judicial re-examination of the case by the same court
and generally the same judge. A revision is an
examination of the proceedings of an inferior court by a
superior court only to ensure that that the lower
court acts within the bounds of its jurisdiction.

Provisions: Review is provided for under section 114 1

read with Order 47 , Revision under section 115 and
Appeals are provided for in various provisions of the
Code inter alia, section 96 read with Order 41 (first
appeals); Section 100 read with Order 43 (second
appeals) and section 109 read with Order 45. (appeals
to the Supreme Court). In addition, there are appeals
from orders under section 104 read with Order 43.

Scope: When these remedies may be invoked: A first 2

appeal is said to be a matter of right, whilst second
appeal lies only upon showing a substantial question of
law. Further, an appeal to the Supreme Court lies only if
there is a substantial question of law of general
importance and in the opinion of the High Court the
said question needs to be decided by the Supreme
Court. Per contra, a review is not a matter of right but
only lies if no appeal is allowed or preferred from
the impugned order and the petitioner satisfies the
court that new evidence has been discovered which
could not be produced earlier in spite of due
diligence or there is an error apparent on the face
of the record or for any other sufficient reason
(usually read ejusdem generis). So also, Revision is not a
matter of right but may only be invoked if there is no
appeal from the impugned order, and there is a
jurisdictional error committed by the subordinate
court. Now the scope of review is drastically curtailed
by the 1999 amendment which provides that High
Court may not interfere except where the order, if it
had been made in favour of the party applying for
revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or
other proceedings.