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Goedel Incompl SK PF

Gödel's incompleteness theorems state that: 1) Any formal theory capable of interpreting Peano arithmetic is either inconsistent or incomplete. 2) A consistent formal theory cannot prove its own consistency, as proven by constructing a Gödel sentence that asserts its own unprovability. 3) The theorems apply to first-order logic systems, where quantification is only over individuals and relations are represented as sets of ordered pairs. They show that within such systems, there are always true statements that cannot be proven.

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59 views2 pages

Goedel Incompl SK PF

Gödel's incompleteness theorems state that: 1) Any formal theory capable of interpreting Peano arithmetic is either inconsistent or incomplete. 2) A consistent formal theory cannot prove its own consistency, as proven by constructing a Gödel sentence that asserts its own unprovability. 3) The theorems apply to first-order logic systems, where quantification is only over individuals and relations are represented as sets of ordered pairs. They show that within such systems, there are always true statements that cannot be proven.

Uploaded by

Xiao Gao
Copyright
© Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Gödel’s incompleteness theorems

1. If a first-order theory T interprets Peano arithmetic, it is either inconsistent


or incomplete
2. If a first-order theory T proves T 0 ⊥ (that is, T is consistent), then T is
inconsistent (Note that an inconsistent theory proves everything in its language,
including [if it interprets Peano arithmetic] its own consistency. This theorem
says that a consistent theory cannot prove its own consistency)

First-order logic: Finitary (no infinitely long sentences or proofs) logic where
quantification is over individuals only (no quantification over relations). Note
that in first-order set theory, it is possible to simulate relations as sets of ordered
pairs, but these set-theoretic relations are logically individuals and not logical
relations, and so can be quantified over. In fact, in standard set theory the
only logical relation in the language is that of set membership (the identity
logical relation is definable in terms of membership given the standard axiom
of extensionality)

Let Σ be a set of first-order sentences. Write Σ ` φ iff the sentence φ is deducible


using elements of Σ as hypotheses (we say Σ proves φ). Define Cn Σ = {φ :
Σ ` φ}. Cn Σ is the set of consequences of Σ. A set T of first-order sentences
is called a theory iff Cn T = T .

Peano arithmetic is the set of consequences of the following axioms. The hy-
pothesis that T interpret Peano arithmetic is needed in order to construct the
Gödel sentence γ in the proof below.

∀x ∀y. S(x) = S(y) → x = y

∀x S(x) 6= x
∀x S(x) 6= 0
∀x : x 6= 0 → ∃y x = S(y)
For each first-order formula φ, φ(0)∧ : ∀x. φ(x) → φ(S(x)) : . → .∀x φ(x)

A first-order theory T is consistent iff ⊥ 6∈ T , where ⊥ is a false sentence and


hence ⊥ ↔ φ ∧ ¬φ for each sentence φ. T is complete iff for each sentence φ,
φ ∈ T or φ 6∈ T .

1
Sketch of proof of Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem:
Using the arithmetic structure of T , encode the sentences of T as natural
numbers. Construct a sentence γ, called the Gödel sentence of T , such that
γ ↔ T 0 γ. γ asserts, essentially, “this statement is unprovable.” (The proof
that such a γ exists is the most difficult part of the proofs of the incompleteness
theorems.) Clearly, if T proves γ, then T is inconsistent, and if T does not prove
γ, then T is incomplete. The statement of the theorem follows.

Sketch of proof of Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem: If T ` (T 0 ⊥),


then by the argument for the first incompleteness theorem formalized in T ,
T ` (T 0 γ). But by construction γ ↔ T 0 γ (γ asserts that γ is unprovable
in T ), so T ` γ and hence T is inconsistent. (Therefore a consistent first-order
theory interpreting Peano arithmetic cannot prove its own consistency, though
it can express it).

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