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November 2016 (/magazine/2016/november-2016)

SPECIAL FOCUS: PLANT SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT
(/MAGAZINE/2016/NOVEMBER-2016#SPECIAL-FOCUS-PLANT-SAFETY-AND-
ENVIRONMENT)

Useful tips for a successful

HAZOP study
The products we use on a daily basis comprise a variety of chemicals.
Kunte, V. A. (/authors/t/tata-consulting-engineers-ltd/kunte-v-a), Sakthivel, S. (/authors/t/tata-consulting-engineers-ltd/sakthivel-s), TATA
Consulting Engineers Ltd.
The products we use on a daily basis comprise a variety of chemicals. The products increase the living
standards of billions of people across the world. Many technologies have been developed to manufacture
these chemicals. In any type of industry, such as petroleum re ning, petrochemicals or fertilizer
production, specialty chemical manufacturing, or pesticide production, the handling, processing, storing
and transferring of huge quantities of volatile and ammable hydrocarbons and chemicals are inevitable.
Since hydrocarbons and chemicals are vulnerable to res, explosions or toxic release, they can lead to
various types of accidents. The consequences of an accident could be catastrophic, which a ects capital
investment, personnel safety, equipment and the environment.

These incidents can be avoided by proper assessment and management of risk. The process of risk
assessment involves not only leadership, but also those who are involved in planning, design, operations,
maintenance and safety. This process includes managers, engineers, supervisors, operators and laborers.
Typically, risk reduction involves the selection and design of proper equipment for processing and storing
chemicals. This operation involves selecting suitable piping, instrumentation and controls, electrical
aspects, risk assessments and evaluations, safety audits, onsite and o site disaster management plans,
and safety-related training throughout the lifecycle of the plant.

PROCESS HAZARD ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES

Risk management involves process hazard analysis (PHA) as the rst step to commence the process of
hazard identi cation. Many methods exist for conducting PHA, such as:

What-if checklist
Fault tree analysis (FTA)
 Failure mode and e ect analysis (FMEA)
Cause–consequence analysis
Event tree analysis (ETA)
Hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP).

Of the above, a HAZOP study is a powerful technique for the identi cation of hazards. It requires that a
systematic and comprehensive procedure be followed throughout the study, and it utilizes team e orts of
experienced persons in the areas of design, operations, maintenance and safety. This article provides a
number of useful tips for carrying out a successful HAZOP study. These tips are based on the authors’
experience and subsequent analysis of a variety of HAZOP studies attended as a participant and as a
HAZOP study team leader.

HAZOP STUDY—HELPFUL RECOMMENDATIONS

HAZOP is a systematic and structured technique commonly used in identifying potential hazards and/or
problems with plant operability, recognizing consequences arising from various causes and providing
recommendations for safety improvements in design and operations. This exercise is performed by a
properly selected, experienced and interdisciplinary team. Experienced professionals have the ability to
identify potential hazards that may otherwise escape attention during individual desk reviews. Although
this technique was originally developed and used for chemical plants, it has also been used for many
other facilities, such as water treatment plants, sewage treatment plants, water, chemical, hydrocarbon
storage and transfer systems, and pilot plants. Moreover, techniques such as SAFOP, e-HAZOP, c-HAZOP,
software HAZOP and procedure HAZOP have also been developed to identify possible errors in software,
procedures and operational sequences. In such cases, the guidewords vary, but maintain the same intent
—i.e., identifying hazards and causes for operational problems. The following points should be considered.

Requirement of updated documents

Documents for a new or existing facility must be available long before a HAZOP study. The availability of
these documents saves time during these sessions:

1. Process ow diagrams, along with heat and material balances

2. Process descriptions with interlocks descriptions
3. Piping and instrumentation diagrams (P&IDs)
4. Equipment layout drawings
5. Unit plot plans
6. Material safety data sheets (MSDS) for hazardous chemicals
7. Equipment and instrument datasheets
8. Project control philosophy and cause-and-e ect diagrams
9. Provisional operating instructions, and startup and emergency shutdown procedures
10. Utility speci cations (as applicable).

HAZOP is usually carried out once nal P&IDs from the design team are available. The diagrams are
subjected to questioning with the use of proper guidewords and visualizing possible failure modes.
Before undertaking HAZOP of a new facility, it is essential that the latest design considerations during the
design review stages are already incorporated in the P&IDs and other documents.
 (/media/2766/hp116-kunte-plant-safety-environment-table-01.jpg)
If a HAZOP study (TABLE 1) is to be carried out for an existing facility, it is imperative that the P&IDs
(FIG. 1) are up to date. Wherever required, an operator should be involved in updating P&IDs to re ect
the as-built status.

TABLE 1 provides a sample record sheet prepared during a HAZOP study session using di erent
deviations for a continuous process. FIG. 1 provides a schematic representation of the P&ID for a
continuous process. Typical guidewords used for a HAZOP study of a batch process are provided in
TABLE 2.

TABLE 3 provides the sample of a typical recording done during a HAZOP study session using di erent
deviations for a batch process. FIG. 2 provides a schematic representation of the P&ID for a batch
reactor.

(/media/2767/hp116-kunte-plant-safety-environment- g-01.jpg)
 FIG. 1. Schematic diagram of a chemical plant for a HAZOP study of a continuous process.

Realization of adequate time by management

Since the technique of carrying out HAZOP is systematic and thorough, it is a time-consuming activity.
Hence, the identi ed resources that will participate during HAZOP study sessions must be provided in a
timely manner. Since making these resources available for the HAZOP sessions involves drawing
experienced personnel away from their routine activities, along with travel expenses and other costs,
management may nd it di cult to allocate the required resources for an adequate time. Therefore, these
sessions are expected to be completed by the HAZOP team during a very limited time period. This is not
an adequate amount of time, considering the number of P&IDs, their complexity and the volume of work.
Therefore, management must understand the time duration for such studies and should ensure that
unrealistic deadlines are not set.

(/media/2693/hp116-kunte-plant-safety-environment-table-02.jpg)
Selection of proper resources
The intention is that questions raised during the meeting should be answered immediately, instead of
having to resort to outside expertise. Therefore, depending on the type of process, personnel with
suitable backgrounds that are skilled and knowledgeable in the design, operation, commissioning, safety,
shutdown and maintenance of the plant should be part of the HAZOP study team.

If HAZOP is performed by a less-experienced team, all hazards may not be identi ed. The team could
generate recommendations that management may nd di cult to accept.

(/media/2692/hp116-kunte-plant-safety-environment-table-03.jpg)
Desired qualities of a HAZOP study team leader
The responsibility of the team leader includes triggering the discussions using guidewords and
parameters for each of the nodes identi ed, ensuring the completeness of the analysis and maintaining
the progress according to the schedule and agenda.

A HAZOP study leader should be technically strong and experienced. HAZOP study team participants
come from di erent elds of knowledge and experience. It is important that the HAZOP study team
leader is able to manage e ectively during the HAZOP study sessions, keeping in mind the HAZOP study
objectives and the set timelines. The team leader should ensure that the atmosphere during the HAZOP
study sessions is open to a free exchange of ideas and various possibilities without fear of hierarchy by
the participants. The participants should be able to express their ideas and convince other participants of
possible scenarios, causes and consequences. With the knowledge and skills of the team leader, the team
should feel that a balanced and constructive approach is maintained during the study.

(/media/2768/hp116-kunte-plant-safety-environment- g-02.jpg)
FIG. 2. Schematic diagram of a batch reactor.
The team leader should be an independent person with no responsibility for the process and/or the
performance of the operations. Therefore, often with a new facility, a third-party experienced HAZOP
study team leader is considered.

Selection of scribe/secretary
The scribe is an important member of the team. The scribe should be able to quickly write down
numerous causes identi ed by various team members for any deviations during brainstorming sessions.
Thereafter, each and every cause is transcribed to ensure its credibility, identify consequences and arrive
at recommendations. With the help of the team leader and participants, the scribe should properly record
everything into simple and unambiguous language. At the end of each deviation, the scribe should read to
the group the transcribed material. The leader and the participants must ensure that the write-up is
revised, wherever necessary, and agreed upon. The approved write-up should convey to each member of
the group a consistent and clear meaning, as well as provide the proper context in which the
recommendations are considered by the team.

Clear recordings are essential, as these are read at a later stage by other personnel and management for
consideration of implementation of recommendations. Often, it is preferable to add more words,
sentences or a small sketch to improve clarity and further de ne potentially ambiguous meanings.

At present, multiple software applications are available for recoding during HAZOP study sessions. It is
important that both the team leader and the scribe are well skilled with the usage of such software
before HAZOP study sessions. This knowledge will allow the recording to be completed quickly and
accurately. This approach helps prevent these sessions from being boring and avoids team
demoralization, which can a ect the quality of the study.

Avoiding poor recordings of HAZOP study ndings

During the HAZOP process, many ideas can be identi ed as a probable cause to a deviation. These ideas
must be captured. Each cause needs to be considered separately to determine its credibility, and
consequences should be identi ed for each credible cause, without initial consideration of the safeguards
provided. It is a common observation that some enthusiastic participants try to jump to conclusions and
o er recommendations without going through the systematic process.

Consequences may comprise both process hazards and operability problems. More than one
consequence from a single cause may exist, or several causes may have the same consequence.
Therefore, the consequences need to be recorded separately against each cause. Combining all
consequences with all causes for a particular deviation should be avoided. Moreover, it is necessary to
clearly identify and record whether the consequences lead to hazardous situations, loss of production,
nancial losses, damage to the local or external environment, safety of personnel, etc. The team should
consider, identify and record all possible upstream and downstream consequences associated with a
given cause.

The ndings of HAZOP study reports are important for further safety studies, such as safety integrated
level (SIL) studies, or for consideration by management for the approval of implementation of
recommendations. Therefore, the HAZOP study team leader and the participants must be meticulous in
properly and e ectively recording all information and data so that they can be used for further studies
and analysis.

Written recommendations should not be open-ended, but should be as speci c as possible. The
participants must clearly identify the actionable items and the agency responsible for taking the action.

HAZOP study sessions should be time conscious

Time constraints on the team leader and team members to complete a HAZOP study of a large number of
P&IDs are always present, due to non-availability of resources and the costs involved. To complete a large
volume of work, as well as follow the systematic methodology of a HAZOP study, the HAZOP sessions
may have to be conducted for eight to 10 hours each day. Since HAZOP is a brainstorming technique,
fatigue can reduce the overall e ectiveness of the team. In such cases, there is a tendency to rush the
HAZOP process and adopt some short-cut methods to more quickly complete the study.
Therefore, it is essential to schedule adequate time for the given volume of work, and to conduct the
HAZOP study sessions accordingly.

Properly executed design reviews

At times, it has been observed that preliminary HAZOPs are performed on P&IDs for normal design
reviews. HAZOPs conducted under such considerations take a longer time. The HAZOP team is seeing
these diagrams for the rst time, and must address issues to improve designs. Therefore, such HAZOPs
generate a large number of recommendations that could have otherwise been picked up during normal
design review stages.

In such cases, the nal project/process HAZOP study must be undertaken only when the nal design is
completed and the required documents are updated.

Substituting HAZOP for the design review process compromises the very concept of HAZOP, which is a
separate and an independent process hazard identi cation technique.1

HAZOP startup and shutdown procedures

It is essential that the P&IDs that will be used for HAZOP have been updated and have considered piping
and controls for normal startup, normal shutdown and emergency shutdown, bypass connections and
purge connections. The process control philosophy, startup and shutdown procedures must be well
documented and understood before HAZOP sessions. This process ensures that these procedures can be
explained in-depth during the HAZOP process. Accordingly, consequences can be identi ed and
recommendations can be made by the team.

The use of proper guidewords for continuous and batch processes

Since the nature of operations for continuous processes and batch processes are di erent, it is important
to use a di erent set of guidewords for these processes.

A deviation can be de ned as process conditions departing from their intention. A deviation is a
combination of “guideword” and “process parameter.” Guideword is a short word to de ne a deviation
from the intention (e.g., more, less, no, reverse, other than). A process parameter is a relevant parameter
for the conditions of the process (e.g., pressure, temperature, owrate, composition, etc.).

Deviations stimulate creativity and generate new ideas from the participants, which are useful in
brainstorming sessions involving multi-disciplinary, experienced and knowledgeable team members in
that eld.

Proper identi cation of nodes

Prior to the commencement of a HAZOP study, the process plant or the portion identi ed for the study is
to be divided into “nodes.” Nodes are small, manageable and logical portions into which the process is
divided.

Consider the following guidelines for the identi cation/selection of nodes on a P&ID:

Input streams to the equipment

 Output streams from the equipment
Utility connections to/from the equipment
Vent lines, drain lines, over ow lines
Equipment, such as a reactor, tank, heat exchanger, dryer, centrifuge, etc.

Each node from each input/output stream should be marked in the P&ID, preferably with di erent color
codes. These nodes are normally identi ed by a HAZOP study team leader, with assistance from the
process engineer, well before the HAZOP study session. If time does not permit, this identi cation
exercise can be done at the beginning of the rst HAZOP study session.

Long nodes running into two or more P&IDs, consisting of a number of lines and equipment within the
same node, are sometimes identi ed by team leaders. This should be avoided, as a HAZOP study is likely
to miss some probable causes and consequences, decreasing the study’s overall e ectiveness.

Individuals involved in the selection of the HAZOP study team, and participants in the complete HAZOP
process, must adhere to these tips during the planning and execution stage. These steps will help ensure
the e ectiveness of the HAZOP study. The suitable recordings made during HAZOP study sessions, along
with the preparation of a HAZOP study report, should serve as a bene cial tool that can be used for
future reference. These tools can also be useful for subsequent safety studies, commissioning,
troubleshooting and training activities. HP

LITERATURE CITED

1. Jones, D., “Lessons from HAZOP experiences,” Hydrocarbon Processing, April 1992.

The Authors
Kunte, V. A. (/authors/t/tata-consulting-engineers-ltd/kunte-v-a) - TATA Consulting
Engineers Ltd., Mumbai, India
Vasant A. Kunte is senior general manager (chemical) at Tata Consulting Engineers
Ltd. (TCE) in Mumbai, India. Mr. Vasant holds an MTech degree in chemical engineering
from the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) in Mumbai. He has been with TCE for over
(/authors/t/tata- 35 years, and has worked as a project engineer, specialist engineer, project manager,
consulting- HAZOP study team leader, discipline head (chemical), quality coordinator and training
engineers- manager. He has extensive experience in basic and detailed engineering of various
ltd/kunte-v-a) re nery, petrochemicals and chemical projects. He has received training in conducting
and leading HAZOP studies in a “HAZOP Study Leader’s Course” conducted by ICI UK
and ICI India, and has led many HAZOP studies for more than 23 years in India and
other countries. His areas of interest are safety and risk management, HAZID, HAZOP,
SIL, QRA and other safety-related topics.

Sakthivel, S. (/authors/t/tata-consulting-engineers-ltd/sakthivel-s) - TATA Consulting

Engineers Ltd., Mumbai, India
Dr. S. Sakthivel has worked as a Senior Technologist (Process) at Tata Consulting
Engineers Ltd. since 2009. He completed a BTech degree in chemical engineering, an
MTech degree in Petroleum Re ning and Petrochemicals (PRPC) from Anna University,
and a PhD in chemical engineering from the Indian Institute of Technology Delhi (IIT-D).
(/authors/t/tata- He has experience in process engineering, optimization and development; technology
consulting- analysis, screening and selection; technoeconomic analysis; basic, applied and market
engineers- research; design of laboratory and pilot experimental setup; process hazard analysis;
ltd/sakthivel-s) planning and data management; and powder science and technology. He has published
a number of research and technical papers in national and peer-reviewed international
journals.

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