Intelligence and Creativity Are Pretty Similar After All

Author(s): Paul J. Silvia

Source: Educational Psychology Review , December 2015, Vol. 27, No. 4, Special Issue:
Myth or Reality?: Evaluating Common Practices and Beliefs in Education (December
2015), pp. 599-606
Published by: Springer

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Educ Psychol Rev (2015) 27:599-606
DOI 10.1007/s 10648-015-9299-1

REVIEW ARTICLE

Intelligence and Creativity Are Pretty Similar After All

Paul J. Silvia

Published online: 20 February 2015

© Springer Science! Business Media New York 2015

Abstract This article reviews the history of thought on how intelligence and creativity, two
individual differences important to teaching and learning, are connected. For decades, intelligence
and creativity have been seen as essentially unrelated abilities. Recently, however, new theories,
assessment methods, and statistical tools have caused a shift in the field's consensus. New lines of
work on creative thinking strategies, executive cognitive processes and abilities, and cognitive
neuroscience have revealed that intelligence and creativity are much more closely linked than the
field has thought. The deep connections between these concepts offer opportunities for a more
fertile conception of both intelligence and creativity, one that emphasizes similarities between
solving problems with right answers and thinking flexibly, critically, and playfully.

Keywords Creativity • Intelligence • Divergent thinking • Assessment ■ Executive control

Anyone who teaches encounters individual differences: students are so variable in so many ways.
Understanding what these ways are, how they work, and how they can be assessed has been one
of the major projects of educational theory and research during the past century. This article
considers intelligence and creativity, two ways people differ that are deeply embedded in teaching
and learning. Until recently, intelligence and creativity have been seen as essentially unrelated
abilities, as distinct strengths that students bring to the classroom. This view is founded on some
good evidence—including landmark studies and a high-quality meta-analysis—so it is not a mere
myth. Recently, however, some new theories, assessment methods, and statistical tools have
sparked interest in an alternative view: intelligence and creativity are probably much more alike
than we have thought. The past decade has seen a reconsideration of past work, and the consensus
is thus shifting. We will consider some of the new sources of evidence and some implications of
viewing intelligence and creativity as similar cognitive strengths.

A Brief History

Intelligence and creativity have traveled on different tracks. For the most part, they are studied
by different scholarly communities that seek to influence different audiences. At a few points,

P. J. Silvia (E3)
Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, P. O. Box 26170, Greensboro, NC
27402-6170, USA
e-mail: p [email protected]

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 600 Educ Psychol Rev (2015) 27:599-606

however, these tracks have converged, and

Guilford's (1967) Structure of Intellect (Sol) m
in both creativity and intelligence, and his m
them. His Sol model is largely of historical in
1993), but it continues to cast a long shadow ov
stage for later work by casting some mental
thought and lead to correct answers) and others
lead to many responses). Since then, the conve
markers of intelligence, and the divergent pro
The relationship between convergent and diver
by Guilford's model, and it represents the m
intelligence and creativity. He and his colleagues
an enormous amount of data (e.g., Guilford 1957
influential aspect of Guilford's work was (1) cou
divergent labels and (2) developing and populariz
Other researchers soon started examining ho
Getzels and Jackson (1962), in an influential bo
They measured both intelligence and creativi
school children, and they carved the sample into
the other. This yielded a high IQ/low creativit
addition to its awkward emphasis on the dia
intelligence and creativity, this study was crit
creativity tasks. When viewed as a multitrait/m
validity: the creativity tasks tended to correlate
did with each other. Nevertheless, the Getzels an
problem as "intelligence versus creativity."
Not long after, Wallach and Kogan (1965) pu
remains influential 50 years later. Motivated b
and creativity in a sample of 151 children. The
assessment approach that they developed. Wal
were unique responses—responses that no on
complete divergent thinking tasks and then s
number of responses) and uniqueness (the num
point for each response that they gave that no
each response given by anyone else. Guilford a
complex schemes that weighted each response by
of responses (e.g., Wilson et al. 1953). Wallach
divergent thinking was measured: they whit
systems into a small battery of tasks that was e
found good validity for their tasks: the intelli
each other than with the creativity tasks an
intelligence and creativity was a meager r=0
It is easy to see why the work of Wallach and
sample of schoolchildren, clear findings, and
clarify and solve some of creativity's more ve
turned out to be particularly popular. Because
the uniqueness index could be scored object
primarily used the divergent thinking method
family of tasks from the Torrance Tests of Cr

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Educ Psychol Rev (2015) 27:599-606 601

As researchers consistently observed small corre

intelligence, a consensus emerged. When Kim (2
creativity and intelligence using meta-analysis, sh
r=0.17 (95 % CI [0.16,0.18]), which is modest at mos
assessment from this period concluded that in
independent cognitive abilities (e.g., Kaufman
Weisberg 2006).

A Contemporary Réévaluation

It seems like the stoiy should end here. Neverthele

the same time, began to suggest that the literature
Kim's (2005) meta-analysis, the tide has shifted th
ingly see creativity and intelligence as similar.

Statistical Advances

One simple reason to think that the relation between intelligence and creativity is larger comes
from recent statistical models for studying cognitive abilities. Most studies have examined
correlations between observed variables—and understandably so, for latent variable models
have only recently become widespread. Latent variable models allow researchers to model a
construct's true score and error separately (Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh 2004). As a result, they
allow researchers to separate the variance due to an underlying trait (such as "creativity") from
variance due to task-specific and rater-specific factors. By distinguishing true trait variance
from error, latent variable models give more accurate estimates of effect sizes. In most cases,
the effects will be somewhat larger. One example comes from the classic study by Wallach and
Kogan (1965). When the data are reanalyzed using structural equation models, the correlation
between creativity and intelligence rises from r=0.09 to around r=0.20 (Silvia 2008b), thus
illustrating how observed correlations can deflate relationships.

Assessment Advances

Uniqueness scoring became firmly entrenched. Between the Wallach and Kogan
approach and the similar TTCT approach, most divergent thinking research from the
1960s to the present has used some form of it. But many researchers over the years
have leveled serious criticisms at uniqueness scoring, and in hindsight, it is seriously
flawed.

The first flaw is the confounding of fluency and uniqueness. As people generate more
responses, their probability of having a unique response goes up. Researchers pointed out this
problem long ago (e.g., Clark and Mirels 1970; Hocevar 1979a, b; Hocevar and Michael
1979). In even modest sample sizes, the correlation between fluency and uniqueness becomes
very large. In the reanalysis of Wallach and Kogan's data, the correlation was r=0.89 (Silvia
2008b). In the TTCT's national norm samples (Torrance 2008), it is r=0.88. Clearly, there is
little unique variance to be found in uniqueness scores—they are basically the same as fluency.
A creativity task that assesses only the quantity of ideas, not their quality, seems impractical.
The second serious flaw is the confounding of uniqueness with sample size. People receive
one point if their response was unique within their sample. As a result, the likelihood that any
particular response is unique declines as the sample size increases. As a result, the sample's

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 602 Educ Psychol Rev (2015) 27:599-606

mean uniqueness score will also decline as the sam

creative when you assess more of them. Stated
"harder"—it takes even higher levels of novel
larger. Theoretically, a very large sample could
There is something amiss about a test that perfor
In recent years, researchers have revisited som
notably the value of subjective ratings. Guilford
coming up with clever titles for short stories, t
dimensions like cleverness or remoteness, and
ratings (e.g., Wilson et al. 1953). This general a
(1982) in her consensual assessment technique (CA
has been extensively applied and evaluated in cre
Subjective ratings have turned out to be unus
(Benedek et al. 2013; Silvia et al. 2008,2009). Res
response (or some subset, like the best 2 or 3)
averaged, used as indicators in a latent variable mo
scaled in Many-Facet Rasch models that estimate
the tasks and raters (Primi 2014). Many studie
problems of uniqueness scoring: (1) rated creati
negatively, with fluency, and (2) rated creativit
2013). And, as we will see later, their correlations

The Executive Era

Since the 1960s, psychology became increasingly interested in executive processes. Huge
literatures have developed around self-regulatory concepts in different areas of psychology,
from motivation to social psychology to health behaviors to cognitive psychology. In partic
ular, cognitive psychology sowed the seeds of the new look at creativity and intelligence, with
its sophisticated models of how executive abilities (e.g., working memory capacity, inhibition,
and fluid intelligence) and executive processes (e.g., interference management and strategy
use) affect reasoning and problem solving.
Several researchers began to suggest that divergent thinking tasks should involve abilities
associated with intelligence. Gilhooly et al. (2007) examined people's spontaneous strategies
when confronted with a divergent thinking task. People were asked to come up with unusual
uses for a common object and to "think aloud" while doing so. The verbal protocols were
coded and distilled into a core set of strategies. Many of the findings suggested a strong role for
executive processes. First, and simply, people who came up with better responses were using
abstract strategies, indicating that the ideation process was at least somewhat controlled.
Second, the strategies that predicted better responses (e.g., mentally disassembling an object
and using its parts) were more abstract and harder to deploy than strategies that did not (e.g.,
simply repeating the name of the object to oneself).
Other researchers conducted latent-variable studies of how different executive abilities
predicted divergent thinking. This body of work has generally anchored itself in the Cattell
Horn-Carroll (CHC) approach to cognitive abilities (Carroll 1993; McGtew 2005), which
distinguishes between a higher-level general intelligence (g), a middle level of cognitive
abilities, such as fluid, crystallized, and visuospatial intelligences, and a lower level of narrow
abilities (e.g., inductive reasoning as a facet of fluid intelligence). By differentiating intelli
gence into components, the CHC model offers a useful framework for thinking about how
creativity relates to the many cognitive abilities studied in modem intelligence research.

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Educ Psychol Rev (2015) 27:599-606 603

In our first studies, we focused on fluid intellig

associated with reasoning and executive control (
variable strongly predicted the creativity of res
2008a), scored using subjective ratings. These resu
found laige effects of fluid intelligence on idea o
later analysis, we found that the effect of fluid
markers of "executive switching," the ability to sh
and Silvia 2011, study 1) and that people higher
good creativity strategy when given one (Nusbau
have unpacked the executive abilities most strong
b, c) and examined the likely nonlinear nature of t
and Gralewski 2013).
In addition to fluid intelligence, research has ex
ability (Gr)—also known as long-term storage an
reflects the ability to retrieve knowledge from m
studies have shown large effects of broad retrieval
et al. 2012a, b; Lee and Therriault 2013) and unpa
level facets, such as ideational fluency (Silvia et
Kaufman 2014). Broad retrieval ability has effects o
the effects of fluid and crystallized intelligence
2012a, b), thus illustrating the value of a differen
Creative thought is much broader than divergent
how intelligence influences creative ideas on othe
people generate metaphors, which are a salient e
(Gibbs 1994). Some studies have asked people to g
experience—such as what it is like to sit in a bor
intelligence strongly predicts the creativity of the
When other CHC abilities like crystallized intelligen
around half the variance in metaphor creativity c
Other studies have used a newly developed metap
which involves completing a metaphor stem (e
creative entry. Fluid intelligence strongly predict
0.51; Primi 2014).
Like metaphor, humor is a common example
researchers have considered whether intelligence is
to generate funny material when prompted (Earl
several studies have found notable effects of flu
production (e.g., Greengross and Miller 2011; H
measured by asking people to write captions for ca
or draw silly pictures.
Finally, a flourishing cognitive neuroscience of
intelligence and creativity are strongly linked. Th
here, but many EEG and fMRI studies have fou
executive processes in the generation of creative
creativity tasks (usually divergent thinking, met
and then assess neurological markers of controlled,
specific regions known to be important in exe
networks involved in top-down, controlled cogni
and Beaty et al. 2014; Benedek et al. 2014a, b,

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604 Educ Psychol Rev (2015) 27:599-606

neuroscience of executive control is well underst

has been able to establish an important role for
perform creativity tasks.

Practical Implications

The modem look at intelligence and creativity sees

on prototypically "intellectual" tasks (e.g., fluid
"creative" tasks (e.g., divergent thinking). Thus,
identical—strengths. What are some implications o
One implication is for how we define and thi
pointed out that viewing intelligence and creativit
(Kaufman 2013). Carving out creativity yields a
how people get right answers over how they th
carving out intelligence yields a view of creativ
instead of something that can be directed and
creativity as noun-like things—instead of as famili
can do—obscures the bigger conceptual picture (B
and the processes that it uses for solving closed-
making, judging, and playing with ideas.
Another implication is for models of the creative
thought explain individual differences in terms o
example, argued that creative people have flatt
structured semantic networks). Likewise, Weisber
determined by how much people know. Research
2006) and the organization (Kenett et al. 2014) of
how people access, manage, and control their kn
body of work on fluid and executive abilities shows
know but how well we use our knowledge: how we
what we know in the service of creative goals. As a
is congenial to models that view creative thought
decision making (e.g., Finke et al. 1992; Gilhooly
A more practical implication concerns how and
thinking tests are widely used in educational
giftedness programs. Historically, adding creativ
apparently small correlation with intelligence.
creativity shifts, this argument seems less comp
reasons for using creativity assessments in educa
creativity assessments are less biased (Kaufman 2
cardinal twenty-first century skill. As Kaufman
gence should include both sides of the convergen
motivational factors, like interest and openness t
At the same time, the field should take a new look
decide how comfortable it is with using them for h
into a gifted track. The most popular forms of t
fluency tests, and a view of creativity as mere ide
side, an evolving sense of what both intelligence an
interesting opportunities for new models and meas

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 Educ Psychol Rev (2015) 27:599-606 605

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